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Foreword
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP)
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain’s position in these formal
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed
an integral part of Britain’s domestic affairs and international relations. In
publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a
degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning
the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh
and Tinker respectively. The successful completion of The transfer of power and The
struggle for independence,1 both of which were based on British records, emphasised
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of
the final stages of Britain’s association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These documents are crucial
research tools for scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged
from colonial rule as well as those from Britain itself. BDEEP is also set in the much
wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate
Britain’s position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and
informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence
policy of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with the
ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at one
level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved in
that at another.
Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its
predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater
magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major
differences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent
empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final years of
the twentieth century while having its roots in the Second World War and before.
Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, varying in area,
population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individual problems
but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring territories and the
1 Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power
1942–47 12 vols (London, 1970–1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and
Burma 1944–1948 2 vols (London, 1983–1984).
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growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly, while for India the
documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be encapsulated within a
relatively straightforward ‘country’ study, in the case of the colonial empire the
documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of territories and their
scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the ending of colonial rule are
not conveniently located within one leading department of state but rather are to be
found in several of them. As the purpose of the project is to publish documents
relating to the end of empire from the extensive range and quantity of official British
records, private collections and other categories of non-official material are not
regarded as principal documentary sources. In BDEEP, selections from non-official
material will be used only in exceptional cases to fill gaps where they exist in the
available official record. 
In recognition of these differences and also of the fact that the end of empire
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level than
that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country, BDEEP
is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A represents
the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, documents
relating to the empire as a whole are published. Series B represents the country or
territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a British government
perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their independence and
countries which were part of an informal empire regained their autonomy. In
addition to the two main documentary series, a third series—series C—has been
published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former colonial empire
which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). Series C consists of two
volumes which form an integral part of BDEEP and also serve as PRO guides to the
records. Together they enable scholars and others wishing to follow the record of the
ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their inquiries beyond the published
record provided by the general studies in series A and the country studies in series B.
Volume one of the handbooks, a revised and updated version of The records of the
Colonial and Dominions Offices by R B Pugh which was first published in 1964, is
entitled Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations
Office and Commonwealth Office (1995). It covers over two hundred years of activity
down to 1968 when the Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to
form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Volume two, entitled Records of the
Cabinet, Foreign Office, Treasury and other records (1998), focuses more specifically
on twentieth-century departmental records and also includes references to the
records of inter-departmental committees, commissions of inquiry and international
organisations. The two volumes were prepared under the direction and supervision
of Dr Anne Thurston, at the time honorary research fellow at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, and now executive director of
the International Records Management Trust. 
In the two main series the research is organised in stages. Stage one, covering the
years 1925–1957, is now complete and consists of three general volumes and five
country volumes, collectively published in twenty-one individual parts. In series A
there are volumes on Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925–1945 in two parts
(1996), The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951 in four parts
(1992), and The Conservative government and the end of empire 1951–1957 in three
parts (1994). In series B there are volumes on Ghana in two parts (1992), Sri Lanka
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in two parts (1997), Malaya in three parts (1995), Egypt and the defence of the
Middle East in three parts (1998) and the Sudan in two parts (1998). Starting in
1999, the project began publishing volumes in a second stage which covers the
period 1957-1964. Here there are five volumes, a general volume on the Conservative
government and the end of empire 1957–1964 in two parts (2000), and country
volumes on the West Indies in one part (1999), Nigeria, Kenya and Malaysia.
The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in
individual volumes are explained in the introductions written by the specialist
editors. These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in
previous series. Each volume also lists the PRO sources which have been searched.
However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which
have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first the
end of empire in a broad high policy sense in which the empire is viewed in terms of
Britain’s position as a world power and of the inter-relationship between what
derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependencies. Here
Britain’s relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the wider defence,
economic and foreign policy contexts of Britain’s relations with the United States,
with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations. Secondly, there is
investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the emphasis is on those
areas which were specifically—but not exclusively—the concern of the leading
department. In the period before the administrative amalgamations of the 1960s,2
the leading department of the British government for most of the dependencies was
the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the Dominions Office and its
successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the Foreign Office. Colonial policy
included questions of economic and social development, questions of governmental
institutions and constitutional structures, and administrative questions concerning
the future of the civil and public services and of the defence forces in a period of
transition from European to indigenous control. Finally there is inquiry into the
development of political and social forces within colonies, the response to these and
the transfer of governmental authority and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its
colonial dependencies as these processes were understood and interpreted by the
British government. Here it should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not
to document the history of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular
territory. Given the purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source
material, the place of colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which
an awareness of local political situations played an overt part in influencing major
policy decisions made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these
various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The aim in
both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which illustrate
those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and officials at the
time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters which will be
fully documented in the country volumes but some especially significant documents
do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an inevitable degree of
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the
Commonwealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
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sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to be of lesser significance
or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example concerns the extensive
quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of service—salaries,
gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation—within the colonial and
related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative aspects of the
official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes not in a position to
address potentially significant issues because the information was not available.
Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documentation sent to London by
the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of internal self-government
had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the flow of detailed local
information to London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the
records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and the current Foreign and
Commonwealth Office series of Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO),
BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors have
privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning procedures) to
the records at the PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For files which at the
time a volume is in preparation are either subject to extended closures beyond the
statutory thirty years or retained in the originating department under section 3(4) of
the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject to the same restrictions as all
other researchers. Apart from cases where files or series of files are withheld, official
weeding processes now tend to remove sentences or paragraphs from public view,
rather than the whole document; such omissions are indicated in footnotes. To date
access has not impeded the research undertaken by the project to any significant
degree, and the project has been successful in securing the release of a number of
hitherto withheld documents from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and
the Records Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the India
and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of the
documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which have
been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together with the
sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the PRO call-up number and any
internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document appear on the first
line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of the document, the type
of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the originator (person or persons,
committee, department) and the recipient (if any). A subject entry in a heading in
single quotation marks denotes the title of a document as it appears in the original.
An entry in square brackets denotes a subject indicator composed by the editor. This
latter device has been employed in cases where no title is given in the original or
where the original title is too unwieldy to reproduce in its entirety. Security
classifications and, in the case of telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have
generally been omitted. In the headings to documents and the contents lists,
3 The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from
FO 371, the major foreign office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of the
file.
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ministers are identified by the name of the office-holder, not the title of the office (ie,
Mr Macleod, not secretary of state for the colonies).4 In the same contexts, officials
are identified by their initials and surname. In a general volume, ambassadors,
governors, high commissioners and other embassy or high commission staff are
cited in the form Sir H Foot (Cyprus). Footnotes to documents appearing below the
rule are editorial; those above the rule, or where no rule is printed, are part of the
original document. Each volume provides an initial summary list of which principal
offices were held by whom, and a separate series of biographical notes (at the end) for
major figures who appear in the documents. Other figures are identified in editorial
footnotes on the occasion of first appearance. Link-notes, written by the volume
editor and indented in square brackets between the heading and the beginning of a
document, are often used to explain the context of a document. Technical detail or
extraneous material has been extracted from a number of documents. In such cases
omission dots have been inserted in the text and the document is identified in the
heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots have also been used to excise purely
mechanical chain-of-command executive instructions and some redundant internal
referencing has been removed, though much of it remains in place, for the benefit of
researchers. No substantive material relating to policy-making has been excised from
the documents. In general the aim has been to reproduce documents in their
entirety but where available space is a major constraint on editors, a consideration
which applies particularly in the case of general volumes, where the documentation
is voluminous, this is not always possible, and some purely factual information may
be omitted. It must also be emphasised in this context that the BDEEP volumes do
not remove the necessity for researchers to study the original records themselves.
The footnote reference ‘not printed’ is used only in cases where a specified enclosure
or an annex to a document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or
note of explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents
referred to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Obvious
typing errors in the original are in the main silently corrected, but abbreviations and
contractions stand. Each volume has a list of abbreviations together with a
consolidated index, and country volumes include a chronology of principal events.
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and
Burma series, is that BDEEP reproduces many more minutes by ministers and
officials.
Crown copyright material is used by permission of the Public Record Office under
licence from the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. All references and
dates are given in the form recommended in PRO guidelines.
* * * *
Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a
Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of imperial
history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor Anthony
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials.
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Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the Commonwealth in the University
of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. Professor Michael Crowder became the
first general editor while holding a visiting professorship in the University of London
and a part-time position at Amherst College, Massachusetts. Following his untimely
death in 1988, Professor Crowder was replaced as general editor by Professor David
Murray, pro vice-chancellor and professor of government at the Open University,
who played a critical role in establishing a secure financial base for the project and in
negotiating contracts with the volume editors and the publisher. His invaluable
advice and expertise in dealing with the early typescripts are acknowledged with
particular gratitude. Mrs Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and
research assistant. She was succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who
previously worked with Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of
the India and Burma series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director
and general editor in 1993. 
The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major
projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to
employ a research assistant on a fixed term contract. The Managers of the Smuts
Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge are also to be acknowledged. They
made possible the workshop from which the project developed and they have since
provided a further grant for work on two of the stage two volumes. The principal
funding for the project has been provided by the Leverhulme Trust and the volumes
are a tribute to the support provided by the Trustees. A major debt of gratitude is
owed to the Trustees. In addition to their generous grants to cover the major costs of
both stages, the Trustees agreed to a subsequent request to extend the duration of
the first grant, and also provided a supplementary grant which enabled the project to
secure Dr Ashton’s appointment. It is thanks largely to the Leverhulme Trust that
BDEEP has developed into one of the country’s most significant historical research
projects.
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed
encouragement. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a
singular contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985
and presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but
unobtrusive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership
and experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and the staff
of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative support and
the congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The editors of
volumes in stages one and two have benefited considerably from the researches
undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants which resulted in the
publication of the two handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project, the
general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation received from the
Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his appreciation of the spirit of
friendly co-operation received from the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald Hyam, editor in
stage one of the general volume on the post-war Labour government and co-editor of
the stage two volume on the Conservative government, played an important role in
01-ConGov-Prelims-cp  24/10/00  9:01 am  Page xii
FOREWORD xiii
the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP and his contribution is
acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to The Stationery Office for
assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice on matters of design
and production. Last, but by no means least, the contribution of the chief executive
and keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial and administrative, at the
PRO must be emphasised. Without the facilities and privileges afforded to BDEEP
editors at the PRO, the project would not be viable.
S R Ashton
Institute of Commonwealth Studies
February 2000
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FAO French Overseas and Associated Territories/Food and Agriculture
Organisation (United Nations)
FBI Federation of British Industries (later ‘Confederation’)
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FO Foreign Office
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GKN Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds
GNP Gross National Product
GOC general officer commanding
gov governor
gov-gen governor-general
govt government
H of C Debs House of Commons Debates (Hansard)
HCTs High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland
Protectorate and Swaziland)
HMG Her Majesty’s Government (UK)
HMOCS Her Majesty’s Oversea Civil Service
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
ICA International Co-operation Administration (USA)
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trades Unions
ILO International Labour Organisation (United Nations)
IMF International Monetary Fund
IRA Irish Republican Army
IRD International Relations Department (CO)
JPS Joint Planning Staff (COS)
KADU Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU Kenya African National Union
KAR King’s African Rifles
KNFU Kenya National Farmers’ Union
Lab Labour Party (MP)
Leg Co Legislative Council
LSA land, sea and air
LTS Long-Term Study Group
03-ConGov-Abbrev-cp  18/10/00  2:00 pm  Page xviii
ABBREVIATIONS xix
memo memorandum
MEOC Middle East Official Committee (Cabinet)
MoD Ministry of Defence
MP member of parliament
NAAFI Navy, Army and Air Force Institute
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCNC National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NKG/P New Kenya Group/Party
OAS Organisation of American States
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OEEC Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPEX United Nations Technical Assistance Programme
OSD Oversea Service Department (CO)
PAC Public Accounts Committee
PAFMECA Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and Central Africa
PAP People’s Action Party (Malaya)
PM prime minister
POMEF Post Office, Middle East Forces
PP Parliamentary Papers
PPP People’s Progressive Party (British Guiana)
PRO Public Record Office (Kew)
PUS permanent under-secretary
RAF Royal Air Force
SACEUR supreme allied commander, Europe
SCAAP Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan
SEATO South-East Asia Treaty Organisation
S of S secretary of state
T/Tsy Treasury
TANU Tanganyika African National Union
tel telegram
TEMO Tanganyika Elected Members’ Organisation
TUC Trades Union Congress
UAM Union of African and Malagasy States
UAR United Arab Republic
UDI unilateral declaration of independence
UF United Front Party (Southern Rhodesia)
UFP United Federal Party (Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland)
UNCTAD United Nations Commission for Trade and Development
UK United Kingdom
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UN(O) United Nations (Organisation)
US(A) United States (of America)
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCIGS vice-chief of the imperial general staff
WEU Western European Union
ZNP Zanzibar National Party
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Principal holders of offices 1957–1964
1 Ministers
(a) Cabinet ministers
Prime minister Mr H Macmillan (10 Jan 1957–13 Oct 
1963)
Sir Alec Douglas-Home (18 Oct 1963–
16 Oct 1964) (formerly Earl of Home)
Lord chancellor Viscount Kilmuir (14 Oct 1957)
Lord Dilhorne (13 July 1962)
Chancellor of Exchequer Mr P Thorneycroft (13 Jan 1957)
Mr D Heathcoat Amory (6 Jan 1958)
Mr J S B (Selwyn) Lloyd (27 July 1960)
Mr R Maudling (13 July 1962)
S of S foreign affairs Mr J S B (Selwyn) Lloyd (20 Dec 1955/
14 Jan 1957)
Earl of Home (27 July 1960)
Mr R A Butler (23 Oct 1963)
S of S colonies Mr A T Lennox-Boyd (30 July 1954/14 Jan 
1957)
Mr I Macleod (14 Oct 1959)
Mr R Maudling (9 Oct 1961)
Mr D E Sandys (13 July 1962)
(office held jointly with S of S 
Commonwealth relations)
S of S Commonwealth Earl of Home (12 Apr 1955/14 Jan 1957)
relations Mr D E Sandys (28 July 1960)
(office held jointly with S of S colonies 
from 13 July 1962)
Minister i/c Central Mr R A Butler (Mar 1962–Oct 1963)
Africa Office (First S of S & deputy prime minister, 
July 1962–Oct 1963)
S of S defence Mr D E Sandys (13 Jan 1957)
Mr H A Watkinson (14 Oct 1959)
Mr P Thorneycroft (13 July 1962)
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(b) Junior ministers
(i) Colonial Office
Minister of state Earl of Perth (17 Jan 1957)
Marquis of Lansdowne (20 Apr 1962) *
Parliamentary under-secretary Mr J D Profumo (18 Jan 1957)
of state Mr J Amery (28 Nov 1958)
Mr H Fraser (28 Oct 1960)
Mr N Fisher (16 July 1962) *
Mr R Hornby (24 Oct 1963) *
(ii) Commonwealth Relations Office
Minister of state Mr C J M Alport (22 Oct 1959–1 Mar 1961)
11th Duke of Devonshire (6 Sept 1962) *
Parliamentary under-secretary Mr C J M Alport (18 Jan 1957)
of state Mr R H M Thompson (22 Oct 1959)
11th Duke of Devonshire (28 Oct 1960–
6 Sept 1962)
Mr B Braine (9 Feb 1961–16 July 1962)
Mr J D Tilney (16 July 1962) *
2 Civil servants
(a) Secretary to the Cabinet Sir Norman Brook (1947–1962)
Sir Burke Trend (1963–1972)
(Deputy secretary, 1956–1959)
(b) Colonial Office
(i)ii Permanent under-secretary Sir John Macpherson (1956–1959)
(i)ii of state Sir Hilton Poynton (1959–1966)
(ii)i Deputy under-secretary Sir Hilton Poynton (1948–1959)
(i)ii of state Sir John Martin (1956–1965)
Sir William Gorell Barnes (1959–1963)
(iii) Assistant under-secretary C G Eastwood (1947–1952; 1954–1966)
(i)ii of state W L Gorell Barnes (1948–1959)
W B L Monson (1951–1964)
E Melville (1952–1961)
A R Thomas (1952–1964)
C Y Carstairs (1953–1962)
P Rogers (1953–1961)
H T Bourdillon (1954–1959; 1961–1962)
* These offices jointly held between CO and CRO from 21 Oct 1963
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A N Galsworthy (1957–1965)
Trafford Smith (1959–1967)
W I J Wallace (1963–1966)
(c) Commonwealth Relations Office
(i)ii Permanent under-secretary Sir Gilbert Laithwaite (Feb 1955–Aug 1959)
(i)ii of state Sir Alexander Clutterbuck (Sept 1959–
Dec 1961)
Sir Saville Garner (Jan 1962–1968)
(ii)i Deputy under-secretary Sir Henry Lintott (Oct 1956–1963)
(i)ii of state Sir Algernon Rumbold (Dec 1958–1966)
Sir Neil Pritchard (July–Nov 1961; 
1963–1967)
Sir Arthur Snelling (1962–1969)
(iii) Assistant under-secretaries H A F Rumbold (1954–1958)
(i)ii of state include: A W Snelling (1955–1959)
W A W Cark (1958–1960)
D W S Hunt (1959–1960)
G W StJ Chadwick (1960–1966)
(d) Foreign Office
(i)ii Permanent under-secretary Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar (1957–1962)
(i)ii of state Sir Harold Caccia (1962–1965)
3 Select list of ambassadors, high commissioners and governors
Ambassador in Washington Sir Harold Caccia (1956–1961)
Sir David Ormsby-Gore (1961–1965)
Permanent representative to the Sir Pierson Dixon (1954–1960)
UN Sir Patrick Dean (1960–1964)
Permanent representative to the Sir Andrew Cohen (1957–1961)
UN Trusteeship Council Sir Hugh Foot (1961–1962)
Commissioner-general, Earl of Selkirk (1959–1963)
South-East Asia
High commissioner, India Mr M J MacDonald (1955–1960)
High commissioner, South Africa Sir Percivale Liesching (Mar 1955–
and High Commission Dec 1958)
Territories Sir John Maud (Jan 1959–Dec 1962)
(ambassador to South Africa from May 
1961)
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Ambassador to South Africa Sir Hugh Stephenson (1963–1966)
(high commissioner, BBS, until 1964, 
when post abolished)
High commissioner, Federation Lord Alport (May 1961–July 1963)
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
Governor-general of The West Lord Hailes (1958–1962)
Indies Federation
Governor of Kenya Sir Evelyn Baring (1952–1959)
Sir Patrick Renison (1959–1962)
Mr M J MacDonald (1963–1965: gov-gen/
high commissioner)
Governor of Tanganyika Sir Richard Turnbull (1958–1961)
Governor of Nyasaland Sir Robert Armitage (1956–1961)
Sir Glyn Jones (1961–1964)
Governor of Northern Rhodesia Sir Evelyn Hone (1959–1964)
Governor of Cyprus Sir Hugh Foot (1957–1960)
Governor of Aden Sir William Luce (1956–1960)
Sir Charles Johnston (1960–1963)
Sir Kennedy Trevaskis (1963–1965:
high commisioner)
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Introduction
The documents and their selection
The arrival in office of the Macmillan government brought with it a huge increase in
documentation. Nowhere was this more true than in the field of overseas and
colonial policy. For example, the number of PRO Foreign Office files (FO 371) on one
subject for a single year, relations with the UN in 1962, totals 500; the general
correspondence of the CRO (DO 35) generated 6,682 files between 1957 and 1960;
and the CO records on the West Indies alone (CO 1031) run to 2,335 files,
1957–1964. Faced with documentation on such a massive scale, the best any editor
can do is to work from the PRO listings and call up for study those files which seem
most likely to yield promising material for selection. Searches in this manner were
conducted by the editors across the records of several government departments, the
most useful being those of the Cabinet, the prime minister’s office, the CO, CRO and
FO. The editors have noted shifts in the salience of different parts of the policy-
making machine over time. In the post-war years, the Defence Committee, the
Economic Policy Committee, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee all played major
parts in the formulation of colonial policy. This had ceased to be true by the late
1950s, when the Colonial Policy Committee and its successors (the Defence and
Oversea Policy Committee by 1963) came to occupy a more central position. The
Treasury remained in a purely secondary role, at least as far as decolonisation policy
was concerned.
Before BDEEP was launched, one particularly influential supposition, especially
among economic historians, was that the Treasury files would hold the key to
understanding the dynamics of decolonisation.1 With ten BDEEP volumes now
published (in twenty-four books), it is possible to report, though with all due caution,
that this has not proved to be the case. The Treasury generated apparently
promising-looking files labelled ‘general policy’, but this mostly turns out to be in
Treasury parlance merely a misnomer for ‘miscellaneous’. The Treasury had no
positive input into colonial policy initiatives and simply reacted to proposals laid
before it. As often as not, its consideration of colonial issues was easily dismissed
with the summary conclusion ‘no Treasury interest’. Of course, where expenditure
was involved, scrutiny could be rigorous (below, p lxiv). One should not imagine that
the CO was constantly bombarding it with unrealistic requests, or that the two
departments were constantly at loggerheads, although there was some tough
bargaining over the size of financial settlements at independence. At the conclusion
of his five-volume Official history of colonial development, D J Morgan (who had
unrestricted access to the files), endorsed the picture painted by a former deputy
under-secretary of state for the colonies, Sir Charles Jeffries: that the work of the CO
touched the Treasury less continuously and less intimately than the work of other
departments, and so for ‘most of the time the Colonial Office went its own way’.2
Even in the titanic debate over the funding of pensions for the new Overseas Civil
Service (HMOCS) between 1955 and 1961, the Treasury officials were, Jeffries found,
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‘anxious to be as helpful as possible within the limits of what they regarded as the
correct approach’. And in the end, ‘the Colonial Office substantially achieved all that
it fought for over the years’ in the scheme established under the Overseas Service Aid
Act, 1961.3 The Treasury can also be shown to have exercised flexibility in other
matters too, such as the new Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1959
(document nos 83, 306, 319, 320).
One other observation needs to be made about the nature of the archival records.
This concerns the official weeding and withholding of documents. BDEEP editors
can only see at the PRO what the general public are allowed to see. It is frustrating to
know that runs of files on the Falkland Islands are not available and the minutes of
some Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meetings are withheld—or to infer that
references to Hong Kong or CIA activities are blanked out in otherwise intact
documents—but none of this has in practice proved to be an insuperable problem.
When it comes to explaining why our selection is what it is, the first thing to say is
that the most serious challenge has been to stick within the predetermined strict
page-limits imposed. Defining the general shape and scope of the selection has not in
itself been difficult. It follows the now well-established BDEEP pattern for the
general volumes, of giving more or less equal space to the three categories of
political, administrative and constitutional change, economic and social policies
(including race and human rights), and defence, Commonwealth and international
relations. An opening chapter in Part I attempts to bring together the more
important surveys and planning papers on general policy formation, of which there
are a considerable number. Documents referring to more than one country find their
place here. Similarly, the final chapter in Part II is also organised around a general
theme, this time Commonwealth issues. The test of what kinds of document are
most relevant and suitable for selection draws on accumulated BDEEP experience.
Although a high proportion of Cabinet-level conclusions on any given problem—
assuming there were any—has been selected, the editors have constantly borne in
mind the desirability of representing, where possible, opinions expressed along the
various chains of decision-making, from junior officials upwards.
As far as technical editorial practices are concerned, printed selections such as this
inevitably impose on the documents a deceptive coherence and tidiness, and even an
elegance, alien to the actual archival record. A document may consist of a barely
legible typed carbon copy on flimsy paper, or perhaps a hand-written note, and may
lack any convenient indication as to what it is about. An editor has to start by doing
what any reader of the original files on colonial policy would have to do: mentally
assemble the sequence, cross-referencing and co-ordinating the records, not only
between different government offices, but also sometimes between departments
within those offices. A document may go through several drafts or reincarnations.
These have to be evaluated and the final version identified. Memoranda and
decisions, minutes and papers, letters and replies, which have become separated
archivally have to be correctly aligned again. But in addition, editors on occasion do
what readers would not, namely, undertake a certain amount of ‘document creation’.
What sometimes appears here as an apparently neat ‘document’ may in fact be
artificially constructed out of some of the minutes which appear in a bigger batch on
the minute-sheet attached to the inside front-cover of a file, and editorially
integrated with other minutes buried in the main body of the file.
The two editors of the present volume have probably each contributed about half
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of the selected total of 583 documents, though WRL searched the larger number of
original files. There was no systematic division of labour between us at the PRO, and
we avoided undue duplication of effort by the simple device of keeping each other up-
to-date on which files we had read. The final selection, link-notes, footnotes and copy
editing have mainly been the responsibility of RH. Our task has been eased to some
extent by Morgan’s pioneering research, published as volumes III, IV and V of The
official history of colonial development, the coverage of which is somewhat wider
than the title suggests. The erratic organisation of Morgan’s work, the scissors-and-
paste method, the random mixture of quotation and paraphrase, and the absence of
PRO referencing, all make these volumes difficult to use. But they provided some
welcome signposts and alerted us to a number of points which we might otherwise
have missed.
Dr Peter Henshaw provided an important set of xeroxes from the Government
Archives in Pretoria to complete our South African documentation. Others who have
helped us with insights, advice, or answers to enquiries, include Dr Mandy Banton
(PRO), Sir Derek Oulton, GCB, QC, the late Professor R E Robinson, CBE, Professor
A D Roberts, Dr John Lonsdale, Professor Tony Stockwell, Dr John Kent, Dr T N
Harper, Dr Philip Murphy, Dr S J Ball, Philip Alexander, and Richard McMillan; and
above all, our general editor, Dr Stephen Ashton.
We also acknowledge gratefully the generous contributions to the costs of
researching and preparing this volume made by the University of Texas at Austin,
Magdalene College, Cambridge, and the Managers of the Smuts Memorial Fund in
the University of Cambridge. 
* * * *
The policy-making process: ministers, officials, and administrative structures
Macmillan is of course famous for his proclaimed awareness of the need to come to
terms with the nationalist ‘wind of change’ in Africa. His speech in Cape Town on 3
February 1960 (document no 32) was not just an official declaration (though it was
that), nor did it represent a sudden personal conversion. In June 1955 we find him
writing to the ambassador in Paris: ‘The tide of the world is set in the direction of
national…autonomy and identity. . . . Time is not on the side of France, and she will
not be able to swim against the tide of nationalism in North Africa any more than we
have been able to do elsewhere in the world’.4 Again, as early as July 1957 Macmillan
made a speech describing nationalism ‘as a tidal wave surging from Asia across the
ocean to the shores of Africa’, powerful, swift and elemental: ‘it can be led, but it
cannot be driven back’.5 Macmillan regarded this tide of colonial nationalism as one
of the two biggest developments in the world since 1945. The other was the
ideological struggle against communism ‘which really dominates everything . . .
really holds the front of the stage’ (541). It was within these parameters that he
approached the higher level of colonial problems. It was very much the essence of his
policy to find ways of harnessing colonial nationalism so as to prevent the spread of
communism. This indeed was the theme at the heart of the Cape Town speech.
It is perhaps hard to see that Macmillan had any deep conviction which would
predispose him to favour the continuation of colonial rule. He came to the highest
office with a particular set of previous conditioning experiences. He probably knew as
much about the French empire as the British, after his three-year involvement with
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North Africa during the war, which had shown him how much damage imperial
pretensions could do to a great power and how tiresome settler communities could
be.6 Even before this, briefly at the CO in 1942 as parliamentary under-secretary, he
had proposed an extraordinarily bold scheme for ‘buying out’ the European farmers
of the Kenya ‘white highlands’ and repatriating most of them.7 Then, as chancellor of
the Exchequer in the last months of the Eden government, he had taken the
initiative for a reappraisal of overseas defence commitments (‘The future of the UK in
world affairs’).8 Reviewing government expenditure as a whole, he took the line that
if available resources were too small to go round, colonial development might have
to be slowed down. As secretary of state for the colonies, Lennox-Boyd countered that
it would be ‘a very serious step indeed’, causing acute embarrassment politically and
economically in relations with colonies. Macmillan in reply (May 1956) agreed it
would be serious, but ‘in our present economic situation, serious and unpalatable
steps may have to be taken. I could not accept the view that Colonial development
should in all circumstances be exempt from review’. Nor was he entirely happy about
the level of the financial settlement made as Ghana approached independence.9
When Macmillan became prime minister in January 1957, he wanted the entire
colonial position reassessed as one of the first acts of his administration (1). As
Morgan comments dryly, ‘whether he would have felt so had he moved directly from
the Foreign Office rather than the Treasury is an interesting matter for
speculation’.10 What is beyond doubt, however, is the rebuff given to his initiative by
officials (2–3). As a result, any hopes Macmillan might have had of speeding up
transfers of power in the colonies—other than Cyprus—were put on the back-burner
for the next two years. His position was then enormously strengthened by an
unexpectedly solid election victory in October 1959, after which the colonial empire
unravelled instantly and without remission. In part that process was facilitated by the
way he had actively encouraged further preparatory policy studies. In this sense, the
two intervening years were not wasted years.
Macmillan’s chosen instrument for speeding up decolonisation from October 1959
was Iain Macleod, who, although aged only forty-six and without directly relevant
experience, seemed to have the right kind of qualities for a task likely to be both
difficult and controversial: ‘it would need a Minister of great imagination, even
genius’.11 He believed Macleod shared his own brand of ‘Disraelian Tory radicalism’.
So did Lord Hailsham, the other possible candidate for the CO, but Macmillan
disapproved of his unfortunate marital circumstances, even though Hailsham was
not the guilty partner. It may also be noted in passing that he did not promote his
son-in-law, Julian Amery, already in post as parliamentary under-secretary at the CO
since November 1958, and this despite the fact that nepotism held no terrors for
Macmillan. He thought Amery a skilful negotiator, having an ‘exceptional
combination of patience and determination’. Amery was, however, a right-wing die-
hard upholder of his father L S Amery’s vision of the geopolitical verities of empire
and its need for fortress colonies (193, 194). Clearly this was not the kind of outlook
Macmillan wished to see directing the CO. Instead, it is possible that he had
earmarked Macleod for the post as early as May 1959. At least one MP noticed that
from about this time Macleod began attending parliamentary debates on colonial and
Commonwealth matters.12
There were in all four secretaries of state for the colonies during the Macmillan
years: Alan Lennox-Boyd (July 1954 to October 1959), Iain Macleod (October 1959 to
05-ConGov-Intro-cp  18/10/00  2:01 pm  Page xxviii
INTRODUCTION xxix
October 1961), Reginald Maudling (October 1961 to July 1962) and Duncan Sandys
(July 1962 to October 1964). There were two secretaries of state for Commonwealth
relations: Lord Home (April 1955 to July 1960) and Sandys (July 1960 to October
1964). Any ranking of these five key ministers would probably put Maudling at the
bottom, despite his important contribution to independence for Kenya and Northern
Rhodesia, simply because he occupied his office for a mere nine months. By contrast,
Home spent five years at the CRO before taking over the FO in 1960 for three years,
followed by one year as prime minister: a total of more than nine years—the nine
crucial years, it may be argued—at the centre of policy-making during the ‘end of
empire’. He was also a close and continuous confidant of Macmillan’s in a way none
of the others ever was. The only other leading ‘overseas’ minister, in the later years at
least, was R A Butler (home secretary, 1957–1962), put in charge of a Central Africa
Office for eighteen months (March 1962 to October 1963), and then foreign
secretary. Among the junior ministers, an especially active role was played by Lord
Perth as minister of state at the CO for over five years, under three successive
secretaries of state. Although he emerged from and returned to political obscurity,
Perth made himself in these years useful by providing an element of informed
continuity. Julian Amery during his two years at the CO made a distinctive if
sometimes unsettling contribution, specialising on colonies where defence issues
were involved.
All the five principal ministers of the inner group were strong characters. Lennox-
Boyd was perceived as a dominant, exuberant, and quixotic personality, a right-
winger, who got on well with colonial governors. Macleod also had plenty of
confidence, was a fine orator and debater, quick, well-organised and often ingenious
in decision-making, but many found him abrasive and even rude. (He was often in
pain, caused by arthritis and ankylosing spondylitis.) Lord Salisbury’s jibe in March
1961 that he was ‘too clever by half’ proved to be damaging to Macleod’s reputation.
By contrast, Maudling was more genial but much less good at public speaking. He
was reckoned to be a centre-right Conservative. Despite a keen intellect, he was
unfocused and perhaps too relaxed. Sandys was less clever, more ponderous, and
more to the right politically than these two, but methodical, a tough and patient
negotiator, forceful, and (as his permanent under-secretary admitted), ‘if necessary,
brutal’.13 Some senior advisers, including the Chiefs of Staff, found him
unnecessarily inconsiderate. Nehru remarked that Sandys reminded him of the sort
of Englishman who used to put him in jail.14 Home was a shrewd, pleasant and
competent administrator, who could be tough when necessary, and generally came to
sound official conclusions whatever his private prejudices. As prime minister, he was
less ‘presidential’—and less agitated or emotional—than Macmillan. There was
undoubtedly serious incompatibility between him and Macleod. Home regarded
Macleod as lacking in judgment to an alarming degree (‘he clearly believed
Lumumba was the greatest man in Africa’), and thought he should have stuck to
domestic politics. For his part, Macleod regarded Home an unregenerate
traditionalist.15
Each of these ministers in the last or penultimate phase of dismantling the empire
had to work extremely hard. It was not uncommon for more than one constitutional
conference to be taking place simultaneously. Sir Kennedy Trevaskis of Aden
provides striking vignettes of Macleod and Sandys at work. Macleod he found
preoccupied with the West Indies, Northern Rhodesia, East Africa, Mauritius and
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Gambia. Trevaskis eventually got ten minutes with him to talk about Aden’s serious
problems. Macleod was eating a sandwich, glancing at newspapers, and issuing
instructions to his secretary on points in them: ‘he was like one of those
international chess champions who think nothing of taking on a couple of dozen
opponents at once. It was admirable, but seemed an odd way to wind up an empire’.
Of Sandys, Trevaskis recalled that his appointments book ‘read like an imperial
gazetteer’ and he ‘looked wan with fatigue . . . but not as wan as his red-eyed officials.
He was beset by a host of crises—a revolt in Zanzibar, mutinies in Kenya, Tanganyika
and Uganda, near war in Cyprus . . . Rhodesia’.16
Macmillan became disillusioned with both his chosen CO lieutenants. Macleod
revealed ‘many faults’, threatened resignation too often, was too proud, too
emotional, too ambitious. And then to Macmillan’s astonishment, Maudling,
replacing him, did not produce a ‘steadier’ atmosphere but proved to be ‘plus noir
que les nègres, more difficult and intransigent than his predecessor’.17 Why did
Macmillan come to think they were both moving too fast?
On the eve of his departure for his African tour, Macmillan told Sir Norman Brook:
‘Africans are not the problem in Africa, it is the Europeans who are the problem’
(497). Meeting settlers at first hand impressed upon Macmillan the strength of their
views. The Africans could not be dominated permanently, but: ‘nor can the
Europeans be abandoned’ (below, p liv). As decolonisation gathered momentum,
Macmillan began to feel the Europeans were being lost sight of: ‘no-one seems to
worry very much about the Europeans’ (124).18 More than once he reminded his
ministers of Britain’s ‘moral obligation’ to the settlers. Macleod had to ease him
along and persuade him that there was no such thing as a safe colonial policy. In
retrospect, Macleod showed considerable understanding of the prime minister’s
mind:
I think the difficulty with Harold Macmillan in relation to Africa was that he had all
the right instincts, as his ‘Winds [sic] of Change’ speech showed quite clearly. He was
more than prepared for a rapid move to independence—as his appointment of myself
showed. But from time to time he wanted, as I daresay we all do, the best of both
worlds, he didn’t want to fall out with his good friends either at home or in Central or
East Africa as the case may be. Whereas, I took the brutal, but I think practical view
that this was an omelette that you couldn’t make without breaking eggs and one
couldn’t be friends with everybody however much one wanted to do it, while one was
pursuing such a policy.19
This astute interpretation receives support from an American insight into
Macmillan’s government (April 1963): ‘From a narrow national interest point of view
they would probably prefer to get out [of Southern Rhodesia] as quickly as possible.
However, as in the case of other dependent territories, they are showing a marked
sense of responsibility and making persistent endeavours to work out pragmatically
arrangements acceptable to the various elements concerned’.20
Of the civil servants, Norman Brook as secretary of the Cabinet, and, by 1957, with
ten years’ experience behind him, was already an olympian figure, able to offer the
prime minister magisterial advice until the very end of 1962, when he was succeeded
by his deputy, Burke Trend, from January 1963. Brook was closely involved in the
production of many of the major reports and surveys; Trend ran the Africa
Committee. In the CO, the permanent under-secretaryship in this period was divided
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(at August 1959) between Sir John Macpherson and Sir Hilton Poynton, while Sir
John Martin was deputy under-secretary of state throughout, jointly with Sir William
Gorell Barnes between 1959 and 1963. Macpherson had returned to the CO after
being governor (and governor-general) of Nigeria, 1948 to 1955, an experience which
gave a hard-edged practicality to his recommendations. Poynton was clever, but did
not get on with Macleod and was perceived as a patrician civil servant of the old
school; so was Martin in many ways, but more balanced and open-minded. Gorell
Barnes had a good brain but was thought to be tactless. Among the assistant under-
secretaries, Leslie Monson became especially prominent, in charge of East and
Central Africa from 1959. By contrast, one of the radical high-flyers of the period
before 1951, John Bennett, was in effect side-lined, being shuffled around a rapid
succession of the less active CO departments and then denied all further promotion
for the last twenty-five years of his career.
The three permanent under-secretaries of the CRO—Sir Gilbert Laithwaite, Sir
Percivale Liesching and Sir Saville (Joe) Garner—were all formidable and highly
experienced. Laithwaite transferred from the India Office and had been high
commissioner in Pakistan. Liesching had served in Canada, South Africa and
Australia, as well as in the Board of Trade and Ministry of Food: an unflinching, lucid
realist. Garner had served in India and Canada, married an American wife, and loved
skiing; in retirement he wrote an important semi-autobiographical history of the
Commonwealth Office.
The governors who loomed largest in the Whitehall limelight were those who took
a radical stance: Hugh Foot and Richard Turnbull. Foot was a left-winger of Quaker
education, who as governor of Cyprus (1957–1960) helped to achieve a settlement
there, though he felt he disagreed with Lennox-Boyd about almost everything. As the
British permanent representative to the UN, he had an even more fundamental
disagreement with Poynton, and increasingly found government policy on Rhodesia
unacceptable. He resigned in October 1962 (below p lxxii). He came into his own
again under the Labour government of 1964. Turnbull in Tanganyika was widely
recognised as a powerful and robust figure, performing for East African
decolonisation a role comparable with that of Sir Charles Arden-Clarke ten years
earlier for West Africa. Tanganyika seemed a model of how to transfer power: swift,
smooth, peaceful and apparently amicable. Like Foot, Turnbull was a rowing fanatic;
unlike him, he had an earthy streak, which showed itself, for example, in teaching his
parrot to swear roundly before reciting the Lord’s Prayer. Turnbull provides a notable
case of a governor who seized the initiative and who was able decisively to speed up
the timetable. Reassessments by new governors were in any case always eagerly
awaited, not least Sir Charles Johnston’s for Aden in 1961 (199). The post of high
commissioner in South Africa was the most demanding of the ‘ambassadorial’
appointments, and it was filled with great panache by a former academic town-
planning expert, Sir John Maud, for four years (January 1959 to December 1962). His
despatches were among the best received from the periphery during this period, full
of caustic insight into the evils of the apartheid regime (462, 479).
Although the Cabinet was the final arbiter in all matters, many of the most
important decisions for the colonies were hammered out in its specialist sub-
committees. The Colonial Policy Committee was for Macmillan’s first few months
chaired by the lord president of the Council, Lord Salisbury. Its members were the
lord chancellor, the foreign secretary, the secretaries of state for Commonwealth
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relations and for the colonies, and the minister of defence. The prime minister
attended for Cyprus business. After Salisbury’s resignation over the release of
Archbishop Makarios, from April 1957 the chair was taken by the lord chancellor,
Lord Kilmuir, the lord president no longer attending. Macmillan was not an admirer
of Kilmuir, and the Committee tended to get bogged down on Cyprus and Malta.
Towards the end of 1958, Macmillan took over the chairmanship himself (554) and
ensured that it reviewed constitutional developments more widely. Behind it was an
official committee (ie, a committee made up entirely of officials), which declined
rapidly in importance after its heroic work in 1957 on Macmillan’s ‘profit and loss
account’, and with the setting up from mid-May 1957 of an official Africa Committee
under Burke Trend. (This was after the FO had protested about the ‘insufficiently
interdepartmental’ way Africa was being dealt with.) The Africa Committee rapidly
gained in significance. In July 1962, with decolonisation well advanced, the Colonial
Policy Committee was converted into the Oversea Policy Committee, to provide a
more international overview; its parallel official committee took on the functions of
the Africa Committee (97). The OPC was chaired by the prime minister; its members
were the first secretary of state (Butler), the foreign secretary, the Commonwealth
secretary (Sandys, also representing the CO), the minister of defence and the
chancellor of the Exchequer. The higher-level nature of the new committee is evident
in the presence of the chancellor, who had not sat on the CPC. Then in October 1963
the Defence Committee was wound up and its functions, together with those of the
OPC, were amalgamated into a single Defence and Oversea Policy Committee.
Reasonably good working relations appear to have been established between the
CO and CRO over transitions to independence (88, 89), though there was always a
certain amount of rivalry, and the CRO sometimes would have liked more
information, particularly about the economic circumstances of territories coming its
way. The High Commission Territories (Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland)
were transferred from the CRO to the CO as a consequence of South Africa’s
departure from the Commonwealth in 1961. Macmillan was not entirely happy about
this but saw no alternative.21 It occurred to him that a possible reverse transfer of
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland from the CO to the CRO might be made, partly as
a quid pro quo, and partly as a means of resolving the tensions between the two
departments in their joint handling of the Central African Federation. Brook,
however, convincingly disabused him of this idea, stressing that it would be read as
shifting the balance of sympathies too much in favour of the Europeans (94). Instead,
Brook proposed an entirely new Central Africa Office. This was duly established, to
great surprise within the Federation and opposition from Sir Evelyn Hone, the
governor of Northern Rhodesia (96). Butler took charge and, as intended, reduced
the pressure on the prime minister, who had found himself at the centre of repeated
disagreements. It is a good illustration of how a neat and simple solution can
sometimes be found to a bureaucratic nightmare, even if a little late in the day.
An amalgamation of the CO and CRO seemed in principle to make sense, with
Brook being among the first to point out the desirability of getting rid of the term
‘colonial’. Neither office was keen to lose its identity before it had to.22 Sounding out
Commonwealth governments through the high commissioners in 1959 only further
discouraged the idea for the moment: they felt the existence of a separate CRO was
proof of the importance attached to the Commonwealth, and if this ‘retrograde’ step
were taken, their governments might bypass the new combined office and deal direct
05-ConGov-Intro-cp  18/10/00  2:01 pm  Page xxxii
INTRODUCTION xxxiii
with the FO instead (90). The prime minister concluded in 1960 that merger was as
yet premature. However, the overall situation had altered so much by the end of 1962
that Macmillan was then willing to accept the principle of amalgamation. What he
absolutely rejected was a merger between the CRO and FO as the supposedly two
‘diplomatic’ departments; it would be ‘political dynamite’ (98). Sandys took over
responsibility for the CO as well as the CRO in July 1962. As the territories for which
the CO was responsible shrank dramatically in number, the attractions of
amalgamation grew. Poynton was determined that the CO should not be side-lined as
a mere ‘rocks and islands’ department (99). The two offices were eventually
amalgamated in 1966.
By this time in any case, a lot of the functions the CO performed for the smaller
territories had already been transferred, at first to the new Department of Technical
Co-operation, set up in 1961 in order to co-ordinate and expand all the government’s
activities in this growing field (92, 93, 346). Ministers soon thought it needed
glamorising (43); it was transmuted by the new Labour government of October 1964
into a new Ministry of Overseas Development, under Sir Andrew Cohen as the first
permanent under-secretary.
Other proposed administrative innovations were abortive. The CO turned down as
unnecessary a suggestion to appoint its own minister for aid; the Development Policy
Committee provided enough co-ordination.23 Brook urged the CO to start a planning
section like the one run by Peter Ramsbotham in the FO. Poynton would not agree,
reflecting a general scepticism in the CO about ‘thinking departments’ divorced from
practical responsibilities; in any case everything in Africa was changing so fast that
any policy projections would soon be invalidated. A suggestion for a ‘commissioner-
general for Africa’ (parallel to the commissioner-general for South-East Asia) was
also ruled out, as too difficult and unnecessary.24 A proposal from Malcom MacDonald
(high commissioner in India) for an aid co-ordinator in South-East Asia was rejected
(341, 345).
For the Colonial Service, the main event of these years was the finalisation of the
arrangements for the new Overseas Civil Service after protracted planning since
1956.25 The idea was to reassure officers who might feel they were working
themselves out of a job and to ensure administrative continuity through transfers of
power. The substantive issue surfacing in 1957 was anticipating administrative
breakdown in Nigeria. The Treasury submitted to CO and CRO pressure to try to
ensure that a reasonable number of officers stayed on after independence (82). The
alternative might be a disastrous collapse. Moreover, as Home argued the case, ‘today
trade follows the technical adviser and administrator, just as in the past it followed
the flag’ (83). However, at this juncture the emphasis was on getting a fair deal for
civil servants. In the event, decent compensation proved to act as a disincentive to
staying on. Macmillan decisively intervened, helping Macleod to expedite a solution.
A ‘new approach’ was adopted in July 1960, enabling as many expatriates as possible
to continue in post, the cost of the excess of their emoluments over those of locally
recruited officers being borne by the British government. This cost was estimated at
about £24 million a year. The chancellor of the Exchequer was anxious about such a
substantial new expense, but accepted that offsetting pension savings could reduce
the apparent cost significantly, while he could not deny the need to give high priority
to good administration in newly independent countries (85, 86). A survey was made
in August 1960 asking governors for their opinion of the new scheme. The response
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was generally favourable, the only sour reply coming from Sir William Goode of
North Borneo (87).26 As enacted, the Overseas Service Aid Act (1961) was essentially a
scheme of technical assistance, in that it helped developing countries to secure and
retain experienced staff from overseas by giving them direct financial help.27
High policy planning and surveys
The Macmillan government is notable for the large number of policy studies it
produced, most of them initiated by the prime minister himself, starting with
‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’, 1957. Barely two weeks after
taking office, Macmillan called for an analysis of progress towards independence, and
‘something like a profit and loss account’ for each colony; he wanted to know
whether Britain stood to lose or gain by its departure (1). It is probable that he saw
the exercise as moving in tandem with the defence review entrusted to Sandys. (The
prime minister asked for a ‘Chequers weekend’ discussion in late February to take
account at least of the strategic aspects of colonial constitutional development; the
CO refused to co-operate, since the information by then available would be
incomplete.)28 In the event the assembling of the analysis was so complex that the
process could not be finalised within the time-scale Macmillan had envisaged, with
Cabinet consideration perhaps in June 1957. The main CO paper (2), co-ordinated by
Ian Watt (an assistant secretary) was ready in May. CO ministers praised it highly:
‘this is a stupendous job—splendidly done’ (Lord Perth), ‘a magnificent achievement
on which all who have worked so hard in the Department deserve the highest
possible praise’ (Lennox-Boyd).29 The secretary of state thought it both
comprehensive and realistic, and said later that he constantly referred to it.30
Governors were not consulted, the permanent under-secretary taking the view that it
was ‘best not to alarm them by the knowledge that this exercise is being conducted.’31
Moreover, Brook, in a remarkable piece of bureaucratic obfuscation, began to argue
that the whole purpose of the reappraisal was simply information-gathering; the
prime minister was not concerned to evaluate or write off colonies in order to save
money. Officials like Watt himself and Sir Frank Lee of the Treasury dismissed this
tendentious briefing with a pinch of salt.32 Brook further played down the exercise by
advising the prime minister that Cabinet discussion was not required after all, since
any policy decision would require special consideration in the light of each local
situation. Macmillan—perhaps disappointed that the result was not more supportive
of his presuppositions—agreed that circulating the reports would suffice.33
The thrust of the officials’ argument (2, 3) was that withdrawing from colonies
might produce some modest financial saving but would be discreditable where it was
not dangerous, and not only for strategic reasons. They advanced four reservations.
The first was a worry about withdrawal of British authority from multi-racial
communities, especially Kenya, Fiji, and Mauritius, where the presence of Indian
immigrants was, after all, entirely Britain’s responsibility. The second was a warning
that withdrawal might lead to a vacuum into which other powers would move:
France into Gambia and Sierra Leone, Yemen into Aden, Greece, Turkey or even
Egypt into Cyprus, Indonesia into Borneo, the United States into Guiana, Guatemala
into Honduras, and Argentina into the Falklands. British prestige would be damaged,
and the risk of communism would then be increased. The third reservation was
concern that trusteeship obligations would be repudiated. Where international
reputation, strategic requirements or global prestige could not be said to be at stake,
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the officials raised the objection of ‘moral abdication’. This was held to operate for
Seychelles, Mauritius, the Solomons, and Gilbert & Ellice Islands; the last two indeed
could be expected to ‘revert to a primitive mode’ of chaos and barbarism. Finally
there was a risk that an expanding South Africa might use the opportunity of British
withdrawals to take over the High Commission Territories, the two Rhodesias, and
even Tristan da Cuhna, all of which would be equally bad for the inhabitants and for
British prestige and moral standing. (Fear of the spread of apartheid seems to have
been as great as fear of communism.) In short, massive, not to say fanciful,
objections were raised to reducing British colonial commitments. Indeed, the
response was even more negative than a similar exercise (though on a much smaller
scale) undertaken by the FO in 1952, when at least the Falkland Island Dependencies
were identified as a possible sacrifice.34 Now the Falklands were clearly marked out
for retention (because abandonment of the British population to the fate of
Argentinian rule ‘would be discreditable and severely damaging to prestige’); while
the Falkland Island Dependencies were said to be an important base for Antarctic
research, the loss of which would contribute to damaging British prestige and
influence, ‘especially in scientific circles’.
However, what is significant here is that no economic or strategic objections were
advanced as a general bar to constitutional progress. Even in territories where the
strategic requirements were reckoned to be large, it was forecast that the
government might for political reasons be forced to reduce their military
expectations. Officials recognised that much would depend on policies pursued after
independence, because the economic and financial implications of the grant of
independence did not flow from the grant itself; the maintenance of goodwill and
friendship was therefore the vital thing. The conclusion of the whole matter was,
then, as far as economic factors were concerned, that the officials pronounced a nihil
obstat. And accordingly they highlighted the salience of political considerations and
prestige calculations.
As to the other main issue, progress towards independence, two themes emerged
strongly. One was scepticism about the speed of advance in Nigeria. The Gold Coast
had ‘set a pace too fast’ for Nigeria, and the prospects for the latter’s future under
self-government seemed doubtful. But there could be no turning back. The other
theme was the identification of East Africa as the pivotal area for future
constitutional planning, caught as it was—or so the officials argued—between
Islamic instability and Soviet expansion moving potentially southwards, with South
African expansion and apartheid moving potentially northwards, and possibly even
Indian expansion moving potentially westwards. Local internal nationalism would be
growing all the time.
In the summer of 1958 another major officials’ report emerged, ‘The position of
the United Kingdom in world affairs’ (5), in which Brook completed an initiative for
which Macmillan had been mainly responsible before he became prime minister.35
Although there were several departmental submissions, the FO draft by Ramsbotham
formed the core of it. The CO insisted (once again) that its obligations should not be
abandoned (‘to do this anywhere would undermine confidence and imperil our policy
everywhere’), and Brook was (once again) sympathetic; he also played up the
Commonwealth. The CO were pleased with the final report: ‘an excellent and well
thought out paper’, which suited them nicely. Lennox-Boyd found it a ‘worthwhile
document, especially paras 16, 21 and 22’. On the other hand, the Treasury did not
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like the prospect of ‘some immediate but limited expenditure in support of colonial
and Commonwealth commitments’.36 The report concluded that there was no scope
for reducing overseas commitments on the scale required, nor could further major
defence cuts be contemplated.
In receiving this report, Macmillan decided he wanted officials to look further
ahead, over the next ten years, and to make a comprehensive study of total resources
in relation to total overseas commitments. Thus the ‘Future policy study, 1960-1970’
was designed as a large-scale planning exercise which might become a blueprint for
whichever government took office after the general election in October 1959. Sir
Patrick Dean (deputy under-secretary of state at the FO) was put in charge. Lennox-
Boyd supported it: ‘I am strongly in favour of this and think that such a wide-ranging
study will be of great value to the members of a new administration’.37 Into it were
fed not only the ‘position of the UK’ report, but despatches from Malcolm MacDonald
on India (eg, 7), and correspondence about the South-West Pacific (9, 10). The CRO
submitted a major new survey of the Commonwealth (11), the Treasury an analysis of
‘economic strength’, and the FO a paper on Anglo-American relations (13). Of these
the most contentious was the Commonwealth paper, even in its revised form. The CO
(14) and the FO considered that claims for the value of the Commonwealth had been
over-pitched by the CRO. Surely the Americans did not listen to Britain because of
the Commonwealth? (para 31). Surely Britain was not a spokesman for the
Commonwealth? And if it was economically ‘good business’ (para 32), surely this did
not depend on its cohesion as a political entity?38
The basic premise of the report was gloomy: that during the 1960s Britain’s
relative power would certainly decline (17). Its fundamental conclusion was
therefore that the preservation of the Atlantic alliance was ‘the core of our foreign
policy’ and ‘in the last resort, the most basic of our interests’. The study was
emphatic that the first, the ultimate, aim of British policy in the 1960s would be to
check the growing power of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The implications of this conclusion
were perceived with succinct clarity by Ramsbotham: ‘United Kingdom power will
thus be founded on United States partnership, buttressed by Western European
solidarity (we hope), and usable through the instrument of the Commonwealth’.39
Integration with Europe was certainly seen as a possible alternative to the Atlantic
alliance; but no more than that. As Dean put it: ‘I am concerned that we should not
lightly consider throwing away the bird-in-the-hand of the Anglo-United States
interdependence and special relationship for the as yet bird-in-the-bush plan for
much closer association, leading perhaps to integration, with Western Europe’. The
British ambassador to France, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, could not persuade him that it was
‘later than you think’ and not too soon for the European option to be more fully
thought out (18). 
The CO felt this important and inevitably complicated exercise had been handled
very efficiently by Dean and the permanent under-secretaries. They thought ‘a
fascinating set of papers’ had been assembled; they were especially impressed by the
Treasury paper, which was unexpectedly sympathetic to increasing the amount of
aid.40 Carstairs (one of the assistant under-secretaries of state, who had a
philosophical turn of mind) contributed two criticisms of the draft report:
successfully urging that a clearer statement of fundamental objectives was needed
(15), but less successfully trying to inject some traditional trusteeship doctrines (16).
Not included in the ‘Future policy study’ was a report on ‘Democracy in backward
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countries’, which Macmillan wanted kept separate (117).41 This examination of the
validity of the Westminster model of government was organised by Brook, relying
chiefly on FO advice. Unfortunately the FO took two years to produce its paper, and
when it did so, neither the CRO nor the CO liked it (25–27). Meanwhile, the CO was
conducting its own investigation into the reasons for the apparent failure of
democratic parliamentary institutions (28). This whole debate resonated within the
cold war context, validating the idea that post-independence deviations from the
Westminster model should be viewed tolerantly. Stable and popular government was
what mattered, and it was probably at least as important to make ‘these countries less
backward as to make them democratic’. In any case, whatever doubts there were
about the Westminster model, theorising seemed to CO officials to be largely
irrelevant. It would be quite impracticable to offer an alternative, since this would be
resented by emerging nations themselves (25). Only Swaziland rejected the model
from the outset.
‘Africa in the next ten years’ was a report prepared early in 1959 by officials of the
Africa Committee working under its chairman Burke Trend of the Cabinet Office
(20). It provided an interdepartmental view as well as a basis for ministerial talks
with, and persuasion of, the Americans and Canadians (November 1959) (22), and the
French (December 1959). Its central thesis was as follows:
If Western governments appear to be reluctant to concede independence to their
dependent territories, they may alienate African opinion and turn it towards the Soviet
Union; if on the other hand they move too fast they run the risk of leaving large areas
of Africa ripe for Communist exploitation.
By thus starkly demonstrating how policy was impaled on the horns of a dilemma,
the paper undoubtedly sent a very clear cautionary message to ministers. When
officials discussed their draft report, they felt the emphasis on defence might seem
rather heavy, but in the last resort it was difficult to define British interests in Africa
in other than strategic terms, which seemed likely to remain strong for the next
decade. They had in mind particularly the need for over-flying rights to ensure
communications to the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia. They also addressed the
South African problem. Although they felt that on balance South Africa would
probably still be in the Commonwealth through the 1960s, it was fundamentally
important not to be thought identifying with its policies.42
The US State Department received the paper as ‘a very fine intelligence document’,
‘remarkably perceptive’. The Americans did not wish to dissent from it, although
they could have wished for something more specific on future policy.43 The French
also found it ‘excellent and comprehensive’, if rather too optimistic in tone: perhaps
a more catastrophic view should be taken in the light of the Congo?44 The prime
minister’s personal advisers were much less indulgent. Tim Bligh (principal private
secretary) thought it only quite good, but not very original and not very profound
about many of the fundamental questions. De Zulueta (the foreign affairs private
secretary) was unimpressed. Unfortunately, perhaps, he secured Macmillan’s
signature to his critique, which was neither well-informed (his views on Indirect
Rule and on the kabaka of Buganda were obviously out of date) nor realistic (Africa
was ‘one of the few parts of the world in which European powers still have direct
influence’). In reply, Lennox-Boyd attempted politely to put the prime minister
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straight (21). But the prime minister’s request for further investigation was readily
conceded. Moreover, Macmillan in March 1960 authorised a South-East Asian
counterpart, modelled upon it, as an off-shoot of the ‘Future policy study’. A
committee chaired by Sir R Scott (formerly commissioner-general for South-East
Asia) reported in October 1960: ‘Future development and policy in South-East Asia’.45
The ‘wind of change’ speech takes its place in the sequence of key state-papers and
policy declarations (32). The idea of an African tour was entirely Macmillan’s own,
one which came to him after the 1959 election victory. Africa, he explained to Brook,
seemed to be the biggest problem ‘looming up for us here at home’:
We just succeeded at the General Election in ‘getting by’ on this. But young people of
all Parties are uneasy and uncertain of our moral basis. Something must be done to
lift Africa on to a more national plane as a problem to the solution of which we must
all contribute, not out of spite—like the Observer and New Statesman—and not out of
complacency—but by some really imaginative effort.
Undertaking a journey immediately after Christmas would bring this African
problem ‘into the centre of affairs’. Brook was to be sure to tell him if this was a bad
idea, ‘but I have the feeling that it might be a good idea and just get something
moving in what seems [to be a] log-jam of ideas’. Macmillan’s original plan was to
start the tour in the Union, and of course if the South African government would not
receive him then the whole thing would probably be called off.46 In fact Verwoerd was
not averse to the visit, but the sequence had to be reversed, with the Union coming
last. This was mainly because South African MPs would not reconvene until mid-
January. Macmillan himself had not intended to visit the High Commission
Territories, but Maud persuaded him that this would be a mistake, since it would be
interpreted as lack of interest in them.
The general preparation of the speeches for the tour was begun by Bligh, who set
out some suggested themes which were then considered by various CO depart-
ments, who submitted drafts to the prime minister’s office for co-ordination and
refinement. The Ghana draft, forwarded by Poynton, was largely the work of High
Commissioner Arthur Snelling and, in the CO, of O H Morris and J H Robertson.
C G Eastwood (an assistant under-secretary of state) revised the collective CO advice
that the prime minister should be ‘a man in a hurry’ in Africa into an exhortation
to ‘remember the pace of change in Africa’. (The CRO brief made a similar plea: ‘in
the face of the rising flood of African nationalism the pace at which we have to
move becomes very delicate’.) Gorell Barnes (deputy under-secretary of state) coun-
selled the prime minister against referring to a time-table: ‘we are not on the run,
with our dependencies pace-making; we are discharging our obligations in a consci-
entious and orderly manner’. The Nyasaland speech was drafted in the high com-
missioner’s office at Salisbury and, unsurprisingly, was badly received in the CO. It
seemed too supportive of Sir Roy Welensky (federal prime minister) and the
Federation, too committed to a limited franchise and slower African progress. As
Perth complained, such an emphasis could only spread ‘alarm and despondency’ in
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Radical redrafting was therefore undertaken, by
Perth himself.47
The preparation of the crucial keynote speech to the South African parliament in
Cape Town was entrusted to Maud, since he seemed to have mastered the knack of
speaking forcefully to Afrikaners without mortally offending them. Macmillan’s
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directive to Maud was that he ‘must philosophise but not attack’. In two discussions
with Maud on 14 December 1959,48 when they planned the outlines of the speech,
Macmillan said he believed ‘there was a very strong demand’ in Britain that he
should ‘indicate that the vast majority of people in this country did not agree with
the Union government’s policy on apartheid. . .he must really try to find some phrase
which indicated a critical approach’. It would be fruitless to tell them that we did not
approve of apartheid, but criticism could be expressed in terms of how Britain dealt
with not dissimilar problems; South Africa was not the only state grappling with
racial diversity. Maud agreed this would be an excellent approach; necessary
courtesies must be observed, but they were after all dealing, in Maud’s view, with a
police-state run by Transvaal thugs; the main objective would be to get them to be
less ostrich-like, and look at themselves against the background of the world as a
whole. Maud emphasised the theme that ‘the stage was still being set in Africa as to
whether the forces of nationalism would be harnessed for or against Communism’.
This theme was built into the speech, and the records also show clearly that the
sentence which came at its climax was a revision worded by Maud. This was the
unequivocal statement that there were some aspects of South African policies which
made it impossible to support them ‘without being false to our own deep convictions
about the political destinies of free men, to which in our own territories we are trying
to give effect’.49
Meanwhile, Home had asked the former high commissioner in South Africa, Sir
Evelyn Baring, to think of themes which would help to create a more emollient
atmosphere. Baring helpfully suggested references to Scotland, the Afrikaans lan-
guage, pioneers, and accomplishments in farming and industry.50 Maud consulted
his deputy, Jack Johnston, despite having to produce a first draft at speed. This
went to the CRO, then back to the prime minister’s secretaries and to Brook. The
CO was simply shown the resultant draft at the end of December. The reaction
there was decidedly favourable: ‘this is a clever speech’ (O H Morris); ‘very good
and courageous, if possibly a little long’ (Eastwood); ‘goes further than might have
been expected in the direction that we in the CO would wish it to take’ (J H
Robertson). Robertson reported to Bligh how relieved the CO was that a good deal
would be said about the Afro-Asian Commonwealth and the way in which South
Africa was an embarrassment to Britain: ‘I have been asked to say to you that if the
prime minister had not felt able to take this sort of line when he was in South
Africa, we think the repercussions in many colonial territories might have been
serious’.51 Indeed, the underlying sub-text of the speech as a whole was that South
Africa was a liability to the West in the geopolitical context of the all-important
battle against communism. This battle required coming to terms with the rising
tide of African national consciousness: ‘the wind of change is blowing through this
continent’. 
The famous phrase occurred only about a third of the way into the speech. It was
first used on 9 January in the Ghana speech, following a reference to states which
had recently achieved independence, and those who were about to do so, Togoland,
Somaliland and Mali: ‘the wind of change is blowing through British East and
Central Africa and through the Belgian Congo’. It attracted little attention, but
someone in Macmillan’s entourage thought it worth repeating, and inserted it at the
last moment into the Cape Town speech. Who this was is not entirely certain. Two
members of the party, John Wyndham (one of the private secretaries) and Tim Bligh,
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both later disclaimed any knowledge of the phrase’s genesis (which might be thought
almost to prove neither of them was responsible).52 On the other hand, the CRO’s
D W S Hunt (later Sir David) did claim to be the ‘author’.53 It may well be that Hunt
made the insertion into the Cape Town speech, but the phrase itself belongs to a
section of the Ghana speech apparently written by J H Robertson before 15
December. Robertson was allowed to accompany the prime minister in order
specifically to help with the finalisation of his speeches.54
The address was received by the South African parliament in silence, with only a
mild titter where laughter was expected. The Opposition and the Africans were,
however, jubilant, and no-one could deny its impact. From the British point of view it
was a triumph (444). Maud commented privately and at once that ‘the whole thing
will have done untold good out here’. His considered judgment was that it made the
visit ‘probably the most important event in South Africa since 1948’,55 for, as Hunt
declared, the speech was the visit (444). Back in Whitehall, a planned declaration on
British colonial policy was finally abandoned, Sir Alexander Clutterbuck explaining
to the CRO: ‘we now have the Cape Town speech as our locus classicus, and no-one
can say that our broad policy is not known to the world’(34). In the CO, it was seized
upon by John Bennett (who had long urged the need for a faster and more radical
approach to decolonisation) as ‘an important speech . . . one of the most noteworthy
statements of United Kingdom policy about Africa and the developing
Commonwealth which has been made in recent years’. At his insistence copies were
transmitted to all governors, thus underlining the status of the speech as a definitive
guide to government thinking.56 Brook reported to the Cabinet that the prime
minister was generally thought to have been both courteous and courageous.57
Within weeks the phrase ‘wind of change’ entered the discourse of decolonisation,
quoted and appealed to by ministers, proconsuls and officials alike. Macleod invoked
it (147). Home referred to it (40: and p liv below). Macmillan mournfully quoted it
against himself when South Africa left the Commonwealth (‘the wind of change has
blown us away’).58
In order to establish the exact significance of the speech in the evolution of British
policy towards its own colonies, we may observe that nowhere did it employ the old
well-worn slogans about multi-racialism and partnership (in the idiomatic Central
African sense). Instead, it endorsed the term ‘non-racial’ which had been used by the
foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, at the UN General Assembly on 17 September 1959,
‘our policy is non-racial’.59 The term seems rather suddenly to have come into use
during 1959, Maud using it in connection with Swaziland in February; it was also
applied to Basutoland (December 1958 : 478), Kenya (20 & 116 n 3), Tanganyika
(141) and Zanzibar (116). Macmillan’s speech gave it greater prominence.
Importantly too, the speech meshed in with the new clarity of thought which
Macleod brought to colonial policy from October 1959. For Macleod, the ‘real
problem’ at the heart of all his challenges, was East-Central Africa, especially Kenya
(31, 35). ‘The final test of our policies’ would come in Kenya, Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia (35). The basic difficulty was ‘to achieve an orderly transfer of
power to the Africans without losing the confidence of the Europeans’ (37). The over-
riding consideration was to make sure East Africa did not become sympathetic to the
Sino-Soviet cause. The speed of advance was driven by events, ‘above all in the
Congo’ (160). Macleod’s Cabinet memorandum of 3 January 1961 (36) contains his
well-known statement that he had tried to ‘define the pace of British colonial policy
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in Africa as “not as fast as the Congo and not as slow as Algeria”’. He invited his
colleagues to recognise that ‘pressure from the United Nations, now that Belgium
and France are dropping out as colonial powers, will increasingly concentrate on us’.
An officials’ interdepartmental paper in August 1961 firmly returned the focus to
the cold war context. Africa was a ‘target in the east–west struggle’ and policy-makers
must always remember the need to keep it out of the communist camp. Over-flying
rights still seemed essential for the maintenance of the British position in the world.
But much the most effective policy was ‘to disengage, to leave the Africans alone, to
advise and help only when our advice and help is asked for’ (39).
The main policy surveys of the early 1960s were concerned with the expansion of
the Commonwealth and the future of the smaller colonial territories, those too small
to aspire to realistic independence. The notable report prepared by officials under
John Chadwick (an assistant under-secretary, CRO) in April 1962 reflected the
progress made with decolonisation (544). And then a most important CO survey
produced in September 1963 showed that although there were still forty British
dependent territories, independence was the proclaimed goal for twenty-four of
them. These were expected to get it by 1965, though no date could as yet be given for
the High Commission Territories. This left sixteen small territories, most of which
could probably find their future within a UN category of ‘free association’ with
Britain, allowing them internal autonomy. The CO pondered whether a ‘general act
of decolonisation’ could be made by 1965. Everyone seemed to agree this was neither
possible nor wise, and that no general solution could be proposed for colonies whose
status was so diverse. The CO believed, however, that these sixteen colonies could all
make significant political advances (46). The survey was tested on other departments
and no substantial modifications resulted, so the paper held the field for the
remainder of the life of the Conservative government (47–49).
As prime minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home* in Canada in February 1964
proclaimed ‘the virtual end of the process of decolonisation’, making a ritual
reference to its beginnings in the Durham Report of 1839. ‘Colonialism is nearly at
an end’ and it was time to take up the challenge of other problems (389). And Duncan
Sandys announced to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting on 8 July 1964,
‘we have no desire to prolong our colonial obligations for a day longer than is
necessary’ (52). These pronouncements were as near as the Conservative government
came to a formal declaration of the ‘end of empire’.
Defence policy and strategy
Macmillan’s desire for a defence policy combining maximum effectiveness with
minimum cost was speedily delivered by Sandys as minister of defence. The 1957
Defence White Paper60 was a rigorous reappraisal which arose directly out of
Macmillan’s cogitations as chancellor of the Exchequer and before that as minister of
defence himself. He commissioned Sandys to secure substantial savings in costs and
manpower. In the last five years defence had been absorbing ten per cent per annum
of GNP, and the aim was to get it down to seven per cent by 1962. The priority given
to the nuclear deterrent was upgraded (perhaps reflecting disillusionment over the
* Lord Home had renounced his peerage in order to become prime minister from 18 October
1963.
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reliability of the United States in the Suez Crisis). Consequent upon this, the end of
National Service (conscription) was decreed for 1962, together with reductions in the
size of the Navy and RAF Fighter Command. For the remaining all-volunteer
(regular) conventional forces, mobility was to be the key doctrine. Presented to the
Cabinet as a five-year plan amounting to ‘a fundamental revolution in our defence
policy’ (53), the new policy stopped short of questioning the need for a global role.
The government believed it was important to remain a nuclear power, in order to
have the maximum influence on world affairs. The cuts, however, were deep, and the
huge reduction in manpower (to 375,000) was bound to make sustained counter-
insurgency operations problematic. British army strength in the colonies was
slashed by almost two-thirds. A settlement in Cyprus was now urgently required. To
the extent that calculations about the feasibility of continuing to hold on to colonies
by force were integral to decisions to transfer power, the new defence policy can be
said to have contributed to decolonisation. Lennox-Boyd was especially anxious
about the naval cuts (54). 
The 1957 principles were superseded by the White Paper of 1962. Once again the
review was initiated by the prime minister, in a directive of October 1961 calling for
the preparation of a new strategy for the 1960s, setting forth the objectives and likely
limitations (66). The aim was to keep defence costs within seven per cent of GNP
(one-third of government expenditure), which meant reducing overseas costs by £35
million a year. Although the government’s commitment to the nuclear deterrent
remained firm (42), the balance was deliberately shifted towards conventional forces,
and towards reliance on sea-borne and air-borne forces (67). Defence Minister Harold
Watkinson told the Chiefs of Staff he was looking for a change of image: ‘I wish this
image to be one of highly mobile, well-equipped forces, with a touch of the
swashbuckling of the first Elizabeth’s forces about them’. Perhaps, he added, ‘in
modern times, it must be more like Dan Dare* and less like the public’s conception of
Whitehall-bred warriors’.61
The perennial problem of rising defence costs was examined again in February
1963 (69). Ministers seemed inclined to prefer to reduce commitments in Europe
rather than East of Suez. But they wondered whether oil might not flow without
bases, and whether Kuwait might not be encouraged to look more to self-defence.
Burdens in the Far East could only be reduced by curtailing political commitments
to Malaysia. In the context of a decision about aircraft carriers in July 1963, the
chancellor, Maudling, insisted ‘a healthy economy was as important in the world-
wide struggle against Communism as military forces’ (72), thus echoing the kind of
warnings made by chancellors right back to the 1930s.
By the summer of 1963 the minister of defence, Peter Thorneycroft, summarised
the three pillars of the existing strategy on which defence planning was based: ‘a
contribution to the forces of NATO, the preservation of an independent nuclear
deterrent, and the provision of a continuing military presence East of Suez’.62 It was
clear to him at any rate that the government could not abandon any of these, though
in due course the European burden might be scaled down. Chancellor Maudling
accepted this, but questioned how vital the ‘third pillar’ was (72). Macmillan
* A space-age clean-limbed comic-strip figure in The Eagle, a famous boys’ comic, edited by a
clergyman.
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certainly felt there was room for argument about the levels of military capacity in the
Middle East and Far East: the commitment to the external defence of Malaysia by
maintaining forces at Singapore need not be a long-term one, particularly if a
political understanding could be arrived at with Indonesia; and they would need to
consider whether the threat of force in Aden to protect oil supplies would become
increasingly less effective.63 Politically, though, the Cabinet agreed that there was no
scope for an early reduction of anything: better to reduce in the future than to take
over-large risks now.
How then were strategic interests in the Middle and Far East conceived? For the
Middle East (including the Persian Gulf), it was commonly understood that the
principal British concern was economic: to secure the flow of oil, and on
‘remunerative commercial terms’ (71). It followed that the other aims were: (a)
minimising or containing Soviet penetration (since several countries had borders
with Russia) (55), (b) maintaining the stability of the region, or ensuring that if there
was change it should be peaceful change, (c) keeping open the direct sea-route to the
Far East, via the Suez Canal, and (d) preventing unified Arab control of oil.64 The
region was perceived as one in which Egypt’s unfriendly Col Gamal Abdel Nasser
loomed all too large, an area which, if left to its own devices, would become ‘a jungle
of smash-and-grab’ (77).
Kuwait was the largest oil-producing state. Its oil was also the cheapest in the
world to produce, so its importance to Britain was paramount. It was, however, under
mounting threat from its neighbour Iraq after the Iraqi revolution of 14 July 1958,
when a coup by General Qasim overthrew the anglophile Hashemite monarchy in
Baghdad, murdering the king and the prime minister. The British government hoped
this new regime might be usefully anti-Nasser, but its growing reliance on the
Communist Party and its sabre-rattling towards Kuwait created a dilemma. A batch
of papers (57–59) in the early summer of 1959 analysed the position in the Gulf and
Kuwait. The defence of Kuwait was the central issue. Home warned that action
against Iraq ‘could mean the break-up of the Commonwealth as we at present know
it’ (58). Suspicions of an intervention by Qasim were seized upon by the Defence
Committee as real evidence that the threat to Kuwait had become imminent by July
1961. An expedition was launched. Qasim backed down. Brook was critical of the
government’s action: ‘we are still pursuing our traditional policy of extracting oil
concessions from an autocratic Ruler in return for military protection. I doubt
whether this policy is realistic in the circumstances of today’.65 Realistic or not, while
Iraq kept up its claim, the vulnerability of Kuwait continued to be a stumbling-block
for Britain (68). In March 1963 the diplomat Lord Hood declared that Kuwait
remained ‘the lynchpin of British interests in the Middle East’.66
Turning now to British strategy in the Far East (79), the British interests were: (a)
maintaining the links with, and defending, Australia and New Zealand, (b) containing
the expansion of Sino-Soviet communism, and (c) making an effective contribution
to the Anglo-American partnership in upholding world peace.67 The main reason why
the Singapore base remained at such strength (32,000 troops) was primarily for
defence of the Australian connection. In the long run, Australia was the only possible
secure British base in the area. (North Borneo might once have been a possibility,
but not after the Indonesian Confrontation with Malaysia.) (63) Whenever strategic
planning was discussed, the development of Australia as a main base figured
prominently. As Sir Patrick Dean observed, it had not been put in the ‘Future policy
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study’ report, but the increase of the Australian European population was an
important objective: 30 million whites there would greatly strengthen the political
and strategic position for British interests.68 Hong Kong was regarded as in the last
resort untenable, but its inevitable transfer to China in 1997 had got to be peaceful.
Britain could not afford to be forced out of Hong Kong before then. A premature
withdrawal would be a blow to prestige, bad for Anglo-American relations, and
involve the loss not only of valuable trade and finance but of an irreplaceable source
of intelligence about China.
The last major reconsideration of defence requirements in these years took place
in 1964, leading to significant conclusions about ‘future politico-strategy’ in the
last days of the Conservative government (80, 81). Although the implications of an
enforced withdrawal from Far East bases had been contemplated as early as 1960
(83), and the value of fixed bases in general was being seriously questioned from
1961 (65: ‘nowhere did we seem to have absolute security of tenure and absolute
freedom from strings’), a much more systematic analysis was under way in the late
summer of 1964. Reports were commissioned from officials, covering the Middle
East, the Far East, Europe, and the overall future situation (79–81). Their instruc-
tions were to assume that within the next decade Singapore and Aden would be
lost. These terms of reference ‘represented a distinctly more radical approach than
that underlying previous studies of this nature in recent years’. A sharper and more
critical view could thus be taken of ‘the relevance of our existing commitments to
our real interests’ (80). The long-term military value of Singapore was found to be
declining, while politically the presence of so many troops was a public relations
liability. It would be important to withdraw before being asked to go, and a balance
had to be struck between the ‘dangers of staying too long and the opposite dangers
of withdrawing too fast’ (79)—the classic dilemma of decolonisation. Military pres-
ence in the Far East was found to be significantly more expensive than in the
Persian Gulf, and partly for this reason the latter should have priority for continua-
tion if it came to a choice between them. Simultaneously, a junior FO official sub-
mitted a paper (78) recommending the dismantling of the Gulf political treaty
structure, which he held was actually ‘delaying progress by obscuring the need for
it’. All these papers are striking evidence of at least a willingness to get rid of all
forms of colonial control, whether formal or informal, even if bureaucratic inertia
prevented their rapid implementation. One sentence used at this time surfaced
again prominently in the reasoning behind the disengagements of 1967–1968: that
global influence ‘depends not only on military strength but also on our economic
power and the respect (or lack of it) which the nations have for our economic per-
formance’ ( 80).
Meanwhile, in developing the ‘flexible mobile strategy’ of the future ‘island bases
scheme’, considerable hopes were pinned on the prospects for American help East of
Suez (73). The joint development of a new defence strategy in the Indian Ocean—
American support-facilities on British-owned islands for shared use—would of
course solve many problems. The Aden–Gan–Singapore line of communication had
recently been completed after three years spent constructing an air staging-post at
Gan in the Maldives, which the inhabitants had to be coaxed to accept (60). This
would now be reinforced by a new more southerly route to the Far East, Australia
and New Zealand: Aldabra (Seychelles)–Diego Garcia (Mauritius)–Cocos/Keeling
(Australia) (74–76).
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Political and constitutional change
On the morning of 3 March 1959, the president of the Nyasaland Congress Party, Dr
Hastings Banda, was arrested at his house in Limbe, and bundled off into a truck, still
wearing only his pyjamas, to be flown to Southern Rhodesia together with seventy-
two other detainees. At Nkata Bay twenty Africans, demonstrating against the arrests,
were shot dead (and others followed in the days to come). On the same day, 1,200
miles to the north, eleven Africans were killed at a remote ‘rehabilitation’ camp for
hard-core Mau Mau detainees (not convicted criminals), as a result of beatings
administered to force them to work on an irrigation scheme. About twenty others
were seriously injured at Hola Camp in the same incident. If one had to choose a
single fateful date which signalled the moral end of the British empire in Africa it
would thus be 3 March 1959. Macmillan told his Cabinet colleagues that the system
which led to the Hola deaths had ‘undoubtedly been wrong’ (159). Macleod later
recalled his sense of outrage: ‘this was the decisive moment when it became clear to
me that we could no longer continue with the old methods of government in Africa,
and that meant inexorably a move towards African independence’. Macleod believed
that the same was true for Macmillan.69
In July 1959 the report of Sir Patrick Devlin (a high court judge) into the
Nyasaland disturbances was published, stating on the first page that ‘Nyasaland has
become, doubtless only temporarily, a police state’. The report as a whole was a
brutal condemnation of the government, and the fact that a senior British judge
could speak of a ‘police state’, and couple it with such an acid parenthesis, had a
profound effect on British opinion.70 This was a phrase more electric to
contemporaries than the rather tame ‘wind of change’ which followed it half a year
later. Whatever flaws there were in the Devlin Report, the Cabinet was patently being
misled in an invitation to make a comparison between the Nyasaland disturbances
and Mau Mau ‘and possibly with the Indian Mutiny’ (494). 
Southern Rhodesia had also declared a state of emergency early in 1959, in the
course of which some five hundred people were detained without trial, among them
Guy Clutton-Brock. He was an ANC member, a missionary farmer, reported by the
native commissioner of Rusape, H B Masterson, as an ‘odious and harmful influence’,
a ‘subversive’—because he let natives eat with him at his own table, even sleep at his
house, and did not teach them to rise to their feet if a European entered the room.
The Cabinet was compelled to consider the case of Clutton-Brock after Barbara
Castle in the House of Commons had described the Rhodesian government’s action
against him as ‘absolutely fantastic’. The Cabinet decided that it was ‘ill-advised’ of
the Rhodesian authorities to victimise so prominent and distinguished a European,
and even though it was contrary to established practice to interfere on behalf of
British nationals with dual citizenship, pressed the Federal government to release
him. When he died in 1995 he was proclaimed ‘a hero of Zimbabwe’.71
Even before it knew of the Hola massacres, though aware that two newspapers in
Kenya had been banned (which seemed bad enough), the CO was alarmed that the
government would be seen as declaring war on African nationalist aspirations.
Accordingly, the CO permanent under-secretary drafted for Lennox-Boyd a public
statement reaffirming his commitment to preparing for self-government in Africa as
quickly as possible.72 In the course of the early summer of 1959, during the crisis
over Hola Camp and the Devlin Report, Lennox-Boyd offered his resignation twice
over.
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All these unfortunate episodes, and the bad attendant publicity, in the long run
played into the hands of Macmillan and Macleod by reducing opposition to their
plans for constitutional advancement. If these events, and especially Hola, made
them more determined, and improved the chances of Conservative Party
acquiescence, the electoral victory of October 1959 delivered them the necessary
power to act.
At around the same time, there were vital facilitating influences coming from
outside as well. Independence was to be granted by the UN to Somalia in 1960
consequent upon the surrender of the Italian trusteeship. Accelerated political
progress there would inevitably lead to a demand for equivalent advancement in
British Somaliland and in neighbouring territories, especially Aden (198) and Kenya,
whose peoples were more advanced than the Somalis. As Gorell Barnes put it: Britain
‘was compelled to move with the tide’ (183). The governors of East Africa realised
that an independent and united Somalia would ‘increase the difficulty of controlling
the pace of constitutional development’ in their own territories, but this was
preferable to the emergence of a hostile Somalia (184).
In the middle of 1958, de Gaulle had challenged francophone Africans to choose
between a continuing relationship with a revamped French Community or
independence out in the cold. Sékou Touré’s supporters in Guinea voted ninety-five
per cent (in the referendum held in September 1958) against the new Community
constitution. Suddenly de Gaulle was urging Macmillan to see that France and
Britain must decide jointly whether to stay in Africa or go. The writing on the wall
could not have been plainer. As Macmillan’s official biographer understood, de
Gaulle’s African policy had a profound influence on Macmillan.73 Lennox-Boyd also
pondered the implications of French policy:
I have been considering the effect on British territories of the recent referendum in
French Africa and the possibility of the French action having some lessons for us. We
have yet to see how things will settle down; but we should take stock of our own
position in the light of these dramatic developments on the French side. . . . My
provisional conclusions are that some results of French policy are bound to have
repercussions, possibly unfavourable, in British territories, especially in Sierra Leone;
that it would be wrong for us to try to follow the French example in any general way;
but that the French action, taken as a whole, is likely on balance to be a good thing for
us and the West.74
De Gaulle was gradually driven into an unequivocal offer of ‘self determination’ in
September 1959. The Belgians in January 1959 announced far-reaching plans for
constitutional advancement in the Congo, which by the end of the year had
telescoped into independence by June 1960. These developments, British officials
recognised, were ‘bound to have major repercussions in British East Africa’. Together
the French and Belgians were putting Britain into the position where the period of
British leadership in the transfer of power in Africa would appear to be coming to an
end. The possibility was unfolding that Britain might be ‘classed with the Portuguese
as the obstacle to further advance’ (20). This was not an appealing prospect to either
Macmillan or Macleod.
Almost all officials and politicians felt that a pace of political advancement faster
than they would have preferred had been unexpectedly forced upon them. Sir James
Robertson, governor-general of Nigeria, may be quoted here:
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The trouble is that we have not been allowed enough time: partly this is because we
are not strong enough now as a result of two world wars to insist on having longer to
build up democratic forms of government; partly because of American opposition to
our idea of colonialism by the gradual training of people in the course of generations
to run their own show; partly because of dangers from our enemies, the Communists,
we have had to move faster than we should have wished.75
And Joe Garner, permanent under-secretary of the CRO:
with the wind of change in Africa and throughout the world, the impact of nationalism
and pressures in the United Nations, the pace of constitutional development has been
forced in recent years. The result is that a number of countries have now been
included as Commonwealth members before they can be regarded as fully mature and
responsible, and fully capable of standing on their own feet.76
From a Colonial Service perspective, Robertson advised Macmillan that although
Africans would not be ready for independence for fifteen to twenty years, they should
have it at once, otherwise all the most capable would be in prison and learn nothing
about administration.77
The underlying dynamics of the accelerated pace appear to be centred around
calculations about the feasibility of holding on to colonial territories demanding
change, and the pressures of external and especially neighbouring example. The CO
understood well that the emergence of strong personalities such as Kwame Nkrumah
(in the Gold Coast) and Julius Nyerere (in Tanganyika) was a vital factor in progress
to independence, and—with the exception of South Arabia—they had no desire to
exclude such leaders by backing, or artificially creating, authoritarian puppet
regimes (based on traditional chiefs or feudal rulers), which could only lead ‘to the
creation of a revolutionary force against the set-up that we had created’.78 As to
feasibility, the dilemma was well expressed in Lennox-Boyd’s memorandum on
Nigeria in May 1957: ‘either to give independence too soon and risk disintegration
and breakdown of administration; or to hang on too long, risk ill-feeling and
disturbances, and eventually to leave bitterness behind’ (100). The British meanwhile
faced almost insoluble administrative problems in coping with a discontented and
possibly rebellious Nigerian population (105). Also, conventional wisdom was already
well established generally that the ‘risks of going too slow were probably greater than
the risks of going too fast’ (2, para 52). As to neighbouring example: Ghana had set a
dangerous but unavoidable precedent, so Nigeria had to be given what Ghana had
(2). Chain reactions were operating. Sierra Leone moved forward under the impact of
events in Ghana and Nigeria and the French territories, especially Guinea, so that
‘anything less than a real measure of advance would cause trouble’.79 What happened
in West Africa must eventually be repeated in East Africa. Kenya’s political
advancement was speeded up as a result of Somaliland’s impending independence;
Tanganyika profited especially from the example of the Congo. Nyasaland was the
beneficiary of the acceleration of the timetable in Kenya; Northern Rhodesia in its
turn followed Nyasaland. So did Zanzibar, where the feasibility of getting troops into
it was in doubt after the independence of Kenya (130-132). Further afield, even the
Solomon Islands began to move forward after Australia announced plans to
introduce universal suffrage in Papua New Guinea from 1964.80
The question must thus arise as to whether the influence of ministers in London
made much difference. Clearly there were elements of continuity between each of the
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secretaries of state for the colonies and an underlying support by at least some of
their advisers for policies of constitutional progress. As Macleod recognised in
respect of Kenya: solid disagreement from his officials ‘might have halted me in my
tracks’. As to continuity, it was his predecessor Lennox-Boyd who had said: ‘there is
of course no stopping the process of devolution on which we are now well set’ (54).
However, judgments about timing were crucial. Macleod’s own assessment of his role
seems a fair one:
The change of policy that I introduced in October 1959 was, on the surface, merely a
change of timing. In reality, of course it was a true change of policy, but I telescoped
events rather than created new ones.81
He published his definitive apologia in the Spectator in 1964, defending the
deliberate decision to speed up the movement towards independence:
And in my view any other policy would have led to terrible bloodshed in Africa. This is
the heart of the argument. . . . Were the countries fully ready for Independence? Of
course not. Nor was India, and the bloodshed that followed the grant of Independence
there was incomparably worse than anything that has happened since to any country.
Yet the decision of the Attlee Government was the only realistic one. Equally we could
not possibly have held by force to our territories in Africa. We could not, with an
enormous force engaged, even continue to hold the small island of Cyprus. General de
Gaulle could not contain Algeria. The march of men towards their freedom can be
guided, but not halted. Of course there were risks in moving quickly. But the risks of
moving slowly were far greater.82
It would be a work of supererogation to summarise here all the political
developments and constitutional advances in each of the British colonies. What
follows is therefore a selection of some of the more significant cases: Cyprus,
Tanganyika, Kenya, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, Aden, Malaysia, and the West
Indies Federation. But a preliminary observation should be made. Even apart from
the obvious question-marks hanging over territories claimed by other powers—
Hong Kong (9, 10, 258, 259), Gibraltar (290), the Falkland Islands (432, 436) and
Honduras (431, 433–435)—almost every colony had puzzling and unique problems
of its own. In Uganda progress was bedevilled by the relationship of its four
kingdoms, especially Buganda, to the centre (120-121): a complex, confused, and
according to Macleod even ‘somewhat Gilbertian’ situation (36). The governor, Sir
Frederick Crawford, despaired of ‘our problem children’, roundly denouncing ‘these
bumptious, beer-swilling, bible-punching, bullying, braggart Baganda’.83 Secession
was ruled out (36). In geographically anomalous Gambia (111, 112), and tiny St
Helena (291, 341), the problem was one of viability. In Malta too—‘a small but
terribly difficult problem’ (Home: 254)—the worry was how 320,000 ‘not very
industrious people living on a relatively barren island group’84 would manage
without high employment in the naval dockyard (242–255). In Fiji, the peculiarity
was the unwillingness of the Fijians to contemplate any form of independence,
locked as they were in ethnic rivalry with a powerful immigrant Indian community
(292, 296). In Guiana the communist leanings of Dr Jagan bred hesitancy,
assiduously played upon by the Americans, fearing that independence would result in
another Cuba or Congo (293–295, 297–299). In Southern Rhodesia the problem was
the intransigence of the 250,000 Europeans, most of them bent on blocking African
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majority rule (the approach to UDI in 1965 is documented in 514, 518–520,
524–527).
(a) Cyprus. As a way of introducing the Cyprus problem, the following magisterial
passage by Professor Nicholas Mansergh can hardly be bettered:
A Byzantine emperor, in grateful acknowledgement of a copy of the Gospel according
to St Matthew found in the tomb of St Barnabas near Salamis and sent to him in
Constantinople, decreed that henceforward the Orthodox Church in Cyprus should be
autocephalous and that its Archbishop should enjoy the imperial privilege of signing
his name in red ink. British governors accorded to themselves a like privilege, signing
their Minutes in red—an essay in imperial emulation no doubt gratifying to
gubernatorial vanity.* But when confronted with a demand for self-determination
which had the backing of the Orthodox Church and the leadership of the Archbishop,
the British imperial authorities found that they could not arrogate to themselves what
mattered most—the quasi-spiritual sanctions of Byzantium. So they resorted to the
cruder device of episcopal and archiepiscopal deportation in a vain endeavour to bring
to an end a prolonged and painful struggle for which psychologically they were ill
equipped and the character of which, in conjunction with earlier experience in
Ireland, and contrary to the fashionable assumptions of the time, suggested that
similarities in race and colour, not differences, served most to intensify the bitterness
of national revolt against the imperial power.85
A conflict of this character had long been regarded both by the CO and FO as
anomalous, dangerous and embarrassing.
One of the earliest acts of the Macmillan government was to release Makarios from
his ‘archiepiscopal deportation’ to the Seychelles, of which Macmillan had never
approved.86 It was hoped that this would clear a path towards a settlement. Macmillan
was prepared to give priority to Cyprus in part because the problem was familiar to
him from his time as foreign secretary in 1955. The baffling deadlock encountered
then persisted into 1957.87 The problem was essentially a strategic one, with two
elements. The first was that the Chiefs of Staff declared that Britain needed a secure
grip on Cyprus as a whole. The second was that the British government feared an
independent Cyprus would implement Enosis, that is, union with Greece, and Greece
might become communist. In any case, good relations with a strong Turkey as a
NATO ally on its eastern flank were essential. And Turkey was vehemently opposed to
Enosis: to Turkey, Cyprus was an off-shore island only forty miles away, and one-fifth
of the Cypriot population was Turkish. Thus for Britain the wishes of Turkey
increasingly became more important than those of Greece: ‘to keep in with the
Turks—both in Turkey and in the island’, as Julian Amery rather bluntly expressed it
(237).
The Colonial Policy Committee agreed in June 1957 that they needed ‘release from
the odium and expense which we carried at present’ (218). Governor Sir John
Harding told them that without a political settlement 10,000 troops would be
required indefinitely, plus 6,000 reinforcements—which was impossible. Ministers
dreaded ‘a second Palestine’. In December hard-line Harding was replaced by the
more flexible Hugh Foot, who produced a plan for qualified internal self-
* This practice was not confined to governors of Cyprus, and was also adopted by secretaries of
state.
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government, leading to self-determination after a period of up to seven years—
apparently basing his hopes on a sort of compulsory co-operation across the ethnic
divide. Ministers felt this would commit Britain to continuing close involvement,
which ‘could not be reconciled with the policy of progressive reduction in the
strength of the Army’ (229, 230). They could not go on indefinitely ‘bearing the
burdens and costs’ of sole responsibility for administration, with the risk of renewed
large-scale violence. Instead of Foot’s plan, Macmillan preferred a ‘tri-dominium’
solution, which would bring in representatives of the Greek and Turkish
governments as resident advisers. At Zürich in February 1959 the foreign ministers
of Greece and Turkey announced (to general surprise) that they had after months of
negotiation agreed that Cyprus should be independent, more or less under the
Macmillan Plan. Macmillan regarded the settlement, confirmed at the London
conference of February 1959, as one based on a parity of sacrifice. The British
abandoned sovereignty, except over ninety-nine square miles of base-enclaves. The
Greeks agreed not to press for Enosis. The Turks agreed not to pursue their preferred
outcome of partition. The new state would have a Greek Cypriot president (Makarios
was the first), a Turkish Cypriot vice-president (both with a veto in certain matters),
and a cabinet of seven Greek Cypriots and three Turkish Cypriots. This 7:3 proportion
was repeated right down the administrative ladder; in other words, Turkish Cypriots
were entitled to thirty per cent of posts even though they had less than twenty per
cent of the population. It was not exactly a popular solution, nor did it last for long.
In December 1963 fighting broke out again, barely three-and-a-half years into
independence. Britain invoked the help of the United Nations, who policed a ‘green
line’ demarcation between the two sides. In 1974 Turkey invaded Cyprus and
consolidated de facto partition.
Partition was of course the one thing the British had steadfastly refused to be
responsible for. In Macmillan’s words, it would be a ‘confession of failure’ (219). It
would be immensely difficult to carry out, internal ‘bitterness and bloodshed’ being
matched by the damage it would do to British prestige and international reputation
(220, 226). No-one in the CO believed partition had any attractions except as a last
resort. Lennox-Boyd minuted: ‘A “Palestinian solution” is distasteful to me’. Harding,
the Chiefs of Staff, and constitutional adviser Lord Radcliffe, were all against it.88 The
FO, however, with their special pro-Turkish concerns, always seemed to hanker after
it, and as prime minister, Douglas-Home (a former foreign secretary) did not flinch
from it as the probable ‘final solution’ (241).
Cyprus gained independence because of British strategic revaluation and a need to
cut costs. In 1954 a government spokesman had implied that Cyprus would ‘never’ be
independent.89 Although that should probably have read ‘not yet’, the strategic
objections then were formidable. Cyprus, however, was a principal beneficiary of the
post-Suez shake-up. It had proved to be of limited use in that operation, and once it
was clear the military planners did not need to hold the entire island as a base for
major military purposes, the strategic requirements could be reduced to the
retention of airfields. The prospect—which Foot warned about repeatedly (231)—of
‘civil war in Cyprus, possibly leading to war between Greece and Turkey’, also
increased the pressure for a peaceful disengagement. 
(b) Tanganyika. In 1957 the official members of the Executive Council were
redesignated ministers, and assistant ministers (four Africans, one European and one
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Asian) were appointed to the Legislative Council. The old idea of an equal three-way
split between Europeans, Africans and Asians, regardless of the actual population
proportions, was abandoned. A general election was held in 1958, preparatory to the
establishment of a council of ministers. Lennox-Boyd defined a policy of gradualness,
a controlled, step-by-step, middle-of-the-road constitutional advance in order to
prevent ‘frustration and bitterness’ (116, 117), and by January 1959 he expected
independence in perhaps 1970.
In May 1959 Governor Sir Richard Turnbull presented radical proposals for
stepping up the speed of political advancement in Tanganyika (141). His thesis was
that there had been ‘a great upsurge of nationalism in the Belgian Congo which had
not been foreseen’. A similar turmoil in Nyasaland and Ruanda-Urundi had erupted.
And it ‘could not be expected that Tanganyika would remain immune from the trend
of events elsewhere in Africa’ (142, 143, 145). Accordingly his plan was to ‘tame
Nyerere’, using him to rob those he called ‘the wild men’ on the lunatic fringe of
their glamour. To do this, reasonableness and co-operation with Britain on Nyerere’s
part must be shown to be a paying proposition. Therefore, Britain should introduce
immediately an unofficial majority, smack ‘the wild men’ down, and encourage the
moderates.90 Although Turnbull did not think Tanganyika was really ready for
independence for twenty years yet, without this kind of political progress, he forecast
a chillingly apocalyptic scenario, predicting two major insurrections in Tanganyika.
The first would come in 1960 or 1961. The second would arrive, apparently, in 1970,
and it would be a ‘combination of Mau Mau and the Maji-Maji rebellion, with the
support of modern techniques of guerrilla warfare and fifth-column activities’. The
forces available to put such uprisings down would be wholly inadequate. Turnbull’s
advice was that holding to ‘ordered progress to self-government’ would depend
primarily on Nyerere’s not being supplanted by an ‘extremist’, but also on Britain’s
finding enough money to spend between 1960 and 1970 on education and training in
order to sugar the pill of political gradualism.91 Basically what he envisaged was
chopping about four years off the timetable, that is to say, reaching an unofficial
majority in the Council of Ministers by late 1960 instead of early 1965.
Lennox-Boyd and his officials were flummoxed by this extraordinary initiative,
which contradicted a policy agreed at Chequers only five months previously (141).
For the remainder of his time in office, Lennox-Boyd prevaricated, some plausibility
being lent to this by the impending general election in Britain. However, Turnbull
met Macleod on 16 November 1959, only weeks after Macleod had taken over, and
Macleod was persuaded (145). Lest we attach too much importance to Macleod’s
enabling role, it is worth noting that his predecessor was probably beginning to
accept Turnbull’s line.92 But we are entitled to take the view that Macleod was more
genuinely sympathetic, and considerably better at getting Turnbull’s policy through
the Colonial Policy Committee than Lennox-Boyd would have been. Macleod sold the
policy to his colleagues by telling them that he believed the governor’s argument was
sound: if the government did not concede the unofficial majority, ‘we may be faced
with serious disturbances and may lose the opportunity of some years of constructive
effort’ in the vital matter of economic and social development. Macleod also
emphasised the inability of the police to cope with any serious trouble, especially in
circumstances where Britain could expect little support either inside or outside
Tanganyika. Indeed, they would face active UN criticism for failure to ensure peace by
a positive response to a claim for self-government requested in a reasonable and
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constitutional manner. Rejection could only lead to non-co-operation and admin-
istrative breakdown (146). Finally, the Cabinet in November accepted that it was
necessary to advance the timetable in order to maintain peaceful development, and
confidence in Britain.93 And so in December 1959 a second general election was
announced, with constitutional changes which would bring in an elected majority on
both the Executive and Legislative Councils in August 1960. Of the seventy-one seats,
fifty were open to contest by all races. In the event Nyerere’s TANU party won seventy
seats. Just before the election Macleod argued that ‘the wind of change has been
gathering force since last November, so the thinking of all of us has been speeded up’;
the government could now contemplate Tanganyikan independence by July 1962
instead of 1968 (147). In fact independence was reached in December 1961.
What were the dynamics behind the dramatic speeding up of the transfer of power
in Tanganyika? First, there had been the collapse of faith in its European settlers,
well under way even by 1957. Then there was the near inevitability of promoting a
personable, moderate, collaborative nationalist leader, of co-opting Nyerere as the
best available African, for whom there seemed to be no acceptable alternative: the
policy which Arden-Clarke had called (with respect to Nkrumah) backing ‘the one
dog in our kennel’.94 Calculations about governability also came to the fore: here,
Turnbull’s scare tactics performed an historic function. The ‘wind of change’ was
evoked to telling effect, in combination with the influence of what was happening in
neighbouring states, particularly in the Congo. Finally, there was a recognition of the
importance of keeping on the right side of world opinion and heading off the
pretensions of the UN to assert itself. 
(c) Kenya. Where Tanganyika led, Kenya was bound to follow, profiting from
Turnbull’s ‘no immunity from neighbouring trends’ argument. The first African
elections were held in Kenya in March 1957, but deadlock ensued. A new
constitution equalised the communal representation of Africans and Europeans and
a common roll was introduced (the Lennox-Boyd constitution). Fresh elections were
held in March 1958. By June 1959 Macmillan was looking for ‘perceptible
movement’: heading off African disturbances without driving the settlers into trying
to join the Union of South Africa (29). At the Lancaster House Conference in January
1960 Macleod devised a complex new constitution, under which the Africans (on a
greatly extended common roll) could expect to secure thirty-three out of sixty-five
elected seats in the Leg Co. Macleod had in effect been able to concede the principle
of majority rule and was well pleased with the way things had moved forward (160).
The question from then on was the timing of independence, which as Macleod saw it
was ‘to go as slowly as possible, but not as slow as Alec Home [now foreign secretary]
would like’, because that would lead to ‘a Cyprus on our hands again’ (125). But
Macleod absolutely rejected the idea being floated that it would be possible in
practice ‘to maintain our position in Kenya by consent for anything like eight years’,
as some ministers were suggesting. He pointed to ‘the growing pressure in the
United Nations to bring Colonial territories to independence’. He reminded them of
the success of their policy in Tanganyika, which was ‘largely due to our willingness to
consider a progressive and early transfer of power to the Africans’. The Colonial
Policy Committee accepted that if, as seemed possible, Tanganyika, Uganda and
Zanzibar were likely to move fairly quickly towards independence, ‘it would be
impossible to justify to the Kenya Africans the maintenance of United Kingdom rule
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in Kenya merely on account of the presence of significant numbers of Europeans’.95
Macleod’s successor, Maudling, reinforced the same message in November 1961:
‘arithmetic and African nationalism’ had destroyed European political power (172),
and it was impossible to continue to rule Kenya for some years to come, because this
would require the use of force, which could only lead to ‘another outbreak of Mau
Mau’ and great disorder, ‘possibly reaching even Congo proportions’ (169).* However
distasteful it was, they had to face the fact that Jomo Kenyatta would end up as prime
minister, since he was the leader the Africans acknowledged (169).
Full internal self-government was introduced, following an unhelpful London
conference early in 1962, but Kenya remained ‘an extremely intractable problem’
(Macmillan: 169). The issues anxiously discussed by the Cabinet over the next two
years included: safeguards and compensation for over 3,000 European farmers (175,
176, 180), the threat of economic and financial collapse (which a European exodus
would exacerbate) (174), the maintenance of law and order between the Kikuyu and
their rivals (173, 175), whether or not to retain a military base (65, 178), whether or
not to allow the Somali-majority Northern Frontier District to join the Somali
Republic (178). (The integration of the NFD into a ‘Greater Somalia’ might forestall a
frontier civil war, another Congo or Kashmir, but it would upset Ethiopia—‘the
emperor would get very excited’, said Macmillan.)96 In the face of such problems, it is
perhaps hardly surprising that ministers turned once again to ‘the federal panacea’.
Macleod thought an East African federation would be ‘a wonderful prize’ (150, 154).
Malcolm MacDonald (now governor of Kenya) regarded it as ‘a dream answer’ (177).
The prospects were repeatedly reviewed (123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 138, 153), it being
always understood that the initiative would have to be left to local politicians. Despite
an initial interest in the idea, especially by Nyerere, they eventually got cold feet
(126).
Thus in speeding up the timetable for decolonisation in Kenya, the same
fundamental imperatives were at work as they had been for Tanganyika: fears of the
country dissolving into chaos, worries about the whole situation going sour on them,
the ineluctable impact of what was happening in neighbouring territories (especially
the negative example of the Congo), the desirability of pre-empting the growth of
Russian and Chinese influences and the necessity of submitting to the overriding
dictates of cold war considerations (172, 174). Kenyatta duly became president of
Kenya in 1964, after a year as prime minister, and proved to be much less extreme
than the white settlers had feared.
(d) Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The documentary record in Part II hardly
conveys the underlying tensions and contortions in the ministerial handling of the
future of the Central African Federation (established in 1953).97 Macleod twice
threatened resignation, Maudling once. For Macmillan it ‘haunted, not to say
poisoned’ the last years of his premiership.98 He personally did not believe they had
the right to break up something which had a chance of working, though his
condescending attitude to critics (493) reflects his distinctly Augustinian attitude—
* Macmillan juxtaposed the analogies slightly differently in a highly characteristic diary entry,
bemoaning the balance of evils: ‘If we have to give independence to Kenya, it may well prove
another Congo. If we hold on, it will mean a long and cruel campaign—Mau Mau and all that’
(Memoirs vol VI p 291).
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as if to say, ‘make us sinless with regard to empire, O Lord, but not just yet’.
Ministers struggled to keep the doomed Federation afloat, because it represented
their commitment to stability and multi-racialism in Central Africa. Nor did they
want to fall out with the white Rhodesians who were its principal beneficiaries, lest
they be driven into the arms of South Africa (regional military alliance was more
likely than integration) (499, 506, 510, 521), or refuse Britain the over-flying rights
which were essential for the protection of the High Commission Territories (523). In
June 1959 Home advised buying time by appointing a commission of inquiry into
discontent : ‘properly managed it would carry us on for nine months’.99 In asking
Walter Monckton (the retired former Conservative Cabinet minister) to chair this
commission, indeed to avert ‘a maelstrom of trouble’, Macmillan set out his own
views crisply:
The cruder concepts, whether of the left or the right, are clearly wrong. Africans
cannot be dominated permanently (as they are trying to do in South Africa) without
any proper opportunity for their development and ultimate self-government. Nor can
the Europeans be abandoned. It would be wrong for us to do so, and fatal for the
African interests.100
When a few months later Macleod took office, the new secretary of state quickly
concluded that the resentments building up in the Federation ‘will be our most
difficult single problem to solve’ (31). He agreed with Macmillan (towards the end of
1960) that ‘the crux of the matter’ was that they ‘did not want an Algeria’ in Central
Africa, even if on a smaller scale.101
Macleod’s first task was to calm things down in Nyasaland. He believed that
continuing detentions under the emergency would be indefensible before the Human
Rights Commission. Early in December he raised the question of Banda’s release,
preferably before the arrival of the Monckton Commission. ‘There are no more
moderate leaders likely to emerge than Banda himself’, he wrote to the prime
minister, and ‘an imaginative offer on constitutional advance at a fairly early date’
was the best and perhaps only hope of holding the position (31, 495). However, the
CO officials were dubious about releasing Banda, since the governor had assessed the
risks of doing so as dangerous;102 but neither Macmillan nor Macleod fully trusted
Governor Sir Robert Armitage: he was ‘not giving a real lead’, when a ‘positive policy’
was needed, and he had been rude to Macmillan when they met in January 1960.103
Home by then was also convinced that ‘the wind of change’ was blowing strongly,
that the political log-jam must be broken, and that it would be dangerous to stand
still in Nyasaland politically (492, 499); he accepted that Banda could be used ‘to
further our constitutional plans’. Macleod’s timing for the release was, however,
deeply controversial. He threatened to resign, but a compromise solution was found,
since Macmillan could not afford to lose him after only four months in office. So
Banda was released on 1 April 1960, shortly before the Monckton Commission
completed its work in Nyasaland, and he was thus able to give evidence as a free man
(498). This was the decisive step. Macleod was proved right when it did not lead to an
escalation of violence. A new constitution was agreed in July 1960. Elections in
August 1961 resulted in a majority for Banda’s Malawi Congress Party. Internal self-
government was achieved in the spring of 1963.
But it was Northern Rhodesia, not Nyasaland, which was ‘the true problem’ of the
region, Macleod believed (35). His decision to speed up change there arose out of two
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favourable developments by the autumn of 1960: agreement on the Nyasaland
constitution, and the Monckton Report’s recommendation of an African majority on
the Northern Rhodesia Leg Co, in the context of its general conclusion that the
Federation could not be maintained in its present form. The nationalist leader
Kenneth Kaunda had restrained his followers. Macleod realised that Kaunda ought to
be able to show that his moderate policy was producing results; violence could break
out if there was no move soon.104 Welensky (the settlers’ leader) was firmly told ‘we
cannot hold the position by a Canute-like process of ordering the tides to return . . .
move we must’.105 Macleod tried to find a solution ‘somewhere around parity’ in the
Leg Co, a token African majority amongst the elected members, which would swiftly
resolve into an actual majority. At the February 1961 conference, Kaunda demanded
an immediate African majority. Macleod persuaded him that although what was on
offer fell short of what Tanganyika, Kenya and Nyasaland had got, it was safely and
definitely on the right lines for the future (502). The settlement was, however,
saddled with a new voting system of almost incomprehensibly labyrinthine
psephological complexity, and there followed months of ministerial wrangling, back-
bench dissent, pressure from Welensky, devious discussions and back-trackings, as
various formulae—‘transient phantoms in an unreal dream’, Macmillan described
them106—were produced and examined and discarded. Successive Cabinets wrestled
with technicalities they ought never to have got involved in (504, 506). By June 1961
there seemed to be an agreed solution, but after widespread African protest and
disorder, in September 1961 Macleod sought to reopen the policy-decision to make it
more favourable to the Africans.
Not long afterwards Macmillan removed him from the CO. His successor Maudling
decided that Macleod was indeed right: there must be a constitution acceptable to
Africans, giving them a chance of winning at least a small majority, otherwise there
would be civil disobedience and rioting, and ‘the situation would get out of hand’
(506). He too threatened resignation, and in all probability Macleod and Perth would
have resigned in sympathy. The new constitution came into force in September 1962.
As Macmillan later admitted, ‘the delay between December 1960 and February 1962
achieved nothing’. It is hard not to agree with Richard Lamb: ‘The only verdict can be
that it antagonised the Africans without pacifying the Europeans’.107
In March 1962, Butler took over ministerial responsibility for Central Africa. With
considerable cunning and finesse he managed to gain the confidence of all sides. In
Zomba the Africans honoured him with the name ‘Large Elephant’. He got on well
with Banda and retained Welensky as a friend. Macmillan was naturally thankful to
transfer matters to his ‘wise and experienced hands’ (513). Butler achieved the
orderly dissolution of the Federation on terms which the settler lobby of the Conser-
vative Party had to accept. The crucial issue was Banda’s demand for secession (505).
Banda was acting co-operatively, taking ‘a moderate and constructive line’, according
to Macmillan (512), so concessions to him could be contemplated, just as they had
been to Nyerere and Kaunda. Butler decided that the importance of retaining Banda’s
goodwill outweighed the danger of worsening relations with Welensky (507), and did
so in the main because they could not cope with a serious security situation in
Nyasaland (511). In any case, ‘against the pace elsewhere in Africa, the extent to
which we can hope to apply the brake . . . is extremely limited’ (509). Sandys was in
full agreement: to fight Nyasaland on secession would lead to ‘another Cyprus’ (511).
It was also pointed out that recent precedents from the West Indies would make it
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difficult to refuse to agree to secession (508). Ministers, however, did not wish to give
any encouragement to Banda to secede, partly because of the economic implications
(almost certainly making increased aid from Britain necessary), and partly because
Northern Rhodesia would almost automatically follow suit (510). For seven months
Butler spun out the time on secession, but by October 1962 he could no longer
continue to do so without a show of force: ‘this would not only be inherently
mistaken but was also impracticable’.108 In the long run, he argued, it would be more
expensive financially than the consequences of secession, and extremely costly in
terms of international reputation. Though secession would inevitably mean in time
the dissolution of the Federation, ‘there was really no alternative’ (510).
Home in particular clung to the notion that some sort of Northern and Southern
Rhodesian association could be maintained (511). This continued to be explored
(512, 515, 517, 522). The Cabinet reluctantly accepted Northern Rhodesian secession
on 28 March 1963 (517). A decision on the long-term future of an unregenerate
Southern Rhodesia was, on Macmillan’s advice, deferred as long as possible, since it
could only be ‘profoundly damaging’ and probably ‘a fatal blow to the
Commonwealth’ to accept the whites’ demand for immediate independence (518,
520-522, 526). The Federation was dissolved on 31 December 1963. Nyasaland
became independent as Malawi on 6 July 1964. Northern Rhodesia became inde-
pendent as Zambia on 24 October 1964. Southern Rhodesia became independent as
Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980.
(e) Aden. The first acquisition of Victoria’s empire (1838), Aden 120 years later was
fast becoming the last imperial frontier. It had an excellent natural harbour, and had
developed as an important coaling station on the route to India and the east. This had
unlovely results: Kipling’s ‘unlit barrick-stove’; ‘the cinder-heap of the world’. From
the later 1950s its value was increasing as other bases and footholds came under
threat: not only was it a staging-post ‘East of Suez’, but the citadel of oil-bunkering,
the protector of Middle East oil interests, especially in Kuwait, and the base from
which military commitments in the Persian Gulf and East Africa could be
discharged. Thus it was not totally surprising when a government minister declared
in 1956 that Aden could not expect to aspire to more than internal self-government
‘for the foreseeable future’ (2). In 1960 it became the headquarters of Middle East
Command, and by 1964 there were 8,000 troops stationed there.
Aden was a particularly intractable case for decolonisation (198). At its heart was
the port of Aden Colony. But it was surrounded by successive ‘layers’ of unfavourable
circumstance which made it hard to manage. The tiny Colony itself was, according to
Macleod, ‘a very politically conscious place’ (127), penetrated by militant trades
unions, the ATUC being led by the pro-Nasserite al-Asnaj, and composed largely of
Yemeni migrant workers staffing the expanding BP oil refinery opened in 1954 in the
aftermath of the Iranian oil crisis of 1951. There were eighty-four strikes in 1959
alone. By then the colony had a population of 37,000 Adenis, but 48,000 Yemenis, in
effect a fifth column whose task was to spearhead the incorporation of Aden into
Yemen. The immediate surrounding ‘layer’ was the turbulent and murderously
unstable hinterland of South Arabia, a protectorate which the British had almost
entirely ignored, leaving it to its traditional princes, tribal rulers and warring
factions. Because it was claimed by Yemen, the protectorate could not stand by itself
and the rulers sought to ‘put their paws’ on Aden and bring its international port
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within their ambit. If Aden developed constitutionally on its own, this would seem
disastrous to the Yemenophobic princes of the hinterland, who were friendly to
Britain. In February 1959 a somewhat chaotic Federation of the states of the Western
Protectorate was formed. Then, in the outer layer came the hostile neighbour itself,
Yemen, ruled by ‘a gloomy medieval imam’ until 1962, when he was overthrown by a
republican coup dominated by Nasserites. In British eyes, Yemen became a virtual
Egyptian puppet-state, with 70,000 Egyptian troops stationed there. British
government departments were divided on according recognition, the FO in favour,
the CO and MoD against. Macmillan could see attractions in recognition: it was
‘repugnant to political equity and prudence alike that we should so often appear to be
supporting out-of-date despotic regimes and to be opposing the growth of modern
and more democratic forms of government’. Moreover, recognition might embarrass
Nasser, whom Macmillan persisted in regarding as ‘another Hitler’.109 And in the
background beyond Egypt there was the UN, where the international witch-hunt
against ‘colonialism’ was in full cry, and British policy in South-West Arabia was
routinely denounced as ‘the engine of oppression’.
The new governor towards the end of 1956 was Sir William Luce, fresh from acting
as constitutional adviser to the governor-general of the Sudan during its run-up to
independence. With this background, Luce had no difficulty in recognising that to
deny self-government to Aden beyond about 1967 would involve ‘a head-on collision
with Aden Arabs’. The decline of British power, the policy of moving from
dependence to independence, Arab nationalism, and Russian expansion—all these
impinged on Aden, and, he concluded, pointed to a gradual disengagement leading to
the ‘termination of British control’ within the decade (188). Macmillan seems to have
been sceptical.110 There was general agreement in the CO that Luce’s idea of a
federation in the hinterland need not be discouraged, but they were less sure about
letting go of sovereignty in Aden (189,190). Amery fought for a rejection of Luce’s
radical policy, and for sticking with the hard line of 1956. Aden, he argued, was a vital
fortress colony, controlling a key position globally, which it was geopolitically
advantageous to retain (193,194). In May 1959—a year after Luce’s proposals were
received—Lennox-Boyd was still stalling: ‘the wisest course will be to play for time
and to avoid defining our policy too clearly’ (195, 196). Before leaving his post, Luce
developed his idea of bringing together the friendly princes of the hinterland and the
friendly moderates of the Colony (197). His procedural suggestions for engineering
this constitutional merger did not convince the CO, and gave them ‘much to think
about’. The Defence Committee confirmed that the retention of the base was still
essential (198). Macleod wanted the views of the new governor, Sir Charles Johnston,
before deciding anything (198). In March 1961 Johnston confirmed that merger
would be the right solution, preceded by self-government in Aden Colony (199), the
aim being the creation of an ‘independent and prosperous Arab state in relations of
friendly partnership with ourselves’. After going to Aden to see for himself, Macleod
decided to support this plan. He admitted that the princes would not like an election
in Aden under a self-governing constitution, and neither would the British
government if the moderates did not win (in which case direct rule would have to be
resumed), but, applying his trusty doctrine of ‘lesser risk’, Macleod believed it would
be ‘less dangerous to our interests than would be the certain dangers involved in our
refusing the moderates their wish for constitutional advance’. Accordingly he would
tell the hinterland rulers that although they could have their merger, ‘we could not
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exclude Aden Colony from the general aims of our overall colonial policy’, and must
give due weight to the principles of consent (200).
After some grumbling by the minister of defence, Harold Watkinson, and by
Amery, the Cabinet accepted that merger should be encouraged if the parties could
agree upon it. The policy was seen as a means of securing defence facilities for as long
as possible (202, 206). Sovereignty over Aden would continue for the moment. The
CO was still aiming to ‘pay out the rope as slowly as we decently can’, regarding the
merger as a way of buying time (203), although recognising that even the moderates
were ‘susceptible to the wind of change’ and sensitive to charges from Cairo that they
were ‘British stooges’.111
In September 1962 the Aden Leg Co voted for merger, and the Federation of South
Arabia came into being on 18 January 1963. The status of Aden was again considered
towards the end of the year, with Trevaskis as high commissioner proposing its
advance to full internal self-government. A decision in favour was temporarily
thrown off course by an assassination attempt against him (December 1963), but by
the end of February 1964 ministerial opinion was beginning to crystallise around the
doctrine of timely concession: ‘if we ignored the pressure for constitutional advance
there would be serious political trouble, in the face of which we should eventually
have to give way’ (211). At a constitutional conference in London in June 1964 it was
agreed that the federal constitution should be reformed on a democratic basis with a
view to independence no later than 1968; also that Britain would renounce
sovereignty over Aden as soon as practicable, at a date to be agreed after a general
election in October, and with a defence agreement covering the retention of the
British base.112 It had taken more than six tortuous years to reach these not very
remarkable conclusions, which were then put back into the melting-pot by the
Labour government. Towards the end of 1967 Aden and the Protectorates were finally
abandoned to the Yemen-based National Liberation Front, who established a Soviet-
Marxist successor government.
(f) Malaysia. On 31 August 1957 the British formally transferred power to a Malayan
elite headed by the anglophile Tunku Abdul Rahman (257); any possible alternative
government, they believed, would certainly be less well-disposed to them.113 The
subsequent transformation of the Federation of Malaya into the Federation of
Malaysia in September 1963 represented a major reconstruction of the map of South-
East Asia, accompanied by accusations that it was a ‘neo-colonialist plot’.
Paradoxically, however, if Britain had given a blank refusal to this project, the
accusation would have been one of ‘preventing the natural development’ of the Malay
world. In Singapore, the first prime minister under internal self-government (256,
260), Lee Kuan Yew, needed the merger with Malaya in order to ‘finish off
colonialism’ as a political issue there. Tunku Abdul Rahman had an expansionist
desire to double Malaya’s territory and get access to the oil revenues of Brunei;
negatively, the incorporation of Singapore was designed to head-off the possibility of
an independent communist state’s establishing itself on Malaya’s doorstep. For he
had come to realise that he would not for much longer be able to rely on a positive
and effective British presence in Singapore. Its incorporation alone would upset the
racial balance of Malaya by adding 1.5 million Chinese, so the Borneo territories were
a necessary way of redressing the balance and sweetening the pill (261).114
From the British government point of view, ‘Greater Malaysia’ seemed to offer the
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resolution of several problems.115 First, it would be ‘an ultimate solution’ for
Singapore, ‘the best and possibly the only hope for longer-term stability’,
neutralising communist tendencies and, after re-negotiation of defence facilities,
reducing the prospect of increasing hostility to the base (79). Secondly, it might
provide a viable future for the three Borneo territories, which would otherwise be
vulnerable to Indonesian encroachment. Thirdly, it might forward the purposes of
decolonisation, including retrenchment, in an area where Britain was from 1954 the
last colonial power. Lastly, a Greater Malaysia might form a stable bloc of anti-
communist territory in geopolitically significant South-East Asia (264, 265). As
commissioner-general, Malcolm MacDonald had for many years (and perhaps as far
back as 1947, though even then he was not the first to propose a consolidation)
propounded some such theory, calling it ‘the grand design’. In February 1958 he
publicly committed himself to a Borneo federation, the ultimate objective being a
confederation of five territories. But clearly the British could not take the initiative
in its consummation.116 Hence the decisive importance of the Tunku’s public
conversion to the scheme on 27 May 1961 (264).
There was, however, considerable opposition in Borneo and from its neighbours in
Indonesia and, to a lesser extent, the Philippines (268). Brunei, recently oil-rich and
apprehensive of Chinese influence, stood aside. Merger was a divisive issue in
Sarawak, where communism was making extensive inroads into its large Chinese
population. Local opinion was canvassed by a commission led by Lord Cobbold
(recently retired governor of the Bank of England). The results were sufficiently
reassuring for the scheme to go ahead.
The Greater Malaysia project was of close personal concern to Macmillan. He was
looking for ‘significant economies’ in defence expenditure in South-East Asia (269):
‘our limited resources and our growing commitments elsewhere make it essential that
we should gradually reduce our military and colonial responsibilities in South-East
Asia’.117 He described himself as ‘extremely anxious that it should come off’. However,
he was conscious of the practical difficulties, and was not going to superintend either
the creation of a ‘partial power vacuum’ or a shot-gun wedding. At the end of 1961 he
warned Lord Selkirk (commissioner-general, South-East Asia) that ‘Merdeka Day’,
independence, could not realistically be achieved as early as August 1962: ‘it might well
be fatal to the whole project if we appeared to be rushing our fences, particularly in
relation to the Borneo territories’.118 Equally, though, he took a firm line with the faint-
hearts. The governor of North Borneo, Sir William Goode, was suspicious both of
federations in general and of the Tunku’s intentions, clearly reluctant to ‘hand over’ to
him, complaining darkly that Borneo had already once been ‘steam-rollered’, by the
Japanese. Unless the Tunku seemed more co-operative and prepared to give some real
help to its people, ‘Malaysia must be off’. Macmillan picked up the two telegrams in
which these views were advanced and he reacted crossly to what he thought was the
governor’s lack of understanding of the realities of the situation:
I am rather shocked by [this] and the attitude it reveals. Does he realise (a) our
weakness in Singapore, and (b) our urgent need to hand over the security problem
there? The whole mood is based on a false assumption of our power. If this is the
Colonial Office point of view, we shall fail.
This confidential note was meant for Brook, but by accident a copy of it was sent by
the Cabinet Office to the secretary of state for the colonies. Both Maudling and the
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CO staff were angered by it, Maudling replying to Brook that the governor was ‘fully
aware’ of the importance of Malaysia.119
Indonesia officially declared its opposition to Malaysia on 13 February 1963,
launching Konfrontasi (‘Confrontation’). There was armed incursion on the
Kalimantan border on 12 April 1963, and British and Commonwealth troops were
sent into Borneo (267, 270). President Sukarno withdrew his exhausted Indonesian
troops in 1966, leaving Malaysia the victor of Confrontation. Meanwhile, Singapore
had seceded in 1965.
(g) The West Indies Federation. Few federations have failed faster than the West
Indies, which lasted only from January 1958 to February 1962.120 Though its
antecedents extended back many years, its formal creation got off to a bad start. In
Britain the Treasury, trying to save money, quibbled about the exact date when the
Federation was to come into legal existence, but backed down (272). In the West
Indies, at the federal government’s first press conference, its Barbadian prime
minister, Sir Grantley Adams, shocked everyone by personal attacks on his political
rivals and by threatening retroactive taxation.
The Federation had never been envisaged as ‘an end in itself’ (276), but rather as
a device to enhance the prospects of West Indians for independence. These
prospects were reviewed in the CO in May 1959 (275). Doubts were expressed as to
their readiness, while Home at the CRO was anxious about the impact of early
moves to independence on his Central African problem (273, 277). A federal inter-
governmental conference of constitutional review, held in September 1959, was
not exactly a success—indeed Philip Rogers (an assistant under-secretary at the
CO), who attended it, described it as ‘disastrous’. It settled little and in fact pre-
saged the collapse of the Federation (279, 281). Governor-General Lord Hailes was
determined to be optimistic, but this did not impress the CO or dent its gloomi-
ness. The CO would have preferred a more active attempt to promote the fragile
Federation. Macleod was ‘not sure how I read the tea-leaves’ (281). In December
1959 Grantley Adams caused consternation by calling for Dominion status within
months. Macleod paid a visit in June 1960 and said he would do all he could to
speed the advance to independence. Macmillan toured the islands in March and
April 1961; most of the concerns put to him were financial. The Lancaster House
Conference in May and June 1961 quickly ran into trouble, causing Macleod
considerable alarm. If the Federation failed, it would mean ‘balkanisation’, leaving
behind a gaggle of indigent islands and a very anxious American neighbour. His
colleagues would not allow him to divert funds from Africa—a clear demonstration
of the low priority accorded to the West Indies. Agreement was, however, reached
to strengthen the Federation and work for independence by 31 May 1962 (283).
Everything was then overtaken by a referendum in Jamaica (19 September 1961)
which voted 54.1 per cent to withdraw from the Federation. The British govern-
ment decided it could neither stop the dissolution of the Federation, nor refuse
Jamaica’s request for independence on its own (284). Macleod was saddened, but
with the examples of Cyprus and Sierra Leone before him, felt he could not
resist.121 Dr Eric Williams, the historian-prime minister of Trinidad, declared a new
arithmetical proposition—‘1 from 10 equals 0’—and withdrew his country too,
which also had to be granted independence (286). A possible reconstruction into a
federation of the remaining eight came to nothing (284–288). In 1967 St Lucia,
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St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St Vincent, Dominica, and Grenada entered into ‘associ-
ated statehood’ with Britain.
Why did the Federation fail? On the face of it, the West Indies should have been
eminently suited to co-operate in a single government. They had a common
language, a common heritage, and a common devotion to cricket and calypso and
(mostly) to Christianity. Air travel was beginning to reduce the distances between
them. The total population (three million) was about the same as Canada’s at the
time of Confederation in 1867, but with the advantage of not being afflicted with a
communal problem like Quebec. The most immediate explanation for failure offered
at the time was that ‘the leadership was awful’ (280). There is no denying this. The
leaders were variously assessed in the CO as irresponsible, immature, impatient and
inefficient. Adams was ‘not big enough for the job’, unimaginative, tactless, rude,
vain and lazy, quite apart from his failing health and mental powers. Hailes reported
that it was being predicted that Adams would become ‘a West Indian Mussadiq’,
retiring to bed whenever things looked dangerous. Rogers complained of Sir
Grantley’s ‘appalling inadequacy’. But as Rogers had also recognised from the outset,
if Manley did not ‘go to the Federation’ and become its prime minister, ‘it will be so
weak that its survival is doubtful’ (272). The leading politicians put ‘the second
eleven’ into bat, and then unsportingly refused even to give any encouraging shouts
from the boundary (276).
The failure of all worthy institutions and projects is, however, invariably ascribed
to ‘poor leadership’, and as a historical explanation it does not take us very far. Did
the fault lie rather with the compromising looseness of the federal structure? The
West Indies undoubtedly had one of the weakest federal systems ever called into
existence. There was no common currency or customs union. There were
restrictions on inter-island migration. The only responsibilities of the central power
were for external relations, communications between the islands, a university
college, and a regiment, the last two together pre-empting half the federal budget.
That budget was tiny, only one-tenth of the revenue of either Trinidad or Jamaica. No
direct taxation was ever raised, no common postage stamp ever issued. Many federal
powers were left dormant. But this structural laxity was an effect of the weakness of
commitment to the Federation rather than its cause.
The roots of failure were in fact to be found in the fundamental unsuitability of the
units for federation, their congenital incompatibility, the result of ‘centuries of
isolation, mistrust and mutual ignorance’ and jealous ‘local particularism’.122 The ten
were unequal in weight: Jamaica had over half the total population, Trinidad a
quarter; both were far ahead of the others in economic development, nervous of
having to bail them out. Once the large mainland colonies of Guiana and Honduras
stood aside, the rest were mainly competitive and not complementary in their
economies. Only five per cent of exports were between the islands. The smaller ones
were highly disparate. Barbados, with a unique constitution, had been self-governing
since 1639. St Lucia, a coaling station, had been disputed between Britain and
France, and although British since 1814, it still relied on the Quebec civil code and
Roman Catholic schools; its population mostly spoke ‘a queer patois of antique
French warped by a rustic kind of English’.123 St Vincent was dependent on
arrowroot. Montserrat was minuscule (only thirty-two square miles), dominated by a
sinister mountain and, Hailes thought, ‘a strange kind of Irishness’; Nevis he
described as ‘almost sullenly poor’. The Cayman Islands (some 200 miles west of
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Jamaica), preoccupied mainly with tourism and turtle fishing, were neither wholly in
nor wholly out. Technically members of the Federation, they were not represented in
the federal legislature nor did they contribute anything financially.124
Colonial economic and social policies
The officials involved with colonial economic policy defined its purposes as follows:
(i) raising the standard of living of colonial peoples, including productivity and
diversification, (ii) strengthening economies to stand on their own feet for self-
government, and (iii) maintaining the conditions for the inflow of external capital.125
Aid was given through a combination of Colonial Development and Welfare, grants-
in-aid, the Colonial Development Corporation, access to the London loan market,
and private investment. The mechanics of the way this assistance was given to
colonies was carefully analysed for the benefit of the incoming secretary of state,
Macleod, in October 1959 (306).
There was of course a fundamental problem. Desirable objectives were too great
for Britain’s resources (302), and the external financial position was precarious (301).
Macmillan during his premiership was never free from anxiety about over-stretched
economic resources (42). This led him, for example, summarily to dismiss a plea to
spend more on the High Commission Territories (482). A climax to this perennial
problem was reached in the middle of 1961, with a balance of payments crisis, ‘more
serious than at any time during the past ten years’.126 An emergency budget was
introduced on 25 July 1961. Three days later the prime minister wrote to all
spending ministers asking them to scrutinise their expenditure with the utmost
stringency. The CO had already a year earlier set a ceiling on colonial expenditure
(307), and the need for restraint on aid was well understood.
Another general anxiety concerned the state of the Sterling Area. Sterling was a
volatile currency during this period. As a framework for British policy-formation, the
Sterling Area was already beginning to fall apart. Gradually its Commonwealth side
became less important, and the foreign side, especially the oil producers like Kuwait,
became more important. The balances of the major African members of the
Commonwealth declined slowly. Although the Sterling Area did not formally come to
an end until 1972, ‘much of the rationale underlying [it] became redundant by
1958’.127 This was because the Montreal Trade and Economic Conference of
Commonwealth ministers in 1958 recommended convertibility, in the interests of
working together ‘in no exclusive spirit towards a multilateral trade and payments
system over the widest possible area’. Most of the restrictive aspects of the Sterling
Area system were dismantled, and sterling made convertible, soon after the Montreal
conference, though Britain continued to give preference to investment in sterling
countries. Economic planning generally moved further towards internationalisation.
None of which made decolonisation any harder.
Uncertainty about the future behaviour towards the Sterling Area of colonies
nearing independence gave rise to much debate. In this context, the Treasury
reviewed the advantages of membership in October 1958 (305). There was anxiety
about the possibility of newly independent countries like Malaya, Ghana and Nigeria
leaving the Area (300, 304). These countries had been amongst the principal dollar-
earners for the Sterling Area during the 1950s, and their continued earning power
remained a matter of concern to other members. They had large sterling balances. If
they ran sizeable balance of payments deficits and drew in their sterling balances—as
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India had done—this would become a serious problem for Britain and the Area. The
chances of South Africa’s leaving were also investigated (442). Most Treasury officials
did not think it would technically matter too much—and certainly less than it would
have done ten years earlier—if South Africa withdrew. The Bank of England showed
more alarm than the Treasury, arguing that the defection of the world’s leading gold
producer would be seen as psychologically a major crack in the Sterling Area system.
In the event, South Africa remained inside despite her departure from the
Commonwealth in May 1961.
To illustrate what was happening in the field of economic development we have
concentrated on a case-study. Swaziland was a notable example of intensive
economic improvement under ‘the late colonial state’, which showed just what could
be achieved, given the chance.128 The post-independence prosperity of Swaziland was
almost entirely due to the measures taken in the years covered by this volume (see
map, p 38, part II). Before the 1950s very little had been done, apart from setting up
an asbestos export industry in 1938 at Havelock, which became one of the five largest
asbestos mines in the world. Within a period of ten years, however, by the end of 1964
a trans-territorial highway and railway line to Mozambique, connecting Swaziland to
the port of Lourenço Marques (Maputo), had been completed; a central power-
scheme, a new iron-ore mine at Ngwenya, and a coal-mine at Mpaka had all been
opened; and an industrial estate at Matsapa (with Swaziland’s first cotton ginnery)
was almost fully operational. The Ngwenya mine supplied high-grade iron ore to
Japan. In 1950 a government-run cattle-holding area at Impala Ranch (25,000 acres)
was established for cattle culled from over-stocked herds. The timber resources of
80,000 acres of forest in northern Swaziland were exploited from 1955. In 1959 the
Usutu Pulp Company was formed to process the timber of a 107,000-acre estate of
pine (and some eucalyptus), the largest man-made forest in Africa. Several irrigation
schemes were completed, the biggest at Malkerns, over 6,000 acres, with a diversified
output, notably rice and citrus fruits; there was also a large irrigated dairy-farming
area in the north, and, a little to the south of it, the Vuvulane sugar-producing
scheme. By 1962 sugar had become Swaziland’s major export. Nearly all of these
were Colonial Development Corporation projects, and among its few unequivocal
successes.129 Central to all these developments was the completion of the freight
railway operated by the Caminhos de Ferro de Mozambique. The track followed a
route first surveyed eighty years earlier, along the Usushwane river valley out of the
mountainous highveld, and linked many of the new industrial enterprises: 139.5
miles in all. It gave Swaziland an outlet to the sea independent of South Africa. The
progress of the railway project was monitored at the highest ministerial level, with
Macmillan taking a particular interest (310, 311, 323–326).
During the period represented here, government attitudes towards aid underwent
a significant shift. Aid to developing countries was coming to be generally accepted
as desirable. Amounts were increased throughout the world, and new international
institutions were set up to handle it. Aid became a major new theme in international
relations. For Britain, the politics of aid upset all economical calculations. Since both
the communist and western worlds tried to attract the unaligned nations, the latter
could in this competitive situation ‘sell their favours dear’, in Macmillan’s sardonic
phrase (541). Accordingly, as he explained to the Cabinet in February 1962 (in the
context of Uganda), the costs of relinquishing colonial rule were proving to be high,
but it was ‘probably better to accept definite, if large, financial commitments on
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independence than to take the risk of the indefinite and large expenditure involved in
prolonging colonial rule against the risk of a collapse of law and order’ (134).
The traditional attitude of ‘no independence before financial viability and no aid
after it’ was still in place in 1957, with the test of viability being the ability to raise
money on the London Market. In May 1957 the Economic Policy Committee
reaffirmed its opposition to any regular system of Exchequer assistance (government
capital) for independent Commonwealth countries, and refused to empower the
Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) to start new development schemes in
them (302). The Cabinet in June endorsed this hard-line policy (303). Accordingly,
the White Paper of July 1957 declared magisterially and categorically, ‘the special
responsibility which HMG has for colonial dependencies ceases when they achieve
independence’ and further CDC investment would therefore be ‘inappropriate’.130
Parliamentary debates in January had already uncovered a lot of dissatisfaction over
these rules, but the CO, the CRO and the Treasury had all agreed the Ghana
Independence Bill should retain the clause precluding new CDC operations (327,
328).131 Only a short time afterwards, however, all these policies went into sharp
reverse. The rapidity of political advancement made it virtually impossible in all but a
few instances for colonies to borrow on the London Market, and it became politically
necessary to continue giving aid after independence. 
The major move forward came as a result of the policy inaugurated at the Montreal
Conference of 1958 (313), after which colonies could continue to expect to receive,
once independent, financial help much as they would have done had they remained
dependent. Commonwealth assistance loans were provided for independent
countries. In the light of this, by mid-1959 a good deal of pressure had built up to do
more by way of financial help for newly-independent Nigeria than had been done for
Ghana. The kind of assistance to be given was considered closely (330–332). Like
Ghana, Nigeria did not get any aid, but it did receive one of the new Commonwealth
assistance loans. The financial debate was extended early in 1960 to the West Indies
Federation (333) and Sierra Leone (107, 334–335). Countries reaching independence
were now generally allowed technical assistance (mainly the services of experts and
advisers), and any unspent CDW allocation, together with a Commonwealth
assistance loan. Otherwise there was a reluctance to move beyond this, and certainly
to regard the more generous provision made in 1960 for Somaliland and Cyprus
(239) as special cases. But then a transitional annually tapering financial grant for up
to ten years was proposed for the West Indies Federation by the CO (333). This would
be an important and unwelcome new departure, but seemingly unavoidable, given its
circumstances. Improved financial assistance was still not easy to achieve, and the
debate about it was regularly renewed (352). Both Tanganyika (August 1961) and
Uganda (February 1962) obtained fairly generous settlements (134, 156). The
chances of applying simple, uniform, minimal, arithmetical formulae were fast dis-
appearing.
Plans for the renewal of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act were started by
Lennox-Boyd in February 1958 (312), to cover the quinquennium 1959–1964. It was
expected that the poorer countries would continue to need grants for as long as
could be foreseen. The Treasury accepted in principle the need for further aid, but
there was tough negotiation over (a) the amount, and (b) even more so, the ceiling
on new Exchequer loans for approved development schemes, introduced (to the
delight of the CO) in parallel with the Commonwealth assistance loans agreed at
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Montreal. The points at issue with the Treasury were recorded in CO minutes in
December 1958 (315, 319). Formal representations were made by Lennox-Boyd (316)
for raising the ceiling on money available by an extra £80 million in grants (to £300
million) and for providing £125 million (or £25 million a year) to underwrite
Exchequer loans for colonial development programmes. The Treasury was
unconvinced, and a face-to-face meeting was held between the two ministers on 2
January 1959 (318). The CO did quite well in the bargaining (319). The 1959 CDW
Act was the fifth since 1940 and provided an additional £95 million, together with
£100 million for Exchequer loans, with an annual ceiling of £25 million. Officials
met in the summer of 1962 to discuss the next CDW Act, to come into operation
from 1 April 1963 in accordance with the usual one-year overlap procedure. The
result was the Commonwealth Development Act, 1963, which provided £103 million.
In his circular to governors (18 November 1963) Sandys asked them to submit
integrated development plans instead of unrelated shopping-lists of schemes.132
The other change which reflected the general loosening predicated by the
Montreal policy was the transmutation of the Colonial Development Corporation
into the Commonwealth Development Corporation in mid-1963, when it was re-
organised and freed to operate in independent countries. The debate about its future
had begun in 1956.133 That the CDC survived in any form is perhaps surprising,
granted its poor track record and huge losses. At least thirty out of thirty-five CDC
schemes for producing food were failures. Whether or not the chairmanship of Lord
Reith (to the end of March 1959) should be counted an asset or a liability is no doubt
a matter for dispute. He was unpopular outside the organisation, over-persistent,
aggressive and difficult to deal with. ‘Old Wuthering Height’ was how Macmillan
referred to him: ‘is there no way of getting rid of this turbulent Peer?’134
Nevertheless, Reith’s tenacity undoubtedly saved the CDC. The CO, the CRO and the
Treasury were all prepared to see it wound up, but it gradually became apparent that
the CDC had too many friends in parliament, and it would not be politically feasible
to kill it off (321–322). Macleod commented on a ‘mystic belief’ in it, or something
like it, and a possible ‘great outcry’.135 Lord Sinclair of Cleeve was appointed to find a
solution to its special losses account, running at about £9 million (321), though the
government in the end took a tougher line than he recommended. 
One other major new departure in the provision of aid should be noted. In April
1960 the CRO put forward a ‘constructive and positive non-political initiative’ for
Africa: an economic plan for aid analogous to the Colombo Plan (1950) for South-
East Asia, but restricted to Commonwealth countries both as recipients and donors
(336). It was hoped this might help to persuade independent countries of the value of
the Commonwealth, while at the same time spreading the load for Britain. This
proposal was put before the Africa Committee and blessed by them, rather to general
surprise.136 The response of the CO had been lukewarm, dismissing it as ‘economic
imperialism’ or ‘window-dressing’. The FO disliked the exclusion of foreign countries
and also thought it open to a charge of ‘neo-colonialism’. The Treasury was sceptical
as to whether any substantial funds would be forthcoming from the Commonwealth,
in which case it might be a discreditable flop (337). The scheme was, however,
referred by the Cabinet to the Development Policy Committee for further study—
mainly because Nkrumah coincidentally proposed, at the May 1960 Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Meeting, something similar (338). So it seemed that if Britain did
not take a lead, Ghana, or even Canada, might make proposals prejudicial to British
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freedom of action. The pros and cons were thus finely balanced. The official
committee recommended a plan (in its ‘Report on Commonwealth co-operation in
African development’, 15 July 1960) confined to technical (as opposed to capital)
assistance, not necessarily restricted to Commonwealth countries, provided they
were in the western camp (340). The scheme emerged from the Commonwealth
finance ministers’ meeting in September 1960 as the Special Commonwealth African
Assistance Plan (SCAAP), with the particular support of Canada, together with
Australia and New Zealand. It provided some capital as well as technical assistance,
ie, capital aid was not actually excluded. Many were disappointed by this limited
outcome, but it was obvious that the resources for doing more were not forthcoming
(343, 344).
Three other matters concerning the management of aid had to be considered.
First, whether or not aid should be ‘tied’. In fact the traditional policy of not tying aid
to British goods and services (307) broke down in mid-1962 in the aftermath of the
economic crisis of 1961 (349). Thereafter aid was tied. Untied aid had become a
problem. It constituted a significant pressure on the balance of payments, and
Britain was being badly left behind because all other donor countries were tying aid
to their own goods and services or to the import costs of development. A distinct
change of outlook was registered in the Economic Policy Committee on 31 October
1962 (350), when Home argued that aid should be treated like defence, diplomacy
and information services—as an instrument of policy, to be used in the maintenance
of British influence and strength abroad, ‘an essential part of our policy of
maintaining our position in the face of the Communist threat’, and a means of
reducing tension between the haves and have-nots. He wanted a greater proportion
earmarked for non-Commonwealth countries. In discussion, the Committee thought
Latin America might now be a more useful recipient than Africa. Africa was thus
almost visibly slipping in importance (353), and the whole conception of ‘colonial’
aid was on its way out. Secondly, the government tried to persuade the Americans to
contribute more to aid. The United States was prepared to help in the Caribbean, and
if the West Indies Federation had survived, the Americans would have provided
generous aid, regarding it as a barrier against Castroism (so the offer was withdrawn
when the Federation broke up). By the same token, they were not willing to help
Guiana, led by Dr Jagan, supposedly a communist. But they showed some interest in
helping East Africa.137 Finally, there was the question of adequate publicity for aid. A
good many ministers, MPs, and businessmen were concerned that the improved aid
effort was not making enough impact, and an attempt was made to rectify this (347,
351).
To conclude on aid policy: by 1964, the amount of aid to developing countries had
been greatly augmented, from £81 million in 1957-1958, to £161 million in 1960-
1961, and about £170 million in 1963–1964. The proportion going to colonies
remained considerable. The days of disinterested aid were, however, long gone, and
officials were now debating whether aid should be used directly as a cold war weapon
—overall policy was as yet unclear about that (353). Nevertheless, in the final
analysis, aid was still not regarded as a matter of the highest political priority.138
An examination of the government’s record in social policy and research shows a
striking decline in the bulk of archival material over that generated for the 1940s
and early 1950s. These were spheres of action readily handed over to indigenous
elites, and the demand for CO services was falling. Independence—even the
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approach of independence—meant an end to responsibility for colonial research. It
also meant an end to any social engineering, to any justification for attempts to
mould labour relations or colonial trade unions (355, 358, 359). The Trades Union
Congress was contracting its overseas activities, and ‘under the impact of African
nationalism any reversal of this trend is now out of the question’ (359). Not that
there were no anxieties about the abuse of regulatory powers by independent gov-
ernments. Ghana and Singapore virtually ‘nationalised’ their trades unions, bending
them to their own political purposes, and this greatly shocked British officials.
Tanganyika was also a cause of similar concern, but it could only be dealt with
‘informally’ (361). Also, by 1958, the idea of a royal commission to examine colonial
education in Africa was thought too heavy-handed and likely to cause resentment by
implying that Africans needed to be told what to do (356). An adequate education
policy, though, remained a matter of high concern, since a sufficient number of edu-
cated people was obviously vital to the success of every newly-independent state.
However, education was one of the first subjects to be taken over by local govern-
ments as they became more representative. This was probably just as well, since a
more active policy of promoting colonial education—or indeed any other social wel-
fare policy—would have been extremely costly for Britain. Sir John Maud failed to
secure additional expenditure on education for the High Commission Territories
(482).139
In the light of subsequent public preoccupations, the amount of attention given in
these years to tourism, or even to the environment (360), was very small. But here
too, at the time when these might have begun to surface as higher priorities, it was
already too late for the metropolitan government to take a lead, still less to co-
ordinate matters such as game preservation between various territories. By 1960
directives of this kind were recognised as ‘inappropriate today’ and ‘out of keeping
with the degree of constitutional advance’ in Africa (360).
Ministers were, however, alert to human rights issues. In 1957, during the making
of the Malayan constitution and negotiations for the future of Singapore, the local
political leaders (including Tunku Abdul Rahman) demanded constitutional
provisions which strengthened the executive at the expense of the judiciary and
appeared to British ministers to put fundamental civil liberties at risk; these changes
were only reluctantly accepted.140 As foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd early in 1958
placed the defence of free institutions and human rights (where they existed) along-
side the preservation of world peace and stability as the objectives of foreign policy.
Where human rights did not exist, British policy was ‘the encouragement of trends
which will result in ordered progress towards them’ (379). Racial discrimination
certainly existed in the dependent empire (eg, in Bermuda: 354), but nowhere on the
systematic scale of South Africa. Mrs Bandaranaike of Ceylon saw the departure of
South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961 as driven by the unwillingness of
other members ‘to compromise on an issue affecting human rights’ (457); Lord
Hailes rejoiced that there had been ‘a clear affirmation of democratic principles. . .
[an] unequivocal stand for human rights’.140
The Ghanaian constitution made no mention of fundamental rights. The first
African constitution to do so was Nigeria’s in 1958, which embodied, indeed
entrenched, virtually all the clauses of the European Human Rights Convention
(103–105). This highly significant new development arose out of suggestions to the
Willink Commission (investigating the anxieties of Nigerian minorities) made by
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Christian bodies campaigning for a guarantee of fundamental rights. Willink’s
comment was persuasive:
Provisions of this kind in the Constitution are difficult to enforce and sometimes
difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, we think they should be inserted. Their presence
defines beliefs widespread among democratic countries and provides a standard to
which appeal may be made by those whose rights are infringed. A Government
determined to abandon democratic clauses will find ways of violating them, but they
are of great value in preventing a steady deterioration in standards of freedom and the
unobtrusive encroachment of a Government on individual rights.142
It is a matter for speculation whether the Nigerian constitution would have gone
in this direction had Willink been swayed by the demands—made by almost all other
witnesses—for separation and state-proliferation as the means of protecting minority
rights. As it was, sixteen human rights were listed in the Nigerian constitution,
covering life and liberty, the administration of justice, social freedom, religious
rights, and discrimination. When Macleod moved the Second Reading of the Nigerian
Independence Bill in July 1960 he went out of his way to praise the constitution’s
‘code of fundamental human rights’, adding that it had been extremely useful as a
model for many of the constitutional conferences which he had presided over
since.143 Kenya (163, 164), Uganda and Sierra Leone rapidly adopted it; Butler
insisted on a bill of rights for the Nyasaland constitution in 1963 (509). Thereafter it
became almost mandatory.
Macleod also invoked ‘human rights’ as part of his reasoning behind the release of
Dr Banda (495). The declaration of states of emergency involved having to satisfy the
Human Rights Commission before a proclamation could made or revoked:
alternative and less embarrassing procedures were explored, not least for Kenya (23,
24). What happened at Hola Camp had clearly breached the Human Rights
Convention (159). There was concern too that breaches were alleged by the Greeks in
1957 protesting about the ill-treatment of detainees in Cyprus and the application of
curfew (221). Conversely, consideration was given to the possibility that countries
which attacked Britain for its ‘colonialism’ might themselves be vulnerable to
counter-charges of contravening human rights (414, 415).
International policy
By ‘international policy’ we mean relationships with foreign countries concerning
colonial questions, mainly those with America, with Europe and in the United
Nations. All of these occupied important positions in British policy-making: the
United States by providing financial underpinning and strategic cover, together with
supportive advice and unwelcome irritation in about equal measure; Europe by
acting as, in effect, a potential alternative to the Commonwealth; the United Nations
by forcing the pace of decolonisation.
The post-war world was at once profoundly anti-imperial and in the West anti-
communist. Fortunately for Britain, the Americans came to believe that communism
was a more serious threat than ‘colonialism’, but anti-colonialism was a world-wide
movement, exploited not just by communists, but also affecting countries which had
never been colonies, and often led by those Asian and African states to whom Britain
had given independence sooner rather than later. Thus even Hilton Poynton of the
CO realised that the international climate had become ‘a more decisive factor’ to be
05-ConGov-Intro-cp  18/10/00  2:01 pm  Page lxviii
INTRODUCTION lxix
taken into account in the formulation of British policy (405). Contextualising Africa
in cold war terms became almost an obsession, to the point where by 1961 Sir
Andrew Cohen was worried that ‘killing communism’ seemed to be the chief
objective of African policy, rather than the desirability of preparing stable and viable
regimes for independence (382). Analysis of Soviet expansion, its aims, methods and
success-rate, was repeatedly undertaken, together, where appropriate, with those of
Chinese communism. In particular, the situation in Africa was subject to close and
regular scrutiny (39, 132, 379, 383, 387, 390). More specifically, Ghana was the object
of concern and intense interest. The high commissioner, Sir Arthur Snelling, quite
clearly identified Ghana as ‘a key battleground in the cold war’. The dilemma was: if
Britain did not help Ghana a clear field would be left for the Russians to appear her
only true friend; but helping the corrupt ministers surrounding Nkrumah, such as
K A Gbedemah and K Botsio, might well back-fire.144 Snelling’s valedictory despatch
raised the sombre possibility of Ghana’s leaving the Commonwealth and leading a
pan-African, anti-British movement (384, 386).
The prospects of communism in India were analysed closely by Malcolm
MacDonald (7). South-East Asia was examined reflectively by Fred Warner of the FO
towards the end of 1963 (388). Macmillan attempted a global over-view in a
memorandum he called ‘The grand design’ produced over the Christmas holidays,
dated 3 January 1961.145 It was a typically elegant but theoretical essay calling for co-
operation between the United States, Britain and France, because ‘the Communist
danger—in its various forms—is so great and so powerfully directed that it cannot be
met without the maximum achievable unity of purpose and direction’. In a sentence
which resembled one of Ernest Bevin’s, he called for ‘the great forces of the free
world’ to organise themselves ‘economically, politically and militarily in a coherent
effort to withstand the Communist tide all over the world’, and in particular to use
their economic power more efficiently. It is perhaps a little surprising that only three
years later his successor, in a notable speech in Canada, was able to identify a double
‘sea-change’ in world affairs: ‘colonialism’, declared Sir Alec Douglas-Home, ‘is
nearly at an end’ and ‘positive co-existence’ had emerged, signalling a foreseeable end
to the cold war. It was therefore time to move on and tackle the ‘problem of
problems’, the disparity between rich and poor nations (389). Reports of the death of
the cold war proved to be an exaggeration, but the worst was perhaps over.
Of all Britain’s international relationships, none was more vital than that with the
United States. In the aftermath of what Macmillan revealingly referred to as ‘the
Anglo-American schism’, the Suez Crisis of 1956,146 rebuilding the American
relationship was a top priority. One obstacle to this was what was regarded in
Whitehall as the negative, unreconstructed and prejudiced attitude of the Americans
(in at least some quarters of Washington) towards British ‘colonialism’. The CO
urged the prime minister not to flinch from tackling this as soon as possible (374,
375). The Bermuda Conference in March 1957 offered a good opportunity. The State
Department and the British Embassy in Washington collaborated in presenting a
paper on ‘Means of combating Communist influence in tropical Africa’. In it, they
agreed that ‘the best counter to Soviet aims is to pursue resolutely and systematically
the constructive policy of leading dependencies as rapidly as is practicable toward
stable self-government or independence in such a way that these governments are
willing and able to preserve their political and economic ties with the West’.147 At one
of the meetings, the foreign secretary Selwyn Lloyd suggested that Africa was ‘likely
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to be the great battle of the next ten years. The battle of the Middle East had caught
us unawares; we must be ready for the battle of Africa’. The meeting agreed that the
communists did indeed aim to dominate Africa; and the Americans accepted that the
British ‘evolutionary’ approach to decolonisation was right (376). The British felt all
this represented a considerable advance towards a better understanding between the
two nations (377). By October 1957, Lloyd claimed that the ‘special relationship’ was
restored. Macmillan believed with satisfaction that the two had agreed on their
‘interdependence’ (378). What this meant in practice never became entirely clear.
The Americans were increasingly interested in Africa, especially once Kennedy
became president. Being more interested made them better informed, and this in
turn meant, the British believed, that the US government was more understanding of
and less ready to criticise British policy. They did not put pressure on Britain to
proceed any faster with decolonisation (380). Even over Central Africa, where a
legitimate critique could have been forcefully developed, they seemed to become
more sympathetic and patient, perhaps because they had concluded that there was
no immediate threat of communist infiltration.
The contrast between this relaxed indulgence over Rhodesia, and the truculent
pressure the Americans tried to exert over Guiana shows just how far they evaluated
British performance in cold war terms. Guiana posed a serious strategic risk to the
Americans, since it would be as ideal a location for Russian missiles as Cuba, and
because it could prove to be the thin end of the wedge for communism in Latin
America. Home dealt firmly with the American attempt to retard independence in
Guiana and instigate a CIA operation against Dr Jagan. Macmillan wrote ruefully in
his diary, ‘The Americans are the first to squeal when “decolonisation” takes place
uncomfortably near to them’ (295). In June 1963 Kennedy again insisted on
pursuing his Guiana concerns with Macmillan, but the British had no profound
interest in the territory and were only anxious to be rid of it. In any case, as Home
pointed out, they could not possibly revert to direct rule without destroying Britain’s
image as a decolonising power. Sandys, however, was not altogether unmoved,
slowed things up a bit and made two visits. The voting procedure was changed to
proportional representation—something the CO had hitherto opposed (299). As a
result, Jagan held only twenty-two seats as against twenty-nine by his opponents, and
on this basis independence was eventually granted in April 1966.148
Apart from this one exception, relations with the United States in the colonial field
had become fairly smooth. Even so, the Anglo-American relationship as a whole in
1964 needed almost as much careful nurturing as it had in 1959 (13, 391).
Problems with the United Nations consumed immense quantities of time, energy
and paper. One over-arching theme dominated British relations with the UN in this
period: whether or not (in the mid-1950s) to resign from it, or one of its agencies, or
(in the early 1960s) to withdraw from its specialist Committee of Seventeen (later
Twenty-Four) which was charged with overseeing the termination of ‘colonialism’. In
general terms, it was desirable that the UN should function as an effective guarantor
of world peace, and so leaving it would be dangerous, ‘an abdication of responsibility’
(404). On the other hand, the hostility to British colonial policy displayed therein
was embarrassing, and the UN’s determination to extend its influence over all
colonial territories was an unqualified nuisance. The arguments were finely
balanced, and there was no agreed British position. As permanent British
representative on the Trusteeship Council (1957–1961), Cohen wanted a
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modification of the previous rigid line. He recommended remaining forthright and
firm, but also being forthcoming and flexible. Poynton disagreed (‘I have always
been, and unashamedly remain, on the extreme right wing over this’), regarding
Cohen’s approach as ‘extremely distasteful’. Macleod said he shared Poynton’s
anxieties, but felt it would be wise to follow Cohen’s advice.149
Then in December 1960 came the epoch-making Resolution 1514 (XV),
demanding ‘a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism’, sponsored by forty-three
Afro-Asian nations, Britain and the United States abstaining. The Resolution
maintained that unpreparedness must not be made a pretext for delaying
independence, and target dates should be set. How to deal with this was the subject
of an anxious memorandum by Sir John Martin in June 1961 (406). The Committee
of Seventeen was established to implement the Resolution, or at least to monitor
progress (November 1961). However, in the General Assembly 1961 debate on
colonialism, a Soviet-inspired resolution for an early and general target date (the end
of 1962) was killed off. Even Krishna Menon of India opposed this, saying that
immediate independence for South-West Africa and the High Commission
Territories could only condemn them to indefinite South African domination.150 A
Nigerian resolution for a date of 1970—which the British government could have
accepted—was withdrawn (407). Similarly, in the 1962 Assembly, a target-date
proposal was again defeated, failing to secure a two-thirds majority. An earlier
motion by Guinea and the communist bloc for setting 24 October 1963 as the date
encountered considerable opposition, including Nigeria’s.151 The upshot was that the
Committee was merely instructed to report on all colonial territories the following
year—so far it had concentrated on Africa. These were helpful ‘modifications’ of the
Resolution 1514 from the British view-point, making it easier to remain in what had
now become the Committee of Twenty-Four. Nevertheless, a chain of developments
had been started which Britain could not ignore: if some territories at least were not
‘speeded up’ it would look as if no notice at all was being taken of Resolution 1514
(538).
Much of the internal debate was focused in the early months of 1962.152 It was
triggered by Sir Hugh Foot’s memorandum of 22 December 1961 (409), arguing that
although Britain could not tolerate interference in the administration of colonies,
total non-co-operation must only be a last resort. This point had not yet been
reached. In a Churchillian metaphor, he proclaimed his battle-plan: ‘We should fight
on the resolutions. We should fight in the corridors. We should fight in the
Committees. We should never abstain’. The CRO welcomed this, and wondered
whether the initiative might not be taken by making a declaration of intent about
colonial policy. Sandys himself drafted a possible declaration or resolution,
committing Britain to a completion of the transfer of power by 1970. Both Macmillan
and Home (who paid close attention to all UN matters) liked the idea (414). But
Maudling did not, apparently influenced by Poynton, who reiterated that the only
real choice was between co-operation or withdrawal (410). A declaration, it was also
pointed out, might be dangerous (‘what would happen to the Falklands if they
became independent?’), as well as self-congratulatory. The Africa Committee was
asked to consider. It was unhelpful about the prime minister’s angle on this, perhaps
being unwilling to give him an outright rebuff (416). The CO and FO were more
blatantly dismissive (415). Maudling continued to press for a firm line against the
Committee of Seventeen (410).
05-ConGov-Intro-cp  18/10/00  2:01 pm  Page lxxi
lxxii INTRODUCTION
Foot had talks in London in March 1962 and found himself depressed by Poynton’s
attitude (417). After an exchange of minutes (418, 419), Maudling and Home had
talks on 30 March to try to resolve their differences. The only way forward was to
present an agreed general analysis and let the pros and cons be argued out at
Cabinet. The Cabinet in effect decided against Maudling’s more intransigent line
(422). The possibility of a formal declaration of policy was discussed again in June
1962, but the CO reacted against it, thinking it would be counter-productive and
seen as a hypocritical attempt to divert attention from Southern Rhodesia, on which
Britain would be attacked by India, Tanganyika, and Ghana, all arguing it was the
most important example of ‘colonialism’. Southern Rhodesia was certainly the
principal reason for Britain’s difficulties, ‘an absolute liability’ (423). In August 1962
Foot expressed his concern that Britain was perceived as the friend of Welensky,
Salazar, Verwoerd and Tshombe (428). In October 1962 he resigned, warning that the
government was drifting to disaster over Southern Rhodesia. He thought Britain
spoke with the petulance of a retired governess, ‘conservative’ in the worst sense,
‘negative, defensive, cowardly, sterile’.153
After Foot’s resignation, Sir Patrick Dean remained as Britain’s principal
representative at the UN but his views were similar: the Committee was not a serious
threat, so it would be more sensible to remain on it and act as a tormenting gad-fly,
rather than behaving like an early Christian facing the lions. There was a major
discussion on tactics again in July and August 1963, with the familiar array of
arguments.154 The CO officials believed it was damaging to be exposed to such
vehement attacks, and too much goodwill was being used up in trying to mobilise the
support of friends. Opinion within the office was, however, divided between the
options.155 The FO supported Dean, believing the communists would like Britain to
‘run away’; to leave would only make the Committee more extremist and tarnish
Britain’s image as a modern, sympathetic, reasonable nation. In short, the
conclusion of this latest round of exhaustive discussions was once again that the
balance of advantage was in favour of ‘soldiering on’.
The Congo was the scene of the UN’s most high-profiled involvement during the
early 1960s. In 1959, the Belgian government, faced with riots and revolts, offered
self-government on a progressively telescoping time-table. Diverse political parties
emerged. Their leaders—Lumumba, Kasavubu, Tshombe, Mobuto, Gizenga,
Bomboko—all had utterly different intentions for the Congo’s future, and established
competing power-bases (‘more like the Crazy Gang* than anything I can remember’:
Macmillan, diary, September 1960).156 Lumumba came to seem dangerous because
he appealed for Soviet aid. Eisenhower and Macmillan agreed it would be good if he
could ‘fall into a river full of crocodiles’.157 By contrast, Tshombe, who led the
secession of the mining province of Katanga in July 1960, seemed much more
congenial, able, and friendly to the West, and he kept fair order in his prosperous
province. However tempting it may have been, the British government consistently
refused to recognise his regime. African states would have regarded recognition of
Katanga as a ‘colonialist’ attack on the unity of the Congo; but there was a thousand-
mile border with Northern Rhodesia, and what if Northern Rhodesia broke with the
Central African Federation and joined Katanga? (392).
* A group of five or six music-hall comedians (originally three double-acts: Flanagan & Allen,
Nervo & Knox, Naughton & Gold), popular on the London stage in the 1950s.
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Both Macmillan and Home were apprehensive of ‘another Korea’, and, in Home’s
case, ‘another Spanish Civil War’, if the Russians supported the rest of the Congo
against Katanga (394). ‘Russia was the whole problem’, or so Macmillan told
Kennedy in 1962.158 Thus, from the beginning, the Cabinet supported a UN presence
as the best hope of stabilising the Congo and preventing armed communist
intervention and Soviet domination. To this extent the UN presence (opposed by the
Russians) was a convenient instrument for the western powers to fill the vacuum.
Britain agreed the UN could use a degree of force to maintain law and order, but not
to impose a political solution (which might well fail). Katanga must be returned to
the fold by negotiated settlement, Tshombe coaxed into co-operation with the central
government, perhaps in a federal arrangement. A Foreign Office minister, Lord
Lansdowne, had reported in September 1961 that any idea of an independent
Katanga’s peacefully existing alongside a truncated Congo was a fantasy (396). The
British government was opposed to the use of sanctions (399, 401).
Led by India and Nigeria, a number of Commonwealth countries were unhappy
about British Congo policy (396). Malaya, Ghana and even Canada thought Britain
guilty of equivocation. They were suspicious of pressure from the Central African
Federation, sensitive about any supposed lack of co-operation with the UN. Home
appealed to the United States for closer co-ordination of their policies (397), and,
since stalemate persisted Macmillan repeated the appeal directly to Kennedy in May
1962 (398). By this time, Home and Macmillan favoured a package of financial aid
and technical assistance, to which Britain would contribute, organised by the UN and
channelled to a federal state (399). Both sides were to be offered economic aid for
reconstruction as an inducement to co-operate in a negotiated settlement (400).
Home claimed Britain was genuinely keen to see Katanga reincorporated: ‘we are not
dragging our feet simply with a view to delaying the application of the “wind of
change” to our own territories’ (40). Britain remained opposed to sanctions, but the
UN held to a different view (401, 402), wanting to expedite the ending of the Katanga
secession by increasing the economic pressure on Tshombe. The Cabinet agreed not
to participate actively in an international embargo on purchases of Katangan copper
or in measures designed to prevent by physical means the passage of exports from
Katanga, because this would probably fail (403). Attempts at reconciliation of
Tshombe came to nothing. The final UN campaign against him was relatively blood-
less. The dire consequences feared by Britain did not materialise. Tshombe
capitulated in the middle of January 1963. The Cabinet decided against British
intervention or attempting to rescue Tshombe from the predicament he had got
himself into, despite the support he had among some Conservative MPs. Sanctions
would not be actively opposed.159
The main concern of the government throughout the Congo crisis was to try to
stabilise the situation. According to Home—who had a dim view of Africans in this
part of the world—‘unless we are very careful we could get a belt of chaos from
Angola, through the Congo, Ruanda–Urundi to Kenya. That would be a dreadful
prospect’. The limits of British influence were, however, painfully obvious in that
although the Russians were kept out, the crisis was resolved in ways largely outside
British control. What happened in the Congo was a cautionary tale in several senses;
governors were asked for their opinions about the lessons to be learned (405).
It is not possible within the confines of this collection to do justice to Britain’s
first application to join the European Common Market (EEC). We have concen-
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trated on a selection of documents recording the bare bones of the leading Cabinet
decisions, of which the most important was on 18 June 1961, when the formal deci-
sion was taken (365). A major factor in moving towards Europe was that this was
what the Americans (for cold war geopolitical reasons) wanted Britain to do.
Another was the hope of savings on Britain’s contribution to NATO defence (80).
The Cabinet was divided, in part because of Commonwealth considerations. Much
attention was paid to reconciling possible membership with the interests of
Commonwealth countries, especially those of Australia (540, 543), New Zealand and
Canada, all of which had serious worries about the consequences, not merely for
their own trading relationships with Britain but also for the impact on the strength
of the Commonwealth should British links with it unravel. African states indicated
concern that the Community might perpetuate, through arrangements of ‘associa-
tion’, their inferior relationship with their former colonial masters. In July 1961—
following the precedent of 1949 when ministers were sent to Commonwealth
countries to sound out opinion on the continuation of India’s membership as a
republic—Sandys was dispatched to Australia, New Zealand and Canada,
Thorneycroft to India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Singapore and Malaya, Perth to the West
Indies, Edward Heath to Cyprus, and John Hare to Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone
and Gambia (366). The results of this consultation were given to the Cabinet on 18
July 1961 (368). At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in September
1962 Macmillan, who had been prepared for ‘grumbling acquiescence’, was shaken
by the vehemence of the doubts expressed. Nevertheless, an unusually full and
informative communiqué recorded agreement that the application would go ahead
(372, 373).160 The government’s answer to Commonwealth criticisms was that ini-
tial shocks and adjustments could be overcome, and that in the long run British
political and economic strength would decline outside the European Community,
eventually leading to a permanent weakening of the whole Commonwealth.
Consultations continued right through the period of negotiation until de Gaulle
delivered his veto on 14 January 1963.
Southern African problems
Not many parts of the empire or Commonwealth saw such a catalogue of unexpected
dramas as Southern Africa in the first half of the 1960s. Arriving as high
commissioner in January 1959, Sir John Maud had no idea that within little more
than a year a British prime minister would tell the South African parliament for the
first time, and once and for all, that its policies were objectionable; that in just over
two years South Africa would leave the Commonwealth; and perhaps most
remarkable of all, that by the time his term ended in 1963, independence for the
three High Commission Territories, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland,
would have become a live issue.161 During the decade of the 1960s historic objectives
were achieved. For South Africa a republic, for Britain disengagement without too
much dishonour, and for the Basotho, Swazi and Tswana peoples a fresh chance to
live their own lives in their own way. Seretse Khama and Sobhuza II both emerged,
against the odds, as national leaders, though in sharply contrasting modes, and did
so at about the same time Nelson Mandela began his long imprisonment.
British policy towards South Africa always walked a tightrope between co-
operation and containment, between the demands of national interests and the
necessities of international reputation. Any apparent condoning of apartheid put in
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jeopardy British relations with Afro-Asian states; but there were plausible reasons for
maintaining mutually beneficial economic and defence connections with South
Africa, and above all for not provoking any South African hostile move against the
High Commission Territories. The continuation of over-flying rights was also vital
(and quietly confirmed after departure from the Commonwealth).162 By the end of
1959, South Africa’s patience was about to be tested by a combination of steps which
would be extremely unpalatable: a multi-racial constitution for Bechuanaland,
purposeful economic development for Swaziland, and the withdrawal of Britain’s
‘support’ in the international arena.
The substantive point of policy embedded in the ‘wind of change’ speech was a
warning that South Africa could no longer expect British support at the United
Nations (32). Cohen, as British representative on the Trusteeship Council, had
wanted to put more distance between the British and South African positions. By
November 1959 it was clear to officials that the balance between maintaining good
relations with the Union and improving the British reputation at the UN needed
correcting; but the CRO was anxious not to push South Africa to the ‘parting of the
ways’ by handling this in the wrong way. Macmillan’s visit provided exactly the right
opportunity for engineering the change of policy. A draft Cabinet memorandum was
now turned by Home into a personal minute to Macmillan. It is the pivotal document
of Anglo-South African relations in the ten years before 1961. Its most striking
propositions were an admission that the Commonwealth would ‘undoubtedly be
happier and closer-knit were the ugly duckling out of the nest’, and an argument that
South Africa was ‘a liability to the West’ in the cold war (439). Several senior
ministers were asked to comment. All of them were supportive (440, 441, 445).
The test of the new policy was not long in coming. When in April 1960 the UN
General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the Sharpeville shootings in
March (447, 448), Britain voted for it. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting in May 1960 Eric Louw (the South African foreign minister) raised the
question of whether South Africa would be welcome as a member after becoming a
republic (450). This was regarded as premature and ham-fisted, but the signs were
not encouraging. Alarm-bells began ringing for Macmillan, and in the months before
the next meeting he wrote letters to Diefenbaker of Canada (452) and Nehru of India,
urging them at least to come to it uncommitted on this serious issue, for ‘there is a
real danger to the whole Commonwealth structure and the beginning of a break-up
now’.163 Meanwhile, officials had been at work for some time assessing the probable
effects of a South African departure (437). Maud’s advice was to try to keep South
Africa in (as the best way of helping the Africans) (451); while CRO officials briefed
the prime minister to argue tactically to the last in favour of South Africa’s
remaining, but, if it came to it, to follow majority opinion and acquiesce in
departure, though ‘still with every show of reluctance’ (453).
At the crucial Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting in March 1961, the
general mood initially was that South Africa might be given one more chance.
Verwoerd threw this away, gratuitously causing offence on the afternoon of the first
day by launching into a defiant defence of apartheid, and, in the evening, by refusing
a last-minute appeal from Macmillan to agree to accept high commissioners from
other Commonwealth countries (456). Next day, there was an appreciable hardening
of attitudes, articulated in particular by Diefenbaker and Mrs Bandaranaike of Ceylon
(457). Undoubtedly shocked, Verwoerd asked for time to consider his position
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overnight. The following day he formally withdrew his request for continuing
membership as a republic. A despondent Macmillan was consoled by Home (459).164
The departure of South Africa did not solve the central problems of Anglo-South
African relations. South Africa could not be treated as if nothing had changed (461),
and, in Brook’s words, they had to avoid any suspicion that South Africa ‘having
jumped out of the Commonwealth window, is being let in again by the back-door’.165
Nevertheless, the old imperatives to keep on terms as good as possible with South
Africa, despite apartheid, in a reasonable working relationship, remained. The British
government had to continue to treat South Africa as half-ally and half-untouchable
at the same time, uneasily balancing on the tightrope between provocation and
conciliation. Always, it had to be remembered that, in the long run, there would
almost certainly be a black government in Pretoria. If British policy seemed to the
Africans too unsympathetic they might turn to the communist bloc (463): ‘if an
eventual explosion in South Africa (assisted no doubt by outside forces) led to the
installation of a pro-Communist Black Government, this would be a crowning
disaster’ (469). Hard decisions had to be taken about voting on UN resolutions about
sanctions (464, 468, 470, 472). In June 1964 the government voted for a resolution in
the Security Council condemning apartheid, but remained opposed to economic
sanctions, mainly because it believed they would hurt Africans, and do ‘irreparable
damage to Basutoland, and serious damage to Swaziland and Bechuanaland’. On
arms sales, a distinction was drawn by the Cabinet between weapons which might be
used for internal repression and those required for external defence (474).
The future of the High Commission Territories had for so long been considered in
terms of their vulnerability to South African expansionist pressure and in the face of
repeated South African demands to take them over, that it proved hard for all sides to
adjust their policies to any other framework, even after the departure of South Africa
from the Commonwealth put a formal end to the possibility of a transfer of
administration (475, 479–481, 485). As late as May 1963 Maud saw the future of the
three territories as ‘inextricably bound up with that of the Republic’, and self-
determination as therefore probably ‘the most difficult of all our dilemmas in
Southern Africa’ (462). Geographically and economically, Basutoland was
particularly problematic: could it ever aspire to real independence? Nevertheless,
with the encouragement of its constitutional adviser, Professor D V Cowen, and its
resident commissioner, A G T Chaplin, this is what by 1962 it did aspire to. Modern
political parties were founded in all three countries between 1959 and 1962, mainly
in response to announcements of constitutional reform. Bechuanaland and
Basutoland had Legislative Councils by 1961 (475, 477, 483), Swaziland by 1963.
Further advances were agreed in 1964 for Bechuanaland and Basutoland (488, 491),
though not without nervousness as to the South African reaction. The decisions were
momentous, but South Africa kept quiet, and their progress was relatively smooth,
leading to independence in 1966.
Swaziland dropped a little behind, and provides a fascinating exception to the
classic pattern of fruitful co-operation between British proconsul and national leader
in the transfer of power—Mountbatten and Nehru, Arden-Clarke and Nkrumah,
Maurice Dorman and Milton Margai, Turnbull and Nyerere, Glyn Jones and Hastings
Banda, even Peter Fawcus and Seretse Khama. That Brian Marwick, of all people,
should fall out with Sobhuza was surprising. Marwick had grown up in Swaziland,
and spoke siSwati perfectly; he had spent most of his career there (apart from six
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years in Basutoland and three in Nigeria), and he had written the standard
anthropological account of the Swazi. But his friendly relations with Sobhuza
withered away in disillusionment as the latter became ‘too obsessed with his personal
position to act in a statesmanlike manner’.166 The course for Swaziland had been set
by Maud early in 1959: long-term policy was ‘the creation of a non-racial state’.
Marwick also was firmly committed to ‘the establishment of a non-racial
democracy’.167 Sobhuza, the Swazi National Council, and the European settler
community, in more or less unholy alliance, would have none of it. They preferred a
multi-racial power-sharing in a Leg Co divided 50:50 between Europeans and Swazis,
and no elections on a common roll (486). This was completely at odds with British
decolonisation policy in general, and all officials believed it would only pile up
trouble for the future. There had to be scope, they believed, for meeting changes
which were bound to develop rapidly in Swaziland as elsewhere, and the constitution
had to commend itself to the rising generation of educated Swazi (490). Moreover, it
was important not to fail in creating a non-racial state, if only because a successful
Swazi model might have a beneficial effect on South Africa.168 A constitution was
therefore imposed in 1963 by the secretary of state. Marwick refused to allow
Sobhuza a plebiscite on this. In January 1964 Sobhuza went ahead with his
referendum notwithstanding, asking the Swazi to choose—in effect—between ‘the
lion’ (himself) and the ‘reindeer’ (Marwick). (It should he noted that while the lion
was a recognised symbol of Swazi royalty, the reindeer is an animal unfamiliar to
Africans.) The exact figures are disputed, but by any standards there was an
overwhelming demonstration of support for Sobhuza. Marwick left Swaziland,
angrily cursing ‘in some quarters, an impenetrable conceit, a clutching at crutches
to support limping traditions, a Canutism in the face of the rising tides of new
thoughts and experiences which are flooding our Swazi backwater’.169 In the end, in
1968, after a series of concessions by the Labour government, Swaziland became
independent under Sobhuza as king.
The Commonwealth
According to Canada’s Lester Pearson, the Suez Crisis ‘brought the Commonwealth
to the verge of dissolution’.170 This was not just because most of the other members
were upset by the lack of consultation, but because they were shocked, and
disapproved of the whole venture. In marked contrast to his exertions to restore the
Anglo-American relationship, Macmillan did little to mend fences with the
Commonwealth. His reflections at the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting in July 1957 were decidedly languid and rhetorical. What was to be the
future of the Commonwealth?—clearly it was entering a new phase, an ‘inescapable
evolution’: ‘the stream of gradual change was now to be augmented into a fast-
flowing river, which might soon break its banks through its torrential force’. How
could the mystique which kept the old organisation together be maintained? Well, he
would have to try at least ‘to guide these disparate forces into a common faith’.171 In
practice he did not do much. His tour of India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand
in 1958 was undertaken more to restore a show of governmental vitality ‘when
things were at a low ebb’ than to strengthen the Commonwealth chain.172 He
retained a sentimental attachment to his old Commonwealth relationships and was
aware of the Commonwealth as a useful psychological cushion for the end of empire.
Moreover, it was an increasingly valuable instrument to keep communism at bay. Its
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unity was therefore important, and one of his main efforts as prime minister centred
on the attempt to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth, thus running the risk of
cutting himself off from the only element of ‘common faith’ which had any real
potential, commitment to a multi-racial future. Of course the trouble was that
Macmillan did not like the changes brought by Afro-Asian membership. In
characteristically Edwardian metaphors, he complained privately that it was no
longer like gaining admission to Brooks’s but joining the RAC (Royal Automobile
Club).173 It had changed from a ‘small and pleasant country-house party’ into a ‘sort
of miniature United Nations’ (541). Selwyn Lloyd was convinced that Macmillan and
Macleod, for all their rhetoric, did not really care about the Commonwealth, and he
urged Home upon becoming prime minister to effect a ‘change of emphasis’ and set
about fostering Commonwealth links, despite the difficulties (549). Home was not
unresponsive (550).
Those difficulties were of course formidable. As Lloyd himself wrote, the facts were
‘that the Africans are opposed to us over Southern Rhodesia, that Mr Nehru has
never really liked us, that Australia does not buy our aircraft, that Canada
discriminates against us, that there are wide differences over attitudes towards
Communism’. Sir Patrick Dean deplored the lack of cohesion between
Commonwealth members at the United Nations, where the attacks they led on
Britain were a public demonstration that the Commonwealth concept was, he
believed, ‘empty of political content’ (548). The ambassador in Addis Ababa, John
Russell, reported that the Commonwealth delegates to the conference of thirty-two
heads of independent African states in May 1963 were disunited; most of them
avoided his embassy like the plague; ‘in Africa the expression of Commonwealth is
about dead’.174 Sir Norman Brook thought the only common link with any
continuing relevance was speaking the English language, which at least might carry
‘a constructive promise’ of openness to the same ideas (544).
It was against this background that officials wrestled to find a renewed role for the
Commonwealth (550-553). Plainly it could not be made into a self-sustaining
economic unit; it was not significant in power terms; but in theory at any rate it
ought to give Britain enhanced standing in the world, and it could have a valuable
function in keeping developing countries out of the Soviet bloc. It ought to be able to
form a bridge between advanced and developing nations. It had roots in every part of
the world except, marginally, Latin America. Its very existence might be a good
answer to charges of ‘colonialism’. In a more visionary interpretation, its diversities
might even be made constructively complementary (529). An officials’ investigation
into the ‘intangible links’ in 1960 concluded that it was ‘a very vigorous social
organism’, promoting useful contacts between professional people, students, and
sportsmen, although too many of these relationships were only bilateral with Britain
(535).
On the other side of the balance-sheet, the Commonwealth was threatened by the
weakening of sterling, by the unreconcilable opinions and ‘unreliable behaviour’ of
some the new independent leaders, and by intra-Commonwealth disputes, notably
the ‘grim hostility’ between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (529). Above all there
were the three problems of the increasing size of the club, of immigration into
Britain, and of the European Common Market negotiations. The probable impact of
British entry into Europe was disturbing because so incalculable, but it certainly
seemed from the periphery as if the government might be prepared to go in on any
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terms, regardless of Commonwealth interests. As to its growth, by 1962 the
Commonwealth was ceasing to a relatively small group of relatively large countries
(544): decolonisation had created the problem that the tail was now uncomfortably
wagging the dog (542).
What could be done to make the expanding Commonwealth function more
effectively? A declaration of principles was rejected (530). A Commonwealth court of
appeal never got off the ground (533, 537). The possibility of a Commonwealth Youth
Trust came to little, though the government did agree to build 5,000 new hostel
places for overseas students (536). It was decided in 1958 that Empire Day must be
renamed Commonwealth Day (531). Much the most useful achievements, however,
were those of the Montreal Trade and Economic Conference in 1958, which
pioneered the way for a better deal on aid for newly independent countries (p lxiv
above), and took a significant initiative in the field of education. The British team, led
by Home, put forward a plan which, according to him, ‘was received with
acclamation and has proved itself of very considerable value’. The Conference
proposed a scheme of studentships and fellowships (target: one thousand) to be
funded by Commonwealth governments, in the hope that the Commonwealth would
‘increasingly furnish new opportunities for its young people’. The other
recommendation was to encourage co-operation in education generally, especially
the supply and training of teachers. A Commonwealth Educational Conference was
held at Oxford in July 1959 to give effect these recommendations, followed by a
conference held in New Delhi in January 1962 to review progress.175
‘Islands’, Macmillan once remarked, ‘can become rather a bore, whether in the
Mediterranean or in the Pacific’.176 What was known as the ‘Smaller Colonial
Territories’ problem was undeniably intractable. At issue was the question of whether
they could be members of the Commonwealth, or even independent at all. Two-tier
membership was rejected by the Cabinet in 1955,177 but the idea refused to die;
indeed, as the Commonwealth got bigger, the scheme revived, it being argued that it
might be more acceptable once larger numbers of smaller units were to be excluded
from the first tier (561). A concept of ‘statehood’ (self-government in domestic
affairs, but dependence on Britain for defence and external affairs) had been put
forward in 1955 for the small fry who would fall short of Commonwealth
membership. At the end of 1958 the CRO suggested that Brook’s committee on the
subject should take another look at ‘statehood’, in the context of the rapid growth of
nationalism and a possible agreement on Cyprus. The prime minister approved, and
serious work started in March 1959, a report being completed by June of that year.
The committee preferred the CO’s title of ‘Commonwealth state’ to the CRO’s
recommended ‘associated state’ (563) as the designation for a ‘comfortable half-way
house’ between self-government and independence. Such states would not attend
Prime Ministers’ Meetings. There was, however, by this time no question of any
independent states being relegated to a second tier: such possible future members as
the West Indies Federation, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. The report was never
considered by ministers because of the impending autumn election, but in April 1960
Macmillan proposed that a group of Commonwealth (not merely British) officials
should reopen investigations under Brook’s chairmanship. Brook’s study group
concluded in July 1960 that within the next decade membership of the
Commonwealth would probably rise from seventeen to twenty-four and could well
double. Such an increase might not be unmanageable, and it was certainly desirable
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in principle to grant only full membership to all (534). Cohen offered a critique
suggesting that the timetable envisaged in paragraph 12 was too long drawn out and
would make for ‘a rather hard road in front of us at the UN’:
We must not of course give way to international pressure which is irresponsible, but
this kind of international interest will inevitably grow . . . [and] seems likely to have its
effect on opinion, in a number even of those small territories which have so far shown
no signs of aspirations to independence.
For ‘international reasons’ therefore, finding a practical means of terminating
colonial status would be a good idea, although a single ‘managed solution’ was
impossible, Cohen thought, because of the policy of decentralisation, the special
circumstances of ‘fortress colonies’, and the difficulty of concurrent international
claims (he listed Aden, Honduras, Falklands and Basutoland).178
The estimates of July 1960 were, as Cohen had foreseen, quickly overtaken.
Mauritius and Zanzibar were moving up the queue. In April 1962 the Chadwick
Report revised the forecast to thirty or perhaps thirty-five Commonwealth members
by 1970. This important document, ‘The evolution of the Commonwealth’, grappling
with ‘a serious and immediate problem’, once again rejected all restrictions on
membership. For the smaller territories, ‘free association’ was now the preferred
term, because this could be aligned with a UN definition, and Western Samoa was
now available as a model (545). Western Samoa became independent in January 1962
in a special agency relationship with New Zealand, approved by the UN. After
consideration of the report in the CO (565), governors were asked in September 1962
for their opinions (566). Governors were informed that ‘mainly for international
reasons’, the sooner ‘we can change our public posture the better’, since UN pressure
was ‘likely to bedevil our international position for so long as we continue to be
regarded as a colonial power’. Attacks might be pre-empted by removing the Smaller
Colonial Territories as soon as possible from the purview of the UN. Pressure was
building for ‘moving toward a final solution’ of this problem.179 One official described
the whole notion of colonial status as now ‘a horrible embarrassment’ (565).
As luck would have it, the United Nations had itself provided a way out. Under
Resolution 1541 (XV) of December 1960—not to be confused with the more general
Resolution 1514 (XV)—a non-self-governing territory could become self-governing
by (i) sovereign independence, (ii) ‘free association’ with an independent state, or (iii)
integration with an independent state (46, 538). Integration with the United
Kingdom as a solution scarcely survived its failure to be adopted for Malta, except as
a possibility for the Falklands (565–567). The conditions of ‘free association’ were the
consent of the state, ability to determine its own internal constitution, and to change
its status at any time. These criteria did not seem too difficult to comply with, and
‘free association’ thus appeared to be a distinctly possible relationship for a number
of British territories, among them the Falklands, St Helena, Pitcairn, Gibraltar, and
the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (46). Although the UN General Assembly debate in 1963
showed increasing concern over Smaller Colonial Territories, there was also a clear
understanding that sovereign independence was not possible for all, and nothing was
said which seemed to interfere unduly with the plans the British government were
now working on. But there was a degree of urgency: the conditions of ‘association’
might be made harder to accept in future.180
One disappointment for Macmillan was that it proved impossible to arrange for
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Australia and New Zealand to take over responsibility for preparing some of the
Pacific islands for decolonisation (554, 565). It seemed to him an obvious way of
reducing the colonial burden for Britain. In 1958, not only the prime minister, but
Brook, the CRO, and the Official Committee on Colonial Policy—to say nothing of
the duke of Edinburgh (9–10)—all hoped a ‘rationalisation’ of this kind could be
achieved. But the CO opposed it and the Cabinet upheld the CO. An open battle
developed between the CO and the CRO (555), the CO sticking to its traditional
ethical concept of trusteeship, its duty to promote ‘political and economic
advancement’ in the interests of the inhabitants, and arguing strongly that a transfer
to Australia, with its ‘white Australia’ programme, would be dangerous (559). Nor
were the Australians keen to acquire fresh responsibilities. It was decided in 1964
that the status quo would be preserved in the New Hebrides.
The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 removed the right of all British
subjects, irrespective of colour or country of origin, to enter freely into the United
Kingdom. For the first time a legal framework of restriction on immigration was
enacted. Asian and black immigration had perhaps never been welcomed by British
government, but for many years it was unwilling to check it by legislation. Between
1950 and 1961 ‘coloured immigration’ was discussed by the Cabinet on thirty-seven
separate occasions, but the number of immigrants involved never seemed significant
enough to justify taking such a problematic step.181 Although not finally able to
influence immigration policy, the CO monitored the issue carefully, mainly from a
West Indian perspective (568). Junior minister John Profumo acted as its
representative on the Committee on Colonial Immigrants, which kept the general
situation under regular review. Lennox-Boyd and Home had both played a crucial
part in opposing a bill in 1955, and they were equally determined in 1958 that a
similar bill—precipitated by a sudden increase in Indian and Pakistani
immigration—should also fail (569). The Cabinet agreed once again in July 1958 that
‘legislation to control immigration from the Commonwealth was not yet required’
(571). Disturbances in Nottingham and Notting Hill (23 August to 2 September
1958) led to a reconsideration of this decision (572), but in fact the riots made it
harder to make any major pronouncement about control. The CO worked hard to
head off legislation by persuading West Indian governments to take administrative
action as a means of reducing the flow at source (573, 574). Norman Manley agreed
various ways could be found to produce a marked falling off from Jamaica.182 This
administrative action was not ineffective, and there was a temporary drop in
numbers. Although the Cabinet at around the turn of 1960 and 1961 found the
position ‘disquieting’ (576), it was still reluctant to grasp the nettle (577, 578).
A brief prepared in the CO early in 1961 took the line that a stark choice lay ahead.
Restrictions would create severe difficulties for West Indian governments and
weaken the respect paid to Britain as the centre of the Commonwealth; but to leave
things as they were could mean unacceptable and deteriorating social consequences
at home. The issue was kept off the agenda of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting in March 1961, but immediately afterwards Macmillan toured the West
Indies, where Dr Eric Williams warned him legislation would result in ‘social
revolution and a Castro situation’.183 In May 1961 Macleod successfully secured a
delay in announcing legislation in order not to prejudice the results of the Jamaica
referendum on its continued membership of the Federation. (Jamaica nevertheless
voted to withdraw.) Macleod minuted in September 1961: ‘I have no doubt that the
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Cabinet will go ahead with this sort of a Bill. Sad indeed, but for myself I have
thought it inevitable since the spring of this year’. And again, five days later: ‘I detest
the Bill and am painfully aware of its imperfections. But it is wiser to do it now than
to wait’. Poynton agreed with him in ‘disliking this intensely’.184 The Cabinet decision
was taken on 10 October 1961 (580), on the basis of a memorandum by R A Butler,
arguing that controls should be accepted as ‘a sad necessity’ because of the need to
deal with the strain on housing resources and the danger of social tension created by
large unassimilated communities. (The Treasury had expressly said there was no
justification on economic grounds for restriction.) According to Butler, the bill was
‘not inherently discriminatory’: ‘it purports to regulate flexible employment, but it
will inescapably be seen as operating almost exclusively on coloured people’.185 The
deciding factor was the rise in numbers: from 21,000 in 1959 to an estimate of more
than 100,000 for 1961. In subsequent Cabinets, the resulting Irish anomaly was dealt
with (581, 582); Macmillan—who found the whole policy ‘hard and disagreeable’—
was searching for the best way ‘in common sense’ out of a dangerous political
position.186 The Commonwealth Immigrants Act did not solve the problem it was
meant to tackle. This was apparent even before the Conservative government left
office (583).
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Mr Macmillan
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ten years’ [Extract]
20 June
1959
Officials’ Committee
report
(chairman, B StJ Trend)
Minutes, procedure for discussing the
next ten years in Africa
14 Jan
1959
Cabinet Africa (Official)
Committee meeting
Letter, commenting on the future policy
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to Sir P Dean
Draft Cabinet memo, ‘The Common-
wealth, 1960–1970’, + Annex: the future
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Mr Macmillan
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29 June
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23 June
1959
Cabinet meeting
CC 37(59)3
Minute, Middle East military plans:
Kuwait and Iraq
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F A Bishop (PM’s Office)
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5 June
1959
Lord Home
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Mr Selwyn Lloyd (FO)
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31 Aug
1958
Mr Macmillan
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Memo, ‘A policy for the Middle East’
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11 Aug
1958
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for COS Committee
Minute, colonial implications of long-
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1957
Mr Lennox-Boyd
to Lord Selkirk (Adm)
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1964
Mr Sandys
to Commonwealth
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80 298‘Report of the Long-Term Study Group’
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12 Oct
1964
Cabinet Defence & Oversea 
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memo
Memo, ‘British policy towards South-
East Asia’ [Extract]
22 Sept
1964
FO paper
for Cabinet Defence &
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13 July
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Letter on policy and strategy in the Gulf:
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17 June
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Sir W Luce (Bahrain)
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Minutes, ‘The Indian Ocean’6 May
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23 Apr
1964
Interdepartmental paper
for Cabinet Defence & 
Oversea Policy (Official)
Committee
Minutes, ‘The Indian Ocean’23 Apr
1964
Cabinet Defence &
Oversea Policy
Committee meeting
Memo, ‘British and American strategic
interests in South-East Asia and the
Indian Ocean’
20 Apr
1964
Mr Butler (FO)
to Sir A Douglas-Home
Conclusions, ‘Future defence policy’:
aircraft carrier programme
25 July
1963
Cabinet meeting
CC 48(63)3
Memo, review of Middle East policy and
strategy
19 July
1963
Sir R Stevens (FO)
to Sir H Caccia (FO)
Minutes, the defence implications of
withdrawal from the Middle and Far
East
21 May
1963
Cabinet (Official)
Committee on Defence
meeting
Minutes, ‘Future defence policy’9 Feb
1963
Cabinet Defence 
Committee meeting
Cabinet memo, ‘Intervention in Kuwait’13 Apr
1962
Mr Watkinson
Minutes, ‘British strategy in the 1960s’12 Jan
1962
Cabinet Defence
Committee meeting
Cabinet Defence Committee memo,
reassessment of defence policy and
strategy
23 Oct
1961
Mr Macmillan
to Mr Watkinson (MoD)
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82 309
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84 314
85 315
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87 318
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88 320
89 321
90 323
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92 327
93 329Minute, responsibilities of the new office
of secretary for technical co-operation
12 July
1961
Mr Macmillan
to Mr Vosper (Dept of
Technical Co-operation)
Brief on Department of Technical Co-
operation
2 Mar
1961
Cabinet Office paper
Memo, ‘Future of the CRO’, + Minutes
by Lord Home, Mr Macmillan, Mr
Macleod & T J Bligh [Extract]
[10 June]
1960
Mr Alport (CRO)
Minute, suggested amalgamation of CO
and CRO
8 Oct
1959
O R Blair (CRO)
CRO minute (by M E Allen): discussion
of CO/CRO liaison on Nigerian affairs
23 July
1959
Meeting between CO &
CRO officials
Letter on CO/CRO liaison in approach to
independence, + Minutes by Mr Alport,
Lord Home & Sir G Laithwaite
25 June
1958
Sir G Laithwaite (CRO)
to Sir J Macpherson
(CO)
Circular letter, ‘Service with overseas
governments’, + Minutes by Sir H
Poynton and Mr Macleod [Extract]
31 Aug
1960
W L Gorell Barnes (CO)
to governors
Conclusions, approval of Oversea Civil
Service scheme
26 July
1960
Cabinet meeting
CC 46(60)1
Conclusions, proposed reductions in
costs of Overseas Civil Service scheme
21 July
1960
Cabinet meeting
CC 44(60)7
Tel (no 550), on proposed organisation
for HMOCS (Overseas Service Bill)
30 Dec
1957
CRO circular
to high commissioners
Letter on HMOCS: proposed agreements
with Nigerian government about
serving officers
16 Apr
1957
Lord Home
to Mr Thorneycroft
Letter on HMOCS: proposed agreements
with Nigerian government about
serving officers, + Minutes by A R Adair,
J Chadwick, W A B Hamilton & J M C
James (CRO)
9 Apr
1957
Mr Lennox-Boyd
to Mr Thorneycroft
(Exchequer)
Minutes, ‘Report of the Long-Term
Study Group’
14 Oct
1964
Cabinet Defence &
Oversea Policy (Official)
Committee meeting
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06-ConGov-Sum of Doc-cp  18/10/00  2:02 pm  Page xcv
xcvi SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS [94–107]
94 330
95 331
96 334
97 335
98 336
99 337
Chapter 4   West, East, and the Horn of Africa
(1) West Africa
100 339
101 343
102 345
103 346
104 353
105 354
106 357
107 358Minutes, finance and defence impli-
cations of independence for Sierra
Leone
18 Mar
1960
Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee meeting
Conclusions, relations between Ghana
and Guinea
18 Nov
1958
Cabinet meeting
CC 81(58)9
Cabinet memo, progress of Nigerian
constitutional talks
20 Oct
1958
Mr Lennox-Boyd
Conclusions, resumption of Nigeria
constitutional conference
11 Sept
1958
Cabinet meeting
CC 71(58)5
Minutes, on Nigerian political situation
and constitutional proposals
8 Aug
–21 Oct
1958
M E Allen, A W Snelling,
Sir H Lintott, D L Cole &
Sir G Laithwaite (CRO)
Conclusions, Nigerian constitutional
advance
22 May
1957
Cabinet meeting
CC 42(57)4 
Minutes, Nigeria constitutional con-
ference
13 May
1957
Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee meeting
Memo, Nigeria: forthcoming consti-
tutional conference
7 May
1957
Mr Lennox-Boyd
for Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee
Letter about amalgamation of CO with
CRO
25 June
1963
Sir H Poynton (CO)
to Sir C Jeffries
Minutes on possible merger of CO and
CRO
5–6 Dec
1962
P de Zulueta (PM’s Office)
& Mr Macmillan
Minute recommending conversion of
Colonial Policy Committee into an
Oversea Policy Committee
19 June
1962
Sir N Brook (Cabinet
Office)
to Mr Macmillan
Tel (no 67), commenting on proposed
transfer of ministerial responsibility for
the Central African Federation, +
Minute by Mr Macmillan
14 Mar
1962
Sir E Hone (Northern
Rhodesia)
to CRO
Letter explaining proposed new
ministerial responsibilities for the
Central African Federation
12 Mar
1962
Mr Macmillan
to HM The Queen
Minute for prime minister arguing
against a possible transfer to CRO of
responsibility for Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland
26 Jan
1962
Sir N Brook (Cabinet
Office)
to T J Bligh (PM’s
Office)
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116 371
117 382
118 383
119 385
120 390
121 393
122 395Minutes, current political problems in
Uganda
11–26
July
1960
J W Stacpoole, F D
Webber, W B L Monson
& Lord Perth
Minutes, discussion of the Wild Report
on Uganda constitution
8 Feb
1960
Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee meeting
Memo, proposals for constitutional
reform in Uganda
4 Feb
1960
Mr Macleod
for Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee
Minutes, constitutional development in
Uganda
15 Jan
–30 May
1960
Sir H Poynton, J W
Stacpoole, F D Webber,
W B L Monson & Lord
Perth (CO)
Conclusions, East African land forces18 Jan
1960
Cabinet meeting
CC 2(60)4
Minutes, future policy in East Africa17 Apr
1959
Cabinet Colonial policy
Committee meeting
Memo, ‘Future policy in East Africa’10 Apr
1959
Mr Lennox-Boyd
for Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee
Conclusions, future of Southern
Cameroons
29 June
1961
Cabinet meeting
CC 36(61)6
Conclusions, future of Southern
Cameroons on independence
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the future of the British Cameroons
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1961
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Conclusions, future of the Gambia24 Jan
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Cabinet memo, ‘Future of the Gambia’12 Jan
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Mr Macleod
Minute (CRO note), Nigerian defence:
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Mr Sandys
to Mr Macmillan
Minute, Nigerian defence agreement9 May
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Mr Macleod
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Minute, briefing for visit of Sir Milton
Margai (Sierra Leone)
25 Apr
1960
Mr Macleod
to Mr Macmillan
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ference, + Enclosure: summary of
principal conclusions
10 Jan
1961
Mr Macleod
to Mr Macmillan
Minute on Cabinet differences on East
African policy, + Enclosure: letter from
Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan (6 Jan)
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[1] 1
CHAPTER 1
Colonial High Policy, Plans and Surveys
Document numbers 1–52
1 CAB 134/1555, CPC(57)6 28 Jan 1957
‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’: minute by
Mr Macmillan to Lord Salisbury.1 Minutes by Lord Salisbury and
Mr Lennox-Boyd
[Written only eighteen days after becoming prime minister, Macmillan’s famous
initiative, and the ensuing officials’ reports, have been extensively quoted in D J Morgan,
The official history of colonial development vol 5 Guidance towards self-government in
British colonies, 1941–1971 (1980) pp 96 & 103 ff; see also A N Porter & A J Stockwell,
eds, British imperial policy and decolonization vol 2 1951–1964 (1989) p 451 (document
no 70, Macmillan’s minute).]
It would be helpful if the Colonial Policy Committee could submit to the Cabinet
their estimate of the probable course of constitutional development in the Colonies
over the years ahead.
It would be good if Ministers could know more clearly which territories are likely
to become ripe for independence over the next few years—or, even if they are not
really ready for it, will demand it so insistently that their claims cannot be denied—
and at what date that stage is likely to be reached in each case.
It would also be helpful if this study would distinguish those Colonies which would
qualify for full membership of the Commonwealth, and would indicate what
constitutional future there is for the others which may attain independence but
cannot aspire to full Commonwealth membership.
I should also like to see something like a profit and loss account for each of our
Colonial possessions, so that we may be better able to gauge whether, from the
financial and economic point of view, we are likely to gain or to lose by its departure.
This would need, of course, to be weighed against the political and strategic
considerations involved in each case. And it might perhaps be better to attempt an
estimate of the balance of advantage, taking all these considerations into account, of
losing or keeping each particular territory.
There are presumably places where it is of vital interest to us that we should
maintain our influence, and others where there is no United Kingdom interest in
resisting constitutional change even if it seems likely to lead eventually to secession
from the Commonwealth.
1 Lord President of the Council since 1952, and chairman of the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee:
Robert Cecil, 5th marquess; S of S for Dominion affairs, 1940–1942, 1943–1945, for Commonwealth
relations, 1952; S of S for the colonies, 1942.
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If your Committee will produce a report on these lines, the Cabinet might well
devote the whole of a session to it without other business.
I am sending a copy of this minute to the Colonial Secretary.
Minutes on 1
I append copies of minutes on this subject from the Prime Minister to myself dated
28th January, 1957 and the Secretary of State for the Colonies to myself dated 15th
February, 1957.
The Colonial Office is now going ahead with a comprehensive review of this
subject on the lines there indicated. I should be very grateful if all Departments
concerned would give their full co-operation to the Colonial Office, to enable this
very important survey to be completed as soon as possible.
S.
25.2.57
Lord President
The Prime Minister sent me a copy of his minute to you of 28th January, proposing
that the Colonial Policy Committee submit to the Cabinet their estimate of the
probable course of constitutional development in the Colonies over the years ahead.
2. I agree that a comprehensive review of this kind would be a great help. If it is
to be worth doing, however, it must be done thoroughly; and it will take a good deal
of time, and involve consultation with a number of Departments. If you agree, I
propose to arrange for my Department, in consultation with other Departments as
appropriate, to prepare a draft Paper. It will be necessary to approach the problem
area by area in the first instance, and I attach to this minute (Appendix) a skeleton
plan on which I propose to ask my Department to proceed. When the draft has been
prepared, I suggest that it might be considered by the Official Committee on Colonial
Policy, before going to the Colonial Policy Committee.
3. The skeleton plan, as you will see, implies one or two glosses on the Prime
Minister’s minute, and I should perhaps indicate briefly the reasons for these.
4. The Prime Minister drew a distinction between those Colonies which would
qualify for “full Membership of the Commonwealth” and those “which may attain
‘independence’ but cannot aspire to full Commonwealth Membership”. I have
assumed that, in using the word “independence” in this context, the Prime Minister
had in mind the status which we usually describe as internal self-government. It is
generally recognised that, whereas some territories, by themselves or in federal
arrangement with others, should eventually attain independence as full Members of
the Commonwealth, there will remain other territories which, in the foreseeable
future at any rate, appear unlikely, for various reasons, to be able to achieve anything
other than a considerable degree of internal self-government, with the United
Kingdom remaining responsible for at least their defence and external relations.
5. A “profit and loss account” for each Colonial territory must, as the Prime
Minister observes, take account of economic, political and strategic considerations. It
must also take account of the obligations towards the peoples of any given territory
which the assumption of protection or annexation, as the case may be, can be said to
have placed upon the United Kingdom. It would perhaps be going too far to say that
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Her Majesty’s Government should never withdraw protection from, or hand over
sovereignty to, any dependent territory otherwise than in accordance with the wishes
of its inhabitants. But we would I think all agree that nothing is more dangerous
than to gain a reputation for forsaking one’s friends; and if in any territory Her
Majesty’s Government were to withdraw without being able to hand over to a
successor government, which could be expected to govern reasonably well in the
interests of all its inhabitants, the repercussions would be serious and widespread.
6. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister. I suggest that you
should circulate copies of the Prime Minister’s minute of 28th January and of this
minute to the Colonial Policy Committee and ask that the Departments concerned
co-operate with my Department in this work.
A. L-B.
15.2.57
APPENDIX
Skeleton Plan (to be followed in the consideration of each territory or area)
1. Political and constitutional
(a) Outline of the present constitutional system;
(b) brief description of the internal and external political pressures;
(c) the way in which these pressures will be reflected in demands for
constitutional changes.
2. Strategic
(a) An estimate of the strategic importance of the territory;
(b) a statement of Her Majesty’s Government’s strategic requirements;
(c) an estimate of the extent to which retention of these strategic requirements is
dependent upon Her Majesty’s Government’s retaining jurisdiction.
3. Economic
(a) The effect of independence upon the interests of the United Kingdom in terms
of:–
(i) direct effect on the Exchequer;
(ii) the effect on the sterling area;
(iii) trade between the territory concerned and the United Kingdom.
4. Obligations and repercussions
(a) An estimate of the effect upon the political, economic and social development
of the territory of the withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction, including the
effect upon racial and tribal minorities;
(b) The effect of the change of status in the territory upon the prestige and
influence of the United Kingdom;
(c) Whether the premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would
leave a vacuum which would be filled by a country hostile to the United Kingdom
and her Allies.
5. Conclusions
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2 CAB 134/1551, CPC (57) 27 May 1957
‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’: report (CO print,
GEN 174/012) of the officials’ committee (chairman, Sir N Brook)
(CO(0)(57)5) [Extract]
[This report—the central response to the prime minister’s request for a ‘profit and loss
account’—contained an enormous amount of basic information and became a major
reference-guide in government departments. It was organised into seven parts, viz: (i)
West Africa, (ii) East Africa, (iii) Aden and Somaliland, (iv) Mediterranean, (v) Far East,
(vi) Caribbean, (vii) Smaller territories. It is probably the most complicated document to
be selected for the entire BDEEP project, 76 printed pages long in foolscap, with almost
500 paragraphs, and 463 sub-headings, many of them elaborate. Complete uniformity of
layout between the different sections was not attained, and even the paragraph
numbering broke down in part (vii). To simplify its presentation here, and make the
document less unwieldy, much of the factual material has been cut, and most of the sub-
headings have been omitted. Readers can bear in mind that the information (or opinion)
for each section is always given in the sequence: political and constitutional, strategic,
economic, obligations and repercussions, and conclusions, as set out in the Skeleton Plan
(see previous document, appendix). Also in accordance with the Skeleton Plan, specific
questions are being addressed, more especially the probable effects of a ‘premature
withdrawal’ of British rule.]
Part I: West Africa
A. Nigeria
(1) Political and constitutional
. . . 9. With a few relatively minor exceptions all the political parties in Nigeria want,
or profess to want, self-government within the Commonwealth as soon as possible.
Nigerians are, broadly speaking, loyal to the Crown, friendly to the British, and
attached to the Commonwealth connection. The visit of The Queen and Duke of
Edinburgh last year was a great success.
10. Two-thirds of the North’s 18 million inhabitants are Muslims and Islam is a
vital factor in their outlook. The remaining 6 million—a sizable minority of rapidly
growing political importance—are mainly pagans with some Christians. A small
minority of the Muslims—but it includes some of the most influential and able—
must be recognised as potentially hostile to us and what we stand for, and inclined to
fanaticism and xenophobia. If so far they have resisted the blandishments and bribes
of Egypt, this may be almost as much because they regard Egyptians as bad Muslims
and Nasser1 as a King breaker and a cat’s-paw of Moscow as for pro-British reasons.
For all their natural courtesy to strangers and good manners—so beguiling to the
ordinary Englishman—this minority probably regard us as infidels, distrust us as
democrats out to replace their traditional authority by the secret ballot and universal
suffrage (including eventually votes for women), and tolerate us only because they
feel insecure against the energetic and aggressive Southerners.
11. There is a small Communist-inspired party in Nigeria, the United Working
People’s Party, but it has little influence. Potentially it could be dangerous, and
constant vigilance is exercised. All the Governments in Nigeria have publicly
condemned international Communism as a threat to their own freedom, and so far
1 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egyptian prime minister, 1954–July 1956, and president, July 1956–1970.
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Moscow has had little success. Efforts at infiltration continue, mainly in the trade
unions and centres of higher education, but so far the situation has been well
contained. In Nigeria (as in Ghana) the nationalist leaders have all come out firmly
against Communism. We may be thankful for this and indeed take some credit for
this result of our liberal policy on constitutional matters.
12. The reports of the United Nations Visiting Missions to the Cameroons Trust
Territory have on the whole been most laudatory of the British administration. Their
last report a year ago stressed the need for more economic and social development to
keep pace with the rapid constitutional and political progress. The country is poor
and undeveloped. There are considerable possibilities but these need more money
than is available. On the political side the main features are fear of domination by the
Ibos from Eastern Nigeria and the question of amalgamation with the French
Cameroons next door. The two countries were of course one under German rule, and
no political party in the Southern Cameroons can afford not to profess interest in
ultimate unification with the French Cameroons. It is doubtful whether, if the
Federation as a whole became independent within, say, the next ten years, the
Southern part of the British Cameroons would decide to stay in it, such is the fear of
Ibo domination. The Communist-inspired (and probably financed) U.P.C. (Union de
Populations du Cameroun), which was banned in the French Cameroons following
the 1955 riots there, constitutes by far the most serious threat to both
administrations. It aims at the immediate unification and independence of the
British and French sectors, but in the recent elections it gained no seats.
13. The Indians show interest in Nigeria on customary lines, and have a
Commissioner in Lagos though there are not more than a few hundred Indians in
the whole territory. Their written propaganda is tendentious and sometimes
dishonest, but they need not be regarded at present as more than a minor nuisance.
14. The United States has shown signs of seeking to extend its influence and
some of the leading Nigerian politicians were educated in America. Relations with
the American Consul-General are good.
15. Probable demands for constitutional changes. In 1953 the two major
Southern parties, Dr. Azikiwe’s2 National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
(N.C.N.C.) and Chief Awolowo’s3 Action Group, formed a short-lived alliance to
demand “Dominion status” for Nigeria as a whole by 1956. The majority party in the
North, the Northern People’s Congress (N.P.C.), led by the Sardauna of Sokoto (now
Premier of the Northern Region), opposed the demand knowing that independence
so soon would mean domination of the North by the more “educated” Southerners.
They put forward as an alternative formula self-government “as soon as practicable.”
The acute crisis which resulted nearly split the country and there was serious rioting,
with loss of life, in Kano which was prevented from spreading only by prompt and
firm action. The crisis was eventually resolved by the then Secretary of State (Lord
Chandos) at the London constitutional conference in August 1953, when he secured
agreement to the present federal form of government and, as regards self-
2 Nnamdi Azikiwe (‘Zik’), prime minister of Eastern Region, 1954–1959, governor-general of Nigeria,
1960–1963, and first president of the Nigerian Republic.
3 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Yoruba leader in Western Region, opposed to Azikiwi’s ‘Ibo nationalism’;
founder of Action Group, 1951. 
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government, to the following formula, recorded in paragraph 28 of the Conference
Report (Cmd. 8934):—
“The Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Conference that Her Majesty’s
Government were not prepared to fix a definite date for self-government for Nigeria as a
whole, the more so as the Northern delegation, representing over half the population of
Nigeria, was unable to depart from its policy of self-government as soon as practicable.
The Conference eventually accepted a declaration of policy that in 1956 Her Majesty’s
Government would grant to those Regions which desired it full self-government in
respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional Governments, with the
proviso that there should be safeguards to ensure that the Regional Governments did
not act so as to impede or prejudice the exercise by the Federal Government of the
functions assigned to it now, or as amended by agreement in the future, or in any way
make the continuance of federation impossible.”
This formula is the key to the present political situation.
16. A conference . . . to work out how to carry out the 1953 promise of Regional
self-government, including the safeguards, . . . will now open, at Lancaster House, on
the 23rd May.
17. At this conference the N.C.N.C. and the Action Group will both renew the
demand for immediate self-government for Nigeria as a whole, and the question will
have to be discussed; but in the face of expected Northern opposition the Action
Group may and probably will be content with Regional self-government for the West,
for which they have made careful plans, though they may raise objection to the strict
safeguards which the United Kingdom delegation will put forward for the Federal
Government and for the continuance of federation. . . . the Southern parties will
urge very strongly that, if independence cannot be granted to the country as a whole
immediately, 1959 should be the year for the final transfer of power. The grant of
independence to Ghana will sharpen their demand. Indeed the Federal House of
Representatives passed a resolution, nem. con., on the 26th March, demanding
independence for the Federation as a whole (within the Commonwealth) in 1959.
There is likely to be heated discussion at the conference on this issue. At the London
conference in 1953 Lord Chandos made the following statement:—
“Her Majesty’s Government did not intend to force self-government either upon any
part of Nigeria before it felt ready for it or upon Nigeria as a whole so long as any
substantial part of it did not consider the time opportune.”
He repeated this statement at the Lagos conference in 1954 and it gave great
reassurance to the North.
18. If independence for Nigeria as a whole comes too soon, the North, or parts of
it, may talk of secession, particularly if power at the Centre is going to be in the
hands of the N.C.N.C. In fact it would be difficult for the North to set up an entirely
separate existence since all their imports and exports pass through the southern
ports but it is impossible to be certain how much weight would be given to practical
considerations of this kind. It is possible that the Southern Cameroons might also
decide to leave the Federation on account both of their fear of the Ibos and also of
their hope of ultimate amalgamation, as an independent territory, with the French
Cameroons.
19. It will be our aim to proceed with constitutional advances at Federal level as
slowly as possible, if we can, conceding in 1957 only such major changes as the
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creation of the office of Federal Prime Minister, and perhaps a Second Chamber in
which all Regions would be equally represented. (In the Federal House of
Representatives, the North, with over half the population, have half the seats.) We
shall seek to secure that no date is set for self-government for the country as a whole.
But success will not be easy.
20. There will be pressure at the conference for the creation of more Regions, or
States. To some extent such demands will be prompted by genuine fear of the major
tribes by minority groups. But mostly the demands will be made by the Southern
parties in order to split the North. Few of these demands have any wide or agreed
backing, and it will in any event be necessary for compelling administrative reasons
to resist them: the machine of government in Nigeria has already undergone two
major upheavals in the last five years because of constitutional changes, and a
further upheaval, by the creation of more Regions, would prove more than it could
stand, particularly in view of the declining numbers of experienced British officers.
(2) Strategic
21. The international airport of Kano (in Northern Nigeria) is on the air
communications line to Uganda, Kenya, the Arabian Peninsula and the Far East. The
importance of the trans-African air reinforcement route is great and in certain
circumstances it would be vital for reinforcing East Africa, Aden and the Persian
Gulf, the harbours at Lagos and Port Harcourt. Both of these sea ports are bases that
it would be convenient but not essential to use in limited or global war. . . .
24. So long as the Federal Government remains dependent, our strategic
requirements are constitutionally secure. After independence, we shall have to rely
on goodwill; though if we are prepared to continue, and Nigeria is prepared to accept,
some financial and other forms of aid to Nigeria’s defence forces we may possibly be
in a stronger position.
(3) Economic
. . . 28. The sterling area would suffer a moderate loss of dollar exchange if
Nigeria were to leave it; departure from the Commonwealth, without leaving the
sterling area, would have little or no effect on the latter. . . .
. . . 32. The Nigerian market is a valuable one for United Kingdom manufactured
goods. There are also important United Kingdom interests in trading and lesser
interests in mining. United Kingdom trade would be affected if independence were
accompanied by hostility to United Kingdom traders, but it is to be hoped that there
will be no such hostility. After independence there might be a greater tendency to
protect new Nigerian industries at the expense of imports and this might affect
certain United Kingdom industries, but taking the longer view the interests of both
countries in developing the trade between them are great, and these interests seem
unlikely to be appreciably disturbed by independence. . . .
(4) Obligations and repercussions
35. As in Ghana, self-government is the declared objective and at the Regional
level is likely to be reached in the East and West this year and in the North in 1959.
The effect of full self-government for the Federation as a whole depends very largely
on how soon it comes. The fissiparous forces are very strong in this large country and
if Federal independence comes too soon the Federation may break apart.
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36. Until the final transfer of power to the Federation, it should be possible, if we
are firm enough at the conference—and decent Nigerians will not forgive us if we
show weakness to the more extreme and self-interested politicians—for the United
Kingdom Government to retain power to suspend the Constitution of any part or the
whole of the Federation in case of failure. But it would be politically impossible to
use this power in a self-governing Region unless things had gone really badly wrong,
enough experienced officials were available to set them right, and the Nigeria police
could be relied upon to carry out the United Kingdom’s intentions as conveyed to
them through their senior officers.
37. When the Regions are self-governing but the Federal Government is still
dependent, the machinery of government may work at least as well in the West and
the North as it seems likely to do in Ghana. But in both cases, and particularly in the
North, much will depend on how many British officials will be willing to stay on for a
good many years to come until trained and experienced Nigerians are available in
sufficient numbers to take over.
38. In the East, where already only a thin red line of British officers stands
between the Regions and chaos, things are likely to go downhill fairly rapidly. If, as
seems virtually certain, most of the remaining British go on or soon after Regional
self-government, i.e., by the end of this year, chaos must be considered more likely
than not within two or three years; and if the power still remains to the United
Kingdom to suspend the Constitution of the Region, that step may be necessary.
Alternatively, the Federal Government may have to intervene under the powers
which we hope to secure for it to safeguard the Federal interest, as envisaged in the
1953 promise of Regional self-government (see paragraph 15 above).
39. We have made, and shall continue to make, great efforts to persuade
experienced British staff to stay on and various expedients have been devised to
induce them to do so. But the inducements to go are strong. They can retire with
compensation for broken career when the Secretary of State ceases to have
responsibility for them and conditions in Nigeria and the utterances and behaviour
of Nigerian politicians are all too often such as to quicken their desire to take this
compensation and go.
40. It was said earlier that Nigerians generally were loyal to the Crown, friendly
to the British, and attached to the Commonwealth connection. That is true, and they
have many admirable—and indeed lovable—qualities, in particular a keen sense of
humour and the capacity to laugh at themselves. But there is a darker side, which
must not be overlooked.
41. Barbarism and cruelty are still near the surface, as is shown by happenings
such as these during the past two years: villagers beat to death a well-known Nigerian
barrister whose chauffeur-driven car had accidentally killed one of the villagers; the
fellow-villagers of a couple found to be receivers of stolen property sewed them
together and then clubbed them to death; and the Premier of the North (where some
large local government bodies had been asking for the branding of thieves) spoke
wistfully, in a speech in the Northern House of Assembly, of the days of slavery and
the mutilation of thieves “before the British came.” There is in fact likely to be much
less real freedom, especially for the under-privileged, the weak and minority groups,
after “freedom” has been achieved.
42. If the danger of administrative breakdowns is greatest in the East, there are
no less disquieting dangers of another kind in the Muslim North. The great Emirs
07-ConGov-Doc 1-28-cp  18/10/00  2:03 pm  Page 8
[2] CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1957 9
may not tolerate government from Kaduna (the Regional capital) by popularly-
elected commoners when the British Governor no longer has his reserved powers. As
a shrewd Sudanese observer said recently, “When the British go, the Emir of Kano
will rebuild the city walls.” Current proposals for devolution of power from the
Regional capital to the Provinces are framed to counter this danger, but much
depends on whether there will be time to implement them effectively. 1959 is the
date for Regional self-government in the North.
43. The position in Muslim courts in the North is unsatisfactory. They apply
much of the full rigour of conservative Muslim law to the detriment in particular of
non-Muslims. It is more than doubtful how far it will be possible before self-
government to carry through the fundamental changes that are required. . . .
45. To sum up. If the British withdraw in the next half decade, it is quite on the
cards that the North, or large parts of it, will secede, and if this happened a general
disintegration might well follow. There is in any event likely to be a general lowering
of standards everywhere, which might result in complete breakdown in the East and
will almost certainly mean less freedom for minorities everywhere. In some parts
there may be a reversion to much of the barbarism of pre-Colonial days. The outward
forms of democracy may remain but, as has been suggested by the Governor of the
East, the recent general elections there gave the people what may well be their last
opportunity of making a relatively free and fair choice of Government. . . .
47. The continuance of our prestige and influence, which are at present high,
will depend to a very large degree on how far we succeed in these efforts and on how
long we can retain ultimate power at the Centre. So long as there is a restraining
(British) hand at the Centre, backed by some constitutional sanctions and a reliable
machine (civil service and police), there is a fair chance that Nigeria can be held
together, and that something like democratic (if not “honest”) government will
develop. The best hope for Nigeria lies in the present student generation who, one
may hope, will as the politicians of the future be less divided among themselves
tribally and less self-seeking than the present set. Our restraining hand is thus really
needed for a generation. But it is unrealistic to expect that we shall have so long. . . .
(5) Conclusions
52. In spite of its great promise, and several encouraging features, one cannot
avoid forebodings as to the outlook for Nigeria, for the simple reason that we are
unlikely to have long enough to complete our civilising and unifying mission. The pass
in British West Africa was sold when the Watson Commission Report on the Gold Coast
was published in 1948.4 The recommendations of that Commission were very radical.
They set the pace in the Gold Coast and by so doing they lost us a vital fifteen to twenty
years in Nigeria. Successive Governments since have taken the line that the risks of
going too slow were probably greater than the risks of going too fast; and it remains
true that a slow pace would lose us the great goodwill we have at present and cause
much friction. But in West Africa the pace set by the fastest (Ghana) is certainly more
than the vast and unwieldy Nigeria looks like being able to take.
53. Loss of the present airfield facilities at Kano would have a most serious effect
on the ability to safeguard British interests in the Indian Ocean area.
4 See Hyam, ed, Labour government and the end of empire, 1945–1951 part III, document nos 214 and
215, and Rathbone, ed, Ghana part I, document nos 33–36.
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B. Sierra Leone
(1) Political and constitutional
. . . 57. There has been some talk of “self-government in 1961,” i.e., five years
after the 1951 Constitution was originally due to expire. This however is not a
general cry and full internal self-government and independence are at present no
more than fairly distant objectives. There is, however, significant pressure for some
further constitutional advance.
There are as yet no significant external political pressures. But the example and
influence of Ghana are likely to be increasingly felt. Sierra Leone would also not
indefinitely acquiesce in lagging behind the political progress of the neighbouring
French territories under the Loi Cadre. . . .
(2) Strategic
59. Sierra Leone is of some importance on the trans-African reinforcement
route. Freetown is one of the largest and best natural harbours in the world and lies
on the route which would have to be used by shipping to the Middle East and beyond
if the Mediterranean or the Suez Canal were closed. On present planning the port
would in time of war be used primarily as a base for stores and as a NATO convoy
assembly anchorage, but the Admiralty do not intend to establish a naval base there.
(3) Economic
. . . 66. . . . United Kingdom firms have important interests in trading, and in
mining for iron ore, chrome ore and diamonds, and United Kingdom trade would be
adversely affected if hindrances were placed on the activities of these firms, or if the
territory were to leave the Commonwealth and the sterling area and preferences were
discontinued. There is however no reason to think that political independence would
lead to Sierra Leone deliberately hindering British firms or leaving the sterling area;
Ghana shows no signs of doing either, and Sierra Leone would not be in such a
strong position as Ghana to take an independent line. . . .
(4) Obligations and repercussions
67. A withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction at the present stage of political,
economic and social development would be likely to have grave results and could not
be regarded as compatible with her responsibilities for the welfare of the inhabitants.
Considerable animosity remains between the Creoles in the Colony area and the
indigenous inhabitants of the Protectorate, and, with the withdrawal of British
jurisdiction, friction between the two communities would increase and probably lead
to violence. There would be violence also in the Protectorate, where recent
disturbances have demonstrated the widespread and often justified lack of confidence
by the people in their chiefs. Apart from this, responsible government could not be
carried on in a territory where the educational system can still produce only 40
students of matriculation standard a year, and where African politicians have as yet
had very little experience of political and governmental responsibility.
68. From all reports it would appear that a large proportion of the population of
Sierra Leone would view with disfavour any early ending of responsibility by Her
Majesty’s Government, and a premature withdrawal would be disastrous for the
prestige and influence of the United Kingdom in the territory.
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69. A premature withdrawal by the United Kingdom leading to anarchy or near-
anarchy in Sierra Leone might well be regarded by the French, whose territories
border two of the three land sides of Sierra Leone, as a threat to the stability of their
territories. It would be unlikely that a country hostile to the United Kingdom would
fill the vacuum caused by United Kingdom withdrawal, but it is not inconceivable
that the French would feel bound to do so. There might also be some attempt by
Liberia to exert influence. At the best Sierra Leone would become another Liberia,
possibly like Liberia, with American backing.
(5) Conclusions
70. The ultimate future of Sierra Leone is harder to determine than that of many
other territories. It is a borderline case, and cannot be said to fall clearly either into
the category of dependencies which can obviously become fully independent in time
or into the category of those which obviously never can do so. The most realistic goal
to set before us at present is that of internal self-government, the achievement of
which will depend largely upon the speed at which the economic resources of the
territory can be developed, educated Africans produced and the gap between
Freetown and the Protectorate narrowed. It is therefore unlikely that such questions
as the retention of strategic facilities need become pressing for some years to come,
and even when the stage of internal self-government is reached it is unlikely, unless
there is a notable change in the political climate meanwhile, that there would be
serious difficulty in devising acceptable machinery for the preservation of United
Kingdom interests.
71. Nor need vital United Kingdom economic interests be at stake in the political
game. British trade with West Africa preceded British administration, and there is no
reason why it should not continue after it provided that we so conduct ourselves in
the meanwhile as to leave behind us a stable and friendly Government. . . . 
73. The maintenance of good relations between the United Kingdom and Ghana
will be an important background factor in safeguarding the orderly development of
Sierra Leone. Friction between us could well be reflected in internal stresses in
Sierra Leone.
C. Gambia
. . . 78. Gambia at the moment is a happy backwater, but it cannot expect to be
permanently immune from the general political awakening which is going on in
West Africa. It is too small and too peculiar a shape ever to be able to stand entirely
by itself. . . .
86. A withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction within the immediate future
would be likely to result in a complete collapse of Government and a cessation of all
form of development.
87. A withdrawal would be regarded with complete disfavour by public opinion in
the Gambia. The prestige of the United Kingdom there would greatly suffer.
88. A vacuum caused by the premature withdrawal of United Kingdom
jurisdiction would almost certainly be filled by the French. Anarchy in the Gambia
would prove an irresistible invitation to them to extend their influence into the
territory.
89. By virtue of its size, the narrowness of its economy, and the precariousness of
its financial position, the Gambia is a territory which as far as can be foreseen can
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never aspire to full independence. Given that dependence on a bigger country is
unavoidable, there is no evidence that Gambians wish to change the United Kingdom
for somebody else. It is possible that when economic, educational and political
development has proceeded much further than it has at present some form of
internal self-government may be possible, if no other form of association with the
United Kingdom has been evolved. The people of the Gambia are very pro-British and
proud of their connection with the United Kingdom, a factor which is of importance
in considering the future of the territory. It is also probable that Gambia would be
interested in joining any future West African Federation if . . . that should ever
become a practical possibility.
Part II: East Africa
(1) Political and constitutional
. . . 91. Looked at regionally and broadly the external pressures and influences are
those inevitable to a zone of dependencies exposed to the anti-colonial propaganda of
the Middle East and the attractions to evolving Africans of the body of dogma
propagated by what is loosely called the Afro-Asian block of the United Nations. More
potent than Communist doctrine in a nationalistic setting, are the egalitarian
philosophies of bodies such as the Africa Bureau and the International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions. In view of the relatively few leaders of local opinion, personal
contacts and influences have a great importance; every ambitious African can find his
Brockway.5 The question of external pressures is considered more closely below in
relation to individual territories. . . .
94. Kenya. Internally the political pressures are those of an unstable multi-racial
society. For the first half century of Kenya’s existence the struggle was between a
white settled community, wishing to entrench their position against Asian
competition, and a Colonial Government bent on a sometimes sterile impartiality
and subject to fluctuating direction from Westminster. The African was a bewildered
spectator, gradually acquiring the vocabulary of Western politics and the “felt needs”
of Western political theory. With the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, which gave both
Asian and African a place in the policy-forming organ of government, a step was
taken which ruled out for all time the prospect of self-government for the European
Kenyan alone. This settlement was accepted by the Europeans, after a split in their
ranks, welcomed by the Asians and at first rejected by the Africans, who subsequently
acquiesced in African participation. Before the recent African elections those Africans
who had participated declared their support of the Lyttelton formula as an interim
measure. They were not returned by the electorate. The habit of compromise is
growing and if the races can remain yoked in a pattern subject to control from
Westminster for long enough the habit of co-operation and acceptance one of the
other may become a natural order of things. This prospect is menaced by the theories
of democracy which the African has avidly accepted and which many encourage him
to pursue. The move to a common roll, the hall-mark of stable multi-racialism, must
be gradual to be enduring. The theories of quantitative democracy lure the African to
5 Fenner Brockway, MP (Lab) for Eton & Slough since 1950; pacifist; chairman of British Centre for
Colonial Freedom, 1942–1947; first chairman of Congress of Peoples against Imperialism since 1948;
chairman of Movement for Colonial Freedom since 1954; prolific author.
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stand out against co-operation until he can dominate by numbers. The task of
statesmanship in the next decade is to manipulate European fears, Asian timidity and
African impatience to a delicate but changing balance which allows no member of
the team to run off the field.
95. The pressures for constitutional change will therefore be towards a greater
proportionate role for the African. This will be symbolised by the move to break
“parity.” The main African demand will be greater representation in Legislative
Council and the African is likely to realise that adherence to communal voting in
more and more constituencies is the course most likely to result in the victory of
numbers over quality. The counter-move most likely to preserve European influence
in the long term is development of the common roll, at first with high qualifications,
which will oblige all candidates to court a mixed electorate. Whether the resident
Europeans will recognise this soon enough and have the wisdom to urge this line of
constitutional change is the big question.
96. Uganda. Legislative and executive power is still in the hands of the Governor.
He legislates by and with the consent of a Legislative Council, with a government
side of thirty members composed partly of officials (all at present European) and
partly of unofficials (some of them Ministers) of all three races who owe their
position to an undertaking to vote with the Government on an issue of confidence.
The representative side also number thirty; the Governor, as presiding officer, has a
casting vote. These representative members are of all three races, all nominated by
the Governor, although the African members are presented for nomination by
various forms of indirect election. Of the entire council one half of the members are
African. In the Executive Council of fourteen, eleven are Ministers; of these six are
officials (all European); three African Ministers, one Asian and one European are
unofficials. This structure was introduced in 1955 and it was then announced that no
major change was contemplated before 1961. In Uganda at present the mystic term
“parity” means an equal number of Africans to an equal number of others. . . .
98. Internally the great debate is over the future as a unitary or federal State.
This expresses in constitutional terminology something not really thought out in
such terms. It reflects a basically tribal problem, i.e., the assertiveness of Buganda,
which has had a generation’s lead in absorbing the education of the West, and the
fear and envy of Buganda on the part of the other tribes of the Protectorate. Her
Majesty’s Government have declared that they envisage the Uganda of the future as a
united country, which only thus will have the resources and the size to stand
independent among the nations. Buganda feels that alone they have all the attributes
which merit independence in the present age and that their association
geographically with the rest of the Protectorate is being used as a pretext to hold
them back. The other tribes resent the privileged position of Buganda and think that
if only they could acquire the same status they would have the same power and could
face self-government without the fear of exchanging Buganda dominance for British
“imperialism.” . . .
99. Demands for constitutional change will be expressed in self-contradictory
forms so long as there is no genuine country-wide political party with a positive
programme for self-government; the Uganda National Congress does not yet meet
this definition. On the one hand Buganda will claim a greater measure of internal
self-government; this has already reached the limit short of separation from the rest
of the Protectorate. This effort will be represented to the outside world in “national”
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terms which will cloak its parochial intent. On the other hand the other tribes in the
Protectorate will press also for greater local self-government (i.e., an attempt to give
national characteristics to organs of local government) while showing an attachment
to Protectorate institutions and a strong Central Government, which they will regard
as a shield under which they can develop their separate strength rather than an
expression of their collective interest and growing maturity. The task of the
protecting Power must be to develop the central institutions in such a way that they
are regarded as an expression of the unity they must yet create and so design these
institutions that the immigrant communities, notably the Asians, find in them a
niche which they regard as secure, and in which they are recognised and accepted by
the African population. The next proclaimed stage in achieving this objective is the
inauguration of elections to the representative side of Legislative Council in 1961 on
a common roll in a manner which will entrench the fundamental interests of the
minority communities.
. . . 101. Tanganyika. The main external pressure on Tanganyika comes from the
United Nations, whose Trusteeship Council annually examines a report of the
territory and every three years sends a Visiting Mission to inspect and report on its
development. These reports are also considered, more cursorily, in the General
Assembly, which tends to attempt to stretch Tanganyika on the Procrustean rack of
anti-colonial resolutions of general application to all trust territories. The United
Nations is also invoked, under the petitions system, as a court of appeal by the
disgruntled and ambitious, who are vastly encouraged to excesses by the anti-
colonial pack. The trust status of the territory shakes the confidence not only of
external investors but also of the immigrant communities who long for some solid
reassurance of the endurance of a British connection. The malign influence of United
Nations interference has not hitherto been allowed to distort policy but the fear that
it will and the need to have some regard to United Nations sensibilities have retarded
confident advance. Developments in adjacent territories both north and south can
have an unsettling effect on the racial harmony which has so far prevailed; but
conversely solid demonstration of a working partnership in Tanganyika could bring
stability and hope to East and Central Africa. Internal political pressures are not yet
highly developed. Only a small proportion, say 5,000, of the Europeans are settled as
farmers on the land and they have not developed a collective political personality
comparable to that of the Kenya Europeans. They are leaderless and unassertive. The
Asians are supine but have wealth and a readiness to use it to promote political
stability. The Africans have little national cohesion but strong tribal affinities and
have as yet shown little response to the doctrines of African nationalism purveyed by
the Tanganyika African National Union. But this movement could grow rapidly and
dangerously in the event of economic distress or the absence of an alternative
political vehicle for political self-expression. This exists in embryo in the United
Tanganyika Party, founded recently by Europeans and Asians to seek African support
and present a non-racial front when elections are introduced. This party may succeed
if it can recruit effective African leadership.
102. Demands for constitutional change on the part of the great bulk of the
inhabitants are likely for some time to be small and capable of satisfaction by the
progressive introduction of the electoral principle and the association of local
opinion, particularly African, with the policy-forming organs of government.
Strident demands for the introduction of universal adult suffrage and the immediate
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attribution of executive authority to Africans may develop from a minority, who can
only draw strength if United Nations interference is not kept in bounds and if the
extension of the very inadequate social services, notably education, cannot be
financed. The task in the next few years is to anticipate rabid African nationalism by
mobilising the basic goodwill between the races in an active non-racial political
development, which is sustained by but does not outstrip economic and social
progress.
103. Zanzibar. . . . Constitutional development, long stagnant, has recently been
rapid. The Sultan’s Government is now conducted by an Executive Council, of which
the British Resident is President, with seven official members and three unofficial
members (Arab, Asian and African) who have been associated with the work of
certain departments. The Legislative Council has recently been enlarged, with
thirteen official members and twelve representative members, of whom six are to be
elected in common roll elections on a qualitative franchise, in July 1957. After the
results of the elections are known, the remaining six representative members will be
appointed by the Sultan on the advice of the British Resident.
The Arabs of Zanzibar are exposed to Egyptian propaganda, notably from Cairo
radio. Their response is mild recalcitrance, which dares not find expression in a
manner displeasing to the present Sultan. They have urged constitutional change,
have got most of what they asked and may be beginning to doubt its value in face of a
growing feeling on the part of the traditionally subject African majority that
democratic processes may be the revenge for slavery.
(2) Strategic
104. The East African region has great potential strategic importance, situated as
it is to the south of the Middle East air barrier and with an aspect towards the Persian
Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Climatically European forces can well be held in Kenya
which also provides ample training facilities and possibilities of accommodation and
local food supplies. The region contains three major airfields, Entebbe, Nairobi and
Dar-es-Salaam and two others at Mombasa and Kisumu with very fair facilities. The
ports of Mombasa and Dar-es-Salaam are well equipped to deal with commercial
traffic and the former has certain rudimentary naval facilities which could be
improved with some expenditure of time and money. The possibility exists that an oil
refinery may be built at Mombasa. At the present time the airfields of the region are
essential links in the air reinforcing route from South Africa to the Middle East and
from Europe and West Africa to the Arabian Peninsula and the Far East. The
existence of the air barrier necessitates the deployment of substantial forces to the
south of the Red Sea, and for administrative and climatic reasons about a brigade
group will in future have to be maintained in Kenya as a reserve for East and Central
Africa, Aden, and the Persian Gulf. Strategically, therefore, the region has acquired
greatly enhanced importance in Commonwealth defence. The sources of the Nile in
Uganda constitute, while under British control, at least a psychological threat to
Egyptian ambition. . . .
(3) Economic
. . . 117. East Africa is almost the sole supplier of sisal to the United Kingdom and
the principal supplier of coffee. The relative importance of East Africa in the United
Kingdom market for some [other] commodities is a post-war phenomenon, resulting
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from the dollar shortage, but as far as can be seen there will always be a substantial
advantage in having these sterling sources of supply at competitive prices. In 1938,
for example, only 39 per cent. of the United Kingdom’s imports of coffee came from
East Africa, the principal source of supply being Costa Rica. If East Africa left the
sterling area, this would affect the pattern of the United Kingdom’s imports. If the
possibility of denial of supplies is envisaged, the principal difficulty would arise with
sisal, for which there are no obvious alternatives available in the sterling area.
(4) Obligations and repercussions
118. Looking at the region as a political whole it stands out as a testing ground
for the possibility of multi-racial or non-racial development lying geographically
between the Union of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and
the anti-colonial influences of the Middle East and the sub-continent of Asia. The
failure of inter-racial partnership in this region, particularly in Tanganyika, would
intensify the pull of the Union of South Africa on the Central African Federation,
which would then feel itself threatened with hostility from the north and a need to
recoil for support on the south. It would also in effect extend the frontiers of
turbulence south from the Middle East, place the source of the Nile at the mercy of
Egypt, which would feel an urge to secure it, and even perhaps provide a vulnerable
area for the expansionist ambitions of India, provided that the Indian bridgehead is
not earlier engulfed by African nationalism. Failure would, therefore, produce an
important area of instability which would be a grave threat to Western interests in
the continent of Africa.
119. At present the balance between racial groups is maintained only by the
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. Were this withdrawn prematurely that balance
would dissolve into conflict and elimination of the weak minorities in Uganda and
Tanganyika. In Kenya the European settled element would go down fighting. Since
the major tribal groups in the territory have not yet been welded into any national
cohesion, tribal jealousies would succeed the subjection of non-African minorities
with as a minimum result social disintegration and economic bankruptcy. In all this,
so long as it retains jurisdiction, the United Kingdom is the “power of last resort,”
which by its very existence as an arbitrator prevents recourse to violence and by its
experience can often find a way through local antipathies which could not otherwise
be reconciled.
120. It can be seen from the foregoing that the premature withdrawal of United
Kingdom jurisdiction would lead to a disastrous decline in the prestige and influence
of the United Kingdom.
121. Whether this vacuum would be filled by a country hostile to the United
Kingdom and her allies is difficult to say. Soviet Communism has as yet little
foothold or influence in the East African territories, but it is traditionally quick to
exploit a situation of chaos and poverty and there is no doubt that there would be
potent groups in the abandoned territories who would look to Moscow for advice and
support. The Hindu populations would also no doubt appeal to India to come to their
rescue, with what result it is hard to predict. . . .
(5) Conclusions
123. It can be briefly concluded that the withdrawal of United Kingdom
influence from East Africa would bring to a shabby conclusion an important and
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hopeful experiment in race relations, with repercussions locally on the Central
African Federation and a decline in United Kingdom prestige much more significant
and enduring than the self-congratulatory applause of the anti-colonial, anti-Western
world. African gratitude would be felt only by the self-seeking and expressed by none.
An expanding market for United Kingdom goods would contract and become even
more sharply competitive; British business connections would be unlikely to survive
in any strength the chaotic mismanagement of successor States. (Even in Uganda,
often regarded by some as of West African ripeness, there are less than a dozen
African civil servants above the subordinate grades.) The Middle East air barrier
would be extended southward and might be virtually impossible to overcome. The
flank of Africa would be thrown open to subversive penetration from the Soviet
Union and others hostile to the West. The Belgian and Portuguese positions would be
cruelly undermined.
124. A strengthening of United Kingdom interest would, however, pay dividends.
The scope for worthwhile investment in East Africa is illustrated by the growth of the
Kenya economy even through the Mau Mau troubles (£8 million new investment,
excluding reinvested profits, in manufacturing industry alone in the period
1952–56). The remunerative investment desirable over the next five years on
Government account alone has been assessed in the light of the Royal Commission
report at £250 million. Minimum loan requirements for the period 1957–60 have
been squeezed down to £112 million to bring them within sight of assumed
resources, but a realistic assessment of the essential provision to sustain wise policy
would be £150 million. In terms of recurrent expenditure Uganda can work within its
revenue, Kenya can respond to a declining scale of aid on the present curve but
strong efforts will be needed if Tanganyika is to tide over a period of inelastic revenue
while its undeveloped resources are brought into play. If these financial conditions
can be satisfied the stage is well set for a discharge of our obligations.
Part III: Aden and British Somaliland
A1. Aden Colony
134. . . . it is the policy of Government to move as quickly as practicable to
internal self-government with appropriate safeguards in the realms of External
Relations, Defence, Finance, and Internal Security. The policy was clearly stated in
the statement made by Lord Lloyd, on behalf of Her Majesty’s Government, in the
Legislative Council on 19th May, 1956, which defined the aim as “a considerable
degree of internal self-government” but stated that “the importance of Aden both
strategically and economically within the Commonwealth is such that Her Majesty’s
Government cannot foresee the possibility of any fundamental relaxation of their
responsibilities for the Colony.”
135. The strategic importance of the Colony of Aden in peace and war lies in the
fact that it is British territory providing an important base from which naval, military
and air forces can protect British interests in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian
Peninsula and ensure the stability of the Somaliland Protectorate. Restrictions on
bringing troops by air through the Middle East air barrier greatly increase the
importance of Aden in this connection. In addition it is an air-staging post on the
trunk route to the Far East. A naval fuelling base under British control in this area is
of value, as also are the oil storage, and refining capacity of the port. It may well be
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necessary in the future to increase the responsibilities and status of the military
headquarters at Aden.
. . . 142. Removal of British influence from the Colony would certainly greatly
diminish the prestige of Great Britain in the Middle East and its influence for
stability in the area. Moreover it would render the military task of safeguarding
British interests in the Persian Gulf scarcely feasible.
143. Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would certainly leave
a vacuum which the Government of the Yemen would immediately seek to fill and
the Saudi Arabians would be encouraged to pursue more energetically their designs
on the Buraimi Oasis.
144. Taking all considerations into account, particularly strategy, economic
interests, and prestige and influence in the Middle East, Her Majesty’s Government
have a strong interest in the maintenance of control of Aden Colony for an indefinite
future period. This interest is not, however, inconsistent with granting to the Colony
the highest possible measure of internal self-government.
A2. Aden Protectorate
. . . 163. There is a clear obligation on Her Majesty’s Government to maintain
and uphold its treaties with the Protected States for as long as they themselves wish
to remain in that association with Her Majesty’s Government. It would not be
possible unilaterally to abrogate these treaties, although it may be possible in time to
evolve a different kind of relationship.
164. Further, Her Majesty’s Government has a general kind of obligation to assist
and develop these small and weak States so far as may be possible towards a stronger
form of economic and social condition. This has to be done by means of tactful advice
and financial aid.
165. Subject to the foregoing, Her Majesty’s Government has an interest in
continuing to exercise its authority in the Protectorate; but primarily as the
hinterland of Aden Colony, and a buffer between that Colony, the Yemen and Saudi
Arabia.
B. Somaliland Protectorate
. . . 167. The main political and economic problem is presented by the fact that
the livelihood of the nomadic inhabitants of the Protectorate depends substantially
on their enjoying access to the Haud and Reserved Area which were recognised by
the 1897 Anglo–Ethiopian Treaty as forming part of Ethiopia. The rights of the tribes
from the Protectorate to graze and water in Ethiopia were established and recognised
by the 1897 Treaty. By the 1954 Agreement, the Ethiopian Government accepted that
the tribal organisation set up by the Protectorate Government should continue to
function when the tribes were in the Haud and Reserved Area, a liaison organisation
being established to preserve the link between the tribes and the Protectorate
Government and to transmit to the tribes the instructions of that Government on
internal tribal matters. In spite of these concessions by Ethiopia the inhabitants of
the Protectorate as a whole deeply resent the fact that these vital grazing areas have
been recognised as being Ethiopian territory, a resentment which is increased
whenever the Ethiopian authorities do not keep to the spirit of the Treaty and the
Agreement in regard to the rights conferred on the tribes from the Protectorate by
those instruments. Somali leaders suspect the Ethiopian Government of wishing to
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put pressure on the tribes from the Protectorate in the Haud and Reserved Area with
a view to compelling them to accept Ethiopian nationality, this being the prelude,
they suggest, to a move on the part of Ethiopia to take over the Protectorate.
168. Another important external factor is the movement towards independence
in 1960 of Somalia. This country already has a very considerable measure of self-
government, and the leaders of the dominant political party have as their aim the
unification of all Somalis in a greater Somalia, an aim which is supported by most
Somalis everywhere. The ability of the indigenous administration to govern the
country effectively after 1960 and to maintain a real independence is doubtful,
especially in view of the extent to which they are likely to continue to be dependent
on external financial and economic support. Nevertheless, political development in
Somalia acts as a spur to the political leaders in the Protectorate who want similar
rapid development for their own country. They have been promised a considerable
measure of economic and educational development, details of which are still being
worked out, and have been told that the primary object of all these developments is
to make the Somalis of the Protectorate ready for internal self-government. They
have also been told that Her Majesty’s Government is not, however, laying down a
definite timetable for political advances but that Her Majesty’s Government will
review the position in consultation with the people of the Protectorate within a
reasonable time after 1960. The Somali leaders have made enquiries concerning the
views of Her Majesty’s Government regarding the possibility of some form of
association between Somaliland and Somalia some time after 1960. In reply to these
enquiries Lord Lloyd said in a statement approved by the Cabinet and made in
Hargeisa in August 1956 that
“when the time comes to consider such matters, the views of the Somalis concerned will
be one of the factors of decisive importance in determining Her Majesty’s Government’s
attitude towards any proposals which may be put forward on this subject. Her Majesty’s
Government would certainly discuss any such proposals with representatives of the
people of the Protectorate; and if political and economic conditions were propitious, and
the proposals were both well-conceived and favoured by the Somalis concerned, Her
Majesty’s Government will be ready to support them in principle.” . . .
170. The Somaliland Protectorate offers strategic advantages somewhat similar
to those of Aden, except that its port facilities are not sufficiently developed to be of
any value to the Royal Navy, although the Navy’s need to secure port facilities there
would become actual if we lost the facilities now enjoyed in Aden. As our influence in
the Suez Canal area diminishes, so the Southern Red Sea area assumes for us an
increasing importance. The preservation of our strategic interest in the Horn of
Africa generally is not merely a question of the defence of Kenya (which marches
with both Ethiopia and Somalia, and contains some 60,000 Somalis in its Northern
Frontier Province) or the importance of insulating the area from unfriendly
influences, particularly Egyptian. It is also, as the Chiefs of Staff have emphasised, a
question of over-flying and air-staging rights in the Protectorate, together with the
right to station forces, to secure concessions in respect of oil and mineral production
and pipelines, and to safeguard the use and development of ports and anchorages.
Because of the air barriers now erected against us at the eastern end of the
Mediterranean air-staging and over-flying rights in the Protectorate, including
staging rights for troop carriers, have become important for the reinforcement of the
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Persian Gulf, via Nairobi and Aden. Staging facilities might also be required for
short-range aircraft, e.g., for the defence of Aden and the Aden Protectorate. . . .
173. As the range of aircraft increases, the importance of their staging rights will
be correspondingly diminished, but on the assumption that our strategic policy in
the Middle East as a whole remains unchanged, and that our interests in the Persian
Gulf area continue to be substantial, we are likely to need these rights for at least the
next ten years. . . .
Part IV: Mediterranean territories
A. Gibraltar
. . . 195. . . . If withdrawal were accompanied by assumption over Gibraltar of
Spanish sovereignty, economic and social development would be bound to suffer
even if expenditure on the base continued, and independent political development
would cease. If United Kingdom jurisdiction and expenditure on the base both ceased
Gibraltar would be likely to become a slum very rapidly, like parts of Southern Spain.
196. Any change of status which seemed to satisfy the Spaniards’ claim would
momentarily increase the United Kingdom’s influence with Spain; but it would
permanently and disastrously diminish the United Kingdom’s prestige
internationally. In view of the loyalty of the Gibraltarian population to the Crown and
the sentimental attachment of many people in the United Kingdom to the Rock,
cession of Gibraltar to Spain is unthinkable. But if it were to develop into some kind
of “City State” this would be unlikely to have any effect one way or the other on the
United Kingdom’s prestige and influence. . . .
198.—(i) Spain is bound to continue with its claim to Gibraltar. But any proposal
to concede it would run counter to strong loyalist feelings in Gibraltar and here and
would have a disastrous effect on British prestige.
(ii) Constitutional demands in Gibraltar itself are not likely to be for more than
gradual extension of local responsibility, e.g., possibly by the introduction of a
limited Ministerial system.
(iii) Gibraltar is strategically important since it helps to ensure the security of vital
Commonwealth sea and air communications. Provided Spain remains in friendly
relations with the United States, Gibraltar is not of equal strategic importance to
NATO as it is to Her Majesty’s Government.
(iv) Her Majesty’s Government requires to maintain a naval and maritime air base
in Gibraltar together with refuelling facilities, a headquarters and a wireless station.
(v) Though Spain has offered to lease Gibraltar as a base to Her Majesty’s
Government, and our strategic requirements could theoretically be maintained
without retaining sovereignty, such an arrangement in so small a territory would
present serious practical difficulties and would become impossible if Spain
subsequently became unfriendly. . . .
B. Malta
. . . 207. [HMG’s strategic requirements] arise from Malta’s importance as a
United Kingdom naval and NATO base in the Mediterranean, and to a lesser extent
from the usefulness of the Admiralty Dockyard at Valletta. Malta is also an air-staging
post on the main trunk routes to the Middle and Far East, and the airfields are
suitable for operating bomber aircraft.
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208. Her Majesty’s Government’s strategic requirements cannot be met unless
Her Majesty’s Government retain jurisdiction in the field of defence and foreign
affairs. This is the basis of Her Majesty’s Government’s interest in the integration
plan, which would retain the final authority in the reserved field of defence and
foreign affairs to the United Kingdom Parliament and Government. . . .
212. [If UK jurisdiction were ended:] This would mean withdrawal of United
Kingdom use of any defence facilities in Malta. This would have the most serious
political, economic and social effect on Malta. In the foreseeable future, it would
mean economic ruin and widespread unemployment, unless some other Power
stepped in. Politically, it would lead the Maltese to look around for “the highest
bidder” and probably in the first instance to Italy.
213. If integration is unsuccessful, it will lead to difficulties in the use of the
defence facilities of Malta and to a deterioration of Her Majesty’s Government’s
prestige and influence in the Middle East. . . .
C. Cyprus
217. [Pressures] are reflected in an unusual way (as far as colonies are
concerned) in demands for constitutional changes. The Turkish Cypriots are
completely satisfied with the status quo, and are nervous of any constitutional
advance. The extremists among the Greek Cypriots (the only ones who have been free
to give voice in the last two years) disclaim interest in any advance short of union
with Greece. In fact, there is little reason to doubt that, given the end of terrorism
and a moderation of pressure and propaganda by the Orthodox Church, many
moderate Greek Cypriots would welcome orderly advance along the general lines of
Lord Radcliffe’s proposals.6 It is generally recognised by all moderate opinion both in
and outside Cyprus that the existing form of government, with no elective element at
the centre, is anomalous in present times. But because Greek agitation has centred
so much on “self-determination” for Cyprus, the present situation is that
constitutional advance may lead on to self-determination by both main
communities, i.e., the partition of the island. It is only by acceptance of partition as
an end contingency that the Turks have been persuaded to accept the principle of
constitutional advance along the Radcliffe lines.
218. British control over Cyprus was acquired in 1878 to aid Turkey in defence
against Russian aggression; the support of Turkey and hence of the Eastern
Mediterranean and Middle East area against Russia remains the chief strategic
importance of the island to the Western Powers. Cyprus as the third in the chain of
British bases across the Mediterranean has acquired the post-war strategic
importance of serving as a base for protection of British interests in the Near East,
for support to the Bagdad Pact, and for the defence of the southern flank of NATO. . . .
223. Independence, whether or not by partition, would most likely increase
tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and lead to less stable internal
political and economic conditions. Withdrawal of British administration and capital
investment would slow down economic and social development; and the economic
effect of cessation of defence expenditure has already been noted. It is doubtful if
6 C J Radcliffe, lord of appeal in ordinary since 1949; constitutional commissioner for Cyprus (1956); his
proposals envisaged a very wide measure of self-government.
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Cyprus would be viable, especially with the running out of its copper ore in the next
few years, unless it had ties with some country that could offer a measure of
economic support to it. . . .
225. The vacuum would be filled in the first place by Greece and/or Turkey. The
former cannot be relied upon for support in the Middle East so long as she can be
blackmailed by Egypt through the large Greek population of Alexandria, and to
surrender Cyprus to Greece alone would hence be particularly damaging. It may be
that under the Eisenhower plan British withdrawal would lead to greater United
States influence on an independent Cyprus. Most likely there would be attempts by
Russia to keep internal affairs in Cyprus in a ferment through AKEL, the local
Communist Party. It is not inconceivable that Nasser might find an outlet for
Egyptian imperialism in Cyprus—there are strong trade links with Egypt, and
Nasser has given covert support to EOKA.7
Part V: Far Eastern territories
A. Hong Kong
. . . 231. By virtue of the Colony’s geographical position, history and population, the
chief political consideration which influences almost every problem is the relationship
of the Colony to China. The present Chinese Government, like the Nationalist
Government before it, considers Hong Kong to be Chinese territory awaiting reincor-
poration with the “motherland.” We have no indication of China’s timetable for such
reincorporation and it seems likely that she hopes to bring it about in due course by
peaceful means, awaiting a suitable opportunity to bring the matter to a head. In the
meantime, she loses no opportunity of building up her influence within the Colony,
particularly in the trade unions and in the schools, and of enhancing her appeal to the
local population as “compatriots” of China proper.
232. While there are a number of convinced Left-wing (Communist) and Right-
wing (Nationalist) adherents, the majority of the population are politically inactive
and unorganised with survival as their major aim in life. So long as the British
administration maintains its position and appears to be determined and capable of
doing so they are likely to be content with the present position. In any emergency,
however, a desire to join the winning, or at least to avoid the losing, side is likely to
play a large part, and if there seemed to be a possibility of the Chinese Government
shortly taking over the Colony there would be a strong move to reinsure with them.
Any signs of weakening on the part of the Hong Kong Government or Her Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom is therefore likely to have damaging
consequences. . . .
234. The Colony is quite unsuited for any form of self-government. It is too small
in area and resources to stand alone and there are no other territories with which it
could combine. The only alternative to British rule is return to China. In any case most
of the Colony’s water supplies, most of its agricultural land and most of its industry
are in the “New Territories,” the lease of which expires in 1997. There is virtually no
prospect of any Chinese Government renewing the lease, and without the leased area
the Colony would be neither economically viable nor militarily defensible. . . .
7 AKEL, Reform Party of Working People; EOKA, Greek initials of National Organisation of Cypriot
Fighters.
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236. The Colony has a first-class harbour and in peacetime is useful as a naval
and air base. It is a centre for communications in the area and a link in our
communications with Japan and the Pacific providing the only satisfactory service
and repair facilities for shipping and aircraft, other than those at Manila, for
thousands of miles. The Colony is also useful as a source of intelligence close to
China. In cold war terms the retention of Hong Kong is of great importance to our
position in the Far East. . . .
241. . . . [With the end of British jurisdiction,] Hong Kong would also be lost as
the chief base in the Far East for United Kingdom industrialists, traders, bankers and
shipowners; and the heavy but incalculable capital investment associated with those
occupations would have to be written off. . . .
243. The Colony provides a demonstration adjacent to a Communist country of
what can be done by good administration combined with intelligent private
enterprise. It is an example of the rule of law and respect for individual freedom. It
has, largely at its own expense, done outstanding work in absorbing and resettling
the flood of refugees who have confidently turned to it for asylum. It is a valuable
asset in the “cold war” and its loss would in many ways be as serious to the Western
cause as the loss of the Western sectors in Berlin. While few Asian Governments
would be prepared openly to support our colonial position, and none to do anything
to prevent the reincorporation of Hong Kong into China, its loss would certainly be
widely regretted, and would be a serious blow to our prestige and influence in the
area. . . .
245. By ordinary colonial standards Hong Kong is both tractable and useful. No
trouble is to be expected from pressure for constitutional development, and
economically the Colony makes few demands. Owing to its position vis-à-vis China it
stands, however, in much greater danger from external pressure than any other
colony, and this danger is accentuated by the composition of its population and the
inevitable struggle for the latter’s allegiance.
246. Short of the collapse of the Chinese Communist régime and a
disintegration of government within China it must be accepted that in due course
the Colony must return to China, at least when the lease of the “New Territories”
expires in 1997. There is likely, however, to be Chinese pressure for its return before
then and this pressure is likely both to increase and to meet with a readier response
from the population if there is any serious setback to the Colony’s well-being, or any
failure of confidence in the determination and capacity of Her Majesty’s Government
to maintain their position. If the Chinese were to force us out of the Colony this
would be a severe blow to Western prestige in the Far East and a substantial practical
loss in terms of British capital investment and communications facilities. We cannot
be sure how long we may be able to maintain our position if the Chinese seek to force
the issue, but any actions on our part which diminish the Colony’s economic well-
being and the confidence of the population in Her Majesty’s Government can serve
only to encourage Chinese pressure and to create conditions in which it will no
longer be possible to resist it.
B. Singapore
254. . . . Singapore together with the Federation [of Malaya] are most important
in the defences of Australia and New Zealand, although their defence policy is oriented
on SEATO, whose area also includes Thailand and South Viet Nam. Singapore is the
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headquarters of the Commanders-in-Chief, Far East; it possesses the largest and most
comprehensive naval dockyard in that part of the world and it provides a base from
which our air and land forces in the Federation and elsewhere in the Far East may be
supplied and deployed. The United Kingdom’s strategic position in the Far East
depends upon the maintenance of our military presence in Singapore. . . .
261. If the United Kingdom were to withdraw prematurely, leaving the
democratic elements to the mercy of the Communists, the effect on its reputation
would be serious, not least in the Federation of Malaya. If, however, the United
Kingdom were to withdraw in circumstances which provided reasonable security for
the life, liberties, and economic well-being of the people of Singapore, its prestige
and influence in the area would be enhanced rather than lowered. Without the full
use of military facilities in Singapore the United Kingdom could not fulfil its
strategic requirements in the Far East.
262. There is a serious danger that such a premature withdrawal might lead to
the Communists in Singapore gaining control. These Communists, like the vast
majority of the population, are Chinese and would look to China. If they were to gain
control, the vacuum left by the United Kingdom withdrawal would in effect be filled
by Communist China. The Federation of Malaya would not be strong enough to
prevent this.
C. The Borneo territories (N Borneo, Sarawak, Brunei)
298.—(i) The stage reached in constitutional and political progress in the three
territories makes it unlikely that there will be any local demand for independence in
the near future.
(ii) No obstacle is accordingly foreseen at present to the fulfilment of the United
Kingdom’s strategic requirements, for which the territories offer possibilities.
(iii) Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction, i.e., before the people
are sufficiently advanced educationally and politically to be capable of administering
stable and effective Governments of their own, would have very little if any direct
effect on the United Kingdom Exchequer, but would seriously prejudice political,
economic and social development, and react to the detriment and oppression of
racial minorities, probably resulting in armed conflict.
(iv) Premature withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction would damage United
Kingdom prestige and influence in the territories and evoke adverse criticism
elsewhere, not excluding the anti-colonial countries.
(v) United Kingdom withdrawal would leave a vacuum which would be filled
almost certainly by a Government of Communist character or possibly by Indonesia,
which has laid claim to Sarawak and would undoubtedly be attracted by the Brunei
oil. The Philippines claims to North Borneo, held to be groundless, might also be
pursued unless the United States exercised restraining influence.
Part VI: The Caribbean territories
A. The West Indies Federation
. . . 302. The Federation as initially established will not have strong governmental
powers. Its main field of activity will be in economic planning and the co-ordination
of West Indian trade interests, but it will have enough power to establish itself firmly
if there is a will for it to do so.
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. . . 311. The West Indies at present cost Her Majesty’s Government on average
about £4 million per annum. Of this over £3 million consists of direct grants in aid of
normal administration, grants for special purposes (particularly hurricane
rehabilitation) and C.D. and W. grants; the remainder represents the cost to Her
Majesty’s Government of the present defence arrangements. Although the method of
administering grants in aid will change when the Federation is established there will
be no change in the volume of aid required from Her Majesty’s Government.
Theoretically, the whole of this could be saved on the granting of independence. In
practice, however, increased assistance for economic development would almost
certainly be sought in other ways (in particular public loans) as soon as these more
direct forms of assistance ceased. Some of this would be likely to come from the
United States and Canada; there would however be likely to be a continuing call on
United Kingdom sources and thus the apparent saving would not be likely to be fully
realised although it might well remain substantial. . . .
320. The movement towards closer association through Federation and towards
independent status is a healthy one, as showing an out-growing of the effects of slav-
ery and of the isolation in which the small units of the area have existed for so long.
The withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction in due course from a soundly estab-
lished West Indies Federation may be expected to stimulate rather than to impede local
efforts towards development. The greatest danger politically is the growth of a class of
political bosses on the Latin-American model, and that the present healthily develop-
ing local Civil Services may be affected by nepotism and jobbery. The association of
the United States and Canada with the territory after independence is likely to grow
and there may well be some friendly rivalry between these two Powers for a predomi-
nant place—a rivalry which might well be to the advantage of the West Indies. . . .
B. British Guiana
. . . 334. [The effect of a change of status] would be a question of degree; if done
as part of a general withdrawal from a number of the smaller territories, it would
have a damaging effect on United Kingdom prestige and influence. In particular it
would be likely to impair our relations with the United States, in view of their
interest in preventing the establishment of any Communist Government in the
Western Hemisphere.
335. In view of the possibility that a premature withdrawal might be followed by
the development of a Communist-inspired State on the South American mainland,
the United States Government might well step in.
336. Withdrawal before a stable and friendly Government is established (whether
or not as part of the West Indian Federation) would result in some saving to the
Exchequer but would be seriously damaging to United Kingdom relations with the
United States and the West Indian Federation. It would also risk Commonwealth
material interests (considerable United Kingdom investments, and Canadian
investment in bauxite). Withdrawal after the establishment of a stable and friendly
Government would, of course, be another matter.
Part VII: The smaller territories
337. There are numerous small Colonial territories, practically all islands,
scattered around the surface of the globe, the considerations affecting which are set
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out below. Some of these Colonies have strategic value either to us, the
Commonwealth or NATO, e.g., Bermuda and Fiji. Some are dollar earners (e.g.,
Bermuda and the Bahamas). Some have frankly no material value to the United
Kingdom as far as we can see to-day and call for (usually very small) assistance from
United Kingdom funds, e.g., St. Helena. Practically none could hope to maintain
themselves with a stable administration if we withdrew, and certainly not those
which represent any call on our funds. Withdrawal from all, even if practicable on
strategic grounds, would represent only a relatively small saving to United Kingdom
funds and, particularly bearing in mind the internal chaos which would in many
cases result, could only represent a negation of our responsibilities and indeed be
degrading. . . .
Falkland Islands and Dependencies
. . . The strategic importance of the Falklands to the United Kingdom is primarily as a
base from which to support Commonwealth interests in the Antarctic, and depends
on a régime attached to the United Kingdom connection. . . .
The population is almost entirely of United Kingdom origin with a high
percentage of persons born in the United Kingdom. An independent Government
would be entirely British and would involve no loss of United Kingdom prestige or
influence. Provided the withdrawal of United Kingdom jurisdiction did not also
involve withdrawal of United Kingdom protection, there would be no vacuum to be
filled by an outsider. If, however, protection were also withdrawn, the Falkland
Islands would be in danger of occupation by Argentina, and the abandonment of a
racially British population to such a fate would be discreditable and severely
damaging to prestige. . . .
The strategic value of the Dependencies depends partly upon the possibility of
discovering minerals of strategic importance. For the rest, its strategic importance is
largely negative, i.e., it is important to the Commonwealth to deny it as a base to a
potentially hostile Power. . . .
Our withdrawal from Antarctica would mean a loss of United Kingdom prestige
and influence, especially in scientific circles. It might also involve the loss of
strategic minerals, but this will be easier to evaluate when the results have been
assessed of the work done during the International Geophysical Year.
Argentina and/or Chile, which have claims (partly competing) to the
Dependencies, would probably step in if the United Kingdom withdrew.
St Helena with Tristan da Cunha
. . . United Kingdom withdrawal would certainly leave a vacuum in these islands. This
might well be filled by the Union of South Africa in the case of Tristan da Cunha and
Gough Islands. This would be hard on the Tristan islanders who are coloured within
the meaning of the South African apartheid policy. It is unlikely that there would be
an immediate claimant to St. Helena but abandonment of this poor and loyal
community would be degrading. . . .
Seychelles
. . . The Colony is too poor in human and material resources to stand satisfactorily on
its own and would probably decline into a tropical slum if United Kingdom
jurisdiction were withdrawn. The small property owning class of French origin
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would have to come to terms with the majority, which is of mainly African origin.
Withdrawal from Seychelles would affect the prestige and influence of the United
Kingdom only in so far as it would be regarded as an abdication of moral
responsibility. . . .
Mauritius
. . . United Kingdom withdrawal under present conditions would lead to a violent
upheaval in Mauritius with unpredictable results. The amount of bloodshed might be
limited but the effect on the economic and social development of the territory would
be likely to be very serious, and prolonged. . . .
Our present policy is to fit Mauritius for full internal self-government. Withdrawal
cannot be recommended.
Fiji
. . . It is too early to contemplate Fiji becoming fully self-governing. If we
relinquished our administration to New Zealand we should presumably be able to
retain, with her agreement, the use of whatever facilities we required. Whilst the
Colony remains under our administration no difficulty in controlling our strategic
requirements is foreseen. . . .
To [withdraw and] leave the Fijians and Indians to fight it out among themselves,
when it was we who introduced the racial problem by importing Indian labour, would
have a deplorable effect. The Fijians are intensely pro-British and our departure
would for them mean betrayal.
The effect of United Kingdom withdrawal would depend on whether New Zealand
were to replace us in Fiji. If not, there is the likelihood of strife between the Fijians
and Indians and the lapse of the territory into chaos. . . .
British Solomon Islands Protectorate
. . . If the United Kingdom [withdrew and] was not replaced by Australia the
Protectorate would revert to a primitive mode of existence with little prospect of
advance.
The effect on United Kingdom prestige would probably not be great, but, since it
would involve allowing the territory to slide into anarchy, it would be
discreditable. . . .
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony
. . . [If the United Kingdom withdrew:] The islands would relapse into primitive
savagery with little hope of advance unless another civilised country assumed the
administration.8
The effect of withdrawal on prestige would be probably very little, but to permit
the Colony to relapse into savagery would be degrading.
8 The resident commissioner objected to this statement, commenting that the influence of Christian
missions and government was now so great there could be no question of this (CO 1036/331, no 4,
governor to Sir J Macpherson, 3 Mar 1958). In the CO, D J Derx specifically objected to the phrase; ‘near
primitive state’ would be better, he thought (ibid, no 22).
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High Commission Territories: Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and
Swaziland
. . . Representative institutions are at an early stage of development in all three
Territories. There are demands, in varying degrees, for increased powers for Africans.
We are endeavouring to encourage the growth of representative institutions but the
question of eventual self-government is not likely to be a practical one in the
foreseeable future. Other considerations apart, any suggestion that self-government
for the Territories was our aim would, of course, be taken badly by the Union.
The practical question in connection with the High Commission Territories is not,
therefore, whether they will one day become self-governing but whether they will
one day be handed over to the Union of South Africa. . . .
If we were to agree to transfer the Territories in present circumstances it would
improve our relations with the Union of South Africa, but we should be regarded by
many people in the United Kingdom and overseas as having betrayed our trust. Our
prestige and moral standing would be damaged, particularly in the eyes of the
peoples of the Colonies and of the Asian and African self-governing members of the
Commonwealth.
Because of the damage to our prestige which would result and because it would, in
fact, be a betrayal of our trust, we cannot agree to the transfer of the Territories to
the Union until the two conditions to which we are pledged have been fulfilled, i.e.,
until the United Kingdom Parliament has had an opportunity of expressing its views
and the African inhabitants have been consulted. Feeling among the African
inhabitants and in the United Kingdom about the native policies of the Union of
South Africa is such that we are unlikely to be able successfully to fulfil these
conditions in the foreseeable future.
3 CAB 134/1556, CPC (57)30 6 Sept 1957
‘Future constitutional development in the colonies’: memorandum for
Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee by Sir N Brook
[In all, four papers were generated in response to the prime minister’s directive
(document no 1), each of them drafted in the CO:—CP(0)(57)5 was a factual statement
following the ‘skeleton plan’, circulated to ministers as CPC(57)27, dated May 1957
(document no 2);—CP(0)(57)4 was a more specialised factual overview of ‘economic and
financial aspects’, and became CPC(57)28, dated 26 July 1957;—CP(0)(57)3 was an
attempt to be more analytical, with attached summaries: this was never circularised to
ministers, and it was decided at the officials’ meeting on 11 July 1957 to replace it by a
much more schematic general paper;—CPC(57)30, dated 6 September 1957, was this
general paper, signed by Sir N Brook (document no 3, printed here). Brook’s paper
incorporated some of the points made in the officials’ discussion, particularly by the
Treasury representatives, Sir F Lee and W Armstrong, but also the late addition of a
rather specific CO doctrine about the desirability of not transferring power until a
colonial people ‘could live together in harmony’ (para 15). It was also pointed out that
capital assistance requests might not cease at independence (CAB 134/1551, minutes of
Colonial Policy Official Committee meetings on 5 June & 11 July 1957). The three papers
which were circulated to ministers were inter-related parts of the full response to the
prime minister’s directive, and not a sequence of papers which modified or qualified each
other. The ‘economic’ paper CPC(57)28 is not reproduced here, its substance being
represented in Brook’s final paper. It had four sections: (i) colonial balance of payments
(of which it was said ‘any assessment of an individual territory’s standing was too
hypothetical for realistic analysis’), (ii) sterling assets of colonies, (iii) UK financial
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assistance, (iv) special position of Hong Kong. It is fully summarised, with statistical
tables, in Morgan, vol 5, Guidance towards self-government in British colonies,
1941–1971, pp 98–100; Brook’s paper is summarised at pp 100–102. All three papers are
summarised in A G Hopkins, ‘Macmillan’s audit of empire, 1957’, in P Clarke & C
Trebilcock, eds, Understanding decline: perceptions and realities of British economic
performance (1997), pp 234–260.]
1. In his minute of 28th January, 1957 (C.P.C. (57) 6), the Prime Minister asked
that an estimate should be made of the probable course of constitutional
development in the Colonies in the years ahead, and that this study should set out
the economic, political and strategic considerations for and against the grant of
independence.
2. The Colonial Office, with the co-operation of the Departments concerned,
have prepared a comprehensive review of all the present Colonial Office territories
(save the Federation of Malaya, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland) and also of the
High Commission territories in South Africa. This review has been circulated
separately (C.P.C. (57) 27). It suggests some conclusions regarding individual
territories. But any further examination of the problems of any territory, or region,
with a view to a reassessment of policy, would require special consideration after
consultation with the Governors concerned.
A separate study of the economic and financial considerations has also been
circulated (C.P.C. (57) 28).
3. On the basis of these detailed studies the Official Committee on Colonial
Policy have attempted to suggest certain general conclusions, under the headings
Constitutional, Economic, Strategic, and Political. I was asked to submit these on
their behalf. The strategic sections (paragraphs 9–12) have been approved by the
Chiefs of Staff.
Constitutional
4.—(a) Independence
(i) The following territories are likely to obtain independence within, and become
candidates for membership of, the Commonwealth within the next ten years:—
Federation of Malaya, in August 1957. 
Nigeria, perhaps in 1960 or 1961 (or quite soon thereafter). 
West Indies Federation, perhaps in 1963. 
Central African Federation (after 1960). 
Singapore, if it joins the Federation of Malaya.
(ii) Central African Federation. The print (C.P.C. (57) 27) does not deal with
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are parts of the Central African Federation.
The Federation is already self-governing in all matters which have been agreed to be
federal (though in relation to certain types of legislation Her Majesty’s Government
have powers of veto which were inserted into the Constitution to ensure that African
interests were safeguarded); and a great measure of responsibility in respect of
defence and external affairs has been delegated to it. Most matters concerning the
African population are, however, reserved to the territorial Governments (Southern
Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland). The Commonwealth Secretary retains
certain responsibilities for native affairs in Southern Rhodesia and the Colonial
Secretary retains ultimate authority for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The
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Federal Constitution contains a provision for its review by an Inter-governmental
Conference which the Federal Government and the United Kingdom Government
have agreed should be convened in 1960 to consider a programme for the attainment
of such a status as would enable the Federation to become eligible for full
membership of the Commonwealth.
This does not, of course, commit Her Majesty’s Government then to grant such
a status to the Federation. But there will be strong pressure for it from the
Federal Government, and Her Majesty’s Government will have to shape their pol-
icy so as to reconcile the desire for independence among the Europeans in the
Federation with the desire of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland for
continued protection by Her Majesty’s Government and with the safeguards incor-
porated in the Federal Constitution of 1953. The preamble to the Constitution
provides that:—
“Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue, under the special protection of Her
Majesty, to enjoy separate Governments for so long as their respective peoples so desire,
those Governments remaining responsible (subject to the ultimate authority of Her
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom) for . . .”
A later passage in the preamble runs:—
“. . . the association of the Colony and the Territories in a Federation would . . . enable
the Federation, when those inhabitants so desire, to go forward . . . towards the
attainment of full membership of the Commonwealth.”
Her Majesty’s Government are committed to interpret “when those inhabitants so
desire” as meaning “when a numerical majority of all the inhabitants of whatever
race so desire.” At present there is no prospect that such a majority would favour
independence for the Federation at any rate if it involved either the independence
under predominantly non-African control of the Northern Territorial Governments
or the disappearance of those Governments or the transfer of further responsibilities
from them to the Federal Government.
On 6th February, 1957, the Colonial Secretary said in the House of Commons that
Her Majesty’s Government could not abandon their ultimate responsibility until they
were satisfied that Africans in the Northern Territories had transferred their loyalties
from Westminster to the Federation and their own territorial capitals. At present it
cannot be claimed that this transfer has been made.
(iii) Uganda. Although Uganda is not named here among the candidates for
independence within the next ten years, there will almost certainly be African
pressure for rapid advance, which may take the form of demands for a considerable
measure of self-government in 1961 and independence in, say, 1967. Uganda cannot
be expected by then to have acquired the skill in government, or to have developed
the racial harmony, which would justify the United Kingdom Government in
relinquishing their authority. They may, therefore, be obliged to maintain their
authority in the face of opposition and criticism. In a lesser degree similar
considerations might apply to Sierra Leone.
(b) Internal Self-Government
The following territories, listed geographically, appear the most likely to show
significant developments in internal self-government during the next ten years:—
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Singapore Sierra Leone
Cyprus The Gambia
Gibraltar Aden Colony
Kenya Somaliland Protectorate
Uganda Mauritius
Tanganyika British Guiana
Zanzibar British Honduras
Malta has had internal self-government for ten years, and the integration scheme
would maintain this arrangement.
The general classification in this sub-paragraph allows for a large variety of
political changes, as must be expected in such differing territories. Singapore may
join the Federation of Malaya and move into the independent class; Somaliland may
be joined with her neighbour in a “United Somalia” enjoying some sort of
independence, probably outside the Commonwealth; the future international status
of Cyprus has yet to be determined; British Honduras, which at present has the
opportunity to work a constitution with a large measure of responsible self-
government, may suffer a set-back; the future of British Guiana remains uncertain
until its people have made a second attempt at representative government; in the
East African territories, particularly in Kenya, the devolution of responsibility will
largely depend on the growth of inter-racial confidence, which cannot be predicted in
terms of time. What can be said is that in all these territories there are political forces
making for progress in internal self-government, and that neither economic nor
strategic considerations need inhibit its orderly development.
(c) The Remaining Territories
Such forces are less apparent in the remaining territories; in most of them there are
no discernible signs of pressures for significant advance in self-government within
the next decade. The most distinct change could perhaps be expected in Hong Kong
but, if it comes, it will hardly be of a kind discussed in the previous sub-paragraph.
Economic
5. It is difficult to present economic and financial considerations territory by
territory, or even region by region. The print circulated under cover of C.P.C. (57) 28
discusses in some detail the main features of the Colonial balance of payments, the
Colonial sterling assets, present and likely demands for United Kingdom financial
assistance to Colonial territories, and the special position of Hong Kong. The main
considerations involved in the question of granting independence fall under the
following headings:—
Budgetary implications for the United Kingdom.
Effect on flow of investment funds from the United Kingdom.
Effect on the use of sterling balances.
Effect on sterling area balance of payments.
Effect on United Kingdom trade.
Some of the general points under each heading are set out below, but it may be
pointed out at the start that, with the exception of the budgetary implications for the
United Kingdom, the economic and financial implications of the grant of
independence to Colonial territories do not flow from the grant of independence
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itself but from the policies which may be followed by the particular countries after
independence.
6.—(a) Budgetary implications for the United Kingdom. The cost of the Colonies
to the United Kingdom Government in terms of expenditure through the Colonial
Development and Welfare (C. D. & W.) Vote, the Colonial Services Vote and the
Colonial Development Corporation (C.D.C.) is at present running at about £51
millions a year. Ministers have decided against any regular pattern of Government-
to-Government aid for independent Commonwealth countries, and by corollary
against the C.D.C. embarking on new schemes in such countries. Moreover, it is
established policy that territories on attaining independence or leaving the
Commonwealth cease to be eligible for grants-in-aid or C.D. & W. funds. The further
this process goes, the greater the reduction in the burden on the Exchequer on this
account. But the net saving in the foreseeable future would almost certainly be
considerably less than is generally imagined. The reasons for this are various. In
general, the territories which are nearest to the attainment of independence tend to
be least in need of Exchequer assistance. Thus, Ghana had no territorial allocation
under the 1955 C.D.W. Act, and the C.D.C. had inconsiderable investments there. But
if we decide to give independence to a territory before it can hold its own financially,
there are likely to be special reasons for our decision—reasons which might also lead
us to continue financial support after independence. Thus the Federation of Malaya
will continue to need, and has been promised, considerable financial assistance in
connection with the Emergency and the building up of her armed forces. The West
Indies also have asked for financial assistance on a considerable scale after
independence.
(b) Effect on flow of investment funds from the United Kingdom. Grants made
available under the C.D. & W. Acts in the current period (1955–60) to all Colonial
Governments account for only one-sixth of their expenditure on development. The
remaining five-sixths are being found from their own resources and external loans.
(This is the overall picture: in the case of some of the smallest and poorest territories
C.D. & W. assistance provides almost the whole of the capital required for
development.)
It is estimated that the needs of Colonial Governments for loan finance on the
London Market will run at about £25–30 millions a year over the next few years. The
need for loan finance on this scale would not, of course, disappear with the grant of
independence. Independent Commonwealth countries are permitted to come to the
London Market for loans, and Colonial territories after attaining independence would
still wish to do so, if, as we would hope, they so order their affairs that their credit
stands high enough to make this a practical proposition. The experience of the past
two years, however, suggests that the London Market may not be able to meet all the
demands likely to be made on it.
(c) Effect on the use of sterling balances. The Colonies are large holders of sterling
assets: the total of Colonial sterling assets at the end of 1956* was £1,311 millions (of
which £160 millions was held in Dominion and Colonial securities). Of this total
£1,115 millions was held on public account and £196 millions on private account. We
* Throughout this section, references to Colonial sterling assets, balance of payments and trade figures
up to the end of 1956 include Ghana and the Federation of Malaya.
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have encouraged the Colonies to make the maximum possible use of their sterling
assets in the financing of their current development programmes, but there are
certain definite limitations, arising from the nature of some of these assets, on the
extent to which this is possible. Our present estimate is that, excluding the
Federation of Malaya, Colonial Governments may draw some £130 millions net over
the next three or four years from the funds available in one way or another for
development expenditure, provided that present plans are executed at the rate
proposed and no sudden increases in revenue occur. This does not mean that total
Colonial sterling balances are likely to fall by this amount, since there are other
official and private balances which may follow different trends. What the overall
trend will be depends upon the course of commodity prices, internal inflation, capital
inflow, &c., and is virtually unpredictable. The mere fact of the grant of
independence should not in itself make any appreciable difference to the trend except
in so far as it must be expected that standards of prudence would probably fall after
independence. It would certainly be possible for a Colony which became independent
and pursued rash policies of over-development and Government expenditure to get
quickly into an inflationary situation leading to a rapid fall in its sterling holdings
and, in terms of a call on resources, a considerable strain upon the United Kingdom.
It should be borne in mind that any running down of sterling balances represents a
real but inescapable burden on the United Kingdom. It does, however, seem probable
that this factor may be less important as regards the remaining Colonial territories
after Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria are excluded.
(d) Effect on sterling area balance of payments. The Colonies as a whole have
contributed to the strength of the Sterling Area in recent years. During the period
from 1951 (when balance of payments estimates for the Colonies were first compiled)
to 1956 the Colonies have had a net current account surplus in their balance of
payments owing to a succession of boom conditions in various Colonial
commodities. They have also attracted non-sterling capital for investment. If any of
these territories after the grant of independence decided to leave the Sterling Area—
particularly those which are large dollar-earners—the consequences for the United
Kingdom and the rest of the Sterling Area could be serious. The chief danger would
be that the country concerned would wish to convert its balances into dollars either
directly or indirectly by retaining its dollar earnings and running down its sterling
holdings. This could be a serious threat to sterling. Fortunately, however, there is no
reason to believe that any of the present candidates for independence would find it in
their interest to leave the Sterling Area after independence. The Government both of
Ghana and the Federation of Malaya have stated clearly that it is their intention to
remain in the Sterling Area at present. In general, if there were a premature grant of
independence which resulted in a serious deterioration in political and economic
conditions, this might easily cause a serious loss to the Sterling Area’s dollar
reserves. On the other hand, postponement and any pique resulting from it would be
more likely to lead to abandonment of Sterling Area connections. Again, however,
when Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria are excluded this factor may well be less important
as regards the remaining Colonial territories.
(e) Effect on United Kingdom trade. The Colonies are of considerable trade
importance to the United Kingdom. In 1956 United Kingdom exports to the Colonies
were valued at £422 millions or 13 per cent of total United Kingdom exports. Of this
figure, £343 millions were in manufactured goods, which also represented 13 per
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cent of the total exports of these goods from the United Kingdom. In 1956 the United
Kingdom imported from the Colonies goods to the value of £376 millions or 10 per
cent. of the United Kingdom’s total imports: of this figure, £190 millions were in
basic materials and represented about 17 per cent. of the United Kingdom’s total
imports of these materials. The United Kingdom’s share in Colonial trade is about
one-quarter of the total.
Any premature transfer of power which resulted in serious political troubles and a
lasting deterioration in a territory’s economic circumstances would of course
seriously affect United Kingdom trading and financial interest in that territory. On
the other hand, assuming an orderly transfer of power and no appreciable falling-off
in a territory’s economic activity, the grant of independence need not adversely affect
the United Kingdom’s trading position in the territory concerned. We do not enjoy
any formal advantages over our trading competitors in the Colonies, save to the
extent that we benefit from Imperial preferences. The great majority of Colonies
grant preferences to a greater or lesser degree, though the value of such preference
to the United Kingdom varies greatly, but these preferences would not necessarily be
affected by the attainment of independence. But though the United Kingdom
possesses no formal guarantee of trade advantage in the Colonies deriving solely
from their status as dependent territories, we undoubtedly possess certain intangible
advantages over our trade competitors in the Colonies: for example, the employment
of British administrators and technicians means the adoption of British standards
and practices over a large field, and this, coupled with the strong financial and
economic links with the United Kingdom, results in a natural tendency to “buy
British.” Such intangible trade advantages might well be diminished in many cases
with the grant of independence. The dangers of this should not, however, be
exaggerated. So far as the import of British goods and services on private account is
concerned, the Colonies already pursue a very liberal trade policy and are not
restricted as to the source of their imports except to a minor extent on balance of
payments grounds. So far as imports and services financed on Government account
are concerned, there is no doubt a considerable intangible advantage in the fact that
Colonial Governments are required to place their orders through the Crown Agents
for Oversea Governments and Administrations, though the Crown Agents themselves
do not restrict their tenders to British firms. There is, however, no reason why a
Colonial Government after independence should not continue to make use of the
services of the Crown Agents. This is true even if the country were to go outside the
Commonwealth. The Crown Agents still handle Government business for Ceylon and
even Iraq. Once more, it is not so much a question of the grant of independence
itself, but the policy pursued after independence.
7. To sum up, the economic considerations tend to be evenly matched and the
economic interests of the United Kingdom are unlikely in themselves to be decisive
in determining whether or not a territory should become independent. Although
damage could certainly be done by the premature grant of independence, the
economic dangers to the United Kingdom of deferring the grant of independence for
her own selfish interests after the country is politically and economically ripe for
independence would be far greater than any dangers resulting from an act of
independence negotiated in an atmosphere of goodwill such as has been the case
with Ghana and the Federation of Malaya. Meanwhile, during the period when we can
still exercise control in any territory, it is most important to take every step open to
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us to ensure, as far as we can, that British standards and methods of business and
administration permeate the whole life of the territory.
8. Sharing the burden. Total demands for investment from all quarters are well
beyond the present capacity of the United Kingdom’s resources; and unless it proves
possible to obtain sufficient help with long-term investment in the Colonies—
much of it bound to be unremunerative—their economic standards may fall. Thus,
leaving political considerations apart, any arrangement which served to transfer to
some other Commonwealth or foreign country some part of the Exchequer burden,
or the demand for investment, would be welcome. It would be particularly helpful if
Canada could be brought more into this field and could be persuaded to share part
of our burden, and the possibilities of securing Canadian help merit further study.
It must be pointed out of course that, except in the case of Canada which is outside
the Sterling Area, the mere transfer of the investment burden to other
Commonwealth countries within the Sterling Area may not represent full relief for
the United Kingdom, since these countries are themselves importers of sterling
capital from the United Kingdom, and would increase their demand for such capital
in order to discharge their increased responsibilities. Such a transfer would,
however, as has been pointed out, relieve the Exchequer burden on the United
Kingdom.
Strategic
9. The Colonies provide an essential contribution to the facilities required to
maintain and control United Kingdom world-wide sea, air and wireless
communications. In certain areas they also provide the bases where British forces are
stationed in support of United Kingdom interests and of United Kingdom
contributions to regional defence organisations. The territories of East and West
Africa are also the greatest potential sources of military manpower within the
Colonial Empire. Whether we could rely on making use of this manpower in wartime
would depend upon the circumstances in which we were involved in war.
10. The most important Colonial territories for military reasons are:—
Gibraltar Singapore
Malta Nigeria
Cyprus East Africa
Aden
As indicated in the constitutional section of this paper, all these territories are
expected to show significant developments in internal self-government in the next
ten years, and Nigeria and Singapore (if it merges with Malaya) may cease to be
dependent territories during that time.
11. There are certain Colonies, mainly smaller islands, whose strategic value is of
a negative character in that their occupation by an unfriendly Power would be
detrimental to the United Kingdom or to her Allies, e.g., the West Indian territories,
the Pacific islands covering Australasia, the Falkland Islands, the Somaliland
Protectorate and the small islands in the Red Sea and its approaches administered as
part of the Aden Protectorate.
12.—(a) The value of Gibraltar in controlling Commonwealth and NATO sea and
air communications in the Atlantic and Mediterranean would not be diminished by
an orderly progress towards internal self-government. Cession to Spain, however,
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would reduce its strategic value to the West and would certainly make it of no value
whatsoever to the United Kingdom for her own interests.
(b) Malta is unlikely seriously to demand independence in view of her financial
reliance on the United Kingdom. The proposal for integration is unlikely to interfere
with the fulfilment of United Kingdom or NATO strategic requirements.
(c) It is the military view that United Kingdom strategic requirements in
Cyprus can only be fully met by British sovereignty over the whole island. Any
system of partition or condominium would seriously restrict the use of the island
as a base from which to support the Bagdad Pact or British interests and, to a
lesser degree, NATO. Nevertheless, if we were forced by political considerations to
do so, we might be able to group the more essential military facilities within
enclaves, relying on treaty rights for the remainder. Whatever arrangements are
made, however, it is important that we retain responsibility for the external
defence of Cyprus.
(d) The importance of Aden as a headquarters and support base for the protection
of British interests in Arabia, the Somaliland Protectorate and the Persian Gulf and
as an air-staging post has recently been much enhanced by the potential air/sea
barrier and in proportion to the increased Saudi and Yemeni threat. Our essential
military requirements could not be guaranteed were complete independence to be
granted, but some degree of internal self-government with proper safeguards for
British military requirements might be acceptable.
(e) There is no present practical alternative to Singapore as a base for the
deployment of naval and air forces in support of SEATO and ANZAM. The Borneo
territories are geographically suitable, but virtually no facilities exist at present.
Singapore cannot be viewed in isolation from Malaya, and military facilities in both
are complementary. In the event of a merger between the territories, a development
which Her Majesty’s Government have indicated that they would favour, it would be
expected that the Malayan Defence Agreement would be extended to cover Singapore.
The danger inherent in a merger with the Federation of Malaya is that a later
Malayan Government might deny the United Kingdom continued use of Singapore as
a base.
(f ) The emergence of the potential air/sea barrier in the Middle East has
emphasised the importance of the reinforcement route through West Africa and the
deployment of ground forces in East Africa. No foreseeable political developments in
East Africa should prejudice United Kingdom military requirements.
(g) In Nigeria the question of independence may call for a decision on United
Kingdom strategic needs in the very near future. Kano is essential to the Central
African air-route. Even this in certain circumstances depends on the use of Dakar. If
Kano is denied to us it will be necessary to consider a route round Africa via Gambia
or Sierra Leone, Ascension Island and South Africa (which would be practical only
for long-range aircraft) or, alternatively, across French West and Equatorial Africa.
Neither alternative would leave us freedom of action.
Political
13. Successive Governments in the United Kingdom have for many years pur-
sued, with a broad measure of public support, a Colonial policy of assisting depen-
dent peoples towards the greatest practicable measure of self-government. It is
presumably not intended to depart from this general policy, nor to weaken it, as
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regards individual territories, by imposing any delays which could be interpreted as
artificial. A complementary aspect of the same policy, it is suggested, is that we
must retain some measure of jurisdiction or protection where this is patently
required in the best interests of peoples whose system of government, of law, or
administration, and of political habit, derive from United Kingdom custom and
advice. The United Kingdom stands to gain no credit for launching a number of
immature, unstable and impoverished units whose performances as “independent”
countries would be an embarrassment and whose chaotic existence would be a
temptation to our enemies.
14. In many territories it is only British authority and administration which
enables peoples of different racial or tribal loyalties to live in peace with one another.
The United Kingdom bears some past responsibility for encouraging directly or
indirectly, the immigration and settlement of non-indigenous peoples. The present
responsibility is to persuade the races to tolerance and co-operation; this is a slow
process. Conditions in East Africa, Mauritius, and Fiji, for example, are such that it
would be irresponsible to remove jurisdiction and control before the process has
been carried well beyond the present stage.
15. In sum, it should remain our aim to maintain our authority in each territory
until a transfer of power can be shown to be generally desired by its people and they
have shown that they can live at peace with one another and are capable of sustaining
independent status with a reasonable standard of government. In most of the smaller
territories there is at present no widespread desire to escape from ultimate
dependence on the United Kingdom. It might at first sight seem attractive and
advantageous, in the interests of both the United Kingdom and the territories
concerned, that responsibility for certain dependencies should be transferred to
other Commonwealth countries; for example, Canada might assume responsibility
for Bermuda, or New Zealand for Fiji. It is, however, far from certain that the
countries of the older Commonwealth would be prepared to assume complete
responsibility of this kind, and such transfers would be repugnant to political opinion
in this country and to the peoples affected. They would, too, need to be carefully
assessed against the opportunity which they might provide for India to propose a like
arrangement in, say, Mauritius or Fiji, or for South Africa to intensify her claim to
the High Commission territories. As already noted in this paper, it would, however,
be worth seeking some Commonwealth participation in the financial burden at
present borne by the United Kingdom alone, in respect of Exchequer aid to the
Colonies and Colonial investment.
16. Any premature withdrawal of authority by the United Kingdom would seem
bound to add to the areas of stress and discontent in the world. There are territories
over which jurisdiction might be surrendered without prejudice to the essentials of
strategy or foreign relations, and at some modest savings to the Exchequer. But
would we stand to gain by thus rewarding loyalty to the Crown which is an enduring
characteristic of so many Colonial peoples? The United Kingdom has been too long
connected with its Colonial possessions to sever ties abruptly without creating a
bewilderment which would be discreditable and dangerous.
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4 FO 371/135624, no 9 3 Feb 1958 
[Overseas interests of the UK]: FO brief for a permanent under-
secretaries’ meeting to discuss future policy1.  Annex: CRO and CO
memoranda
[In the summer of 1956, apparently on the initiative of Macmillan (chancellor of the
Exchequer) and Sir W Monckton (minister of defence), a high-level ministerial ‘Policy
Review’ committee was set up, with prime minister Eden’s support, to make a reappraisal
of defence policy and British overseas commitments. Officials under Sir N Brook
produced a report, ‘The future of the UK in world affairs’ (see D Goldsworthy, ed, The
Conservative government and the end of empire, 1951–1957, BDEEP, 1994, part I,
document numbers 20 & 21). The work of the committee was incomplete owing to the
Suez Crisis and the change of government. In Nov 1957 Brook—prompted by Sir F Hoyer
Millar of the FO (CO 1032/166, letter to Brook, 9 Oct 1957)—suggested to Macmillan that
a fresh review might be appropriate, in the light of changed circumstances: ‘Our position
in the Middle East has undergone a radical change. A new phase of Anglo–American co-
operation is opening. We are being compelled to review our earlier conception of the
capabilities of the Soviet Union as a technological rival. We are facing renewed economic
difficulties. And we are drastically modifying our defence programme’. The FO was keen
to have a comprehensive assessment of essential overseas interests and the deployment of
resources. The permanent under-secretaries of the FO, CO, CRO, the Treasury and
Defence could undertake it. Macmillan agreed, provided it did not lead to too many or too
lengthy papers or to overburdening of officials (PREM 11/2321, minutes 25 & 28 Nov
1957). Despite this, when the report arrived in June 1958 (see document no 5), Macmillan
appears to have been dissatisfied with it; at all events, in June 1959 he called for a more
comprehensive review of overseas policy as something needed for consideration by a new
administration after the autumn election (document no 8). Although Sir N Brook was put
in overall charge of this large investigation, the main input was from a Working Group
chaired by Sir P Dean of the FO. It started by collecting such papers as the previous report
on the position of the UK in world affairs, the Africa Committee’s report on ‘Africa in the
next ten years’ (document no 20), and despatches from Malcolm MacDonald in India
(documents nos 7, and 529 in Part II). The planning exercise was given the title of ‘Study
of Future Policy, 1960–1970)’; the intention was to produce something akin to a blue-
print, or at least a ‘crystal-ball’, for future overseas policy in all its aspects (FO
371/143702, ZP 25/2, 3, 10 & 12).]
. . . The papers
3. (a) The Foreign Office contribution. This consists of a covering paper (pages
1–13a) discussing our aims, our principal political and military commitments and
the use of our resources, and a series of detailed annexes (pages 14–75). The Annexes
can probably be ignored for the purposes of this meeting. The most important
passages in the covering paper, which it is hoped the Permanent Under-Secretary will
have time to read in full, are paragraphs 5–8 and 41–42. Mr. Ormsby-Gore’s
comments on the first draft of the paper were included.
4. (b) The Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office contributions.
These are interesting papers, on which a number of comments could be made, but
they do not bear directly upon the principal issue which confronts the Foreign Office
(see paragraph 6 below). A look through the attached summaries will probably
suffice. An important question, not discussed in the C.R.O. paper, is whether India, in
her struggle to maintain her First-Year Plan, will be such a drain on the Sterling
system as to frustrate our hopes of building up our reserves.
5. (c) The Treasury contribution. This is a very good and important paper and
should be read in full, as any summary might be misleading.
1 This brief was by P E Ramsbotham. The meeting was chaired by Sir R Makins (T) on 4 Feb.
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The main issue
6. The main issue is whether the economic situation and the financial policy
which has been designed to meet it can be reconciled with the expenditure overseas
which will be necessary to maintain the United Kingdom’s position in the world. Our
object should be to ensure that the Foreign Office and the Treasury stand together in
agreeing that neither foreign nor financial policies can be weakened if our ultimate
objectives are to be attained.
7. We should therefore express full agreement with the Treasury paper, subject to
certain clarifications (para. 8 below) since the paper does not set out a point of view
incompatible with our own. Their line of thought seems to be that, if Sterling
weakens, the United Kingdom will not be able to maintain its present commitments
either at home or overseas, and that economies must be found if this is to be
prevented. We should agree, but the question is where are the economies to be
found? In our view, the exercise should reach agreement on the essential nature of
both financial and foreign policies, recognise that both may need intensifying in
certain directions and conclude by presenting to Ministers the choice of cuts in
unproductive home expenditure or severe damage to our interdependent foreign and
financial positions.
8. In general, the Treasury paper does not seem inconsistent with this line. It
concentrates naturally upon our economic aims, and some correction of this
emphasis is needed to bring it into overall perspective. Thus the paper rightly
emphasises the basic importance to our economic aims of foreign confidence in our
belief in the Sterling Area (paragraph 14). Equally important to the same aims, in
our view, is foreign confidence in our political future as a power with world-wide
influence and interests. Similarly, in paragraph 17, the Treasury state that additional
external investment would secure us greater dividends than additional expenditure
on anything else. Our acceptance of this thesis depends upon how widely investment
is defined. If it is defined widely so as to include action to support our political
position abroad which in turn supports our commercial position, we can accept it. If
not, i.e. if it is to be confined strictly to putting money into Government or private
enterprises in the financial sense, we could not do so.2
The Foreign Office paper
9. In introducing the Foreign Office paper, therefore, the Permanent Under-
Secretary may wish to emphasise and seek to secure agreement on our basic and
subsidiary aims (para. 5–7 of the paper) and go on to make the following points:
(a) The needs of foreign policy cannot be totally subordinated to the need to build
up our financial resources. Both foreign and financial policies depend on each
other’s success. Merely holding on to our present international position is bound
to become increasingly expensive because
(i) costs are rising;
2 Sir P Dean minuted that he agreed with paras 6–8: the FO and Treasury views were ‘already pretty close’,
but ‘we cannot go so far as they would wish in saying that everything must be sacrificed to reinforce
sterling during the next few years and that this means that there can be no increase in our expenditure
overseas’; some (comparatively small) increase might be necessary ‘if we are not to lose a great deal in
other fields while the financial situation is being restored’ (3 Feb 1958).
07-ConGov-Doc 1-28-cp  18/10/00  2:03 pm  Page 39
40 COLONIAL HIGH POLICY [4]
(ii) in a sharply competitive world we have to do more in order to maintain our
relative position; like the Red Queen, we must run very fast in order to stay in
the same place (para. 8 of Foreign Office paper). There are cases where failure to
spend now may mean total loss later.
(b) Given the position, population and organisation of the United Kingdom, the
cost of maintaining our position abroad is astonishingly small (the Foreign Office
vote and Grants and Services Vote in 1957/8 were estimated at £30.5 million out of
a total of £80–100 million on all civil expenditure overseas). Compared with
Defence (£1,629 million) it is a cheap way of maintaining our security; compared
with consumption (£13,409 million) it is tiny. Moreover, we are at present in a
position to spend money profitably if we can find it. All over the world friendly
Governments, especially in the Middle East and Asia, are clamouring for help in
development, defence, etc. We cannot, and indeed should not, do more than a very
small fraction of what they want, but there are both big dividends to be won at
little cost by modest but rightly directed response, and risks of eclipse if we fail to
respond at all.
(c) The policy of Anglo–American interdependence is likely to involve us in some
extra expenditure if it is to remain Anglo–American. There is the policy of
“containment”, towards Syria, to which we have not yet made any significant
contribution, and the Economic Measures Working Group in Washington may
soon be recommending action in individual cases involving expenditure. The
United Kingdom will have to prime the American pump; we cannot expect United
States co-operation in these important fields of policy unless we can contribute
something, however small, to meeting the costs (paras. 17–18 of Foreign Office
paper).
(d) There is a pressing need for a contingency fund (paras. 41–42 of Foreign
Office paper). Unforeseen and unforeseeable requests for new commitments are
constantly arising, and our success or failure in meeting them can make all the
difference to the achievement of our aims. The problem of aircraft for Iraq is a
current example. If we had been able to help the Iraqis and forestall United States
intervention, we should not have risked losing a valuable commercial connexion,
and perhaps also political influence in a quarter in which specifically British
influence is valuable to the West. Other recent cases have been Polish credits, our
inability to provide Nepal with rope-ways, and our insistence on being repaid
£2,000 by the Libyans for a locust-control operation. In the last case we presented
this absurd bill a year after the event and lost a good deal of face. There are two
points here:
(i) occasionally we need to be able to help on a big scale, and stand to suffer a
really important setback if we cannot; this has to be dealt with ad hoc.
(ii) periodically we are confronted with smaller but urgent demands: if we can
meet them it helps enormously to cement good relations, while if we cannot, it
loosens them. It is for this that a contingency fund is needed. There is already
the A. 10 subhead for counter-subversion contingencies, but its use is narrowly
defined and it is small (£20,000 annual limit).
(e) The Foreign Office votes are lower this year than last and will be lower again
next year. We are doing all we can to achieve economy. Despite increased salaries
and rising costs, the estimates for the Foreign Office vote for 1958/9 will be below
the net expenditure of the previous year. The Grants and Services votes for 1957/8
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were only £15 million (compared with £25 million the previous year), and the
estimates for 1958/9 will be down to £12 million, though there will have to be
supplementary votes of £3 or £4 million in July (Libya etc.). We are, in fact, one of
the few Government Departments to have carried out the economies required. But
we are doing so at a risk. The downward trend cannot continue without damage to
our prospects of achieving our aims, including those in the economic and financial
field.
The handling of the exercise
10. It is important that the exercise should not drag on. The Prime Minister
agreed that it should be held provided that it did not take up too much time and
paper, and there is already a tendency on the part of the Treasury to insist that
proposals for new expenditure should await its outcome. We should therefore press
on with it as quickly as possible.
11. The best method of handling it might be for the Cabinet Office (perhaps Mr.
Trend) to collate the various papers with the object of arriving at
(a) agreed aims
(b) an agreed list of essential commitments
(c) an agreed minimum figure which must be set aside for overseas expenditure if
our aims are to be fulfilled.
It may be desirable, if this proves necessary, to provide officials from the Foreign Office,
Treasury, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office to assist in this work.
12. It would not be desirable to turn the work over to existing official
Committees such as the Africa Committee and the M.E.O.C.:—
(a) there are no such committees for Asia and it would take too long to set them up;
(b) The Africa and M.E.O. Committees are not suitably constituted. They have on
them representatives from departments which are not concerned with this
exercise;
(c) the basic papers having now been produced, it should be possible to reconcile
and collate them without referring the work to further committees.
P.E.R.
3.2.58
Annex to 4
A. Summary of memorandum by the C.R.O.
1. Objective: maintenance of cohesion and United Kingdom leadership of
Commonwealth. If Commonwealth disintegrated, United Kingdom would lose status
superior to that of a continental European power. Association with Commonwealth
greatly enhances our influence with our other allies and with our emerging colonial
territories, with whom we could not continue to be linked if the Commonwealth
framework was not in existence.
2. Different values attach to different links with individual territories. Politically,
some members are actively anti-Communist, others “uncommitted”, but at least the
existence of the Commonwealth keeps them “uncommitted”. Economically, all are
important. Any defection from it would greatly weaken its value. To keep all members
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within the Commonwealth will require us to stress different elements of policy to
different members, but overall policy must be to maintain its cohesion.
3. Cohesion depends on continued United Kingdom leadership. Responsibilities
of leadership are entailed by its advantages for us. No Commonwealth association: no
world power status. No world power status: no Commonwealth. No Commonwealth:
no strong pound. No strong pound: no Commonwealth.
4. United Kingdom leadership depends on:
(a) Political. Retention of influence with U.S.A. and other allies and in playing
leading role in handling relations between Soviet and Western blocs. Hence we
must have an independent voice in world affairs, but this depends on our
remaining a nuclear power.
(b) Strategic. (For certain members) on maintaining reasonable defence forces in
certain areas. But our defence policy already takes account of these requirements.
(c) Economic. Maintenance and expansion of trade within Commonwealth. This
depends on:
(i) a strong pound. If we do not exert the effort others will not either. “The
conditions for this, and the reasons required are well known”.
(ii) maintenance of long-term investment in the Commonwealth. Given the
world economic situation, we should encourage members to seek capital from
non-United Kingdom sources even, possibly, from Russia. But the United
Kingdom must make major contribution. Level of investment in
Commonwealth (now c. £200 million a year [it is not clear if this means United
Kingdom investment only]) must be maintained, even raised. We must be able
to respond to special appeals for help and on occasions pre-empt Russian offers
where likely to do serious harm (though generally economic and cold war
considerations should be divorced). We must make scientific and technical
know-how available to less developed members.
(d) Sentimental. We must foster exchanges and visits, cultural, parliamentary,
scientific. Small sums spent on British Council, teaching of English, information
work etc. will reap heavy dividends.
B. Summary of memorandum by Colonial Office
1. Description of United Kingdom colonial policy. Objective is to promote
achievement of independence (within Commonwealth) or of maximum degree of
internal self-government for Colonial territories too small to be reasonably self-
sufficient, in conditions of political stability, rising standards of living and freedom
for individual. Hence to assist territories to stand more and more on their own feet,
politically, economically and socially.
2. This policy is a moral obligation but
3. It is also in our interests to adhere to it for
(a) Economic reasons. Although high current account surpluses for colonial
territories are unlikely to occur again in the foreseeable future and there will be
some drawing on colonial sterling balances, our remaining colonial territories are
likely to be in many, if not most years, net contributors to our gold and dollar
reserves. Premature withdrawal would lead to collapse of markets and sources of
supply for the United Kingdom. Withdrawal too long delayed might have this
result also, and would in addition encourage newly independent territories to leave
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the Sterling Area. In some cases this could be very serious. Timely grants of
independence would not endanger economic links with the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom must make sacrifices to maximise long-term investment
in colonies. Total capital investment in recent years on private and public account
from all sources has averaged £200 million p.a., of which £40 million each from
United Kingdom Government and dollar sources. Needs for external loans will
exceed £25 million over next few years. Non-United Kingdom sources are being
encouraged to help (e.g. Canada for the West Indies) but United Kingdom must
assume large part of the burden if economic development is not to be seriously
hampered.
(b) Strategic reasons. Specific strategic needs may change, but the United
Kingdom has an overall strategic interest in maintaining stability and goodwill
without which strategic requirements cannot be assured, before or after
independence.
(c) Political reasons. It might be argued that the United Kingdom should
relinquish colonial responsibilities as soon as possible, in view of post-war attacks
on us for being a colonial power. But the constructive nature of our colonial policy
is being increasingly recognised and to abandon it would mean a great loss of
prestige, play into the hands of the communists and extreme nationalists and
jeopardise “evolving Commonwealth” policy which offers best hope of reconciling
emergent nationalism with our interests.
4. There are some colonial territories where it might seem to be in United
Kingdom interest to abandon our obligations. But to do this anywhere, would
undermine confidence and imperil our policy everywhere. Policy must be maintained
as a whole, even if detailed application to particular territories must be considered in
relation to those territories.
5. Increasing importance must be attached to this policy in its own right and as
part of wider Commonwealth policy “which provides for the world, hope of
continuing stability and, for the United Kingdom, the only alternative to progressive
political and economic deterioration”.
5 CAB 130/153, GEN 624/10 9 June 1958
‘The position of the UK in world affairs’: report by officials
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to assess the role which Britain can play in world affairs
to-day and to examine how our resources can best be used in support of that role.
2. We can no longer operate from the position of overwhelming strength—
military, political and economic—which we enjoyed in the heyday of our Imperial
power. But, although we no longer have superiority in material strength, we can still
exercise a substantial influence in world affairs—partly in our own right and because
of our position in Europe, and partly as the leader of the independent
Commonwealth. We must now bring that influence to bear, in support of the
superior material strength of the United States, in the world struggle between the
forces of freedom and those of tyranny.
We could not hope to exercise that influence—or to put to their best use the
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advantages of our special position, either as a link between Europe, the
Commonwealth and the United States, or as the guardian and trustee of dependent
peoples—if we took refuge in the neutrality and comparative isolation of the purely
commercial Powers such as Sweden or Switzerland. Nor could we do so if we failed to
maintain our position as a world trading nation and the centre of an international
trading currency.
But, if we are to exercise our influence to the full, we need to have a larger
measure of flexibility and greater freedom of manoeuvre in our oversea policy. In the
nineteenth century we had the power to impose our will. By contrast, we now have to
work largely through alliances and coalitions. We must therefore be more ready to
improvise, to adapt our tactics to changing situations and be quick to take advantage
of fleeting opportunities to strengthen or improve our position almost anywhere in
the world. We shall not maintain our influence if we appear to be clinging obstinately
to the shadow of our old Imperial power after its substance has gone.
3. The basic aims of our oversea policy may be briefly defined as follows:—
(a) We must, in concert with our friends and allies:—
(i) prevent global war and defeat the efforts of Russia and China to dominate
the world;
(ii) maintain the stability of the free world, especially Western Europe.
(b) We must ourselves:—
(i) preserve and strengthen the cohesion of the Commonwealth;
(ii) further our trading interests throughout the world;
(iii) maintain the sterling area and the strength of sterling.
These political and economic aims are inter-dependent. To achieve them maximum
Anglo–American co-operation is indispensable. But the Commonwealth association
is equally vital to the position of influence which we seek to maintain.
Commonwealth cohesion and Anglo–American solidarity are therefore major aims in
themselves.
4. At present our pursuit of these aims is suffering from lack of resources, and
some further expenditure is immediately necessary in support of our oversea policy.
But we cannot achieve a fully effective external policy without stronger economic
backing; we cannot provide this without improving our external monetary position;
and this in turn depends upon our internal policies.
5. It is not possible to draw up any absolute order of priorities for the use of our
resources in support of these general aims. For:—
(a) We are not starting from scratch; we have a highly complex structure of
existing commitments.
(b) Many of our commitments are so different in kind that they are
incommensurable, e.g., the cost of the Colombo Plan and the cost of troops in
Europe.
(c) There are many fields of activity in which a certain minimum of expenditure is
clearly necessary if there is to be a return. But there is no method of assessing
exactly how much this expenditure must be or at what point the return is likely to
fall off.
But, while there can be no graduated list of priorities, some broad conclusions
emerge from the following list of our main political and economic commitments.
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Our principal existing political commitments
6.—(a) The Commonwealth.—The Commonwealth system provides an
important link both between the interests of Afro-Asian countries and the West, and
between the United Kingdom and the Colonies. Its cohesion is necessary to ensure
our position as a world Power and its disruption would have a major effect on the
status of sterling. It is of special importance that the Commonwealth should
continue of provide a framework within which countries following the neutralist line
can be accommodated.
(b) The colonies.—We have an economic interest in the continued stability and
development of the Colonies; a political interest in their continuing evolution within
the Commonwealth, and a strategic interest in the maintenance of necessary bases
and staging rights. Africa is of special importance.
(c) United States.—Anglo–American “inter-dependence” should in the long-term
save us resources through the sharing of burdens which we could not carry alone. If,
however, we are to retain our influence in the Alliance, we shall have to make our
contribution towards the execution of agreed policies.
(d) International.—We are a Founder Member of the United Nations and pledged
to its support. It is of special importance in our relations with the United States and
certain Commonwealth countries. On balance its activities help rather than hinder
the achievement of our aims. The extent of our participation in the work of
international agencies should be determined by a realistic appraisal of the extent to
which this will serve our general political and economic interests.
(e) Europe.—We aim to strengthen our ties with Europe, and are seeking to
negotiate a European Free Trade Area. We support the North Atlantic Alliance as the
bulwark against Soviet encroachment in Europe. NATO involves the United States in
Europe and upholds the confidence of European nations which might otherwise go
neutral or lapse into Communism.
(f ) Middle East.—The Bagdad Pact is our principal instrument for resisting the
spread of Communism in the Middle East and the subversion of existing régimes in
the name of nationalism. Either of these developments would threaten our oil
supplies. The “containment” policy towards the United Arab Republic, and our treaty
obligations towards Libya (in return for which we enjoy essential air staging rights)
have the same object. In the Persian Gulf and in the Colony and Protectorate of Aden
we have a special need to maintain our position in order to protect our oil supplies
and to safeguard our strategic interests in East Africa and the Indian Ocean.
(g) South-East Asia.—The South-East Asia Treaty Organisation has a political as
well as a military value in deterring Communist aggression and securing United
States involvement in South-East Asia. It is important also to Australia and New
Zealand, with whom we are associated in ANZAM and who contribute together with
ourselves to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya and Singapore. By the
Malaya Defence Agreement we are committed to assist in the external defence of
Malaya and to contribute to the expansion of her armed forces. We also assist in the
suppression of terrorism by direct military support and financial help.
Economic commitments
7. The main facts which face us on the external side are:—
(a) We have now entered a long period of repayment of the dollar loans we have
contracted in the last twelve years. The details are described in paragraph 10 below.
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(b) We have the $1,000 millions still available, but undrawn from the
International Monetary Fund and from the Export-Import Bank. These lines of
credit are available for drawing until the end of the year, and any extension would
need to be negotiated. A drawing of the larger element, namely the $760 millions
from the I.M.F., could cause loss of confidence. We cannot count on any further
significant dollar borrowing.
8. Given the low level of our reserves, the need for a continued high level of
external investment, and the probable calls on our resources by the running down of
sterling balances as Commonwealth development gets into its stride, the meeting of
these obligations will be a major task. Yet it is essential that we should meet them if
we are to maintain our own standing and that of our currency in the world.
9. On the other side there are however two important factors of strength:—
(a) Our industrial base has been greatly strengthened by the high level of
domestic investment in recent years.
(b) In the last twelve years we have had to carry out first the major task of post-
war reconstruction and in the more recent years very large defence and housing
programmes, which have consumed much of the normal increase in our national
wealth. With reconstruction mainly past, and the defence and housing
programmes stabilised, we should be able to devote a greater proportion of our
resources to strengthening our currency.
10. The details of the above commitments, which of course are additional to the
expenditure involved in support of the political commitments set out in paragraph 6,
are as follows:—
(a) Debt repayment. Our major debts are:—
(i) The North American Loans: these will cost over £60 millions in dollars to
service annually until 2002—we can defer six annual payments but not more;
(ii) the International Monetary Fund drawing of £200 millions in dollars: this
was all drawn in December 1956 and must be repaid within three to five years
from then;
(iii) the Export-Import Bank loan of £90 millions, drawn in October 1957 and
to be repaid by 1965. The service of this loan rises from about £4 to £20 millions
in dollars annually.
(b) Long-term overseas investment. We have hitherto been working on the basis
of a figure of rather over £200 millions a year. In 1957 the figure rose to about
£260 millions, and at least the same figure is forecast for 1958. We are re-
examining two of the main elements in this, namely oil investment (£160
millions) and deals in sterling securities through the free markets (£65 millions).
It is however clear that we must allow for long-term overseas investment a figure
nearer £300 millions than £200 millions.
(c) Withdrawal of sterling holdings. We must be able to finance these whether
they are made by the rest of sterling area or by non-sterling countries. It is a
commitment difficult to predict as it depends on the balance of payments position
of the creditor countries and on the general climate of confidence. In the
immediate future it is likely to constitute a very large claim indeed owing to the
effects of the present world recession in Commonwealth countries of the sterling
area. They may reduce their holdings by £300 millions in 1958. This follows a
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reduction of £220 millions in the second half of 1957. Such withdrawals do
however reduce our liabilities.
(d) The gold and dollar reserves. These are demonstrably too low in relation to
our liabilities and we must remedy this weakness in our external monetary
position. Ideally we want to increase the absolute level of the reserves themselves;
but in present world conditions we may have to content ourselves with taking a
large proportion of the improvement by way of a reduction of our liabilities.
The distribution of resources available to the United Kingdom
11. In round terms defence in 1957 cost £1,550 millions and the current balance
of payments surplus was £250 millions. These items formed part of a gross national
expenditure (at factor cost) which, in 1957, was distributed broadly as follows:—
£ millions Per cent.
Consumers’ expenditure 11,900 62
Gross internal investment 3,550 1⁄2181⁄2
Defence 1,550 8
Other public current expenditure 2,000 10
Current balance of payments surplus 250 1⁄2 11⁄2
19,250 100
The last item (11⁄2 per cent.) has to meet our external investment and provide for
improving our monetary position. Included mainly under other public current
expenditure is a total of about £90 millions for the Foreign, Colonial and
Commonwealth Relations Office and related Votes: as a proportion of total national
product this is less than 0.5 per cent, but the bulk of it falls on our external balance
and in total it is equal to half of our oversea current surplus in the last five years.
(The table in Annex I1 gives an analysis of our oversea expenditure by regions.)
The adjustments needed
12. An adequate current balance of payments surplus is the key to meeting our
economic objectives. How much we should aim at in any particular year depends on
the general economic conditions expected at home and abroad. The £250 millions
earned in 1957 was for example plainly insufficient in the conditions of last year. In
addition to the drawing down of the oversea sterling holdings, we had to meet a
heavy capital flight from sterling, and as a result sustained a crisis which we were
able to overcome only by means of long-term borrowing, of one sort or another, of
£200 millions. Broadly, we believe that in the years just ahead we require an average
annual current surplus of £350–400 millions if we are to put sterling on a sound
basis—and even more in good years. A high level of exports will be vital.
13. If we cannot achieve a larger surplus in our oversea earnings, we cannot
meet all our external economic objectives, and we shall fall short of our political
objectives oversea. But at the same time, unless we can intensify our effort in the
foreign policy field during the period when we are building up our reserves (and
making military reductions which must involve us in some loss of prestige), we run
the risk of weakening our position in world affairs, with a significant loss of
1 Not Printed.
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confidence which will make it harder to increase the strength of sterling. Moreover,
with costs rising all over the world, we have to spend more money to achieve the
same effect on the ground.
14. Our policies must in particular be designed to counter, in selected places, the
growing economic and technical potential and the political power of Soviet Russia.
Thus:—
(a) We need to be able to meet contingencies of a political or economic nature and
to give our oversea policy the tactical flexibility required to secure essential United
Kingdom interests, especially against Communist threats—e.g., by small-scale
but expeditious aid in time of crisis to countries which are of strategic or political
importance to the United Kingdom.
(b) Some expansion of our expenditure on development and technical assistance
to those countries (including the Colonies, for which we have special
responsibilities, as to which see paragraph 16 below) whose internal political
stability depends on economic progress and is an important interest to the United
Kingdom in the cold war. We have in mind particularly South and South-East Asia
(Colombo Plan) and Africa and, with the addition of some degree of military aid,
the Middle East (Bagdad Pact Countries, the Persian Gulf and South-West Arabia,
including the Aden Protectorate).
(c) Where it is politically possible, assistance by means of military training is far
less expensive than direct military support, and helps to avoid calls for it. It brings
political benefits and sometimes commercial orders. Even where the Americans
supply the equipment it may promote off-shore purchases from the United
Kingdom.
(d) Further co-operation in security and counter-subversion with Middle East and
South-East Asian countries should pay good dividends in increasing the stability of
friendly countries.
(e) Further expansion of information and cultural activities, particularly in the
Middle East and South and South-East Asia. Investment in the teaching of English
could be particularly fruitful.
15. For these purposes we have in mind additional expenditure of some £5–6
millions a year, divided between the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations
Office roughly in the proportion of 3 : 1, though the first year’s expenditure would
not necessarily reach this total. Of this sum £2–3 millions would be for the purposes
mentioned in paragraph 14(a) above. It is difficult to provide for contingent
expenditure by ordinary budgetary means, and there would be constitutional and
administrative difficulties in establishing anything in the nature of a reserve fund for
this purpose. The need could, however, be met by a general Ministerial directive that
sympathetic consideration should be given to applications for Treasury approval of
projects for furthering our oversea policy in the directions indicated in paragraph 14.
The cost of so intensifying our effort is relatively small and the advantages to be
gained are very great. The Policy Review of 1956 acknowledged the need for a switch
of emphasis from military to civil in expenditure in support of our oversea policy.2
2 D Goldsworthy, ed, The Conservative government and the end of empire, 1951–1957 (BDEEP, 1994),
part I, document no 21.
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16. So far as the Colonies are concerned, the main need is for more loan finance
for development. We estimate their needs for external loan finance at not less than
£20 millions per annum over the next few years. There seems little prospect that the
market will provide these amounts, and special measures of one kind or another will
be needed if development is not to be very seriously curtailed. Apart from this there
will be a continuing need for assistance in the form of grants-in-aid of administration
and for emergency expenditure of various kinds. By their very nature the amounts
required for these purposes cannot be foreseen with accuracy. But there is no doubt
that we are not providing enough for several of our poorer territories.
Possible redeployment of resources
17. No very serious difficulties should be involved in making available the
limited additional sum envisaged in paragraph 15 to meet the plain and immediate
needs. In the longer term, however, real flexibility in our oversea policy can only be
achieved through a general strengthening of our external financial position on the
lines indicated in paragraph 12. For this purpose we have already noted that we
cannot count on further significant dollar borrowing (paragraph 7 (b)). To free
resources of our own on the scale required we must either take appropriate measures
internally to increase our external earnings, or we must reshape our external
political policy with a view to disengaging from one or more of our major existing
oversea commitments.
18. Heavy force reductions have already been decided upon in Germany, Libya,
Malaya, and Hong Kong. No further substantial savings can be looked for short of
major policy decisions concerning withdrawal from Germany or abandonment of the
nuclear deterrent, or unless a comprehensive disarmament agreement is achieved.
Our comments on particular possibilities are as follows:—
(a) Withdrawal from Germany.—Total withdrawal of British forces, or their
reduction to the level of a purely token force, would in present circumstances
threaten the basis of the Atlantic Alliance and damage our political and economic
association with Europe. In the absence of full support cost payments Germany
will become a net addition to our oversea commitments. The terms of a possible
settlement for the next three years have been agreed between the United Kingdom
and Germany. These provide for a substantial Deutschmark payment by the
Germans in the current year and, in the second and third years, a reduction in the
strength of the British forces and a German contribution of about one-third of
their local costs. Strong opposition to the reduction is, however, expected from
NATO and W.E.U., but there is a possibility that the Americans may agree to pay
the extra foreign exchange costs, in the second year, of maintaining the forces at
their present level. The additional burden on the United Kingdom budget and
balance of payments will be about £35 millions in the current year and £25
millions in the second and third years.
(b) Abandonment of the nuclear deterrent.—This would free resources (e.g.,
scientific man-power) which could be used, among other things, to increase our
exports. On the other hand, it is by no means to be assumed that a defence policy
which relied solely on conventional forces would cost less than our present
defence effort. The maintenance of our nuclear capacity is moreover a key element
in our relations with the United States and may become so in relation to Europe,
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where the French and the Germans together are likely to develop some nuclear
capacity in due course. The deterrent itself at present accounts for less than 10 per
cent. (£145 millions) of our defence expenditure; its protection (by Fighter
Command) involves about the same amount.
(c) Defence research and development.—Total expenditure on this is £240
millions. It is now being reviewed. Substantial savings are not likely. We should
however get better value for our money in the nuclear field by the pooling of
information with the Americans if the McMahon Act is suitably amended.3
(d) Colonial.—Some small savings may accrue as territories become
independent. In certain territories, such as Cyprus and Hong Kong, we have
military commitments which are a considerable drain on our resources; the same
applies to Singapore, though this commitment is not primarily a Colonial one.
Other Colonies (e.g., British Honduras) may have no economic or strategic value
to us. But premature withdrawal would have consequences for our imperial and
foreign policy which would be felt far beyond these territories themselves.
(e) Commonwealth.—Australia and New Zealand are at present making a very
small contribution to defence and information work in South-East Asia and the
Far East. An increase would be welcome, but there would be considerable local
political difficulties in these two countries if a much increased contribution were
sought at the present time. We should encourage Canadian participation in the
economic development of the British West Indies.
(f ) Foreign.—It may be possible to redeploy some of the resources used oversea
(e.g., in broadcasts to Western Europe) to meet more urgent requirements
elsewhere, but the scope for this is limited.
19. The above review shows that additional resources of a continuing kind on a
scale sufficient to achieve our long-term aim of strengthening our external financial
position cannot be found from further reductions in oversea commitments. We have
considerably reduced them since 1945 (e.g., in Austria, Trieste, the Canal Zone,
Jordan and now Libya). We could not do much more without significantly
undermining our international position.
Conclusion
20. It is sometimes suggested that we should do better to rely on our trading
position, withdraw from the nuclear club and from our oversea commitments and
reduce our status to that of a European Power with a standing similar to that of the
Netherlands or Sweden. But comparison with other Powers differently situated from
ourselves is dangerous. Our trading position is inextricably bound up with, and
sustained by, our roles in Europe and in the Commonwealth and as the centre of the
sterling area, none of which can be abandoned or modified in isolation. The question
is however one of degree. We are already running down our oversea commitments as
fast as circumstances allow us to do so with safety. But to do this wholesale would
undermine the position of sterling and could break up the sterling area. We could
not recommend such a policy as a fair risk.
3 The McMahon Act (1946) made the export of atomic information illegal, but this was in apparent
disregard of wartime commitments made to Britain.
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21. We are therefore driven back to the question of priorities. In our view it
would be wrong to give our oversea, Commonwealth and Colonial commitments a
lesser degree of priority than they have: indeed, their priority should be increased.
Defence is the residual activity on which the axe is apt to fall when economies in
other fields cannot be found. We consider that on the present defence policy,
especially with the additional problem of paying for British forces on the Continent,
no major reductions below those already contemplated over the next two or three
years are likely to be achieved.
22. There remains civil expenditure at home. We recognise that earlier efforts to
reduce expenditure on the social services and education have achieved little, and
there are great difficulties in reducing other forms of domestic expenditure.
Nevertheless, there are areas (e.g., agriculture, and prices in the nationalised
industries) in which subsidies are being paid by the Exchequer on a very large scale.
These, and the movements in earnings on the home front, involve sums compared
with which those required to sustain our present external policies are quite small.
Nor have we touched on the question of taxation. We suggest that it is in these wider
fields that an answer to the problem of our world position is to be found rather than
in abruptly seeking to reduce our oversea and defence expenditure below their
present level.
Summary
23. From the foregoing considerations four points emerge:—
(a) The need for limited further expenditure in support of our oversea policy and
for a Ministerial directive on this subject (paragraphs 13–16).
(b) The need to strengthen our external monetary position (paragraph 12).
(c) Further economies may become possible in our oversea expenditure over the
next few years, but they appear to offer little or no scope for savings on the scale
required to strengthen our external financial position (paragraphs 17–19).
(d) In seeking economies for this purpose from our total national resources
attention should be directed first to civil expenditure at home before further
reductions are sought in defence and oversea expenditure (paragraphs 20–22).
6 CAB 130/153, GEN 659/1st 7 July 1958
‘The position of the UK in world affairs’: minutes of a Cabinet
committee meeting
The Meeting had before them a report by officials which sought to assess the present
role of the United Kingdom in world affairs and the best use of our resources in
support of it.1
The report drew attention to the need for some immediate but limited further
expenditure in support of oversea policy to give greater tactical flexibility and to
allow for some expansion of expenditure on development and technical assistance to
countries whose political stability was of importance to us and on information and
cultural activities, including the teaching of English. It also emphasised the need to
1 See previous document.
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strengthen our external monetary position in the years ahead. But it pointed out that
the further economies likely to become possible in our oversea expenditure over the
next few years seemed to offer insufficient scope for savings on the scale required for
that purpose. It therefore recommended that, in any re-distribution of our total
national resources, attention should be directed to the possibility of securing
economies in civil expenditure at home before further reductions were sought in
defence and oversea expenditure.
In discussion there was general support for the view that some limited further
expenditure, for example, in support of the Bagdad Pact or in the Horn of Africa
would be justified by the importance of safeguarding the very large financial interests
which we had at stake, especially in the Middle East. Particular emphasis was laid on
the following points:—
(a) A sustained attempt should be made to secure and maintain a stronger
information effort in the Middle East. The radio facilities there available to ourselves
and our allies still did not match those available to Egypt.
(b) The possibility should be studied of an expanded programme for the teaching
of English overseas both in Commonwealth and foreign countries, with special
reference to the needs of Africa, India and South-East Asia. There were few directions
in which better value could be obtained for expenditure. It should be our aim to
secure that, as dependent territories passed from our administrative control, they
retained the English tongue as their official language. This would serve both as a
political link for the Commonwealth and as a means of furthering our trading
interests. The provision of teaching staff was no doubt a problem, but there had in
recent years been great advances in teaching techniques and it might be possible to
concentrate more on the provision of suitable courses in this country.
(c) Some further expenditure would be necessary on political intelligence and
counter-subversion.
(d) Assistance in military training was both a cheap and effective means of aiding
friendly countries. Attention was now being given to the need for more realistic
accounting arrangements between the Departments for this purpose.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer2 said that he was in sympathy with these needs
and would be ready to examine in due perspective proposals for limited further
expenditure to such ends. It was however necessary to bear in mind the steady
increase in the size of our financial commitments as a whole. It had already been
necessary this year to accept additional expenditures of the order of £4–5 millions for
aid to dependent or allied States, and the latest forecasts for Government expenditure
in 1959–60, which he would shortly be bringing before his colleagues, showed a
significant increase over the current year. It was of great importance to ensure a
decline in total Government expenditure as a proportion of the gross national
product if reductions in taxation were to be possible, and it seemed manifest that we
were at present trying to do too much in too many directions. Experience on the
occasion of the last Estimates review had shown how difficult it was to secure any
major economies in the civil field. We might therefore be driven further to examine
some of our defence expenditure.
2 D Heathcoat Amory. Also present: Mr Butler, Mr Lennox-Boyd, Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Lord Home, Mr Sandys,
together with Sir N Brook and Sir F Hoyer Millar (FO).
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In further discussion the following points were made:—
(e) There had been a very large increase in the numbers and cost of our
representatives abroad during and since the war. A thorough review should now be
made of the specialised and ancillary posts (Attachés etc.,) attached to British
Embassies abroad. There was scope here for a reduction in overseas expenditure.
(f ) It was for consideration whether the oil companies could not make some
further financial contribution towards our oversea policies, e.g. by expenditure on
non-military measures in support of the Bagdad Pact in furtherance of our political
effort in the Middle East.
(g) The Colonial Secretary drew attention to the conclusions reached in last
year’s review of future constitutional development in the Colonies regarding the
undesirability of premature withdrawal from our dependent territories (C.P.C. (57)
27 and 39 (Revise)).3 He would be examining separately with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer the Colonies’ need for special sources of loan finance, which had recently
been emphasised by the difficulties experienced in floating a Jamaican loan on the
London market.
(h) It would be hard to prevent an increase in defence expenditure in the coming
financial year without major alterations in policy, for example in the nuclear
programme.
(i) It was possible that in the long term reductions might be achieved in civil
expenditure by relieving the burden borne by the Exchequer in respect of
agricultural subsidies and the nationalised industries. But in the short term it would
conflict with the Government’s policy of holding down price levels to pass on to the
consumers the cost, for example, of subsidising wheat production in this country.
(j) With the present inadequate size of the sterling area reserves periodical crises
of confidence would continue unless the credit facilities of the free world could be
expanded. The United States Government were aware of this need for increased
liquidity, and it was desirable that they should take some fresh initiative in respect of
it in time to allow the Commonwealth Economic Conference in September to follow,
rather than to attempt to instigate, such a lead. . . .
3 See document nos 2 and 3 above.
7 DO 35/8916, no 69 6 Oct 1958
‘Crystal-gazing in Delhi’: despatch (no 55) from Mr M MacDonald
(India) to CRO about the future of India [Extract]
. . . 3. Parliamentary democracy in India. None of the Asian peoples are by
nature fitted to govern themselves by a system of Parliamentary Democracy on the
Western model. . . . So the present Parliamentary regimes ruling various of the newly
independent Asian nations are likely to be only a passing phase in their histories.
They will not necessarily disappear completely, but they will be either suddenly or
gradually altered, in at least most countries, to suit Asian conditions.
4. Of all the Asians, the Indians are most likely to continue working most
satisfactorily for the longest period a Parliamentary Democracy. . . .
5. . . . Provided that India remains united, it is therefore likely to continue in the
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predictable future as the foremost champion in Asia of roughly democratic forms of
government, as distinct from the other political giant on the continent, China, which
is now the apostle of Communist totalitarian forms. To that extent India will be a
check on the spread of Communism across the continent, and by the same token will
remain a more or less friendly link with the Western democracies.
6. . . . But I must express some scepticism as to the chances of this colossal
multitude of people remaining a wholly compact nation. . . .
8. I do not mean to suggest that India will break-up into numerous separate
fragments. Its constitutional unity is likely to be preserved; but over the years the
power of the Central Government will probably dwindle. The administrative
inefficiency of many of India’s ill-trained lower-grade civil servants will encourage
this relapse towards a sort of inglorious glorified “parochialism”.
9. Communism in India. There is another factor which must contribute to doubt
whether India will remain both entirely democratic and strongly united. If India’s
ablest future leaders belong to constitutional Parliamentary parties, they should be
able to uphold Indian freedom as well, one must hope, as Indian unity. But supposing
these parties split into ineffectual factions and the Communist Party therefore
becomes the dominant political force in India; or supposing the most masterful
Indian politicians of the next decade or two feel attracted by Communism, and so
make the Communist Party in any case stronger than its democratic rivals—what
will happen then? . . .
10. . . . When the unifying force of Mr. Nehru’s1 personality disappears his
disparate Congress followers are more likely to divide into several factions; and in
that case the chances of the well-organised, disciplined and zealous Communists
making themselves, by fair means or foul, the strongest single party in several Indian
States, and later in the Union itself, would improve.
11. So there are some reasons for reassurance but others for apprehension about
the prospects of the Communists ultimately emerging victorious in India. The issue
is still unsettled, and will be determined not by events which have already occurred
or by facts which are at present established and measurable, but by trends and
developments still to take place—hidden, latent and unpredictable in the future. In
any case the Communists probably cannot come quickly to power; they may need
many years of further hard work by themselves, as well as of errors by their
opponents, before they can win the confidence of India’s widespread agricultural
masses. And many things can happen in the interval to alter circumstances one way
or the other.
12. India and China. The eyes of all Asians will be turned on affairs in India
during the next decade or two. Smaller Asian nations will be influenced to some
extent in their attitudes to their own national affairs, and also to international
relationships, by the degree of success or failure which appears to attend India’s
efforts to remain independent and grow prosperous. If India stays united, and
therefore continues to be a significant major state, and if by more or less democratic
means its leaders give India’s population expanding well-being, then those other
Asian nations will be impressed and will strive to copy India’s methods in solving
their own problems. But if India slides into smaller, ineffective units, or if India fails
1 Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister of India, 1946–1964 (died).
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by democratic methods to improve the economic and social lot of her people, then
those other Asian nations will tend to look elsewhere for a better example to follow.
And if the Communist experiment in China seems to be prospering, they will be
strongly inclined to try a similar experiment themselves—especially if by then the
Indians also have decided to entrust their destinies to local Communist leaders. . . .
15. Steps to strengthen democratic India. The foreground in the picture that I
have sketched above has mixed patches of sunlight and shadow, and I do not attempt
to make any dogmatic or confident forecast as to whether the brighter or the darker
patches will expand as time passes. It is true that in the background of the scene I
have painted a stormy prospect from India’s point of view, with threatening clouds
blowing from the direction of China. But that threat is still at a distance, and it may
be that a break in political climatic conditions in China, or an improvement of the
prospects in India itself, or other changes in conditions elsewhere, will avert the
danger. In any case I suggest that, whilst being aware of it, we should not be
overawed by the danger. On the contrary, it (like other elements in the present-day
situation) should prompt us to do everything in our power to assist the more liberal,
democratic political forces in India to maintain their present predominant influence
there. It is a major and indeed vital interest of Great Britain and other democratic
Western nations that India shall remain an example of a free way of life in Asia, that it
shall continue therefore to be a harmonious Union, that it shall preserve friendly
relations with the West through such associations as the Commonwealth, and that it
shall continue to be a counter-force to China in Asia, at least so long as China
remains Communist and anti-Western. We can help in certain ways to maintain
these characteristics of contemporary India. Our conscious and deliberately planned
aim should be to assist the present and prospective democratic leaders of India to
maintain their prestige and authority with the Indian masses, so that they continue
to secure adequate majorities in successive parliamentary General Elections. The
most important ways in which we can do this are by helping the Government in
Delhi to make a success of their series of Five-Year Plans for economic and social
development, so that progress in India at least does not compare too unfavourably
with that in China; by remaining impartial between India and Pakistan in their
quarrels over Kashmir, Canal Waters, etc., and so avoiding a situation in which
Russia appears to be India’s indispensable friend; by showing a tolerant
understanding of India’s foreign policy and consulting with her as far as possible in
international affairs, so as to avoid head-on clashes with her in those fields; by
supporting her legitimate claims to be recognised as a power of major influence in
world affairs; and by developing our close, co-operative partnership with her in an
expanding Commonwealth of free, fraternal nations representing many different
races, faiths and cultures.
16. Our efforts in these directions may well affect significantly the internal
situation in India. In this uncertain, changeful period, when opposing political ideas
and interests are vying against each other in Indian national life as well as in the
wider world, and when the balance of strength between one faction and another in
India may often be fairly even, our discreet but firm support of the democratic, anti-
Communist elements may tip the balance in their favour. . . .2
2 Mr Macmillan minuted that he thought this ‘a most valuable and interesting paper’ (DO 35/8916, no 74,
Bligh to CRO, 3.11.58).
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8 FO 371/143702, nos 2 & 3 10 June 1959
[Future policy in the next ten years]: minute (M 202/59) by
Mr Macmillan to Mr Selwyn Lloyd (FO) and others.  Enclosure:
outlines for a study by officials
About a year ago we had a report from officials on the position of the United
Kingdom in world affairs.1 I thought it would be valuable if a somewhat similar study
could now be undertaken, which would look rather further ahead and provide the
basis for a comprehensive review of our oversea policy. I discussed this at Chequers
on Sunday last with senior officials and representatives of the Services2 and, as a
result, the attached paper has been prepared to indicate the scope and purpose of the
study which I have in mind.
I do not think it necessary that Ministers themselves should be troubled with this
in the period between now and the Election. What I propose is that officials should
study these problems during that period with the aim of drawing up by the end of the
year a report which would be available for consideration by the Ministers of a new
Administration.
The Secretary of the Cabinet will organise this work on my behalf. Its progress will
be supervised by a Steering Committee which will include the Chiefs of Staff and the
Permanent Secretaries of the Departments directly concerned (including your own).
Under this there will be a working group under the chairmanship of Sir Patrick Dean
(Foreign Office), and each of the members of the Steering Committee will be invited
to nominate a representative who can be called upon to assist in the work of this
group.
I thought you should know that this work was being put in hand. I think you will
agree that it will be valuable to the members of a new Administration to have its
results as a basis for the review which they will have to make of our oversea policy as
a whole.
Enclosure to 8
A. The setting
What developments can we foresee during the next ten years, and what is likely to be
the resulting situation in 1970, under the following heads:—
1. What will be the relative positions of the two major competing countries, the
Soviet Union and the U.S.A., in terms of their military strength, their nuclear
sufficiency and their economic capacity? How far will the Soviet Union have
succeeded in catching up with the U.S.A., and how far will these two countries have
increased their lead over the others?
2. In the light of the answer to question 1 above, should we expect to see new
developments in United States or Soviet policy either towards each other or towards
their friends and allies?
1 See document no 5 above.
2 Meeting on 7 June with Brook, Makins, Hoyer Millar, Sir P Dean, P Ramsbotham, Lord Plowden, and
COS representatives. This minute was drawn up by Dean.
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3. What changes will there be in Western Europe? Can we foresee modifications
in the structure of the North Atlantic Alliance, or economic developments which
would have political and military implications?
4. What position is China likely to reach over this period? How far might China’s
policy produce difficulties for the Soviet Union, and what measures of reinsurance
might the Soviet Union need to take against this? What effect is China’s development
likely to have on the policy of the U.S.A.?
5. What will be the main trends of development in:—
(a) South and South-East Asia and the rest of the Far East?
(b) The Middle East?
(c) Africa?
6. What changes can we foresee in the cohesion of the Commonwealth and its
ability to make an effective contribution to world peace? In particular, what
developments might there be in India and South Africa?
7. What are the prospects of:—
(a) a suspension of nuclear tests?
(b) nuclear sufficiency on the part of the powers concerned?
(c) effective disarmament?
8. What will be the likely development of the United Nations and other
international organisations? Will world opinion be able to exert an increasing
influence by these means?
9. How will the economic capacity of the United Kingdom develop during the
next ten years?
10. In the light of the considerations above, what will be the standing and
position of the United Kingdom in the world in general?
B. The objectives
11. In the light of the answers to questions 1–10, what should be the objectives,
during the next decade, of:—
(a) our foreign policy?
(b) our Colonial policy?
(c) our strategic policy?
12. These three main headings comprise such questions as:—
(i) What is the future of Anglo–American interdependence? What differing
degrees of emphasis may we have to set on maintaining our relations with the
U.S.A., with Europe, and with the Commonwealth?
(ii) To what extent should we reassess our essential interests in Africa, the Middle
East and the Far East? For example, should we in the next decade regard Middle
East oil as a vital interest of the United Kingdom, or as a collective Western
interest?
(iii) By what means should we maintain our essential interests in Africa, the
Middle East and the Far East? What form should our commitment in these areas
take? How far can we rely on conventional bases (even in our own territories) or
our present methods of supply—and how far might these be replaced by other
means?
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(iv) Should we concentrate more on giving political and economic assistance to
the under-developed countries and less on supporting certain of them by military
means? What are the probable demands on the United Kingdom as a source of
finance for overseas development?
(v) What would be the effects of a discontinuance of nuclear tests, and of the
achievement of nuclear sufficiency? If (a) the Soviet Union and (b) the Western
Powers acquire so great a nuclear capacity that each side is afraid to attack the
other, by what means do we maintain this balance of tensions? In those
circumstances should we still need to make an independent contribution to the
Western deterrent? If so, what form should it take, e.g. should it be on the lines of
BLUE STREAK, BLUE STEEL or POLARIS? Alternatively, should we need a greater degree
of interdependence in this field—with the U.S.A., or with the Commonwealth, or
with Europe? Will there be a specifically European contribution to the deterrent,
and what will be our relation to it?
(vi) What commitments, short of global war, should we plan to meet, either on our
own or in association with allies; and what Forces do we need for these purposes?
C. The Means
13. How much of our economic resources can we reasonably expect to be able to
afford to devote, over this period, to:—
(i) defence?
(ii) assistance to the under-developed countries?
(iii) “prestige” civil projects (for example, atomic energy, a supersonic airliner,
space research, Cunarders)?
Can we reasonably expect to be able to:—
(i) maintain the present allocation of money for these purposes?
(ii) maintain the present proportion of gross national product?
(iii) increase the proportion of gross national product?
14. Within these totals, can we expect to be able to maintain or increase the level
of overseas military and political expenditure?
15. What changes within (i) the United Kingdom economy, (ii) the sterling area,
or (iii) the world economy would invalidate the answers to questions 13 and 14?
9 DO 35/8095, no 1, M 213/59 16 June 1959
[Future of Hong Kong and territories in the South-West Pacific]:
minute by Mr Macmillan to Mr Lennox-Boyd
I have recently had some interesting talks with Prince Philip about the impressions
which he formed during his world tour earlier this year.
There are some points which I should like to follow up at an informal meeting
with you and other Ministers concerned. I attach brief notes which I have made of
these points. I suggest that we should meet to discuss them in a week or two’s time.
I am sending copies of this minute and the enclosures to the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, the Commonwealth Secretary and the Minister of Defence.
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British colonial territories in the South-West Pacific
There is much to be said for a rationalisation of Colonial responsibilities in this area.
1. The British Solomon Islands are of no strategic importance to the United
Kingdom. They are, however, of direct strategic interest to Australia. And the trend of
their economic development is likely to bring them into closer association with
Australians in business, commerce, etc. Australia is already responsible for other
dependent territories in this area and is spending proportionately far more on
development in their territories than we do, or are likely to do, in this part of the
world. There is therefore something to be said for asking Australia to take over
responsibility for these Islands. The transfer would probably be of advantage to the
inhabitants. Transfer to another member of the Commonwealth need not involve loss
of prestige to the United Kingdom.
2. The same arguments apply to our share of the Anglo-French condominium in
the New Hebrides. These Islands are of no importance to us. It would be preferable
that they should be administered by Australia.
3. If we continue to be responsible for these Islands, we shall have to increase
our grants and subventions. Otherwise the disparity between our standards and those
of the Australians and the French will become so marked that the inhabitants may
become disaffected.
4. If we transferred to Australia our responsibilities in the Solomon Islands and
the New Hebrides, the Gilbert and Ellice Islands might be rejoined to Fiji. They are
too small to have an independent existence and linking them again to Fiji would
secure a co-ordination of United Kingdom dependencies in the South Pacific.1
The future of Hong Kong
The question here is “how long?”. The lease of the New Territories runs out in 1997
and it is inconceivable that any Chinese Government, whatever its complexion, will
agree to renew it. It is unlikely that the rest of the Colony, shorn of the New
Territories, could continue as a viable entity; and in any case when China gets back
the New Territories she is certain to agitate for the whole of Hong Kong. There is
therefore an absolute limit of thirty-eight years to the life of the Colony. The Chinese
in the Colony would be agreeably surprised if it lasted as long as that. Ought we not
soon to be giving serious thought to this problem—how are we to retire gracefully
before events crowd in upon us?2
1 See CRO comment in document no 556, in Part II.
2 See also document no 258 below: CRO note.
10 DO 35/8095, no 6 9 July 1959
‘Future policy in Hong Kong and the South-West Pacific’: minutes of
a Cabinet committee meeting (GEN 690/1st)
The Meeting had before them a minute by the Prime Minister covering some
observations which Prince Philip had, at the Prime Minister’s request, made of his
impressions following his recent world tour.1
1 See previous document.
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The Meeting considered first the situation in Hong Kong.
The Colonial Secretary said that the territory of Hong Kong could broadly be
divided into that part, including the island of Hong Kong, under perpetual British
sovereignty; and the much larger area known as the New Territories, leased from
China for ninety-nine years to 1997. The New Territories included the Colony’s water
supply and it would not be possible to sustain the British owned area if the New
Territories were controlled by an unfriendly power. It appeared to be generally
recognised in the Far East that an armed attack against Hong Kong by China would
be likely to precipitate a world war, and it was in our interests not to dispel that
impression. A more likely threat to the life of the Colony in the immediate future,
however, was unemployment, caused mainly by the very large influx of refugees from
the mainland which it was impossible to stop. It would be comparatively easy for the
Chinese Government to make trouble for the Hong Kong Government through the
agency of these refugees, though this did not appear likely at present since it suited
the Chinese to maintain the existing status of Hong Kong as a valuable source of
foreign currency.
The following were the main points made in discussion:—
(a) From an economic point of view it was probably to our advantage that the
present situation in Hong Kong should continue. Although Hong Kong had a small
unfavourable balance of payments with the non-sterling area, she maintained £150
millions in sterling balances which we should not wish to see rapidly reduced.
(b) We needed to keep troops in the Colony both to assist the police in the event of
riots, and to delay any military move against Hong Kong by Chinese troops so as to
gain time for consultation with the United States Government on the full
implications of the position. A reduction of the garrison in Hong Kong could only be
contemplated if the troops were moved to Malaya, but this would be more expensive
since new accommodation would have to be provided there for them.
(c) Politically, the future of Hong Kong must be considered together with that of
Formosa and the other off-shore islands. Our prestige in South-East Asia would
suffer if we were to be forced out of Hong Kong, and it was important that in the eyes
of the world we should appear to be determined to maintain our position and that we
should not be thought to be making plans for a withdrawal.
(d) Although there would be some advantage in Hong Kong being included in the
informal exchange of views on South-East Asia at the military level which the Air
Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Far East (Air Marshal Bandon) was shortly to have
with the United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific (Admiral Felt), in view of the
nature of the issues involved it would be better for any discussions with the United
States authorities to be conducted, at an appropriate time, at the political level.
Summing up this part of the discussion the Prime Minister said that the problem
of Hong Kong was part of the more general problem of the maintenance of Western
interests in the Far East. Sooner or later the United States would no doubt have to
reconsider her policy towards the Peoples [sic] Republic of China, and at that stage it
should be our aim to secure a joint Anglo/United States review of Western policy in
the Far East as a whole. In the meantime we should not take any action which might
weaken our position in Hong Kong or prejudice the outcome of any such
discussions. . . .
The Meeting then considered the future of the British Colonial Territories in the
South-West Pacific and in particular the suggestion that responsibility for
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administering the British Solomon Islands Protectorate and the British share in the
New Hebrides Condominium should be handed over to the Australian Government.
In discussion the view was expressed that we could not indefinitely undertake the
financial commitment of administering territories which were of no particular
strategic significance to us, and which could be much more appropriately
administered by other Commonwealth countries. Although these territories did not
constitute a heavy financial drain this was partly because our standards of
administration and of accommodation for expatriate Colonial servants were not high.
The Australian Government was spending more per head of the population in the
territories they at present administered than we spent in ours, and the transfer of
responsibility to them might well be of material benefit to the peoples concerned. On
the other hand it was argued that the existing immigration policies of the Australian
Government would not incline the peoples of British South-West Pacific territories
towards the suggested transfer, and that in the case of the New Hebrides there might
be difficulty vis-a-vis the French Government in handing over our share of
responsibility to a Government other than the French.
Summing up, the Prime Minister said that the future of the British administration
of these territories was a matter which it would be desirable for officials to cover in
their current study of United Kingdom policy in the period 1960–1970, which was
being prepared for the attention of the next Administration.2
2 Because of the continuing disagreement between CO and CRO on this issue, the ‘Future Policy Study’
made only limited reference to it: document no 17, para 75 (b).
11 CAB 134/1935, no 15(15) 30 July 1959
‘The Commonwealth, 1960–1970’: draft Cabinet memorandum by
CRO for Future Policy Study Working Group.  Annex: the future of
the Irish Republic [Extract]
. . . Politico-economic considerations
10. There is one recurrent theme with local variations in Commonwealth
relations. In the first flush of independence, the dominant attitude towards us of the
governments of countries we previously ruled is not one of gratitude. On the
contrary, they mostly remain suspicious of us, apprehensive lest we still think that
we can order them about, resentful of statements by public men and in the press in
this country which appear either to take them for granted or to criticise the way they
are conducting their affairs, watchful and sensitive about anything we do or say
which can be taken as meaning that we do not fully recognise their sovereign
independent status. This attitude of critical suspicion persists in many countries for a
long time after independence; even in the twenties and thirties Canada and South
Africa were displaying signs of it. India showed it for some years after her
independence; Ghana, only two years free of British rule, currently exhibits the same
symptoms in glaring form. We should be prepared to allow for Nigeria, Sierra Leone,
the West Indies and other newly independent members of the Commonwealth going
through the same phase in future. But it is only a passing phase. All the old
Dominions have now grown out of it; with India we are over the hump and already
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the virulence of the accusations she levelled against us six or ten years ago because of
our Colonial policy has mellowed. Ghana has taken up the anti-Colonial theme
where India left off, with her eyes particularly on Colonialism in Africa, and it seems
too much to hope that an independent Nigeria will throw all her weight on our side.
But if we display the same patience and forbearance as we have managed to exercise
in the past, there is no reason why we should not win through to a second phase of
lasting confidence and respect.
11. Our relations with Canada, Australia and New Zealand have now settled down
into a pattern which seems unlikely to be disturbed in any major respect within a
decade. Canada will no doubt oscillate between a pull towards the United States and
a pull towards the United Kingdom. Her two political parties may already be coming
to represent these rival attractions, but whether one or the other is in power is likely
to make only marginal differences to the trend of events in Canada. Economically,
penetration by the United States will continue but will not always generate goodwill,
and Canada will at times be resentful of her large, powerful and apparently
indifferent neighbour. Barring a United States slump, more and more United States
capital seems likely to flow into Canada and with Canada’s increasing domestic
resources of capital and oil, there seems little doubt that the pace of economic
growth can continue to be rapid.
12. Australia and New Zealand have a less certain economic future, but many
past prophecies of an impending decline in world demand for their primary products
and of a consequential slowing down in their rate of economic growth have proved
false. New Zealand’s future, without heavy industries, is less bright than that of an
industrialising Australia. Because Australian and New Zealand politics so closely
parallel the divisions between right and left in the United Kingdom, there will be
periods when their Governments are out of step with each other and with the
Government of the United Kingdom, and consequently periods of particularly close
relations, one of which exists at present between us and Australia, are likely to be
interspersed with periods of less warm friendship. The development of closer ties
between Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and the United States or Asia on
the other will be slow but steady. It holds no long term menace to our relations with
the Antipodes.
13. South Africa too has a record of giving the lie to prophets of imminent
disaster. The South African tragedy will continue to unfold, but only slowly. Relations
between blacks and whites and between the two white races themselves will continue
to worsen throughout the foreseeable future, but the day of the great trek of English-
speaking whites out of South Africa or of the blood-bath when the blacks rise and
overthrow their white masters is unlikely to come within the next decade. The
external pressures upon the Union Government can certainly be expected to
intensify. Abortive attempts in the United Nations to induce them to change their
racial policies will give way to economic pressures. But the Afrikaner people,
conceiving themselves to be defending their race and culture from the barbarians,
will not abandon the belief that they have a God-given mission to fashion their
country their way. A steady intensification is to be foreseen of the enmity between
South Africa and the tropical Commonwealth, which may grow to the point where
South Africa leaves the Commonwealth. If this looks like happening our attitude will
be crucial, and is likely to depend to a considerable degree on whether we have
ourselves succeeded in fashioning a genuine alternative to racial discrimination and
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white domination in those multi-racial parts of the Commonwealth, particularly the
Rhodesian Federation and Kenya, for which we may still be exercising some
responsibility.
14. The future of the Indian Sub-Continent is perhaps the most important
question-mark overhanging the Commonwealth in the next decade. India poses the
more important problem for us in the area. Her attachment to Western ideals
conflicts with her opposition to certain aspects of Western external policies. This
attitude, together with motives of self-interest lead her to a policy of positive non-
alignment. She also believes that by remaining non-aligned she can help to reduce
international tensions. (Admittedly recent events in Tibet and on India’s north-east
frontier have given India much cause for thought, but it seems very unlikely that
China, persuaded by Russia, will risk forcing India away from her policy of non-
alignment). The economic system she has evolved to raise her living standards also
rejects both the capitalist freedom of the United States and communist
totalitarianism of Russia and China. She is thus poised between East and West in
both political and economic terms. This dual non-alignment leaves her free to
negotiate economic aid from both blocs. If only because of her size and population
(the second biggest in the world), what happens in India will greatly influence the
smaller countries of Asia and probably of Africa too. The latter are under equal
pressure to find rapid means of advancing economically and politically. India’s
democratic experiment, despite the emphasis given to the public sector in her
economic programme, is a middle way course. If it is even moderately successful, it is
probable that other countries in the area will adopt her example. If it fails, and if
India should go communist it will be exceedingly difficult for other uncommitted
countries in Africa and Asia to resist communist encroachment. Although India is
not committed to the Western camp, it is therefore of crucial importance to us and to
the West that her democratic experiment should not fail.
. . . 21. In Pakistan, Ceylon and Malaya it seems probable that we shall have to
deal with governments that are in some degree authoritarian over the next decade. If
we decide that only those countries that appear to us to be fully democratic can be
our friends, we shall probably cease our present friendly relations with these
countries (and indeed with many African countries too). If we decide that members
of the Commonwealth have the right to choose the form of government suitable for
their own circumstances without forfeiting our friendship, there is no reason why
these three Asian countries should not remain co-operative and developing parts of
the Commonwealth.
22. In West Africa the largest and most important country, Nigeria, may prove
more co-operative and well disposed towards us than Ghana. If she holds together, as
we hope and expect, there will be a struggle for influence between her and Ghana,
and it is not at all certain that she will be able to stand aside from or swim against the
tide of Pan-Africanism. The Commonwealth countries in West Africa will be
influenced by and will in turn exert influence upon what happens in surrounding
French territories. Two views are possible on the course of events in the area as a
whole. Balkanisation with a dozen or more newly independent members of U.N.O. in
West Africa, could lead to a shifting pattern of alliances and considerable inter-
territorial friction from which Commonwealth countries in the area would not be
immune. At the other extreme, the idea of a West African Federation may have taken
root within a decade; if the rulers of the new states are willing to give up to each
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other some of their recently won sovereignty. Perhaps both these courses will be
followed in different parts of the area. Nigeria, once she feels her strength, will exert
a powerful influence but it is too early to say in what direction.
23. Our relations with an independent Sierra Leone may be as difficult as with
Ghana in the early years of independence, and we shall have to live through the
phase of suspicion with racial undercurrents. Their demand, and that of some of the
other independent African countries, that the formula “one man one vote” should be
applied in the territories for which we still exert some responsibility down the
eastern side of Africa from Kenya to the Rhodesian Federation will strain their
relations with us. If we insist for a full decade on refusing to hand over the reins of
government to black majorities on the Eastern side of Africa or if we do transfer
power to white minorities, it is difficult to see how we shall be able to maintain good
relations with West Africa. But if the West Africans can be convinced in a decade, as
the Indians were convinced within that period, that we genuinely intend to transfer
power on a wide scale without ourselves being animated by racial considerations, we
should be able to live through the phase of suspicion and criticism and to win
through to conditions of mutual trust and respect.
24. The West Indies are likely to confront us with the problem whether to grant
fairly widespread financial assistance to territories which have advanced politically to
a point at which we no longer feel ourselves able to deny them independence. If we
face them with a choice between independence coupled with destitution and
continued dependence with subsidies, there is no doubt that they will choose the
former. The West Indies might then look for and perhaps receive United States aid;
we would forfeit their friendship. And our investments there would probably be
endangered. If we can bring ourselves to the point at which, perhaps in concert with
the Americans, other members of the Commonwealth and international
organisations, we can see our way to granting them economic aid after they attain
independence their relations with us should settle down to conditions of mutual
respect and confidence within a decade.
25. A note is attached on the future of the Irish Republic.
Commonwealth cohesion
26. This account of possible developments during the next ten years shows how
inextricably entangled political and economic factors are in each of the main
countries of the Commonwealth. But it is possible to separate the main political and
economic threats to the cohesion of the Commonwealth that may emerge in this
period.
27. The chief political threats for the most part concern the tropical
Commonwealth and can be listed as follows:—
(i) The possibility that one or more independent members may be attracted out
of the Commonwealth. This seems improbable within the next decade. For
membership does not debar Commonwealth countries from joining other
alliances or associations, except perhaps the Communist bloc, and only Ceylon
seems in danger of turning in that direction in the next ten years.
(ii) An intensification of East-West tension, apart from a third world war, would
probably be the major threat to Commonwealth cohesion if it led the U.K. to adopt
policies which alienated the uncommitted Asian and African members. The
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attitude “he who is not with me is against me” can serve only to change benevolent
neutralists into antagonists. Any military undertaking on the part of the U.K. in
circumstances which did not command general international approval would
endanger Commonwealth cohesion.
(iii) An intensification of peripheral disputes would obviously be damaging. With
prospects in sight of an Indus Waters scheme being started, it is possible for the
first time in twelve years to have real grounds for hoping that Indo-Pakistan
enmities over Kashmir will begin to die down. But strains between South Africa
and the tropical Commonwealth on racial issues may be expected to increase, and
perhaps to come to a head within a decade.
(iv) Finally there is the threat of racialism and anti-Colonialism to our relations
with the tropical Commonwealth. The assumption to which we are working that at
the end of the next ten years there will still be over 30 territories with a total
population of perhaps 30 millions to whom we shall not have granted
independence presupposes that we can resist anti-Colonial pressure for this period
without disrupting the Commonwealth. There can be two views about this. To be
reasonably certain of being able to avoid a situation in which we have to take
painful decisions on this subject, we may need, perhaps during the first half of the
decade, to devise new forms of government for multi-racial societies capable of
inspiring equally in black majorities and white minorities sufficient confidence to
enable them to face independence without fear of each other.
28. The main economic threats to the cohesion of the Commonwealth in the
next decade concern our relations with the temperate as much as with the tropical
Commonwealth. In a sentence, they are that Commonwealth countries may come to
think that the material advantages they derive from their membership, from the
point of view of finance and trade, are diminishing. This could come about in several
ways:—
(i) A weakening of sterling, especially if it occurred in circumstances in which
the U.K. drew most of the blame, could have far graver consequences in the sixties
than in the forties, for the widespread disruption of the second world war would no
longer be an alibi.
(ii) The Commonwealth would be damaged if the belief were to become
widespread that the U.K. could no longer make a significant contribution to the
needs of the perimeter for capital. It is already generally appreciated that the U.K.
can no longer supply the bulk of the needs of Commonwealth countries for
external capital. But there is a vast difference between a little and nothing. And the
political kudos we get for the capital we can invest would be minimised if it all
went out through international institutions such as the I.B.R.D. and I.D.A.
Moreover, a new range of problems, to which we have so far given little thought,
would confront us if sterling were to become stronger to the point at which we
permitted borrowers from outside the sterling area to obtain a significant part of
the funds we have available for investment abroad. Many Commonwealth
countries have held their balances here in bad times as well as good (and we have
been greatly strengthened thereby) and, as the banker for the sterling area, we owe
a primary obligation to our depositors. The banker who lends as freely to non-
depositors as to depositors is likely to lose some of his depositors. It is therefore
important that we should preserve the privileges of membership of the sterling
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area. But we need to think a good deal about the dilemma of strong versus weak
sterling from the point of view of Commonwealth relations.
(iii) A marked decline in the proportion we were able to import of the produce of
Commonwealth countries would weaken the economic links of the
Commonwealth for example, if it were decided to step up the level of our domestic
agricultural supports. Moreover, part of the need is for the temperate and
industrialised Commonwealth to feel that our market is still expanding for their
primary produce, and for the tropical and undeveloped Commonwealth to see
some prospect of growth in the market here for their manufactured goods (e.g.
textiles).
(iv) Commonwealth unity would be weakened if the feeling grew in other
Commonwealth countries that, as a result of reaction to the creation of the
European Economic Community, the U.K. was beginning to attach more
importance to maintaining and developing her trade with Europe than with the
Commonwealth. The proposed Free Trade Area of the 17 was somewhat reluctantly
accepted by the Commonwealth on the basis that it would be confined to
industrial goods and that the Commonwealth would in practice be compensated
for limited losses of industrial preferences in the U.K. by the benefits to them of an
expansion of the U.K’s trade. But the contemplated content of the European Free
Trade Association of the Stockholm Group, with its associated bilateral
agreements on agriculture, risks being regarded, especially in Australia and New
Zealand, as an indication that the U.K. may become increasingly willing to
prejudice the trade interests of Commonwealth countries in the U.K. market to
promote the U.K.’s interests in Europe. If the Free Trade Area of the 17 is secured
without further entrenchment on the Commonwealth interest in the U.K.
agricultural market, this fear will die away. Apart from this, some Commonwealth
countries, in particular Australia and New Zealand, are anxious to gain greater
access to the Continental European market for foodstuffs. They may seek to reach
that goal by bargaining with the preferences they give to us. This could arise in a
number of different ways. These countries might feel impelled so to use their
preferences if the Continental European market were expanding faster than our
own, e.g. if we failed to secure a wider Free Trade Area, or if the balance of
advantage in our trade agreements with them altered against them, or if they
thought that we were sacrificing substantial Commonwealth interests in order to
secure a wider Free Trade Area. Alternatively, the use of these preferences might be
proposed in that context to help secure Free Trade Area arrangements on lines
which would be advantageous to the Commonwealth. Such developments would
hasten the slow attrition of the Imperial Preference system which seems anyhow
inevitable.
29. Preservation of the cohesion of the Commonwealth, as of any other political
association or alliance, thus demands that all its members should regard it as worth
preserving, and should be prepared consciously to direct their policies to that end.
The biggest effort must naturally come from the U.K. Government, as the leader of
the Commonwealth. The major policy requirements for us are to do all we can to
minimise both East-West tensions and peripheral disputes within the
Commonwealth; to devise political solutions for multi-racial territories which will
serve to reduce racial and anti-Colonial feeling in the tropical Commonwealth; to
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keep sterling strong; to preserve the privileges of membership of the sterling area,
including the provision of a reasonable amount of capital; to maintain our imports of
primary produce from the Commonwealth; to be prepared to admit more
Commonwealth industrial products; and to do our best to convince Commonwealth
countries that we do not intend to sacrifice our trading arrangements with them in
order to improve our position in European trade.
30. Is the Commonwealth connexion worth this effort by us? Is the
Commonwealth, politically and economically, more of a liability than an asset to us?
Would it be better, from the point of view of the welfare, prosperity and safety of the
people of the British Isles for us to go our own way and to cease from making the effort
which the task of preserving the cohesion of the Commonwealth imposes upon us?
31. Our international political influence depends greatly on our position as the
centre and originator of the Commonwealth, and upon a continuance of the belief on
the part of foreigners that we can hold it together. A short view often suggests that
even now there is in reality very little Commonwealth cohesion. When the members
of the Commonwealth all cast their votes in different directions in UNO, when India
loads [sic] the pack against us in New York over Suez, or when the newest members
of the Commonwealth publicly spurn our advice, the political influence of the
Commonwealth looks like an illusion. But on a longer view the respect in which we
are held internationally depends to a very large extent upon our knack of being able
most of the time to get on particularly well with, and to maintain the respect and co-
operation of, most of the peoples in other continents whom we have ceased to
govern. The United States in particular probably listens closely to us for this than for
any other reason; if the Commonwealth breaks up—or if it shrinks to countries
solely of British settlement—we shall become in American eyes no more than one
among a dozen or so smallish countries competing for her attention.
32. The Commonwealth is also good business. It still is by far the largest source
of our overseas investment income. We are earning perhaps 10 or 15% a year on our
original investments in the Commonwealth, which bring us in well over £200
millions a year; the catalogue of losses on the capital we have invested during the last
century in Latin America, the continent of Europe and the foreign parts of Asia only
serves to highlight the enormous profitability of our Commonwealth investments.
The Commonwealth is our biggest market from which we earn £1m500 m.[sic] a
year. Almost without exception, Commonwealth countries take from the U.K. a
higher proportion of their total imports than do their foreign neighbours. We keep
our Commonwealth markets not merely because of tariff preferences, which may
dwindle during the next decade, but also because of all the hidden preference we
derive from sharing a common language with our customers, trading with people
who have come from this country or been trained here or who work in feet and
inches and not centimetres or who have grown up to want the sort of things we
produce, made in the way we make them, or who, like many Australians and New
Zealanders, rarely think of looking elsewhere for what they want before seeing if they
can get it from us, because we are their best customers. In 1949 we might well have
doubted whether these factors would still be as important as they in fact still are in
1959, and there seems no reason why they should dwindle to insignificance by 1970.
Since India, Pakistan and Ceylon became independent our exports to them have
increased several times over; no doubt when the newer Commonwealth countries in
Africa have settled down the same will happen there.
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33. There is no doubt that we can maintain the cohesion of the Commonwealth
during the next decade if we wish. The effort we must make to this end, politically
and economically is small in relation to the political and economic benefits we derive
from the existence of the Commonwealth. Although the Commonwealth is not, and
can never be, a monolithic structure comparable in its unity to the United States or
the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, it is a bridge that we have built between the tropical
and the temperate world and between a group of peoples in different continents,
different stages of advancement and above all with different coloured skins. It must
be a major objective of our policy to strengthen and maintain this unique association
which is our chief twentieth century contribution to the comity of nations.
Annex to 11
1. It is now little over ten years since Mr. Costello took Eire out of the
Commonwealth and severed her links with the Crown.1 Since then, with general
Commonwealth consent, the Irish Republic has been in a “non foreign” relationship
with the U.K.
2. On a quick view this “non foreign” relationship looks like an arrangement
under which the Irish Republic get all the benefits of membership of the
Commonwealth without incurring any of the obligations. There is no restriction or
indeed control over the movement of persons between the Irish Republic and the
U.K; the Republic still enjoys tariff preferences here; it is a member of the sterling
area; its citizens who are here even have the franchise.
3. But in fact this odd relationship was devised because it suited us and it still
does. Under conditions of full employment in the U.K. Irish labour is welcome; in
addition to a million or more Irishmen who are permanently resident here, we obtain
great benefits from the seasonal movement of Irish people into this country—the
men particularly into the building trade, the girls into summer employment in
hotels, and both sexes into agricultural employment in the West Country. We not
only give the Republic tariff preferences but receive them from her, and she imports
from us over £100 m. of goods a year. She enjoys the rights of membership of the
sterling area because our two economies are so mixed up; Bank of England notes
circulate in the Republic and she is making a loan to us to the amount of such
circulation. We give the Irish the vote because it is administratively impossible to
disentangle Irishmen from Englishmen when compiling the Electoral Roll.
4. Our political relations with the Republic are likely for at least the next decade
to continue to be dominated by the issue of Partition viz. by her desire to rule
Northern Ireland. The departure from active politics of leaders of 1916–1922 vintage,
and especially of Mr. de Valera, is not likely to involve a diminution in bitterness
against the British because of anti-British propaganda and slanted history books, in
many of the schools. Terrorist activity against the North by the I.R.A. is likely, as now,
to flare up from time to time. There seems no prospect within a generation of a
change of heart taking place in the Republic towards Partition or towards the North.
1 J A Costello, taoiseach of the Irish Republic, 1948–1951, 1954–1957; leader of the Opposition in Dáil
Éireann since 1957. For the events of 1948–1949, see R Hyam, ed, The Labour government and the end of
empire, 1945–1951 (BDEEP, 1992), chap 8 in Part IV.
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The leaders in Dublin will no doubt continue to make appeals to the North to join the
Republic, but such pleas will all be rejected in view of the religious differences
between North and South (though there is a substantial Catholic element in
Northern Ireland); and because of Ulster’s deep attachment to the Crown.
5. Economically the Republic will stand still while the rest of the world goes by.
It is improbable that either agricultural or industrial development will within a
decade make it possible for persons who remain in the Republic to enjoy a
significantly higher standard of living. Indeed the market for Irish agricultural
products in the U.K. may shrink if we admit more European produce duty free.
Continued emigration will keep the population about stable, and may prevent
income per head in the Republic from falling. Any new barriers to Irish emigration
would cause an economic crisis in the Republic. Meanwhile if Northern Ireland
continues to share the economic expansion of the rest of the U.K., the contrast
between conditions of life North and South of the Border will become more marked.
6. The obsession with Partition will continue to prevent the Republic from
entering NATO or any similar alliances of which we are members. In the event of war
or threat of war, even though this should come from the Communist world, we must
be prepared as in 1939 to find a neutral isolationist and outwardly unhelpful
neighbour on our immediate western flank. But there is reason to hope that the
Lemass Government if it remains in power will be anxious to see an improvement in
relations, and while no compromise is possible over the Partition issue, we can
probably continue in other respects to hope for reasonably good practical relations
with the Republic.
12 FO 371/143705, no 58 4 Aug 1959
[Future Policy Study: assessment of emerging conclusions]: letter
from R W B Clarke (T) to Sir P Dean.  Minutes by C O’Neill1 and 
Sir P Dean
Before signing off until the end of the month, I have been trying to collect my views.
O’Neill sent me a very interesting draft on A.8, on which I have commented, and
from which it should be possible to get a very useful and sufficiently agreed paper.
This really completes the ‘A’ Section.
Reading through this mass of papers, I have been rather interested and, I am
bound to say, surprised, to find a few conclusions beginning to emerge. Here they
are, very tentatively:—
(1) In the next decade, the West will find it very difficult to hold Russia and China.
(2) The West will have to work very hard to keep the under-developeds in our
camp—or outside the Russians’.
(3) To achieve (1) and (2) we shall need the full military and economic power of
Western Europe and Japan.
(4) Western European economic, military and political unity is best for (3)—but
unlikely to happen unless it suits the French.
1 C D W O’Neill, assistant under-secretary (FO), 1957–1960.
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(5) If (4) fails, Europe’s contribution to (1) and (2) will fall short, with extra
burden on U.S.A. and U.K. Complete European failure to get and keep unity would
be a great set-back for the West.
(6) But if (4) happens, the Six will oust U.K. from the No. 2 place in the Atlantic
Alliance, and U.S.A. may well choose to work with them more than with us.
(7) Difficult for U.K. to decide how best to exert its influence (with declining
relative power) and make its best contribution. External financial stability is of
paramount importance.
(8) Commonwealth is not significant in power terms, but of great importance in
the crucial relationship between the advanced West and the under-developeds,
and thence for (2)—this role not helped by thinking of the Commonwealth as
an exclusive or discriminatory bloc. Most important are India (size, geography
and democratic commitment) and East Africa (test case for multi-racial com-
munity).
(9) U.K. must in any case continue to develop Commonwealth relationship on
lines of (8). Consistently with this, U.K. will probably in the course of the decade
have to choose between:—
(i) Closer integration (political, military, economic) with U.S.A. (and of course
Canada).
(ii) Closer integration (political, military, economic) with Western Europe—
not “limited-liability” integration, like the free trade area or N.A.T.O.
(iii) U.S./U.K./France triumvirate, with rest of Europe associated (not
“integrated”) via N.A.T.O. and all-European free market.
(iv) Acceptance of No. 3 role in N.A.T.O., and concentration upon political and
economic influence, especially via the under-developeds.
(10) These courses are mutually exclusive. We cannot rely upon being able to get
(i) or (ii) or (iii) even if we wanted them; and some courses will be more possible
than others at different times.
Anyway, this is how I read it so far—although I cannot really say that any of the
prospects in (9) are very alluring.
Minutes on 12
I should accept a good deal of Mr. Clarke’s tentative conclusions, but I have some
comments on them. I think point (2) could be better formulated. Not many of the
underdevelopeds are “in our camp” at present. I think our object must be not so
much to keep or bring them into “our camp” as to keep them uncommitted. I feel a
bit doubtful about the alternative courses in (9). In particular I rather doubt whether
“closer integration” with the U.S.A. is going to be available to us as a practical course,
even though we might choose it if it were. Most of the forces which may operate to
compel us to choose between one course and another are likely at the same time to
make it harder to achieve this one. If we maintain our present close association (not
integration) with the U.S.A. we shall do well; I doubt if we can really expect to make it
closer. I also doubt whether alternative (iii) is really a starter. I should be inclined to
say the three alternatives are really Mr. Clarke’s (ii) or (iv) or the maintenance of
things as they are to-day with a strong accent on our association with the U.S.A.—
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which we should also seek to retain to the greatest possible extent even if events push
us towards (ii) or (iv).
C. O’N.
13.8.59
I agree that there may be difficulties about our being able to achieve “closer
integration” with the U.S.A. in the next ten years but I do not think we can disregard
this possibility without very careful thought. “Integration” may be the wrong word
and I should prefer something more like “association”. The present position is that
we have achieved very close association with the U.S.A. and it seems to me that in
spite of temporary setbacks, sometimes very serious ones like Suez, the association
steadily becomes closer. Logically, as our relative power in the world declines and the
advantages which we at present enjoy as the centre of the Commonwealth become
less obvious and perhaps disappear, the Americans may feel less attraction for us and
tend to put their weight, money and influence behind a united Europe or some other
grouping. But logic is not decisive and so long as we can maintain our reputation for
good sense, produce really first-class brains and ideas, particularly in the scientific
and technical field, & above all show ourselves as reliable & worth-while allies
against Communism, I think the Americans will tend to look more to us and not less.
Again, logically, this might lead to our passing from a position of an interdependent
of the U.S.A. to a dependent, and it is certainly for consideration whether this is the
fate which is best for this country. In such a case it might well be better to merge
ourselves more in the continental European group and to assert our influence as part
of that grouping, maintaining, as far as possible, a special association with the
Americans. I do not think, however, that one can be sure. I have a feeling, however,
that we may at the moment be rather too much influenced by the great change
which has come over the European scene in the last year and take it perhaps a little
too readily for granted that E.E.C. will lead to a more or less politically-integrated
Europe. This may force us to change our policy but I am concerned that we should
not lightly consider throwing away the bird in hand of the Anglo-U.S.
interdependence and special relationship for the as-yet bird in the bush plan for
much closer association, leading perhaps to integration, with Western Europe.
P.D.
15.8.59
13 CAB 134/1935, no 15(28) 6 Oct 1959
‘The future of Anglo-American relations’: FO note for Future Policy
Study Working Group1
For the lasy yeo [sic; last two]2 years Anglo-American relations have been extremely
good. We have succeeded in consolidating and extending our position as the first ally
of the United States and the coordination of policy between the two Governments has
never been so far-reaching and satisfactory.
1 The authors were J S Orme, P E Ramsbotham and R W L Wilding of the FO Planning Section. It became
an FO print, dated 5 Jan 1960. 2 Deduced from typewriter keyboard.
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2. As long as this situation continues, the basis of our position in international
affairs will remain sound. Apart from economic considerations, our interests might
not perhaps be seriously harmed if we remained on indifferent terms with France
and outside the increasing intimacy of the Common Market countries, provided that
the Americans continued to attach paramount importance to their relations with us.
But Anglo–American partnership is not a law of nature, and our present position is
one which we could lose. Unless we are careful to shore it up, it may run into danger
over the next few years. There are several reasons for this:—
Possible causes of friction
(a) Europe
3. The attitudes of the two Governments towards the problems of Russia in
Europe are fundamentally the same. They will be the same if a Labour Government
comes to power at the next election. But both political Parties in the U.K. differ
(though not to the same extent) from the U.S. in their tactical approach to these
problems. The Labour Party’s difference of approach, with its emotional and
historical overtones, is much greater, and may, if they return to power, impose
considerable strains upon Anglo–American cooperation. But the same danger exists
to some extent for Her Majesty’s present Administration, as the recent differences of
opinion over European security and Berlin have made clear. Those differences might
matter less if Western Europe were largely in favour of our own more flexible
approach. But despite recent indications that our Allies are now ready to admit the
need for some flexibility, the French and Germans are at one with the U.S.
Government in regarding our approach with some suspicion; there is a risk therefore
that our position may come to suffer from their counsels being preferred to ours.
4. In particular, there is a tendency to suspect our reliability in the sphere of
NATO strategy. Our move to reduce the number of U.K. troops stationed in Germany
began this process; our ideas about thinning out and control (widely misinterpreted
as betraying a sneaking desire for disengagement) continued it. This is not to say that
such ideas are politically or strategically unsound; our strategic and political
thinking rightly changes with a changing situation. But these changes give our allies
an impression of restlessness—an irksome quality in an alliance where there is a
premium on not making trouble. Admittedly, our willingness to accept U.S. air
squadrons which the French have refused should help us here; so should the general
lack of cooperation which the French have on occasions been showing. But over the
long term this remains a thing to be watched, bearing in mind that, if we are unlucky
or unskilful in our tactics, we may cause doubts in American minds about the reality
of our opposition to Communism.
5. Secondly the Americans are basically unsympathetic to our attitude towards
European integration. This lack of sympathy is partly reasonable, partly not. It is
reasonable in so far as they attach great importance to the ideal of a Europe made
immensely more powerful by greater economic and political unity; we cannot expect
them to take as full account as we must of our own Commonwealth and domestic
difficulties. It is unreasonable in so far as their vision is distorted by their own federal
achievement; they cannot easily understand that what was right for the U.S.A. need
not be right for the radically different condition of Europe. But, reasonably or
unreasonably, they blame us for standing aside.
07-ConGov-Doc 1-28-cp  18/10/00  2:03 pm  Page 72
[13] FUTURE POLICY STUDY (1960–1970) 73
6. Anglo–American relations may therefore suffer if our efforts to create a wider
European Free Trade Area are unsuccessful and Western Europe is split into two
economic groups, i.e. the European Economic Community and the Stockholm
Group. Should this happen, three consequences will probably follow:—
(a) O.E.E.C., the chief forum in which we can influence U.S. economic policy
towards Europe, could hardly survive, at least in its present form;
(b) if forced to choose, the U.S. would tend to support E.E.C. rather than the
Stockholm Group;
(c) such a breakdown of economic cooperation could hardly fail to have an adverse
effect upon NATO solidarity.
7. At the same time, the Americans have so far displayed neither opposition to
nor any marked enthusiasm for the creation of a wider Free Trade Area through the
linking of the E.E.C. and the Stockholm Group. We should not assume that, even if
we succeed in creating a wider grouping, this will be entirely welcome to American
opinion, which tends to be unfavourable to regional economic groupings,
particularly if a preferential or discriminatory element is involved. The Americans
have been prepared to support E.E.C., despite these considerations, because of the
political appeal of the federalist element in the E.E.C. concept. A wider economic
grouping, still excluding the U.S. and lacking this political content, would be a
different matter.
(b) Far East
8. Our differences over China need no description here. So far our agreement to
differ has remained amicable. But Anglo-American relations may run into trouble if,
as may soon happen, the U.N. General Assembly decides to delay consideration of the
question no longer. If the U.S. Government maintain their present attitude, a U.K.
vote for Peking’s representation, or even abstention, might do great damage to our
standing in American eyes, regardless of the prior warnings and explanation which
we would have given them.
(c) Middle East
9. There are also potential differences between us over the Middle East due
primarily to differences of circumstance. Most important of these is that American
interest is overwhelmingly absorbed in the Communist threat and that the
Americans tend to regard everything else as of subordinate importance, whereas two
other problems figure largely and assume coordinate importance in our thinking:
radical nationalism, and the security of our oil supplies which is threatened both by
Communist penetration and by radical nationalism. This difference is reflected in
our attitudes towards Nasser, and towards the new Iraq as it was towards the old. It is
latent in our attitudes on the Yemen, and could again affect our views on Syria if, as
is very possible, Syria resumes its historic role in Egyptian/Iraqi rivalry. It also affects
our views on the future of Jordan. Other potential sources of differences are:—
(i) U.S. involvement with Saudi-Arabia;
(ii) our special responsibilities in the Arabian Peninsula;
(iii) the relative weights of financial responsibility for keeping Jordan afloat falling
on the United States and on the U.K.
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But it has been successfully shown since Bermuda3 that these differences of
emphasis need not, if handled carefully, cause fundamental policy divergencies. We
have a common interest in stability, checking the growth of Communism, the
survival of Israel, peaceful evolution rather than violent change, stable relations
between oil companies and producing countries, access to oil on acceptable terms,
and the economic development of all countries in the area. It is probably safe to
forecast that the Arab–Israel problem, damaging as it is to our common interests,
need never in future be a source of Anglo-American friction.
(d) North Africa
10. We have in the past found ourselves trying to persuade the Americans to
temper their sympathy for local nationalism in North Africa with more
understanding of French difficulties. The advent of de Gaulle’s regime4 has reduced
the need for this. To some extent American strategic interest in their Moroccan and
Libyan bases has also acted as a brake. In the case of Libya, we carry the bulk of
political responsibility and a large share of the economic, although the strategic
interest is now predominantly American. This is a potential source of difference.
(e) Africa south of the Sahara
11. In Africa the Americans have come to respect our policies and to collaborate
increasingly with us. The danger of our falling apart is more distant; but it exists. The
present political developments in the French and Belgian territories suggest that
nearly all the African territories without substantial numbers of European settlers
will have reached independence within about ten years; the heat of the anti-colonial
movement will then inevitably be turned on to the remainder. To the extent to which
we find ourselves unable to adopt some particular policy which might appear liberal,
whether directly in East Africa or because of our association with the Central African
Federation, the Americans may come to regard us as no longer willing to collaborate
in achieving the U.S. aim in Africa—the creation of a solid pro-Western bloc of
states, or at least of stable and benevolently neutral countries which can stand up to
Communist blandishments. It is not that the Americans ignore our contribution to
ultimate stability and the value to native interests of a slower timetable and
continued association with the U.K. But the inborn tendency of Americans to
distrust colonial rule, and their desire to keep in with the Africans and Asians, may
lead to American pressure on us to be more flexible and to put what they consider
general Western interests before specifically U.K. ones. But such pressures on us will
be stronger from the new Commonwealth and elsewhere than from the U.S. The
remedies in the case of America are skilful presentation of our steady progress
towards agreed goals, and increasing collaboration with American organisations in
the field. The difficulties will be worse if we try to keep the Americans at arm’s
length.
Changes in the balance of power
12. Possible Anglo-American differences of the kind contemplated in paras 3–11
above would matter less if the U.K. remained an indispensable partner because of her
3 Meeting between British prime minister and President Eisenhower, 20 Mar 1957.
4 Gen Charles de Gaulle became president of the French Fifth Republic in 1958.
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world-wide power and because the Americans could find no alternative. But, in at
least three respects, this will not necessarily always be true.
(a) Partnership in Europe
13. With the growth of her army, Western Germany is rapidly becoming the
main military power in Western Europe. She is the main economic power already. If,
in addition, the U.S. found German policies more to their liking than those of the
U.K., Western Germany might not impossibly take our place as first ally in Europe.
Such a community of policy is quite likely. As the prospect of reunification recedes,
the political forces representing Catholic Capitalism are entrenching themselves
even more firmly in power; they are natural political allies for the U.S. Moreover,
granted the continued division of Germany, both the present and future West
German administrations are likely to cling even more closely than before to U.S.
involvement in their defence as their only means of security. They will therefore
probably take pains to make their policies acceptable to the Americans and to build
up a more extensive relationship of consultation and trust. We shall soon be rivalled
in this respect; if things go wrong, we could be supplanted.
14. The future development of the “Six” must also be taken into account. If polit-
ical and economic integration really goes ahead, this group could become a major
political power which would be a strong pull on the U.S. away from the U.K. This might
particularly be the case if the U.K. fails to reach an economic accommodation with the
E.E.C. (para 6 above). It is, in any case, becoming increasingly doubtful whether
Europe can continue to be organised as a distinct economic unit under the O.E.E.C.,
in which U.K. influence has been predominant. The authority of O.E.E.C. was badly
shaken by the break down of the Free Trade Area negotiations. The recent moves
towards convertibility will make it increasingly difficult to achieve further advances in
tariff and quota questions on a regional basis, while preferential or discriminatory
regional arrangements will become hard to reconcile with the universal GATT oblig-
ations in a convertible world. A further decline in the influence of the O.E.E.C. will
inevitably affect the U.K.’s standing in Europe.
(b) Partnership outside Europe
15. But a part at least of our present standing with the Americans derives from
the fact that we are a world power, in the sense that we can bring military strength to
bear in different parts of the world through our overseas bases, and are also
responsible for ruling colonial territories in important places. Our status as a world
power in this sense has dwindled during the past twelve years and will decrease
further as, of deliberate policy, yet more territories reach independence. If, for
instance, we were obliged to abandon our large base in Singapore, the value to the
Americans of our contribution to the Alliance in Asia and the Far East might be
sharply reduced. There is therefore a danger that our influence on American policy
will diminish with the extent of our territorial power, unless we can compensate for
this by increasing our standing as technical and political experts helping the U.S. to
build up independent and viable countries in Africa and Asia.
(c) Nuclear partnership
16. At present we have considerable standing with the Americans because, in
addition to our contributions to space research and other scientific and technological
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developments, we are the only other Western power to have developed a military
nuclear capacity. Both Governments desire to prolong this situation; the U.S.
Government are not at present prepared to give weapons or information to “fourth”
countries. But the situation is unlikely to be permanent. Even if the U.S. keep to
their present policy, other powers may, sooner or later, develop a nuclear capacity of
their own. Only a few could do so on such a scale as to rival the U.K. But, in terms of
resources, both France (certainly) and Western Germany (though there are serious
obstacles to be overcome) could do so, and, in terms of politics, probably will do so
one day. Moreover, without local manufacture, any state which is in the future given
nuclear weapons under its own control, will exercise correspondingly greater weight
in international affairs. There is already an unofficial school of thought in the U.S.A.
which favours a change of policy which would enable certain European NATO
countries to possess their own nuclear weapons though subject to some form of
NATO control. We cannot therefore be sure of holding our present unique position
indefinitely.
Positive factors
17. At the same time, there are positive factors which the U.K. should be able to
exploit.
(a) The first is our position as manufacturer, trader, banker and investor. At
present we are sharing with the U.S. the main burden of providing the means for
settling international debts and capital for under-developed countries. It would
greatly help to buttress our position in American eyes if we can maintain an
efficient and expanding economy, able to contribute its full share of capital to the
rest of the world, and to sustain sterling as one of the most important means of
international payment.
(b) The second is the steadfastness of the U.K.’s opposition to Communism. In
many ways this is the chief criterion by which the Americans judge other
countries; they look not just for a powerful ally, but also, and even more, for a
reliable partner. So long as the Americans continue to feel that our assets and
influence (even if they diminish) are firmly ranged beside theirs in the struggle
against Communist imperialism [sic] our special position in their eyes should be
maintainable.
(c) Thirdly, it would be quite unrealistic to assume that the other countries in the
Western camp which could supplant the U.K. in U.S. eyes will themselves make no
mistakes or will uniformly pursue policies which find favour in Washington. It
seems unhappily clear that General de Gaulle will do no such thing, and probable
that his successors (of whatever political colour) will follow his footsteps at least to
the extent of insisting upon the special position of France to the embarrassment of
the Americans. Nor is the docile cooperation of Western Germany a certainty for
all time. There is reason to expect that, provided that we can maintain a generally
steady course in international affairs, we shall still be “there” when other possible
close allies have disappointed the U.S. Administration of the day.
Conclusions
18. The analysis of the various dangers and difficulties with which this paper
begins, necessarily requires more argument than needed for the favourable factors.
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This does not mean that there are less reasons for confidence than for concern. It is
reasonable to conclude that, taking the possible risks of friction (paras 3–11) and the
factors which can be manipulated to our advantage (para 17), the position of the U.K.
vis-à-vis the U.S. will not be in great danger of deterioration during the next few
years. For while there are not a few possibilities of disagreement, it seems probable
that the basic steadiness of U.K. policy and the vagaries of our European allies will
continue to uphold our value as a reliable and trusted ally.
19. There is however another factor to be taken into account: the changes in the
balance of power described in paras 12–16. To what extent will these changes affect
our future influence and standing in the Anglo-American partnership?
20. It is probably true to say that what really counts in this partnership is our
general reliability as an ally in the struggle against Communism, and that, while it
may be true that we carry more weight in proportion to our ability to act as the
spokesman or leader of a larger group, it is our influence and knowledge of the world
outside Europe, especially in the Commonwealth, which has most value today in the
eyes of the Americans who no longer expect us to lead in Europe.
21. Another point in our favour is that, despite development of ICBM’s5 and
Polaris submarines, the U.S. will probably become increasingly dependent upon her
friends and allies. Not only will she be economically less self-sufficient and
consequentially more concerned with assistance for under-developed countries, but,
with Russia’s growing strength, she will not be able to afford to risk any serious
weakening of the Western alliance. The U.K. will certainly remain at the top of the
U.S. list of the inexpendables.
22. This in itself should ensure that, provided we remain economically strong
and politically reliable in their eyes, the U.S. will continue to maintain the practice
and machinery of Anglo-American interdependence or at least the habit of prior
discussion with us on all major issues. Moreover, the importance of our relations
with the U.S. should not deter us from standing up to them when we disagree with
them and have a good case—provided always that they have no cause to doubt the
firmness of our opposition to the Communist threat.
23. Even on the military side it is highly improbable that, at least in the next
decade, any other Western power could supplant us as the U.S.’ nuclear partner (para
16). But we shall have to work to keep our position and it may prove to be in our
interest to join with the U.S. in building up some new form of N.A.T.O. nuclear
association within which we could play a leading role.
24. At the same time it would be short-sighted to suppose that it will have no
effect on the Anglo-American partnership if our relations with Western Europe
deteriorate. Whereas we are probably now doing all we can to develop the 
Anglo-American relationship, there is certainly room for improvement in our
relations with Europe. We must expect to see the U.S. fostering closer relations with
the E.E.C. powers in proportion as their economic strength develops. A more
intimate association will probably grow up between the U.S. and Western Germany,
more especially if, as is quite possible, the Germans rather than the French emerge
as the natural leaders of the Six in Europe. We shall then be relatively less powerful,
some of the exclusive war and post-war links will have been weakened and the U.S.
5 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles.
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may be less inclined than at present to take account of U.K. interests, more
particularly if they felt that we were responsible for maintaining the split in Europe
and thus weakening N.A.T.O. solidarity (para 6). They will want to see us included in
any new political grouping in Europe and in the closest possible relations with the
Six.
25. But it is hard to draw any useful conclusions as to what steps might be taken
now to improve our relations with Europe in the interests of the Anglo-American
partnership. So much depends on the future of the E.E.C. and the extent to which
the supra-national element within it may develop. Nor is the American attitude to
such developments predictable. They may be obliged to face the dilemma of having to
choose between building on NATO or on a narrower European union. If we were led
to make unsuccessful attempts to thwart the Six, or if, on the contrary, we decided to
join them and found ourselves having to support them against the U.S., our position
vis-à-vis the Americans would be weakened. For the present, therefore, we would
probably be wise to concentrate on working with the Americans in Europe through
the medium of N.A.T.O., while seeking, through the Stockholm Group, to establish
an accommodation with the E.E.C. countries. We should not rule out the possibility
of some closer association with the Six, e.g. through a revivification of W.E.U.
26. In the light of these conclusions it is possible to list some of the policies and
practices which are calculated to preserve the Anglo-American partnership:
(i) Demonstration of reliability as an anti-Communist ally. This means that we
should be chary of policies e.g. of increasing trade and credits to the Communist
world which could, if taken too far, damage U.S. confidence in this respect.
(ii) Maintenance of an efficient and expanding economy. To this end we should (a)
Keep up the payments on loans to this country. (b) Abolish, as soon as possible,
discriminatory quantitative restrictions against dollar imports. (c) Move, as soon
as we can, to as free a regime of trade and payments as possible. (d) Avoid creating
new regional discriminatory arrangements mainly damaging to the U.S. (e) Keep
to internal economic policies compatible with these external ends.
(iii) Ability to meet the U.S.’ increasing expectation of contributions from her
Allies towards the task of assisting the under-developed countries. We must
therefore take a significant share in international aid operations of this kind.
(iv) Maintaining our reputation as the technical and political experts with
influence in and knowledge of the world outside Europe. We must cooperate
closely with the U.S. in building up independent, viable countries in Asia and
Africa (this could be seriously undermined if we fail to solve our problems in East
and Central Africa). We must retain the leadership of an expanding
Commonwealth; do all in our power to support India as the counter-attraction to
China in Asia; and maintain the closest possible relations with Canada, Australia
and New Zealand who will rely increasingly on the U.S. for their defence.
(v) In the field of defence and technology, we must, while maintaining the special
nuclear partnership, work harder to enhance our value in U.S. eyes through
contributions to technological research, outer space and other scientific projects.
(vi) Maintaining the quality and vastly increasing the quantity of the scientific
and technological expertise needed to fulfil our purpose under (iv) and (v) above.
At the moment, the high level of our scientific and technical thought is one of our
most considerable assets but every year we fall further behind the U.S. and
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U.S.S.R. in terms of scientists and engineers per head of population. Unless an
energetic effort is made to reverse this process we cannot continue to play the
major role in this sphere which today we still enjoy.
(vii) In our relations with Europe we must do nothing which would seem in
American eyes to lead to a weakening in European strength and self-sufficiency.
We cannot afford to be excluded permanently from any new European political
grouping. For the present, therefore, while not ruling out some closer association
with Europe, we should concentrate on strengthening European cohesion
through N.A.T.O. This requires not only a political effort; we must also be careful
not to fall behind in fulfilling our defence commitments to N.A.T.O.
27. To sum up. There are solid reasons for hoping for, and believing in, Anglo-
American cooperation, which, if maintained, would bring far greater benefits to this
country than could strictly be accounted for by our own direct contribution. Anglo-
American partnership is not a law of nature and we must work hard to preserve it.
But if we are steadfast in our opposition to Communism, maintain and improve the
expansion of our economy and trading position and continue to produce people of
the first quality in politics, science, industry and administration, the Americans will
continue to believe in our ability to remain an indispensable ally.
14 CO 1032/174, no 16 16 Oct 1959
CO comments on CRO draft memorandum, ‘The Commonwealth,
1960–1970’: letter from C G Eastwood to W A W Clark (CRO).
Minutes by P Selwyn, T B Williamson and A Emanuel [Extract]
[The CRO paper, document no 11, was thought contentious by the Working Party,
particularly because of the assertions in paras 31 & 32 which seemed to exaggerate both
the international value and economic importance of the Commonwealth. The CRO had
revised its paragraphs on India, but the Working Group still could not accept the paper in
its present form (FO 371/143707, no 72, minute by P E Ramsbotham, 22 Sept 1959). The
CO also had reservations.]
. . . Para. 23. . . . We ourselves would not expect that our relations with an
independent Sierra Leone would be as difficult as with Ghana in the early years of
independence, and we would be more inclined to equate Sierra Leone with Nigeria in
this respect (compare first sentence of para. 22). One cannot of course be sure, but
we would have thought that, unless we ask or expect Nigeria and Sierra Leone to do
unreasonable things on our behalf, they will remain more friendly and less neutral in
sentiment than Ghana.
In the latter part of this paragraph some reference to the dangers of economic
collapse in East Africa as a result of a too hurried “hand-over of the reins of
government to black majorities” might be appropriate.
Para. 24. The recent Conference on the future Constitution of the West Indies
Federation which has just been held in Trinidad was not a success. We feel that the
paragraph should be revised on the following lines:—
1 The paragraph numbers in this document have been amended so as to refer to the revised version of the
CRO paper, printed as document no 11.
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“Whether or not the Federation survives in the present form, The West Indies are likely
to confront us with the problem whether to grant fairly widespread financial assistance
to territories which have advanced politically to a point at which we no longer feel able
to deny them independence. If we face them with a choice between independence
coupled with destitution and continued dependence with subsidies, the outcome would
be unfortunate for U.K. political and economic interests, whichever the West Indies
were to choose. If they chose independence coupled with destitution their standard of
living would undoubtedly decline, probably to the accompaniment of industrial and
political troubles and/or they might become dependent upon aid from foreign sources
which would be bound to act unfavourably on the British connection. If they chose
dependence with subsidies the fact that it was their choice would not prevent a
gradually increasing tide of discontent and aggressive criticism of the U.K. attitude
which would damage our position politically. Furthermore this course would almost
certainly be increasingly expensive for us.
If we can bring ourselves to the point at which, perhaps in concert with the
Americans, other members of the Commonwealth and international organisations, we
can see our way to granting them economic aid after they attain independence their
relations with us should settle down to conditions of mutual respect and confidence
within a decade.”
Para. 28 (iv). As I have said above, there may be rather under 30 territories with a
population of not more than 10 millions.2 As regards the last sentence it is not a
question that “we may need, perhaps during the first half of the decade, to devise
new forms of government for multi-racial societies” but that we do need to and are
doing our best to do so with some urgency. I suggest that you should omit all this
sub-paragraph except the first sentence and that the last one should read, “It is
urgently necessary to try to devise new forms of government, etc.”
Para. 32. I have read with some surprise the statement that “we are earning
perhaps 10 or 15% a year on our original investments in the Commonwealth”. I dare
say it is true: it was news to me.
While it is probably historically true that the greater part of U.K. investments have
been in the Commonwealth and that investors in other regions (e.g. Latin America
and Egypt) have burnt their fingers, the value of U.K. investments in the United
States is greater than in any Commonwealth country except Australia and Canada,
and conversely a very important element in the investments of some Commonwealth
countries comes from outside, e.g. U.S. investments in Canada and the West Indies.
While U.K. investors in Latin America and Egypt have suffered losses, is it certainly
the case that investments in some Commonwealth countries (e.g. India, Pakistan,
Ghana, Ceylon) are any better secured than those in some countries outside, e.g.
Burma, Israel?
We wonder whether it is altogether true that, almost without exception,
Commonwealth countries take from the U.K. a higher proportion of their total
imports than do their foreign neighbours. If the non-Commonwealth countries are
members of some other trading system (e.g. the franc area) then this is clearly so,
but if such factors are not present, it is less evident. To take the Indian sub-continent
and the Middle East, for example, in 1958 imports from the U.K. as a proportion of
total imports were 20% in India, 18% in Pakistan and 24% in Ceylon. At the same
time they were 18% in Burma, 27% in Iraq and 17% in Jordan (all sterling area
2 ie, Under (rather then over) 30 territories still dependent in 1970.
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countries at the time), 13% in Iran, 12% in Israel, 17% in Lebanon and 11% in Syria.
It would appear from this that sterling area countries tend to buy more from the U.K.
than do non-sterling area countries, but not that Commonwealth countries tend to
buy more than non-Commonwealth countries. Commonwealth Membership seems
to be only one factor among many influencing the direction of trade; it will not
influence members to buy U.K. products which they do not want, and non-members
are not deterred from buying U.K. products if they are competitive.
Minutes on 14
. . . In general, this paper leaves me in a mixed frame of mind. I agree with a great
deal of it, but the authors seem to me to be guilty of some special pleading in their
attempt to show the importance of the Commonwealth connection,—at least in the
economic field. I have the following comments on the economic sections of the
paper. . . .
Paragraph 24. My own impression is that the paragraph is highly coloured, and I
agree with Mr. Galsworthy that the dangers are far less acute than the paper suggests.
The real question is less whether the wealthier West Indian islands could carry the
poorer ones. The issue is surely whether they will be willing to do so. That is, it is
more a political than an economic question.
Paragraph 28. I think that this analysis of the main economic threats to the
cohesion of the Commonwealth is mainly correct. I would add another. As sterling
becomes more and more convertible, so the advantages of being in the sterling area
become less for the dollar spenders (as opposed to the dollar earners.) Sterling
currently earned by non-residents is, I believe, already convertible into dollars, so
that access to the dollar pool by sterling area members is of no significance.
Paragraph 32. This seems to me to be the weakest section of the draft, making a
number of assertions without a great deal of evidence. Is it, for example, true that
Commonwealth countries tend to buy more from us than neighbouring non-
Commonwealth ones? If the non-Commonwealth countries are members of some
other trading system (e.g. the franc area) then this is clearly so. But if such factors
are not present, it is far from evident.
I think that it would be useful to have an objective study of the interests that the
U.K. and other Commonwealth members have in the maintenance of the
Commonwealth (e.g. the real value of Imperial Preference), and it is one of the
weaknesses of the CRO paper that it doesn’t really get to grips with this.
P.S.
25.8.59
I have little to add to the three foregoing minutes, with which broadly speaking (if I
may say so) I agree; though I must confess that I have had to look at these papers
very hurriedly.
On paragraph 28(ii) of the C.R.O. paper, I would agree most strongly that the
continuance of bilateral capital aid to the Commonwealth is important. Almost
equally important, perhaps, is the continuance of bilateral ‘technical assistance’,
because good (British) men can influence thinking and policy formation generally in
the countries to which they are supplied.
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As regards access to the London money market, I believe a decision is imminent
here in favour of allowing some of the Scandinavian countries to raise loans. But as
against this innovation (if it materialises), we have of course the new system of
Commonwealth assistance loans to the independent members of the
Commonwealth, and Exchequer loans to the Colonies.
On paragraph 28(iii), it is in our view vital to keep the U.K. market open to the
manufactured products of under-developed Commonwealth (including Colonial)
territories. The classic case is that of Hong Kong textiles. It is not much use offering
aid to under-developed countries if, at the same time, the industrialised countries
shut out their goods. The position on this matter was well summed up in an article
which I read earlier this year, which ran something like this—‘The whole future
balance of international manpower is likely to depend on one factor: on whether the
poorer nations can be offered the prospect of getting richer within the free world’s
economic and political system than they would within the Communist one. The
delusion of Western politicians is that, to achieve this prospect, the main problem is
going to be to lend these countries money; instead, it is going to be far more
important, and often far more awkward, to open markets to them.’
This may have been slightly over-stating the case, but essentially it is true.
I would like to add that I agree very much with paragraph 33. I am not a
sentimentalist; but there are imponderables which count. I am strengthened in this
view having attended the Commonwealth Trade and Economic Conference at
Montreal a year ago, and several other Commonwealth economic meetings.
T.B.W.
11.9.59
As regards para 10 the C.R.O. tend to think of all non-white Africa as tarred with the
same (black) brush & therefore to assume that each country which becomes
independent will follow the same path. They may of course be right, since who can
tell? But we think of Nigeria as probably being less struck by inferiority complexes
than Ghana & therefore more likely to be sensible (though inexperienced) in
international affairs. Sierra Leone may well be independent much earlier than 1970
and will begin in a much less emotional attitude than did Ghana. What the attitudes
of both Nigeria & S.L. will be towards the cold war & us will itself depend on the way
that ‘war’ develops & it seems rather far fetched to assume that conditions will be
exactly the same in 1970 as now. I would have thought that, unless we expect or ask
Nigeria & S.L. to do unreasonable things on our behalf they will remain more
friendly & less neutral in sentiment than Ghana. But it is anyone’s guess.
A.E.
28.9.59
15 CO 1032/171, no 88 20 Oct 1959
[Draft report on Future Policy Study]: minute by C Y Carstairs (CO)
to Sir H Poynton (CO)
. . . May I, at the risk of being academic and of butting in on a matter which is not my
official concern, voice some doubts which have been growing in my mind regarding
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this study? The idea of a radical review of what our policy should be over the next 10
years, with the object of using our relatively shrinking resources to the best
advantage, requires no justification; but it seems that such an enterprise, if it is to be
really useful, should start from the very beginning and not somewhere along the
road. I fear that the latter is what has been happening. The study is to begin, it seems,
with an elaborate analysis of our resources, and the resources and probable
intentions of other countries, and our policy is presumably to be deduced from and
follow on the implications of this preliminary analysis. But surely resources only
have meaning in relation to purposes, and unless these are clearly stated at the
beginning and the discussion of resources etc. related thereto, the study is to my
mind bound to lack cogency. Moreover, lacking a preliminary statement of purposes,
that is to say of our general policy, policy assumptions are bound to creep in to the
analysis itself and colour the implications to be drawn from it. We may therefore be
left with a policy seemingly derived from an objective recital of facts, but in fact
deriving from relatively unscrutinised and un-thought-out policy assumptions which
in fact govern the choice and the presentation of the facts themselves.
I have hitherto read the papers in vain for anything approaching a clear statement,
not shirking platitudes, of what the governing objectives of policy of a U.K.
Government must be. I now find one, however, in parenthetical form, in paragraph 3
of the “Outline of Part Two,” (FP(A) (59)2 of the 16th of October). This passage runs
“. . . what must always be the ultimate aims of the United Kingdom itself, viz. the
security of these islands from foreign domination or attack and the prosperity of the
British people”.1
I think that this statement has much to commend it, and further that something
on these lines should preface the study as a whole, and not come in as a subordinate
clause somewhere in the middle of the exercise. But I think it needs a bit of
elaboration and working out, and I suggest the following points to that end. First, I
think that the emphasis on the interests of the U.K. itself is healthy, and enables us to
cut away a lot of the humbug which bedevils much talk on overseas and particularly
on Commonwealth and Colonial policy, humbug which is apt to get into policy
pronouncements but not into commensurate action. It is surely clear that the first
duty of any U.K. Government must be to the people of the U.K. to whom, and to
whom alone, it is answerable; and if we build on that foundation, I think we build
solidly. I think, to put it briefly, that we are only likely effectively to discharge our
obligations to others, to the extent that we have any, if in so doing we also do our
duty by ourselves.
The quoted parenthetical passage is to my mind sound on this point, but
insufficient in its summary of what the aims of a U.K. Government should be.
Clearly, it must seek to safeguard the independence and prosperity of the U.K., but I
feel that in any statement of ultimate aims should figure also some statement
covering the liberties to which in my opinion the peoples of these islands attach as
much importance as they do to independence, and without which independence
would lack meaning, that is to say the rule of law, freedom under the law and the
Parliamentary system of government. It might be argued that this is not
fundamental, as compared with independence and security; against that I would
1 This became para 1 of part III: see document no 17.
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suggest that a considerable number of people in this island, whether or not the
majority I would not care to guess, would rate these matters at least as high as
independence and would regard independence otherwise than as a liberal and
democratic state as not being worth any ultimate sacrifice.
Earlier in this minute I have apprehended that these comments might be deemed
academic, but I do not think they are, since from our concept of ultimate aims would
derive, I think, conclusions of importance on how we should dispose of our
resources. As it is, I think that what we should like to see prevail in the world, purely
from the point of view of the interests of these islands, are, in equal priority, peace,
an international rule of law and brisk world trade, the latter requiring in its turn a
state of affairs in as many countries as possible conducive to lively economic
development.
I may be entirely deceiving myself, and it may be that more thorough study of the
papers than I have had the opportunity to give them would show that any valid points
I may have made have already been taken, but I have the feeling that if the study were
recast so as to put these principles, or platitudes, in the forefront we could then
arrive at a more logical and coherent analysis of the world forces working for and
against our interests, so defined, and of the best means of deploying our total
resources so as to influence affairs in the way we should like them to go.
16 CO 1032/172, nos 102 & 116 5–12 Nov 1959
[Draft report on Future Policy Study]: minutes by C Y Carstairs and
R J Vile (CO)
I am glad to see that the “ultimate aims” section has been expanded and brought up
from a parenthesis to the prominence of the introductory paragraph.1 I still have the
feeling that it should not be expressed so much as our “aims” as what, taking one
year with another, the people of this country will require of the Government of the
United Kingdom. From that point of view, I think allowance should be made for what
I can perhaps best describe as the desire of the people of this country to be able to
look themselves in the face. Rightly or wrongly, realistically or unrealistically, there
is at all times a strong section of opinion in this country which is uneasy at the
contemplation of opposition,2 unavoidable poverty etc., etc., in any part of the world
and it will only be happy if it feels that the Government of the day is doing what it
reasonably can to put an end to such things. This may or may not be sentimentality,
but I think it is there, and to make no allowance for it in any statement of aims of
Government policy is not being “realistic”, but being guilty of what I might call
inverted sentimentality. In terms of practical politics—a large section of opinion in
this country will never be easy if it feels that our liberty or prosperity depend directly
or indirectly on the servitude or poverty of others; and a policy which gives rise to
such feelings will for that reason not in the long run be capable of steady and
effective pursuit. . . .
1 See previous document.
2 ‘Oppression’ may be meant here.
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Paragraphs 10 to 12.3 In discussing the importance of the United States
partnership, it is well to bear in mind, as indeed is recognised in paragraph 12, that
in any alliance one is the leader and the other the led; and in this case quite
manifestly we are not the leader. This points to the desirability of not putting all our
eggs in one basket; the more other groups we are happily involved with, the less
wholly dependent we are on the United States and the more they must pay attention
to what we have to say. This is in some respects brought out in paragraph 16, sixth
sentence; but I think it needs bringing up to the forefront of the discussion of our
relationship with the United States.
. . . The argument in [para 19] and elsewhere that all alliances, groupings etc. are in a
way subsidiary to the Western European and through that to the relationship with
the United States, is most important, as is the clear statement at the end of the
paragraph that the Atlantic alliance ranks above the Commonwealth connection
(and, presumably, above our responsibilities to dependent territories). If this is the
considered view of the Working Party, it should, I think, be made even more explicit
and striking.
C. Y. G.
12.11.59
. . . 3. From the colonial point of view I think we possibly have a much greater
interest in the maintenance of the strength of sterling and the economic
development of the Commonwealth than we have in our ability to meet a number of
the military commitments which are described in the papers. I think I would go
further than this if pressed and say that from the broader United Kingdom point of
view I think it would still be wise to place more emphasis on economic development
than on the ability to meet military commitments. From the economic point of view
expenditure financed from United Kingdom funds will in large measure create assets
of lasting value, help to raise the standard of living of the colonial peoples and
encourage the growth of world trade. In other words there is I think likely to be an
appreciable economic gain of a direct nature to the United Kingdom in this way. On
the military side on the other hand it seems to me that the present papers bring out
to some extent the element of wishful thinking in much current military thought
and that in particular there has as yet been little attempt apart from the Ministry of
Defence paper to think at all carefully about the order of priority of our
commitments and in some cases about the actual nature of those commitments over
the next 10 years.
4. What I have just said may appear to be sweeping but I think I can justify it at
least to some extent by quoting a number of cases. I would like to start first in the
colonial field by looking at Singapore. There are references to the fact that we need
Gurkhas over the next 10 years to maintain internal security in Singapore. I know
that all of us are deeply influenced in our thinking about Singapore by the fact that it
takes nine major units fully deployed to deal with a major internal security crisis and
that we cannot produce that number of units without using Gurkhas. On the other
hand we can be certain that the present Singapore Government will attempt to
govern in such a way as never to create an internal security crisis of the first
3 These became paras 8–10 in the final version of part III.
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magnitude. If they are successful in this as I think we all hope they will be then in
4–5 years’ time we may well find that the internal security requirements of
Singapore will be assessed in a very different light indeed. In short therefore I think
that in this case there may well be an element of over-insurance from the military
point of view and if as I suggest this element of over-insurance exists in other cases
then the final picture of the total military forces likely to be required over the next 10
years may to some extent be inflated. I suggest too that in other cases a similar
concentration on purely military points may lead us to overlook other
considerations. To go outside the colonial field I take the case of Kuwait. Here we
have a commitment for military intervention, that as far as I can tell has no clear
positive policy. It is surely to be expected within the next 10 years that developments
in Kuwait will materially change the present dominance of the ruling family and that
it is likely to be in our interests to do everything we can to ensure that such change
comes about peaceably and to recognise that in any circumstances of internal crisis
in Kuwait (leaving aside the question of external aggression) military intervention on
our part might well in say 1964 or 1965 only serve to exasperate the situation to our
grave disadvantage. Mr Eastwood tells me that in the discussion of the paper on M.E.
oil considerable doubts were expressed about the feasibility of the Kuwait plans.
5. In the Ministry of Defence paper reference is made to the possibility that
limited wars in which we engage will be of limited duration measured in weeks. I
think you should know that the J.P.S. who originally fathered this conception
justified it by saying that either world opinion would effectively stop hostilities very
quickly or that we would go into a limited war with the intention of asking the U.N.
to take over at the earliest opportunity. The Chiefs of Staff have not signified their
agreement to this concept and the impression I got from their last discussion is that
they would find it very difficult to accept it as it now stands. I think they are probably
right. In certain cases we might well be able to count upon United Nations support
but in most cases I think we might well find ourselves condemned by the United
Nations.
6. The element of wishful thinking also appears in the discussion of over-flying
and staging rights. In essence I think the problem here lies in the fact that those
countries which have given us these rights will effectively only allow us to use them
so long as our policies are not offensive to them for any reason. This I think puts a
restriction on our freedom of action which is hard to define in advance.
7. Although I dislike the word co-ordination yet I think that to some extent the
reference to co-ordination contains at least part of the policy which for one reason or
another I think we have to pursue. Here again I should like to mention the economic
side of affairs as well as the military. It is I think now clear in broad terms that funds
for economic development can best be made available through international agencies
although this does not mean that national governments cannot usefully provide
funds of their own to their own dependent territories. I wonder whether the facts of
the situation are not much the same on the military side where if anything we are
less able to discharge our responsibilities than we are on the economic side. If we can
use organisations like the I.M.F. and the I.B.R.D. for economic development might it
not conceivably be very much in the U.K. interest to work for the creation of an
international defence agency to which member countries would subscribe as much
as they do for the I.M.F. and the I.B.R.D. and which would be able to give assistance
in the field of defence to member countries in exchange for firm and enforceable
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pledges about the use of those countries’ armed forces and their cooperation with
their neighbours. In making this suggestion I recognise that it involves a very
considerable change in military and political thinking and I would be the first to
recognise that there are many disadvantages in such an idea. On the other hand I am
more than convinced of the necessity from the United Kingdom point of view of
securing international action to deal with those world problems of direct interest to
us. I think the present papers show a high degree of vulnerability on the military
side, the likelihood that that vulnerability will increase over the next 10 years and the
need to secure something more settled and permanent than a continuation of the
shifting pattern of alliances which we have had hitherto. From the point of view of
our colonial and Commonwealth responsibilities over the next 10 years I think such
an idea might have a positive advantage of reducing the likely burden on us from our
Defence Agreements with Malaya, Nigeria and possibly Sierra Leone and if the
international defence agency really began to work it might relieve our fears of
external aggression in other parts of the world.
8. If I may sum up what has become a fairly lengthy minute the main points I
have tried to make are:—
(i) we need figures of likely resources and costs before any worth while
conclusions can be reached in relation to defence matters;
(ii) subject to that there seems good reason to suppose that we are still trying to
do rather too much;
(iii) we must be careful that in our assessment of all our likely military
commitments there is not some inflation of military requirements;
(iv) some order of priority among military commitments seems necessary;
(v) we cannot be safe through our own efforts and must work with other Nations;
(vi) the suggestion is made that instead of relying solely on existing military
alliances some kind of international action through a United Nations agency might
be contemplated.
R.J.V.
5.11.59
17 CAB 129/100, C (60)35 24 Feb 1960
‘Future Policy Study, 1960–1970’: Cabinet memorandum, report of
officials’ committee (chairman, Sir N Brook) [Extract]
[This major report, which was not at first released under the 30-year rule, was discussed
by the Cabinet on 23 and 25 Mar 1960—the Conclusions still have not been released. The
report was signed by: Sir N Brook (chairman), Lord Mountbatten of Burma (chief of UK
defence staff & chairman of COS Committee), Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles Lambe
(first sea lord and chief of naval staff, 1959–1960), F-M Sir F Festing (chief of the imperial
general staff), Marshal of the RAF Sir D Boyle (chief of air staff), Lord Plowden (chairman
of Atomic Energy Authority, 1954–1959), Sir R Makins (T), Sir F Hoyer Millar (FO), Sir A
Clutterbuck (CRO), Sir H Poynton (CO), and Sir R Powell (MoD to 1959, then permanent
secretary, BoT from 1960). The principal drafter, however, was Sir P Dean. In briefing the
foreign secretary about it, Dean stressed a number of points: (i) part II might seem over-
technical, but nothing like it had been undertaken before on this scale ‘to balance defence
and aid programmes against other claims on the future national product, and to analyse
the overseas component of public expenditure’ in the face of an aid burden which would
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continue to grow; (ii) Lord Hailsham had criticised the report for being too pessimistic
about the economic future, but Mr Heathcoat Amory had effectively disposed of that
criticism; on the other hand, Hailsham was right that they had not allowed for scientific
and technological progress over the next ten years, and ‘nobody would dispute . . . that a
much greater contribution will be required from science and technology and that only
H.M.G. can effectively obtain it’; (iii) the report stressed vigorously the importance of ‘one
comprehensive Atlantic community’, which was more important than the
Commonwealth politically and militarily—there was no room for sentiment, and ‘the
truth is that the Commonwealth is not and will never be a source of power in absolute
terms comparable with say the U.S.A. or possibly Western Europe’, but with luck and the
right policies it could ‘greatly increase the power and prestige of the UK; conversely if we
are unlucky or make bad mistakes we may find the Commonwealth more of a weakness
than an asset’; (iv) strategically, there was marked fragility in Asia and the Far East, and
we should discuss how the Americans and the Australians might help, while in the Middle
East there should be no interventions in force to stop communism or restore British
interests; ‘while we have now no alternative, we should work towards terminating our
political obligations in the Persian Gulf, if this can be done without causing too much
damage; and we should try to engage the Americans further in the defence of the area’
(FO 371/152133, no 45, minute 15 Mar 1960).]
Part I: The international setting
. . .
The Western camp
(A) The United States
7. The United States will continue to be the backbone of Western resistance to
Communism. But the Americans will become more rather than less dependent upon
the rest of the free world. As their economy expands and their indigenous natural
resources diminish, their imports and so their interest in the continued security of
the raw-material-producing countries will increase; though this will not have much
impact upon United States policies during the next 10 years. Even more important,
as the world-wide struggle continues, the United States will attach increasing
importance to the containment of Russia and China both for the sake of their own
security and because, more generally, they cannot afford to appear to be losing the
struggle for ideological and political mastery. It is therefore highly improbable that
the United States will deliberately adopt an isolationist or “Fortress America” policy.
Only the development of neutralist or third-force policies in Western Europe (see
paragraph 10 below) might cause the Americans to withdraw their troops and lose
interest in Europe, but even then they would maintain their interest and their
influence in other parts of the world.
8. As always, the United States will continue to look for allies who are strong and
stout-hearted opponents of Soviet ambitions. They will also expect their allies to do
more in promoting the development of backward countries. If disputes or tensions
force them to choose between their allies, they are likely to throw their weight
behind the ally for whom they have most respect as an actively powerful opponent of
Russian and Chinese expansionism, and as a large contributor to the joint aims of the
free world. The continued intimacy of Anglo–American co-operation will only be
possible provided that we can satisfy these conditions; in the last resort we must be
ready to use our available resources in support of American efforts to halt a forward
thrust by the Communist Powers. . . .
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(C) The Commonwealth
11. Some Commonwealth members do not regard themselves as part of the
Western Camp. But the Commonwealth may be considered in this context as an
entity both of particular value to the United Kingdom and contributing generally to
the stability and survival of the free world.
12. The importance of its role in both respects is difficult to assess. While the
Commonwealth would not survive if its ties were made definite and tangible, their
lack of definition makes their value largely imponderable. But the likely course of
events over the next 10 years may illuminate the nature of the Commonwealth in the
following respects:—
(a) It is not and with its present and prospective membership will certainly not
become a political or military unit. Indeed, as more colonial territories gain
independence or internal autonomy, the formal ties both political and military will
tend to become looser. Nor is there any likelihood of a united policy in the struggle
between the Sino-Soviet bloc and the free world. Some new members of the
Commonwealth as well, naturally, as the old, are likely to remain closely aligned
with the United Kingdom; for instance Malaya and Nigeria. But in Pakistan there is
a risk that the present régime might collapse and a period of instability ensue.
India, Ceylon and Ghana will follow a policy of non-alignment. If, however, Russia
and China adopt conspicuously aggressive policies a greater degree of
Commonwealth political and even military co-operation will be a possibility.
(b) The Commonwealth is likely to become less of an economic unit. We shall
probably maintain a high and increasing level of trade with members (although
imperial preferences are likely to continue to dwindle), and continued preferential
access to the London money market, the tie of healthy sterling and sizeable United
Kingdom contributions to economic development would help to keep the
Commonwealth together. But a Britain which is slipping backwards in relative
economic power cannot expect to increase her proportion of the trade of other
Commonwealth countries, and the next 10 years may see a decrease in this
proportion.
13. Those assets of the Commonwealth connexion which are capable of surviving
are perhaps the following:—
(a) Its continued existence can demonstrate to coloured and not least to colonial
peoples the possibility and advantage of an independent but close relationship with
white Western Powers. As the colonial character of the Commonwealth
increasingly disappears, it should be possible to achieve a more wide-spread
community of sentiment and fundamental approach to international problems.
(b) The Commonwealth will continue to provide an exceptional forum in which
advanced and backward countries can plan economic development on a basis of
equality and collaboration. This could be of real importance if India achieves a
measure of economic success and the Commonwealth connexion is seen to have
contributed to it.
(c) To be prosperous, the United Kingdom must continue to be a power with
world-wide economic, and so political, interests. The Commonwealth can
continue to be a useful instrument for maintaining this world-wide “presence”,
though as it loses its colonial character, its military character will also decrease.
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(d) Intimate co-operation with Canada, Australia and New Zealand is likely to
continue. The United Kingdom can expect to benefit from the economic expansion
of these countries.
(e) The combination of (a), (b) and (c) above will enhance our general political
standing and in particular our value as an ally in United States eyes.
14. These assets may be threatened in various ways over the next 10 years.
(a) By 1970 the Commonwealth will consist of 700 million coloured and 100
million white people, and the gap between their standards of living will have
steadily widened. This fact in itself will be a danger to the Commonwealth
connexion.
(b) Anti-colonial and racial disputes could destroy the value of the
Commonwealth relationship for coloured people. There is little the United
Kingdom can do to influence South African policy, which may lead to South Africa
leaving the Commonwealth. But the crux for the United Kingdom will be East and
Central Africa, where failure to solve the problems of multi-racial communities
could strain and even destroy the Commonwealth by directly involving the United
Kingdom in an irreconcilable division between white and coloured.
(c) The defence and economic interests of Canada, Australia and to a lesser extent,
New Zealand will involve them increasingly with the United States. If it ever came
about that any or all of these three had to choose between the United Kingdom and
the United States in an issue which vitally affected their security or prosperity, they
might well, albeit reluctantly, choose the latter. Aggressive Chinese expansionism
would accelerate such tendencies on the part of Australia and New Zealand.
(d) Any severe weakening of sterling or (as regards the new members) failure by
the United Kingdom to provide a reasonable contribution to their economic
development would have a damaging effect.
(e) India is very important. If India fails to make economic progress and falls apart
or is lost to Communism, all South and South-East Asia is likely to be effectively
lost to the West. If the worst comes to the worst and India leaves the
Commonwealth, many of the other new members are likely to go too. If, on the
other hand, India is reasonably successful, the outlook for Asia and the
Commonwealth will brighten.
15. Our relations with Eire will continue to be dominated by the issue of
partition, but no important changes seem probable.
16. To sum up, the future of the Commonwealth over the next 10 years will
depend chiefly upon the course of events in India, East and Central Africa and the
Union of South Africa, and the economic strength and policies of the United
Kingdom. If these go well, the Commonwealth can continue to contribute to the
maintenance of our position and to the stability of the free world. . . .
The confrontation of East and West
. . . (B) The uncommitted and backward countries
29. On the assumption that there is no general war and no major Russian
advance in Europe, the main struggle will be for influence and power in the
countries outside Europe. They vary immensely. But certain features are almost
universal.
07-ConGov-Doc 1-28-cp  18/10/00  2:03 pm  Page 90
[17] FUTURE POLICY STUDY (1960–1970) 91
(a) Most of the uncommitted countries and some of our allies are waiting to see
which side wins. They will die in no last ditches. They have little or no ingrained
attachment either to Marxist or, with certain exceptions (e.g., India and Israel), to
Western liberal ideas.
(b) Nearly all of them are in urgent need of capital for economic development and
they will accept it from any quarter without regard to political alignments. While
Western generosity will probably not by itself win new friends for the Western
camp, the lack of it may cause additions to the ranks of our enemies.
(c) The gap between the advanced countries of the West and the Soviet bloc, on
the one hand, and the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa on the other
will widen. This is not likely to be conducive to international political stability.
(d) The dominant political motive will continue to be national independence, and
great advantage will accrue in the next 10 years to the side which successfully
represents itself as its champion. This will cut both ways. Colonial Powers which
appear to be clinging to their remaining possessions, or which fail to solve their
multi-racial problems, will suffer; but if this can be avoided, the growing
awareness of peoples and Governments that Sino-Soviet imperialism is the real
threat to their independence should tell on our side.
(e) The trend away from parliamentary government is likely to continue.
Africa
30. The division between North and Tropical Africa will remain. In North Africa
events will chiefly depend upon the outcome of the Algerian War. If no solution
emerges, there will be a risk that rabid nationalism fomented from Russia will pose a
grave threat to the southern flank of NATO.
31. South of the Sahara, territories which are now colonies will have obtained
their independence, but are likely to remain separate States rather than to form closer
associations, pressure for greater unity being frustrated by local rivalries. African sen-
timent and (in many independent States such as Ghana and Guinea) practice are likely
for the main part to be neutralist. But Nigeria with its 35 million people will be a rel-
atively large and stable community within the Commonwealth, likely to exercise
increasing influence in our favour in the rest of Africa. It is, however, early days to pre-
dict the attitude of other territories which have not yet gained independence. Much
will depend on what happens in East and Central Africa where there is the complicat-
ing factor of the white settlers. The attainment of independence by countries else-
where in Africa will act as a spur to African nationalist aspirations in these areas. If we
are able to effect a peaceful and satisfactory settlement there, and if we and our friends
can produce enough capital to meet their needs, the uncommitted countries may well
remain friendly towards us. But if we fail in these two respects they are likely to offer
an easy prey to Russian blandishments. . . .
South-East Asia
34. The danger-points are the former Indo-Chinese States and Indonesia, which
for different reasons are highly vulnerable to Communist penetration, and
Singapore, a key position where future stability is uncertain. It is possible that the
United Kingdom will be able to retain bases there until 1970, but it would be unwise
to base policy for the end of the period upon this assumption. In other parts of the
area the struggle seems at present likely to take the form of prolonged economic
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competition rather than of sudden political shifts. The latter cannot however be
ruled out. In particular, while most Asians are firm neutralists, they will nevertheless
watch keenly for any sign of Western weakness. Their policy is made possible by the
existing balance of power; if it alters against us, defections will follow rapidly. Much
will also depend on what happens in India. . . .
Conclusions
41. Since there is no reason to believe that the period 1960–70 will be any more
predictable than previous decades, any forecast will certainly be mistaken in detail
and may well be so even in its whole approach. Certain elements of the above
section—those relating, for instance to population changes or industrial
development—rest on a reasonably solid base. Other parts are more controversial
and sometimes amount to little more than guesswork.
42. In general it is believed that the picture of the 1960s presented in this
section—one of military equilibrium in the struggle between the Sino-Soviet bloc
and the West, with the under-developed countries as a main area of economic and
ideological conflict—represents the least unlikely course of events in the
international scene. It cannot, however, be over-emphasised that this picture,
including the part to be taken in it by the United Kingdom, might be completely
falsified by some major and unforeseeable disturbance. The chief and most
devastating of these would be global war; for reasons given in this paper we do not
think that this will happen. There are other possibilities which, though less
devastating, could also radically change the whole picture and thus any
considerations of policy which may arise out of it. . . .
45. . . . Certain conclusions seem to emerge:—
(a) The struggle in all its aspects—military, political, ideological and economic—
between the free world and the Communist bloc is likely to intensify rather than
slacken. One of the main arenas will be the under-developed countries. The West
collectively may find it harder than before to contain the Russians and Chinese. It
is clear that the United Kingdom will need to make a substantial contribution.
(b) The gap between the advanced countries of the West and the Soviet bloc on the
one hand, and the under-developed countries of Asia and Africa on the other, will
widen. The West will face increasing pressure to devote a larger proportion of its
resources to helping close this gap.
(c) The United Kingdom’s relative power in the world will certainly decline,
though it does not follow that our status need necessarily do the same. The main
problems for United Kingdom policy are likely to be not so much how to defend
our interests by the use of our own resources, as how to do so by combining with
friends and allies.
(d) We may therefore before 1970 face difficult choices. As regards our own
resources, there will be a danger that by spreading them too thinly and too widely,
we may fail to preserve our most important interests. As regards friends and allies,
we may find that the centre of gravity of our international relationships has to
shift, to the extent that our links with one cannot be greatly strengthened except
at the expense of our links with another.
(e) The greatest problems in this context are posed by our relationships with the
United States, the Commonwealth and Western Europe.
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Part II: The resources of the United Kingdom
. . . 3. If the world conditions are reasonably favourable, the United Kingdom
should be able to take advantage of them. The national economy has recovered well
since the war. Our industrial and technological resources are stronger and better
attuned to world demand than for a very long time—perhaps even since the early
years of the century. The prospects for economic growth in the next decade provide a
fair expectation that the gross national product in 1970 will be significantly higher
than in 1959. There are internal risks as well as external—the United Kingdom can-
not claim to have solved the problem of combining full employment and rapid eco-
nomic growth with internal price stability. In order to earn our living as a relatively
smaller Power, subject to the danger that capital and skilled resources will be attracted
to the greater agglomerations of economic resources, we have to show greater adapt-
ability and readiness to change our traditional practices than in the past. It is reason-
able, however, to suppose that output per worker (i.e., productivity) will continue to
increase at about the same rate (2 per cent. per year) as in the post-war period.
The significance of sterling
4. Of all the major Powers, the United Kingdom has the most vulnerable
economy, because of the weakness of the external financial position—the legacy of
World War II. The gold reserves are less than one-third of the sterling liabilities to
other countries—precarious backing for an international currency that by its nature
must take the strain of political and financial pressures throughout the world.
5. Experience in the last 10 years has shown how vulnerable sterling is and how
damaging sterling crises are to the United Kingdom’s foreign policy and military
position. Moreover, sterling provides the currency reserves of the British, and
formerly British, countries of Africa and Asia, from Freetown to Singapore, and
weakness in sterling strikes directly at their financial and therefore their political
stability.
6. It follows that the United Kingdom’s first economic responsibility, and the
necessary condition for maintaining our place in the world, is to keep sterling
strong. This means keeping commitments within resources. If the future claims on
the economy are allowed to accumulate so that the prospective increases in
resources are already mortgaged in advance, there will be no margin available to
meet unforeseen needs or to cope with adverse changes in circumstances—which
are bound to happen some time in a ten-year period. Such overloading, whether it
creates expenditure inside or outside the country, always hits the external financial
position sooner or later.
7. Thus, in order to make the most effective economic contribution to the
defence of British interests and those of the free world, the Government must strike a
balance between the risks of doing too little, and those of doing too much and so
creating a situation in which all its purposes are frustrated and its international
influence and authority undermined by a further series of sterling crises. This does
not mean that the Government can never contemplate taking a deliberate risk: there
may be occasions on which it would be more dangerous to refrain from spending
than to spend. Nevertheless, we must constantly watch the state of the external
financial position and the course of the balance of payments; they are likely to forbid
any ambitious expansion of overseas spending and to limit internal spending too.
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B. The burden of support for security and foreign policy
8. The range of Government expenditures which contribute directly to the
support of the United Kingdom’s security and its overseas policies includes defence,
economic aid, diplomatic expenditure, the overseas information and cultural
services, civil defence, &c. They are listed in Appendix A.1
9. These expenditures—described subsequently as the “aggregate”—are
estimated to amount to about £1,750 millions in 1959. This is about 81⁄2 per cent. of
the gross national product at factor cost2—i.e., the national output of goods and
services of all kinds (some £21,000 millions). . . .
Part III: The main objectives of the UK’s overseas and strategic policy
A. Aims and standing of the UK
1. The ultimate aims of any Government in the United Kingdom must always
remain the security of these islands from foreign domination or attack, the
prosperity of the British people and the protection of our individual freedom and
liberty. The following paragraphs consider how best these aims may be safeguarded
over the next 10 years, in the light of the international situation depicted in Part I
and the estimate of the United Kingdom’s material resources in Part II.
2. In order to fulfil our ultimate aims we must strive-:—
(a) to play a full part in the free world’s efforts to counter the growing power of
the Sino-Soviet bloc;
(b) to maintain the strength of sterling and to further our trading interests
throughout the world;
(c) to preserve and strengthen the cohesion of the Commonwealth.
Whether we like it or not, our interests are inextricably linked with those of the
whole free world. We cannot hope to preserve them by our own independent action,
and we are much too important a part of the free world to be able to retreat into a
passive role like Sweden or Switzerland. Our duties and responsibilities will be very
different in the future from what they have been in the past, but they will be no less
onerous and no less demanding of our highest efforts.
3. By 1970, though our national economy will have expanded, our colonial
empire will have shrunk still further. The population and economic, political and
military power of the United States and the Soviet Union will grow faster than the
United Kingdom’s. If the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) consolidates itself
into an effective political unit it will dwarf the United Kingdom, and the United
Kingdom will be a small Power in comparison with the three giants—the United
States, the Soviet Union and E.E.C. (with the fourth giant, China, moving up fast).
4. But despite the contraction of our former strength and resources the United
Kingdom still has many of the responsibilities of a world Power; and our influence
need not shrink in proportion to our material strength. Provided that we live up to
our own highest standards, our resources will not lie in material things alone. Our
leadership of the Commonwealth, the progressive fulfilment of our Colonial
responsibilities, our special relationship with the United States, our European
1 Not printed.
2 Compared with 111⁄2 per cent for the USA (para 14).
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associations, the legacy of our Imperial past, the maturity of our political experience
outside Europe, our national quality of rising to an emergency and our reliability in
the defence of freedom and justice: all these can continue to justify for the United
Kingdom a leading position among the Powers and a higher place in their counsels
than our material assets alone would strictly warrant. . . .
B. World groups and forces
7. Our friends. There are three main groups or Powers with whom we must work
in concert if the interests of ourselves and of the Free World are to be preserved.
The United States
8. Our partnership with the United States is an existing source of power and is
capable of still further development. It is our first interest that it should remain as
close as possible. In many cases, the United States will be the only Power capable of
supporting our interests in the world outside Europe. We shall become increasingly
dependent on their support, as perhaps they will on ours, and our status in the world
will largely depend upon their readiness to treat us as their closest ally. They will be
the more ready to do this, if we play our full part in the international groups to which
we belong.
9. But Anglo-American partnership is not a law of nature. In the past we have
had sharp differences with the Americans over the Middle East and divergences over
Colonial policy. For the moment these have been largely resolved, but they could
again become acute so long as our interests are not identical and we have
commitments not shared by the Americans. Thus in the Middle East the United
Kingdom and the United States share common interests in resisting the Communist
threat and preserving oil supplies for the West, but the Americans are more
interested in the former than in the latter. And, although the Americans are now
showing a much better understanding of our Colonial problems, the day may come
when our responsibilities towards the white settlers in Africa may force us into
policies antipathetic to certain influential sections of United States opinion. . . .
Europe
. . . 13. It is impossible to be sure that Western Europe will continue along its
present path towards integration. Our tactics must, therefore, be adjusted to suit the
needs of the moment. But the development of the E.E.C. will confront the United
Kingdom with new problems:
(a) we shall have to adapt ourselves to the idea of living alongside a very powerful
West European group;
(b) though it may be inconvenient to us in the short term, the movement towards
West European unity foreshadowed in the E.E.C. is to our interest since it is the
best means of guarding against German neutralisation and a Russo-German
rapprochement, an eventual recurrence of Franco-German enmity, a resurgence
of German militarism or of Communism in Italy, and the disintegration of the
Atlantic Alliance;
(c) it would seriously weaken our own standing in the Commonwealth and in the
Atlantic Alliance and the cohesion of the Alliance itself if we found ourselves
excluded from Europe;
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(d) as a relatively small economic Power, we shall be increasingly vulnerable to
the economic and trade policies carried out by the E.E.C., and shall risk serious
damage if we fail to establish a satisfactory association with it;
(e) We cannot say whether we shall be able to negotiate a European agreement
that would give us the advantage of such association and minimise the risks of
damage. But we are most unlikely to be able to get such an agreement without
difficult concessions in agriculture and horticulture; we should probably have to
make concessions also in Commonwealth Preference (although this is now less
significant to our export trade than it was 20 years ago, it would still raise political
and economic difficulties with the Commonwealth).
The Commonwealth
14. The Commonwealth is neither a military entity nor a source of military
power comparable to America or Western Europe. But some members make small
but valuable contributions to the Free World’s defence alliances and it furnishes
bases of the highest strategic importance. Economically, though Commonwealth
Preference will be a wasting asset, Commonwealth countries will be important to us
because of the high proportion of our trade for which they account and the network
of trading and financial interests based on past associations and on sterling.
15. The Commonwealth association is a very important source of political
influence which buttresses our standing as a Power with world-wide interests. It can
make a valuable contribution to the problems arising out of the relationships
between advanced and backward countries and between different racial societies. But
the fact that it is a conglomeration of often disparate and occasionally incompatible
elements, each with its own interests and points of view, means that this influence
can rarely be applied directly with any precision. Indeed, politically it can sometimes
be more of an embarrassment than an asset. Nevertheless, this unique association of
independent nations undoubtedly contributes to world stability. We should lose
much, both in terms of direct economic interest and of wider political influences, if
the Commonwealth association were to disintegrate. Our exclusion from Europe
would probably lead to such disintegration or, at any rate, to a weakening of our
leadership.
16. The Commonwealth association assumes special importance in the
ideological and economic struggle for influence and power in the countries outside
Europe, with the opportunities it offers for the propagation of our ideas and ideals
and for intimate association with developing countries in Asia and Africa. It can help
to keep away from Communist clutches a very large part of the world’s population
which might otherwise be more vulnerable.
The balance between our friends
17. It will not always be easy to retain an equally close relationship with these
three different groupings. One basic rule of British policy is clear: we must never
allow ourselves to be put in a position where we have to make a final choice between
the United States and Europe. It would not be compatible with our vital interests to
reject either one or the other and the very fact that the choice was needed would
mean the destruction of the Atlantic Alliance. The continued cohesion of that
alliance, though not necessarily in its present form, is essential. We must therefore
work to ensure the continuation of the United States presence in Europe and the
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development of a wide economic and political community of interests embracing
both the United States and Western Europe. In so far as the United Kingdom can help
to keep Western Europe steady in the alliance we shall enhance our own standing in
American eyes.
18. This is the core of our policy and we must be prepared to adapt our plans
and actions to it. If we can uphold it successfully, our influence on the United
States will be considerable and we shall not need slavishly to follow their line,
though we should always consider their susceptibilities before making policy deci-
sions. In particular this is true where no essential interests of our own are
involved: for example, it might be inconsistent with this policy for us to press for
the admission of Communist China to the United Nations if we were doing so
against strong United States opposition. Even where essential interests are involved
we should never ignore the American point of view. Similarly, to secure our posi-
tion vis-à-vis Western Europe, as well as the United States, we must continue to
maintain our military contribution to NATO at a level acceptable to our Allies even
if this means a disagreeable strain on our military and economic resources. And we
must be prepared to adapt our traditional trading and domestic policies if, by fail-
ing to do so, we should run a serious risk of being isolated from the rest of
Western Europe.
19. All other alliances or groupings are to some extent subsidiary. Prima facie,
there is no reason why our responsibilities towards the Commonwealth should be
incompatible with our place in the Atlantic community. We should do all we can to
ensure that they are not and should try to guide the policies of our Atlantic Allies so
that they command the support of the rest of the free world and, in particular, carry
appeal for the uncommitted countries. But if such a clash of interests should arise
then we should never forget that the preservation of the Atlantic Alliance is, in the
last resort, the most basic of all our interests. . . .
The United Nations
26. The final major element in this world pattern is the United Nations. It has
been said in Part I that the Organisation is likely to grow in power over the next 10
years. It is unlikely to develop into an instrument either of Western or Soviet policy
but will remain largely uncommitted between the two. Irritating though we may find
its attitude on certain problems, we should remember that the Communists probably
find it equally unsatisfactory on other scores and that they, as well as the Americans,
will have to pay increasing attention to the voice of world opinion as expressed
through the United Nations and personified in the Secretary-General. We must be
prepared therefore to endure and answer ill-informed strictures on our colonial
policy, to work patiently for a proper appreciation of Communist imperialism and to
encourage the Organisation to participate more vigorously in those fields where we
feel it can do useful work (e.g., multilateral aid to the under-developed countries or
the scotching of minor wars before they become dangerous).
27. Our own position and influence within the United Nations will, to a large
extent, depend on our success in handling our colonial problems; on our record in
respect of the use of force; and on our attitude towards countries which are “black
sheep” in the United Nations. If we fail to maintain a good record in these respects,
we shall lose influence rapidly in the United Nations whatever other virtues we may
display. . . .
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C. Contribution of the UK: particular policies
Africa south of the Sahara
. . . 45. The general interests of the West will be to check Sino-Soviet infiltration,
to keep local Governments and populations on our side or, at least, benevolently
neutral, and to promote trade and economic prosperity.
46. Our own policy should be to foster the stability and freedom of the
independent countries, and to establish self-governing societies throughout Africa
on a basis which will ensure the maximum respect for personal liberties. In
territories with multi-racial communities the immediate problem is to reduce the
inter-racial tensions, since only when this has been done can there be progress to
self-government or full independence.
47. Our insistence that time is needed to allow integrated multi-racial societies
to develop in Eastern and Central Africa leads us into difficulties with impatient
African nationalists. This in turn may lead to a conflict with the general Western and
Commonwealth interest of ensuring that the new countries in Africa retain their
Western ties, or at least, remain benevolently neutral.
48. Over the next 10 years this area is going to present the West with one of their
greatest challenges which will impinge on us with particular force because of the
executive responsibilities which we shall still bear. The tempo of change is gathering
momentum and it may not be long before we find ourselves alone with Portugal and
Spain in retaining colonial territories in Africa. Pressures may well so build up that
we shall find it difficult to pursue the more orderly and less precipitate progress
towards independence which we judge to be desirable in East and Central Africa.
49. Claims on United Kingdom resources for defence and aid. Our defence
responsibilities in the area will be mainly limited to the protection of our remaining
colonial responsibilities. They will generally be met by local forces, reinforced from
the Strategic Reserves; but the theatre reserves based in Kenya may be called upon, if
not committed to their primary role of reinforcement of the Persian Gulf and
Arabian Peninsula. It is, however, conceivable that one of the recently established
Commonwealth Governments in the area could call on the United Kingdom for
military support in the face of a local threat to its territory.
50. The needs of the area for economic aid will, however, be great and, because of
our position as a colonial Power, many of them must be met by us. We are committed
to provide Commonwealth Assistance Loans to the independent Members of the
Commonwealth and Exchequer Loans to dependent territories. We shall also have to
finance schemes of technical assistance to Ghana and Nigeria and to provide grants
to dependent territories under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts and for
other purposes. In all we are likely to have to spend at least £24 millions to £28
millions a year during the period and there is likely to be pressure to increase this
figure.
The Middle East and North Africa
. . . 61. At present the United Kingdom is committed to the protection of the
Ruler of Kuwait and other Persian Gulf Sheikhs. It is quite certain that if we
withdrew this protection or showed our intention of so doing, the local rulers would
hasten to make the best terms they could with their larger neighbours. It would be
wrong to abandon them without making adequate provision for their protection (the
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Americans could certainly not take over the commitment) and to do so would
endanger our wider interest outlined above. However, any allied support for our
intervention in the area would be unlikely except in the improbable event of the Arab
countries combining to cut off the supply of oil. If it were not thought feasible to
intervene in Iraq or Iran we could in any case only protect a part of the supplies of
the Middle East oil and of our profits from them (annual profits from Kuwait amount
to £45 millions out of a total of about £100 millions for all Middle East oil). The
presence of our forces however also protects other potentially oil-rich areas
(especially Abu Dhabi.)
62. These commitments have disadvantages in themselves. For one thing our
position in the Persian Gulf is an obstacle to good relations with the rest of the Arab
world, and, to a lesser extent, with Iran. For another the need to retain supporting
military facilities may become a serious obstacle to the working out of our Colonial
policies in Aden and possibly also in Kenya.
63. While we have at present no alternative to maintaining our political
obligations to the Persian Gulf Rulers, and particularly to the Ruler of Kuwait, it
should be the object of our policy over the next ten years to create a situation in
which they can be terminated without undue damage to the security of our oil
supplies and the general political stability of the area. In view of the large American
interests in the area we should try to engage them further in its defence. In the
meantime, to prevent revolutionary pressures from building up, we should continue
to encourage the Persian Gulf rulers to modernise their régimes. . . .
68. [Claims on UK military resources.] If the function of the United Kingdom
forces in the Middle East is limited to the tasks set out above, the forces required are
not great. To meet the maximum commitment we are not likely to need
reinforcements of more than a total of two brigade groups, and the duration of any
intensive fighting, if it occurs at all, is likely to be weeks rather than months. If,
however, on our own or in association with allies, we are to be prepared to intervene
in a country in order to prevent it going Communist or to invade it because it had
taken some action very harmful to the United Kingdom the commitment could be
very large. We should have to be prepared not only to overcome the armed opposition
of the country itself, but also to remain there, holding it down by force, until a
Government which could preserve itself on its own had been established.
69. If our defence effort is to be kept within bounds, we believe that we must be
prepared to forgo the possibility of engaging in operations of this last kind. With the
exception of those and possibly intervention in the Levant, we believe that the United
Kingdom should, though trying to reduce her commitments, be prepared to discharge
the tasks which she does to-day in the Middle East on approximately the same scale
throughout the period. However desirable it may be to associate allies with us in any
action we may take, it is extremely unlikely that any of them either would or could sta-
tion land or air forces in the area permanently. It is probable that apart from countries
in the area itself (e.g., Turkey, Pakistan) only the United States will either wish or be
able to provide forces to meet specific emergencies. Even in the case of the United
States there will be both political and practical difficulties in deploying forces quickly,
certainly south of the air/sea barrier. We should retain our capacity to intervene alone
for the protection of Kuwait (and, conceivably, of other Persian Gulf sheikhdoms) but
should not plan on the assumption that we might engage alone in a war with any coun-
try in this area on a scale beyond that required for this. . . .
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Asia and the Far East
75. The United Kingdom has two particular interests of her own in the area:—
(a) . . .3 Short of that, our position is vulnerable to subversion and, on that
account, a garrison of eight units is needed there. Without the leased territories
the Colony is not viable: the lease expires in 1997 and we cannot hope to negotiate
an extension of it. Nor is there any prospect of our being able to transfer
sovereignty to an independent Hong Kong, or fit it into any eventual solution for
Formosa. We might in due course consider making a public declaration to the
effect that we would stay until 1997 and then withdraw altogether. But, in the
foreseeable future, such a declaration would be unwise. We should not even
prepare for any new move because this would destroy the confidence on which our
present position rests and might prejudice the outcome of any joint Anglo–United
States review of Western policy in the Far East. Our position in Hong Kong may be
expected to give us some influence over the Americans when they are ready to
reconsider their policy towards Communist China and Formosa. Meanwhile, we
have no choice but to remain in Hong Kong and should, without provoking the
Chinese, show that we intend to do so.
(b) Our colonial territories in the South-West Pacific cost us about £1 million a
year for little economic return. Strategically, their value is greater for Australia
and New Zealand than for us. In view of our moral responsibilities it may be
difficult to divest ourselves of this burden. We should, however, do all we can to
involve Australia and New Zealand in this area though, in the end, the people of
the territories concerned will have to decide their own future. . . .
78. In the Indian sub-continent more than in any other area the provision of
economic aid to under-developed territories will prove a heavy burden for us. Indian
needs, in particular, are enormous. The Indians are thinking of a Plan costing some
£7,500 millions, which would involve a foreign exchange deficit of some £1,875
millions, all of which would need to be met out of foreign assistance. On the present
pattern of lending we should have to provide £385 millions of this, or £75 millions
per annum if India’s needs were to be met in full.
79. This is too large a proportion of the total amount which we can make
available for economic aid. For the period 1960–63 it is calculated that our average
annual contribution may have to be between £35 millions and £55 millions. Pressure
for it to reach the higher figure will be great. This would account for between a third
and a quarter of all our economic aid. The question whether the United Kingdom
should devote so large a sum to India is difficult. There are other, smaller countries
to which a small proportion of this sum would mean a real economic advance and a
real promise of political stability. But the considerations of the importance of India,
outlined in Part I of this study, lead clearly to the conclusion that this is a sector on
which the West as a whole should concentrate over the next decade, and in which the
United Kingdom should play a large part, though not to the exclusion of all other
claims. As far as the rest of the sub-continent is concerned, Pakistan may need £5
millions per annum and Ceylon up to £3 millions.
85. [Claims on UK resources for defence.] . . . There is a danger that in future the
3 Sentence on Hong Kong (presumably), a little over two lines in length, removed from public view under
section 5(1) of Public Records Act.
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effort involved in maintaining our position in Singapore may be out of proportion to
our interests in doing so particularly if political developments in Singapore or
Malaya were to lead to serious restrictions on the full use of the base facilities. Before
the end of the decade we may have to abandon it as a base.
86. If this happens no substitute would be entirely satisfactory. To create a major
new United Kingdom base in Australia would be enormously expensive and, anyway,
it might be too far away. We might be able to maintain some defence effort in the Far
East by co-operating with the United States and the Commonwealth, developing
facilities in Australia and making greater use of Borneo. Such dispersion would
reduce our dependence on Singapore but might still leave a military and political
vacuum which the Americans and Australians would not be able to fill. The
development of a forward naval operating base at Addu Atoll in addition to the
existing airfield at Gan would go some way towards redeeming our military position.
87. It seems clear that it is in our interest (and in that of the West as a whole) to
stay in Singapore for as long as possible. If, however, it were desired for any reason to
disperse some of our forces now in Singapore to Borneo or Australia, this should be
done gradually since the employment that these forces give in Singapore is an
important reason for our being not unwelcome there. In general we should develop
close consultation with the Americans and Australians and discuss with them the
form which the Western political and military presence in South and South-East Asia
should take. But in doing so, we should make clear the radical difference which the
denial of facilities in Singapore would make to the Western position in the area as a
whole, unless our friends and allies can find a viable alternative. If Singapore were
lost altogether to us as a result of Communist expansion throughout South-East
Asia, including Malaya, the political consequences in the area would be such that our
whole position in the Far East should be reconsidered.
Latin America
. . . 91. We have a few minor commitments (e.g., British Honduras and British
Guiana) which involve no essential national interest, yield no significant economic
benefit and tend to act as an irritant in our relations with the Latin American
neighbours. The United Kingdom would gain if these territories could be brought
into the West Indian Federation and if Canada could take some responsibility for the
economic development of the territories of which it is composed.
Part IV: Conclusions and recommendations
. . . 6. . . . we must make what is seen to be a significant contribution to countering
the growing power of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Even though our reduced material
strength will mean that we must work mainly in combination with our friends and
allies, we shall still have an important role to play. By exerting the strongest
influence we can over our allies we can, in concert with them, maintain a better
status than we can hope to have on our own. The problem will be to maintain, and
improve, the effectiveness of the main groups in which we participate, especially the
Atlantic Community and the Commonwealth. There are important British interests
to be sustained throughout the world, but we may have to be more ready to
subordinate them to the general interests of the West in order to carry our friends
and allies with us.
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The United Kingdom’s foreign policy
7. Our material contribution to the Western effort will consist of two main
elements—defence and overseas aid—but its value will depend largely on our
external policies. Therefore, in considering the broad conclusions which stem from
the earlier parts of the paper, account should be taken of the following principles
which it is suggested should govern our foreign policy over the next decade.
8. The core of our foreign policy is and must remain the Atlantic Alliance.
Whatever happens, we must not find ourselves in the position of having to make a
final choice between the two sides of the Atlantic. For this, it is essential that the
American presence in Europe be maintained. We must continue and develop the
Anglo–American alliance, but must never allow ourselves to be excluded from
Europe. These twin objectives may face us with disagreeable political and economic
decisions, as, for example, over Communist China or our agricultural policy: we
must be prepared to take these in the interests of our basic requirements.
9. The value, and the problems, of the Commonwealth association have been
described in paragraphs 14–19 of Part III. The Commonwealth can continue to help
us in applying our policies in the rest of the world. But these advantages will
diminish unless we make a conscious effort to maintain them. It may not always be
easy to maintain the balance between the claims of the Commonwealth and of the
Atlantic Alliance.
10. In the New Commonwealth countries and in the rest of the free world our
policies should be governed by the overriding importance of countering the threat
from the Communist world. In Africa, the task will be made more difficult by the
problem of multi-racial relationships; in the Middle East, by the susceptibilities of
Arab nationalism. In South-East Asia and the Far East there will be the most direct
danger from the power and attractions of Soviet and Chinese Communism. But in
all these areas alike we must foster the stability and freedom of the independent
countries, and disengage so far as possible from their internal politics and from dis-
sensions between them. While not concerning ourselves unduly if the individual
countries find “undemocratic” solutions to their constitutional problems, we
should always encourage the sort of social reform which will remove the root
causes of discontent and instability. We should not press them unduly to declare
themselves as our allies: in many cases benevolent neutrality may be the best we
can hope for.
11. As for the Communist world, we must distinguish between aggressive
Communist ideology and Russian and Chinese nationalism. The former can best be
eroded away by exposure to another system which is shown to be equally successful
and more attractive: the latter must be met by the unity and strength of the West. We
should welcome a détente in Europe, but we must guard against its potentially
disruptive influence. We must not imagine that it will make our task easier in the
rest of the world. We must not let it inhibit us from doing what little we can to limit
the further consolidation of Russia’s domination of her Satellites in Europe or from
telling the uncommitted world what is happening in Eastern Europe.
The United Kingdom’s contribution
12. As our part of the Western effort to limit the power of the Sino-Soviet bloc we
must deploy our limited resources as efficiently as we can while at the same time
exerting the greatest possible influence on our allies. It will not always be easy to
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reconcile these two requirements. Some of the problems involved are discussed in
paragraphs 13–28 below.
Conclusions on defence
13. The main defence commitments of the United Kingdom at present are:—
(i) A strategic nuclear striking force and its defence.
(ii) A contribution to NATO forces.
(iii) A military presence in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia;
and a capability for reinforcement.
(iv) A number of small garrison commitments.
If all these commitments, and the plans for the Service Departments to meet
them, remain unchanged they will entail a Defence Budget rising from a little over
£1,600 millions in 1960–61 to about £1,800 millions in 1970 (calculated on present
prices and rates of pay).
14. Within the total of the Defence Budget, expenditure overseas cannot be
assessed in figures comparable to those given for overseas economic aid, because the
forces and their equipment are to a large extent mobile and can be sent where needed
from the central strategic reserve or transferred from one role or theatre to another.
For example, the cost of the deterrent and air defence in the United Kingdom is at
present about 20 per cent. of the total defence budget; but this takes no account of
the fact that both the bombers and the fighters can also be used for limited war
operations in overseas theatres. In most cases it is not possible to identify costs with
particular roles performed by the Services in one area or another.
15. Within the total defence programme over the next ten years there will be
problems of priority and choices to be made in the allocation of limited resources in
terms of money, manpower and scientific effort. The present study does not aim to
consider in detail what should be the size or nature of particular elements. But three
general principles emerge:—
(a) First, and most important, British influence in the Atlantic Community and
the cohesion of the Alliance as a whole will gain if the United Kingdom continues
to make a significant contribution both towards the Western strategic deterrent
and towards the Shield Forces of NATO.
(b) Secondly, forces will still be needed to safeguard the most important of the
British and Western interests outside Europe. There is not necessarily a conflict
between these two principles; the existence of our nuclear deterrent force is a
significant factor in the maintenance of our world-wide military position. But we
must ensure that a proper balance is struck between the cost of the strategic
nuclear deterrent and that of providing adequate and properly equipped forces as a
whole.
(c) Thirdly, the cost of introducing complex and expensive new weapons systems
should not generally be accepted, in any role, if they will only be effective for a
limited period. Long-term planning should take into account not only the
requirements of the next decade but also the resources (e.g., in scientific effort)
required for research and development into weapons and delivery systems likely to
be needed after 1970.
16. The following points are of special importance:—
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(a) The strategic nuclear deterrent.—Our purpose should be to maintain a
strategic nuclear force which is accepted by the Americans, and by the Alliance as a
whole, as a significant contribution to the Western deterrent. Without this, our
standing in the Alliance would suffer and we should lose a valuable means of
influencing American policy in the event of serious disagreement with them over
the importance of a particular Communist threat. This would not mean (except in
the view of one of those associated with this study) that we were aiming to provide
a force capable by itself of deterring Russia. Nevertheless, a United Kingdom
contribution, significant in American eyes, would also have significance for the
Russians.
The size and shape of our strategic nuclear deterrent during the next decade
should be determined on the following principles:—
(i) To retain our status in the Alliance, we must make a significant effort in the
field of the strategic nuclear deterrent.
(ii) To retain this status, it will not be enough simply to make a scientific
contribution, however outstanding. We must maintain a viable force in being,
under our ultimate control, which is sufficiently large to accomplish our
political purposes.
(iii) We should therefore maintain, at the least, the ability to provide British
warheads for whatever weapons systems may be adopted; but
(iv) We can accept that there may be periods during which our deterrent will
not be maintained at the strength which we are now about to achieve if that
strength could only be maintained by introducing costly new weapons systems
which would be effective only for a limited period. . . .
Conclusions on aid
17. It is at present estimated that by 1963 the United Kingdom will be giving
economic aid partly in grants, partly in loans, at the rate of between £170–£190
millions per annum. These figures are tentative. On the one hand they will need to be
reviewed from time to time in the light of the prospective load on the balance of
payments. On the other, although they include estimates of future requirements
which are not yet firm, there is no reason to believe that they are exhaustive. They
make no allowance for sudden changes in the political and economic scene which
might well bring for the United Kingdom new and pressing claims: on past
experience it would be surprising if no such changes took place. Moreover, and
perhaps most important of all, they implicitly assume a continuance of United States
effort at its present level and make no allowance for what might be required of the
United Kingdom if the level of United States aid were to decline. After 1963, the
prospect is even more obscure. But the effort required of the United Kingdom is
likely to increase still further, rather than diminish.
18. Three-quarters of this total (£130–£150 millions out of a total of £170–£190
millions) is expected to go to the Commonwealth. Colonial territories are a direct
responsibility of the United Kingdom. The independent Members of the
Commonwealth have a major claim upon our resources, not least because other
potential donors regard them as being largely our responsibility. This allocation of
our aid seems justified, but it is possible that over the decade changing
circumstances may make it desirable for us to give an increased proportion to
countries outside the Commonwealth.
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19. During the next ten years overseas aid will continue to be provided by the
United Kingdom for the Colonies on a bilateral basis. The same will apply to many of
the independent under-developed members of the Commonwealth, though there
may be occasions when it will be found appropriate for aid to them as to other
Commonwealth members to be channelled multilaterally, either through
international organisations or by consortium arrangements. It should be our aim to
adopt, so far as possible, arrangements of this latter kind for aid to foreign countries,
though occasionally bilateral aid will alone bring the full political advantage to the
United Kingdom. In general multilateral aid is most likely to bring forward the
maximum contribution from other countries. Further it reduces the economic risks
to ourselves by giving the best opening to our exports. Experience shows also that it
may be more acceptable to the recipients and thus politically more effective.
Balance in the allocation of resources
20. Broadly, there are three main elements in the resources allocated to defence
and overseas policies. In 1959 defence itself cost £1,550 millions (plus about £20
millions for home defence). Economic aid cost £131 millions. Diplomatic
information and cultural activities cost about £35 millions. All these claims are
complementary. Basically they all have the same object—that of keeping the free
world out of the Communist camp. All are charges on economic resources and on
our balance of payments. Given the fact that we have limited resources to devote to
the support of our security and foreign policy, they are in competition.
21. In this competition, diplomatic information and cultural expenditure has a
special place. It has an importance out of proportion to its size. But because it is
small, the main rivals for the allocation of resources are defence and economic aid.
22. In practice, this competition relates primarily to the world outside Europe.
Some form of strategic nuclear deterrent and our contribution to the forces of NATO
are essential on any reckoning. What is in question is the best way of making our
contribution to the general Western cause in the Middle East, in Africa and in Asia.
23. Economic aid has some particular arguments in its favour. First, we have
both political and humanitarian obligations to under-developed countries, and public
opinion is becoming increasingly inclined to accept this fact. Secondly, in contrast to
expenditure on defence, aid can bring us economic returns. On the other hand,
economic aid is a direct burden on the balance of payments. Some military
expenditure overseas is also a direct burden but it is more properly considered as part
of total defence expenditure, which imposes an indirect burden on the balance of
payments through its claims on the economy as a whole.
24. In practice no amount of economic aid will do our cause any good if
Communist arms are unopposed. For the West as a whole, defence must come first.
This has special implications for United Kingdom policy since we and, in a different
way, the Americans have widespread military commitments outside Europe which no
other Power can take over and which, if they were abandoned, would leave dangerous
vacuums. It is important that our allies should give us credit for our world-wide
effort.
25. It is difficult to determine at any given time the right balance between
defence and aid. There are no precise criteria for measuring the risk involved in
reducing one commitment or the advantages to be gained from increasing another.
The problem is long-term and global in character: it will rarely if ever pose itself in
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simple terms as, for instance, whether the presence of our troops is of more value to
Malaya than the help we give under the Colombo Plan. In order to determine
whether the present overall balance is about right, it is necessary to consider what
the effect of changing it would be. What would be the risks and advantages at stake in
switching a significant block of resources from defence to economic aid between now
and 1965?
26. Certain preliminary considerations stand out. For political and economic
reasons flexibility in our expenditure is limited. Changes would have to be made
gradually: for instance the sudden abandonment of any of our defence commitments
might start a chain reaction which we should not be able to check. Changes would
also have to be co-ordinated in advance with our allies; in certain cases we could only
afford to give up or reduce one of our commitments if someone else was prepared to
take it on. Nevertheless the possibility over a period of time of switching resources
from defence to economic aid without complete dislocation of our policies
undoubtedly exists. The question is whether it is right.
27. If such a switch were being considered it would be necessary to decide which
part of our defence effort should be cut. It can be argued that the raison d’etre for our
forces outside Europe is, in the last resort, less convincing than the case for the
strategic deterrent and our contribution to the NATO shield forces. In a sense our
military presence outside Europe is the residue of the large forces which we deployed
in those areas in the post-war decade and indeed of the pre-war period, when the
Indian Army was the mainstay of our defence in the Middle East and the Far East.
Part III of the Report has shown the risks inherent in our Far East position—Gurkha
manpower and the uncertain tenure of Singapore as a base. Whatever
representations we may make to them, Australia and New Zealand are unlikely to add
much to the small defence contribution they are making at present. The picture of
the future is perhaps less precarious in the Middle East, though taking into account,
for example, what has been said in Part III about the uncertain future in the Persian
Gulf, the capacity to fulfil our present commitments in that area cannot be
guaranteed.
28. But there is another side to this. There is an increasing need to maintain
mobile, self-contained units able rapidly to meet threats to British or Western
interests in any corner of the globe. Our presence in the Middle East and Asia and our
possession of a chain of bases means that we are specially qualified to provide such
forces. By doing so we support the Atlantic Alliance. Moreover, it seems hardly
feasible in practice that the Americans or any other member of the Alliance could,
even if they wished, relieve us of all these commitments during the next decade.
29. The previous paragraphs only touch on a complex problem. Even if the
balance between defence, aid and other overseas activities is rightly struck at a
particular time, the situation is always liable to change, either because the Sino-
Soviet bloc change the direction of their threats or because of some major
dislocation in the taut and over-extended framework of our own commitments. If we
are to hold a proper balance in the forward planning of resources allocated to these
purposes, the position should be kept under regular review.
General conclusions
30. Underlying all these problems of the size and nature of our contribution are
certain fundamental conclusions which have recurred constantly in the three Parts
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of this Report and apply to every façet of our policy. It is these which should
determine our actions over the next 10 years:—
(a) We must work increasingly with and through our friends and allies. Our
defence and overseas policies must be adapted to this concept.
(b) The core of our policy is the Atlantic Alliance. Our main task in the next
decade will be to maintain and make more intimate the association between North
America, the United Kingdom and the continental countries of Western Europe.
We must therefore work to ensure continuation of the United States presence in
Europe, effective co-operation between ourselves and the continental countries,
and the development of a wide economic and political community of interests
embracing both the United States and Western Europe.
(c) We must do all we can to strengthen the Commonwealth, which can be a
valuable instrument for maintaining our influence as a Power with world-wide
interests and for propagating our ideas and ideals, and can form a bridge between
the Western world and the developing countries of Asia and Africa.
(d) The main area of conflict will be the under-developed countries. To keep them
in the non-Communist world will call for a sustained and expensive effort of
economic aid and the complementary political, information and cultural activities.
The United Nations can be of positive assistance, but to ensure this will call for a
careful approach by the United Kingdom.
(e) All this aid could be wasted if it were not backed by an adequate defence effort
by the West.
(f ) The total burden on the United Kingdom is unlikely to get lighter. If we are to
maintain our present external policies we cannot expect to reduce the 81⁄2 per cent.
of the Gross National Product now devoted to defence, aid and other overseas
activities. Part II shows that—if the public can be brought to accept the
implications—the burden can be carried. In the light of Part III, the inescapable
conclusion is that it should.
(g) To lighten it as far as possible we must make the best use of our resources—
material, intellectual and scientific. Our effort must be selective, and we must rely more
heavily on interdependence with our allies if we are to make do with our limited means.
(h) The ability of the United Kingdom to play its full part in meeting the
commitments of the West over the next decade will largely depend on the co-
operation of our friends and allies. If they do not make comparable efforts, in
defence and aid, our prospects of carrying out our own programmes will be
jeopardised. Most of them are doing less than their fair share and we must aim to
make them realise this and do more.
(i) Our economy must be kept strong and in balance if the required effort is to be
maintained. This will call for restraint on the part of the public. If these are to be
accepted, the policies of Her Majesty’s Government will need to be presented in
such a way as to command the widest measure of understanding and support.
(j) The main problem is to keep the balance right between the competing claims,
domestic and external, on the national resources and, within the resources applied
to the support of external policy, between the claims for defence, for economic aid
and for other overseas expenditure.
(k) It is recommended that this Report and its conclusions, as finally approved,
should be kept under regular review.
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18 FO 371/152132, no 36 23 Mar 1960
“It’s later than you think!”: letter from Sir Gladwyn Jebb (Paris) to Sir
P Dean (FO), commenting on Future Policy Study 1960–1970 Report
Very many thanks for sending me a copy of your “Future Policy Study 1960–70”
which I found extremely interesting and (not surprisingly, given the signatures at the
end of it) admirably written and presented. I have only three points to make—one
large, two small—as follows:
On page 1, paragraph 2, you observe that: “The United States and the U. S. S. R.
will increase their already formidable lead over the rest of the world: the United
Kingdom and Western Europe will continue to grow, though more slowly . . .”.
Immediately below in paragraph 3 (b), however, you observe that the European
Economic Community will (alone, apparently) “if they continue to grow at their
recent pace . . . approach and perhaps reach the present United States level by 1970”.
Thus Western Europe as a whole will, it seems, be producing in 1970 more than the
United States produces now. Would you really maintain that Western Europe is going
to increase its production less rapidly than the U.S.A.?
Another point more or less arises out of this. The statistics you give in paragraph 6
show that the U.S. are likely to increase their population from 171 million in 1957 to
204 million in 1970. In the same table the equivalent increase in the population of
the European Economic Community is stated to be from 164 million in 179 million
only—i.e. not much more than half the rate of increase. Are you sure that these
statistics are correct? I have always been led to believe that in France, at any rate, the
birth-rate since the war has been very high and is likely to continue to be high. From
46 million now, I believe she will probably equal the population of Western Germany
in a few year’s [sic] time: and surely the birth-rate of Italy (at any rate Southern Italy)
is colossal? Over the whole area of the E.E.C. one would have thought, on the face of
it, that the birth-rate was no less impressive than that of America. Is it not therefore
more likely that the Six will number something like 200 million in 1970 and thus
become from the point of view of mere size almost the exact equivalent of America?
The larger point may be summarised as follows. If the Six do not cohere and if, for
instance, either France or Western Germany becomes a “rogue elephant”, the only
future that we can foresee for our Island is to become a sort of poor dependency of
America. If, on the other hand (as you hope) the Six make a success of it and in ten
year’s [sic] time become something like a federation, then it must be evident that
whatever our desires may be we shall in practice have to make some kind of “final
choice between the two sides of the Atlantic”. (See paragraph 8 on page 41). We can in
such circumstances, no doubt, if we concentrate on that end only, “continue and
develop the Anglo–American alliance” but I am afraid that there would be every chance
of our having to face the fact that in practice we should be “excluded from Europe”.
It may well be that this is not a choice which confronts us immediately, but I am
inclined to believe that it may, sooner than we think. It might therefore be quite
useful, if only as a study, to think out which alternative would have the fewer
disadvantages.1
1 Sir P Dean replied that it was too early to think of having to make ‘a final choice between two sides of the
Atlantic . . . and I think we can avoid such a choice’. He questioned whether the Six would ever be a
federation (5 Apr 1960).
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19 CAB 134/1353, AF 1(59) 14 Jan 1959
‘The next ten years in Africa’: minutes of Africa (Official) Committee
meeting to discuss procedure for study
[The meeting was chaired by B StJ Trend of the Cabinet Office. The principal members
were H T Bourdillon and C G Eastwood (CO) and W Hughes (BoT), but there were also
representatives of the Treasury, FO, MoD & CRO, together with W L Gorell Barnes, T C
Jerrom and A Emanuel (CO). They received memoranda submitted by MoD, FO, CO &
CRO. This document and the report have been extensively quoted in D J Morgan, Official
history of colonial development, vol 3 A reassessment of British aid policy, 1951–1965
(1980) pp. 85–90; and in R Ovendale, ‘Macmillan and the wind of change in Africa,
1957–1960’ Historical Journal vol XXXVIII (1995) pp 455–477.]
The Chairman said that it was important to be clear about the purpose of the study
on which the Committee was embarking of the situation in Africa over the next ten
years. The study had been generated by a view that Africa was likely to be the next
object of Soviet attack and influence in various forms, and that it was, therefore,
timely for the interests of the United Kingdom to be clarified, in consultation with
the United States, and for the means of defending these interests in the next ten years
to be decided upon. The conclusions of the Committee’s work might be regarded as
constituting a brief for discussions with the Americans in an attempt to secure an
agreed Western policy towards Africa over the next ten years.
In discussion, it was suggested that the Committee’s study would also serve the
purpose of enabling Departments to formulate the United Kingdom’s own policies—
for example, in regard to political advancement in the territories for which we were
directly responsible, and in regard to decisions about defence facilities—against a
background of a comprehensive policy for Africa generally.
While consultations with the Americans were clearly necessary, it was important
that we should not give the impression of allowing these to determine unduly our
future policy towards our own colonial territories. We should, therefore, have settled
our own proposals firmly before holding discussions with the Americans, but, as
regards East Africa for example, our proposals were at present only in a formative
stage; however, firm decisions would have to be taken, in relation to Tanganyika at
least, by about March and this made it desirable for the African background which
the Committee was setting out to paint to be completed before then.
In the light of this, it might be desirable to consult the Americans in two stages:
first, we should ascertain their views (and probably those of the French and the
Belgians) on what the future situation in Africa might be; and secondly, when we had
settled our own policy proposals, hold talks with them about future policies in Africa.
In any preliminary discussions with the Americans we could inform them that we
were not ready to discuss our policies for British territories but, nevertheless, we
might suitably discuss, for example, the future position in French, Belgian and
Portuguese territories in order to assist the formulation of our own policy. It should
be borne in mind that discussions with the Americans would also give us the
opportunity of influencing their thinking and this underlined the importance of
crystallising our own ideas in advance, even in regard to forecasts of the future
situation in Africa. The difference between formal consultations with the Americans
and regular diplomatic exchanges needed to be borne in mind: talks in Washington
between the Americans and the British and French Ambassadors were already in
prospect and would by mutual agreement be covering African questions.
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It would be important, before holding discussions with the Americans, to consult
independent Commonwealth countries in Africa: we were under constant pressure,
for example, from the Central African Federation to exchange with them our views
on the future of Africa.
In addition to consultations with the Americans, talks with the French would be
desirable for political reasons, although the French might not prove to be very
forthcoming. Discussions with the Belgians would also be desirable in spite of the
indications, at least until very recently, that it would be difficult to ascertain much
information about their future plans. Talks with the Portuguese were unlikely to
yield anything useful, but partly in view of the importance of some of the Portuguese
provinces in Africa to the interests of the Central African Federation, we should be
seen to hold discussions with them also.
Summarising the discussion up to this point the Chairman said that it must be
assumed that, subject to the views of Ministers, we should have to consult various
foreign Governments at a suitable stage; further consideration would have to be
given later to the precise line we should take in such consultation.
The Committee then turned to a consideration of the United Kingdom’s inter-
ests in the African continent which, for the immediate purposes of the study, it
was agreed should be regarded as excluding the Mediterranean littoral. These
interests could be divided into three broad groups, namely, political, strategic and
economic.
(i) Political interests
In discussion of the United Kingdom’s political interests, it was suggested that these
might be defined as the maintenance of stability and of a pro-Western outlook in
African territories. It was probable however that over a large part of the continent a
pro-Western outlook would be too much to hope for and we might have to accept
neutrality of the kind now practised by India. The ultimate outcome would be
different in different territories, as it now was between India and Pakistan on the
Indian subcontinent, and our aim should be to secure the maximum pro-Western
sentiment that was possible. This led to the question whether our interests would
best be served by the retention of control in the dependent territories or by
withdrawing control; this was a matter which needed separate consideration in
respect of each territory. It should not, however, be assumed that a withdrawal of
control from the dependent territories would necessarily be the best way of ensuring
a pro-Western or politically neutral Africa; in East Africa, in particular, where there
was as yet no reasonably educated middle class, withdrawal would lead to
administrative chaos and a dangerous vacuum which would open the way to anti-
Western influences—the repercussions in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would
also be very serious. On the other hand, it had to be recognised that control of the
dependent territories could not be retained indefinitely; our aim should rather be to
stay long enough in each case to build up an adequately educated middle class
capable of administering the territory after independence, and to promote measures
such as the reform of land tenure. If we could demonstrate that this was our aim, the
period before control was relinquished and during which anti-Western infiltration
could be prevented would be likely to be longer, with the result that the final
outcome would be more in accord with our general political interests than would
otherwise have been the case.
In this part of the discussion the following additional main points were made:—
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(a) The building up of a middle class in African territories might not prove to be
the best insurance against a spread of anti-Western influence; the acquisition of
the rudiments of education could assist the spread of hostile propaganda. In Ghana
the existence of an educated middle class had not prevented the growth of
authoritarian Government. On the other hand, other newly independent states
might not develop in the same way as had Ghana, and in any case it could be held
that authoritarian Government was preferable to administrative chaos.
(b) It was suggested that in those areas where there was a European settler
population the United Kingdom could not lightly consider withdrawal of control,
particularly in the light of the encouragement given in the past to those settlers to
establish themselves there. On the other hand, in East Africa the European
population was too small relatively to the African for it to be likely that a
satisfactory multi-racial form of Government could be maintained over a long
period.
(ii) Strategic interests
In discussion of the United Kingdom’s strategic interests in Africa it was suggested
that if, as the Committee’s earlier discussion showed was possible, a tropical Africa
emerged which was to a great extent neutralist, the United Kingdom might be unable
to maintain its present defence rights and facilities there. The question therefore
arose of how essential it was that these rights and facilities should be preserved.
Mr. Wright1 said that the United Kingdom’s strategic interests in Africa were set
out in A.F. (59) 1 and principally comprised the stationing of the strategic reserve in
Kenya and the possession of over-flying and staging rights in certain territories. The
need to retain the strategic reserve in Kenya depended wholly, and that of over-flying
and staging rights partly, on the extent to which the United Kingdom would in the
long term be prepared to safeguard its oil supplies in the Persian Gulf by the use of
force; this matter was currently under consideration at a high level. It was his
personal view that, provided suitable control of Aden were retained, it would
probably be possible to meet our requirements in the Persian Gulf and to safeguard
our interests in the Far East by other means; to do so would, however, be extremely
expensive. The important thing was to be able to plan on a long term basis; the
Committee’s study would be particularly valuable in this respect.
In this part of the discussion the following further main points were made:—
(c) Pending a final decision by Ministers, the Committee should proceed on the
assumption that for the foreseeable future the United Kingdom would continue to
be prepared to use force, in the last resort, in defence of its oil interests in the
Persian Gulf. It must be recognised, however, that this might make it difficult to
retain defence facilities in pro-Arab parts of tropical Africa.
(d) The United Kingdom’s defence requirements would be best met by a pro-
Western Africa; this would be the ideal outcome. But in aiming at this ideal we
might in the event lose the opportunity of securing the least satisfactory solution
that was acceptable from a defence point of view. It was for consideration,
therefore, region by region, whether it would not be wiser to adopt in the first
place political aims which would ensure that our minimum strategic requirements
were met, rather than to risk losing all by aiming too high.
1 C W Wright, assistant secretary, MoD, since 1951.
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(iii) Economic interests
It was felt that while substitutes or alternative sources of supply might be avail-
able for some of the raw materials produced in Africa, there was little doubt of the
permanent importance of Africa as a market and of the continuation of an African
desire to trade with the West whatever the political future. Our economic objec-
tives would be met if success were achieved in ensuring stability in Africa and in
preventing a pro-Russian attitude from developing. It was likely that the pressure
for capital assistance from the West would increase, especially after independence,
if only because such assistance would be offered from other sources. Although the
example of India might be misleading in this respect, African politicians were
bound to profess to favour economic development, partly as a result of their asso-
ciation with China through Afro-Asian conferences, and the United Kingdom’s
attitude to such requests for help would colour the African views of our political
ends.
On the other hand, withdrawal of European administrators was likely to limit the
capacity of African countries to absorb capital on a grand scale. [Although they
should look at Africa] as a whole the Committee should base their consideration of
the problem upon the different interests involved, in relation to particular areas; by
this means it would be found whether, for example, our political and strategic
interests were in conflict in regard to any territory. For example, the time might
come when the United Kingdom should support political groupings which fell short
of those which we should regard as ideal, in order to prevent a much worse outcome;
in such a case economic or strategic interests might to some extent have to be
sacrificed in the interests of preserving political stability. In a territorial approach it
would, however, remain necessary to bear in mind the likelihood that the situation in
one territory would in some respects often be inter-related with that in others;
staging rights at Kano would, for example, be of little value if no over-flying rights
were accorded by other territories.
The Chairman, summarising the discussion, said that it would be useful at the
next meeting to consider the outlook in a particular region of Africa, though the
effects in any one region of the various cross-currents—such as Islam, pan-
Africanism and racial questions—would have to be taken into account. West Africa
seemed the most appropriate region for discussion first. The papers already before
the Committee would provide most of the material needed, but it would be useful if
the Foreign Office were to circulate a more detailed paper on the future of the
French and Belgian territories insofar as this affected the West African problem. It
would be appropriate for the Committee to meet weekly for the present, and at their
meeting after next the problems of the Central African region could with advantage
be discussed. There was a gap in the papers before the Committee relating to the
economic considerations which might affect our African policies, and the Board of
Trade should prepare a memorandum on this subject, looking forward to the next
five and ten years. As far as possible this should cover all African territories, and it
would no doubt have to make certain assumptions relating, for example, to the
political future of the French territories and to the development of the European
Common Market. . . .2
2 The Committee held further regular meetings, the ninth being on 9 April 1959.
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20 FO 371/137972, no 24 June 1959
‘Africa in the next ten years’: report (FO print) of committee of
officials (chairman, B StJ Trend), AF (59) 28 [Extract]
[This report occupied 30 printed pages of foolscap. The historical section (i) and the
‘current influences’ (ii) are both omitted here. The latter included: pan-Africanism,
European racialism, Soviet penetration, Islam and the UAR, social and economic change.
In sections (iii) and (iv) detailed analysis of foreign territories is omitted. The conclusions
(v) are printed in full.]
1. The purpose of this report is to survey the African scene over the next ten years—
not in order to make detailed recommendations on individual problems but rather in
order to provide a framework within which we can discuss with our Commonwealth
friends and with our allies, the policy which the West should adopt towards the rapid
march of events in the African continent. It is limited to Africa south of the Sahara,
since the Mediterranean littoral is a geographically separate area and its problems are
rather different; but it can, if necessary, be made the subject of a separate enquiry.
2. The report is divided into five sections:—
III. A brief historical introduction.
III. A survey of the influences currently at work in tropical Africa.
III. A forecast, in general terms, of the probable outcome of these influences during the
next ten years, i.e., a rough picture of Africa South of the Sahara in 1970.
IV. An attempt to define both the interests of the West in Africa and the problems with
which the continent confronts the European Powers, particularly the United
Kingdom; and to suggest possible means by which the Western position in Africa
might be safeguarded during the next ten years.
IV. A conclusion summarising the main considerations which emerge from the survey.
Part III.—The next ten years
42. In this section of our report we attempt to forecast the manner in which
Africa south of the Sahara may react over the next 10 years to the various influ-
ences which we have outlined in Part II. Any attempt to peer into the future is
bound to be speculative; and in the case of Africa it is particularly so for a variety of
reasons. In the first place the African peoples have little in the way of common his-
tory; and they have no significant inheritance of shared culture or religion. In other
areas of the world where the Western Powers have transferred sovereignty to the
native population—e.g., in India and the Far Eastern territories—the political
immaturity of the new society has been to some extent compensated by the fact
that the peoples have an indigenous culture of their own, with roots stretching far
back into the past. They have inherited a tradition of social organisation, even if
they have had little experience of political unity. In most of tropical Africa this ele-
ment of stability is lacking; and in transferring sovereignty to the local inhabitants
the West will in many cases be surrendering power to peoples who are not far
removed from primitive savagery. Moreover, the outstanding personalities are few
and disproportionately important; and much will depend on what happens to a
handful of key men—Dr. Nkrumah in Ghana;1 Abubakar, the Prime Minister of
1 Kwame Nkrumah, founder and leader of the Convention People’s Party in the Gold Coast, first prime
minister of Ghana, 1957–1960; president, 1960–1966.
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Nigeria;2 M. Houphouet-Boigny in the Ivory Coast;3 and half a dozen more. If these
few men were to disappear from the African scene, the whole future of the conti-
nent would be affected. It is considerations of this kind which make it particularly
difficult to predict with any confidence the future of Africa in 10 years’ time.
43. With these reservations, however, we would hazard the following forecast of
the political pattern in Africa as it may emerge during the next decade. For
convenience we have divided the territories concerned into two main areas—first,
the predominantly black area north of the Congo, extending from Senegal in the
west to the Somali territories in the east; second, the area south of the Congo which
is, and is likely to remain during the next 10 years, an area of multi-racial societies
dominated, though to a decreasing extent, by the European element.
(a) North of the Congo
44. Looking 10 years ahead, we believe that we can discern in this area an
emerging patchwork of independent or semi-independent States, the principal
exceptions being relatively unimportant—Portuguese Guinea, the Spanish
Possessions and, possibly, French Somaliland. And even these are likely to be under
pressure by 1970. Most of the French African territories may have reached
independence within some form of association with France. They may have
established some kind of federal link between themselves; and, if so, they will
probably have constituted two main federal groups, comprising some (though not
all) of the territories of French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa respectively.
The tendency towards federation is likely to be encouraged by the legacy of French
administrative practice, which has established “capitals” at Dakar and Brazzaville,
and by the fact that the organisation of the native political parties and Trades Unions
transcends the frontiers. It would also be more in conformity with natural economic
alignments, which are distorted by the present artificial territorial frontiers. But
economic and other forces will not be wholly in favour of federation. Rich territories
such as the Ivory Coast and Gabon dislike sharing their wealth with poorer areas.
Thus, the Federation of Mali, which was originally intended to include four
Republics, has now been reduced to two (Senegal and Soudan)—Dahomey and
Upper Volta having yielded to economic and political pressure from the Ivory Coast
and to the fear by the Christian ruling class of the two Muslim partners. This episode
admirably illustrates the cross-currents of nationalism and sentiment through which
Pan-Africanism will have to steer its course.
45. In Sierra Leone all the political parties are pledged to independence as their
ultimate aim; and in the light of recent developments elsewhere in West Africa,
particularly in the French territories, it seems likely that the United Kingdom will be
asked, in 1960, to name a date for full independence not later than 1963. Hitherto the
Government of Sierra Leone have maintained a fairly non-commital attitude towards
Ghana and Guinea; but, if their request for independence is granted, the Colony may
enter into some form of association with the neighbouring territories during the
decade.
46. The Gambia provides one of the more striking examples of territorial
anomaly in Africa. The Protectorate is a thin strip of land, no more than 20 miles
2 Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, first federal prime minister of Nigeria, 1957–1966 (died).
3 Felix Houphouët-Boigny, first president of the Ivory Coast from 1960 for more than 30 years.
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wide at its maximum breadth, extending for some 180 miles inland on both sides of
the river. The result is to hinder the efficient use of the only important river in the
area, to make it impossible to develop the only good natural harbour, to create a
small enclave of territory which can only with difficulty sustain an economic
existence and to maintain an artificial barrier between peoples of the same race.
Hitherto, however, the Protectorate has shown a considerable sentiment of loyalty to
the United Kingdom; and since from every point of view—social, constitutional and
economic—it is a backward and impoverished country, its real interest may lie in
maintaining the British connexion for as long as possible. On the other hand, it is
wholly surrounded by Senegal; and Senegal is now governed by Africans themselves.
The Prime Minister of Senegal has already spoken in public—albeit in moderate
terms—of the possibility of establishing “Senegambia”; and although the economic
interests of the two countries do not entirely coincide, we must recognise that some
form of closer association between them will become increasingly probable.
47. In Ghana it seems probable that the present political system will be
maintained, a semi-authoritarian control being enforced by a “democratic” party
under the leadership of some dominant personality (possibly still Dr. Nkrumah); and
that the Government will continue to ensure that the Opposition is demoralised and
that the tribal chiefs are eliminated, except for ceremonial purposes. Ghana should
therefore be capable of maintaining internal political stability, for as far ahead as one
can reasonably foresee, by a continuation of the present methods of administration.
Her relations with her neighbours, however, will probably involve new forms of
association; and the results are not easy to predict. It is unlikely, on balance, that the
association of Ghana and Guinea will mature into a federation in the conventional
sense; but it may form the basis of a wider and looser grouping of several states with
little or no real merging of sovereignty. We are perhaps on surer ground in
forecasting that, although Ghana is likely to remain a member of the
Commonwealth, she will probably become a Republic at some point in the next five
years; and that the forthcoming exchange of formal diplomatic representatives with
the Soviet Union will not prevent her from suppressing internal Communist cells as
a threat to the régime.
48. By 1965 Nigeria will have had five years of independence. Regional
patriotism will still remain strong, but with the passage of years the sentiment of
Nigerian unity will probably have grown. The Federation will have held together; and
the conservative North will probably be playing the major part in the Federal
Government, although it may have had to ally itself with the leading party from one
of the other Regions. Although authoritarian tendencies may have increased in the
Regions, it will probably be necessary to maintain a coalition at the Centre; and this
may ensure the continuance there of parliamentary government. There is little or no
evidence at present to suggest that Nigeria wishes to become a Republic; and this is
unlikely to happen during the first half of the decade. On attaining independence she
will have signed a defence agreement with the United Kingdom; and, if we have
played our cards well, she will still, in 1965, be a fully co-operative member of the
Commonwealth, although much will depend on our policy in East and Central
Africa. Preoccupation with her own internal problems may at first reduce her
influence outside her own frontiers; but by virtue of her size and position she should
be beginning to play a leading part in the affairs of tropical Africa. By 1970 it is
conceivable that she may have become a Republic, although—we repeat—there is
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no present evidence of such an intention. In addition, the aristocratic party may no
longer be dominant in the North (and hence in the Federation) but may have had to
give way to a more “advanced” party, a development which may affect to some extent
Nigeria’s attitude to external affairs. But—again if we have played our cards well—
she should still be a loyal member of the Commonwealth. Moreover, the country
should be wealthier, particularly if oil resources prove to be large. In addition, the
sentiment of unity should have grown stronger; and, being less preoccupied with her
own problems, Nigeria should be able to exert a greater influence outside her own
borders. In any event she is likely, throughout the decade, to be deeply concerned by,
and opposed to, the designs of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic. . . .
50. Further to the east, European influence is also likely to have diminished by
1970 in the Sudan and the Horn of Africa. The Sudan has become more aware of its
African connexions since it achieved independence. Its future depends essentially on
whether the standards of administration can be maintained and the economy can be
developed sufficiently rapidly. The future alignment of the Sudan should not be
unfavourable to the West, provided that economic assistance can be provided and
used in such a way as to diversify Sudanese production. The Sudan, probably under
military Governments, will play a fairly important part in African affairs as a
genuinely independent country, following a Nationalist and neutralist external policy
not unfriendly to the West, but maintaining cordial political and trading relations
with the Soviet bloc. Relations between the Sudan and Nigeria may become of special
importance.
51. Somalia will become independent next year; and the British Somaliland
Protectorate may shortly afterwards be united with it. Somalia would inevitably be
the dominant partner in the union; and the Somali Youth League would probably
establish the familiar African pattern of one-party government. Somalia will be
strongly Muslim and, at least culturally, pro-Arab; economically unviable; and
politically committed to furthering the plan for a Greater Somalia which would
include French Somaliland, a part of Ethiopia and certain areas in Kenya. Economic
realities, however, may force the Somalis to reach an accommodation with Ethiopia,
in order to preserve the grazing rights in Ethiopia which are essential to the tribes in
the present British Protectorate and are guaranteed to them by treaty. . . .
(b) South of the Congo
53. In the non-Commonwealth territories the pace of political advance will
probably be rapid—particularly in the Belgian Congo as a result of the far-reaching
plans for constitutional advance which were announced by the Belgian Government
in January 1959. . . .
54. The form and pace of constitutional advance in much of British East and
Central Africa are likely to vary from those typical in other parts of Africa owing to
the presence of considerable non-African settled communities on which most of
these territories are largely dependent both economically and administratively. A
review has recently been undertaken of the position in the territories which
comprise British East Africa. This has rejected, at one extreme, a policy of rapid
withdrawal of British control and, at the other extreme, a diehard policy of “digging
in” and refusing to contemplate any possibility that we may relinquish our control in
the foreseeable future. The review came down in favour of a “middle of the road”
policy, implying that we will continue to promote the constitutional advance of the
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territories step by step but that we will also seek sufficiently to prolong the period in
which the United Kingdom will retain control in vital matters to ensure that the
territories will be reasonably equipped to discharge the responsibilities of self-
government by the time when they achieve independence. The British East African
territories are to a large extent economically interdependent; and constitutional
developments in each of them will have a profound effect on the other two. For this
reason, if for no other, policy must be directed to promoting constitutional advance
at roughly the same pace in all three territories. But although they are all primarily
African States, Tanganyika is a Trust Territory, Kenya contains an important non-
African settled population (on whom the economy largely depends and to whom we
have special obligations) while Uganda, dominated by the powerful Buganda
Agreement State, is comparatively advanced. These differing factors make the policy
of approximately equal advance particularly difficult to achieve.
55. In Uganda, if the present conflicts persist, on the one hand, between the
traditionalists, headed by the Rulers, and the nationalist movements drawn from the
young educated elements and, on the other hand, between Buganda and the rest of
the Protectorate, it is unlikely that by 1965 full internal responsible self-government
will have been reached. But it will probably be attained by 1970. If, however, these
conflicting elements come to terms, the United Kingdom may be forced to grant
internal self-government rather earlier, although this at present seems unlikely.
56. In Kenya, our policy is to build up a viable, non-racial State, in which the
interests of all communities will be secure, and to maintain full responsibility until
this has been achieved. Our aim is unlikely to be realised by 1970; and on present
indications Kenya will lag behind Uganda and Tanganyika in attaining responsible
self-government—as is probably inevitable if the legitimate interests of all
communities are to be safeguarded.
57. In Tanganyika the African nationalist movement is particularly strong and
undivided; but the people are educationally backward. Here the main retarding factor
will be, for many years, lack of personnel capable of governing with any hope of
success. Even so the pressure for advance is likely to result in the territory’s being
well on the way to responsible government by 1965. By 1970 it will probably have
achieved internal self-government but will still rely largely on external economic and
administrative help.
58. Thus, if we succeed in holding to our own policy against both internal and
external pressures, by 1970 Tanganyika and Uganda will have attained internal self-
government and Kenya will be moving in that direction; but, owing to the
backwardness of the majority of Africans in all three territories and the multi-racial
nature of Kenya in particular, British authority will remain and will still, in the last
resort, prevail. If these forecasts are reasonably accurate, the interests of the West
should be reasonably secure in East Africa. But the pressures for more rapid advance
will be considerable; and great skill and judgment will be required in order to prevent
a dangerously rapid advance which can only result in economic and political chaos
and throw the door wide open to influences hostile to the West.
59. In Central Africa the circumstances are different from those in East Africa;
and they present even greater difficulties. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland
consists of Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing colony which took its present shape
after conquest, with an independent, strong, numerous and rapidly increasing
European population; and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which are British
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Protectorates. The politically vocal part of the European population, unlike the
Europeans in East Africa, are anxious for independence from United Kingdom
control, although they are intensely loyal to the Commonwealth. The Africans in
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the other hand, look to the United Kingdom
connexion to protect their interests against encroachment by local Europeans—
although there is at the same time a rising pressure for universal adult franchise
leading to African political control and independence. The Federation was created as
a compromise between two different forms of possible association between three
territorial units whose economies are uneven but to some extent complementary.
The Europeans in Southern Rhodesia and those in Northern Rhodesia wished to
amalgamate, with or without Nyasaland, in a “Dominion”; but the Governments of
the two Northern Territories preferred a looser type of association which promised
economic advantage but did not imply political links. As a result the compromise
concept of Federation was evolved; and it was argued in its favour that it would bring
economic and political benefits to the area as a whole and that, by promoting the
development of multi-racial partnership based on “civilised standards,” it would
prevent Southern Rhodesia from passing under the control of the Union of South
Africa and would avoid a direct clash between a white-dominated Africa south of the
Zambesi and a black-dominated Africa to the north.
60. While the Federal experiment is of vital importance to the maintenance of
stability in this area, and, indeed, in all Africa, and while it already has considerable
economic achievement to its credit, it is bedevilled by African fears of being
dominated by local Europeans and by European fears of being submerged by an
“uncivilised” African nationalism. It is in order to counter these fears that the United
Kingdom has insisted, on the one hand, that, as stated in the pledges contained in
the Preamble to the Constitution and reiterated by United Kingdom Ministers when
that Constitution was debated in Parliament, our protection of African interests will
be maintained so long as the majority of the people so desire and, on the other hand,
has agreed to a high qualification for the franchise, based on a necessarily arbitrary
interpretation of “civilised standards.”
61. In 1960 a Conference of the Governments concerned is to review the Federal
Constitution, to agree on the constitutional advances which may be made and to
“consider a programme for the attainment of such a status as would enable the
Federation to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth.” If this
Conference succeeds in finding a course which is both acceptable to the Federal
Government and compatible with our pledges to the Africans, we may perhaps infer
that by 1965 the Europeans will still be providing the main driving force of
government in Southern Rhodesia and in the central Federal Government; that the
United Kingdom Government will still be in ultimate control of the Governments of
the two Northern Territories; but that in Northern Rhodesia Africans will probably be
playing an increasingly substantial part in the Legislature as well as participating in
the Executive and in Nyasaland will be likely to have a majority of the unofficial
members in the Legislature and to be playing a prominent part in the Executive. In
the following five years the position should remain reasonably stable, with African
influence gradually increasing in the Legislatures and Executives of the Northern
Territories and in elections to the Federal and Southern Rhodesian Legislatures but
Europeans still providing most of the effective direction in the Federal and Southern
Rhodesian Governments.
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62. But, if the 1960 Conference fails to find a solution which is both reasonably
acceptable to the parties concerned and capable of providing stable and progressive
administration, the picture grows darker. For in that event the Federation will be
rapidly subjected to an increasing strain which may soon become intolerable.
Confidence between the races will deteriorate sharply; there will be a grave risk that
the Europeans will adopt increasingly restrictive policies; and in the end they may
attempt to force the issue by declaring the Federation, or at least the two Rhodesias,
fully independent under predominantly European Governments. The Africans (if
they have not already taken the initiative themselves in seeking to disrupt the
Federation) will then react no less vigorously in the opposite direction by adopting
the more extreme forms of resistance; and the white population will be compelled to
resort to force in order to maintain their position—to the discredit of the United
Kingdom, to the detriment of the Federation’s economy, and to the embarrassment
of the policy of moderation which we shall be trying to pursue in East Africa.
Alternatively, the Federation may simply break up under the mounting pressure of
the internal conflict of opinion; and in that event either Southern Rhodesia may
gradually drift into the orbit of the Union of South Africa or some general regrouping
of territories may take place on more specifically racial lines. On either assumption
the South African racial policies will then have advanced northwards to the edge of
the Zambesi, towards the heart of Central Africa.
63. The policies of the Union of South Africa seem unlikely to change for as far
ahead as one can see; and the relationship between the Union and the black
independent States is likely to continue to be one of increasing bitterness. At the
same time economic expansion will probably continue steadily; and the material
welfare of the African population may well improve faster in the Union than
anywhere else in Africa. As a result the Government of the Union may be able so to
develop their economic plans for the native population (through resettlement in
native areas, &c.) that the Africans will have both less chance and less desire to rise
against their white masters. And, although tension between the black and white
communities is almost certain to increase, it is unlikely that the Africans in the
Union will be able to rise against the Europeans on a scale with which the latter
could not deal. Under the influence of these pressures the Union will be liable to
retreat deeper and deeper into isolationism. By 1970 it may have become a republic
and may well have resigned permanently from the United Nations. It may seek to
maintain links with the United Kingdom and Portugal as its last remaining friends in
the free world, though we should hope that it would wish to stay within the
Commonwealth.
64. In this context the future of the three High Commission Territories of
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland is likely to continue to present a delicate
problem. We must expect the Union Government to maintain their pressure for the
incorporation of the three territories in the Union; and our reactions to this
pressure—particularly in view of our commitment to consult the inhabitants of the
territories before taking any such step—will be regarded internationally as a critical
test of our sincerity.
Summary
65. The picture which finally emerges is a picture of a continent which, in ten
years’ time, may—at least as far as Black Africa is concerned—be largely
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“balkanised,” i.e., divided into a large number of nominally independent States, in
which the black peoples will have achieved de facto control and will have established
governments which, though professing to be democratic, will in fact be largely
authoritarian in their outlook. But they will not necessarily be any the less stable on
this account; and although it would be unrealistic to assume that newly independent
African States will be either able or willing to sustain the full burden of responsible
representative government as it is known in the Western democracies, their
authoritarian régimes will probably command a wide measure of popular support.
Nigeria alone may be an exception, in that, although the Regional administrations
may well be semi-dictatorships, the central Federal Government (which is likely to
constitute the real focus of power and authority) may be established on a basis of
parliamentary democracy.
66. The States constituting this patchwork will be likely to be linked more or less
loosely together in various forms of federal association or, more probably, in shifting
alliances; but it would be unwise to assume that, at least by 1970, they will be
integrated into a relatively small number of competent and viable units. There will be
a good deal of jealousy and friction between each State and its neighbours, mainly
over issues of boundaries and frontiers; and this will be liable to manifest itself in the
accumulation of arms and, possibly, a tendency towards military adventures. In
Ghana and Guinea the old structure of tribal loyalties will have been largely
overthrown; but elsewhere the tribal chiefs, although often in conflict with the new
authoritarian politicians, will probably survive and may, indeed, assume a new
importance, albeit in a modified and more sophisticated form, as an alternative
source of psychological reassurance when European protection is withdrawn.
67. In the areas of Africa settled by Europeans the picture in ten years’ time is
different. In East, Central and Southern African the risk is not, as in Africa north of
the Equator, a risk of the “balkanisation” of a large number of self-governing black
communities but a risk of conflict between, on the one hand, black majorities and,
on the other hand, either dominant white minorities or Colonial Governments
seeking to ensure that constitutional advance proceeds in an orderly and moderate
manner and that the legitimate interests of minorities are safeguarded. In British
East Africa there is perhaps a reasonable chance that, given patience and goodwill on
both sides, the problem can be resolved without excessive friction and that by 1970
the three territories may have advanced, by peaceful and constitutional means,
significantly nearer to what is almost certainly their ultimate status, i.e., non-racial
but mainly African States largely controlled by the African majority. But in South
Africa there is no likelihood, so far as can be foreseen at present, that the Union
Government will modify their policy of apartheid within the next decade. The pattern
of development in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is therefore critical. It is
impossible to predict that pattern; but, if the concept of Federation can be sustained
and can be encouraged to take organic root in the three territories with the consent
and support of their inhabitants, 1970 may see a primarily multi-racial community
interposed, as a shock absorber, between the European-dominated Union at the
southern extreme of Africa and the predominantly black societies which will be
emerging in the central part of the continent. But if, by the end of the decade, the
Federation has disintegrated, the racial separatism of the Union will be directly
confronting the new black states; while, if it is maintained under white domination
by force and without the consent of the African inhabitants, the whole of the Western
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position in black Africa, even in those territories (such as Nigeria) which are at
present well-disposed towards us, will be gravely shaken.
68. But, whatever the course of events, the West will need to remember that the
new African States, although deficient in administrative experience and
organisational ability, will be proud of their independence and abnormally sensitive
to anything which they regard as threatening it or derogating from it. This will
largely condition their reactions both towards the cold war (where positive neutrality
and non-alignment will be the watchwords of many) and towards offers of economic
and financial assistance, on which they will be very heavily dependent. It will also
tend to make them less attractive to the foreign investor. And if the battle between
the West and the Soviet bloc for Africa will turn mainly on the ability of the
democracies to solve the acute racial and constitutional problems in East and Central
Africa, its outcome will also depend partly on the extent to which the West is able to
provide appropriate economic assistance on terms acceptable to the pride and self-
consciousness of inexperienced and newly-awakened peoples.
Part IV.—Problems of policy for the West in Africa
69. The countries of the West have certain common interests in Africa; and they
face certain problems which, although differing in detail from one area to another,
present much the same fundamental features. The purpose of this section of our
report is to define Western interests in Africa; to outline the problems which
confront the West; and to suggest how these problems should be approached.
The interests of the West in Africa
70. These can be summarised as the maintenance of peace, stability, economic
security and goodwill, and the exclusion, so far as possible, of Soviet and other
hostile influences. . . .
71. The United Kingdom has particularly close interests in Africa—partly as a
result of the special responsibilities imposed on us by history and by our present or
past possession of large parts of the continent; and partly for strategic reasons. These
interests can be grouped under the following headings:—
(a) Our share in the general Western interest in the maintenance of peace and
political stability in Africa, the exclusion of subversive influences and the
encouragement of pro-Western sentiment.
(b) The maintenance and development of our trade with Africa and the
encouragement of British investment.
(c) The safety and welfare of white settlers and other minorities in present or
former British territories. We have a particular responsibility to do everything we
reasonably can in order to ensure that peoples of all races who have made their
homes in such territories with the encouragement of successive British
Governments will be able to live there in security and to contribute to the
development and prosperity of their own part of Africa.
72. In addition, we have certain defence requirements in Africa which need to be
examined in rather more detail. They derive partly from considerations of internal
security and partly from considerations of global strategic policy.
73. It is unlikely that, except in cases of emergency, we shall wish to introduce
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British troops, solely for purposes of internal security, in African territories after they
have achieved internal self-government within the Commonwealth. It is even more
improbable that British armed intervention will be either necessary or feasible in
former British African territories which have achieved full independence within the
Commonwealth, except conceivably at the invitation of the Government concerned if
it was threatened or attacked by an aggressive neighbour. On the other hand, so long
as a territory remains dependent and our consequent responsibility requires and
justifies the use of British troops for the maintenance of internal security, we shall
require facilities for the accommodation, training and reinforcement of forces for
this purpose. It may become progressively more difficult to insist on our right to use
these facilities as the territory in question approaches nearer to independence. But,
formally, the responsibility for internal security will remain with the United
Kingdom; and, so long as this is so, we shall need to retain the means to discharge
that responsibility.
74. In the wider context of global strategy our current defence policy requires
that:—
(i) In certain circumstances we should be in a position to use armed force in
Arabia and the Persian Gulf. This implies, given present logistic possibilities, that
we need to maintain in Kenya an element of the Strategic Reserve in order to
reinforce the small detachment which we can station in the Persian Gulf; and to
retain certain modest but important naval facilities which we at present enjoy at
Mombasa. We also need over-flying and staging rights in certain African territories
in order to be able to reinforce Kenya and Arabia by a route otherwise than via the
air barrier of the Middle East.
(ii) We should be able to reinforce South-East Asia by air eastabout from this
country. This requirement similarly calls for over-flying and staging rights in
Africa.
75. During the next ten years the only aircraft so far planned which are likely to
be available in quantity will have ranges which require, for rapid reinforcement, the
use of Kano (Nigeria) and either Entebbe (Uganda) or Nairobi (Kenya); or,
alternatively, if the airfields were developed, either Bathurst (Gambia) or Freetown
(Sierra Leone) and Nairobi. Another possible means of reaching East Africa would be
by the route Gibraltar, Bathurst, Ascension Island, Southern Rhodesia and Kenya;
but this would involve costly engineering work at Ascension Island. There will,
however, be a continuing need to retain the existing intermediate staging posts in
order to stage medium-range aircraft of all types to Kenya and Aden. The
requirement for staging and over-flying rights will not, therefore, change materially
during the next ten years.
76. In short, our present defence policy and resources require the presence in
Kenya of elements of the Strategic Reserve; staging rights in Nigeria, Gambia (or
Sierra Leone) and Kenya; and rights to overfly territories between the staging points.
77. While the ability to station and reinforce troops in Africa for the maintenance
of internal security is essential so long as our responsibilities require us, and our
authority enables us, to exercise the right of intervention, the requirement deriving
from our global strategic policy is a relative one—for two reasons. In the first place,
we may find in the long run that, in relation to independent African governments, we
are more likely to achieve our primary objectives of goodwill, commercial and
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economic security and the exclusion of Soviet influence if we refrain from using or
demanding certain defence facilities and meet our defence needs by means which do
not involve a use of particular African territories. (The practicability of developing
these alternatives needs further investigation. They would certainly involve
substantial expenditure and would take time to complete; and the decision to develop
them would depend on a balance of many conflicting factors.) Second, our defence
requirements in Africa, as we have defined them in the context of global strategy,
depend on the assumption that it will remain our policy to be able both to apply force
in the Arabian Peninsula and to reinforce South-East Asia direct from the United
Kingdom or Africa. But it is not certain that these elements of our current policy will
remain unchanged; and, if they are modified, our defence requirements in Africa will
be correspondingly reduced.
78. Over the next ten years, therefore, we should be able, if we so decide, to
maintain a Strategic Reserve in Kenya (part of which may need in any event to be
stationed there during this period for internal security purposes) and to secure the
requisite staging and overflying rights. But we must expect political pressures to
build up increasingly against us, even though in Kenya they may be mitigated to
some extent by the economic benefits which the territory should derive from the
presence of British troops. Moreover, we may find it expedient to modify our strategic
requirements in Africa in the interests of conciliating African opinion and promoting
political goodwill in the longer term; and our defence requirements may therefore
have to be modified in the light of other more fundamental needs of our future
policies in Africa. At the same time our strategic policy as a whole may change; and
Africa may become less important in relation to our defence requirements in other
parts of the world. We hope, therefore, that the extent of our strategic needs in Africa
during the next decade will be examined in greater detail in the light of the
considerations in this report. At the same time we must recognise that it may
become necessary to apply force in the Arabian Peninsula before any alternative to
the use of our facilities in Kenya has been developed. In that event we may expect
violent criticism from some of the independent African countries, which may have
repercussions on internal security in Kenya itself.
The problems of the West in Africa
79. The impact of European power and civilisation on Africa and the rapid social
and economic revolution in the life of the African peoples which has resulted have
created acute stresses within the continent and have confronted the West with grave
new problems. Basically, these problems are two—first, the pace and timing of the
progress of still dependent countries towards self-government in the context of the
inter-racial problem; second, the means by which the West should seek to retain the
sympathy and support of newly independent States in Africa and to prevent them
from being subverted by Soviet influence. These problems need separate discussion.
Constitutional advance and racial tension
80. The colonial policies of the United Kingdom have themselves led the African
peoples to believe that independence is the ultimate goal to which they are being
directed. And the other European Powers who are involved in Africa are equally
tending to grant the Africans an increasing degree of responsibility for the
management of their own affairs. But it is essential both to the completion of the
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task of colonial trusteeship and to the safeguarding of the general interests of the
West in Africa for the future that power should not be transferred until there is at
least a fairly firm prospect that the territories concerned will remain reasonably
stable and viable and will be capable of standing on their own feet. If power were
handed over before these conditions were satisfied, internal chaos would develop and
the territories would be a prey to the hostile external forces which are now seeking to
penetrate the continent. The rising African politicians, however, stimulated by
internal and external pressures, naturally desire to achieve independence in their
time. In seeking, therefore, to bring the process of “‘nation-building” in Africa to its
logical end, the metropolitan Powers face the dilemma of arousing bitterness and
hostility if they appear to be going too slowly: or, if they go too quickly, of failing to
fulfil their obligations and jeopardising the future of the territories both for their
own inhabitants and for the West generally.
81. This problem has not proved impossible to resolve in West Africa, where
there is no substantial settled non-African population and a substantial degree of
social and economic progress has already been achieved. All the French West African
territories are now wholly self-governing members of the French Community, apart
from Guinea, which is independent, and the French Cameroons and Togoland, which
are to become independent in 1960. Of the British territories Ghana is independent,
Nigeria is on the verge of becoming so, and Sierra Leone has an advanced
constitution.
82. But in the British East and Central African territories the problem arises in a
more acute form, partly because, for historical and economic reasons, the African
peoples in these regions are more “backward” and partly because in the eastern half
of Africa the problem of establishing a genuine partnership between Africans and
non-Africans in all walks of life and on a workable and equitable basis assumes a
particularly acute form. In East Africa there cannot be much doubt that the African
majority will ultimately gain political control of the territories. But, although it is
important that they should be raised to the economic, educational and
administrative levels at which self-government can be sustained, it is also important
to safeguard the future of the non-African minorities. These generate much of the
wealth of the territories and contribute much of the skill and enterprise which are
engaged in them. They play a vital role, therefore, in the prosperity and development
of East Africa. Moreover, in Kenya, in view of the economic and political power which
they wield at present, any attempt to sacrifice their essential interests might still lead
to serious political conflict. We shall only succeed in safeguarding the interests of all
parties and ensuring the prosperity of the territories if we can build up “non-racial”
States where the non-African minorities will continue to make their important
contribution to the general good of all the inhabitants.
83. The Belgians are faced with a similar problem in the Congo, where white
settlement, especially in the copper-belt, has created much of the wealth of the area.
Both the Belgian Government and the leading companies seem to be moving to the
conclusion that Belgian interests will best be served by fairly rapid moves towards
self-government on the principle of “one man one vote,” without attempting to
achieve over a period a defined basis for partnership. Indeed, Belgian policy now
tends to regard the non-alienation of the native majority and their moderate leaders
as the only effective safeguard for the future. As this policy is progressively
implemented it is bound to have major repercussions in British East Africa,
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especially in territories where the white minority is less important than in the
Congo.
84. Further to the south, in Central Africa, the problem is even more acute—
partly because the United Kingdom is not, as in East Africa, in sole control of the
whole area and partly because the Federation includes one territory, Southern
Rhodesia, where the numerical disparity between Africans and non-Africans is less
pronounced. But here also, as in East Africa, the problem is essentially one of
securing time for the further “development” of the African people and for the gradual
evolution of the right kind of relationships between the African and non-African
inhabitants. The handling of the Central African problem is therefore critical for the
future interests of the United Kingdom and the West. In this area, sandwiched
between Black Africa in the north and European-dominated Africa in the south, the
stresses of European and African racialism meet and, as they become increasingly
exacerbated, imperil the solutions which we are striving to reach. If the bold and
difficult experiment of “partnership” and “federation” fails, Southern Rhodesia may
be forced into the orbit of the Union of South Africa while the two northern
territories in whole or part may join the African bloc in the north. On the other hand,
if Federation is maintained by force and without the consent of the African
inhabitants, the Western position in black Africa will be seriously weakened.
85. This risk is so grave that we are bound to underline it. It must not be
forgotten that, after Nigeria becomes independent in 1960, the period of British
leadership of the advance of African colonial territories towards independence will
appear to be over; and unless we can solve the problems of East and Central Africa,
our past record of benevolent government will be forgotten and it will be the French
and perhaps the Belgians who will be regarded by world opinion as the leaders, while
we may be classed with the Portuguese as the obstacles to further advance. Moreover,
although conditions have hitherto enabled us to adopt an apparently more simple
and unambiguous approach to the problems of black West Africa than to those of the
multi-racial societies in East and Central Africa, the growth of Pan-Africanism on a
continental scale will make it increasingly difficult for us to continue to pursue
policies which, to the African mind, seem to differentiate between the two areas. We
have emphasised earlier in this report that, given reasonable luck, Nigeria should
emerge during the 1960’s as the most important power in Black Africa—but that she
will watch, with increasingly influential concern, our handling of the racial tension
which is steadily building up on the eastern side of the continent. If we fail to solve
the problems of East and Central Africa in a manner which will satisfy all reasonable
aspirations and will demonstrate that we are not seeking to perpetuate an unqualified
white supremacy, we may lose West Africa as well.
The political alignment of Africa
86. The second main problem which faces the West is the problem of ensuring
that, as the African States achieve independence, they retain an active sympathy with
the free world and do not succumb to Soviet penetration. If our forecast of probable
political developments in Africa is correct, this purpose may not be easily realised. If,
as we have suggested, a large part of Africa resolves into a patchwork of independent
States, politically at odds and economically weak, we shall not be able to take for
granted either the will or the ability of their Governments to maintain internal
stability and to resist external aggression. Moreover, we must assume that they will
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follow a mainly neutralist policy, which might at best be vaguely benevolent towards
the West but at worst would be actively hostile. On the other hand, the West has
certain assets—a long connexion with Africa; the European personnel who occupy
key positions; the large areas of territory which the Western Powers still control; the
fund of goodwill which they have gradually accumulated over many years; and the
economic assistance which they provide. How can they use these assets in order to
ensure that, without detriment to the welfare of the Africans themselves, the
interests of the West in Africa are safeguarded? It is not the purpose of this report to
make detailed recommendations on specific issues. But certain general principles of
association between Africa and the free world—political, strategic and economic
links—suggest themselves.
87. The political link. The Western Powers will have done not a little to achieve
their purpose if they succeed in solving the complex of racial and constitutional
issues which obstruct the road towards independence—if they succeed, that is, in
transferring power to African or multi-racial administrations in a manner which
does not sacrifice political and economic realities to emotional pressure but also
leaves no great legacy of bitterness behind. But even when independence has been
attained the new States will be inexperienced and volatile entities, liable to be easily
influenced and easily subverted. It should therefore be the purpose of the West to
maintain some degree of formal political association between themselves and the
independent African Governments. We have suggested, earlier in this report, that
there will be a tendency for the new States to come together in various forms of
federal grouping or regional alliance, although many practical difficulties will need
to be overcome before these links are likely to be very close or, indeed, very
permanent. This situation confronts us with another variation of the basic dilemma.
From a purely mercenary and short-term point of view it might well be to the
advantage of the Western Powers to encourage the centrifugal forces on the ground
that they are more likely to secure the defence facilities which they need if they have
to deal with a multiplicity of weak and divided States than if they are confronted with
a relatively small number of organised and competent confederations, capable of
bargaining on level terms. On the other hand, it can hardly be in the ultimate
interest of the free world that Africa should disintegrate into a medley of feeble and
quarrelsome communities, an easy prey to every kind of subversive intrigue; and
there can be little doubt that the Western Governments would be wise to foster the
forces making for unity and association wherever they can do so on the basis of a
generally pro-Western sentiment. . . .
89. If the British territories—Central Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika,
Zanzibar, Somaliland, Sierra Leone and the Gambia—were to follow the pattern set
by Ghana and Nigeria, they too would all eventually become sovereign independent
States and members of the Commonwealth. But a development of this nature would
create obvious difficulties. Many of the territories concerned would be very small and
all would be to some extent immature and hypersensitive. The other members of the
Commonwealth might well think twice about admitting all of them as full members
of the Commonwealth. Indeed, it is hardly a practicable proposition; and, in any
event, other destinies seem likely for Somaliland and, possibly, the Gambia. The
Federation, if it holds together, will be a sizeable and viable unit. The same may prove
to be true of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, especially if, as we hope, they eventually
come together in some degree of association. The Commonwealth is in any event
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changing, and we may hope that it should be able eventually to accommodate itself
to receive this more limited number of new members.
90. It seems, therefore, that for French, Belgian and British territories there is a
prospect of some form of association with the former metropolitan Power on the
basis of equal political sovereignty. This association would no doubt retain the
present economic links—in the case of the French and Belgian territories, a franc
currency and access to the Common Market; and, in the case of the British
territories, a currency based on sterling and the advantage of Imperial preferences.
By different ways all the territories concerned may be converging on a common
constitutional destination.
91. At the same time we must recognise the possibility that some form of union
of independent African States may emerge, transcending the arbitrary and largely
accidental divisions of European linguistic and administrative frontiers. The
Ghana–Guinea experiment deserves close attention from this point of view because it
proposes itself as a pilot scheme for a Federation open to all African States. In a
milder form the same concept is advocated by President Tubman of Liberia. But a
development of this nature would not necessarily disrupt the economic and cultural
ties on a “Commonwealth” basis which individual States might still wish to retain
with the European Powers; and the best hope of that stability in Africa which the
West should seek to promote lies in maintaining and strengthening those ties.
92. The defence link. It is improbable that, at any rate for some years after
independence, the new African States would wish to be parties to collective defence
arrangements in association with any of the NATO Powers (although the Nigerian
leaders are not at present neutralist and have undertaken to enter into a defence
agreement with us). There are also dangers in our encouraging any efforts on the
part of African States to associate with each other in this way. In particular, relations
with the Union of South Africa and the Central African Federation would be a
complicating factor. Moreover, it is possible that the emergence of anything in the
nature of an African defence pact might make it more difficult for us to maintain
overflying and staging rights in the independent African States. Our attitude towards
any moves by African States in this direction would therefore have to be assessed at
the time in the light of the risks to our defence interests and the counter-balancing
factors.
93. But it is important that the African States should be encouraged to maintain
sufficient local forces for their own security, and should, if necessary be assisted to do
so. It is also vital to Western interests that they should be helped to devise their own
security intelligence organisations, capable of meeting the threat of subversion,
espionage and sabotage inspired by the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.
The links between the metropolitan security authorities and the intelligence
organisations in African territories should be used to educate African administrators
and to train African intelligence officers in the techniques of security intelligence
organisation in order that an association may develop in step with constitutional
changes and regional groupings as they emerge. Experience has already shown that
professional liaison of this kind can create a degree of trust which cuts across
political differences and not only ensures a pooling of security intelligence, which is
of mutual value, but also provides the opportunity to guide the local authorities in
their task of guarding against Soviet penetration. There are obvious risks in
promoting a policy of this kind in partnership with inexperienced peoples; but they
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are less than the dangers of inaction in the face of the growing threat of hostile
subversion.
94. The economic link. The economic development of the independent States will
call for a considerable degree of practical sympathy and support from the West if Africa
is not to be driven to turn to the Soviet Union for advice and assistance. The Africans
are ambitious to achieve rapid economic, as well as constitutional, advance; but they
lack both the means and the experience to do so unaided. The policy of the West must
therefore be realistic as well as generous, taking account of economic limitations no
less than of political ambitions. At the same time economic advance must measure up
to the conditions of political success; and, if self-government and independence are to
be substantial realities, they must be accompanied and reinforced by progressive eco-
nomic development and rising standards of living. It is impossible to predict the addi-
tional capital which Africa will need if these conditions are to be satisfied; and the
statistical survey of the continent which is being undertaken by the Economic
Commission for Africa, the newly-created agency of the United Nations, is not likely
to throw significant light on this problem. But on any reckoning very considerable
investment will be needed. This points to an international approach to the problem,
designed to ensure that Africa will receive special consideration from the various
international agencies such as the International Bank, the International Finance
Corporation, the projected International Development Association and the United
Nations Special Fund. (The International Bank, for example, has lent much less to
Africa in the past than to any other continent.) An approach on these lines could have
political as well as economic advantages to the West, particularly in those cases where
capital provided through an international agency may be more acceptable to an inde-
pendent State than bilateral aid. Moreover, international institutions may be better
placed to give effective and acceptable advice on development planning than metro-
politan Governments, whether individually or in association. The International Bank
in particular has now had considerable experience of helping under-developed coun-
tries to formulate development plans on sound lines and of ensuring that the supply
of capital is related to a realistic assessment of needs and potentialities and that indi-
vidual projects are accommodated to the pace of economic development as a whole. It
can therefore exert considerable influence in inducing under-developed countries to
concentrate on a steady expansion of production and dissuading them from schemes
on which they may overreach themselves. At the same time it would be unwise to
assume that international sources will by themselves provide sufficient funds for
African development; and it should therefore be one of the purposes of the United
Kingdom to seek to stimulate the interest of the United States, Western Germany and
other industrialised countries of the West in the development of Africa and to convince
them of the necessity of providing capital on a much greater and more widespread
scale than hitherto.
95. If capital will be needed for productive investment, it will be required no less
urgently for social investment—for education; housing and home ownership
(coupled with a review of systems of land tenure); and the other social services. Here
again we should seek primarily to promote an international approach to this
problem; and we should endeavour to secure the support of the proposed
International Development Association for the social, as well as the economic,
development of African territories. Education will be particularly important. To the
aspiring African it is a matter of overriding concern. To the United Kingdom and to
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other European Governments with interests in Africa (especially the French, who
have suggested a greater co-ordination of our policies with theirs in this field) it
offers an opportunity of promoting a sense of political responsibility and a means of
controlling to some extent the subversion of the young. The dangers of a semi-
literate proletariat are well known and well authenticated by experience; and it is as
politically dangerous as it is financially extravagant to suppose that education is in
itself a panacea for all other social and economic disabilities. But if it is carefully
related to the needs of the recipients and properly integrated with other plans for
their social and political advancement, it should pay a handsome dividend both in
terms of economic betterment and in terms of a lowering of political tension.
Education is the essential pre-condition of the most efficient use of all the other,
more sophisticated, forms of assistance which the West will need to provide to Africa.
96. Technical assistance will, indeed, be required on a scale considerably greater
than any which the West has so far envisaged. It is debatable whether Western
interests will be best served by making such assistance available on a bilateral basis
in each case or under the aegis of some multilateral organisation. There is much to
be said in favour of the bilateral approach. It makes for speed and for relative
simplicity of administration. It enables each donor country to direct its contribution
to those areas of the continent, or to those sectors of an individual economy, in
which it has a particular interest. It would obviously be desirable, for example, that
Nigeria should look to the United Kingdom for the technical assistance which she
will continue to need after attaining independence. (A scheme of this kind is, indeed,
already being worked out in collaboration with Nigeria). On the other hand, bilateral
assistance might be regarded by some of the recipient countries as perpetuating the
appearance of dependence and tutelage; and they might be more disposed to accept
assistance if it was offered not by a single Western Power from whose domination
they had recently escaped but through some international agency. Moreover, a
multilateral approach of this kind, while not necessarily resulting in any significant
increase in the aggregate of assistance provided for Africa, might gradually help the
donors to distribute their bilateral aid more rationally and equitably among the
beneficiaries; and, given that resources for this purpose will inevitably be limited,
there might be advantages, both of substance and of presentation, in an organisation
which would be seen to spread the butter more systematically over the bread.
97. For this reason it has been suggested that some initiative corresponding to
the Colombo Plan in Asia might be launched in Africa. But the circumstances in
which the Asian venture was promoted were probably unique; and the analogy would
be misleading. Moreover, a “Colombo Plan for Africa” would probably be interpreted
by the Africans as implying that the West was prepared to allocate large sums of
capital for which the African States could scramble. But the original Colombo Plan
has never had a task of allocation of this kind; and although its Bureau has oiled the
wheels of the Technical Co-operation Scheme, it has equally had no responsibility for
allocating technical assistance, which remains on a bilateral basis.
98. This is not to say, however, that there would be no advantage in the existence
of some organisation to foster mutual co-operation between the Western Powers and
the independent African States on a footing of equality and partnership. Within such
a framework the existing arrangements for the provision of technical assistance on a
bilateral basis could continue substantially unchanged; but such assistance would
bear the “stamp” of the new organisation in order to indicate that it was part of a
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comprehensive attempt by the West, in partnership with the new States, to assist
them to promote their economic development. The nucleus of such an organisation
may possibly be found in the existing Commission for Technical Co-operation in
Africa South of the Sahara (C.C.T.A.)—which comprises the main European Powers
with territorial interests in Africa; the Union of South Africa; the Federation; and
Ghana, Liberia and Guinea—and in the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa
(F.A.M.A.) which the Commission has recently established as a centre for arranging
technical assistance to the countries of tropical Africa. F.A.M.A. is still a very new
creation; and the scale of its activity is very modest. But it could be encouraged and
helped to grow, and the recent decision of C.C.T.A. to move its headquarters to Lagos
implies that it will be administered henceforward in the African State which is not
only the most favourably disposed to the West but is also likely to play a major role in
the Africa of the future.
99. If an enterprise of this kind were to succeed, it would need to be launched
with due regard to the risks which it might entail and to the susceptibilities of the
newly-independent states. In the past they have been suspicious of C.C.T.A. as a
“colonial club,” and, while these suspicions are diminishing as the black African
membership of the Commission increases, this development itself contains certain
dangers. The position of Ghana as would-be leader of the Pan-African movement and
at the same time a member of C.C.T.A. is an ambivalent one, and the Ghanaian
Government may at any time press for the extension of the Commission to include
the North African countries. Moreover, the association of the black African countries
and South Africa within the Commission is, naturally, not an easy one. Three, or
possibly four, more independent countries may join the Commission in 1960
(Nigeria, French Cameroons, Togoland and, possibly, Somalia); and this increase in
membership may be regarded as completing the evolution of the Commission into an
independent association of African states, albeit one which maintains special links
with the West.
100. Nevertheless, this development need not be to our disadvantage. If it is true
that it is the willingness of the West to provide economic assistance which will be
regarded by the Africans as the touchstone of our sincerity, it must be in our ultimate
interest to demonstrate that willingness as convincingly as we can and to be
prepared, for this purpose, to work with an organisation which African States have
helped to create and will increasingly control. And, while technical assistance outside
the United Nations must continue to be based on bilateral agreements, there may be
a part, even if a comparatively modest one, for a non-United Nations international
organisation to play. Such an organisation would associate the independent African
states with the West as equals in a mutual enterprise; and it would avoid any
implication that the help and encouragement which we were prepared to provide
were being imposed by a superior people for their own profit or were being offered in
a spirit of patronage. It might also engage the interest of the United States and other
Western Governments, including perhaps Canada and Western Germany, who are
likely to be both willing and able to contribute to the development of Africa. Properly
presented, a scheme on these lines could be of psychological value in demonstrating
the desire of the West to assist Africa on an organised and continuing basis and on
terms of equality.
101. The details of such a scheme do not lie within the scope of this report. They
would need to be worked out with care; and the scale and nature of the United
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Kingdom contribution would need to be determined in relation to the considerable
assistance which we are already providing to those territories where we retain direct
responsibility and are likely to continue to wish to provide even after they have
attained independence. Moreover, the venture would serve—at least initially—only a
supplementary purpose as an addition to the main stream of bilateral assistance; and
it would be foolishly optimistic to overrate its immediate practical effect. The
relationship of Member Governments with C.C.T.A. will probably remain a loose one,
and neither the Commission nor F.A.M.A. is likely to develop into a strong
organisation for some time. But, subject to these reservations and to a more detailed
examination of its implications, a scheme of this nature, providing for bilateral
assistance to the African States under the aegis of an international organisation
which might well be built gradually on the foundations of the existing F.A.M.A., could
provide the opportunity for a useful gesture of practical and co-operative assistance
by the West to Africa.
Part V.—Conclusion
102. The purpose of this report has been to survey the forces at work in Africa, to
attempt to predict their outcome in terms of the African scene in 1970, to indicate
the problems in Africa with which the free world will be confronted by these
developments during the next ten years and to suggest certain basic principles by
which Western policy should be guided during this period. We have not sought to
solve individual problems; we have attempted only to set them in perspective. So
considered, they appear as a series of dilemmas. It may be helpful to restate the more
important of these as briefly as possible:—
(a) Racial relations and constitutional development.—The pace of the advance
towards independence has become rapid in much of Africa. France has granted all
her colonies internal self-government, with the right, at least in theory, to opt for
independence at any time; and the Belgian Congo is likely to reach the same
position in a short period. We ourselves have moved even faster in West Africa. But
in the east and south the position is different. If, on the one hand, we retreat there
too rapidly before the rising tide of Pan-Africanism, we shall run the risk of
transferring power to local Governments before they are competent to exercise
authority or to maintain stable and viable administration. We shall expose volatile
and unsophisticated peoples to the insidious dangers of Communist penetration.
And we shall jeopardise European interests and investments, which have made the
major contribution to the development of large parts of Africa and can claim the
main credit for the gradual improvement in the African standard of living. This
danger is particularly acute for the United Kingdom in relation to East Africa. If,
on the other hand, we are too intransigent in opposing African aspirations or,
where European minorities are dominant, are too ready to appease them, we run
the risk of being identified with the extreme racial doctrines of the Union of South
Africa, of exacerbating African hostility towards the European and of provoking the
African States, when they finally achieve independence—as in the end they
must—to turn more readily towards the Soviet Union. This danger arises with
particular urgency for the United Kingdom in relation to Central Africa. The West
must therefore seek to steer a middle course between these extremes, bearing well
in mind that, while the Soviet Union will be alert to seize every opportunity to
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exploit our dilemma, Pan-Africanism in itself is not necessarily a force which we
need regard with fear and suspicion. On the contrary, if we can avoid alienating it
and can guide it on lines generally sympathetic to the free world, it may well prove
in the longer term a strong, indigenous barrier to the penetration of Africa by the
Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic.
(b) The strategic interests of the West in Africa.—In the short term it may appear
to be essential in the interests of the West, and particularly the United Kingdom, to
demand the retention of defence facilities in Africa as a condition of conceding
independence. But in the longer term we may well gain, rather than lose, the
sympathy and support of newly independent States if we are able to refrain from
seeking to acquire, retain or use facilities which appear to be necessary from a
purely strategic point of view. On each occasion the West will have to choose; and
the difficulty of the choice for the United Kingdom lends additional urgency to the
need for a re-examination of our global strategy in an attempt to determine
whether we can devise some alternative defence policy which will provide adequate
protection for our world-wide interests but will make us less dependent on the
good will of African States which are likely to be predominantly neutralist in
sentiment.
(c) The economic development of Africa.—If Africa is to remain loyal to the
Western cause, its economic interests must coincide with, and reinforce, its
political sympathies; and one of the major problems of the relationship between
the West and Africa will be to ensure an adequate flow of economic assistance, and
particularly capital, through various channels to the newly emerging States. On
any reckoning the amounts required will be considerable; and, if the Western
Powers are unreasonably insensitive to the economic aspirations of independent
Africa, the Governments of the new States may be compelled to turn to the Soviet
Union for the assistance which they will certainly need. In the longer term the
European Common Market may increase the flow of European capital for African
development. But the commercial provisions of the Treaty of Rome, particularly
the new preferential arrangements which it envisages, will be liable to work to the
more immediate disadvantage of those States (particularly British colonial
territories) which are debarred from entry into the Common Market. Here again
the Western Governments will have to choose. If they attach sufficient importance
to avoiding African disunity, they will need to negotiate some modification of the
Treaty of Rome in order to mitigate its commercial effects. On the other hand, if
the Six refuse any mitigation of the serious disadvantages for some African
territories which may result from a changed pattern of trade, a dangerous new
divisive element will have been introduced into the continent.
103. Each of these problems needs further detailed consideration. Moreover, they
are all inter-related not only in terms of their impact on Africa itself but also in terms
of their effect on the metropolitan Powers involved. Neither the United Kingdom nor
any other administering Power in Africa can consider its policy towards African
territories in the light of the issues arising in those territories alone; and the Western
Governments must seek to strike a balance between their particular interests and
obligations in individual territories and their more general interests and
responsibilities both in other parts of Africa and in the world at large. For the United
Kingdom it is especially important to harmonise our policies towards the emergent
07-ConGov-Doc 1-28-cp  18/10/00  2:03 pm  Page 132
[21] AFRICA: THE NEXT TEN YEARS 133
countries of Africa with the policies which are prescribed by our relations with other
colonial Powers in Africa. Until about 1957 the former factor hardly arose; and after
1965–70 the latter should largely have ceased to be relevant. But at the moment we
are compelled to take both factors into account; and the problem is aggravated by the
fact that the position and influence of the United Kingdom in the world depend to a
large extent on what other countries think of us. Their reactions are liable to be
brought into particularly sharp focus at the United Nations; and we can never afford
to forget, for example, that Tanganyika, (like Ruanda-Urundi in the neighbouring
Belgian Congo) is a Trust territory, whose welfare is in some sense the special
concern of the United Nations and provides our enemies in that Organisation with an
opportunity to indict our African policies before world opinion.
104. It is seldom profitable to attempt to peer very far into the future. And we do
not claim that the forecasts contained in this report are any exception to the rule
that expectations are often belied by events. Nor do we claim that there is anything
novel in the policy proposals which we have made. The novelty lies rather in the
situation which those proposals are designed to meet—in the unprecedented pace of
political adjustment in Africa. It is impossible to carry out even a superficial survey of
the continent without being impressed by two considerations—first, the long lead
over the Soviet Union which the West at present enjoys in Africa after a century of
association; second, the rapidity with which the African scene is changing under the
impact of new political and social pressures. The former is an asset to the free world
in the twentieth century; the latter need not be a liability if the Western Powers are
willing to present a common front to the problems of Africa and to approach them
with patience, imagination and courage.
21 PREM 11/2587, PM/59/72 28 June–30 July 1959
‘Africa: the next ten years’: minute to Mr Macmillan from Mr Selwyn
Lloyd, enclosing the officials’ report.  Minutes by P de Zulueta, Mr
Eccles,1 Mr Macmillan (M 244/59), Mr Lennox-Boyd (PM (59) 33 &
39) and Mr Heathcoat Amory
I do not know whether you will yet have had time to look at the paper entitled
“Africa: The Next Ten Years” AF(59)28 which has been prepared by the Africa
(Official) Committee under Mr. Trend’s supervision.2 It gives the first comprehensive
picture of “Black Africa” as a whole and I found it a most interesting and instructive
document. It is quite an achievement that the views of all the overseas departments
have been so closely harmonised and I am sure that much credit is due to all
concerned and especially to the Chairman.
2. I do not know whether it is the intention that the paper should be formally
considered by the Cabinet. But I hope that in any case we may be authorised to use it
in our discussions on these African problems with the Americans and the French,
etc.
1 P de Zulueta (PM’s office); D Eccles, president of the Board of Trade.
2 See previous document.
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3. Indeed the genesis of the paper was the conversation which I had with Foster
Dulles3 at Brize Norton in October 1958 when we agreed that we should try to take a
joint look at Africa. The sooner we can carry things a stage further with the
Americans the better. We have also agreed to discuss Africa with the French and have
already started the processes of consultation with them. At a later stage, as Dulles
agreed at Brize Norton, the Belgians and Portuguese might be brought in too.
4. The Africa Committee paper should provide the essential background for all
these conversations—supplemented of course as the occasion may require by more
detailed and up-to-date information. I should like to start the ball rolling by opening
discussions with the Americans on the basis of the report. Thereafter we can go on to
discuss things with the French, Belgians and Portuguese.
5. I should accordingly be grateful for your authority to proceed along these
lines provided that our colleagues whose Departments were concerned in the
drafting of the report and to whom I am sending copies of this minute raise no
objection.
Minutes on 21
In spite, or perhaps because, of its length, this is not a very good paper. It is
permeated by the unimaginative spirit of colonial administration in decadence. I am
afraid that it will only result in wrong policies being adopted, or at best, in no policy.
The analysis of the African historical scene is adequate although much too long,
and the analysis of the present day is politically and economically quite good. There
is, however no attempt at all to compare the progress and success of the different
colonial policies adopted by the European powers. For example, is the Congo system
going, in the end, to give better results than that in Portuguese East Africa? Why
have the French managed to produce a higher type of politician than we have? Is the
French system of breaking down the tribal areas and superimposing their own
administration more satisfactory than our method?
These questions may seem academic, but Africa is one of the few parts of the world
in which we still have the power to influence events, at least to some extent.
It may be that in certain cases we ought now to reverse our policy of indirect rule
through native Chiefs and try to build up politicians, who are more or less well
disposed towards us: this might be a policy practicable in Nigeria. In Buganda on the
other hand it seems as though the Kabaka is our best bet.4 Then again the experience
of Ghana seems to show, if demonstration is necessary, that parliamentary
democracy will not survive the end of colonial rule. Ought we not decide what we
would like to see in its place instead of going on pretending.
Finally, perhaps the most curious feature of the paper is that it is proposed to
discuss it first with the Americans and only then with the other colonial powers. No
doubt the Americans will be more likely than the French to agree that it is essential
to teach the Africans English (Paragraph 95 of the report). But the main American
interest is to get a share in the exploitation of Africa’s mineral resources, and they
have no direct experience whatever of colonial administration.
3 US secretary of state, 1953–1959. 4 H H Sir E F W Mutesa II.
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This is one subject, I should have thought, in which we could really begin to build
a basis of inter-European co-operation; also our interests and those of the French are
really closer in Africa than those of the French and the Germans.
I must say that I should like to feel that we could have had a sensible talk with the
French, with a view to working out some sort of co-ordinated policy. For example,
the role of Christianity ought to be very important in keeping Africa orientated
towards Europe; the French are very conscious of this, but in this paper Christianity
is dismissed in a couple of sentences in Paragraph 24.
P.de Z.
1.7.59
Prime Minister
1. I welcome the course which the Foreign Secretary suggests in his minute to
you of June 28th.
2. It is encouraging that the Americans and French in particular are anxious to
consult with us about policy in Africa. I hope that we shall make full use of the
opportunity to bring home to both the U.S.A. and France—and especially the
U.S.A.—the dangers inherent in the policy of the European Economic Community
about trade with their Associated Overseas Territories in Africa. Let the Six, if they
wish, concentrate their investment in their own Associated Territories, but let them
not also penalise the trade of other African territories with Western Europe.
3. I am glad to see that the Official Committee’s Report brings out the dangers of
dividing Africa which the Treaty of Rome will bring in its train unless it is modified. I
am sure that it is most important for us, in the broad political context of the talks
which the Foreign Secretary proposes, to enlist the interest of the Americans on this
issue, and to persuade them to bring their influence to bear on the French and
Belgians.
4. When we come to talk to the French the fact that it is they who are pressing us
to discuss African policy should strengthen our position. We shall be better able to
insist that co-ordination in the political sphere can be nullified if they fail to show
more flexibility and understanding about the commercial and economic effects of the
Treaty of Rome.
D.E.
2.7.59
Foreign Secretary
I have now considered the Paper called “Africa—the next ten years” which has been
prepared by the Africa Official Committee and about which you sent me a minute on
June 28. I agree that this is a useful Paper and that it might be used as the basis for
preliminary discussions with our Allies.
At the same time there are many important questions with which the Paper does
not deal. African problems will undoubtedly become more important to us in the
next ten years and this is one of the few parts of the world in which the European
powers still have direct influence. Although I do not suggest that we could at this
stage quickly readjust our policies in Africa I think that it would be useful if officials
would now start preparing a further report on future policy.
In the first place I think that we should consider how far we can co-ordinate our
policies with those of the other Colonial powers. This would involve considering
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what territorial adjustments might be desirable in order to remove any anomalies
which there may be in the present division of Africa. Secondly, we ought to examine
the relative success of the various Colonial systems in developing a type of African
political system capable of standing on its own feet and favourably disposed towards
the West. Ought we, for example, to put less emphasis on indirect rule in some areas
or should we rather try to build up the native rulers? Is the French system of
breaking down indigenous tribal arrangements a good one? We should also consider
whether it would be wise to encourage higher educational institutions in Africa or
whether it is better to welcome African university students to Europe. The language
question clearly also presents a problem. Thirdly, I believe that more thought ought
to be given to the role of Christianity in keeping the Africans orientated towards
Westerns ideals. Finally, as the President of the Board of Trade has pointed out in his
minute of July 2, cooperation in Africa between the Colonial powers in the economic
field is highly desirable. We ought to consider how far this will have to follow
economic arrangements in Europe and whether African problems can be dealt with
separately. It may indeed be that cooperation in Africa might help to prevent the
economic division of Europe.
I am sending copies of this minute to the members of the Africa Committee, the
President of the Board of Trade, and the Secretary of the Cabinet.
H.M.
3.7.59
Prime Minister
I support the proposal in the Foreign Secretary’s minute to you of June 28th that we
should have talks with the Americans about Africa based on the report of the Africa
(Official) Committee.
2. The Foreign Office will no doubt consult my Department about the timing of
the talks.
3. I should be in favour of separate talks later with the French, Belgians and
perhaps the Portuguese. I imagine that it is not suggested that there should be joint
talks with them all together. I think these could be embarrassing, as the impression
might be given that the Colonial Powers in Africa were “ganging up”, and this would
lead to difficulties not only with Ghana but also with South Africa, if they were not
included.
4. I agree with what the President of the Board of Trade says in his minute to you
of the 2nd July about bringing home to the Americans, and subsequently at high
level talks to the French, the danger of dividing Africa which the Treaty of Rome will
bring in its train unless it is modified.
5. I am carefully studying your minute of 4th [sic] July and will be replying
separately to it. . . .
A.L-B.
7.7.59
Prime Minister
I was most interested to read your minute of 3rd July in which you suggested that, as
a follow up to the Africa Official Committee’s paper “Africa—the next ten years”,
officials should undertake a further study of African problems—some of which you
sign-posted.
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2. I fully agree that the African problems will loom larger in importance in the
next ten years or so, and that we should be diligent to prepare ourselves by study to
be able to take decisions based on sound knowledge. I therefore agree that further
studies would be useful and stimulating.
3. I have some reservations about your selection of subjects for study. It may or
may not be possible for us to co-ordinate our policies with those of other Colonial
powers. We should certainly exchange views freely. But I fear that it is fifty years too
late for the Metropolitan powers to indulge in an exercise to adjust territorial
boundaries. We know a good deal about the Colonial system of other powers and I
honestly don’t think that any of them is better able, or as well able as ours to develop
stable African Governments well disposed towards the West. But this doesn’t mean
that a careful objective study would not be most useful.
4. This applies also to the question of a comparison between the system of Chiefs
and native authorities, and tribal organisation generally, versus more modern
systems—on which millions of words must have been written. (It is not easy to
generalise on the subject). There is a wealth of information and opinions available,
too, about whether there should be Universities in Africa or whether African students
should come to Universities in Europe. The fact is that Universities have already been
established in West, East and Central Africa.
5. The language question has been the subject of innumerable studies but it
would be useful to collect the essence of these in small compass.
6. I agree that the role of Christianity is important in keeping Africans orientated
towards Western ideals—although I doubt whether the Archbishop of Canterbury
would agree that this was its role!
7. I warmly agree about the need to study economic arrangements for Africa in
relation to developments in Europe.
8. I hope you will not think that these comments suggest in any way that I do not
agree that further studies of the African scene will not be valuable.
A.L.B.
30.7.59
. . . In general I agree with the Foreign Secretary that there would be advantages in
our now initiating discussions on African problems with the Americans, the French,
and possibly the Belgians. The terms of reference for the U.K. official team, appended
to the Foreign Secretary’s minute of the 28th July, seem to me perfectly adequate for
this purpose. But I hope that, in addition to making the point about the impact of the
European Economic Community on Africa (which the President of the Board of
Trade rightly stresses), we shall emphasise the desirability of a genuinely
international approach to African problems, particularly as regards investment. All
the evidence suggests that, if Africa is to be kept on an even keel during the next ten
years, political advance will have to go hand in hand with economic development;
and for the latter very substantial investment will be required. The more this can be
provided through international channels—the International Bank and so forth—the
more we may hope not merely to improve the standard of living of the African but
also to promote a sense of partnership between black Africa and the West, which
should be valuable in a political no less than in an economic context. . . .
D.H.A.
30.7.59
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22 DO 35/8804, no 11 26 Nov 1959
‘Africa: the next ten years’: minutes of meetings of British and
Canadian officials in Ottawa to discuss the trend towards
independence
[The meetings were chaired by J W Holmes; other members of the Canadian team were
E W T Gill, G de T Glazebrook & D Stansfield. The British officials included A D M Ross
(FO), C G Eastwood (CO) and D W S Hunt (CRO); the high commissioner was Sir Saville
Garner. Further meetings on 27 Nov considered (1) Ghana’s relations with francophone
Africa, the UN, South Africa, Liberia and Egypt, & (2) Canadian public interest and policy
in Africa.]
(1) First Meeting
Mr. Holmes welcomed the United Kingdom team. The Canadian Government was
paying increasing attention to Africa. There was already an African section in the
Department of External Affairs and it was hoped soon to enlarge this to an African
division. Canadian officials had been very impressed by the United Kingdom paper on
Africa.
2. The High Commissioner introduced the members of the United Kingdom
visiting team. He welcomed the growing consultation between the United Kingdom
and Canada on African affairs. He doubted whether such consultation would have
taken place, say 10 years ago, when the United Kingdom was reluctant to take other
Governments into its confidence on Colonial affairs, and Canada for her part was
reluctant to become involved in them. The High Commissioner explained the origins
of the paper on which the present talks were based.
3. Mr. Glazebrook said the Canadians had prepared tentative agenda in order to
focus attention on the points on which they particularly sought enlightenment. It
was agreed that the first 5 items under the heading “The trend towards
independence” might be taken together.
The trend towards independence: time-tables
4. Mr. Eastwood said the trend towards independence had been so speeded up
recently that he found it a good working rule in estimating time-tables to ‘halve the
number you first thought of’. It could not be assumed, however, that the tempo
would go on increasing. He thought the timing of Ghana and Nigeria had been about
right. But progress towards independence in e.g. the Belgian Congo might be too
fast; independence there in four years might lead to chaos, and this in turn would
have an adverse affect on progress, e.g. in Tanganyika. Progress towards
independence in Kenya might move more quickly than the report suggested.
Mr. Ross instanced Guinea as an argument for shorter rather than longer time-
tables. Guinea had managed to find its own feet more quickly than was expected.
Mr. Eastwood emphasized that in the march towards independence the emergence of
strong personalities in the countries concerned was a vital factor. In multi-racial
communities the United Kingdom felt bound to apply the brakes but might not be
given the time to do so. (There were signs that in the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland the African element themselves now wanted the brakes applied). Mr. Gill
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thought that at least in uni-racial countries the speedier the progress towards
independence the more likely it would be that close links would be maintained with
the metropolitan powers.
5. Mr. Stansfield asked whether the United Kingdom accepted the primacy of
African interests in Africa. The answer was clearly “yes” in West Africa. Even in Kenya
and Central Africa the answer was similar because the African was in a majority. The
hope was that in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland ‘majorities’ and ‘minori-
ties’ would not in the future be distinguishable on racial lines but on party multi-racial
lines. Mr. Hunt believed personally that even in the Union of South Africa primacy for
the African must be the long-term trend. Short of global war, however, he doubted
whether this would happen in the lifetime of any of those present. In Portuguese Africa
there was not the slightest evidence of any change in, or desire to change, the status
quo, but it was impossible to foretell how long this would last.
6. Mr. Holmes wondered what the effect of economic conditions was on the trend
towards independence. It was agreed that as a whole the Continent was poor in
resources; its people also were poor, though poverty was not so abject as in large
parts of Asia. The wealthiest areas were those in which Europeans had settled. The
Federation, thanks to investment in such schemes as the Kariba dam, was almost
ready, in Professor Rostow’s phrase, to ‘take off’.1
7. Economic factors did not slow down the African nationalists’ drive towards
independence and the gaining of political freedom very often produced an upsurge in
economic effort. Some moves had been made towards economic interdependence,
e.g. the Ghana loan to Guinea, but on the whole each African territory pursued its
own economic ends without regard to its neighbours.
8. Mr. Holmes asked what were the economic interests of metropolitan powers.
Would they, e.g. be better off economically if their territories secured independence?
Mr. Eastwood said that no serious thought had been given to this question. This was
perhaps significant. In some cases, e.g. the High Commission territories, dependent
territories in Africa were a burden on the United Kingdom exchequer. But in fact
questions of economic advantage were not a factor in deciding United Kingdom
policies towards granting independence. In fact, provided the break occurred
amicably, political independence made very little difference to economic relations
between the United Kingdom and an African territory. From the point of view of
United Kingdom business interests it was important that the break should be an
amicable one.
The European Common Market
9. Mr. Eastwood emphasised that the overseas provisions of the Treaty of Rome
were damaging to United Kingdom colonies in Africa; they were a divisive factor and
tended to embitter the territories excluded from the common market against the
Western powers in general. The United Kingdom’s protests against these provisions
had so far proved unavailing. There were emotional factors involved, particularly
insofar as General de Gaulle was concerned. The United Kingdom hoped to obtain
some mitigation in the course of general tariff negotiations in 1960/61. It should be
remembered that the Six genuinely believed that the provisions of the Treaty of
1 W W Rostow, professor of Economic History at Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1950, author
of The stages of economic growth (UK edition 1960).
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Rome would tend to bind Africa to the West. The United Kingdom believed that the
discrimination against certain territories in Africa would have the opposite effect.
Commonwealth preferences were of some value to United Kingdom territories but
these advantages could not be compared with the advantages provided by the Treaty
of Rome to territories of the Six.
10. The problem of finding an alternative Government to which the
metropolitan ruler could transfer power, though it had proved acute in Ireland and
India, was not arising to the same extent in African territories. There was a tendency
towards authoritarianism in newly independent territories, but this was not
necessarily a bad thing, since in the early days at least of independence, strong
Government was vital.
11. The meeting then turned to individual territories:
(i) Sierra Leone. It was clear that Sierra Leone wanted its independence quickly
and preferably within the next 2 years. It had a moderate Government who believed
that if they were to play their due part in African affairs they must gain their
independence. The United Kingdom Government had made no commitment yet to
give Sierra Leone independence, but there seemed to be little alternative. Sierra
Leone was a small country with a population of 21⁄2 million people. It could just be
regarded as financially viable without outside assistance. The United Kingdom would
probably require certain defence rights in the country as a condition of
independence. It was probable that Sierra Leone would wish to join the
Commonwealth as an independent member and Commonwealth Governments
would have to consider in due course whether to accept Sierra Leone.
Mr. Holmes said that, although obviously he could not commit the Canadian
Government, nevertheless the evolutionary development of the Commonwealth had
been accepted as inevitable, and he had no doubt that the Canadian Government
would meet a request for membership by Sierra Leone with the usual sympathy.
The United Kingdom side pointed out that while Sierra Leone and certain other
larger territories would perhaps pass the test for full Commonwealth membership, it
was nevertheless going to be a difficult problem to find a suitable status for small
colonial territories ranging from, e.g. St. Helena to Hong Kong. Any views the
Canadian Government might have on this problem would be very welcome.
(ii) The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Mr. Hunt outlined the present
position. There was to be a review of the constitution in 1960 at what would
obviously be a crucial conference. The United Kingdom Government believes that
the Federation was going to be a success and that racial partnership would continue
to develop in the Federation. There were three main reasons for this:—
(a) The Rhodesian white settlers were on the whole strikingly realistic and liberal;
(although this could not be said of more recent British settlers); they were out-
numbered by the Africans by some 28 to 1; the figures for the Union were 3 to 1;
(b) the central African was far behind the West African in social and political
development;
(c) both sides understood that it was to their advantage to try and make
Federation work.
Nyasaland was the problem. There was no present enthusiasm for federation in
Nyasaland, but the United Kingdom Government’s view was that there was no future
for the country except as part of the Federation.
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12. Mr. Gill expressed some doubts about the liberalism of the Rhodesian white
settlers. Mr. Hunt believed that there had been great improvement within the last
two or three years. Most settlers now genuinely believed that colour-consciousness
must be removed from the political scene. He agreed that nevertheless time for
further enlightenment was still required. Mr. Glazebrook wondered whether the
multi-racial pattern proposed for the Federation could resist opposing pressures
from black Africa on the one hand, and the Union on the other. Mr. Hunt said that
the Union of South Africa and the Federation were moving in opposite directions.
United Kingdom business interests, and in particular the Rhodesian Selection Trust,
were proving very liberal in their outlook. In general it was coming to be realised
that inter-racial difficulties must be overcome before political independence was
granted, and the pressure for independence in 1960, the original target date, had died
away.
(2) Second Meeting
1. It was agreed to continue the morning meeting by looking at individual
territories in Africa which had not yet been covered.
2. Northern Cameroons. Mr. Eastwood said that up to a year ago it was
commonly supposed that the Northern Cameroons would opt to join Nigeria. In fact,
in the plebiscite, there had been a vote of almost 2 to 1 in favour of deciding the
territory’s future at a later date.
3. The United Kingdom Government was now faced with the problem of how to
administer the small and scattered Northern Cameroons after Nigeria became
independent in October 1960. No decision had been taken but the thinking in
London was that the territory would have to be separated from Nigeria and
temporarily administered by the United Kingdom. It might be that the administrator
would be responsible directly to the Colonial Office or, possibly, to the United
Kingdom High Commissioner in Lagos. It was also thought that the United Nations
should be asked, as in the case of the Southern Cameroons, to put two questions to
the people of the Northern Cameroons not later than March, 1961:
(i) Did they wish to join Nigeria?
(ii) Did they wish to join the French Cameroons?
4. East Africa: Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. The United Kingdom had always
hoped that these three territories might evolve into a federation but this now seemed
unattainable.
5. The outlook for Tanganyika was encouraging. There was not the rigidity of
racial feeling in Tanganyika such as existed in Kenya. The programme was expected
to be somewhat as follows:—
(i) “Responsible Government”: to last 6–7 years with a mixed cabinet of officials
and non-officials; Mr. Nyerere to be effectively Chief Minister;
(ii) “self government”: i.e., a cabinet of non-officials with reserved powers for the
Governor;
(iii) full independence.
There was no fixed time limit for this programme.
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6. The problem of Kenya was a much more difficult one because of (i) the legacy
of Mau Mau and (ii) the existence of a powerful European right wing minority. The
United Kingdom Government accepted that Kenya should have an African majority
with political power. There was to be a constitutional conference in London in
January 1961 which would be of crucial importance. Kenya lacked an African
personality of the type of Mr. Nyerere.
7. Uganda also presented a difficult problem. There was no single leader who
commanded general support. The attainment of full internal self-government by
1970 was only a pious hope.
8. French African territories. There was some discussion of French suspicions of
the United Kingdom’s attitude to her African territories, and to some extent of
Canada’s attitude also. Mr. Ross said the suspicions derived from Anglo-French
disagreements in the Middle East in the first world war. In recent years the
suspicions had been transferred to Africa. The French bitterly resented the United
Kingdom supplying arms to Tunisia in 1957. They were convinced that the United
Kingdom induced Ghana to suggest the Ghana–Guinea union and the French Prime
Minister had even believed that the Bank of England had provided £10 million for
Ghana to offer to Guinea. Suspicion still existed but the atmosphere had become
more relaxed in recent months. The United Kingdom believed that the French had
considerably altered their views since the date when the United Kingdom paper on
Africa was written. They were no longer so hostile to the formation of new
independent states in Africa.
9. Belgian Congo. It was agreed that the proposed ‘pyramid’ constitution for the
Belgian Congo was good on paper. It was, however, very doubtful whether the plans
for independence for the Congo in 4 years were practicable. If they were, then the
prospects for satisfactory relations between Belgium and the West generally and the
Belgian Congo were good. If they were not, then the Congo might break up into
fragments.
10. The Portuguese Colonies. There seemed no sign of any change in the status
quo. There was no ready explanation why this should be so.
23 CAB 134/1558, CPC(59)6 29 June 1959
‘Security powers of colonial governors’: Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee memorandum by Mr Lennox-Boyd
[A general problem was involved here, but a solution was urgent for Kenya and
Nyasaland. Mr Lennox-Boyd wanted to dispense with the psychological disadvantages
involved in proclaiming a State of Emergency, which involved the embarrassment of
having to satisfy the Human Rights Commission that an emergency existed before a
proclamation could be made (or revoked) (CPC(59)5, memo of 9 June 1959). The issue
was discussed by the Colonial Policy Committee on 1 July, when it was agreed governors
should not be authorised to introduce legislation for the time being, despite the evident
wishes of the two governors most concerned to have permanent powers enabling them to
end Emergencies at an appropriate time (CPC 3(59)). The matter was raised again by
Macleod in a memorandum arguing that at the beginning of Nov 1959 there was now ‘a
situation in Kenya on which we can build constructively’. What he felt was needed was
security legislation which could be invoked as soon as the Emergency was formally
terminated. He revived Lennox-Boyd’s idea of a two-tier system: in one tier the governor
would have some powers to deal with disturbances short of an Emergency; in a second
tier there would be more drastic powers, including detention without trial (CPC(59)18).
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The Kenya situation was discussed in the light of this proposal on 5 Nov 1959 (see next
document). However, as far as Nyasaland was concerned, he believed the balance of
advantage was to continue the State of Emergency (CPC(59)21, 17 Nov 1959).]
Since the Committee’s discussion on 18th June (C.P.C. (59) 2nd Meeting) I have
been giving much further thought to this. I have discussed it with the Governor of
Kenya and am in touch on it by telegram with the Governor of Nyasaland.
2. There is an acute dilemma. The dangers of allowing any Governor to publish,
let alone pass, permanent legislation giving him powers such as that of detaining
people without trial without actually declaring an emergency are patent. There is not
only the possibility that some marginal votes in the forthcoming election might be
affected. There is also a danger that the Labour Party would, with the election in
mind, state their intention, if returned to power, to see that the offending legislation
was withdrawn, thus producing in acute form that very state of uncertainty which
the permanent legislation is designed to prevent.
3. There are, however, also, in the case of both Kenya and Nyasaland, dangers in
the alternative course of restraining the Governors from introducing legislation and
asking them to rely on keeping their declared emergencies in being. Thus:—
(1) Whilst it is unlikely that a Labour Government would feel able to allow the
Governors to introduce permanent detention legislation, they might well allow
them to continue to make use of existing legislation. In fact, in Kenya at any rate,
they would find it very difficult to go into reverse. Both Governors are convinced
that they must continue to detain some people for a very long time if there is to be
any prospect of their maintaining law and order in their territories.
(2) In Kenya the Governor announced in his speech from the Chair in October
1958 that permanent security legislation would be introduced during the
Legislative Council Session—i.e. by October 1959. If this is not done, he will have
great difficulty in explaining why; and, if it gets around that I have stopped it, there
will be much despondency in non-African and in moderate African circles in Kenya
and the African extremists will be given a big boost. Further, it will not, of course,
be possible to bring the declared state of emergency to an end and, as the African
Elected Members have gone on record to the effect that it would be difficult for
them to take part in constitutional discussions till this is done, things might well
go sour again on the constitutional front; and
(3) As regards Nyasaland the Governor constantly says that it is the belief that
Hastings Banda and the other Congress leaders will soon return which prevents
many Africans from coming round to co-operation with the Government; and that
only the introduction of permanent detention legislation will serve to get rid of
this belief.
4. A further consideration is that, even if permanent legislation is not introduced
before the election, we shall certainly be cross-questioned about our intention by the
Opposition. For it has been publicly stated that in both Kenya and Nyasaland
detainees will be held as long as the Governors are satisfied that this is necessary for
the maintenance of law and order and the Opposition know perfectly well that we
have been considering legislation.
5. Possible compromises are:—
(a) to authorise the Governors to introduce the legislation, but to give it a life of
not more than, say, three years, unless renewed. This should considerably lessen
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the row; indeed we might be able to convince people that legislation of this kind
with a life of only three years was preferable to keeping on the emergencies; or
(b) to authorise the two Governors to introduce their legislation (i) in the case of
Kenya only if the Fairn Committee1 make it clear in their Report that continued
detention for a long time of some people is going to be necessary and (ii) in the
case of Nyasaland only if the Devlin Report has something in it to the same effect.
(I would say that (i) is a good deal more likely than (ii)).
6. We must not forget that one of the main purposes of the proposal for
permanent legislation was to enable embryo emergencies to be nipped in the bud
without a full emergency having to be declared. But it is the post-emergency
problem in Kenya and Nyasaland which is the more urgent and would really be
prejudiced by delay.
7. I should welcome further discussion with my colleagues on this.
1 R D Fairn, commissioner of prisons, 1955–1963, and director of prison administration, 1952–1960;
chairman of committee on detention camps in Kenya (1959); subsequently assistant under-secretary of
state at Home Office, 1964–1967.
24 CAB 134/1558, CPC 5(59)1 5 Nov 1959
‘Security powers in Kenya’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(59) 18) proposing that the State of Emergency in Kenya should be brought to an
end at an early date and replaced by local legislation, first to enable the Governor to
continue to detain the hard core of Mau Mau and other terrorists whom it would not
be safe to release at present, and secondly, to provide the Governor with certain other
security powers; and a memorandum by the Attorney-General (C.P.C. (59) 17)
commenting on certain aspects of these proposals.
The Colonial Secretary said that as a result of his predecessor’s declaration of
policy in April, 1959, which included a conditional promise of a constitutional
conference now arranged to take place in London in January, 1960, and the
subsequent emergence of moderate political groups, the political situation in
Kenya had been transformed and there was now a good chance that the country
could advance steadily towards more peaceful conditions. He therefore proposed
that the Governor of Kenya should be authorised when opening the new Legislative
Council on 10th November to announce the end of the formal State of Emergency.
This could only be done if means could be found to enable the Governor to keep in
detention the hard core of Mau Mau and other terrorists whom the Fairn
Committee had agreed could not safely be released at the present time. It would
also be necessary for the Governor to retain certain other powers such as those for
the control of public meetings and societies. He proposed that these should be
secured by enacting a local Preservation of Public Security Ordinance. It would be
desirable in this Ordinance not only to provide for the Governor to take certain
security powers which were necessary to deal with the present situation, but also to
enable him to take more drastic powers, if this should prove necessary, in order to
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deal with a possible deterioration in the situation, including the power to detain
without trial.
In their previous discussion of the general problem of security powers for Colonial
Governors the Committee had not favoured the suggestion that Governors should be
empowered to assume whatever powers they thought were necessary to deal with the
situation, including that of detention without trial, since this would invest them with
the means of destroying the fundamental rights of individuals at their discretion and
without notice. The local legislation he now proposed would get over this difficulty
by providing a two-tier system of emergency powers. The first tier would enable the
Governor, after making an appropriate announcement, to assume certain strictly
defined powers, such as those concerning public meetings, societies, publications
and movement, but not the all-important power of detention without trial; these
powers would be used either in a situation where there appeared to be a gradual
development of unrest, intimidation and lawlessness, or in circumstances such as
those existing in Kenya at present, where certain powers were needed but a full State
of Emergency was no longer necessary. The second tier would enable the Governor,
after issuing the necessary proclamation, to assume more drastic powers, including
the right of detention without trial, in circumstances where the safety of the nation
was being endangered. This proposal was put forward to deal with the particular
problem of Kenya, but it could be a model for other Colonial territories.
In discussion the following were the main points made:—
(a) The exercise of the limited powers suggested for the first tier would not
involve derogation from the European Human Rights Convention, but the
detention of persons without trial as part of the second tier proposals would
involve such derogation; in order to comply with the Convention, the second
tier would have to be preceded by an announcement by the Governor in terms
which would be consonant with the requirements of Article 15 of the
Convention—i.e. that there existed a public emergency threatening the life of
the nation. The proposed legislation to enable Mau Mau terrorists to be kept in
detention could be justified to the Human Rights Convention on the ground
that setting them free at the present time would create a public danger threat-
ening the life of the nation.
(b) The inclusion of the second tier proposals in the proposed Ordinance rather
than allowing the Governor in circumstances affecting the safety of the nation to
invoke the Emergency Powers Order in Council might result in Governors
resorting to these powers at an earlier stage than they would otherwise have done.
On the other hand there were presentational advantages in the local legislation
being comprehensive and covering both lesser and graver emergencies; moreover
this procedure would also assist the transference from a situation appropriate to
the second tier to one appropriate to the first.
(c) Although it was hoped that the proposed legislation for the continued
detention of Mau Mau terrorists would be of temporary duration, it would be
advisable not to mention a specific term in the Bill. Mention should however be
made of the intention to conduct a continuous review of individual cases and to
release detainees as soon as could safely be done.
(d) There would be advantage in the Colonial Secretary making a statement on
this subject in the House of Commons on the same day as that on which the
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Governor made his announcement in Kenya; the Colonial Secretary might also
make other appropriate arrangements for publicity.
Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that the proposals seemed
likely to lead to a significant improvement in the situation in Kenya. It would be
desirable for the proposed Kenya Bill regarding the two-tier security powers to be
circulated to the Committee for information, and members of the Committee could
send any comments direct to the Colonial Secretary unless they felt it necessary that
the matter should be further discussed in the Committee. . . .
25 CO 1032/241 14 Dec 1959–4 Aug 1960
[Parliamentary democracy and the Westminster model in Africa]:
minutes by C A G Wallis, R S Hudson, E R Hammer and Sir H
Poynton (CO)
Mr. Hudson
1. My visit to the Sudan in February of this year gave me an opportunity—too
good to be missed—of enquiring what reasons the Sudanese were giving to
themselves for their failure to operate a parliamentary constitution, Westminster
model? How much blame, I wondered, did they ascribe to their own natures and how
much to a faulty institution?
2. I did not write up my notes at the time, because the constitution of the Sudan
did not directly concern African Studies Branch, but you have now, for a number of
reasons, urged me to do so.
3. I attach1 therefore, for such action as you may think fit, a paper on the Sudan,
a sort of case-study of the breakdown of the parliamentary system in one country. I
also attach a note of a conversation with some Ministers in Nairobi. This, though
strictly speaking “off the record”, nevertheless follows on from the Sudan paper.
4. Parliamentary democracy has failed in countries which are so varied that, if
there is a common cause, it is at least as likely to be found in the system as in the
peoples. My own doubt is centred in the relationship between the Executive and
Parliament.
5. In the Westminster model, Parliament is the matrix of the Executive. When
this model is exported to dependent territories, we are forced in the transitional
stages to modify it in the interests of strong and stable government. This we do by
rigging the parliament through official majorities, a restricted franchise and so forth.
6. When the territory becomes independent it is usually to the accompaniment
of a greatly enlarged parliament and universal suffrage, for which our system may
not have been a direct preparation.
7. When the excitement of independence has died down, the successor
government is brought face to face with the problems which faced us, for they are
real problems such as lack of education and lack of nationhood. The new government
cannot go back on universal suffrage but is as sure as we were that the parliament
1 Annexures not printed.
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must be rigged, if government is to be at all possible. One method is by all possible
means, e.g. suppression of the opposition, to ensure that the government party is
dominant in the parliament and in local government councils also. If possible, this is
done by constitutional means and the democratic system at least continues. If it is
not possible the whole system breaks down and there is a revolution. Ghana is an
example of the first situation: Sudan, Pakistan and probably France are examples of
the second.
8. I do not pretend to be able to see more than a few bits of the problem, but a
very tentative deduction, which I should like to see examined by those who can see
the problem whole, is that in the sort of country of which we are thinking, the
parliament must be rigged in some way or other. It might be a better and more
lasting preparation for what always seems to follow if we, while we were able, adopted
a different method of rigging and restricted the powers of parliament rather than its
composition.
9. For example, parliament might cease to be the matrix of the executive, which
could then be created separately and made much more independent of parliament.
Parliament might be made more a consultative body and less the source of the
government of the country. This in turn would lessen the dangers otherwise inherent
in a wide extension of the franchise and we might be able to make early concessions
in this field, thus ceasing to oppose ourselves to a contrary opinion which seems to
be almost too massive for comfort.
10. If it is quite impossible to plan a different structure of government, and we
must go on as we are, then possibly we should revise our ideas about party
government. Do we perhaps over-emphasize the role of opposition in our system? In
African territories one-party domination, so far from being a lapse into
totalitarianism, may be the best way, without disrupting the constitution, of
ensuring stable government for the period while the country is developing true
nationhood. One-party government should perhaps be regarded with more sympathy
as being the first natural substitute for the former benevolent colonial
administration, an interim form of “indigenous” democracy replacing our system of
“applied” democracy.
11. If the first alternative of changing the relationship between the executive and
parliament proves impossible, I think that positive planning for one-party
government might be more in accordance with the facts and might therefore help
towards a more continuous and less jerky development. In that case we should look
for counterweights not within parliament but outside it, in units of decentralized
government, all of which will act as pressure groups. Our policy for local government
and possibly for provincial government should therefore be pursued even more
vigorously.
C.A.G.W.
14.12.59
I urged Mr. Wallis to write up these notes on the Sudan constitutional developments
because the lesson that the Westminster Model of parliamentary democracy is not
necessarily that best suited to African conditions is well brought out and if ever we
are to profit by it the time is now.
2. There is much to be said for a form of presidential government on American
lines, with a strong executive divorced from the legislature and a safeguard against
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central dictatorship by the dispersal of power before independence, where this is
possible. I have always felt that party government on British lines was a non-starter
in Africa
(a) Because party divisions are mainly on ethnic, racial, or religious lines and not
on the lines of e.g. economic or social policy;
(b) because elected members do not conceive themselves as representatives of the
territories as a whole but rather as delegates of those who send them to the
legislature;
(c) because Africans have not learnt to abide by majority decisions.
3. I heard the head of an independent African State defending one-party
government a few weeks ago. He said that this was in accordance with the African
way of doing things; that the disputes on policy would go on inside the one party and
the resultant decisions would represent the general view.
Professor Wheare speaking to the Cambridge Conference on local government
some years ago2 said
“There are two possible ways in which a democratic government could go to the bad in
these days; it could become a dictatorship or it could become a bureaucracy. Against
both of these dangers a strong healthy system of local government is not only the most
important protection, but is probably the only really effective protection. This is by far
the strongest of all the arguments in the case for local government.” . . .
I think it will be found to have been a mistake not to have set up provincial
councils in Uganda, Tanganyika and Northern Rhodesia somewhat on the lines the
Sudan is considering (paragraphs 10 and 11 of Mr. Wallis’s note.)
4. I fear it may be too late to change direction in the central constitutional
structures in East Africa, nor would this be politically possible. It may be possible in
Central Africa as a result of the present review of the federal structure. I doubt
whether we can plan for a one party structure, as Mr. Wallis suggests, even if this
were desirable, but it may not be too late to do more to disperse power to local
government bodies so that whatever winds may blow at the centre the man on the
farm, and in the street will be able to provide for his day to day needs in services and
have a buffer against a dictatorship or bureaucracy.
R.S.H.
16.12.59
Seen with great interest. I attach a copy of a note of a meeting which Sir John
Macpherson had with Under Secretaries earlier this year, which shows that Ministers
have had very much in mind the question of whether the Westminster model of
Parliamentary democracy is necessarily the best one for our Colonial territories, but
that the general view of higher authority in the Office at the official level was that we
now had very little room for manoeuvre in this matter, and that, in face of the
demands of the Colonial peoples themselves for constitutional progress modelled on
our own system, and taking into account also Parliamentary and public opinion in
U.K., it would be extremely difficult for us deliberately to introduce a more
2 Sir Kenneth Wheare, rector of Exeter College, Oxford since 1956, formerly Gladstone professor of
government and public administration. The summer school conference referred to was held in Aug 1951.
07-ConGov-Doc 1-28-cp  18/10/00  2:03 pm  Page 148
[25] DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 149
authoritarian regime or even any substantial variation of our own form of
Parliamentary democracy in a Colonial territory.
2. I also attach a copy of a recent paper on Democracy in Backward Countries,
which has been produced mainly by the Foreign Office.3 Paragraph 37 of this paper
sets out various arguments against trying to set up authoritarian regimes in Colonial
territories, but suggests that the United States system deserves further study. We
have made one or two preliminary comments on this paper in the light of the note
referred to in para 1 above; in particular, we have said that for us to attempt to deny
the Westminster model to the Colonial peoples, in favour of such a distinct variant
from our kind of democracy as the American system, could only engender suspicion
of our intentions, and that we are doubtful whether the emergent territories would
welcome the characteristic feature of the American system, namely, the divorce
between the Executive and Congress. The paper has not, however, yet been agreed
with us or the C.R.O.; in fact it is likely to be discussed between the three
departments fairly soon. . . .
E.R.H.
18.12.59
In the available time before going on leave tonight I really cannot do this justice. I
have ‘flipped through’ the F.O. paper, but have not had time to read Mr Branney’s.4 (I
should like to do so when I get back from leave).
To my mind, the crux of the problem, in practical terms, is well set out in
paragraphs 11 & 12 of the F.O. paper. To my mind it is quite unreal to think that we
could promulgate a policy which in effect says to Africans (& other indigènes):
‘The UK is the Mother of Parliaments. The Westminster model is the best—for us &
countries like Canada, Australia, N.Z. etc. But it is much too heady wine for you. We will
devise a bowdlerized version of Parliamentary democracy for you’.
Even if we could ‘get away with this’ politically, would not the eventual result be
that these territories when they come to independence would be not less
authoritarian but more so? They surely have a better chance if they’ve been brought
up on the right lines.
Are we to write off the whole work of the Commonwealth Parliamentary
Association & their (in my opinion) very valuable training courses? Is not the real
problem to pick out what may be regarded as the essentials (or ‘eternal verities’) of
British Parliamentary procedure—if one can agree on their identification—& plug
those for all we are worth, leaving perhaps more latitude over traditional ‘frills’
which have grown up out of the history of Great Britain but which may have no
particular appeal or value when exported. Easier to say than to apply, I admit.
I agree that the problem is aggravated where you have mixed racial communities.
‘One man one vote’ does not satisfactorily look after racial immigrant minorities.
But, I suggest, qualitative franchises & other devices are not irreconcilable with the
fundamentals of a democratic system.
3 See next document.
4 Paper by L Branney of the African Studies Branch: see also document no 27 below.
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Finally, I believe that the building up of an effective local civil services is more
than half the battle. Parliamentary democracy may break down even with a good
Civil Service. It cannot operate without one.
These are some rather random & wayward thoughts which you [Mr Eastwood]
may or may not find useful.
A.H.P.
4.8.60
26 FO 371/152113, no 3 8 Mar 1960
‘Democracy in backward countries’: FO planning report, ‘implications
for the future’ [Extract]
[During the prime minister’s visit to Washington in June 1958, Foster Dulles expressed
concern about the dangers arising from the introduction of democratic institutions into
relatively backward countries. Accordingly, Sir N Brook chaired a committee to consider
the issue with Sir A Clutterbuck (CRO), Sir H Poynton (CO) and Sir R Stevens (FO). He
invited the FO to make this report in its Planning Section—where P E Ramsbotham
minuted: ‘The emphasis we should give to “national independence” is part of the problem
of reshaping our information policies to fit the new Soviet tactics of the Khrushchev
regime’ (18 Feb 1960). Brook’s small committee decided in Sept 1960 that it was
unnecessary to circulate the report (was it already out of date?), but a copy was sent to the
US State Dept, who agreed with it to the point of discontinuing work on their own
report—‘the kiss of death!’, Brook commented. The conclusions of the report are
summarised in Morgan, Guidance towards self-government pp 185–186.]
. . .
United Kingdom colonial policy
11. In the light of the analysis in paragraphs 4–10 above, what are the prospects
for democracy in the United Kingdom colonial territories which can expect to reach
independence? While prediction is more than usually difficult in this matter, the
following tentative conclusions emerge:
(a) States which are and remain comparatively free from the direct impact of the
East–West struggle will stand a better chance. The West Indies are an example.
(b) None of our remaining colonial territories can be expected, before the
pressure for independence becomes intense, to have achieved the political and
administrative skill and experience which many Indians had achieved by 1947.
(c) We must expect that those territories which have had little or no tradition of
popular rule in the past will only put up a poor resistance if, after independence,
their democratic institutions are threatened.
(d) Finally, we must take into account the fact that democratic institutions will
result in policies acceptable to vocal political opinion, that this opinion will, for
the foreseeable future, be greatly swayed by nationalist sentiment and that this
sentiment may in the short term work to the disadvantage of the United Kingdom
and the Western Powers generally, e.g. over the questions concerning
“colonialism”, overseas bases and the protection of British interests by force.
12. It is of course the set policy of the United Kingdom to bring colonial
territories to independence as soon as they can be made ready for it. While the record
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of democracy in newly independent and backward countries can only confirm the
view that independence has often been granted in the past before the recipients were
really ready for it, this cannot materially affect United Kingdom policy over the
timing of such grants in the future. The surest way to discredit democracy for ever
would be to use it as a reason for refusing independence to those who felt themselves
[ready] for it.
13. The question therefore is not whether, in the light of experience, the United
Kingdom should delay the granting of independence until the territories concerned
are capable of maintaining a stable democratic system. It is, rather, whether it would
be preferable in the interests of stability to grant independence, when this becomes
necessary, under some other kind of régime which might be less perishable than a
constitution in the Westminster model.
14. On this subject generalisation is more than normally dangerous. Every
territory has its peculiar problems, and a constitutional device applicable to one may
be quite irrelevant to the needs of another. But certain broad considerations seem
pertinent.
(a) Constitutional devices must not be confused with the realities of power. To
dress up an authoritarian régime with the trimmings of democracy achieves
nothing but discredit for the ideal to which it pays lip service.
(b) If therefore the United Kingdom were to instal in power an effective
authoritarian régime, it would be extremely difficult in most cases to disguise this
fact. But to do so openly would raise other difficulties:
(i) In the vast majority of territories, the politically vocal sections of opinion
want fully democratic institutions, and would be content with nothing less.
(ii) Home opinion would find it difficult to understand the transfer of power to
an authoritarian régime.
(iii) Such a policy would render the United Kingdom liable to attack in the
United Nations and present the Russians with a propaganda advantage.
(iv) Our own traditions and habits of mind equip us singularly ill as mentors to
future authoritarian rulers.
(c) There are of course varieties of democracy other than the “Westminster”
model. But though some of these may be as effective, if not more so, the fact is that
the countries themselves nearly always pay us the compliment of wishing to
imitate our system. When a country embarks on self-government it is anyway
perhaps more important what kind of party life it will have than what kind of
institutions. Institutions only provide the framework, while the organisation of the
political parties is the essential content. In some cases, there may be political
institutions or habits in backward countries which could be adapted to democratic
purposes.
(d) But perhaps the principal feature of the democratic system is the existence of a
means whereby an alternative Government can lawfully come to power, and any
constitution which can be called democratic must include it. As long therefore as
any constitution introduced by the United Kingdom remains democratic it must
contain that element of instability which is involved in the possibility that the
Government will be thrown out. Assuming the absence of restraint referred to in
paragraph 6(d) above, this will mean that the government will always be tempted
to make sure by authoritarian methods that this does not happen.
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(e) There are however strong arguments for ensuring that the possibility of lawful
replacement is a feature of any constitution introduced by the United Kingdom.
First, if this is not the case, Governments can only fall unconstitutionally and
almost certainly by violence. This is an obvious bar to any lasting stability.
Governments always do fall sooner or later, and any régime which comes to power
by force is likely to rule by force. Inasmuch therefore as moderate government is
both desirable in itself and a necessary condition of lasting stability, there must be
provision for replacement by lawful means. Secondly, if an authoritarian govern-
ment set up by the United Kingdom fell or became highly unpopular, we should
incur odium for having set it up. There would therefore be a considerable risk that
its successor would adopt a policy of hostility towards the United Kingdom. Thirdly,
the opposition under an authoritarian régime would be bullied, denied the oppor-
tunity for constructive public criticism, and possibly driven underground. In these
circumstances it would offer an easy target for Communist penetration, with dan-
gerous consequences when it ultimately forces its way to power.
15. The problem is complicated in the case of multi-racial communities,
especially those containing a white settler population. This is, for us, the most
crucial problem of the coming decade. If full democracy is introduced, the majority
will oppress the minority. At first sight a more authoritarian régime therefore seems
more suitable. But where is the power to lie? If it lies with the majority, the same
result would follow; if it lies with a minority, the constitution will appear unjust and
will only last for as long as the minority can maintain itself. In the last resort, it will
only be able to do so by force. The best hope seems to lie in a modified democracy,
which will balance the conflicting interests of all parties, but it is difficult to imagine
that this will provide a permanent answer; constitutional safeguards are flimsy
obstacles to the tendency of power to find its own level.
16. To sum up the preceding paragraphs, therefore, it appears that, the
arguments in favour of some form of democratic constitution are overwhelming.
Neither the democratic nor the authoritarian solution, however, offer an easy answer
to the problem of multi-racial communities. . . .
26. It may also be that the struggle between East and West is gradually losing its
ideological character and reverting to historical type as a more straightforward
competition in national power. This is a speculative question which cannot be
discussed at length in this context. But if it is true that, while preaching Marxism,
the Soviet and Chinese leaders are now more fundamentally concerned with the
national aims of Russia and China than with the promotion of world revolution as an
end in itself, this development may be an advantage to the West in its task of
influencing the backward countries.
27. For the theoretical case for and against Communism does not and probably
cannot engage the thoughts and emotions of backward peoples in such a way as to
make an important difference to their international alignment. It is frequently
regarded as an alien and primarily “European” dispute between Great Powers, which
has little bearing upon the less sophisticated problems of backward countries, and
which the Great Powers use as a smokescreen to conceal their efforts to drag the rest
of the world into their own quarrel. The internal problems which obsess the
backward countries are raising the standards of living and obtaining an honest and
efficient administration. Many of them are predisposed to try what Communism has
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to offer, not because they believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat but because
they believe that the Communists have succeeded in providing a solution to these
material problems. Inasmuch moreover as they have already tried democracy and
found it wanting in this respect, they are also inclined to close their minds to the
ideological aspects of the counter-appeal from the West.
28. In this situation the importance of economic aid, technical assistance and
tactful advice from the West are obvious. It will be important to the success of our
projection of the West as a tried and reliable friend to do all that is possible to expand
and make them effective. If we are to win the competition for the allegiance of the
backward countries, we shall need to be able, and before very long, to point to the
example of one or more of these countries which has succeeded, with the help of
Western aid and without recourse to Communist methods, in solving its economic
and administrative problems.
29. The conclusion which seems to emerge from this review of the West’s
posture in the East–West struggle is that we shall have to depend in future less upon
the ideological appeal of democracy and more upon a reputation for large and
effective economic aid and the championship of national independence. At the same
time we should not abandon our championship of democratic ideals. Our hope must
be that in gaining the friendship of the backward countries by promoting their
economic advance and defending their political independence, we shall vindicate in
their eyes the political system under which we live.
30. Since there is a direct correlation between standards of living and of
education, technical and administrative skill, and breadth of opportunity for ability
on the one hand and the successful practice of democratic forms of government on
the other, a policy which concentrates on the material requirements of the backward
countries is likely, at least in the long run, to serve the best interests of democracy as
well. This is not just a question of slogans but of political realities. Given the state of
political maturity of the majority of the under-developed countries and territories,
we cannot hope to see them operating a fully-fledged parliamentary régime for a long
time. What is very much in our interest to see is that emerging governments (and
others with whom we are on friendly terms) shall be stable and popular. Our efforts
may be better directed towards that than trying to shore up parliamentary systems or
universal franchise or encouraging their operation on a farcical or dishonest basis (as
behind the Iron Curtain) which can only discredit both them and ourselves. We
already work consistently and, by and large, successfully to create the preparatory
realities of democracy (which include an efficient and independent army and police
service, training of all kinds, technical assistance, legal and medical advice and
education). This is more important than a finished facade. It is right that our
conscious efforts should be directed at least as much towards making these countries
less backward as towards making them more democratic.
31. Conclusions
(a) Westminster Democracy can not be expected to work well in countries with
low standards of living and education. Among other causes of the comparative
failure of democratic institutions in backward countries have been abnormal
political and economic circumstances, the tradition of authority, the absence of
restraint, the lack of maturity and the withdrawal of discipline in a political
situation already predisposed to unrest.
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(b) But, in many cases at least, governmental instability has been a reflection as
much of the political, economic and social crisis which might well have upset any
alternative system of government as of the unsuitability of democratic institutions
themselves.
(c) The prospects for democracy in backward countries which reach independence
in the future are no more encouraging. But in the present situation this cannot
materially affect the timing of the granting of independence.
(d) It may be possible and desirable to introduce variants on parliamentary
democracy but the arguments in favour of some form of democracy are
overwhelming.
(e) The United Kingdom must maintain its open support for the democratic ideals
which are a strongest suit for the rest of the world. But we cannot afford to
alienate authoritarian régimes on ideological grounds, either inside or outside the
Commonwealth, and we must find a means of accommodating them within our
camp.
(f ) This presents the West with a dilemma, especially in the context of the
East–West struggle. The solution may lie first in stressing the basic needs of an
independent judiciary, a non-political civil service, freedom to criticise etc. rather
than constitutional forms, and secondly in placing relatively less emphasis on the
ideological appeal of democracy and more upon our role as a reliable provider of
aid and defender of national independence. Success in this may persuade the
backward countries that democracy can work as well in their countries as ours if
the minimum conditions of prosperity and stability are first achieved.
(g) We should concentrate more on the preparatory realities of democracy than
the finished facade. The cause of democracy can best be promoted in the long run
by raising standards of living, administration etc., in the backward countries.
27 FO 371/152115, no 18 15 Mar 1960
[Democracy in backward countries]: letter from T J O’Brien (CRO) to
P E Ramsbotham (FO) commenting on draft paper [Extract]
. . . I think I must say here and now that there are still considerable differences
between us in our approach to this problem. . . .
(a) The record. We still feel that your paper fails to do full justice to the record of
newly-independent countries, and that it puts the wrong slant on the lessons to be
learnt for the future conduct of United Kingdom policies. Maybe this is because
countries formerly under British rule have developed different characteristics to
those which never were. We can only speak with authority about the former. Possibly
this makes differences between our respective views inevitable. . . .
Any such analysis, in our experience, leads to less gloomy conclusions than you
have painted. Surely the bull-point is that the basic conditions of democratic life are
still respected, still desired, and have in fact (in the new Commonwealth at least)
survived tolerably well? Admittedly the formal institutions of democratic life have
taken some hard knocks in a good number of cases. . . . But there is hope for the
future simply because the authoritarian régimes that have been installed in their
place are generally expected to aim towards social conditions analogous to those of
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the Western democracies and usually refrain from regimentation of the sort
practised by past or present totalitarian states. In itself this makes possible pressure
for some form of popular government suited to the particular needs of the country
concerned. This has already had results in Burma; it is having results in Pakistan.
With any luck the evolutionary transition to whatever forms of popular government
are best suited for these countries will be more rapid than it was in the United
Kingdom!
To put it brutally, the conclusion that seems to emerge from your paper is that
parliamentary government is only workable by westerners. We do not believe that
our constitutional policy in the Indian and Colonial Empire was as misguided as all
that.
(b) United Kingdom future colonial policy. We should start off by saying what our
future colonial problems are. In point of fact we have not got a lot of room for
manoeuvre—most of the horses have already bolted; and a number are already so far
out of the stable that they cannot be pushed back again. Those that remain are either
multi-racial (and represent an entirely new problem for us) or very backward or so
small that they are unlikely ever to become fully independent.
We should go on to say that even if we wanted to, we have no opportunity of
introducing any radical change in our colonial constitutional policy—it would not
be tolerated either by the territories concerned (though perhaps Group-Captain
Briggs1 might enter a dissentient vote here) or by public opinion in this country.
But the crux of our future policies lies in promoting parliamentary government
(as we understand it) in multi-racial communities. Here we would like to give your
paragraph 15 very much fuller treatment, drawing as necessary on the Prime
Minister’s recent speeches in Africa.
Your paragraphs 11 to 14 seem frankly academic to us and very remote from what
has been happening in Africa during the last two months.
(c) United Kingdom policy towards non-parliamentary regimes. We do not accept
that we are presented with an embarrassing dilemma.
The conflict which you see between United Kingdom ideology and normal friendly
associations with Ayub, Nkrumah, Sukarno and even Syngman Rhee seems very
unrealistic to us. We have got to live with these regimes. None of them are
committed to the self-perpetuating tyranny of communism. If we deliberately cut
them off from the West, we may well propel them towards that precise form of
tyranny. And if it were seriously suggested that the United Kingdom should associate
only with the ideologically pure, according to your estimate of the record of
democracy we would have to retreat into an exclusive Anglo-Saxon/Western
European club and assume comparative indifference over the fate of the
uncommitted under-developed world. I know you do not suggest we should do this.
But the point is that nobody else is suggesting we should.
Part of this difference between us is that we are drawing different conclusions
form the record (my (a) above).
Our thesis is that given time, stability, economic advance and education (and
provided that the Soviet Bloc do not win the battle for the under-developeds) most of
these countries could evolve forms of popular government, not necessarily of the
1 Of Kenya: see document no 160, n 2, below.
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Westminster pattern, but at least far-removed from totalitarianism. We must
continue to present a picture that shows the United Kingdom as a working example
of democracy, anxious to promote independence both in our own remaining
dependencies and in the world at large. We must be tolerant of those who have not
yet been able to go so far as we have, and must live in hopes that our example is the
one that they wish and seek to emulate. Our real concern is with the realities of
democracy rather than with its outward forms (the Prime Minister’s Cape Town
speech is not irrelevant in respect of those who transgress these realities). The
material contribution that we are providing is economic aid that can promote social
conditions where there would be less need to lean heavily on authoritarian
government.2 . . .
2 By contrast, the CO commented that they were happy with the redraft as it stood.
28 CO 1032/242, no 2 3 Aug 1960– 1 Aprl 1961
[L Branney’s paper on British democracy and the Westminster
model]: CO minutes by L Branney, A R Thomas, W B L Monson, C G
Eastwood and J C McPetrie [Extract]
I send you this Paper, at Mr Hammer’s request, with diffidence and apologies owing
to its length.1
It originated in an attempt to comment within the limits of a minute on the
General Dept. file concerning an investigation of the reasons for the apparent failure
in various cases of the democratic constitutions, modelled as it is supposed on our
own, with which we have endowed our former dependent Territories. It was
stimulated in particular by what seemed to me certain serious misapprehensions in
the contributions on that file, epitomised particularly in two propositions; one, a
C.O. comment concerning the apparent need for a stronger Executive in these
Territories, which observed that unfortunately we could not have one version of
democracy for ourselves and one for export; and the second, an F. O. comment which
characterized western democracy as consisting essentially in a universal franchise.
The first proposition seemed to me to evince a serious misapprehension about the
nature of our own constitution and the supposed correspondence of these Colonial
constitutions with it, and the second a serious error about the nature of democracy
at least in our British tradition and institutions.
The Paper is therefore mainly concerned to point out the two quite different tradi-
tions of democracy in England and elsewhere in Europe, one of government by the peo-
ple and the other by their consent; secondly that the position of the Executive in our
constitution and the separation of powers which give expression to our principle of
democracy is the essential characteristic of our constitution; that owing to 19th century
propaganda this has been almost entirely lost sight of and so we have failed to reproduce
1 ‘An examination of British democracy and the British constitution and their supposed application to the
dependent territories’ (at no 1). This was 67-pages long. Branney was a research officer in the African
Studies Branch. He left the CO in 1963, and Poynton minuted ‘on the whole I think we’d better quietly put
this by’ (19.7.63); he believed it to be a stimulating but largely irrelevant piece of work, as the pattern of
constitutional advance was already pretty well set (CO 1032/241, minute 20.9.60).
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it in these Colonial constitutions, and to this in large part their failure is probably to be
ascribed. Finally it is maintained that experience (our own especially) shows that the
proper control of the Executive power, (which our system achieves without nullifying
it), is far more the essence of democracy as we mean it than the mere machinery, like
the franchise, by which popular participation in government is effected, and that such
popular participation and effective government can—and safely—be combined in a sys-
tem of what is in effect a separation of powers like our own.
To demonstrate all this adequately, and especially the nature of the separation of
powers in our constitution which is so much more clearly portrayed in our history
than it can be in any theoretical exposition, requires extensive reference to our
political and constitutional history. This is the excuse for the length of this paper as it
was the reason for the complete failure to put it in the original minute.
L. B.
3.8.60
. . . It seems to me that the degree of success which a newly independent country
achieves in preserving a reasonable degree of democracy coupled with a sufficiently
(but not excessively) authoritative government, depends far less on the form of
constitution we bequeath (though that is important) than on the good sense and
willingness to compromise on the part of the legislators and political leaders so that
the former recognise the need to allow some initiative and scope for leadership on
the part of the Government and the latter recognise their ultimate responsibility to
the Legislature. Given a reasonable degree of this maturity, I should think that the
misconceived “Westminster model” which we have been sowing round the place was
probably as good a one as we could leave; and that without such maturity things were
likely to go wrong whatever forms of constitution were provided. . . .
A.R.T
29.9.60
. . . 2. Let me say at the outset that in the Departments with which I am concerned
there is a very keen appreciation of the merits, particularly from the point of view of
the protection of minorities with which Mr. Branney is particularly concerned, in
separating the powers of the Executive and the Legislature in such a way as to avoid
giving the latter full control over the former. Indeed this principle of reserving the
ultimate authority to the Executive has been followed by us in the new constitutions
we have negotiated for Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda and Nyasaland, and I hope that, if
we negotiate, as is likely, a new constitution for Northern Rhodesia in the coming
months we shall again do it on the basis of firmly establishing the Governor’s power
to act independently of his Legislature if the situation warrants it. It only remains for
me to invite reference to the statement by the Secretary of State recorded in
Footnote 1 to this minute which shows that his policy in these negotiations has been
based very much indeed on this thesis of the separation of powers.2
3. But it may be said with justice that in these particular constitutions we have
been concerned with an interim stage during which we are giving the African
majority a considerable amount of its head but at the same time trying to educate it
2 Statement in Zomba, 31 Mar 1960: ‘the reality of power would be retained in the hands of the
government through the Executive Council’.
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to discharge its responsibilities, particularly towards the minorities in its midst,
when it has control of independent states. There has been, it is fair to say, no overt
suggestion from our side that these reserve powers which are presently entrusted to
the Governors under direction of the U.K. Government should be transferred to the
Executive of an independent state. We have therefore got to consider the idea of the
separation of powers from the point of view of building something into the
constitution which would allow of such separation after independence. This means
that we must negotiate, particularly if we are to protect minorities, with the majority
in advance of independence.
4. From my own standpoint I find it difficult to persuade myself that such a
proposition would either be negotiable or indeed practicable.
5. To take negotiability first, (though strictly speaking it is perhaps a second
point) we want to get a system of government with the consent of the governed, that
is to say we want in concrete terms to get a system, containing in it a separation of
the powers of the Executive and the Legislature with particular reference to the
protection of minorities, but which is at the same time acceptable to the bulk of the
African peoples concerned. There is no point in our imposing a solution before
independence if we are to think in terms of something which will be acceptable
before independence and carried through into the independent period.
6. If therefore we are to negotiate something acceptable to the bulk of the Africans
we have to consider how such a proposal for the separation of these powers would
appear to the average African of influence politically. What the African Nationalist (for
it is with the Nationalist that we would have to reach agreement) is fundamentally
concerned with in politics is the removal of any idea that the African is an inferior type
of human being. The belief that he is so inferior goes back into history far beyond mod-
ern “imperialism”. (The Semitic authors of the Book of Genesis had to dress up in the
story of Noah’s [Ham’s?] drunkenness a justification for what was evidently to them
an accepted truth viz. that the African was inferior to all other branches of the human
race). With this long history of contempt behind him it is little wonder if his reactions
in constitutional matters are often illogical. It is therefore understandable if he is
inconsistent in sometimes claiming that he must have a constitution precisely the
same as we give ourselves and at other times claiming that he is fully entitled to devise
a form of constitution different from ours but which will give expression to the sepa-
rate “African personality”. In so far as both these attitudes are found among politically
conscious Africans they tend to rationalise their inconsistency by demanding that any-
thing which we give them during the “Colonial” phase shall be what we would give
ourselves but that after the Colonial phase they are fully entitled to change the con-
stitution left behind to make it express properly the African personality.
7. What is quite certain is that they will not take from us something different
from what we give ourselves simply because we say we have come to the conclusion
that, while suitable for ourselves it is not suitable for them. . . .
13. It looks in fact as though the best protection for minorities that we can
devise, imperfect though it may be, is to be found rather in legal safeguards or
entrenched clauses as recommended e.g. by the Monckton commission.3
W.B.L.M.
31.10.60
3 C G Eastwood added in the margin: ‘and embodied in the Nigerian Constn’.
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. . . The great danger to which an emergent country is exposed is “the tyranny of the major-
ity”, as in Ghana—a majority which may (as also in Ghana) operate at the behest of a sin-
gle person. It is going to be very difficult in any emergent country to get the pendulum
swinging so that the government of today becomes the Opposition of tomorrow. (The
Federal Government of Nigeria is, I hope, going to be an exception to this since it is likely
to have to consist for a considerable time of a coalition of the principal parties of two out
of the three Regions and the two coalescing may change from time to time. The Regions
look like being almost as monolithic as Ghana.) Almost everywhere it is going to be very
difficult to build up an effective Opposition in the initial years of independence because
prior to independence the main objective of everyone has been to obtain independence:
no politician has been able to oppose that: he will only have been able to oppose the way
other leaders set about getting it and when the other leaders have been successful in get-
ting it his criticisms will not carry much weight. For the first few years an Opposition will
find it very hard to build themselves a platform and their efforts will, as Mr. Branney points
out, risk being regarded as factious or even seditious—again as in Ghana.
These dangers are evident enough in a (relatively) mono-racial country like Ghana.
They are greatly increased in a multi-racial country where there are racial minorities
which can never expect to become a majority. Mr. Branney is very critical of the Willink
report on minorities in Nigeria and I personally agree with some of his criticisms. But
I believe that one of the safeguards which they recommended was the best that we have
been able so far to invent for racial minorities, namely the laying down of a code of
fundamental rights in clauses of the constitution so entrenched that they can only be
altered if this is the will of something much more than a bare majority. . . .
C.G.E.
2.1.61
. . . I would hesitate to accept some of his generalizations. How the “Westminster
model” works when exported must, it seems to me, depend to a considerable extent
on the social, political and, perhaps, economic state of the territory to which it is
exported. The exported product is recognizably like the original in some places, such
as, for example, Jamaica and Barbados (to say nothing of the old Dominions).
Furthermore, even in this country, the working of the Westminster model surely
varies with the circumstances of the time. When the Government majority in
Parliament is very small, then the Executive in this country would appear to me to be
much more dependent upon Parliament than is the case when the Government
majority is a comfortable one; and I would expect that to be reflected in Government
policy and Government activity generally. It may be that what an African territory
needs today is a strong Executive Government and it may be, as Mr. Branney
contends, that the Westminster model is unlikely to produce this. But there is
another side to the medal and I should have thought that if one strengthened the
Executive Government at the expense of the legislature one would be taking a risk
with the freedoms of the individual, which the legislative chamber (at any rate if it
contains anything of an Opposition) would be more jealous to safeguard than would
the Executive. In any case, like Mr. Monson I doubt whether we could get Africans to
accept anything other than the Westminster model at our hands; though they might
work out a different pattern for themselves once they had attained independence. . . .
J.C.McP.
11.4.61
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29 PREM 11/2583 25 May 1959
[D Stirling’s memorandum on change in Black Africa]: letter from 
Mr Macleod (Ministry of Labour) to Mr Macmillan
[Entitled ‘A policy for East and Central Africa’ (20 May 1959), this memo was sent to the
prime minister with Macleod’s encouragement. It accused the government of lacking an
‘irrevocable commitment’, merely retreating towards eventual independence ‘in the
despondent spirit of a rearguard action instead of advancing towards it with a planned
programme of legislation’, providing more aid, more education and a speedier response to
popular demands; they should not insist on the pattern of the British constitution, and
should get rid of communal representation by substituting common roll franchises (CAB
130/164, GEN 688/1).]
There is rather a complicated story behind the Memorandum on African policy which
I think has been sent to you by David Stirling,1 and I thought you might be interested
to hear the full story.
“Black Africa” remains perhaps our most difficult problem as far as our
relationships with the vital middle voters is [sic] concerned. It is the only one in
which our policies are under severe criticism and for example the only one on which
we are regularly defeated at the universities. Indeed the universities feel more
strongly on this issue than on any other single matter. We have in front of us the
Devlin Commission, now I believe expected at the end of July.2 I see in a recent issue
of the Spectator that they say that this issue is the only one on which the Socialists
can reasonably still hope to turn the tide for them and although I think this is rather
special pleading unquestionably we are in a difficult position.
David Stirling as you know was a man of tremendous courage and with a genius for
leadership in war and he is a dreamer in peace. But on the whole he dreams the right
sort of dreams. There is only one sentence that matters in his policy and that is the
suggestion that the rights of the individual should be secured to him by virtue of his
position as a citizen rather than because of the colour of his skin or his membership
of a particular community. This goes perhaps a little further than Blundell3 would like
to go, but is really no different from Cecil Rhodes’s old idea of “equal rights for all
civilised men”. It would mean the end of separate electoral rolls and no doubt it would
mean in many territories African majorities on the unofficial side, and it would be nec-
essary during the period of tutelage perhaps to have a fairly stiff qualification for the
right to vote. But whatever it is it would be the same for everyone.
Stirling understands little or nothing about the realities of Party politics in this
country and his idea is that all Parties should join hands now in a declaration along
these lines before the General Election. He has talked in what he fondly claims to be
confidence to Gordon Walker and Callaghan.4 His idea was for a press conference on
1 A D Stirling, DSO, OBE, Légion d’Honneur, founder member of first Special Air Service (SAS)
Regiment; president of Capricorn Africa Society, 1945–1959, while living in Salisbury or Nairobi. His
influence on African policy is discussed in R Ovendale, ‘Macmillan and the wind of change in Africa,
1957–1960’ Historical Journal vol XXXVIII (1995) pp 472–473, 477.
2 See document no 494 in Part II.
3 Michael Blundell, Kenya farmer, minister of agriculture, 1955–1959, when he resigned to form New
Kenya Group.
4 P C Gordon Walker, MP, S of S for Commonwealth relations in Labour government, 1950–1951; James
Callaghan, MP, parliamentary and financial secretary to the Admiralty, 1950–1951; Labour spokesman on
colonial affairs from 1951; prime minister, 1976–1979.
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the 3rd June, to be followed by a Debate in the House of Lords, which I gather would
be led by Ferrier and Boothby, and a public campaign to secure general acceptance of
this principle. Such a programme could not fail to be extremely embarrassing and
dangerous for us. I should also mention that Stirling is really behind the Opposition
in the Debate in Edinburgh at the General Assembly today to the ideas of my
namesake, Dr. Macleod,5 and he has drafted, in conjunction with Bernard Fergusson,
an alternative and more right wing Motion. I do not know what will come of this but
as you know it is a considerable issue in Scotland. Stirling calls himself a high Tory
and I am sure that he is anxious if he can to help but I think for him Africa comes
first. Knowing this when he discussed the matter with me and showed me a copy of
his Memorandum, I suggested that the campaign he has in mind would be bound to
end up as a Party squabble and that he would get nowhere. I went on to say that as we
were going to win the next Election by far the most effective thing to do was to have
some paragraphs in the Conservative Manifesto which would point the way to a
liberal solution in Africa and I further suggested that he should, in view of this, send
his Memorandum to you. I believe he has done this.
I think we must try if we can to persuade him to agree to something like this.
Accordingly if you have the time, and because this subject is potentially so explosive,
I would suggest that you see him yourself, and try to persuade him that his best inter-
est lies in the line I have suggested to him and we then see how far we can go in the
phrasing of some paragraphs to meet him. You may remember that when we discussed
future policy just before the Whitsun Recess you said that our policy for Africa should
be a form of “Blundellism”. I am sure this is true and we may be able to secure the
right formula although no doubt the Colonial Office would have many reservations
and it may be that the particular idea of Stirling’s goes too far at the present time.
I have discussed this matter with John Wyndham6 who knows Stirling and has
seen his paper, and it may be that he can think of a better solution than the one in
this letter but for myself I can see no other alternative that has a chance of avoiding
what I am sure would be a very unhappy controversy.7
5 The Very Revd Sir George MacLeod, DD, moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland
since 1957, leader of the Iona Community since 1938.
6 J E R Wyndham, private secretary to the prime minister since 1957.
7 Macmillan and Home saw Stirling on 1 June. The prime minister said: the important thing was not
everyone having the vote, but what sort of life they had; a simple majority parliamentary system would
lead to the greatest instability in Africa; the whites would have to realise that ‘one day the black majority
would have to make itself effective, although not necessarily right away’; ‘our objective was to induce the
Europeans to accept something that was going to happen anyhow, and to assure the Africans that progress
would be made towards the inevitable. . . . there must be a perceptible movement’; ‘there were two forces
capable of operating to bring about a Civil War. If we pressed on too fast with the extension of the
franchise, the more reactionary white people might try and join the Union [of South Africa]. If we did not
move fast enough, the Africans would lead the disturbances’ (Note for the record, by T J Bligh).
30 DO 35/8039, no 5 25 June 1959
‘Constitutional development in Africa’: memorandum by Lord Home.
Annex: draft declaration on colonial policy
[This memo was personally prepared by Lord Home in his own handwriting, and the
prime minister asked for it to be circulated to the Committee on Constitutional
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Developments in Africa (a Cabinet ministerial sub-committee), but it was never discussed
at the meeting on 1 July 1959 because of the rush of business about the Central African
Federation. That committee was then dissolved, and no further action was taken until
Nkrumah came to see the prime minister in August and was shown a copy. Nkrumah
thought that without dates for independence being set it would lack the real meat. In Jan
1960 in Accra, Nkrumah again mentioned to Macmillan the possibility of a joint paper
making a statement of policy—but this was thought out of the question; so what was left
was a possible unilateral British declaration which Commonwealth prime ministers
might perhaps endorse if it was discussed at their meeting in May. In fact Nkrumah did
not raise it at that meeting. Sir A Snelling however warned that Nkrumah might revert to
the question, so a draft was got ready, although on the whole it was thought better to let
sleeping dogs lie.]
When I talked to Dr. Nkrumah and his Ministers in Accra last month, I was struck by
the extent to which their pan-African ambitions and their obsession with slogans
such as “one man one vote” were tending to lead them towards the adoption of public
attitudes directly in conflict with our own policies. The idea occurred to me that,
against this background, some kind of clear re-statement of our African policies
might serve, at the best to encourage people like the Ghanaians to take a more
understanding view of our problems, and at the worst to deprive them of some of
their ammunition in criticising us. In any case I found Dr. Nkrumah himself quite
attracted by the idea of such a declaration, partly perhaps because he thought that in
its drafting we might really find some common ground, and partly no doubt for less
altruistic reasons.
Since then the Prime Minister has had a separate proposal from Mr. David Stirling
about the urgent need both here and in Africa for a re-definition and declaration of
the Government’s intentions regarding our African territories.1
I am far from convinced that it is in fact possible to produce a general declaration
sufficiently sweeping in character either to have any significant effect on the
attitudes of people like Dr. Nkrumah or to produce the dramatic impact on opinion
which Mr. Stirling has in mind. However, in order to focus discussion on the
problems that arise in attempting to work out any such declaration, I have prepared
the attached preliminary draft for the consideration of my colleagues.
Annex to 30
British colonial policy in Africa
(1) The goal of Colonial policy is self-government.
(2) For those territories which are capable of standing on their own feet in the
world this means independence and the hope and desire is that this should be
independence within the Commonwealth.
(3) What are the conditions for self-government? The short answer is good
government. That means tolerable standards of administration and of justice, for
these are the foundation of stability in society.
(4) Protection can only give way to self-government and independence when the
people accept the need to recognise and protect the political rights of minorities and
of individuals.
1 See previous document.
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There will be different forms of constitution and the United Kingdom does not
insist on any universal pattern but the protection of minorities and the rights and
duties of the individual in the community are the very essence of democracy.
(5) On the grant of independence safeguards must be written into the
constitution but the only real safeguard that a country will maintain stability within
and follow the policy of the good neighbour without is when the leaders have enough
maturity to recognise the absolute obligation to protect minority rights and to
respect the individuals.
(6) The franchise and the pace of advance towards the goal of “one man one vote”
must be judged against this background.
(7) The aim of the United Kingdom as the protecting power is to create a
situation in which the social and political status of the individual citizen is secure.
Progress will be made as fast as a sense of responsibility can be created by
education. The complete universal suffrage is only meaningful when the individual
voter can exercise a free and unfettered choice between parties and when voters in
the aggregate have learned not to misuse the vast majorities which often emerge
from free elections.
The United Kingdom objective is to create independent countries in which the
people are secure in their rights and understand their duties.
(8) Where there are multi-racial communities where different races have a stake
in the country and claim it as their home the rights and duties of the individual and
safeguards for the different communities become even more important, for
confidence in a future of partnership is based on tolerance and in particular on
responsible use of the franchise which results in political power.
The aim of British policy is to achieve a “common role” [roll] where any individual
of any race may exercise his political right on a basis of complete equality.
(9) As democracy can only survive in an educated society, there must be
qualifications for the vote. In the United Kingdom it took 600 years to graduate from
the qualified franchise to that of “one man one vote”.2 Today no one suggests such a
lengthy apprenticeship but if democracy is to be secure education in its broadest
sense must underpin the franchise.
(10) It is because the United Kingdom is anxious to advance its colonial
territories to this state of maturity that it gives so high a priority to public education
and to training in administration. Everything will be done to mobilise resources so
that the scale of effort can be increased.
(11) This statement of the aims of United Kingdom policy reveals that the
orderly progress to self-government in any Colonial territory is not so much a
problem of blue-prints for constitutions or of systems as a problem of men,
beginning with the understanding of the local leaders of the rights and duties
inherent in democracy and ending with the full comprehension of the people.
(12) The United Kingdom will base all its legislation in its territories and any
proposals for constitutional advance on such principles and it invites the co-
operation of the people of all races as the way to attain a common end. The quickest
road to a date for self-government is complete co-operation on programmes of
education and development.
2 According to the draft in PREM 11/2588 this should have read ‘200 years’.
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(13) Partnership between races devoted to noble principles of living and
partnership between independent nations practising tolerance, liberty and peace will
then be the gift of the Commonwealth to the world.
31 PREM 11/2586, PM(59)65 29 Dec 1959
[Reflections on policy in East Africa, Malta and Nyasaland]: minute
from Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan
I thought you might like to have a short personal report on my first visit as Secretary
of State to Malta and the East African territories.
Malta. Governor’s rule has been continuing here for a very long time and although
there is little resentment shown about this except by Mintoff’s Labour Party,1 it isn’t a
satisfactory form of rule, particularly for a people with such a very long history of
representative government as the Maltese. On the face of it deadlock seems complete,
because Mintoff demands independence before he will talk and, although he may
have lost some prestige, he still remains the most likely person to emerge from
ordinary contested elections. He refused to see me in Malta, but sent me a letter just
before I left which I interpret as meaning that he would be glad if he could be rescued
from the end of the limb along which he has crawled. I feel that we ought to initiate
talks and try and feel our way back to representative government even if the talks
break down. In this event we should have to see how we could make the existing
regime more “democratic”. I feel myself that there is a very real difficulty in Malta
when dealing with such wily politicians as Mintoff that traditionally the Governor is a
senior Navy or Army man. At the present time this is very much a post for a career
Colonial Office man or for a politician. However, I do not intend to put proposals for
Malta forward to the C.P.C. until you return.
East Africa. The one common factor in the four East African territories is that in
each of them something is happening about constitutional advance, but this is
almost the only point they have in common and our approach to them will have to
differ very widely. The constitutional problems of the territories in ascending order of
difficulty are as follows:—
(a) Zanzibar. Early elections are due here in July, 1960. The Arab Nationalist Party
is making much of the running, but in fact the Afro-Shirazi Party will almost
certainly win the election by a very large margin. There is very little representative
government and a good deal of grumbling about this; but everyone was very content
with my assurance during my brief visit there that Sir George Mooring, the new
Resident, who takes up his post in a few weeks, would examine the constitutional
position urgently and report to me. I expect that we will have to move a short
distance but that we need not contemplate anything drastic.
(b) Tanganyika. The Governor’s announcement went down very well, although
there was, of course, some criticism about our rejection of the full franchise
proposals. There were very large demonstrations when I arrived at the airport but in
a sense these demonstrations (urging earlier and faster independence) were against
1 Dom[inic] Mintoff, prime minister, 1955–1958, 1971–1984.
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Nyerere2 rather than me. Naturally, with the success he has had and is going to have,
he has now become the target of the extremists, and this is the sad fate that awaits
almost every African leader who is prepared to co-operate with us. But I think he can
ride the storm. I do not even think now that it will be necessary to hold the
Tanganyika conference in London in the spring because the ideas Nyerere put
forward to me for the Council of Ministers were almost exactly those that in any case
we intended to offer. There are two important matters still to be cleared up and if this
can be done we could effect the decisions about Ministers by exchange of despatches
without a conference. This would be very satisfactory.
(c) Uganda. When I arrived in Uganda it became clear to me that there was an
utterly confused political situation, complicated by the position of the Kabaka and
his central kingdom of Buganda and by the splintering of the weak political parties
that existed. I decided that the Wild Report on Constitutional Reform3 should be
published at once, partly to try and bring some certainty into a confused situation
and partly because I was sure (as did in fact happen) that it would soon leak to the
press, who were following me. It is to be debated in the Legislative Council in
February and we ought by then to be ready with our decisions. I will, of course, put
forward a paper to the C.P.C. Some of their recommendations go far beyond anything
that we can accept, particularly in their proposals for Ministers. However, we can and
should give them a major measure of constitutional advance and I would be
reasonably confident about the future of this country were it not for the Kabaka. The
combination of being weak and obstinate and a king is a difficult one to deal with. He
is in fact running his Ministers and does not act as a constitutional monarch.
Buganda plays no part in the Legislative Council and threatens that they will not do
so unless they are granted virtual self-government. We are, in short, very nearly back
where we were when Oliver Lyttelton deported him some years ago.4
I had two interviews with him. At the first he was unpleasantly difficult and indeed
uncivil, but I thought it worth going back to see him again at the end of my visit, and
on this occasion he came to Government House and we established more amiable
relations. But the fundamental difficulty of his position and that of Buganda still
remains, and if there is a rock on which we will be shipwrecked in Uganda this is it. I
have, however, some ideas for steering round the rock which I will include in my
paper to the C.P.C.
(d) Kenya. This, of course, is the real problem for us. There is much weak
thinking going on here at home about Kenya. When, for example, the Economist
cheerfully says that the settlers in Kenya must accept the same position as in
Tanganyika they forget:—
(i) that Kenya is only just emerging from a seven-year long reign of terror and
emergency;
(ii) that the political parties in Kenya are not united at all in the way that they are
in Tanganyika;
2 Julius Nyerere, first president of Tanzania, 1962–1985.
3 J V Wild, administrative secretary of Uganda, 1955–1960, chairman of Constitutional Committee (1959).
4 S of S for the colonies, 1951–1954; subsequently Lord Chandos. For the deportation episode see
Goldsworthy, ed, The Conservative government and the end of empire, Part II, document no 294.
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(iii) that the problem of the settler and the European and Asian business man is
far greater and more formidable in Kenya than in any other of the Colonial
territories.
When I arrived in Kenya I made two simple points which I kept plugging to the
end. The first was that Kenya’s problems were peculiar to Kenya and the pace at
which she moved must be one that suited her. This had to be said partly for the
reasons I have outlined above and partly because of the uneasiness the Tanganyika
announcement had caused. Secondly I asked people to come to the London
Conference not completely committed in advance to their own particular solutions.
As you know, the Africans are going to present a joint front at the Conference, but in
fact that front is far from secure and there are many personal antagonisms clearly to
be seen within it. I think in the end I had some success over this. In any event, when
I arrived everybody was certain that the Kenya Conference was doomed to failure,
and now people think—particularly in view of Mboya’s5 statement that he now
accepts the principle of reserved seats—that it has a true chance of success. I do not
rank the prospects higher than this, but even so this improvement alone would have
made my trip well worth while.
There is one comment that I should make on the Kenya Administration which we
have discussed so often. It is in fact at all levels head and shoulders above that of any
of the others I saw and Sir Patrick Renison, who will himself be a first-class
Governor, tells me that it is far in advance of the Administration of any Colony that
he has served in.6 But I am sure it remains true that they thought little in the years of
the emergency of the letter of the law and I know the Governor is taking steps to try
and ensure a more orthodox approach to the security problems of the future.
Nyasaland. I remain very dissatisfied with the position here. I asked Sir Robert
Armitage to come and see me at Dar-es-Salaam, but I fear that he is giving no real
lead and his Chief Secretary is of poor calibre and is being replaced.7 I am afraid also
that Southern Rhodesia and the Federation are themselves too stubborn to
appreciate the resentment that is building up in the Northern Territories against
them. This will be our most difficult single problem to solve. I have put forward
Cabinet papers and I envisage a sequence of events something like this:—
(a) the Governor to issue any day now a statement about the detainees giving
evidence which he has agreed with me;
(b) that the programme of accelerated release should be announced about the
time that you leave for Africa;
(c) the Monckton Commission8 will presumably be clear of Nyasaland, say, by
April;
(d) by then we should be able to announce the end of the emergency, the release
of Dr. Banda9 and the passing of special legislation for the hard core;
5 T J Mboya, Kenyan trades union leader, member of the Kenya African National Union.
6 Sir P Renison succeeded Sir E Baring as governor of Kenya at the end of 1959. He was previously
governor of British Honduras, 1952–1955, and British Guiana, 1955–1959.
7 C W F Footman.
8 See document no 495 in Part II.
9 See document no 498 in Part II.
08-ConGov-Doc 29-52-cp  18/10/00  2:04 pm  Page 166
[32] WIND OF CHANGE 167
(e) I will myself go to Nyasaland in June and start discussions on constitutional
advance with the Administration and leaders of political parties, including, I would
hope, Dr. Banda.
This programme, of course, can easily slip and we will be severely criticised for
taking so long about it. It will be of the first importance to decide what you yourself
say in Nyasaland when you are there, and whom you see. I am myself absolutely
convinced that whether the Federation like it or not an imaginative offer on
constitutional advance at a fairly early date is certainly the best, and perhaps the
only, hope of holding the position.10
10 Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘I am grateful for a most interesting and imaginative report, wh. I wd. like to
discuss further with you. H.M. 30.12. 59’.
32 DO 35/10570, no 53 3 Feb 1960
Address by Mr Macmillan to both houses of the parliament of the
Union of South Africa, Cape Town
[The text of this speech was printed in an official souvenir booklet; although not recorded
in the South African Hansard, it was frequently referred to in the South African
parliament during March and April 1960—see House of Assembly Debates, vol 104. It has
been reproduced in Macmillan’s memoirs, vol 5, Pointing the way, 1959–1961 pp
473–482 (appendix 1), and in A N Porter & A J Stockwell, eds, British imperial policy and
decolonization, vol 2 1951–1964 (1989) pp 522–531 (document no 77). It has to be
regarded as a major statement of government policy.]
It is a great privilege to be invited to address the members of both Houses of
Parliament in the Union of South Africa. It is a unique privilege to do so in 1960 just
half a century after the Parliament of the Union came to birth. I am most grateful to
you all for giving me this opportunity and I am especially grateful to your Prime
Minister who invited me to visit this country and arranged for me to address you
here today. My tour of Africa—parts of Africa—the first ever made by a British Prime
Minister in office, is now alas nearing its end but it is fitting that it should culminate
in the Union Parliament here in Cape Town, in this historic city so long Europe’s
gateway to the Indian Ocean, and to the East.
As in all the other countries that I have visited my stay has been all too short. I
wish it had been possible for me to spend a longer time here, to see more of your
beautiful country and to get to know more of your people, but in the past week I have
travelled many hundreds of miles and met many people in all walks of life. I have
been able to get at least some idea of the great beauty of your country-side, with its
farms and its forests, mountains and rivers, and the clear skies and wide horizons of
the veldt. I have also seen some of your great and thriving cities, and I am most
grateful to your Government for all the trouble they have taken in making the
arrangements which have enabled me to see so much in so short a time. Some of the
younger members of my staff have told me that it has been a heavy programme, but I
can assure you that my wife and I have enjoyed every moment of it. Moreover, we
have been deeply moved by the warmth of our welcome. Wherever we have been, in
town or in country, we have been received in a spirit of friendship and affection
which has warmed our hearts, and we value this the more because we know it is an
expression of your goodwill, not just to ourselves but to all the people of Britain.
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It is, as I have said, a special privilege for me to be here in 1960 when you are
celebrating what I might call the golden wedding of the Union. At such a time it is
natural and right that you should pause to take stock of your position, to look back at
what you have achieved, to look forward to what lies ahead.
In the fifty years of their nationhood the people of South Africa have built a strong
economy founded upon a healthy agriculture and thriving and resilient industries.
During my visit I have been able to see something of your mining industry, on which
the prosperity of the country is so firmly based. I have seen your Iron and Steel
Corporation and visited your Council of Scientific and Industrial Research at
Pretoria. These two bodies, in their different ways, are symbols of a lively, forward-
looking and expanding economy. I have seen the great city of Durban, with its
wonderful port, and the skyscrapers of Johannesburg, standing where seventy years
ago there was nothing but the open veldt. I have seen, too, the fine cities of Pretoria
and Bloemfontein. This afternoon I hope to see something of your wine-growing
industry, which so far I have only admired as a consumer.
No-one could fail to be impressed with the immense material progress which has
been achieved. That all this has been accomplished in so short a time is a striking
testimony to the skill, energy and initiative of your people. We in Britain are proud of
the contribution we have made to this remarkable achievement. Much of it has been
financed by British capital. According to the recent survey made by the Union
Government, nearly two-thirds of the oversea investment outstanding in the Union
at the end of 1956 was British. That is after two staggering wars which have bled our
economy white.
But that is not all. We have developed trade between us to our common advantage,
and our economies are now largely interdependent. You export to us raw materials,
food and gold. We in return send you consumer goods or capital equipment. We take
a third of all your exports and we supply a third of all your imports. This broad
traditional pattern of investment and trade has been maintained in spite of the
changes brought by the development of our two economies, and it gives me great
encouragement to reflect that the economies of both our countries, while expanding
rapidly, have yet remained interdependent and capable of sustaining one another. If
you travel round this country by train you will travel on South African rails made by
Iscor [see lines 8–9 above]. If you prefer to fly you can go in a British Viscount. Here
is a true partnership, living proof of the interdependence between nations. Britain
has always been your best customer and, as your new industries develop, we believe
that we can be your best partners too.
In addition to building this strong economy within your own borders, you have
also played your part as an independent nation in the world.
As a soldier in the first world war, and as a Minister in Sir Winston Churchill’s
Government in the second, I know personally the value of the contribution which
your forces made to victory in the cause of freedom. I know something, too, of the
inspiration which General Smuts brought to us in Britain in our darkest hours.
Again in the Korean crisis you played your full part. Thus in the testing times of war
or aggression your statesmen and your soldiers have made their influence felt far
beyond the African continent.
In the period of reconstruction, when Dr. Malan was your Prime Minister, your
resources greatly assisted the recovery of the sterling area. In the post-war world
now, in the no less difficult tasks of peace, your leaders in industry, commerce and
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finance continue to be prominent in world affairs today. Your readiness to provide
technical assistance to the less well-developed parts of Africa is of immense help to
the countries that receive it. It is also a source of strength to your friends in the
Commonwealth and elsewhere in the western world. You are collaborating in the
work of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara,
and now in the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. Your Minister for
External Affairs intends to visit Ghana later this year. All this proves your
determination, as the most advanced industrial country of the continent, to play your
part in the new Africa of today.
Sir, as I have travelled round the Union I have found everywhere, as I expected, a
deep preoccupation with what is happening in the rest of the African continent. I
understand and sympathise with your interest in these events, and your anxiety
about them. Ever since the break up of the Roman Empire one of the constant facts
of political life in Europe has been the emergence of independent nations. They have
come into existence over the centuries in different forms, with different kinds of
Government, but all have been inspired by a deep, keen feeling of nationalism which
has grown as the nations have grown.
In the twentieth century and especially since the end of the war, the processes
which gave birth to the nation states of Europe have been repeated all over the world.
We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who have for
centuries lived in dependence upon some other power. Fifteen years ago this
movement spread through Asia. Many countries there of different races and
civilisations pressed their claim to an independent national life. Today the same
thing is happening in Africa and the most striking of all the impressions I have
formed since I left London a month ago is of the strength of this African national
consciousness. In different places it takes different forms but it is happening
everywhere. The wind of change is blowing through this continent and, whether we
like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all
accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.
Of course you understand this better than anyone. You are sprung from Europe,
the home of nationalism, and here in Africa you have yourselves created a new
nation. Indeed, in the history of our times yours will be recorded as the first of the
African nationalisms, and this tide of national consciousness which is now rising in
Africa is a fact for which you and we and the other nations of the western world are
ultimately responsible. For its causes are to be found in the achievements of western
civilisation, in the pushing forward of the frontiers of knowledge, in the applying of
science in the service of human needs, in the expanding of food production, in the
speeding and multiplying of the means of communication, and perhaps, above all,
the spread of education.
As I have said, the growth of national consciousness in Africa is a political fact and
we must accept it as such. That means, I would judge, that we must come to terms
with it. I sincerely believe that if we cannot do so we may imperil the precarious
balance between the East and West on which the peace of the world depends. The
world today is divided into three main groups. First there are what we call the
Western Powers. You in South Africa and we in Britain belong to this group, together
with our friends and allies in other parts of the Commonwealth. In the United States
of America and in Europe we call it the Free World. Secondly there are the
Communists—Russia and her satellites in Europe and China whose population will
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rise by the end of the next ten years to the staggering total of 800,000,000. Thirdly,
there are those parts of the world whose people are at present uncommitted either to
Communism or to our Western ideas.
In this context we think first of Asia and of Africa. As I see it the great issue in this
second half of the twentieth century is whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and
Africa will swing to the East or to the West. Will they be drawn into the Communist
camp? Or will the great experiments in self-government that are now being made in
Asia and Africa, especially within the Commonwealth, prove so successful, and by
their example so compelling, that the balance will come down in favour of freedom
and order and justice?
The struggle is joined and it is a struggle for the minds of men. What is now on
trial is much more than our military strength or our diplomatic and administrative
skill. It is our way of life. The uncommitted nations want to see before they choose.
What can we show them to help them choose right? Each of the independent
members of the Commonwealth must answer that question for itself. It is a basic
principle of our modern Commonwealth that we respect each other’s sovereignty in
matters of internal policy. At the same time we must recognise that in this shrinking
world in which we live today the internal policies of one nation may have effects
outside it. We may sometimes be tempted to say to each other “Mind your own
business”, but in these days I would myself expand the old saying so that it runs:
“Mind your own business but mind how it affects my business, too”.
Let me be very frank with you, my friends. What Governments and Parliaments in
the United Kingdom have done since the war in according independence to India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya and Ghana, and what they will do for Nigeria and other
countries now nearing independence, all this, though we take full and sole
responsibility for it, we do in the belief that it is the only way to establish the future
of the Commonwealth and of the Free World on sound foundations. All this of course
is also of deep and close concern to you for nothing we do in this small world can be
done in a corner or remain hidden. What we do today in West, Central and East Africa
becomes known tomorrow to everyone in the Union, whatever his language, colour
or traditions. Let me assure you, in all friendliness, that we are well aware of this and
that we have acted and will act with full knowledge of the responsibility we have to all
our friends.
Nevertheless I am sure you will agree that in our own areas of responsibility we
must each do what we think right. What we think right derives from a long
experience both of failure and success in the management of our own affairs. We
have tried to learn and apply the lessons of our judgment of right and wrong. Our
justice is rooted in the same soil as yours—in Christianity and in the rule of law as
the basis of a free society. This experience of our own explains why it has been our
aim in the countries for which we have borne responsibility, not only to raise the
material standards of living, but also to create a society which respects the rights of
individuals, a society in which men are given the opportunity to grow to their full
stature—and that must in our view include the opportunity to have an increasing
share in political power and responsibility, a society in which individual merit and
individual merit alone is the criterion for a man’s advancement, whether political or
economic.
Finally in countries inhabited by several different races it has been our aim to find
means by which the community can become more of a community, and fellowship
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can be fostered between its various parts. This problem is by no means confined to
Africa. Nor is it always a problem of a European minority. In Malaya, for instance,
though there are Indian and European minorities, Malays and Chinese make up the
great bulk of the population, and the Chinese are not much fewer in numbers than
the Malays. Yet these two peoples must learn to live together in harmony and unity
and the strength of Malaya as a nation will depend on the different contributions
which the two races can make.
The attitude of the United Kingdom towards this problem was clearly expressed by
the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, speaking at the United Nations General
Assembly on the 17th September 1959. These were his words:
“In those territories where different races or tribes live side by side the task is to ensure
that all the people may enjoy security and freedom and the chance to contribute as
individuals to the progress and well being of these countries. We reject the idea of any
inherent superiority of one race over another. Our policy therefore is non-racial. It
offers a future in which Africans, Europeans, Asians, the peoples of the Pacific and
others with whom we are concerned, will all play their full part as citizens in the
countries where they live, and in which feelings of race will be submerged in loyalty to
new nations.”
I have thought you would wish me to state plainly and with full candour the policy
for which we in Britain stand. It may well be that in trying to do our duty as we see it
we shall sometimes make difficulties for you. If this proves to be so we shall regret it.
But I know that even so you would not ask us to flinch from doing our duty.
You, too, will do your duty as you see it. I am well aware of the peculiar nature of
the problems with which you are faced here in the Union of South Africa. I know the
differences between your situation and that of most of the other states in Africa. You
have here some three million people of European origin. This country is their home.
It has been their home for many generations. They have no other. The same is true of
Europeans in Central and East Africa. In most other African states those who have
come from Europe have come to work, to contribute their skills, perhaps to teach,
but not to make a home.
The problems to which you as members of the Union Parliament have to address
yourselves are very different from those which face the Parliaments of countries with
homogeneous populations. These are complicated and baffling problems. It would be
surprising if your interpretation of your duty did not sometimes produce very
different results from ours in terms of Government policies and actions.
As a fellow member of the Commonwealth it is our earnest desire to give South
Africa our support and encouragement, but I hope you won’t mind my saying frankly
that there are some aspects of your policies which make it impossible for us to do
this without being false to our own deep convictions about the political destinies of
free men to which in our own territories we are trying to give effect. I think we
ought, as friends, to face together, without seeking to apportion credit or blame, the
fact that in the world of today this difference of outlook lies between us.
I said that I was speaking as a friend. I can also claim to be speaking as a relation,
for we Scots can claim family connections with both the great European sections of
your population, not only with the English-speaking people but with the Afrikaans-
speaking as well. This is a point which hardly needs emphasis in Cape Town where
you can see every day the statue of that great Scotsman, Andrew Murray. His work in
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the Dutch Reformed Church in the Cape, and the work of his son in the Orange Free
State, was among Afrikaans-speaking people. There has always been a very close
connection between the Church of Scotland and the Church of the Netherlands. The
Synod of Dort plays the same great part in the history of both. Many aspirants to the
Ministry of Scotland, especially in the 17th and 18th centuries, went to pursue their
theological studies in the Netherlands. Scotland can claim to have repaid the debt in
South Africa. I am thinking particularly of the Scots in the Orange Free State. Not
only the younger Andrew Murray, but also the Robertsons, the Frasers, the
McDonalds—families which have been called the Free State clans who became
burghers of the old Free State and whose descendants still play their part there.
But though I count myself a Scot my mother was an American, and the United
States provides a valuable illustration of one of the main points which I have been
trying to make in my remarks today. Its population, like yours, is a blend of many
different strains and over the years most of those who have gone to North America
have gone there in order to escape conditions in Europe which they found
intolerable. The Pilgrim Fathers were fleeing from persecution as Puritans and the
Marylanders from persecution as Roman Catholics. Throughout the 19th century a
stream of immigrants flowed across the Atlantic to escape from poverty in their
homelands, and in the 20th century the United States have provided asylum for the
victims of political oppression in Europe.
Thus for the majority of its inhabitants America has been a place of refuge, or place
to which people went because they wanted to get away from Europe. It is not
surprising, therefore, that for so many years a main objective of American states-
men, supported by the American public, was to isolate themselves from Europe, and
with their great material strength, and the vast resources open to them, this might
have seemed an attractive and practicable course. Nevertheless in the two world wars
of this century they have found themselves unable to stand aside. Twice their
manpower in arms has streamed back across the Atlantic to shed its blood in those
European struggles from which their ancestors thought they would escape by
emigrating to the New World; and when the second war was over they were forced to
recognise that in the small world of today isolationism is out of date and offers no
assurance of security.
The fact is that in this modern world no country, not even the greatest, can live for
itself alone. Nearly 2,000 years ago, when the whole of the civilised world was
comprised within the confines of the Roman Empire, St. Paul proclaimed one of the
great truths of history—we are all members one of another. During this twentieth
century that eternal truth has taken on a new and exciting significance. It has always
been impossible for the individual man to live in isolation from his fellows, in the
home, the tribe, the village, or the city. Today it is impossible for nations to live in
isolation from one another. What Dr. John Donne said of individual men three
hundred years ago is true today of my country, your country, and all the countries of
the world: “Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankind. And
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”
All nations now are interdependent one upon another and this is generally realised
throughout the western world. I hope in due course the countries of Communism
will recognise it too.
It was certainly with that thought in mind that I took the decision to visit Moscow
about this time last year. Russia has been isolationist in her time and still has
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tendencies that way, but the fact remains that we must live in the same world with
Russia and we must find a way of doing so. I believe that the initiative which we took
last year has had some success, although grave difficulties may arise. Nevertheless I
think nothing but good can come out of its extending contacts between individuals,
contacts in trade and from the exchange of visitors.
I certainly do not believe in refusing to trade with people because you may happen
to dislike the way they manage their internal affairs at home. Boycotts will never get
you anywhere, and may I say in parenthesis that I deprecate the attempts that are
being made today in Britain to organise the consumer boycott of South African
goods. It has never been the practice, as far as I know, of any Government of the
United Kingdom of whatever complexion to undertake or support campaigns of this
kind designed to influence the internal politics of another Commonwealth country,
and my colleagues in the United Kingdom deplore this proposed boycott and regard
it as undesirable from every point of view. It can only have serious effects on
Commonwealth relations, on trade, and lead to the ultimate detriment of others than
those against whom it is aimed.
I said I was speaking of the interdependence of nations. The members of the
Commonwealth feel particularly strongly the value of interdependence. They are as
independent as any nation in this shrinking world can be, but they have voluntarily
agreed to work together. They recognise that there may be and must be differences in
their institutions; in their internal policies, and their membership does not imply the
wish to express a judgment on these matters, or the need to impose a stifling
uniformity. It is, I think, a help that there has never been question of any rigid
constitution for the Commonwealth. Perhaps this is because we have got on well
enough in the United Kingdom without a written constitution and tend to look
suspiciously at them. Whether that is so or not, it is quite clear that a rigid
constitutional framework for the Commonwealth would not work. At the first of the
stresses and strains which are inevitable in this period of history, cracks would
appear in the framework and the whole structure would crumble. It is the flexibility
of our Commonwealth institutions which gives them their strength.
Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Honourable Ministers, Ladies and Gentlemen, I fear I
have kept you a long time. I much welcome the opportunity to speak to this great
audience. In conclusion may I say this. I have spoken frankly about the differences
between our two countries in their approach to one of the great current problems
with which each has to deal within its own sphere of responsibility. These differences
are well-known. They are matters of public knowledge, indeed of public controversy,
and I should have been less than honest if by remaining silent on them I had seemed
to imply that they did not exist. But differences on one subject, important though it
is, need not and should not impair our capacity to co-operate with one another in
furthering the many practical interests which we share in common.
The independent members of the Commonwealth do not always agree on every
subject. It is not a condition of their association that they should do so. On the
contrary the strength of our Commonwealth lies largely in the fact that it is a free
association of independent sovereign states, each responsible for ordering its own
affairs but co-operating in the pursuit of common aims and purposes in world affairs.
Moreover these differences may be transitory. In time they may be resolved. Our duty
is to see them in perspective against the background of our long association. Of this
at any rate I am certain—those of us who by grace of the electorate are temporarily
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in charge of affairs in your country and in mine, we fleeting transient phantoms in
the great stage of history, we have no right to sweep aside on this account the
friendship that exists between our countries, for that is the legacy of history. It is not
ours alone to deal with as we wish. To adapt a famous phrase, it belongs to those who
are living, but it also belongs to those who are dead and to those who are yet unborn.
We must face the differences, but let us try to see beyond them down the long vista of
the future.
I hope—indeed, I am confident—that in another 50 years we shall look back on
the differences that exist between us now as matters of historical interest, for as time
passes and one generation yields to another, human problems change and fade. Let
us remember these truths. Let us resolve to build not to destroy, and let us
remember always that weakness comes from division, strength from unity.
33 CAB 128/34, CC 9(60)2 16 Feb 1960
[Report by Mr Macmillan on his African tour]: Cabinet conclusions
[The prime minister made a formal statement to the House of Commons on the same day,
stressing that ‘it would be wrong to try to apply a single and simple solution to a
multiform and complex problem’; he believed it was important that the UK should so
manage its economic affairs as to be able to make increasing contributions in aid to
developing countries—to be ‘the good neighbour overseas’ (H of C Debs, vol 617, cols
1132–1137).]
The Prime Minister said he did not propose at this stage to make a detailed report to
the Cabinet on the visit which he had just made to the four Commonwealth
countries in Africa which had attained, or were nearing, independence. Some of the
specific problems which he had been studying at first hand in Africa would come to
the Cabinet for decision in due course. Meanwhile, he would content himself with
giving a few of the impressions which he had formed during his tour.
Ghana, he thought, would have few serious problems to face. The politicians might
behave irresponsibly from time to time, in the first flush of independence; but this
was a country inhabited by a homogeneous population and rich in natural resources
and neither its political nor its economic problems need be serious.
Nigeria had a great future before it if, under its Federal structure, its various
peoples could work together in a spirit of national unity. It was a large country and
could exercise a valuable influence over its smaller neighbours. The new discoveries
of oil which had been made there might substantially strengthen its economy. Its
leaders were ready to accept continuing advice and assistance from the United
Kingdom, and there was good reason to hope that it would prove a loyal and useful
member of the Commonwealth.
In South Africa the main political problems arose from the doctrinaire policy of
the Nationalist Government on race relations. Though we could not endorse that
policy, we must remember that it was their responsibility, not ours. It would be a
tragedy if South Africa’s links with the Commonwealth were weakened by reason of
differences of opinion on that question. South Africa had a strong and flourishing
economy and had a valuable part to play in the Commonwealth.
In the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the United Kingdom Government
had a more direct responsibility for finding a means of constitutional progress in a
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multi-racial society. This was a difficult [t]ask, and it had been made even more
difficult by the apprehensions aroused among Europeans in the Federation by the
rapid growth of national consciousness throughout Africa. It was now our duty to
find a way of constitutional advance which would be sufficient to satisfy the Africans
without unduly alarming the Europeans. In this, the work of the Monckton
Commission should prove to be valuable. The immediate need was to study European
opinion in these territories and to keep it stable while the processes of constitutional
review were being carried out over the next year. There was at present a real risk that
the future of Federation would be prejudiced before those processes could be
completed.
The Cabinet:—
Took note of the Prime Minister’s statement.
34 DO 35/8039, no 14 [27 Apr 1960]
‘British colonial policy in Africa’: draft CRO declaration.1 Minutes by
G B Shannon, Sir A Clutterbuck, Lord Home and Sir H Lintott
1. The goal is freedom and independence.
2. We recognise as legitimate the aspirations of the peoples of the African
territories to manage their own affairs.
3. But before transferring power, we would wish to be satisfied that certain basic
principles of just and democratic rule will be respected:—
–There must be no discrimination on grounds of race, colour or creed. Merit alone
is the criterion of the place of the individual in society.
–The rights of minorities, whether racial, political or religious, must be
safeguarded.
4. Justice and statesmanship, and the practical responsibility of the United
Kingdom Government towards these future nations require that, when we withdraw,
it should be in the confident assurance that these principles will be observed.
5. But the establishment of independent nations observing these conditions
depends, not on written constitutions, but on the will, the character and the abilities
of the peoples themselves.
6. We have shown, and are showing, confidence in the ability of African peoples
to create independent nations which fulfil these criteria. Ghana is independent,
Nigeria will be in October, 1960; rapid progress is being made in other African
territories.
7. The transition to self-government and independence must take longer in the
territories where two or more races have their homes. That is because mutual
tolerance and respect between races take time to establish on a secure basis.
8. In these territories the aim of British policy is a steady increase in the part
played in politics and administration by the inhabitants of whatever race. But until
all races accept fully and unreservedly the principle of racial equality, there will have
1 See document no 30 above. This version was eventually passed by Lord Home: ‘I think this is the best we
can do. H. 22.4.60’. Subsequently, however, the idea was dropped (see final minute).
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to be constitutional checks to preserve a proper balance between the rights of the
different communities.
9. This implies in particular that the extension of the franchise must be
progressive. Complete universal suffrage (“one man one vote”) is only meaningful in
a democratic society when voters and their leaders can use the majorities which they
may command with wisdom and forbearance.
10. Extremists of whatever race will not help. The call is for tolerance, order and
moderation. These will be achieved through the spread of education which stands
high among our purposes. Education, too, will ensure that enough citizens are
competent to take their part in all the complex activities of a modern society, and to
achieve the economic stability without which independence is illusory.
11. These are the principles that guide our policy today. The United Kingdom
Government are determined to pursue with vigour and confidence this great task of
the creation of new, independent nations in Africa.
Minutes on no 34
I am sorry to have kept this so long. I am not very happy about either the idea or any
of the proposed wordings of a declaration.
2. British policy in most spheres is empirical, and a declaration in set terms
imports an element of rigidity. Declarations soon get out of date, and then either
have to be deliberately scrapped, or replaced by new ones. The process can be
uncomfortable. In the general political sphere, look at the Labour Party’s Charter. In
the sphere of colonial policy, the Devonshire doctrine2 of the paramountcy of native
interests did not last very long.
3. It is, moreover, difficult to devise and to defend a wording limited to
dependent territories in Africa. We should be asked whether we will apply the same
principles to dependent territories elsewhere, and, if not, why not, and what
principles we would apply there. Even in Africa, it will be difficult to formulate a
declaration which will include the High Commission Territories, without causing
difficulties with the Union, whilst we could not specifically exclude them.
4. If there is to be a declaration of the kind suggested, the wording will be looked
at under a microscope after it has been made and therefore needs to be examined
with care before it is made, e.g., do we mean different things by “self-government”
and “independence”? When we say “universal suffrage (one man one vote)” do we or
do we not mean votes for women? I think too that something should be included
about economic and technical support both before and after independence.
5. My conclusion is that, if there is to be a declaration at all, it should be in bom-
bastic and high flown terms, which sound well but are not susceptible of detailed inter-
pretation. It was with the intention of producing a draft on these lines that I kept the
file, but pressure of other requirements has prevented me from producing it. I will not
delay the file further, but shall be happy to attend any discussion on the subject.
G.B.S.
28.3.60
2 A declaration made in 1923 to the effect that ‘primarily Kenya is an African territory’ and that ‘the
interests of the African natives must be paramount’.
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Secretary of State: Much water has flowed under the bridge since the PM’s talk with
Dr Nkrumah at Accra. We now have the Cape Town speech as our locus classicus, and
no-one can say that our broad policy is not known to the world. Ministers have
refused so far to put any gloss on, or add interpretations to, the Cape Town speech,
and Dr Nkrumah, though given opportunity, has not returned to the charge. There
seems much to be said therefore for avoiding any further “declaration” at this
juncture—which indeed, however well-intentioned, might be highly dangerous in
the present fluid and explosive situation in Africa. Moreover it would be extremely
difficult to draft in a way which would hold the balance as one would wish and at the
same time would not expose us afterwards to recrimination in one quarter or
another.
This is not to say that we shd. not have in the background a “defensive” brief, to be
agreed with the Colonial Office, giving an outline of our policy: but that is a different
thing from taking the initiative & tying ourselves down to a declaration. Perhaps we
could discuss with you before matters are carried further?
A.C.
13.4.60
I don’t much like the draft. I will take away & give some thought to it at the weekend.
It may be right to put something up to Col. Sec. & P.M. but it will clearly have
weaknesses & dangers of which all must be aware.
H.
14.4.60
Secretary of State
I don’t think you ever liked this Declaration much (nor, indeed, did those who drafted
it). What I think you and your colleagues had in mind was that this text could be a
useful standby at the time of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting in case either (a) Dr.
Nkrumah reverted to the idea of a joint declaration and his January draft or (b) the
discussion on South Africa at the Prime Ministers’ Meeting got so out of hand that a
unilateral declaration of this kind by the United Kingdom could provide, outside the
formal communiqué, a focus for the expression of views on the racial question.
As it turned out, it was not needed; Dr. Nkrumah did not revert to his draft or to
the idea of a joint declaration, and indeed Sharpeville3 had entirely altered the
context from that in which he had put forward his suggestion earlier.
Looked at in the light of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, this draft declaration seems
even flatter and more platitudinous than before and I very much hope that Dr.
Nkrumah will not return to the charge and, indeed, I should think it unlikely that he
will.
We had better let Sir A. Snelling know what has happened (or rather not
happened), but I think it would be better to conclude the draft letter opposite by
instructing him definitely not to re-open the question of a declaration with Dr.
Nkrumah and that, if the latter raises it, he should simply say that he would imagine
that U.K. Ministers would feel that what with the Cape Town speech and all that was
said in and around the Prime Ministers’ Meeting, everybody’s views on racial
3 See document no 477 in Part II.
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problems in Africa had been pretty fully expressed and that any formal declaration
would be rather an anti-climax.
H.L.
23.6.60
I think any draft we could devise is likely to be ‘platitudinous & flat’ so I inclined not
to pursue the idea. If Dr. N. returns to it or if we have better thoughts we can look at
the possibility again. Could Mr Snelling improve the draft with the benefit of local
atmosphere?4
H.
27.6.60
4 A W Snelling left the CRO, where he was assistant under-secretary of state, to become high
commissioner in Ghana, 1959–1961.
35 PREM 11/3240, PM(60)33 31 May 1960
[Progress report on colonial policy]: minute by Mr Macleod to
Mr Macmillan
We are almost half way through the much-heralded year 1960 and I think you might
like to have a progress report on what has been done and on the problems that lie
ahead.
2. The emergency in Nyasaland will be brought to an end in a week or two. When
that happens, following on the ending of the emergencies in Cyprus and Kenya, there
will be for the first time for more than a dozen years no emergency in the Colonial
territories. This does not mean that there are not any number of trouble spots, but it
does mean that things have gone fairly well in a period of some tension. My
comments on the individual areas would be as follows:—
(1) Cyprus. You know how far we have gone here and how well Julian1 has done.
Frankly, I am not wholly convinced that we gave him the right instructions last time,
although naturally the Turkish coup would have made impossible the alternative of a
Foreign Ministers’ conference. The Turkish position, however, may work on the
whole for us rather than against us and the next few days will presumably clear this
matter up. If Julian can use the formula of cession as a way into further talks and
clear up the outstanding problems, that would be splendid. The Bill went through
Legislation Committee today and is ready for presentation. If on the other hand
Makarios pockets a formula on cession and begins to argue again on other and new
matters, I am sure Julian should break off and come home and we should consider
the summoning of a conference.
(2) The West Indies. As a result of the protracted Cyprus negotiations it isn’t
possible for Julian to go to The West Indies, and as you know I am taking his place.
On the other hand, this is a particularly convenient time for me to go and Hailes2 has
been urging it for some time. There are considerable tensions between Trinidad and
1 J Amery, parliamentary under-secretary of state at CO.
2 Lord Hailes, governor-general of the West Indies, 1957–1962; formerly P G T Buchan-Hepburn,
government chief whip, 1951–1955.
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this country and much wild talk about taking Trinidad out of the Federation. The
Federation itself is inefficiently led at the moment by Sir Grantley Adams3 and there
is a strong move, which I hope succeeds, to replace him with Mr. Manley from
Jamaica.4 In any event, I am glad I will be able to take my own soundings and also, I
hope, to complete the Trinidad Constitutional Conference, which broke down in
London last autumn.
(3) Malta. The deadlock here has gone on too long and I have decided that we
must break it. I attach as Annex I to this minute a copy of my recent directive on this
subject.5 The deadlock arises, of course, because of the apparent inconsistency
between our defence needs and the almost universal cry for independence for Malta. I
think we must feel our way towards a solution, probably via the calling of a National
Assembly. My minute lays down the sort of timetable that I am aiming for.6
(4) West Africa. Here almost all the news is cheerful. We had excellent
conferences on Nigeria and Sierra Leone and managed to secure satisfactory defence
agreements from both. Sierra Leone will become independent in April next year and
then the only Colonial territory in West Africa will be the Gambia. It isn’t easy to say
what will become of this, although I believe the most likely solution is that, in spite
of the physical separation, it will federate with Sierra Leone.
(5) Somaliland. The Conference went extremely well, although inevitably there
was a slightly Edward Learish air about its proceedings. I was more impressed than I
expected to be with the calibre of the leader of the deputation, but they are, of course,
very unprepared for self-rule. However, they would be just as unprepared, say, in
September, and we would have accumulated a store of bitterness towards ourselves
for the future. I am sure the decision we have taken is right, although there is no
doubt that Ethiopia is deeply suspicious that we have plots for the creation of a
Greater Somalia.
There are, of course, problems in some of the distant and island territories, but
they are not of great moment. The heart of the Colonial problems remains in the
multi-racial communities of East and Central Africa. If we can solve these prob-
lems—and it is a big “if”—everything will fall into place.
(6) East Africa
(a) Tanganyika. This continues to be the brightest spot. They are to have elections
with an African Chief Minister (the first in East or Central Africa) in October.
Julius Nyerere will be the Chief Minister. He has always shown excellent co-
operation with us and the Governor and a complete understanding of the
economic needs of his country and the need for keeping British administration
and Western capital and know-how. There is no reason why Tanganyika should not
continue to go forward and prosper.
(b) Uganda. The problem here is an extremely complex and difficult one. In no
other territory is the political picture so confused. No national African leader of
any sort has yet emerged. In consequence the struggle goes on between the
3 Prime minister of the West Indies. 4 Premier of Jamaica.
5 ‘We must determine now that we will start the process of ending direct rule. This is NOT to be thought of
as a delaying operation nor as an exercise foredoomed to fail. That way lies certain failure. The history of
previous constitutional discussions on Malta is deeply discouraging’.
6 A conference by the end of the year.
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traditional forces represented by the Kabaka and the other Agreement Rulers and
the rising power of the political parties. We must try and keep the balance between
these and not sacrifice either. Accordingly there are to be elections following on
the recommendations of the Wild Committee,7 which you will remember, early
next year. At the same time I am setting up a Commission to advise on the
relationship between the territories which have Rulers and the rest of the country.
In this way I hope to preserve an uneasy advance. But the situation is in my view
potentially very explosive, although because there is no real colour problem
involved it does not attract the headlines in the same way as events in Kenya and
further south.
(c) Kenya. The political situation here remains turbulent. Amongst the Africans
there is a struggle going on for political power and some encouraging signs that a
monolithic African party is not going to emerge. The issue of Kenyatta will be
stirred up by the Corfield Report, which appears today.8 In any case, as far as we are
concerned we have given a completely flat answer that there is no question
whatever of his release. European trading sentiment is probably not unfavourable
to Blundell, but the European farming community (actually only some 2,500
families) is fairly solidly pro-Briggs. I do not think that Briggs, however, is the real
danger. A more difficult person is Sir Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, who is trying
to form a sort of European alliance.9 He will come over here in the summer and
will seek an interview with me and seek in effect the reversal of the Lancaster
House agreement. I will, of course, receive him, but give him no encouragement
whatever on his mission. Indeed, if he succeeds, I really believe the future of Kenya
is hopeless. For there would be a return to purely racial politics and racial
thinking, and it is the great achievement of Blundell and of the Lancaster House
Conference that we began to lead Kenya away from this sterile approach. Blundell
has (probably wisely) refused the offer of an award that was made to him. I hope
very much that he succeeds, for in his policies lies the best, indeed perhaps the
only, hope of inter-racial thinking.
(7) The Central African Federation. I think the clearest way of showing what my
thinking is in relation to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland at the moment is to send
you a copy of the letter that I have written to Sir Roy Welensky yesterday. I attach
this as Annex II.10 I think the future largely depends upon two men. Firstly upon
Walter Monckton, whose report will, I think, guide the whole of our approach to the
Federal Review. If his report is both in favour of federation and yet sufficiently
progressive, federation can reasonably be expected to win through. The second man
7 J V Wild, administrative secretary, Uganda, 1955–1960; chairman of Constitutional Committee, 1959.
8 F D Corfield, Historical survey of the origins and growth of Mau Mau (Nairobi & HMSO, 1960: Cmnd
1030). Corfield retired from the Sudan Political Service (provincial gov) in 1952; lived in Kenya from 1954;
secretary to Game Policy Committee.
9 Gp Capt L R Briggs was a right-winger opposed to all concessions to the Africans; Cavendish-Bentinck
was Speaker of Kenya Leg. Co, 1955–1960, and formed the Coalition Party.
10 In this letter Macleod made the point that ‘the true problem is not really Nyasaland but Northern
Rhodesia. We are still, of course, in the dark about what exactly will happen in the Congo. . . . In all my
thinking about Nyasaland I have been concentrating upon what I call the realities of power as against the
appearance of power: and I am sure that in Nyasaland that means firm retention of official control of the
executive at the present stage’.
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is Roy himself. A moment will certainly come when he will have to tell his party
leaders in the two Northern Territories to fall in and follow him. If he will do that,
again all will be well. But there is also, as you know, that dour and clever man
Whitehead.11 I am afraid that his decisions will be taken mainly on a basis of
Southern Rhodesian political calculations: to this extent he is unpredictable.
(8) Overseas Civil Service. You have sent me minutes expressing your concern at
the possibility of a serious loss in morale here. I fully share this anxiety. This
uneasiness has, of course, appeared in all territories as they begin to move towards
responsible self-government or independence; but it is essential that we do what we
can to meet it. I am putting my detailed plans to the Colonial Policy Committee, as
you asked me to do, after the Whitsun recess.12 In brief, my main suggestion will be
that we should take over the overseas and inducement elements of the pay and
pensions of those serving overseas; in other words, we would offer a British officer to
a territory, say, in Africa at the local price and pay the difference ourselves. This is
what the United Nations do, for example, with their technical experts. It would, I
believe, make the relationship between the Civil Service and the territories they
worked for very much easier and would, of course, be a great relief to the countries
themselves. But the cost is something of the order of £14 million and no doubt the
Chancellor will wish to study this very closely, particularly as a portion of it is
overseas expenditure.
This leads me to the last point that I wish to make. In territories like Nyasaland,
Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, where the final test of our policies will come, more
money is needed. Not much more money—say £10 million in all, or the equivalent
of the building of a few hundred council houses. But it is essential in these places to
encourage African agriculture and African education more than we have been doing,
and no expenditure would be more worth while.
This picture inevitably has light and shade in it, but I think it is not unhopeful and
that we can look forward to the problems ahead of us with some satisfaction as a
result of the first half of 1960.13
11 Sir Edgar Whitehead, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia since 1958.
12 This came to the Cabinet on 21 July 1960: see document no 85 below.
13 Mr Macmillan minuted that ‘this came more or less out of the blue. As far as I remember I did not ask
for it, but I am glad to have it so as to know what is going on’ (to Sir N Brook, 4.6.60). Brook advised that
it did not call for a written reply, but was best talked over with Macleod; he agreed it would not be wise to
show it to Lord Home, as ‘it contains one or two passages which seem to imply regret that progress
towards independence cannot be even faster, and the Commonwealth Secretary might perhaps find this
somewhat disturbing’ (Brook to prime minister, 17.6.60).
36 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)1 3 Jan 1961
‘Colonial problems in 1961’: memorandum by Mr Macleod for Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee
[The last paragraph of this document was printed in full by D J Morgan, The official
history of colonial development vol 5 Guidance towards self-government in British
colonies, 1941–1971 (1980), pp 143–144.]
The Committee may like to have a brief review of the most difficult colonial problems
that still confront us as we move into 1961.
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East Africa
In each of the four territories the next few weeks are going to be of critical
importance.
1. Kenya. The primary elections for the reserved seats will be held on January
19th–23rd and the open elections about a month later. On the whole the political
news from Kenya has become more reassuring recently. On the African side it seems
very likely now that the African opposition party which on the whole represents the
smaller tribes (KADU) will obtain something like twelve or fifteen out of the 33 seats
with the remainder going to the KANU party representing in the main the two
largest tribes, Kikuyu and Luo. This means that the chances of a coalition
Government, which would be perhaps the best answer, are very much increased.
Equally on the European side the prospects of Blundell and the NKG and the various
independents associated with him are somewhat brighter and he should get a
reasonable number of seats. But Kenya politics have in the past depended entirely on
personalities and the outcome of the reserved seats is difficult to forecast.
The Kenya financial problem is causing considerable concern. The actual drain
away of money seemed to have stopped, and indeed been reversed, in October; but
the budgetary position of Kenya is naturally as a result of the drop in income
extremely weak. We will have to help in this field for the next financial year. It has
never appeared likely that confidence would be restored this side of the election and
it will, of course, depend very much on the attitude of African leaders whether it can
be restored afterwards.
There is also, of course, the formidable problem of Jomo Kenyatta. The Governor
wishes to discuss this matter while he is on his present visit to this country.
2. Uganda. The problem here is essentially a relationship problem between the
Kabaka and to a lesser extent the other three minor Rulers and the rest of the
Protectorate. The press in this country concentrates on the Kabaka and the manoeu-
vrings of the Baganda tribe, but we must not forget that the rest of the Protectorate
are deeply distrustful of the Baganda and are very much afraid that H.M.G. will give in
to them. It was clearly necessary to turn down the request for immediate talks on
secession, but I tried to do this in as soft a way as possible and on the whole, although
the position in Uganda is somewhat Gilbertian as a result, we seem for the time being
to have reached a satisfactory answer; that is to say, we have got over the D-day of New
Year’s Eve without any trouble at all, whereas at one point it appeared likely that we
might have to declare an emergency. It is of course my hope that through the medium
of the Munster Commission1 which is going out this month to Uganda we will be able
to find a solution which will preserve the Kabakaship and the position of the other
Rulers. The Kabaka himself knows and appreciates this but is not always strong
enough to carry his more extreme Ministers with him.
3. Tanganyika. What will in effect be the Tanganyikan Independence Conference
will be held in Dar-es-Salaam in March and I propose to take it myself. Tanganyika
itself continues to be comparatively plain sailing, but the question of East African
federation is one on which we shall have to take a position in March. The difficulty is
that Nyerere claims that federation is not practicable until all the four territories are
at the Chief Minister stage, although if things go well in Kenya and Uganda it might
1 Lord Munster (5th earl), chairman of Uganda Relationships Commission, 1960–1961; formerly
parliamentary under-secretary of state at CO, 1951–1954.
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be possible to appoint an African Chief Minister within a very short time. The balance
of advantage seems to me to lie clearly in favour of federation, but again I shall be
discussing this with the East African Governors at our conference. I am equally sure
that until we are certain that it will succeed we should not proclaim our adherence to
it too strongly.
4. Zanzibar. There are to be elections this month and a Chief Minister will be
appointed after them. I do not anticipate any problems arising in this territory which
we could not contain.
5. There is in addition the general problem of the Colonial Service in East Africa
which partly because of the Congo and memories of Mau Mau is very jumpy indeed.
Our proposals for taking over the inducement element of pay have gone some way to
help and I hope that when we announce, as we will do in a few days, the results of the
Fleming Commission2 on Civil Service Salaries for East Africa we may finally be able
to convince them of H.M.G.’s good faith in these matters. But it is an uphill task.
Central Africa
1. Northern Rhodesia. The Territorial Conference will reassemble on the 30th
January. The Monckton Commission unfortunately recommended an African
majority in the Legislative Council and it is going to be very difficult, if not
impossible, to negotiate anything less than this with the Africans. On the other hand
it would be almost equally impossible to push the Europeans so far. The solution
clearly is going to lie somewhere round parity and I am really thinking in terms of a
token African majority amongst the elected members while preserving an official
plus European majority through the official Ministers who would be members of the
Council. We will really know in advance of the 30th January whether this conference
is going to succeed or fail and with it whether the Federation has a chance or not,
because if Sir Roy is prepared to accept and recommend something like this solution
I believe we could push the Africans into a reluctant acquiescence. If he doesn’t, and
the Conference fails, it is hard to see how Federation itself would survive.
2. Nyasaland. Elections cannot be held until early June. The UFP are trying by
various devices to delay them and I am sure this is foolish. We may not get rid of the
tension in Nyasaland after the election; we certainly are not going to get rid of it until
the election comes and we must, I am sure, hold to the earliest possible date. The
situation there is complicated by what appears to be a struggle for power between Dr.
Banda, who with all his faults represents the moderate element, and Mr.
Chipembere,3 who is going to be prosecuted for sedition in the near future and who
advocates as he did in the emergency days, more extreme solutions.
Malta
I have now got the report of the Sir Hilary Blood Commission4 and will be circulating
a summary of it to the C.P.C., together with my proposals, in a few days. I think it is
an extremely competent bit of work and gives Malta an advanced and liberal
2 Presumably J M Fleming, UK representative on Economic and Employment Commission of UN,
1950–1951; chief of Special Studies Division, IMF, 1954; adviser to IMF, 1959.
3 H B M Chipembere, elected member of Nyasaland Leg Co, 1956, treasurer-general of Malawi Congress
Party, organiser of the return of Dr Banda; subsequently minister of local government.
4 Sir H R R Blood, formerly governor of Mauritius, 1949–1954; and constitutional commissioner for
British Honduras, 1959, and Zanzibar, 1960.
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constitution not far away from the Singapore pattern. I think Mintoff is almost sure
to fight the election and he would be foolish to refuse to do so. But he may well after
that either call a referendum on independence, assuming he wins the election, or
decline to take office unless we make a forthcoming statement about self-
determination. I will consider this further and report to the C.P.C. when I put my
proposals before it.
The West Indies
Here, if the inter-governmental talks go well and if the Jamaica referendum is won by
Manley5 (both of which seem probable, though neither is certain), we should be able
to proceed to the West Indies Independence Conference in June or July and
independence might come about nine months later. The successful conclusion of the
West Indian Bases talks is a good augury for the future.
Colonial affairs are notoriously unpredictable and there may well be other candidates
for the headlines. Aden and Fiji in particular may well cause us problems, although
probably not quite yet. Moreover matters in the Far East might so develop that Hong
Kong and Singapore create problems that we cannot foresee at this stage. But the list
summarised above seems to me to be our major problems as we start the New Year. We
will be fortunate indeed if we get through them all without major difficulty.
We have, I think, come through 1960 reasonably well. I have tried to define the pace
of British colonial policy in Africa as “not as fast as the Congo and not as slow as Algiers”
and we have in spite of many contrary pressures managed so far to hold to this. British
territories in Africa have come to an uneventful and welcome independence. All the
emergencies that existed in the colonial territories have been ended and now for the
first time for thirteen years there is no emergency in any of the dependent territories.
But if we are realistic we must confront the fact that if there is to be a Congo in British
territories it is most likely to happen in Kenya, and if there is to be an Algiers it is most
likely to happen in the Central African Federation. Although African states have been
brought successfully to their independence, no one has yet succeeded in bringing to
independence a state which includes a large settler population. If we can achieve that
then we will have succeeded in doing what the Prime Minister once defined as “turn-
ing an Empire into a family”. We must also recognise that pressure from the United
Nations, now that Belgium and France are dropping out as colonial powers, will
increasingly concentrate on us. And there will be echoing voices from their different
viewpoints from both the extreme right and the extreme left in this country. 1961,
then, is sure to be a year of drama and decision in the colonial field.
5 Norman Manley, QC, premier of Jamaica, 1959–1962.
37 CAB 134/1560, CPC 1(61)2 6 Jan 1961
‘Colonial problems, 1961’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (61)
1) discussing the main Colonial problems likely to confront the Government in 1961.1
1 See previous document.
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East Africa
The Colonial Secretary said that, apart from the Central African Federation, by far
the most difficult problem would be East Africa and, in particular, Kenya. There was
likely to be growing pressure on the United Kingdom in the United Nations to bring
Colonial Territories to independence, but so far there had been no single instance of
a country where a dependent territory with a sizeable white settler population had
been brought successfully to independence. The basic difficulty was to achieve an
orderly transfer of power to the Africans without losing the confidence of the
Europeans.
In his current discussions he had found that the Governors of the East African
Territories were reasonably optimistic about the future. It seemed clear that opinion
in all the Territories was developing in favour of the formation of an East African
Federation. This was a matter which he would have to bring to the Committee in the
near future, since it would inevitably arise at the proposed independence conference
for Tanganyika to take place in Dar-es-Salaam in March, 1961. He was concerned at
the attitude of a certain section of the United Kingdom press to events in Africa, and
he was considering what action could be taken. The recently agreed extension of the
Overseas Civil Service inducement scheme to cover certain locally engaged staff in
Kenya, together with the forthcoming report of the Fleming Commission on Civil
Service Salaries in East Africa, would be likely to have a steadying effect on the
administration and on the situation generally.
In discussion it was suggested that it would be politically impossible for the United
Kingdom to disengage from Kenya as rapidly as the Colonial Office appeared to
envisage. We ought therefore to take the decision to remain responsible for the
administration of Kenya for another eight to ten years. This would allow us sufficient
time to embark on a comprehensive scheme of training of young Africans who by the
end of that period would be ready to take over responsible posts from expatriate
officers. We should try to get other members of the Commonwealth to understand
the difficulties facing us in such territories, and to secure their support in countering
irresponsible attacks in the United Nations on our Colonial policy. The cost of
conducting a rescue operation in East Africa as a result of handing over power to
Africans too soon was likely to be much higher than that of maintaining our position
there over a longer period. A premature withdrawal from Kenya would be likely to
lead to the emergence of a Congo-type situation which would contribute to the
instability of the whole of the African Continent. It was also important for our
defence interests that we should have security of tenure of certain bases in which to
station our strategic reserve south of the Middle East barrier. We were contemplating
the expenditure of a considerable sum of money on such installations in Kenya, but
the decision whether to proceed, or alternatively to seek some other solution, would
greatly depend on the period for which we might reasonably expect to be able to use
the facilities.
As against these arguments, however, it was pointed out that although we must
retain our responsibilities in East Africa for as long as possible, it was not possible in
practice to administer the Territories by military force. There could be no question in
practice of our being able to maintain our position in Kenya by consent for anything
approaching eight years. The success of our policy in Tanganyika had been largely due
to our willingness to consider a progressive and early transfer of power to the Africans
and to the fortunate emergence of a moderate African leader of exceptional ability.
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The Committee were in general agreement that the main hope of achieving stabil-
ity in East Africa lay in the formation of an East African Federation. Not only would
this be of great benefit to the Territories economically but it would be much easier
effectively to entrench in the constitution provisions regarding individual and prop-
erty rights of European settlers. It would also give each territory in the federation a
vested interest in preserving stability in the other territories. Thus any attempt by a
future government of Kenya to expropriate European settlers might be resisted and
restrained by the other territories because of the economic consequences to the
Federation as a whole. The Europeans in Kenya might be more inclined to acquiesce
in an early transfer of power to Africans if they thought that by such means they would
facilitate the creation of a federal system likely to afford political and economic safe-
guards for themselves. The emergence of an East African Federation should also make
it easier to secure a satisfactory defence agreement after independence, on the lines of
that negotiated with Nigeria and proposed for Sierra Leone. It had to be recognised,
however, that even with such a defence agreement we might not be able to retain full
liberty of action in regard to the purposes for which the forces stationed in the
Federation could be used; and this might considerably detract from the usefulness of
the Federation as a location for the general strategic reserve.
In further discussion about the setting up of an East African Federation the
Committee were informed that it was the view of the Chief Minister of Tanganyika,
Mr. Nyerere, that all the East African Territories should be brought as soon as
possible to the stage of having an African Chief Minister, so that they could all enter a
federation at a somewhat similar stage of constitutional development, but before
they achieved independence separately. Mr. Nyerere would be willing if necessary to
defer the attaining of Tanganyika’s independence for a short period in order to enable
this state of affairs to be brought about. But, especially in view of the fact that
Tanganyika was a United Nations Trust Territory, it was most unlikely that we should
be able to avoid conceding independence either to Tanganyika alone or to an East
African Federation of which she was a part, for longer than a few years. Furthermore,
if as seemed possible, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar were likely to move fairly
quickly towards independence it would be impossible to justify to the Kenya Africans
the maintenance of United Kingdom rule in Kenya merely on account of the
presence of significant numbers of Europeans. It was pointed out that it would be
essential to ensure that the Territories entered a federation as a result of the freely
expressed desire of their inhabitants, in order to avoid a situation arising similar to
that in the case of the Central African Federation.
Malta
The Committee took note that the Colonial Secretary would shortly be submitting
proposals for a new constitution for Malta, following which elections would be held.
It seemed likely that if Mr. Mintoff were to win the elections there might be an early
demand for independence.
Southern Rhodesia
The Minister of State, Commonwealth Relations Office,2 informed the Committee
that the Southern Rhodesian Constitutional Conference had adjourned to Salisbury
2 Mr C J M Alport.
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where, during the course of the next two or three weeks, the Southern Rhodesia
Delegation would be attempting to work out amongst themselves some agreed
proposals which the Commonwealth Secretary would consider when he visited
Salisbury towards the end of January.
Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that the Committee would
wish to resume its discussion on Colonial problems generally at a subsequent
meeting, particularly in the light of the outcome of the current discussions which
the Colonial Secretary was holding with the Governors of the East African
Territories. For purposes of defence planning, the best estimate it was possible to
make at present was that we should be able to retain our facilities in Kenya, either by
virtue of our retaining responsibility for the territory, or by virtue of a defence
agreement, for about six to seven years in all.
38 PREM 11/4608 22 Mar 1961
‘Africa: Lord Salisbury’s “Watching” Committee’: record of a meeting
of the deputation with Mr Macmillan
[The deputation consisted of Lord Salisbury, Lord Coleraine (minister of state at FO,
1943–1945), Lord Milverton (formerly, as A F Richards, governor of Nigeria, 1943–1947),
Lord Lloyd (parliamentary under-secretary of state at CO, 1954–1957), J A Biggs-Davison,
MP (member of parliamentary delegation to West Africa, 1956), R H Turton, MP (minister
of health, 1955–1957), Lord Hinchingbrooke, Sir R Grimston, MP, Sir John Barlow, MP,
and J B Eden, MP. In writing to thank the prime minister afterwards, Lord Salisbury said:
‘I must say quite frankly that we got very little comfort from it’ (ie, what Mr Macmillan
had said) (23.3.61).]
Lord Salisbury opened the proceedings by thanking the Prime Minister for his
courtesy in receiving the deputation at a time when he must be very busy. He added
that the Committee was not a body hostile to the Government. He referred to the
Watching Committee which used to meet under his father’s Chairmanship in the
early days of the war. This was a Committee of the same kind which had now been
formed to keep an eye on developments in Africa and to concern itself both with
questions of general policy towards that continent and special problems that might
arise both inside and outside the territories within our control there. The views of
the members of the committee, nevertheless, reflected certain views which were
widely held outside. Lord Salisbury thought that it might be helpful if in discussions
of this sort some fears which were current could be dispelled. Lord Salisbury said
that there were 4 questions which they would like to discuss:
(1) What were the views of Her Majesty’s Government about the future of the
Europeans in Africa?
(2) The United Nations Organisation and the Congo.
(3) What was really happening about the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland?
(4) Kenya. Lord Salisbury said that in some ways they felt that Kenya was the
most unhappy of all the areas which they had in mind.
In reply the Prime Minister welcomed the delegation and referred to Lord
Salisbury as an old friend and most distinguished man whose name was a household
word. The Prime Minister said that he would not comment on what Lord Salisbury
had said in another place: he was not Disraeli [this was an oblique reference to
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Disraeli’s remark in the House of Commons in 1874 about Lord Salisbury’s
grandfather— “He is a great master of jibes and flouts and jeers.”]1
The Prime Minister went on to say that Lord Salisbury had posed some broad and
pretty difficult questions. What was the future of Africa? Well, what was the future of
Asia? He would like to remind them, however, that Mr. Macleod’s period of office has
been the only one which for many years had not been marked by civil strife in the
territories in Africa for which the Colonial Secretary is responsible.
The Prime Minister said that in those countries in Africa where the Europeans are
not settlers and did not regard the country as their homeland (for example, Ghana
and Nigeria) the problem had not been too difficult. Nevertheless of course
everything might be said to have gone too quickly. But the risks involved in trying to
hold the situation had been greater than those involved in advancing as fast as we
did.
For the rest, if a settlement of the Algerian problem were reached by France, the
heat from the East would be turned more on us.
The problem was to provide the basis for a reliable mixed society.
In the Congo the object was to prevent a Spanish or Korean kind of war—to
prevent the cold war turning into a hot war there. About this the Russians had been
confounded. Of course not only the Russians but pedantic legalists in other countries
were a nuisance in the U.N. The U.N. had failed to fulfil the purpose of its founders. It
was now a forum for the cold war. The Congo might turn into a federation or a
confederation. In the meantime life in Katanga went on. Shipments of copper were at
least normal.
About the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Prime Minister said that in
pursuing the object of federation Her Majesty’s Government was the only strong
friend Sir Roy Welensky had. The most important thing at the moment was the
relations between Sir R. Welensky and Sir E. Whitehead. The discussions about the
Northern Rhodesian Constitution cast a shadow over the Southern Rhodesian
Referendum. What Sir R. Welensky wanted most was the independence of the
Federation. It was the question of the independence of the Federation which had
hastened things on in its component parts. If we had postponed the Northern
Rhodesian negotiations, we should have had to postpone the next discussions about
the future of the Federation. In trying to make federation we had made for ourselves
a terribly difficult problem. What would happen if Sir E. Whitehead lost the
Referendum? Looking back some people might think that an economic Federation
instead of a political one might have been better. But one could not go back now.
About Kenya, the Prime Minister said that the elections had gone off quietly and
that money was beginning to flow in again.
The Prime Minister said that in the purely African countries the future of the
Europeans was quite good. The question was how to secure the future of the
Europeans in countries like Kenya and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He
was sure that the way to do it was not by force of arms but by influence; and our
future policy must be not to make haste too fast or too slowly.
In the course of the discussion which followed Lord Salisbury asked whether Her
Majesty’s Government envisaged an African majority in Northern Rhodesia now. The
Prime Minister replied that it should not be a question of the colour of people’s faces.
1 Square brackets in the original.
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Mr Turton said that Sir R. Welensky on his return to Salisbury had not been helped
by headlines in the newspapers, “Welensky rebuffed”.
Lord Salisbury referred to the 1958 Lennox-Boyd Constitution for Northern
Rhodesia which he liked. The Prime Minister reminded him that it had been an
imposed constitution at the time—a thing which people were apt to forget now—
and in any case we could not stand still.
Lord Salisbury then said that the people of whom he was thinking in particular
were those who were fighting for the survival of their societies in our countries in
Africa in which they had made their permanent home. The Prime Minister in reply
mentioned all the blood and treasure which the French had spent to no avail fighting
in Algeria. He did not think that armed force was the right way to go about it. Nor,
however, for obvious reasons, could the Government guarantee to recompense
settlers in the hypothetical case of their losing their farms.
Lord Salisbury said that he did not regard Algeria as an analogy because he
thought the Algerian Moslems were more sophisticated than the Africans whom he
had in mind. He added, with great emphasis, that there was a feeling among the
settlers that our people were being abandoned: they had come and asked and gone
away empty; anything that the Government could do to reassure them would be well
done.
Lord Salisbury again thanked the Prime Minister for receiving the deputation and
the deputation withdrew.
39 DO 168/60, no 1 A Aug 1961
‘Policy towards Africa south of the Sahara’: officials’
interdepartmental paper (FO, CO, CRO) [Extract]
[This paper was crystallised by a West Africa heads of mission meeting in London in May
1961 (see document no 382 in part II), as a revision of an original FO draft, incorporating
CRO changes. Neither Home nor Sandys had time to comment, so it was not formally
endorsed as an expression of ministerial policy.]
I Summary and conclusions
The problem
(I) The main importance of Africa lies in its political fluidity at a time when the
rest of the world has adopted reasonably firm positions in the East-West struggle.
(II) The principal objectives for Western policy in Africa are:
(a) stability, and growing prosperity;
(b) benevolence to the West or, at least, genuine neutrality.
(III) The lack of capital resources and economic backwardness, in terms both of
equipment and efficient manpower, prevent progress. They militate against stability,
particularly because African leaders are determined to raise standards of living at
almost any cost.
(IV) Africa is also inhibited from the achievement of stability and growing
prosperity by tribal jealousies, international and bloc rivalries and difficulties of
communication, both physical and linguistic.
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(V) Pan-Africanism is potentially a counter-force to these and will always possess
strong emotional appeal. At the moment, however, its championship by extreme
anti-Western elements makes it more a source of disunity.
(VI) The achievement of benevolence to the West or, at least, genuine neutrality is
made more difficult by such factors as:
(a) Dislike of colonialism and racial discrimination. In this connexion a smooth
advance to independence in multi-racial British territories in Africa is vital.
(b) The policy of certain Western Governments.
(c) Fear of economic exploitation.
(d) Resentment at Western bases in Africa.
(VII) As a result of its history in Africa the West is judged by harsher standards
than the Communists. But the Africans are not blind to the threat of Communist
imperialism and few of their leaders or intelligentsia are attracted by Communist
ideology.
(VIII) However, reliance on systems of State-control and traditional collectivism in
agriculture produce an economic structure to which Marxist methods may seem
naturally to apply.
(IX) The West still enjoys a valuable heritage in Africa. The Commonwealth
provides a unique association of strength and depth. The French have, for the most
part, been more successful in binding their former colonies to the West politically,
but the very completeness of their success may work against its permanence.
Recommendations for policy—economic
(X) Aid, in itself, should not be considered as a political weapon, though its
absence might be used as a weapon against us. The Africans are exaggeratedly
conscious of the threat of neo-colonialism and will be on the look-out for any
political content in Western aid.
(XI) The West should try to overcome African suspicions that Western aid is
designed to perpetuate Western influence. There are considerable limitations on the
use of multilateral organisations though the fact that Africans can play a part in
them makes them theoretically more desirable. Purely Western multilateral
organisations will be unlikely to win the confidence of the Africans.
(XII) On the whole, money spent by the West on technical assistance (which the
United Kingdom is particularly well placed to provide) does more for our position in
Africa than economic aid. In this field, as in aid generally, we should encourage the
older Commonwealth countries, the Germans and other potential contributors in
the Western camp who are not handicapped by colonial histories, and we should help
to direct their effort to where it would have the best impact. We should also consider
the advantages of some “spot treatment” of technical aid by applying it where it will
be effective and noted.
(XIII) Aid is particularly valuable if devoted to the development of national
administrations and to the laying down of the social infrastructure without which no
lasting progress is possible.
(XIV) A really massive effort in the teaching of English and French would make a
great contribution to co-operation and stability in Africa. Discussion with the
Americans, the French and the other Commonwealth countries as to how this can
best be done should be started forthwith.
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(XV) Development of trade is a very effective form of aid. The West’s position will
be proportionately stronger as it buys more raw materials from the African countries.
Difficult though it will prove in practice, the West must aim to achieve some stability
for basic commodity prices.
Recommendations for policy—political
(XVI) Politically the West, and, in particular, the United Kingdom has inherited
valuable assets in Africa. It must be our aim to preserve our existing cultural,
educational and commercial ties. The Commonwealth relationship is the most
valuable means at our disposal.
(XVII) Nevertheless, in the interests of achieving benevolence to the West or, at
least, genuine neutrality, it must be general Western policy to disengage as far as
possible from African affairs. The Africans must see that we do not wish to engage
them in the cold war and that we ask nothing better than that they should run their
own affairs in their own best interests.
(XVIII) We should do our best to avoid taking sides in any African dispute since the
side we support is likely to run foul of African nationalist feeling.
(XIX) Though we shall have to be careful not to damage particular countries by
obviously favouring them and thus creating Governments as vulnerable as was the
Nuri régime in Iraq, we should do what we can to build up certain pro-Western
countries into positions where they can take the lead economically and politically.
Nigeria, with its preponderance in area, population and economic potential, would
clearly be a first charge: in “French” Africa the Ivory Coast, though smaller in scale,
would repay similar treatment.
(XX) In line with the same general policy we should:
(a) examine critically the importance of the strategic objectives we are trying to
achieve before deciding to ask for the bases or overflying rights which they
necessitate;
(b) do nothing to promote the idea of an arms embargo for Africa unless some
African initiative arises spontaneously or can be discreetly inspired;
(c) avoid any appearance of support in Africa or elsewhere for the policies of such
countries as Portugal and South Africa;
(d) seek to educate the Americans in the political and economic realities of Africa
so that they secure the best return for their efforts;
(e) keep away from any idea of a NATO or specifically “European” policy towards
Africa;
(f ) in general, maintain diplomatic representation of the highest possible quality;
its scale being dependent on the complex of relationships which has been built up
with the country concerned, whether foreign or Commonwealth.
. . .
III The importance of Africa
3. Africa South of the Sahara is not so important as its area might suggest. Its pop-
ulation is some 160 million: hardly more than a third of India and little more than a
quarter of China. Its rate of increase is far slower than either of these giants or of the
under-developed countries in Latin America. Its exports of manufactured goods barely
exist. It only exports 4 per cent. of the world’s raw materials. The Gross National
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Product is less than quarter of that of Britain, and such wealth as there is is concen-
trated largely in South Africa, the Rhodesias and the Congo. Its production of dia-
monds, cobalt, gold, uranium, chrome and copper, to mention only a few, is of great
significance to the economy of the free world, but none of these have anything like the
same crucial importance as the oil exports of the Middle East. Nor is there much hope
of any early and dramatic improvement: only in the three rich areas mentioned above
does the proportion of the national income devoted to production investment
approach that generally held necessary for the modernisation of a backward territory.
4. Strategically, Africa South of the Sahara holds somewhat greater significance,
though this relates largely to the defence of interests such as the oil of Kuwait which
lie outside the continent. Overflying rights at present seem essential for the mainte-
nance of our position in the rest of the world, and the sea route round the Cape could,
in certain circumstances, be of the greatest importance not only to ourselves but to
the West as a whole. But with all this, Africa South of the Sahara is still not an area of
prime strategic importance in the same sense as Europe or the Middle East.
5. The importance of Africa lies not in its strength but rather in its weakness and
its consequent susceptibility to external influences. Africa is fluid at a time when
Europe and, to a lesser extent, Asia have frozen into fixed attitudes towards the cold
war and when Latin America is still largely confined by the position in which history
and habit have cast it. It has not taken sides in the East-West struggle, nor has it even
evolved a firm position from which it can decline to take sides. However, the begin-
nings of attitudes can be seen and “Africa for the Africans” represents a consistent
underlying theme. Political objectives, for the most part, are less clear; nevertheless
clarification is taking place and in the case of, e.g., Ghana, closely defined principles
have been laid down, if not always respected. Five years from now the continent may
have evolved into a more coherent pattern but for the moment the policies of a num-
ber of States are not necessarily more than ephemeral. Nigeria seems likely to remain
in the middle of the road for the time being: Guinea on the one hand and Liberia on
the other appear more or less to have committed themselves. But for the most part
the Black African States might move rapidly and unpredictably towards East or West.
This fluidity coupled with the rapid increase in the number of independent African
votes gives the area particular importance in the United Nations.
6. The loss of all Black Africa to Communism would present nothing like so
immediate a threat to the West as the loss of France or Germany. But France or
Germany could only be lost to the West as the result of a cataclysm: the African
countries could drift into the Communist camp without any violent upset or turn of
fortune. It is for this reason that Africa is of such significance to the West and that it
calls for an effort from us quite disproportionate to its intrinsic importance. In this
paper Africa is considered above all as a target in the East-West struggle and our
policy towards it in the light of the need to keep it out of the Communist camp.
IV The objectives of the West
. . .
The double standard
31. In theory several of these factors1 should militate against Communism as
well as against the West. The Russians have in fact got colonies; they, far more than
1 i.e, ‘state-socialism’ and ‘traditional collectivism’ (summary, para VIII).
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the West, are enemies of Islam; they have as their eventual object the subversion of
the independent Governments of Africa. The more sophisticated Africans may believe
this but even to this small group the facts do not seem very important or relevant to
their situation. They do not care about the East-West struggle. The basic fact is that
they want to stay out of it. The repressed minorities within Russia, even the fate of
Hungary, do not mean much to the African leader harassed by his local problems and
obsessed by his own national history. All they care about is that Russia has no history
of colonialism in Africa, that it claims to make no distinction of race, colour or class,
and appears to pose no immediate threat to African independence. On the contrary,
the Russians appear to be seeking the immediate extirpation of colonialism from the
continent and can therefore easily pose as the champion of African rights. Since they
have few if any responsibilities they are more free to manoeuvre than the West and
can allocate their relatively small contributions of aid to maximum political
advantage. In this context the absence of local Communist parties from most
countries of Black Africa is a positive advantage to the Russians in their efforts to get
themselves accepted by the nationalist régimes.
32. The result is that, vis-à-vis the Russians, the West has to run twice as fast to
keep the same place. The Africans are not blind to Russian interference in, for
example, the Congo, but they will be far more ready to suspect it in the case of the
Belgians. They are ready to accept that Soviet economic aid is genuinely
disinterested, yet are quick to accuse the West of neo-colonialism. This is the
unfortunate heritage of our colonial history. It should disappear with time and
patient effort, but in the meantime there is nothing to do except recognise the
handicap and work correspondingly harder to overcome it.
The difficulties of the communists
33. Not all the trump cards are in the Communist hand. For one thing, they are
still learning about Africa and are certain to make at least initial blunders in their
technical aid programme and attempts to influence the Africans. They have nothing
to rival the complex of trading and other interests which the West still possesses in
Africa—a complex which may at times offend the African by its very obtrusiveness
and economic importance but which still provides an excellent means of retaining
contact and influence with them.
34. For another the Africans, though more suspicious of the West, are aware of
the threat of Communist imperialism. It was Nkrumah who warned the All-African
People’s Conference in 1958 that “. . . imperialism may come to us yet in a different
guise—not necessarily from Europe”. The African may find that, in foreign policy,
his ideas tend to coincide with those of the Russians, but this does not mean that he
accepts their rights to lead or wishes to adopt their methods. He may admire
Communism as a system which appears to achieve rapid economic results but few
Africans will find it very appealing ideologically or when viewed from the angle of
religion.
35. The Chinese believe that, because of their colour and their own poverty and
under-industrialisation, their help and presence will be more acceptable to the
Africans than that either of “imperialists” or European Communists. There is some
evidence that they are right though they are handicapped by such factors as physical
remoteness, inexperience, language difficulties and shortage of foreign exchange.
Certainly their effort in the area is growing rapidly. So far there is little evidence of a
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clash of interest between Russia and China since both are pursuing the same
objective of undermining the Western position. But variations in tactics—e.g., on
attitudes towards “bourgeois nationalist” régimes—may grow into wider differences
and the West should be alive to any possibility of exploiting rivalry between the two.
36. The determination of the Russians to wreck the United Nations should also
be a handicap to them in their efforts to woo the African world. An independent voice
at the United Nations should have greater value for the small African Power than a
subordinate voice in the sort of “Afro-Asian bloc” at which the Russians are aiming.
Though Russia will do its best to cloak its intentions, if the Africans suspect that it is
Russia’s policy to deprive them of this voice then they may grow to be suspicious of
Russia’s motives in other fields.
The significance of the Commonwealth
37. Finally, the Commonwealth and the grouping of former French colonies are
very important to Africa as a whole and to the members of both groups. Moderate
African Powers such as Nigeria, Tanganyika and Senegal, working closely in
association with each other and with the former metropolitan Power, could act as a
stabilising force in the continent. But the Commonwealth offers much more than
the maintenance of links with the United Kingdom; it provides a positive influence
operating in a multitude of ways on newly independent African Governments and
representing to them a sort of “third force” which softens the hard choice between
East and West. A country can be a member without falling victim to neo-colonialism
nor does it thereby feel bound to grant some corresponding concession to Soviet
interest so as to maintain an East-West balance. It is a bridge between “neutralists”
and “imperialists” which the Communists would dearly like to see destroyed.
V A policy for the West
38. Africa to-day is very far from meeting the two main objectives of Western
policy. The continent has shown itself apt to splinter into fragments and the disasters
of the Congo have illustrated how quickly a major economic asset can be
undermined or even destroyed. Guinea, Ghana and Mali, in their different ways, have
moved towards Left-wing xenophobia over the last two years, the future of the Congo
is a gigantic question-mark and few would put much money on the other former
French colonies remaining as loyal to the West as they are to-day.
Economic aid and technical assistance
39. What can the West do about this? Anything which can be done to increase
the wealth and stability of Africa would obviously contribute to meeting both our
objectives. And yet the resources available seem so small compared with the
immensity of the problem that it is hard to know how they can best be allocated. This
is not the place to consider Western aid projects in any detail. Certain general
considerations may however usefully be mentioned.
Aid is not a political weapon
40. . . . or rather, if aid is used as a political weapon, it will often boomerang on
the user. The Africans are exaggeratedly conscious of the threat of “neo-colonialism”.
They will claim aid as a right and will be righteously indignant if we fail to meet their
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bills. But if we do give aid they will still scrutinise it suspiciously for any hint of
political strings. If they think that it is being given simply as a counter to Soviet aid
or so as to tie the recipient to the West, then they will probably continue to accept it
but even the scanty harvest of gratitude which we may otherwise hope for will be cut
off. On such conditions aid would still be worth giving since otherwise Africa would
inevitably drift into economic disaster, chaos, primitive tribalism or Communism.
But if we hope that aid from the West will generate goodwill in African hearts, then
we have got to find ways of giving it which do not seem to aim for this end.
Unfortunately, the “double standard” referred to above means that Communist aid is
not yet subject to such harsh scrutiny. Where the African will tend to suspect that
Western aid is:
(a) given as a recompense for generations of colonial exploitation and
(b) intended to secure a perpetuation of Western influence,
he will be ready to accept that Communist aid is more disinterested.
The pattern of aid
41. Hitherto, on a rough calculation, more than 15 times as much non-
Communist bloc aid has been received by African countries bilaterally as through
multilateral organisations (while the bloc effort has been exclusively bilateral). The
bulk of United Kingdom governmental aid to African countries and territories (over
£30 million in 1959–60, and probably about £55 million in 1960–61) is necessarily
given bilaterally to our own dependent or former dependent territories. The same is
true for the French (whose governmental aid to Africa, even excluding Algeria and
the Sahara, is probably running at about £100 million a year). In our present balance
of payments difficulties we ourselves cannot hope to make further substantial
increases in our aid to Africa, nor to alter its pattern. We must face the consequences
of this: they might well be serious.
Multilateral aid
42. This takes various forms: capital aid through the World Bank (and now
through the I.D.A.); technical assistance through the United Nations and the
Specialised Agencies; and through bodies specifically concerned with Africa such as
C.C.T.A./F.A.M.A. and S.C.A.A.P.2
43. There is room for both bilateral and multilateral aid. While in theory the
latter may be more popular in Africa, in practice bilateral aid has many advantages,
principal among them that it can be given more quickly. The less developed
countries criticise rather the abstract idea of bilateral aid than any concrete bilateral
aid they may themselves be receiving. With the inception of the I.D.A. and for other
reasons the proportion of multilateral to bilateral aid in Africa may increase in the
future. There is certainly scope for “consortium” operations, like that for the Volta
Dam project, and even for “Colombo Plan”-type organisations as a forum where
recipients and donors are associated on a basis of equality.
44. However, the following considerations operate in a limiting sense:
(i) we delude ourselves if we think that the burden of aid will be more equally
shared between West and East by using such agencies. The Communist Powers are
2 Special Commonwealth African Assistance Plan: see document nos 343 & 344 in Pt II.
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only likely to use multilateral agencies if they can reap political dividends by so
doing;
(ii) the means of the United Nations are limited and it is likely, particularly for
special operations, to depend largely on Western support;
(iii) the I.B.R.D. may be viewed with some scepticism by certain African countries
because of the disciplines it imposes in connexion with project loans. In addition
none of the former French colonies is a member. The I.D.A. with its long-term,
interest-free loans may be more popular;
(iv) aid organisations in which Africans do not participate are likely to be
regarded with even more suspicion by Africans than individual donors;
(v) many African Governments want, for economic reasons, to take aid from both
sides and for political reasons to be seen to be doing so;
(vi) individual Western countries must retain the ability and the freedom to
provide bilateral aid ad hoc when asked to do so (e.g., aircraft for Mali, arms for
Sudan). It is essential for the Western cause that a few key countries such as
Nigeria, Senegal and Tanganyika should prosper and be seen to prosper;
(vii) the traditional pattern of aid (e.g., French to ex-French territories, British to
East Africa and Nigeria) could not be broken from the Western side without
adverse political consequences. If it can, however, be diversified without being
reduced, by the participation of other countries or consortia arrangements, there
would be political gain.
45. The (necessarily tentative) conclusions to be drawn from this are:
(i) there are considerable limitations on the use of fully international agencies as
channels for multilateral aid;
(ii) the use of agencies in which African States participate and take some
collective responsibility for the division of aid might be useful;
(iii) bilateral aid must be maintained and may need to be increased. The
participation of other friendly countries such as West Germany, Sweden,
Switzerland and Japan should be encouraged. The local political responses to
bilateral aid coming largely or exclusively from one donor country should be
carefully watched;
(iv) every effort should be made to show up the aid pattern of the Communist bloc
as more political and self-seeking than that of the West. . . .
Political tactics for the West
54. The West has a valuable heritage in Africa. The United Kingdom in particular
has many assets which good government has left it in its former colonial territories
while the formal and informal ties which are part and parcel of the Commonwealth
Association are invaluable assets in the case of independent members. It would be a
grave mistake not to try to retain the cultural, educational and commercial links
which have grown up in the past. But real though they are, they may still not stand
an excessive strain. It must be our aim not to risk destroying them by demanding
from them more strength or endurance than they can be expected to have.
55. The more one considers positive action by the West the longer becomes the
list of things which the West should not do. In perhaps 95 per cent. of the political
problems which confront us a negative policy of disengagement and hold-back will
be most successful or—at any rate—least disastrous for the West. This is not a
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policy of despair; it is no more than recognition of the fact that Western interference
will usually be misinterpreted and Western advice ignored except in those cases in
which the Africans themselves have invited it. Such cases will only occur frequently
if we do not give the impression that we are anxious to thrust ourselves forward or
think that the Africans have a duty to listen to us.
56. In the context of the cold war this means that our objective must be to make
the Africans realise that we have no objection to their following an independent
policy and are not particularly anxious to enrol them in the Western camp. We must
accept the fact that we will be doing well if most African countries adopt a posture of
benevolent neutrality. In the United Nations, where the cold war will impinge most
sharply on the African nations we should ensure that they know the Western case,
but should not suggest that our friendship depends on their supporting it. Writing
on November 17, 1960, of the decision to try to get Kasavubu’s credentials adopted by
the United Nations, Sir Patrick Dean wrote:
“The realities are such that an active policy of this kind, however sensible, if based
on Western votes and running counter to the major current of African and Asian
opinion, may well impel that current towards the Soviet bloc and may result in a
Pyrrhic victory if not in defeat”.
Though the factors described in paragraphs 23–29 above will mean that the
Africans, if left to themselves, will often vote against us, we need not fear that this
tendency will be invariable or permanent. “We are not voting for either of you, we are
voting for Africa”, said the Foreign Minister of the Central African Republic. We must
try to see that so far as possible our interests coincide. The results will not always be
happy for the West but there is every reason to believe that, in the long run, they will
be quite as uncongenial to the Communists.
Disengagement in practice
57. Unfortunately disengagement is sometimes more easy to preach than to
practice. In the General Assembly, for instance, we cannot maintain a detached
attitude on subjects such as the fixing by the United Nations of target dates on which
the support of uncommitted Governments is a vital interest. In the Congo, the plain
fact is not merely that Lumumba called on the Russians for help but that he wanted
to eliminate all Western interests. However sincere their desire not to interfere, the
West were inevitably jockeyed into a position where they had to support the rival
faction. The megalomania of Lumumba and the inertia of Kasavubu led the West into
policies which, even if they succeed in the end in the Congo, have put much strain on
our relations with other African States.
58. In so far as any moral can be drawn from the Congo it is that we will always
be in trouble if factions take shape in an African country and the West finds itself
conspicuously supporting one of them. If the faction of our choice wins then it will
be assailed by all the more vociferous African nationalists and even the moderates
will hesitate to support it. It may win through to stability but the cards will be
stacked against it. If the rival faction wins then we will be faced with a Government
dedicated to an extremist anti-Western policy. In justice the same should apply to the
Communists but here again the double standard applies. The Russians can get away
with more interference than we can and their supporters in Africa will be more
fanatical and more unscrupulous than our own. The object of the West should
therefore be to avoid taking sides unless it is forced upon it. This may reduce our
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chances of getting the best result but it will make it much more likely that we will
end up with a Government tolerably well disposed towards us.
59. A consistent policy of political disengagement by the West can be applied to
several of the problems which now face us in Africa.
60. (i) Bases and overflying rights. Obviously the United Kingdom cannot divest
itself entirely of these so long as it still exercises colonial responsibilities in Africa,
and commitments in other areas which may lead to requirements for reinforcing via
Africa. But it must be our object to do so as far as possible. This has, indeed, already
been our policy in Nigeria. It will be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find an
alternative to Kenya for the defence of the Persian Gulf but it would be a mistake not
to plan on the assumption that it may be politically impossible to hold on to a base in
Kenya once independence has been granted. Where overflying rights are concerned it
will be even more difficult to dispense with our commitments or meet them by other
means, but we should be ready to contemplate the considerable extra cost and delay
which would be involved in, for instance, reinforcing certain parts of the world by the
west-about route. The situation may, of course, be different where an independent
African State requests our protection but even in such a case we should be careful to
avoid the appearance of propping up an unpopular régime against the current of
“African” opinion. In the long run we might thereby do more damage to the interests
of our allies.
61. (ii) Arms embargo. It would be very desirable if the flow of arms into Africa
could be controlled and limited. But there is little initiative which the West can take
in this direction since requests for arms, if refused by the West, would be likely to be
swiftly acceded to by the Sino-Soviet bloc. Any attempt to press the Africans to accept
such an embargo would be misinterpreted as a plot to keep them in a state of
inferiority in which colonial rule could easily be reimposed. The most that we can do
is to give encouragement and advice if any Africans seem disposed to launch the idea
themselves and perhaps to preach it cautiously to a few exceptionally trusted friends.
Even this would need to be handled discreetly since too eager support by the West
could prove the kiss of death.
62. (iii) Misbehaviour of our allies. We must be energetic in dissociating ourselves
from the policies of such countries as Portugal and South Africa. It is bad that a
member of the West should be pilloried, but it will be still worse if their odium is
spread over all their allies. We are already half in the pillory ourselves over our multi-
racial colonies. But the argument that we should stick by the Portuguese and South
Africans now so that they will stick by us then has no validity. For one thing, their
support would be more of an embarrassment than an asset; for another, our support
for them now would make more likely our own involvement in similar difficulties in
the future. This does not mean that we should attack our recalcitrant allies, but we
need not defend them either. Each case must be considered on its merits, but non-
involvement should be our usual objective.
63. In the interests of winning the favour of the Africans, the Americans will
probably press more urgently for the ending of colonialism than they really feel is
wise. We should be able to avoid any direct clash and should certainly urge the
Americans not to act in a way which would make our policy less likely to succeed.
But we should recognise that it is in the interests of the West that the Americans
should keep themselves aloof even from such relatively innocuous colonialism as our
own. They are going to have their hands full resisting Russian charges of economic
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imperialism without associating themselves with colonialism in its more traditional
form. . . .
Summary
70. To disengage, to leave the Africans alone, to advise and help only when our
advice and help is asked for is not a heroic policy. But neither is it defeatist. Nor does
it involve any relaxation of effort. The first objective of our policy must be to
convince the Africans that we have no designs on their continent—either economic
or political, that we do not wish to engage them in our quarrels with the Communist
bloc and that we are perfectly content that they should run their own affairs. Only
when this has been accepted can we hope to reap the full benefit from what we are
doing to help them and can we feel reasonably sure that they will not drift towards
the Communist bloc and become ever more alienated from the West.
40 FO 371/161358, no 3 6 Mar 1962
[Situation in Africa]: letter from Lord Home to J H A Watson (Dakar)1
I was very much interested in your letter of January 25 commenting on the last
paragraph of Lord Head’s despatch No. 1 of January 11.2 Your first hand observations
were most valuable and I agree with most of what you say. I fully accept that the
belief among Africans that colonial rule is an anachronism today is very deep-seated
and that it is this rather than anti-Western attitudes as such which prompts newly
independent African states to act as they do. I also agree that we should not allow
ourselves to become identified with positions which we do not believe are tenable
and that if we were to do so it would adversely affect our relations with newly
emergent African states.
The crux of the issue, however, lies in Lord Head’s phrase that colonial territories
should have their independence as soon as they are politically and administratively
ready (my underlining). If this test were applied in the abstract it might be argued
that we ought not to go out for a generation. This will scarcely be practical politics
and we shall run the risk that what follows may not be written up as a monument of
British skill and good sense.
It is these considerations which make the pressure for immediate independence
from African states in the United Nations and elsewhere (the motive for which I
entirely understand) so very difficult to reconcile with our responsibilities and our
desire to lead countries to orderly independence. I can only hope that little by little
the lesson of the Congo will sink in and that those who regard independence as an
end in itself will gradually come to see that it is desirable that there are other
priorities which also have to be taken into account. I have been encouraged for
instance to read in Pat Dean’s3 summing up of the recent debate on Ruanda Urundi
1 British ambassador to the Federation of Mali, 1960–1961, to Senegal, Mauritania and Togo, 1960–1962;
formerly head of African Dept of FO, 1956–1959.
2 High commissioner in Federation of Nigeria since 1960; formerly (as A H Head) S of S for war,
1951–1956.
3 Sir P Dean, UK permanent representative to the UN, 1960–1964.
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that in his view the last session has shown that the Afro-Asians are moving to a more
constructive attitude. They are now intent on hastening independence, he says, with
painstaking regard to the need to avoid breakdown and chaos. Whether this will be
avoided in the case of Ruanda Urundi remains to be seen; but at least it is something
that a more constructive attitude has been displayed in this particular instance.
I hope too that recent developments in connection with Katanga and the Central
African Federation will have made it clearer to African opinion that we are not
supporting Katangan secession, that we are genuinely anxious to see Katanga re-
incorporated in the Congo by peaceful means and that with all the difficulties
involved in a community where there are a large number of white settlers we are not
dragging our feet simply with a view to delaying the application of the “wind of
change” to our own territories.
The Portuguese overseas territories are of course in a special category and I am
sorry to say that our attempts to persuade the Portuguese that they would be well
advised at least to start on the long and difficult process of preparing their territories
for self-government have been totally unsuccessful. Recent events, however, and
notably the vote on the Angola resolution in the United Nations,4 the course of the
C.C.T.A. meeting in Abidjan and the distinction drawn between the Portuguese and
the Spanish on the one hand, and the French and ourselves on the other, during the
political debate in E.C.A. at Addis Ababa, seem to me to show that African opinion is
increasingly recognising the essential differences between our colonial policy and
that of the Portuguese.
4 See document no 413 in Part II.
41 FO 371/166836, no 342 Oct 1962
‘Future constitutional development in the UK dependent territories’:
CO memorandum for the US government
(1) African territories
Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. Within the last three years
Executive and Legislative Councils (the latter with unofficial majorities) have been
established in Basutoland and Bechuanaland, and a similar development is expected
to take place shortly in Swaziland, where a multi-racial Constitutional Committee
was set up in 1960 and its proposals for a constitution are now under consideration.
It is the policy of the British Government to maintain the separate identity of the
three High Commission Territories, and within the framework of that policy to
entrust their peoples with progressively greater responsibilities for the management
of their internal affairs. It is not, however, expected that there will be any marked
change in the constitutional position of Basutoland or Bechuanaland in the
foreseeable future. Swaziland will, it is hoped, get its first constitution at the turn of
the year. (Its present form of Government was laid down in 1903 and there is neither
a Legislative nor an Executive Council.)
Gambia. The present constitution, which came into force in May 1962, provides
for a form of internal self-government. The British Government has accepted that
independence in one form or another is the goal for the Gambia, but it is not yet
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clear what form this will take or when it will come about. It is doubtful whether an
independent Gambia could ever be viable on its own; one possibility is some form of
union with Senegal, and the new Government of the Gambia has begun to discuss
this subject with the Government of Senegal. It is proposed as a first step to arrange
for a technical enquiry into the economic and financial problems which would arise.
Kenya. Following the Constitutional Conference in February/April, 1962, which
reaffirmed that full independence was the ultimate aim of the British Government
for Kenya, constitutional discussions were held in Nairobi. The constitution for
internal self-government is now being drafted, but it is impossible to say when it will
be introduced and the elections held. It will be for the new Kenya Government after
these elections to raise the question of the date of independence.
Zanzibar. At the Constitutional Conference held in London in March/April, 1962,
the British Government reaffirmed that full independence is the aim for Zanzibar. It
was not, however, then possible to fix dates either for internal self-government or for
independence because of the differences between the Government and Opposition
parties on the programme for further constitutional development. Unless these
differences were resolved, preferably by the formation of a Coalition of the parties, it
did not seem possible to secure a stable government in Zanzibar during the period of
internal self-government, which the British Government regarded as essential. It
now appears unlikely that it will be possible to form a coalition government but in an
effort to break the deadlock, the British Resident is continuing discussions with the
parties in Zanzibar.
(2) Caribbean territories
Bahamas and Bermuda. In effect these two territories already enjoy what is virtually
a form of internal self-government, though neither has a ministerial system. There is
no present indication of any general desire in either territory to move towards
independence.
Barbados, Leeward Islands (Antigua, Montserrat and St. Kitts), and Windward
Islands (Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent). The decision of the people of
Jamaica not to remain in the Federation of The West Indies, followed by the announce-
ment of the Trinidad Government that they would not continue any association with
the other and smaller islands except on the basis of a unitary state, induced a deter-
mination on the part of those other islands (Barbados and the Leeward and Windward
Islands) to form an immediate federation of their own. Their proposals were discussed
with the British Government at a conference in London in May. Preparations are now
proceeding for the early establishment of fiscal and civil service commissions. When
their conclusions are available a reasonable time will be allowed for public discussion.
The authority of Parliament to establish a federation will then be sought if the British
Government is satisfied that there is a reasonably wide measure of support for the con-
ference proposals throughout the territories concerned, signified finally by approval
of the legislatures. After a federation has been established and a new elected Federal
Government is in office, the British Government will be prepared to enter into dis-
cussions concerning independence for the federation.
British Virgin Islands. These islands have shown no disposition to join the
proposed East Caribbean Federation referred to above. They are almost entirely
dependent economically on the American Virgin Islands, but are likely to continue as
a British dependency.
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British Guiana. It had been hoped that a further constitutional conference would
take place in July, but the report of the Commission of Enquiry into the disturbances
last February, which is germane to the conference, will not be available until early
October. The conference has therefore had to be postponed and is now due to open
on the 23rd October. British Guiana already enjoys internal self-government and the
principle of independence was conceded in 1960.
British Honduras. A ministerial system has been established and a constitutional
conference, which would discuss an advance to full internal self-government, is due
to take place in 1964. It is expected that British Honduras will eventually become
independent but it is not yet possible to say when this will happen.
Cayman Islands and Turks and Caicos Islands. After the decision to grant
independence to Jamaica, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands were
given the opportunity to decide what their future should be. The legislatures of both
territories unanimously requested that they should remain British colonies and this
has been agreed to. They seem likely to remain in a relationship of dependence on
Britain in the foreseeable future, although constitutionally they are likely to advance
towards internal self-government.
(3) Mediterranean territories
Malta. Under the present constitution which came into force in March, 1962, Malta
enjoys internal self-government, and the constitution also provides for the
delegation to the Malta Government of powers in the field of external affairs. Both
the main political parties in Malta regard independence as their aim and in August,
1962 the present Malta Government made a formal request for independence. The
British Government at once indicated its willingness to discuss the matter. A
Conference is likely to be held in the fairly near future. Whether or not Malta
becomes independent, the very serious economic difficulties confronting her will
remain.
Gibraltar. There is an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council and a
membership system, and unofficials have a large measure of responsibility for the
administration of internal affairs. There is no indication that the local population
desire any major constitutional advance beyond the point already reached. Gibraltar
lives under the shadow of Spain and in view of its small size it is scarcely conceivable
that it could ever become fully independent.
(4) Far Eastern territories
Singapore, Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak. The British and Malayan
Governments have decided in principle that, subject to the necessary legislation, the
proposed independent Federation of Malaysia (comprising Malaya, Singapore, North
Borneo, Sarawak and, possibly, Brunei) should be brought into being by 31st August,
1963. To give effect to this decision the two Governments intend to conclude, by 31st
January, 1963, a formal agreement which will provide for:
(a) the transfer of sovereignty in North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore by 31st
August, 1963;
(b) provisions governing the relationship between Singapore and the new
Federation, as already agreed in principle between the Governments of Malaya and
Singapore;
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(c) defence arrangements as already agreed between the British and Malayan
Governments; and
(d) detailed constitutional arrangements, including safeguards for the special
interests of North Borneo and Sarawak, to be drawn up after consultation with the
legislatures of the two territories.
An Inter-Governmental Committee, on which the British, Malayan, North Borneo
and Sarawak Governments are represented, has been established to work out the
future constitutional arrangements and the form of the safeguards.
The British and Malayan Governments have told the Sultan of Brunei of the
agreement they have reached and have made it clear that they would welcome the
attendance of observers from Brunei on the Intergovernmental Committee and the
inclusion of the State of Brunei in the new Federation.
Hong Kong. Hong Kong consists of a small area of colony (which is not viable by
itself) and the New Territories, which are held on a lease from China which expires in
1997. It is not possible to forecast the future of the Colony, or, as things are, to
conceive of Hong Kong becoming independent either inside or outside the
Commonwealth. There is at present still an official majority on the Executive and
Legislative Councils and local opinion is generally opposed to constitutional advance
of any kind.
(5) Pacific territories
Fiji. At present there are still official majorities in the Executive and Legislative
Councils, and among the unofficial members of Legislative Council there is parity
between the three main races. By current standards Fiji is large enough to achieve
independence, but it is difficult to say when this might come about because of the
tension between the Indians and the less numerous and less energetic Fijians, which
makes constitutional advance very slow.
British Solomon Islands Protectorate and Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. These
are both very backward territories. Executive and Legislative Councils with official
majorities have recently been established in the former. They do not yet exist in the
latter but the High Commissioner is considering proposals for their establishment
which we expect to receive shortly. Britain is doing what it can to develop these
territories up to the point where they can make an intelligent and reasonable
decision about what their own future is to be.
New Hebrides. This is a condominium which is being jointly developed by the
British and the French. The question of what its ultimate future is to be has not yet
been discussed with the French, though we hope to propose such discussion to them
before long.
Tonga. Tonga is an independent kingdom, but is not fully sovereign because it is a
Protected State in treaty relationship with Britain for major aspects of defence and
foreign affairs and also for certain minor judicial and financial matters. There are at
present no signs that Tonga wants to alter its status.
(6) Other territories
Falkland Islands and Dependencies. There are unofficial majorities in the Executive
and Legislative Councils but no ministerial system. The population is entirely of
European descent, mostly British. There is no reason to think that they will ever seek
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independence. The British Antarctic Territory is now a separate colony but has no
permanent inhabitants.
St. Helena. There is an Executive Council with an official majority and an Advisory
Council, into which an elected element is shortly to be introduced. There is no
reason to think that this territory will ever seek independence. 
Mauritius. Mauritius already has a ministerial system, and seems likely to
continue to advance constitutionally at its present measured pace, reaching full
internal self-government during the period following the next elections, which are
due to be held not later than 1964. Whether Mauritius will at some later date move
on to independence will probably depend on whether the differences between the
opposing communities in the island can be sufficiently composed.
Seychelles. There are at present still official majorities in the Executive and
Legislative Councils. There is no present indication of any general desire for
substantial constitutional advance, and even the introduction of a membership
system is not yet in sight.
Aden Colony and Protectorate. It is the policy of the British Government to
encourage the movement towards closer association between Aden Colony and the
Federation of South Arabia (which comprises eleven of the States of the Aden
Protectorate). This policy was recently discussed in London with Ministers of the
Colony and of the Federation. Agreement was reached on proposals for the entry of
Aden into the Federation and for further constitutional advance in Aden. The
proposals were based on a scheme which the Federal and Colony Ministers had
previously worked out together in Aden. Subject to approval by Parliament and by
the Legislatures of the Federation and Colony, the British Government will be willing
to conclude a Treaty with the Federal Government to effect the entry of Aden into the
Federation. Certain minor preliminary constitutional changes are now taking place
in Aden. Subject to the approval of Parliament, Aden is to accede to the Federation,
and simultaneously achieve its constitutional advancement, on or before 1st March
1963. Under the original Treaty with the Federation the British Government have
undertaken to assist development towards the ultimate achievement of full
independence, but the Federation is so heavily dependent economically on the
British Government that it is not possible to forecast when this will be achieved.
42 PREM 11/4412 26 Dec 1962
‘The tasks ahead’: minute by Mr Macmillan to T J Bligh (PM’s Office)
[This minute was written by Mr Macmillan after his meeting with President Kennedy at
Nassau in the Bahamas, 18–21 Dec 1962; it was essentially a list of things he had been
pondering since his return. It was addressed to members of his private office, with whom
he hoped to work out a plan—‘the more carefully we work out our plans the better we
shall do’. The ‘Nassau Agreement’ referred to was an ambiguously worded arrangement
whereby the Americans would supply Polaris missiles to the British government.]
We have a formidable programme ahead of us and not many months in which to
complete it. A great burden will lie upon us all. I do not know when any Government
has been so beset by problems at such a stage in its life. The object of [this] note is to
set them out in some order so that you can study them collectively and separately
and see that we keep up the impetus.
I have put them under various headings.
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1. Brussels negotiations on E.E.C.
I have written a letter to Mr. Heath,1 of which I attach a copy.2 I think we shall have to
work out a detailed timetable. There will have to be a meeting of the Steering
Committee in the middle of January, followed by a meeting of the Cabinet. Final
instructions will have to be given to the Lord Privy Seal as to the points on which he
is to stand firm and those on which he may give way. We shall have to consider
carefully how these negotiations are to be broken off if this becomes necessary. Also
what the date of this should be. I take it the end of January or the beginning of
February. We shall then have to study what we shall do. Shall we demand a meeting
of Heads of Government, so that the whole of Europe and the world may know where
the blame lies if we fail? Can a final effort be made for a negotiated settlement? We
shall also have to study what is called the “alternative”. This needs great care. We
must not suddenly return to the Commonwealth like a dog with its tail between its
legs. But we must have some imaginative approach on a wide scale. This is a very
difficult problem, and we must start to work on it.
2. Defence reorganisation
This must be pressed on with all vigour. I have seen the Chief of Staffs’ note which I
do not find very convincing or very clear. However, we must get ahead with this. It is
all the more necessary because of the situation caused by the Nassau Agreement.
3. Polaris agreement
This raises a lot of problems, both technical and presentational. On the first I assume
that the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Secretary together will be dealing with
the next stage in making a more formal agreement than that which we reached at
Nassau. This will follow the Skybolt lines. I attach a copy of a minute I am sending to
the Minister of Defence on this matter. You will see from this minute the things that
are in my mind. On the presentational point there is still the question as to whether I
should broadcast next week, or whether we should use the Birmingham meeting for
a considered case in preparation for the Debate in the House as soon as Parliament
returns, probably January 23 or 24. All this we must think over very carefully.
Apart from presentation publicly I wonder whether I should try and see Michael
Berry and Lady Pamela Berry3 or ask them to luncheon or something? They have
done well in The Telegraph and I would like to keep them on our side. I also wonder
if I should ask to see Haley.4 I think I could put some arguments in his head. What is
important is that we should not be afraid of the double argument. We are
independent because that is the right of a Sovereign people; we are inter-dependent
because that is the need of the modern world. (Incidentally, has anyone got a copy of
what the President’s guidance was to the Press? I believe there was a telegram
mentioning the Sovereign right of a state which might be very helpful for me to
quote.)
1 Government chief negotiator on the European Common Market, as Lord Privy Seal.
2 Attachments not printed.
3 The Hon W M Berry (and his wife Lady Pamela), editor-in-chief of the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday
Telegraph.
4 Sir William Haley, editor of The Times since 1952.
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Finally, we have to consider what is going to happen about Skybolt. Maybe there
will be such pressure in America to get on with it after the successful test that the
situation will alter.
4. Modernisation of Britain
This is particularly urgent. I am to have a meeting I know on Monday but I must
push on with things like ship-building and shipping, the Commissioner for the North
East Coast, re-training (where the Minister of Labour’s plans seem to be too modest),
rural transport (where I was impressed by the Speir deputation5 and something
ought to be done). All this is a great field where we must keep the pressure up all the
time. Actually it will be on this issue that the Election will be largely won or lost. The
state of the economy is what the people worry about most.
5. There are some Defence oddments which I must not ignore:
(a) the Beverley replacement. I understand that we were going to have a decision
before the end of the year. As usual, we have not lived up to this. It affects Belfast
particularly as well as, of course, a immense sum of money involved.
(b) The future of the Gurkhas. This is important.
6. There are some overseas oddments which we must keep a careful eye on:
(a) Malaysia, Brunei. Defence and political position.
(b) Indonesia.
(c) The recognition of the Yemen.
7. Central Africa
I think I can leave this safely in Mr. Butler’s hands though I must not appear to
ignore it. I had a talk with him on the telephone and he seemed fairly happy. But
what I am a little worried about is his visit to Africa, as this may coincide with some
very vital decisions that may have to be taken about Europe, defence, and so forth.
Will you find out what his present plans are? I must warn him that he may have to
put off his visit so that he may be present at decisions on which the whole life of the
Government may depend.
5 R M Speir, MP (Con) for Hexham since 1951.
43 PREM 11/4406 27 Apr 1963
‘Foreign affairs—1963’: record of a ministerial discussion at
Chequers, by T J Bligh
At the Ministerial meeting at Chequers on Saturday, April 27,1 there was a somewhat
general discussion about Foreign Affairs, and the Ministers seem to think it would be
worth developing the following four lines of thought:
1 This was a ‘Chequers weekend’, attended by all Cabinet ministers and ministers i/c departments on
Sunday, but only by senior ministers on Saturday. The main subjects discussed were industrial, economic
and social questions, and government reorganisation.
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(a) The rise and fall of Communism—the receding tide—the growing interest in
the Soviet Union in bourgeois comforts. Insidious effect of Western “culture”, pop
records, and the like. The great unfulfilled demand for consumer goods. The
Westernisation of Russia contrasted with the growth (albeit with setbacks) of
China.
(b) How important it is to glamorise the work of the Department of Technical Co-
operation, Voluntary Service Overseas, and all that. We do a lot but say too little
about it.
(c) The great contribution made to the peace of the world by our defence
commitments, especially in the Middle East and the Far East.
(d) A rather loose idea of what might be called “The part Britain plays in the
world”.
44 CAB 129/114, C(63)106 25 June 1963
‘Meeting of ambassadors and high commissioners from tropical
Africa, 21–24 May: general conclusions’: Cabinet memorandum 
(Joint FO–CRO Paper)
I.—Pan-Africanism
Whether Commonwealth or foreign, the new African States share certain basic
problems. Unlike other under-developed parts of the world they have no real history
and no culture on to which twentieth century civilisation can easily be grafted. All of
them are conscious, though they may not admit it publicly, of their dependence on
the developed world. To most of them the withdrawal of non-African expertise would
represent the creation of a dangerous vacuum. These are among the reasons which
create the urge towards Pan-Africanism. There is an emotional desire to cling
together, whether or not practical results are achieved. But the high point of the Pan-
African movement had perhaps been reached during the colonial era, and there is
now little prospect of any effective grouping uniting the countries north and south of
the Sahara. Similarly any organisation for wider African unity which emerges from
the Addis Ababa meeting is likely to be loose and vague. Present African leaders are
above all concerned to maintain their status and their votes at the United Nations.
Reactions to the problem of the Somali areas in Kenya illustrate how arbitrary
boundaries inherited from colonial days tend after independence to become
sacrosanct. But for all this, there is genuine emotion behind the movement for
African unity.
II.—Commonwealth and foreign Africa
2. There are profound differences in outlook between the Commonwealth and
foreign countries in Tropical Africa. British Africa looks on the Commonwealth as a
world-wide association, not merely as a bilateral link with us alone. The ex-French
territories, on the other hand, by virtue of their far closer ties with and greater
dependence on France are more parochially minded. They are less inclined to
become emotionally involved in Southern African problems; less ready to make the
running—though they follow the majority—in the anti-colonial field and more
inhibited about displeasing France. The Union of African and Malagasy States
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(U.A.M.) group wish to maintain their cohesion but would not necessarily be opposed
to closer co-operation with English-speaking Africans.
III.—The French position
3. French influence is directed towards keeping the U.A.M. together both to
increase French weight in the world and to keep French Africa as a preserve for
French business. French cultural imperialism is also a significant factor. General de
Gaulle, moreover, is deeply interested in Africa and all important decisions are
referred to him. The possibility for effective Anglo–French co-operation is, therefore,
limited. Despite earlier fears that France might pursue neo-imperialism too hard and
that the younger generation would quickly sweep aside the “Black Parisians” at the
top, France’s position in her ex-African territories is still far stronger than many
would have prophesied two years ago. While we need be less tender of French
susceptibilities since January, the maintenance of the French position is on the
whole a Western and indeed an African interest.
IV.—Communist penetration
4. At the moment the Russian bloc effort seems to have been held in check and
there has been an improvement in the situation as compared with say two years ago.
Nevertheless the Russians are still putting a lot of effort into Africa and we may be in
for trouble later. The Chinese are also a threat in East Africa. The crucial factor is the
resistance of the Africans themselves to foreign interference. Egyptian influence
appears to be surprisingly slight.
V.—Arms policy
5. There is some case for international co-ordination over the supply of arms to
African countries between the United States, the French, the Germans and ourselves.
It is unsatisfactory that many poverty stricken African countries are spending more
on arms than they can afford. But any attempt to ration them might only make them
turn to other suppliers, of which there are plenty. We should lose the business and the
goodwill. Moreover, we have to be careful not to seem to be refusing arms to black
countries, while supplying them to South Africa (see below) and it would be hypo-
critical to impose limits on Tropical Africa. All we can do is try to use our influence to
persuade African States not to arm unnecessarily. Some countries in Africa want arms
mainly to compete with Ghana which they regard as a threat. There may be room for
some limited co-operation with the French here since the French also want to limit
arms supplies. We might start with an exchange of information with the French about
types of arms supplied. We can also explain to the French that we do not want an arms
race. An approach to the French on these lines is in preparation. In ex-French Africa,
there is a desire to maintain French troops which have a stabilising effect.
VI.—Arms for Southern Africa
6. It is our arms policy towards South Africa and Portugal which inspires the
gravest doubts. We could not boycott Portugal herself as a NATO ally, and a collapse
of Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique might well precipitate Congo-type
situations. But we would be in trouble at the United Nations if arms delivered to the
Portuguese were turned to the suppression of disorder in their oversea territories.
This applies with even greater force in respect of South Africa. In African eyes most
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forms of military equipment delivered to South Africa are seen as intended for use
against the Blacks in perpetuation of white rule. While we could not go along with
any resolution on general economic sanctions against South Africa in the Security
Council, we should avoid being manoeuvred into the position of having to veto a
resolution calling for a ban on arms supplies. It would be useless to attempt to justify
such a veto to African opinion.
VII.—Southern Africa
7. Southern Africa remains the main stumbling block to United Kingdom
interests throughout Tropical Africa, especially in the Commonwealth territories.
8. We need to re-think our long-term interests. The Tropical African countries
are likely to survive the next decade in some viable form. Can we expect the same of
South Africa or even Southern Rhodesia? The question is whether to offend the rest
of the world by pursuing policies towards South Africa conditioned by our economic
and defence stakes there, or whether to take the calculated risk of offending South
Africa in order to improve our position elsewhere in Africa. The penalty we risk by
retaining close links with the present régime in South Africa is that we might as a
consequence forfeit our increasing economic stake in Tropical Africa, and when
white rule collapses, lose our stake in South Africa as well. Against this must be seen
the 1962 figures for United Kingdom exports of £148 million to South Africa and
£156 million to African Commonwealth countries.
9. In the defence field the continuing importance of the Simonstown
arrangements1 was questioned. But on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff it was explained
that these arrangements were considered to be important because of our interest in
the security of the sea routes round the Cape and in possible air routes across and
through Africa. The importance of being able to defend the sea route seemed,
however, to rest on the perhaps unlikely assumption that we might become engaged
in a major war of the old-fashioned kind, in which nuclear weapons were not used or
not used with decisive effect in the initial phase. The air route, which might be
required to deal with limited war in the Middle or Far East in the event of routes
further north being ruled out for political reasons, was therefore of potentially
greater importance than the Simonstown base. But our use of this route depended
on ad hoc South African clearance for each flight.
VIII.—Southern Rhodesia
10. If independence were granted to Southern Rhodesia with no firm and prior
commitment about the extension of the franchise, there would be a move by African
members to leave the Commonwealth (or even to exclude the United Kingdom from
it), and to break off diplomatic relations with us. Commonwealth countries are now
realistic enough not to press for “one man one vote” overnight. But in their view,
however little physical force we can exert on the spot, a strong card is still in our
hands, namely, our ability to grant or withhold legitimacy to Southern Rhodesia’s
independence. A real extension of the franchise visibly designed to put Africans in a
majority in the foreseeable future is, therefore, an essential prerequisite to
independence if the Commonwealth itself is to remain a reality in Africa.
1 For Simonstown (naval base) agreements, 1955, see Goldsworthy, ed, Conservative government and the
end of empire, part I, document nos 79–81.
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45 CAB 128/137, CC 51(63)4 1 Aug 1963
‘Commonwealth and colonial affairs’: Cabinet conclusions, reporting
latest developments
The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies informed the
Cabinet of the latest developments in relation to the following territories:
Malta.—The Constitutional Conference had reached a deadlock and would
probably have to be suspended without agreement. In these circumstances it would
be right to postpone the date for the attainment of independence by the Island until
May 1964. This would allow more time for a further attempt to resolve the
outstanding differences, possibly by means of a referendum.
Zanzibar.—It was proposed to convene an Independence Conference for Zanzibar
in September, in order that the Protectorate might become independent before the
end of the year and might therefore be able to accede to the East African Federation
at the outset of its existence.
British Guiana.—Although racial tension was gradually subsiding, it seemed
unlikely that the Prime Minister, Dr. Jagan, and the Leader of the main Opposition
Party, Mr. Burnham, would reach agreement in the near future on the form of future
constitutional advance in the Colony. It was therefore proposed to convene a further
Constitutional Conference in London in the autumn, at the conclusion of which it
might be necessary for the United Kingdom Government to impose their own
solution.
The Caribbean.—It was possible, although not certain that a sufficient measure of
agreement might be reached between the members of the group of islands known as
“the little Seven” (Barbados, Antigua, St. Kitts, Montserrat, Dominica, St. Lucia and
St. Vincent) to make it possible to grant them independence, as a Federation, in
1965. It was proposed to convene a conference for this purpose in due course,
possibly by the end of the year, if developments in the interval appeared to justify
this.
Malaysia.—The Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had apparently
been persuaded by the Prime Minister of the Philippines, Mr. Macapagal, and the
President of Indonesia, Dr. Sukarno, to ask the Secretary-General of the United
Nations how long it would take him to ascertain the attitude of the inhabitants of the
North Borneo territories towards Malaysia. He had also indicated that, if some
enquiry for this purpose could be conducted under United Nations auspices in the
immediate future, he might be prepared to postpone for a short period the
establishment of Malaysia, at present fixed for 31st August.
In discussion it was agreed that any postponement of the creation of Malaysia at
this stage would be more likely to lead to an indefinite postponement of the project
than to promote an early resolution of the current differences between Malaya and
Indonesia. Moreover, a survey under United Nations auspices would not only be liable
to take a considerable time but would also merely confirm that the inhabitants of
North Borneo endorsed the concept of Malaysia. We should therefore impress on the
Prime Minister of Malaya the importance of adhering to 31st August as the date for
the formation of Malaysia and warn him of the dangers implicit in any further delay.
India.—Recent intelligence suggested that the Communist Chinese Government
were now in a position to resume military operations against India. There was as yet
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no firm evidence that such operations were likely to take place; but, if they did,
Pakistan might be tempted to associate herself with China, at least to the extent of
seeking to recover Kashmir by force. The United States Government might take steps
to remind the Government of Pakistan of the guarantees which they had given at an
earlier stage to protect India against Pakistani aggression and Pakistan against
Indian aggression; but the applicability of these guarantees to a situation of the kind
which might now develop must be open to question.
The Cabinet:—
Took note of these statements by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations and the Colonies.
46 FO 371/172610, no 13 [27] Sept 1963
‘The future of British colonial territories’: CO memorandum.  Annex:
‘Likely future status’ [Extract]
[In sending a copy to Sir G Harrison (FO), C G Eastwood called this a paper produced
‘with some pain and grief. . . . With the best will in the world it looks as if it is going to be
very difficult to do anything very dramatic in the very near future’. Although drafted by
Eastwood, it was often referred to as ‘the Poynton memorandum’ because it was
circulated by the permanent under-secretary. It was extensively summarised in Morgan,
Guidance towards self-government, pp 199–202.]
The problem
There are still 40 British dependent territories. They are listed in Annex I which, it is
suggested, should be read before the main part of the memorandum. Our colonial
relationship with them is becoming outdated; it affects adversely our position in the
United Nations and our relations with other countries. The United Nations show no
signs of losing their interest in colonial questions and we must expect the
Committee of Twenty-Four to discuss nearly all our remaining territories in the next
year. This will inevitably produce local repercussions—as it has already done in Fiji,
Aden and Gibraltar—which may well complicate matters for us. A number of the 40
territories are well advanced towards independence. For the remainder we need to
devise new “post-colonial” forms of association which will honour our obligations to
their peoples and preserve our interests, while gaining general acceptance both in
Britain and among our friends abroad.
2. The Secretary of State wishes, if possible, to make a statement about our
future relationship with the territories when he announces the decision to merge the
Colonial Office and the C.R.O. in 1965.
Prospects of independence
3. For 24 of the 40 territories (category I of Annex I) independence, separately or
in association, is the proclaimed or expected objective. If present policies are
successful, most of them will attain it in 1965 or a little later, but in some cases our
policies may not succeed.
4. The East Caribbean Federation would include seven of these territories and
there will be an awkward problem if the Federation is not established. Our traditional
attitude has been to welcome and assist local efforts to establish a Federation in the
East Caribbean but not to force it on unwilling customers. In view of the present
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lukewarm attitude of the Governments the question arises whether, because we want
to divest ourselves of our colonial responsibilities, we should be more positive and
press them to federate, and whether we should be ready to give them substantially
greater development aid than we had intended, if (as seems likely) this proves
necessary to persuade them to do so.
5. The prospects of an association of the Cayman Islands with Jamaica and of
Grenada with Trinidad or the Federation will depend, inter alia, on our insisting that
they cannot continue in their present status. The prospects of early independence for
British Honduras depend on the achievement of some sort of modus vivendi with the
Guatemalans over their territorial claim—which will not be easy.
6. The High Commission Territories are included among the candidates for
independence, but it is difficult to see how any of them could attain it by 1965, and
they will continue to be a serious problem for us. How far our difficulties are
increased by pressure in the United Nations or from other Commonwealth countries
will depend on how we deal with the complex of issues facing us in Southern Africa.
7. If our policies fail in the case of the East Caribbean Federation, the Cayman
Islands, Grenada, the Gambia or Brunei, we shall have to look for some other
solution for them. We have also to find a policy for the 16 territories in categories II
to IV of Annex I which are unlikely to achieve unqualified independence. The
problem is when and how we should try to remove the colonial label from these
territories.
The United Nations
8. We have accepted the obligation in Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter
to develop self-government in those of our territories which have not yet “a full
measure of self-government”. We do not accept that this obligation has been
amended by the Soviet-inspired General Assembly Resolution [1514(XV)] of 1960
calling for immediate steps to end colonialism. In any case this obligation under the
Charter is to the peoples of our territories, not to the United Nations.
9. Our only obligation to the United Nations in this respect is, under Article
73(e) of the Charter, to provide certain information to the United Nations about our
non-self-governing territories. We provide this in respect of all our territories except
Tonga and the British Antarctic Territory, the former apparently because of a
fortunate oversight and the latter because it has no permanent inhabitants.
10. We have always held that it is for the administering government alone to
decide when a territory ceases to be non-self-governing and we recognise no
obligation to seek the approval of the General Assembly for ceasing to transmit
information in that event. The General Assembly has, however, frequently asserted
its right to express its views as to whether territories have ceased to be non-self-
governing and the United States and the Netherlands have, in fact, sought the
Assembly’s approval by resolution in the case of territories proceeding to a final
status other than independence. France, on the other hand, simply notified the
General Assembly of the cessation of information in the case of its territories, at the
same time supplying full information of the constitutional change being made. We
ourselves have had no case of a non-self-governing territory proceeding to any final
status other than independence either on its own or in association with others.
11. In 1960 the General Assembly endorsed a number of “Principles” which
should guide members in determining whether or not a territory is fully self-
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governing. These criteria recognise that a territory may become fully self-governing
by one of three means:—
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent state;
(b) Integration with an independent state;
(c) Free association with an independent state.
12. If we want solutions for our territories capable of commanding international
acceptance we should be guided by these criteria. The Western Samoa relationship
with New Zealand is an example of a small territory becoming independent but
remaining in treaty relationship with the former Administering Authority; it has
been approved by the General Assembly and merits consideration as a solution for
some of our territories. . . .1
Candidates for a Western Samoa relationship
23. The most promising candidates that appear for this type of relationship are
the Bahamas and Bermuda (where the implications for staffing and finance afford no
problem) and it may ultimately prove the best solution for two or three others. The
application, including the timing, of such a policy to the Bahamas and Bermuda
would require careful thought and working out. The Bahamas will be embarking in
January, 1964 on a new and radically different constitution from their present one
and cannot be expected to take kindly to any suggestion for a further change of status
until they have been allowed to operate their new constitution for some time.
Bermuda is a stage behind the Bahamas in political development and is likely to
require both time and an intermediate stage of development, before taking to a
“Western Samoa” relationship.
Other types of relationship
(a) Integration with Britain
24. The other types of internationally acceptable relationship are “integration”
and “free association” with the metropolitan country. In most places complete
integration would mean the handing back to the metropolitan government of
considerable powers at present exercised locally; from the administrative point of
view it would be a considerable innovation and hardly an improvement. It would also
raise the question of representation in Parliament at Westminster and the difficulties
attendant on equalisation of social amenities and taxation. We were prepared to
accept the disadvantages in the case of Malta in 1953 because at that time our
defence interest in keeping Malta from independence seemed large enough to
warrant it; and it was thought improbable that Malta would serve as a precedent.
Integration is in fact unlikely to be practicable for any of our territories and is not a
course which can be recommended.
(b) Free association with Britain
25. For those territories which cannot achieve independence even on the
Western Samoa model it is within the category of “free association” that we must
1 There followed a detailed analysis of the Western Samoa model in line with the conclusions in document
no 545 in Pt II. Subsequent editorial cuts in this document also overlap with material in no 545 and other
documents in ch 9(3).
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look for a solution. (We can, of course, choose another description if we prefer to
avoid using the United Nations jargon.) . . .
26. The following conditions would have to be met if a form of association is to
be brought within the United Nations definition:—
(i) there should be a clear demonstration that the people of the territory approve
the relationship;
(ii) the territory should have a continuing right within the terms of the
association agreed upon
(a) to modify its status; and
(b) to determine its own internal constitution.
In addition, to secure general agreement in the United Nations it would be necessary
for the territory to have a large measure of self-government. Some comments on
these conditions are set out below. . . .
31. “Free association” would appear to be a possible relationship for a number of
our territories. Further detailed study is, of course, necessary to determine the
constitutional forms it might take and to examine the constitutional problems that
may have to be surmounted if these forms are to accord closely with United Nations
theory. We might obtain some guidance from further examination of the nature of
the association between the United States and Puerto Rico. We do not think the
French arrangements of 1958 or the agreement that exists between the Netherlands
and the Antilles provide any useful guidance.
Possible application of “Free Association”
32. Of the twelve territories in Categories III and IV of Annex I, the British
Antarctic Territory is no problem in this context. The British Virgin Islands might join
with the U.S. Virgin Islands. There is some evidence that most of the people and the
U.S. Administration would favour this; it would make economic sense. It would of
course simply mean the transfer of a dependency from one administering to another
rather than the accession of the territory to full self-government, but this should in
this case raise no difficulty, internationally or in Britain. The British Solomon Islands
may, we hope, find a future in relationship with Papua/New Guinea. The territory is so
backward that the people will not be capable of choosing their future status for sev-
eral years, during which they will have to remain dependent on Britain. The New
Hebrides is a problem that can be resolved only in consultation with the French.
33. This leaves the first eight territories in Category III of Annex I for
consideration as candidates for “free association”. The Falklands, St. Helena and
Pitcairn are so small that a Western Samoa relationship is impractical. The Gibraltar
leader, Sir Joshua Hassan, has gone on record at the United Nations in favour of free
association. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands suffer from such dispersion of population
that it is hard to conceive of them as a unity other than that imposed by external
administration. In all these cases, it should not be difficult to comply in large
measure with United Nations’ criteria for “free association” and it is recommended
that we should work towards this. It would also be the objective for the Seychelles if
defence requirements make a Western Samoa relationship impracticable.
34. There remain the awkward cases of Hong Kong and Fiji. There is no
alternative to the present status of Hong Kong other than its return to China and no
possibility of complying with the United Nations’ principles for “free association”. In
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Fiji, the Fijians do not want any constitutional advance for fear of the Indians, and
although our ultimate aim should presumably be to bring the territory to
independence, either on its own or in a Western Samoa relationship with Britain,
even the mention of this is out of the question for some years. In the case of Hong
Kong there is a tacit convention that the problem of its future should not be raised in
New York since it would be to the benefit of no one and if we ceased transmission of
information regarding it, at the same time preferably as we ceased transmission in
regard to a number of other territories, we might escape criticism. There is not the
same convention in regard to Fiji and discussion of it in the Committee of 24 has
already caused us embarrassment. On the other hand we are assured that this
discussion was not stimulated by any great pressure from India or any other country
and if, at the same time as we ceased transmission of information about a number of
other territories, we made a number of apparent changes of form in Fiji, there is a
chance that we might escape criticism if we ceased transmission in regard to Fiji
also. It must be admitted however that there is a risk of criticism in the case of both
Hong Kong and Fiji, with inevitable local repercussions.
(c) Channel Islands relationship with Britain
35. We have in the last year considered the possibility of adopting for some of our
territories a permanent relationship on the lines of that of the Channel Islands and
the Isle of Man with Britain, which lies somewhere between the United Nations
categories of “integration” and “free association”. Such a relationship would probably
not satisfy international opinion and it is doubtful whether it would have any
particular advantage for overseas territories. In the case of Fiji, we are now seeking to
move the Fijians away from the feeling that the status of the Channel Islands is a
ready-made constitutional solution for them. We should rather try to evolve some
simpler forms of “free association” suited in each case to the constitutional history of
the territory concerned.
Possibility of general “decolonisation”
36. It is clear from the foregoing that we cannot within the next two years
“decolonise” all our territories in a manner that accords with their or our interests
and is internationally acceptable. In the case of Hong Kong, there is no possibility of
decolonisation without giving the territory to China and in the case of Fiji and the
British Solomon Islands no solution that is conceivable for several years. The timing
and the way in which the High Commission Territories may come to independence
cannot yet be foreseen.
37. There is no likelihood of anti-colonial pressure at the U.N. ceasing within the
next few years. In the main this pressure has been in respect of Southern Africa, and
to a less extent Arabia. Southern Rhodesia, the High Commission Territories, the
Portuguese territories, Aden and the Federation of South Arabia between them are
likely to continue to keep U.N. interest in colonial questions well to the forefront for
several years, though the continued dependence on us of the High Commission
Territories might come to be accepted if the alternative seemed to be worse. Most of
our territories are now outside Africa and if we can devise a solution for South Arabia
and if a substantial number of our remaining territories become independent or we
succeed in devising other acceptable futures for them, then there is quite a chance
that the U.N. will not be much interested in what happens to the rest. But we cannot
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be sure of this and one or two countries may make use of the U.N. to pursue their
own interests, for instance their claims to British Guiana, British Honduras, the
Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. In these cases the facts of geography and power in the
area could well be as important as the precise constitutional relationship.
38. As already said, it is clearly impossible to carry out a general act of de-
colonisation now; nor would it be wise to declare now that we are going to make such
a move in 1965. We are doubtful if it will be practicable as early as that. Apart from
the territories which are so backward that it is not yet possible to foresee their future
destiny clearly, such as the Solomon Islands, and those which are enmeshed in wider
political complications such as the High Commission Territories, there are several
other territories in which it might be dangerous to force the pace too much, e.g.
Bahamas, Bermuda and British Honduras—and of course Fiji. Nor must we lay
ourselves open to the charge that we are abandoning the interests of people to whom
we have obligations. However, we can start now a policy which might make
practicable a significant move in a relatively short time. Unfortunately, on present
form it seems to us that this is not likely to be as early as 1965.
39. This policy would be:—
(a) to bring to independence as soon as possible all territories capable of it,
including those for which a Western Samoa relationship is the goal;
(b) to bring into “free association” as many as possible of those for which this
seems the final destiny even if in some cases the conditions are somewhat
vulnerable to international criticism;
(c) to make whatever changes in form we can which will help to avoid criticism.
The Colonial Office will cease to exist in 1965. The word Colony might go too and
remaining places be known as “associated states” or some such word.
40. When the time came, we should then have reached a position where:—
(a) a number of territories have become independent, are just about to become
independent or have independence as their declared objective. This would include
those within a Western Samoa relationship;
(b) a number of territories are in free association with us and it is the accepted
goal for most of the rest.
41. Many of our territories would then be off the U.N. books, and we should have
ceased transmitting information about them. We should be left only with those who
had not yet reached the declared objective—including Hong Kong and Fiji. The
impetus against British colonialism should then have lost most of its force and it is
possible that we might be able to make a general declaration which would pass
muster in the U.N. and enable us to cease transmissions in respect of the remaining
territories. We cannot judge this now.
Wider consultations
42. This is a memorandum prepared by Colonial Office officials. The Department
of Technical Co-operation has been consulted on the staff implications. It will be
necessary to consult the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the
Central African Office, the Treasury and the Ministry of Defence. Later, the question
will also arise of consultation with other friendly Governments, particularly the
United States, Australia and New Zealand, on the policy adopted.
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Annex to 46
Likely future status of British dependent territories
The territories are listed in four categories on an assessment
of the chances as seen at present:—
II(I) Independence.
I(II) Independence in contractual relationship with Britain
(Western Samoa model).
(III) Continuing dependence on Britain (“Free Association”).
(IV) Other solutions.
Territories Population Remarks
I. INDEPENDENCE
A. As separate States:
(i) Assured
1. Kenya 7,287,000 December, 1963.
2. Zanzibar 307,000 December, 1963.
3. Malta 329,000 By end May, 1964.
(ii) Expected
4. British Guiana 559,000 Possibly 1964 or 1965.
5. British Honduras 91,000 Possibly 1966 but see
paragraph 5.
6. Aden Federation* 1,200,000 Possibly 1965/66.
(less British base The unfederated
areas) States are expected
to join shortly.
7. Mauritius 658,000 Possibly 1966.
Central 8. Northern Rhodesia 2,515,000
African 9. Southern Rhodesia 3,849,000
Office 10. Nyasaland 2,921,000
B. In association with other countries or other territories
11. Gambia 284,000 Association with Senegal
or separate independence
in 1965.
12. Barbados 232,000 Federation with Leewards
and Windwards or
separate independence
or Category II below.
1965 or later.
*Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands are legally part of Aden Colony, but we may want to keep the former
under British sovereignty in case it has some future military value and we want to hand the latter back to
the Sultan of Oman. We may also want to keep the Island of Socotra for strategic reasons. Kamaran is
merely occupied territory; the simplest course might be to give it to the Yemen if that was the wish of its
few inhabitants.
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Territories Population Remarks
Leeward Islands
13. Antigua 54,000
14. Montserrat 12,000
15. St. Kitts 57,000
Windward Islands
16. Dominica 60,000
17. St. Lucia 86,000
18. St. Vincent 80,000

19. Grenada 89,000 Association with
Trinidad or the East
Caribbean Federation
or Category II below.
1965 or later.
20. Cayman Islands 8,510 Association with
Jamaica or Category III
below.
21. Brunei 84,000 Entry into Malaysia in
year or two or transfer
of present Treaty
relationship to Malaysia
or some revision of 1959
Agreement to bring it
into Category II below.
C. Final form at present unpredictable
22. Basutoland 800,000 Possible candidates
for Category II or III
23. Bechuanaland 350,000 if, at a later stage of
constitutional development
24. Swaziland 265,000
 they want it.
II. INDEPENDENCE IN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH BRITAIN (WESTERN SAMOA MODEL, PROBABLY NO
SEAT IN THE UNITED NATIONS)
25. Bahamas 105,000 New status might be
possibly including granted within three
26. Turks and Caicos Islands 5,670 years but see para. 23.
If Turks and Caicos do
27. Bermuda 43,000
 not integrate with Bahamas
they will fall into
Category III below.
Federation with
Barbados or Category II
below (Category III
for Montserrat).
1965 or later.
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Territories Population Remarks
28. Tonga 63,000 As a Protected State,
it is already in a
contractual relationship
with Britain, but
does not have the
status of an
independent State.
A number of the territories in Category I above might also fall
into this Category if they do not join Federations and cannot
maintain themselves as independent States without firm
British support.
III. CONTINUING DEPENDENCE ON BRITAIN (“FREE ASSOCIATION”)
(i) Because of size
29. Falkland Islands and 2,150 Argentina disputes
Dependencies sovereignty.
30. St. Helena, Tristan da 5,040
Cunha and Ascension
Island
31. Pitcairn 150
(ii) Because of special circumstances
32. Hong Kong 3,128,000 Ultimate future
unforeseeable.
33. Fiji 394,000 Fijians (as distinct
from Indians) want a
continuing link with
Britain without
independence. We have
agreed to consider
“suitable arrangements”
possibly with Channel
Islands features.
34. Gibraltar 26,000 The Spanish claim to
sovereignty may cause
difficulty.
35. Gilbert and Ellice 46,000 Geographical dispersion
Islands of islands and people
militates against any
independent status.
36. Seychelles 42,000 Defence interests may
require dependence,
but Category II not
excluded.
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Territories Population Remarks
37. British Antarctic NIL Having no permanent 
Territory inhabitants this is not a 
‘colonial’ problem.
IV. OTHER SOLUTIONS
38. British Virgin 7,920 Amalgamation with U.S.
Islands Virgin Islands, initially as U.S.
dependencies or Category III.
39. British Solomon 124,000 Possible ultimate link with 
Islands Papua/New Guinea; not for
several years in view of 
administrative backwardness.
40. New Hebrides 60,000 Final status for discussion 
Condominium with the French Government.
47 FO 371/172610, no 13 3 Oct 1963
[CO memorandum about future of British colonial territories]: letter
from Sir H Caccia (FO) to Sir H Poynton (CO)
Thank you for sending me a copy of your memorandum on the future of the British
colonial territories.1 In your covering letter of the 27th September you asked for any
first thoughts which we might have on this paper and I am writing now to let you
have these.
Seen from here it is important that our colonial policy should be understood in
the United Nations and the world at large; while we hardly expect to gain any credit
such an understanding should at least mitigate the often ill-informed criticism
which is at present directed towards us. You may therefore care to consider whether,
when the Colonial Secretary makes the statement foreshadowed in paragraph 2 of
the paper, he should not make some reference to the United Nations de-colonisation
resolution No. 1514, of which I enclose a copy for convenience.2 He could point out
that, while our de-colonisation programme has been conducted quite independently
of United Nations pressure, our aim is nevertheless the same as that laid down by the
United Nations. The only difference is one of timing.
My next point is one to which we attach considerable importance and concerns
those territories where independence as a separate entity is not the right answer.
Here it will be essential to demonstrate to the world that the solution proposed is in
accordance with the will of the majority of the people of the territory. A referendum
under United Nations supervision has advantages from this point of view. I can see
that you do not wish to commit yourself to holding a series of such referenda, but in
the international context it would be very helpful if the process of reaching whatever
1 See previous document. 2 Not printed.
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the next stage may be in each case could be planned to involve United Nations co-
operation in some form.
In paragraph 31 of the paper it was suggested that it would be worth examining
the association between the United States and Puerto Rico. We have had a look at this
and at first sight it seems doubtful whether it would be a useful model for us, since
the present status of Puerto Rico is a legal muddle, over which there is considerable
controversy. Nor is it a final solution, since there is still discussion whether Puerto
Rico should remain as it is or become a fully-fledged member state of the United
States of America. A minority still favours independence. The present position is
roughly that Puerto Rico has most of the rights of a constituent state of the Union,
except the right of representation in Congress; it pays no Federal taxes, and is
virtually a pensioner of the Federal Government.
As to the Virgin Islands, mentioned in paragraph 32, it seems to us that a merger
between the British and American Islands could raise difficulties internationally and
in Britain. As you know, British public opinion reacted unfavourably just after the
war to a proposal that Bermuda should be handed over to the United States of
America in settlement of Lease Lend debts, and there is the colour problem for the
Islanders. This suggests things might need to be handled very carefully in the Islands
and here. . . .
48 FO 371/172610, no 17 16 Oct 1963
‘Future of the colonial territories’: letter from Sir S Garner (CRO) to
Sir H Poynton, commenting on CO memorandum
In your letter of 27th September you asked for our first reactions to your
memorandum on the future of the British Colonial Territories.
2. I entirely agree with you that we ought to be making a move on this front, and
that we should try to get rid of the “Colonial” label. But it is only too clear from the
memorandum that no general solution is possible, and that we cannot hope to
“decolonialise” completely by 1965.
3. It is only realistic to assume that, however fast we move, we shall remain
subject to violent criticism so long as the racialists in Africa remain dissatisfied with
what we do or say over Southern Rhodesia, Portugal or South Africa. They will seek
any stick to beat us with from the Falkland Islands to Tonga.
4. We in the C.R.O. are naturally concerned to see some general policy emerge
which will prove saleable to the rest of the Commonwealth—old or new. We must
therefore be able to demonstrate to them that we are offering a degree of autonomy
which meets the wishes of the inhabitants of the territories concerned. When our
own objectives are clearer, I think that there would be much to be said for tabling the
whole problem for discussion at some future Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Meeting. If by then we were well on the road to an acceptable solution in Southern
Rhodesia, we would have a strong case to put to other Prime Ministers that there
remained far smaller territories, which for obvious reasons, could not hope to
achieve full independence. We could surely appeal to our Commonwealth partners
for support in striving towards a practical alternative series of solutions of which in
the main some form of free association seems to offer the best hopes. This might
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dissuade them from rocking our boat at the United Nations, and they might be
prepared to participate in some more practical fashion. One possibility would be
Commonwealth supervision of referenda in conjunction with, or instead of, U.N.
supervision.
5. Of the solutions which are reviewed in the memorandum, we are less
optimistic than the Colonial Office appear to be that a solution on the Tonga model
could be sold to the United Nations. In Tonga:—
(a) British armed forces are guaranteed access;
(b) British Government approval is necessary for legislation relating to defence,
banking currency and discrimination against non-Tongans;
(c) Britain has Courts with exclusive jurisdiction to deal with non-Tongans.
One can imagine Mr. Bing1 going to town over this.
6. We could be slightly more hopeful than you about the possibility of Australia
being ready to shoulder our responsibilities in e.g. the case of the British Solomon
Islands, provided that this was on a basis of free association. On a mere shifting of
Colonial responsibilities, I would of course agree with you that there can be no
prospect of other Commonwealth Governments being willing to share or to inherit
the burden.
7. Although in paragraph 31 of the memorandum you dismiss the agreement
which exists between the Netherlands and the Antilles for failing to provide any
useful guidance, we ourselves wonder whether in fact the arrangements which exist
in Surinam and Curacao would not repay further study. I am no expert in this sphere,
but I am told that the relationship of these territories with the Netherlands is a fairly
successful compromise between free association and integration. I am informed too
that there is free movement of people between both sides; full internal autonomy and
a system by which local Ministers are directly associated with a Dutch Council in the
formulation of foreign, external trade and defence policies. Whatever the precise
system, it seems to work well, and has not apparently brought down the wrath of the
United Nations upon it.
8. We have reservations about the Western Samoa pattern as a possible solution
at least as regards the very small territories. To begin with, it has not aroused
enthusiasm among other Commonwealth Governments. It is untidy and at best
temporary. And above all, it leaves hanging in the air the prospect of an application at
any moment from the “Samoan” partners for Commonwealth Membership—a
request which it would be difficult to turn down if at the same time the territory were
to be admitted to the United Nations.
9. For the above reasons we are inclined to favour free association as the best
practicable, if not ideal, solution for all those territories which do not qualify for full
independence.
10. One further point. The phraseology used about “membership” of the
Commonwealth sometimes leads to obscurity. The non-self-governing territories are,
of course, all within the Commonwealth. Commonwealth Membership (with a capital
“M”) comes after full independence and its hall-mark is attendance at Prime
Ministers’ Conferences. There is nothing illogical therefore in a territory like
Western Samoa remaining within the Commonwealth without full Membership.
1 G H C Bing, QC, Irish barrister, attorney-general of Ghana, 1957–1961.
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49 CAB 148/5, ff 11–14 23 Mar 1964
‘Future of the smaller colonial territories’: CO memorandum for
Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee 
(DO(O)(64)16)
[This paper was essentially a re-issue of the survey made in Sept 1963 (at the request of
Mr Sandys, when he was considering whether it would be practicable to make any
‘general act of decolonisation’ in the next year or two), printed again as the appendix: see
document no 46. The covering memo updated it, taking account of comments of the CRO
(see document no 48) and the FO (see no 47). With these revisions, the Sept 1963 survey
continued to hold the field, and was submitted by officials to CO and FO ministers of the
new Labour government at the end of October 1964 (FO 371/178373, no 1, letter from
C G Eastwood, CO, to D A Greenhill, FO, 30 Oct 1964). This paper is referred to in
Morgan, Guidance towards self-government, pp 210–211.]
The Colonial Office has, for some months, been considering the future of the
remaining colonies and the possibility of devising new “post-colonial” forms of
association with those small territories which are unlikely to achieve full
independence. The possible ways of dealing with these territories and the problems
are analysed in the Appendix to this memorandum.
2. The Appendix was prepared last September for consideration by Colonial
Office Ministers. The Colonial Secretary has not yet reached decisions on its
conclusions or on the terms of a possible public statement about Britain’s future
relationship with the colonies. The conclusions in paragraphs 36–41 of the Appendix
express only the official view in the Colonial Office and the suggestions as to the final
status of individual territories given in Annex I to the Appendix are tentative.
Preliminary views of other departments
3. The Appendix was prepared in close consultation with the Department of
Technical Co-operation. It was shown informally last October to the Foreign Office,
Treasury, Commonwealth Relations Office, Central African Office and the Ministry of
Defence. The following comments were then made about the choice for small
territories of independence on the Western Samoa pattern or what the United
Nations calls “free association”:—
Western Samoa
(a) The Treasury were inclined to favour the Western Samoa type of solution as
likely to involve a lesser degree of financial obligation on the part of Britain than
“free association”, although they recognised that it is doubtful whether the
balance of financial advantage is likely to be sufficient to weigh the scales
decisively between the two solutions.
(b) The Commonwealth Relations Office regarded the Western Samoa solution as
untidy and at best temporary. They pointed out that it has aroused no enthusiasm
among Commonwealth Governments and leaves open the prospect at any moment
of application for Commonwealth membership. They felt inclined to favour “free
association” for all territories not qualifying for full independence.
“Free Association”
(c) The Foreign Office considered it doubtful whether the association between
Puerto Rico and the United States would be a useful model for British territories.
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The present status of Puerto Rico is a legal muddle and is in question as a final
solution.
(d) The Foreign Office thought that it would be essential, where territories are not
proceeding to separate independence, to demonstrate to the world that the
proposed relationship is wanted by most people of the territory. They believed that
it would be very helpful internationally if the processes of reaching the new
relationship could be planned to involve United Nations co-operation in some
form.
Comment: The force of this is recognised in paragraph 27 of the Appendix, but
there are strong arguments against permitting United Nations interference in
dependent territories other than Trust Territories. Moreover, if the United Nations
is once allowed to get a foot in the door in any one territory it will become virtually
impossible not to “involve” them in all. Since we are not in a position to accept
United Nations involvement in all territories, it would be better not to accept it in
any.
(e) The Commonwealth Relations Office thought that, however fast we moved in
pursuit of the aim expressed in the Appendix, we should be subject to violent
criticism so long as African racialists are dissatisfied with us over Southern Africa.
The Commonwealth Relations Office wanted a policy that would be acceptable to
all Commonwealth members and suggested that, when our objectives are clearer,
the problem might be put to a future Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting. If
by then an acceptable solution in Southern Rhodesia was in sight they thought
that we might get support for some form of “free association”, although it would
be essential to demonstrate that the relationship was desired by the people of the
territories concerned. In this regard they suggested the possibility of
Commonwealth supervision of referenda, in conjunction with or instead of United
Nations supervision.
Comment: The future relationship of small territories to the Commonwealth
will have to be considered in deciding our policy and on that decision will depend
how we handle the matter with the Commonwealth. It is, however, doubtful
whether it will be possible to secure general Commonwealth support for solutions
short of independence unless these comply strictly with United Nations’
requirements which we do not expect to be able wholly to accept. The Afro-Asian
members have nothing to gain from allying themselves with us in supporting
solutions which may prove contentious in the United Nations.
Events affecting the memorandum of last September
4. Since the memorandum attached as Appendix was prepared the following
events of significance to it have occurred:—
(a) Zanzibar and Kenya have become independent.
(b) A date (6th July, 1964) has been announced for the independence of Nyasaland
and the independence of Northern Rhodesia is expected later this year.
(c) Ministers have decided against a recommendation that we should hand our
share of the New Hebrides to the French and are in favour of maintaining for the
time being the existing arrangements (D.O. (64) 2nd Meeting Minutes, Item 1).
(d) New Zealand has announced new constitutional arrangements for the Cook
Islands which, if endorsed by the United Nations, may well set the pattern for
relationships of “free association” elsewhere. These new arrangements are to come
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fully into operation in May, 1965 and as a probable model for a type of relationship
suitable for many of our small territories, they deserve attention.
New Zealand model of “Free Association”
5. The Cook Islands are 15 islands with a total land area of about 90 square miles
and a population of less than 20,000. 80% of the Islands’ revenues are provided by the
New Zealand Government. Most of the Islands’ trade is with New Zealand and there is
an annual outflow of migrants to New Zealand.
6. The main features of the new constitutional arrangements are:
(a) New Zealand will retain responsibility for the Islands’ external relations.
(b) Otherwise, the Islands will have complete self-government with a Cabinet under
a Chief Minister, elected by and solely responsible to the Cook Islands’ Legislative
Assembly. There will be arrangements for making New Zealand’s views on matters
of common concern fully known to the Cook Islanders but New Zealand will retain
no constitutional power to override local decisions, even in internal matters affect-
ing external affairs or in matters affecting expenditure of New Zealand grants.
(c) The Islands’ Government will be free to amend the Constitution and will
thereby have the power, at any rate in theory, to move to independence at any time
without further reference to New Zealand.
New Zealand have not decided on the procedure for securing United Nations’
endorsement of these arrangements, but they may well invite a mission from the
United Nations to satisfy itself that the Islanders want the new relationship. They
may also, or alternatively, hold a referendum on the arrangements under United
Nations’ observation.
7. These arrangements follow closely the United Nations principles of “free associ-
ation” and the extent of self-government goes beyond what we have in mind for our ter-
ritories as expressed in paragraph 30 of the Appendix. The New Zealand Government’s
willingness to dispense with constitutional controls, save in respect of external affairs,
is obviously affected by the facts that the Cook Islands have no racial or other serious
internal divisions, are very heavily dependent on New Zealand for trade and aid and as
an outlet for emigrants and have virtually no interest in international affairs. Despite
these special factors we may expect criticism if we fall short of these arrangements in
establishing some form of “continuing association” with our territories.
United Nations consideration of small territories
8. The United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism (the Committee of 24)
will try this year to complete examination of all the colonial territories on its list.
Most of these are small territories. The Committee may seek to examine each
territory separately and to recommend the final status at which each should aim—
independence or integration or “free association” with an independent State. This
process will be complicated in certain cases by the claims of other States to certain of
our small territories, e.g. Gibraltar, British Honduras and the Falklands. The
Colonial Office see no possibility of being able to make a general statement of “de-
colonisation” this year. We can only do our best to prevent the Committee from
reaching decisions which interfere with our efforts to work out the best possible
solutions for our territories; solutions which as we see it will in a number of cases
take several years to achieve.
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50 CAB 148/6, ff 221–228 15 June 1964
‘Remaining colonial problems’: CO brief for Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ meeting1
(A) Malta
The anti-independence parties made a poor showing in the Malta Referendum in
May, 1964, and the British Government therefore decided to proceed with the grant
of independence, it being understood that British defence requirements will be
safeguarded by a detailed Defence Agreement. It is expected that by the time of the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meetings these negotiations will be completed. It is
also hoped that the present NATO H.Q. in Malta will remain there after
independence.
On the constitutional side, the British Government have insisted on certain
amendments being made in the Malta Government’s Independence Constitution. It is
expected that the Malta Government will agree.2
The real problem in Malta is not political but economic. The island is over-
populated and has no natural resources apart from its harbour and climate.
Employment provided by the Services has declined, but the island’s economy still
remains very greatly dependent on British Service spending, coupled with the very
substantial aid being given by the U.K. to promote tourism, new industries,
emigration, etc. The British Government is now also providing aid to the Malta
Budget. Whatever Mr. Mintoff may say about the pleasures of neutralism, no thinking
Maltese wishes the British Services to leave.
(B) British Guiana
The object of our policy in British Guiana is to grant independence as soon as we can
do so in conditions of peace and stability. But since 1962 we have been held up by the
inability of the Guianese leaders to agree on crucial constitutional issues—notably
the electoral system.
2. Local divisions. A general election in 1961 gave Dr. Jagan’s Peoples
Progressive Party (P.P.P.) a majority in the Legislative Assembly, but the other parties,
Mr. Burnham’s Peoples National Congress (P.N.C.) and Mr. D’Aguiar’s United Force
(U.F.), secured a majority of the votes cast. This situation called for compromise, but
the issues between the parties—the communist connections of the P.P.P. and its
identification with the East Indian community, and the personal rivalry between Dr.
Jagan and Mr. Burnham—were too deeply felt. Each year since 1962, an outbreak of
violence in British Guiana has obliged the Government to declare an emergency and
to rely on British troops to restore order. The disturbances in February 1962 caused
extensive damage in Georgetown but were over in a few days. In 1963 a general strike
lasted three months and degenerated in its last few days into something close to a
race war in the sugar areas. This year a sugar strike has led again to bitter inter-racial
violence.
3. British forces. We have two battalions of infantry in British Guiana at present:
we have no wish to prolong for a day longer than is necessary such a large
commitment in a territory in which we have little economic and no defence interest.
1 DO(O)(64)53/PMM (UK)(64)A26. 2 See document no 255 below.
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4. Constitutional conferences. At Constitutional conferences in London in
October 1962 and October 1963, the Guianese leaders were unable to agree on the
electoral system, on whether or not fresh elections should be held before
independence and on the voting age. The first Conference was adjourned, and
numerous efforts were made during the year which followed to bring Jagan and
Burnham together. Mr. Sandys, Prime Minister Eric Williams of Trinidad, the
Governor and the United Nations Committee of 24 all tried to persuade the leaders to
resolve their differences by negotiation. At the 1963 Conference, however, the
Guianese leaders admitted that there was no prospect of an agreed solution and
asked the British Government to settle the outstanding issues on their own authority
and promised to abide by the British Government’s decisions.3
5. The British government’s decisions. The root of the trouble in British Guiana
lies almost entirely in the development of party politics along racial lines. The aim of
the settlement announced at the end of the conference (which has formed the basis
of subsequent policy) was to stimulate a radical change in the present pattern of
racial alignment; to encourage inter-party coalitions and multi-racial groupings, and
to make it easy for new parties to form. To this end Mr. Sandys announced that
proportional representation would be introduced, and that a fresh election would be
held as soon as possible but special precautions—including the preparation of a new
electoral register—would be taken to prevent cheating. Another decision was that
before independence an additional force not drawn predominantly from any one
racial group should be constituted.
6. The implementation of the decisions. The preparation of a new register of
voters began in May and should be complete by late August. Legislation to change
the electoral system and to substitute a single chamber for the present bicameral
legislature will be made soon afterwards and all being well an election will be held
towards the end of the year. After that we plan to hold another Conference to settle
any remaining constitutional issues and to fix a date for independence. The new
security force is being recruited.
7. Commonwealth intervention. We have welcomed efforts made earlier this year
by President Nkrumah and Prime Minister Williams to persuade Dr. Jagan and the
other Guianese leaders to compose their differences. Even when they do not succeed
at once these efforts must in the long run make it harder for the Guianese politicians
to hold out against common sense and the interests of their country.
8. United Nations. The United Nations Committee of 24 is apt to misrepresent
the situation as one in which the Guianese are trying to throw off colonial rule. Our
difficulties in British Guiana have now gone on so long that the facts explained above
are becoming clear even to our keenest detractors. Nevertheless we should be
grateful for Commonwealth support when the situation is discussed in New York.
(C) Federation and Protectorate of South Arabia
The Protectorate of South Arabia was established during the nineteenth century and
now contains 19 States under British protection. Before the 1950s it was not the
policy to intervene in the internal affairs of the States. Since then however we have
with their agreement actively sought to assist them in the establishment of orderly
administrations and in furthering social and economic development.
3 See document no 299 below.
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The Federation of South Arabia was founded in 1959 by six of the States in the
Western Aden Protectorate. Subsequent accessions, including that of the former
Colony of Aden (now Aden State) in January 1963, have brought the present
membership to 14 States. There are treaties between Britain and the Federation
providing for military and financial assistance to the Federation and binding the
Federal Government to accept and implement British advice on matters relating to
the good government of the Federation.
The legislature of the Federation (the Federal Council) is composed of
representatives (usually 6) from each member State, but Aden has 24 representatives
out of the total membership of 94. The executive authority is vested in a Supreme
Council made up of 14 Ministers (including 4 Aden Ministers) elected from the
Federal Council. There is no Prime Minister: each Federal Minister in turn becomes
Chairman of the Supreme Council for one month at a time.
The constitution of Aden State is far more advanced than that of any other mem-
ber State of the Federation. There is a Legislative Council with a majority of elected
members and a Council of Ministers headed by a Chief Minister. The High
Commissioner is normally bound to act upon the advice of the Council of
Ministers, subject to his general reserved powers, but he remains responsible for
external affairs, defence, internal security, police and the Aden public service. A
general election under a revised franchise is due to be held in Aden State by
October, 1964.
British policy is to lead the people of the Federation to sovereign independence as
soon as practicable, and substantial amounts of financial and other forms of
assistance are given by Britain to the Federation to this end.
Factors delaying progress. The constant threat from the Yemen, where the
Republican authorities lay territorial claim to the whole of the South Arabian
Protectorate, has interrupted constitutional progress. Interference from the Yemen
has taken the form of numerous violations of the frontier, both by air and on the
ground, and of substantial attempts to subvert tribes on the Federal side of the
frontier with supplies of money, arms and ammunition. The revolt in Radfan is one of
the results of this.
The Base. The base continues to be necessary for the discharge of our
international commitments in the area, notably our undertaking to come to the aid
of Kuwait if asked and our obligations towards the Rulers in the Gulf. It also provides
an essential staging post between Britain and the Far East. It is an important factor
in the maintenance of political stability in the region, and our position in Aden has
the declared support of the United States Government.
United Nations interest. The United Nations Committee of 24 set up a Sub-
Committee in April 1963 with terms of reference to visit Aden to ascertain the views
of the population and leaders of the political parties. The British Government
rejected the ensuing request to visit Aden on the grounds that the Committee has no
competence to intervene in the administration of British non-self-governing
territories. After visiting the Yemen and Cairo, the Sub-Committee produced a
tendentious report unacceptable to the British Government.
The Committee of 24 again in April this year set up an Aden Sub-Committee, the
Chairman of which has recently proposed a visit to London for discussion of the
situation in Aden with the British Government. The request is still under
consideration. . . .
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(C) Barbados and the smaller West Indian Territories (Antigua, Dominica,
Grenada, Montserrat, St Lucia, St Kitts and St Vincent)
Following the decision of Jamaica and Trinidad to seek separate independence, the
remaining eight constituent territories of the former Federation of the West Indies
proposed, in January 1962, to form a new Federation. H.M.G. agreed that if
federation could be achieved on satisfactory terms this would offer these islands the
best possible future. Our principal anxiety was that any new central government
should be strong enough—the failure of the former Federation can be attributed in
the main to the weakness of the central Government.
2. Grenada has since dropped out and is exploring the possibility of union with
Trinidad and Tobago. The remaining Seven asked in May, 1963 that the new
Federation should be independent from its inception.
3. Although we have agreed to consider a constitution for independence,
agreement has not yet been reached on a constitution, particularly as regards the
powers of the central government. The Premier of Barbados and the Chief Ministers
of the other six islands were invited to a meeting with the Colonial Secretary in
London in April, 1964, but have been unable to agree pending further discussions
amongst themselves. A more detailed account is in Appendix III.2
4. In May 1964, appearing before Sub-Committee III of the United Nations
Committee of Twenty-four, a Trinidad representative attacked British policy and
performance in the Caribbean (Appendix I). The British representative made a full
reply (Appendix II).
5. The Trinidad representative’s attack was based on four propositions
summarised below with points made in our previous reply.
6. (i) Britain is thrusting independence on these islands without equipping them
to sustain it.
[Comment:] So far from Britain thrusting independence on these islands, it is on
their initiative that we are considering a constitution for independence.
7. (ii) The scale of British aid in the past has fallen short of what was estimated to
be required.
[Comment:] In general, British aid to overseas territories warrants a modest pride.
In particular, over a three-year period 1959–62, British aid in the Caribbean
exceeded the level of aid estimated by the Government of Trinidad to be required at
that time for the whole area. (In fact much the greater part of this went to Jamaica
and Trinidad but (a debating point) would Trinidad complain of that now? To
strengthen Jamaica and Trinidad could have been expected to strengthen the whole
Federal area).
8. (iii) Grenada is seeking union with Trinidad but would require substantial aid
to bring it up to the economic level of Trinidad and (by implication) that aid would
not be forthcoming.
[Comment:] We have not so far been invited to consider whether financial
assistance could be given to facilitate union of Grenada with Trinidad and Tobago.
9. (iv) Britain should leave these islands to settle what political institutions they
want without interference—which they could do if only they they had assurances of
the financial assistance required.
2 Appendixes not printed.
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[Comment:] We recognised from the first that a federation of these islands would
continue to need external aid both on capital and on recurrent account. At the
London Conference in 1962 we volunteered assurances that we would continue to
provide aid. Those assurances should be sufficient to enable the territories to
complete their consideration of what form the federal constitution should take. The
time to consider the level of aid to be provided is when it is clear what kind of
federation is contemplated and what is its capacity to make good and effective use of
money provided for development. It is not, therefore, in our view finance which is the
obstacle to progress with Federation, but the difficulty of reaching agreement on a
satisfactory federal scheme. A Federation is recognised as likely to offer these
territories a better future than they could expect individually. But if Britain is to
continue to provide finance it has the right to be assured that the federal
arrangements give the central government sufficient power including power to
ensure the co-ordinated development of the whole area. Naturally, it is difficult for
seven separate Governments to reach agreement on a federal constitution; but the
British Government would be failing in its duty if it did not seek to ensure that any
Federation which may be established was in a form which gave it the best possible
chance not only of survival but of a healthy development.
51 CAB 148/1, f 110 6 July 1964
‘The remaining British colonies’: minutes of Cabinet Defence and
Oversea Policy Committee meeting (DO 31(64)1)
[Mr Sandys had not by the middle of June 1964 reached any decision about the
conclusions presented in the survey of Sept 1963, as modified on 23 Mar 1964 (document
no 49). But he raised the possibility of making a statement to parliament about Britain’s
future relationship with the remaining (smaller) colonies, and to do so before the opening
of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting on 8 July, at which it was already
planned to make a statement about Britain’s ‘colonial record’ (CAB 148/6, ff 155–156,
DO(O)(64)42, CO memo, 5 June 1964). Officials discouraged the idea of anticipating the
Commonwealth meeting statement by a parliamentary one, which would be even harder
to draft and would lessen the impact on the prime ministers it was hoped to impress (CAB
148/4, ff 61–62, DO(O)14(64)2, minutes of meeting of DOP(Official)C, 17 June 1964). A
parliamentary statement having thus been stopped, ministers then discussed the terms of
the statement to the Commonwealth meeting. Sandys explained the main purpose: ‘The
issue of colonialism was at present one of the main causes of present attacks on the
policies of the United Kingdom; and our international position would be greatly improved
if it could be demonstrated that such attacks were now beside the point’. Some doubts
were expressed by his colleagues as to the desirability and the wording of his statement,
so it was decided that ‘further thought’ must be given before a decision was taken (CAB
148/1, f 102A, DO 29(64)1(vi), minutes of meeting of DOPC meeting, 1 July 1964).]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (D.O.
(64) 65), to which was appended the re-draft of a statement about the remaining
British Colonies which might be circulated to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers
after their arrival in London.
The Colonial Secretary said that he attached importance to making such a
statement at the outset of the Meeting. A private discussion on this subject with the
Prime Minister of Kenya, Mr. Kenyatta, on the latter’s arrival in London, had
reinforced his view that, if we gave greater publicity to our record in granting
independence to our colonies and emphasised the fact that this process had now
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nearly reached completion, we might mitigate to some extent the criticism of the
African and Asian countries and might encourage the more friendly members of this
group to support us.
Discussion revealed a division of view in the Committee on the desirability of
making this statement. On the one hand, it was primarily a factual account of our
record and of the present position; and anti-colonialist criticism should be mitigated
by a greater realisation of the fact that the remaining Colonial territories were either
on the point of reaching independence or were so small that independence was
doubtfully practicable for them. On the other hand, such criticism seemed likely, in
any event, to continue for political and emotional reasons as long as we retained any
colonial responsibility, and in particular until the issue of Southern Rhodesia was
settled. Moreover, we might well require some of the remaining small territories for
defence or other needs; and it might therefore be inexpedient to suggest in the
statement that the choice of independence was open to all of them, however small.
Nor would it be politic to make a statement which suggested that we were anxious to
be rid of our responsibilities. If, nevertheless, a statement of some kind were
desirable in principle, the draft appended to D.O. (64) 65 would require amendment
in certain respects in order to meet detailed points made in discussion.
The Prime Minister said that he would prepare a revised draft in the light of the
discussion, on the basis of which the Committee could give further consideration to
the desirability of making a statement on this subject.
52 CAB 148/2, f 221 8 July 1964
‘The remaining British colonies’: statement on decolonisation by
Mr Sandys to Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Meeting (DO(64)65
revise)
[The minutes of the meeting are withheld in the PRO. The ‘final revise’ draft is therefore
printed here. An earlier draft of this was printed by Morgan, Guidance towards self-
government in British colonies (Official history of colonial development, vol 5), pp
207–208. A comparison of this with the quotation from the speech, pp 212–213, indicates
that it was delivered more or less in this form, but with the omission of the second
sentence in para 2, and with the addition of two prefatory sentences, viz: ‘Britain had
almost completed the task of divesting herself of her Empire. She had done this of her
own will, not through lack of power to rule, but because she wished to give others the
freedom she so much prized herself’. Discussion by the prime ministers is reported in
Morgan, Guidance, pp 213–214.]
Britain’s long declared aim is to lead her Colonies to independence. We have no
desire to prolong our colonial obligations for a day longer than is necessary.
2. Already more than twenty countries, with a total population of some 700
millions, have achieved sovereign independence under British guidance. [In the
same way, we are prepared to offer independence to all other British territories which
desire it and are able to assume the responsibilities involved.]1
3. Malta will be independent in September, Northern Rhodesia in October, and
the Gambia very soon after. Basutoland has been promised that she can have
independence in about eighteen months’ time; Bechuanaland will be free to follow
1 Square brackets in original; words apparently not delivered.
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when she wishes; and Swaziland’s new constitution has now set her on the same
course. An undertaking has been given to the Federation of South Arabia that it will
be independent within 31⁄2 years. British Guiana will become independent as soon as
she is able to assure internal peace. Southern Rhodesia, which has had internal self-
government for over 40 years, will attain full sovereignty as soon as her
parliamentary institutions are sufficiently representative.
4. There are also other Colonies which already enjoy a wide measure of self-
government. These include the Bahamas, Barbados, British Honduras and Mauritius.
5. In fact, the only British dependency with a substantial population which is not
already on the way to independence is Hong Kong, where, owing to external factors,
the circumstances are exceptional.
6. In addition there are some twenty other Colonies and Protectorates with a
combined population of one and a half millions. Only two have a population of more
than 100,000, several less than 10,000 and the smallest, Pitcairn, under a hundred.
7. Some of these territories may feel strong enough to proceed to independence
on their own. Some may join with others to form larger and more viable units. Some
may wish to couple independence with a treaty of assistance, such as Western Samoa
concluded with New Zealand. Some may favour the form of independence described
by the United Nations as “free association with an independent state”, under which
Britain or some other country would agree to undertake certain limited
responsibilities. Some will for the present prefer to remain as they are. Each will, at
the appropriate time, make its own choice.
08-ConGov-Doc 29-52-cp  18/10/00  2:04 pm  Page 232
[53] 233
CHAPTER 2
Strategy and Defence Policies
Document numbers 53–81
53 CAB 128/31/1, CC 21(57)2 18 Mar 1957
‘Statement on defence, 1957’: Cabinet conclusions on White Paper
[This important White Paper on Defence was published as Defence: outline of future
policy, Cmnd 124 (PP, 1956–57 vol XXIII, 489). Extracts were printed in Porter &
Stockwell, eds, British imperial policy & decolonization vol 2, pp 452–464 (document
no 71).]
The Cabinet had before them a note by the Minister of Defence (C. (57) 69) covering
a draft of a White Paper giving an outline of future defence policy.
The Prime Minister said that the White Paper was designed to set out in greater
detail the new defence policy which he had already outlined to the Cabinet. It was
important that this policy should not be presented in such a way as to reflect
unfavourably on the record of Conservative Governments since 1952 or to alarm our
allies in Western European Union (W.E.U.), to whom the progressive elimination of
National Service would come as a surprise. The opening section of the White Paper
should therefore be replaced by a longer introduction which would make it clear that
the objective of our defence policy remained, as it had always been, the maintenance
of compact and efficient fighting Services, but that the methods by which we should
best attain this objective required radical reappraisal in the light of current strategic
considerations.
The Minister of Defence briefly reviewed the main provisions of the White Paper,
emphasising that, if the Services were to be manned in future by regular recruits,
conditions of service would need to be substantially improved in certain respects, and
some additional expenditure on this account would be inevitable. It would also be
desirable to indicate in the White Paper the date by which we hoped to complete the
elimination of National Service.
In the course of a general discussion the Cabinet reaffirmed their approval of
the broad lines of the new defence policy. Its presentation would need careful
consideration, however, and in this connection the following points were made:—
(a) The White Paper reflected a fundamental revolution in our defence policy, which
might have far-reaching effects on our influence in world affairs and on our ability
to maintain our position in the more remote Colonial territories such as Hong Kong.
(b) The impact of our proposals on the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
might be unfortunate. NATO was the central pivot of our system of defence as a
whole, and we should therefore seek by consultation to convince the other
member countries of the advantages of our new policy. We should oppose any
suggestion that the proposed reduction in our naval forces would warrant the
transfer of certain NATO naval Commands to other countries.
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(c) A reduction in military establishments on the scale indicated in the White
Paper would give rise to considerable problems in the Services themselves,
particularly in those branches which were manned predominantly by technical
personnel recruited by National Service. The effect of the new policy on industry,
particularly from the point of view of the unemployment which might result from
the cancellation of contracts, would also need to be carefully reviewed from time
to time.
(d) It was for consideration how far our allies in W.E.U. should be informed in
advance about our intention to bring National Service to an end. Provided that
we made an adequate contribution to the defence of Europe, the decision on the
means by which we recruited the necessary forces lay with us and not with the
other member countries of W.E.U. Nevertheless it would be advisable to give
them some indication of our intentions shortly before the White Paper was pub-
lished.
(e) The announcement of the withdrawal of two Territorial Army divisions as
reinforcements for NATO would not be very opportune at the present moment.
The extent to which Territorial Army formations should be available for emergency
service overseas should perhaps be reconsidered in the light of experience during
the Anglo–French operation against Egypt.
(f ) The reference to Cyprus should be carefully considered in the light of the
current discussions about future policy for the Island.
(g) The White Paper should include a reference to the need for close collaboration
with the other Members of the Commonwealth in the development of our defence
policy.
(h) The proposed reduction of our forces in the Far East would make it more
difficult for us to discharge, in respect of our Colonies in that area, the
responsibilities for their defence which we should retain even when they had
attained a large measure of self-government.
(i) The treatment of civil defence in the White Paper would need further
consideration, particularly in the light of the statement that the great cities could
not at present be protected against nuclear attack.
(j) It was unlikely that all the transport aircraft needed for the Central Reserve
could be provided by Transport Command; and the relevant passage in the White
Paper might be amended to leave more scope for the contribution which could be
made by air charter companies.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved the general principles of the new defence policy outlined in the draft
White Paper annexed to C. (57) 69.
(2) Invited the Minister of Defence to prepare a revised draft of the White Paper in
the light of the points made in the Cabinet’s discussion and of other comments
which Ministers might communicate to him, and to circulate the revised text for
their consideration at a later meeting.
(3) Agreed that publication of the White Paper should be deferred until not later
than 5th April.
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54 FO 371/129310, no 76 28 May 1957
[Colonial implications of long-term plan for naval reductions]:
minute by Mr Lennox-Boyd to Lord Selkirk (Adm)
[Several departments were concerned about the political and security implications of
proposed reductions, which seemed to signal evidence of the decline of British power—
which would be serious for Hong Kong—and a growing inability to protect vital inter-
ests.]
I am grateful to you for sending me a copy of your minute of the 3rd May to Duncan
Sandys on the long-term plan for the Navy. I share many of the reactions which were
contained on page 5 of your minute: these reductions come at a time when British
Army strength in the Colonies is being reduced to about 37% of its present numbers,
and both on that account and on their own merits they cause me much concern.
None of the Colonies is planning to effect anything like a compensating increase in
their own local forces for internal security purposes—indeed most of them have not
the means to do this if they would. The effect, therefore, of simultaneous Army and
Navy reductions is bound to become evident, and in itself is likely to encourage
disruptive elements in the Colonies.
2. We in the Colonial Office do not feel confident that we are entering a period of
peaceful development when the calls on our naval forces will diminish. There is of
course no stopping the process of political devolution on which we are now well set,
and in addition to the accompanying restlessness we have to realise that it is going to
be very difficult to maintain the politically essential impetus of economic
development. This in itself aggravates the effects of reductions in a large labour force
like a dockyard, but is of course of more general importance in that the internal
security situation becomes that much more finely balanced. The withdrawals
therefore come at a critical and unfortunate time.
3. The naval contribution to our power in the Colonies has been particularly
valuable because of the widespread affection and respect that Colonial people have
for our ships and our sailors. It has often been enough that a warship is in harbour
so that a ship’s company marches through the town for an immediate effect to be
seen in local confidence. The value only a few weeks ago of the Bigbury Bay, at
St. Lucia, to which you yourself referred, is a case in point. A situation ugly
enough to be beyond local control but not sufficiently ugly to warrant the flying in
of troops, or in extreme cases of the “Fire Brigade” from the United Kingdom, can
often be controlled, with the minimum of fuss and the least local exacerbation, by
the Navy. It is therefore a very disturbing thought that in so many vital areas of
the world the cuts proposed would mean that we should no longer be able to call
on you.
4. Turning to the particular effect of the reductions which you have indicated,
and leaving aside the case of Hong Kong which we are taking up separately, I would
like first to deal with the surrender of the naval dockyards at Singapore and Malta. In
neither of these cases are we worried on this account by the direct effect of such
withdrawals on the internal security position; but the indirect effects of such
substantial numbers of people being put out of work are most serious indeed. In
these overseas yards there are no or very few other occupations in which manpower
can then be productively employed. The reductions will weaken the economy of these
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places, and I would like to emphasise this, since David Eccles’1 minute to you of 21st
May points out that by concentrating reductions in the Home Yards we can use the
labour released to strengthen our economy. 5,000 at Singapore and 6,400 at Malta
represent, I understand, about 70% of the present personnel employed on these
dockyards. The Malta cut is 8% of present total employment in the Island.
5. The Chief Minister of Singapore has already asked to meet representatives of
the service departments in London next week to discuss current Admiralty dismissals
in Singapore, about which he is gravely perturbed, although they are of course
trifling by comparison with what is contemplated. One of the chief local arguments
for the retention of our base in Singapore is the employment it provides.
6. As for Malta, you know how heavily dependent is its whole economy on the
dockyard and you will have seen copies of recent letters from Mr. Mintoff which I
circulated to the Malta Committee. In view of our commitment to give Malta
substantial aid for development and to balance her budget, I am not at all certain that
it would be financially prudent for us to close the dockyard there. I should certainly
want to see this worked over in detail before I could agree to it.
7. I note that you are “reasonably hopeful” that both of these yards could be
handed over to private firms. David Perth2 and I have already had a word with
Knollys3 about this possibility in Malta. Such an arrangement would, of course, do a
great deal to counter the economic effects of closure, and unemployment, and I
should be grateful if you would keep me fully informed of your negotiations with
likely firms. Colonial Governments will expect to be fully consulted on this and other
aspects of the new plan and we shall certainly have to ensure that any inevitable run
down in employment is spread over a number of years.
8. May I now turn to another painful topic—the closure of the station at
Bermuda and the abolition of the post of Resident Naval Officer there? There are two
main consequences of this. First, it will mean that the Royal Navy will sever a
connection which has endured since 1767. We do not yet know whether we are to
have a Marine garrison in Bermuda, but if not, and if the two frigates go, there will be
no Service representation whatever in the island to keep our end up against
overwhelming American representation. They have nearly 10,000 service personnel
in the islands, and about 100,000 American tourists visit them each year. We will
have no service representation at all. The younger generation are heavily pro-
American and these withdrawals, indicating the decline of British power, must
strengthen their feeling that their political future must lie, as their economic future
already lies, Westward rather than Eastwards. I cannot be happy about this.
9. Secondly, it will deprive the West Indies of naval assistance in an emergency.
We hope to minimise this disadvantage by re-forming the West India Regiment, and
there is of course always the “Fire Brigade”. But the Navy gives us flexibility and
enables us to reach islands which are inadequately served by airfields. The Windward
Islands are particularly handicapped in this respect. The value of the Royal Navy is
therefore great in the scattered islands of the Caribbean. The effect in the West Indies
generally of the withdrawal on the feelings of the people towards us and the
Americans respectively will be similar to that in Bermuda.
1 President of the Board of Trade, 1957–1959. 2 Lord Perth, minister of state at CO, 1957–1962.
3 Lord Knollys, chairman of Vickers, Ltd, since 1956.
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10. The abolition of our naval headquarters in Cape Town, and the withdrawal of
the existing frigates from the South Atlantic and South America station, will mean
that we will be unable in war to protect our shipping routes via the Cape. If we
cannot (as seems likely) use the Suez Canal, Russian submarines will have liberty to
interfere with our shipping to East Africa, and the Far East. Although the South
African Navy is concentrating on the protection of its coast line, this does not cover
the whole of the area that is of importance to us, and in view of the known Russian
submarine potential we must clearly expect considerable activity in “soft” areas.
11. Moreover there is the vital fact that the Falkland Islands and the Falkland
Island Dependencies will be, as your note indicates, without naval protection. I take
it that this does not mean that we shall be deprived of the armed net-layer, H.M.S.
Protector, which visits Port Stanley for each summer season, but that you had in
mind our ability to reinforce in time of trouble. At present a Naval stand-still
agreement is negotiated each year with the Argentine and Chile, which places a
restraint on the assumed ability of the three countries to increase their naval activity
in the area. I do not see that we can expect this exercise in restraint to be accepted by
our rivals when it is patent that we have no chips to bargain with. The whole area
would then become subject to vigorous and overwhelming naval activity in support
of claims by Argentina and Chile. I do not consider that we could sustain ourselves in
the Dependencies without naval protection, and if we lost them the Falkland Islands
to which the Argentine has a shadowy claim, with their 2,000 British settlers, would
be the next target. The risk of this happening is unacceptable to me.
12. In short, what I want are:—
(1) A detailed programme of reductions in Singapore to be worked out in
consideration with the Singapore Government with a view to softening the blow.
(2) Complete reconsideration of the proposed reductions in Malta in the light of
the economic effects on Malta and the political and financial interests of the
United Kingdom.
(3) Retention of some naval representation in Bermuda.
(4) Ability to protect our sea routes round the Cape to East Africa, Aden and the
Far East; and to control the situation in the Falkland Islands and the
Dependencies. If at any time we lose our position in the Dependencies then the
necessity of controlling the Falkland Islands becomes all the greater. . . .
55 ADM 205/116, COS(58) 193 11 Aug 1958
‘A policy for the Middle East’: memorandum for COS Committee by 
F-M Sir G Templer1 [Extract]
[In introducing this paper to a COS meeting on 12 Aug, Templer said he was convinced
‘that the real threat to the Middle East was from the continued expansion of Soviet
influence; Arab nationalism was chiefly important because it had become a tool of Soviet
policy. Appeasement could only lead to disaster and the point had been reached at which
we must confront the U.S.S.R. with a firm Western policy. At the present time the United
Kingdom had vital interests in the area, but the Russians had not. Our deterrent was still
effective and he did not believe that the Russians would risk a global war by taking overt
1 Chief of the imperial general staff, 1955–1958; formerly high commissioner in Malaya, 1952–1954.
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action. The deterrent would not, however, prevent continued propaganda and subversion
by the Russians’. Whilst accepting the political assessment, Sir Caspar John (representing
the First Sea Lord) expressed doubt about the military practicabilities and implications:
‘any military adventure on our part might well cement the Arab world and so defeat our
aims. It was desirable that we should try to obtain the assistance of the Russians in
formulating a policy for the area because without it any stability we attempted to
establish could only be shortlived’. The Chiefs agreed that a radical reappraisal of western
policy for the Middle East should be pursued (COS 71(58) 3).]
1. Introduction. This paper is written on the assumption that the aims which the
Chiefs of Staff expressed in their previous report (COS(58) 183), have been accepted
by H.M.G. Those were:—
(a) To secure long term stability in the Middle East by means of an overall
settlement,
(b) To secure the unimpeded use of the Suez Canal and a corresponding air
corridor above it,
(c) To guarantee the continued supply of oil.
2. A critical stage has been reached in the Middle East where the UK and US vital
interests are threatened; and the effects of this will spread beyond the boundaries of
the Middle East itself. We do not believe the US yet realise the full extent of the
danger. . . .
15. Summary of deductions. The main deductions from the preceding
paragraphs are as follows:—
(a) The Middle East is a battleground in the cold war between Soviet Russia and
the West. There is a very real danger that the area will fall to Communism through
subversion.
(b) Pan-Arabism, cemented as it is by the fear and hatred of Israel, is being used by
Communism as the prime means of attaining its ends.
(c) The present ambitions of Nasser2 and his present Anti-Western policy are
detrimental to the West.
(d) A solution to the Israel problem is essential to the stabilization of the Middle
East; it will have to be imposed.
(e) Full realisation by the United States of the real dangers of the present situation
is an urgent necessity.
(f) The need for the Arabs to sell oil to the West will not by itself render them
impervious to Communist subversion.
(g) Public opinion is unaware of the Soviet threat, and not prepared for the strong
measures needed.
(h) The United Nations organisation is powerless to take effective action.
(j) There is no likelihood of any action on the part of the West leading to global
war, or of overt Russian military intervention, provided it is made abundantly clear
to the Russians that this would lead to nuclear retaliation.
(k) Whilst the nuclear deterrent is credible today, in two or three years time it
cannot be guaranteed to cover the Middle East. The West, therefore have little time
left in which to adopt strong political and military measures.
2 Col Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, 1956–1970 (died); in 1958 he created a federation with
Syria, the United Arab Republic, from which Syria withdrew in 1961.
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(l) The loss of assured bases and staging posts for sea and air movement would cut
off the UK and NATO area strategically from the Far East. The strategic
repercussions of this would be far reaching.
16. Courses open to the West. It is concluded that there are three courses open
to the West:—
(a) To do a deal with Nasser. . . .
(b) To issue an ultimatum to Nasser. . . .
(c) To break Nasser’s leadership of Arab nationalism by a less direct method than
course ‘(a)’. . . .
17. Conclusion. Of the three courses, Course ‘(a)’ must contain serious risks and
its adoption would fly in the face of all evidence of Soviet penetration and Egyptian
intrigue. It cannot be recommended. Course (‘b’) would be likely to lead to war with
Egypt but it is the certain course to achieve quick and decisive results and could be
adopted now without danger of global war. Its adoption presents great political
difficulties and the ground would have to be carefully prepared in conjunction with
the United States. Course ‘(c)’ cannot be expected to produce quick results and it also
requires political courage and determination. It is, however, the minimum course of
action which can hope to safeguard the interests of the West and thwart the Soviet
plan to dominate the Middle East.
18. Whichever course is chosen, there are three fundamental requisites:—
(a) Joint recognition by the United States, the UK and the Old Members of the
Commonwealth of the Soviet danger.
(b) Similar joint recognition that there is no way of safeguarding the interests of
the West through United Nations auspices.
(c) Co-ordination of US/UK political, economic and military strategy and a visible
determination to defend their interests.
56 PREM 11/3239, T467/58 31 Aug 1958
[Proposed idea of an African defence pact to meet the Soviet threat]:
Mr Macmillan’s reply to Sir R Welensky
[Sir R Welensky made his proposal on 16 May for co-ordinated action; but the FO, CO and
CRO all agreed an ‘African Treaty Organisation’ was a non-starter, because of the
difficulty of associating independent African states with the Union of South Africa in any
effective organisation; in any case the defence of Africa should begin in the Middle East.
This telegraphic letter was drafted in the CRO.]
Thank you for your further letter of July 17 about the threat to Africa.
At the time when you wrote your letter it did indeed look as if the revolution in
Iraq might have fatally damaged the Bagdad Pact. But since then, we have held a
meeting of the Council of the Pact, and, while Iraq was not represented, and her
future attitude remains uncertain, I found our colleagues from Pakistan, Turkey and
Iran in very good heart. You will, however, have seen the important statement of U.S.
policy contained in the declaration which we signed at the meeting. Mr. Dulles has
assured us that, so far as the signatories are concerned, this means that the United
States are in the Pact with them. I agree that the future position of Iraq is uncertain
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and we must certainly leave her out of account in looking at the credit side of the
Pact. But the rest of us dispose considerable forces and these are backed by our
unanimous resolve to make the Pact successful.
I fully share your view, however, as to the potential danger to Africa of the Middle
East situation, and I have every sympathy with your anxiety to take positive and
effective action to strengthen our position. But we have to consider what is
practicable. I think that if we look at the attitude of the independent countries of
Africa we see, beyond question, that an African Defence Organisation on the SEATO
model is not practical politics. The North African countries would not come in. They
are anti-communist and certainly not pro-Nasser. But they are Arabs, and they are
not going to join a defence pact which is clearly directed against Egypt. Still less
because of Algeria, would they consider joining with the French in a pact of this kind.
Furthermore we must face the fact that most of the other African independent states
are deeply committed to a policy of non-alignment. If we were to suggest that they
should nevertheless enter a pact for their own defence, I think that they might well,
for example, in return demand a public declaration by participants with Colonial
Territories designed to commit them to giving those territories independence on a
basis of universal suffrage in the very near future. We do not want to provoke this
kind of counter action; and we may be sure that the French, the Belgians, and the
Portuguese would feel just as strongly as we do on this point.
If, as we are convinced, an African Defence Pact is not possible, this does not
mean that there is nothing we can do. We are indeed doing a good deal already. We
are training and equipping the Libyan Army and we are heavily subsidising the
Libyan budget. We help the Sudanese with arms. Ethiopia has western instructors
for her Armed Forces and by diplomatic action we and the Americans, in particular,
have encouraged the Ethiopian Government to see Nasser for what he is. We have
been talking to the Americans and the Italians about Somalia and we hope that the
position of the moderates there will be strengthened by economic aid from the West
after independence. As regards our own territories, our intelligence organisation is
kept under continual review, and we are also taking steps to make sure that each
Government has sufficient information about the nature of the subversive influ-
ences threatening Africa to be able to set the right targets for their intelligence ser-
vices. I am asking Metcalf to keep you fully informed as our thinking develops and I
should be very grateful if you would talk this over with him and let him have your
ideas.
As you know, I also have it in mind to send Oliver, the Commonwealth Secretary’s
Principal Staff Officer, to Salisbury, possibly in the autumn.1 He was recently
V.C.I.G.S. and he will be able, when he does go, to give you a very much fuller
background than I can give in this letter. He will also be ready to discuss with you
any suggestions which you like to make for improving our collaboration in this vital
field. If you could agree to receive him, I am sure it would be most useful and we
could consider as a result of your talks what future action may be necessary and
possible.
1 Lt-Gen Sir William Oliver, principal staff officer in CRO, 1957–1959, high commissioner in Australia
from 1959.
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57 PREM 11/2753, PM/59/52 9 May 1959
‘The Persian Gulf’: minute by Mr Selwyn Lloyd to Mr Macmillan, on
future military posture
I am very glad that the Defence Committee will consider the problems in the Gulf
and re-examine our military posture there.
2. I feel that we ought to have in the Gulf a British smaller edition of what the
United States has in the Mediterranean in the shape of the 6th Fleet. In other words,
a force which is capable of deploying its striking power in a matter of hours. We
cannot without affecting our political position count on basing adequate troops on
land for reasons of Arab nationalism, but nobody minds ships sailing about in the
sea. This means that we have to have sufficient air-conditioned vessels. The trouble
may come this year, next year or some time. But because we cannot be certain when
it will come, I hope we will not postpone the production (which may take time) of a
considerable striking force. It will have a substantial deterrent effect, and if it never
has to be used it will have been much more successful than if it has to go to action.
No doubt there are technical difficulties but I believe that they could be overcome.
3. What would be even better would be to have in addition to our smaller edition
of the 6th Fleet a similar American striking force. It is urgent to bring the Americans
in on all this. There have been considerable joint studies already undertaken and a
long paper was produced on April 13 on which lengthy comments had been prepared
by May 5.
4. I understand that there is a U.S./U.K. Military Contingency Planning Group in
London which has suggested that Kuwait should be studied next. I am told that this
might provide a quick method of starting joint military planning on Kuwait and we
have agreed to get this going. I asked for an estimate of the time it would take and
was informed that it might well take three months. It seems to me quite out of the
question to accept this delay. I hope that you and the Minister of Defence will give the
British side a strong impulse and if you agree I will speak to both Herter and
McElroy1 in Geneva about the great importance we attach to a speedy discussion. . . .
1 C A Herter, American secretary of state, 1959–1961; N H McElroy, secretary of defense, 1957–1959.
58 CAB 131/21, D(59)15 5 June 1959
‘Likely Commonwealth reactions to UK or UK/US military
intervention in the Middle East’: Cabinet Defence Committee
memorandum by Lord Home
The Memorandum D. (59)13 of 3rd June by the Minister of Defence on the protection
of Kuwait contemplates besides less serious military measures, circumstances in
which we might use U.K. armed forces in large-scale operations against Iraq, or
threaten to do so under an ultimatum.
2. The Defence Committee should be aware, in considering this paper, of the
possible consequences for the Commonwealth of such armed action against Iraq or
another Arab state by the United Kingdom in the circumstances of the Defence
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Minister’s Plan C—which is the only situation with which this paper deals. Even
although all the procedures at the U.N. which the Defence Minister proposes were
followed, the following reactions are probable.
3. Canada. The Canadians are strongly opposed to the use of force in the Middle
East and have expressed agreement with our current policy of disengagement from
Middle East conflicts. It is improbable that we would be able to convince the
Canadians of the rightness of any decision to take or threaten direct military action
against an Arab state hostile to us in the Middle East unless such action were taken
in extreme circumstances, in the closest concert with the Americans and with the
blessing of the United Nations.
4. Other “old” Commonwealth members. We could probably count on the
support of Australia, provided we could show that circumstances amply justified our
action, and provided we consulted them properly in advance. South African support
would probably also be forthcoming, but might be no more than tacit. The present
New Zealand Government would not be happy, but would be unlikely to oppose us
publicly.
5. The “new” Commonwealth excluding Pakistan. With the possible exception of
Pakistan, both governmental and public reaction to any military action by us (or the
threat of it) against an Arab state would be bitterly hostile throughout the new
Commonwealth and could in certain cases notably India, lead to a break with the
Commonwealth with all the wider consequences to this association that would be
involved.
6. Pakistan. The Pakistan Government have shown understanding of our vital
interests in the Middle East and particularly in the Persian Gulf. Pakistan is,
moreover, a member of the Baghdad Pact. It is possible, therefore, that a Pakistan
Government might not be opposed to military action by us in the Middle East in
certain circumstances. But it is doubtful whether any Pakistan Government would be
able to withstand the pressure of its public opinion and Islamic ties for long; in the
end, however reluctantly, they would probably be forced to come out against us.
Again, the possibility of a break with the Commonwealth cannot be ruled out.
7. Conclusions. To sum up:—
(i) Canadian support would be unlikely. They would almost certainly drag their
feet and might even actively oppose us. The full co-operation of the Americans in
our policies and the mobilisation or at least the blessing of the United Nations
would be essential if we were to have any hope of gaining Canadian support.
(ii) Reactions in the “new” Commonwealth would, by and large, be bitterly
hostile and the possibility could not be ruled out that India and other countries
might feel obliged to break with the Commonwealth.
(iii) We could probably count on support from Australia and at least tacit support
from South Africa and New Zealand, provided our action was amply justified and
there had been proper consultation.
8. We cannot exclude the possibility that, at the worst, United Kingdom military
action against an Arab state could mean the break up of the Commonwealth as we at
present know it, for the departure of one or more Asian members would set in train a
disruptive process that would be disastrous.
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59 PREM 11/2753 8 June 1959
‘Middle East military plans’: minute by F A Bishop (PM’s Office) to Mr
Macmillan, about Kuwait and Iraq
The memoranda by the Minister of Defence (D. (59) 13 and 14) deal respectively with
the plans to meet an emergency in Kuwait, and with certain measures which might
be taken to improve our state of readiness to carry out these plans.
We could take practical action (a) to meet a request by the Ruler for British troops
to deal with an internal threat in Kuwait or to deter invasion from Iraq; or (b) to deal
with the situation which would arise if the Ruler were overthrown in the course of
internal disturbances in Kuwait. But the Minister thinks that, because it would take
at least twenty-four days to assemble the necessary forces, it would not be practicable
to reconquer Kuwait by direct assault if it were suddenly invaded and occupied.
In this latter eventuality, therefore, he thinks that we would, in the last resort,
have to try to regain Kuwait by means of an air attack upon Iraq. There is an
unpleasantly familiar ring about a plan of this sort. It clearly could not be undertaken
in present circumstances without the full support of the United States Government.
Even then, it would be a formidably risky operation. The difficulty of carrying world
opinion is shown by the Commonwealth Secretary’s estimate (in D.(59) 15) of the
reactions of other Commonwealth countries.1
The assertions that the Iraqi Government would not face the risk of war, and that
the Russians would not resort to direct military intervention are, to say the least, of
somewhat doubtful validity. We must assume that an Iraqi attack on Kuwait would
not be likely to happen except with the full support of Russia. It might well not be
politically possible for Russia to refuse to come openly to the help of Iraq.
The difficulties in the way of our taking action, once Kuwait had been invaded,
make it all the more necessary to be able to act without hesitation or delay in an
emergency before the invasion has taken place. Therefore all possible measures to
enable us to react more quickly ought in principle to be adopted. To be able to act
quickly in the Gulf is, indeed, of higher priority than anything else. You may wish to
ask whether joint operational planning with the Americans (about which you sent a
personal message to President Eisenhower, after the last meeting of the Committee,
on 12th May) has in fact begun; and to what extent this joint planning affects the
measures now recommended.
Certain of the measures suggested in D. (59) 14 would involve substantial
expenditure, e.g., the provision of air-conditioned quarters at Sharjah would cost £3⁄4
million. The Chancellor of the Exchequer will no doubt wish to consider how far this
expenditure could be found from within the defence budget.
Perhaps the provision of tanks for the Kuwaiti Government should be carefully
scrutinised. These would of course be a valuable precaution, but only so long as they
remained in the hands of authorities friendly to us.
Indeed, it is our dependence on a small number of local Rulers, or their advisers,
which will continue to be our weakness. So long as the Ruler of Kuwait, and his
brother, and the Rulers of Bahrein and Sharjah remain co-operative, and in control,
1 See previous document.
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the existing plans for an emergency in the Gulf may suffice. But control will sooner
or later pass out of their hands. No doubt the problem of aligning ourselves with
different forces in this and other vital areas will be considered in the wider
examinations of future policy that are now going to be made.
60 CAB 128/33, CC 37(59)3 23 June 1959
‘Maldive Islands’: Cabinet conclusions about establishment of an air
staging-post at Gan
[The construction of an air staging-post at Gan was begun in 1957 in the belief that
Britain needed an Indian Ocean airfield immune from political interference from India or
Ceylon. The evacuation of several hundred inhabitants was unpopular, and they were
pressing for financial recompense. Faltering co-operation was ‘inconvenient’, but in
Home’s opinion, ‘they are too primitive in organisation to be capable for a long time
ahead of operating as an independent State’. However, if they ‘cut loose from us they
might fall prey to Indian or Ceylonese expansionism’, so it would be good policy to retain
their goodwill by financial generosity and willingness to talk about status (memo by Lord
Home, 31 Mar 1958, CAB 131/19, D(58)22). The Defence Committee in a series of
meetings in April and May 1958 urged that negotiations should be kept going, in the
interests of reaching an amicable settlement; if force were used to evict people, the issue
could be taken up at the UN (CAB 131/19, D 6(58)3, D 26(58), D 27(58).) Progress
remained slow, but the prospects of eventual agreement were thought to be reasonably
good, and meanwhile building was proceeding. Costs were expected to be £4.3 million, of
which over £0.5 million was in compensation for eviction (CAB 131/20, D(58)74.]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary (C.
(59) 103) on the state of the negotiations with the Government of the Maldive Islands
in connexion with the establishment of an air staging post at Gan.
The Commonwealth Secretary said that the Maldivian Government had suspended
the negotiations on 17th March, but they had now indicated that they were willing to
resume them and proposed to send a delegation to London for that purpose towards
the end of July. The construction of the airfield was meanwhile proceeding and would
be completed early in 1960. The work was being carried out with the full co-
operation of the local inhabitants (the Suvadivans) who were now trying to assert
their independence of the Maldivian Government. Although our legal title to
establish an air staging post at Gan was soundly based, under the Protection
Agreement of 1953 and under the preliminary Lease Agreement of 1956, it was
desirable that we should, if possible, conclude a detailed agreement on the use of
Gan. We should not, however, appear unduly anxious to conclude the negotiations.
Even if the Maldivian Government eventually signed such an agreement, there would
remain the problem of reconciling the dissident Suvadivans to the restoration of the
authority of the Maldivian Government.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) Although our primary interest was to establish a staging post at Gan with the
greatest security and length of tenure possible, we were also concerned to assert
our right under the 1953 Agreement to be responsible for the external relations of
the Maldivian Government. This was necessary in order to prevent a foreign
Government, such as the United Arab Republic or even the Soviet Union, from
establishing a staging post elsewhere in the Maldives.
(b) Although the dissident Suvadivans were at present more friendly, it would be
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inexpedient to encourage their desire for independence. For this might call into
question our rights under the 1953 Agreement, and might encourage the
Maldivian Government to seek the protection of some other foreign Power.
Nevertheless, in the outcome of the negotiations with the Maldivian Government,
we should seek to protect the position of the Suvadivans.
(c) It was important that we should obtain as long a lease as possible of the airfield
at Gan, and that we should secure some arrangement for its renewal.
(d) It would be unwise to delay for too long the resumption of the negotiations. It
should, however, be possible to indicate to the Maldivian Government that, while
we could not resume discussions at the exact date they had suggested, we would be
ready to do so at about the middle of September. Before the discussions were
resumed, we should consider in greater detail exactly how they should be handled.
The Cabinet:—
Authorised the Commonwealth Secretary to invite the Maldivian Government to
send representatives to resume negotiations in London in the middle of
September.1
1 Lord Home reported on 26 Jan 1960 that a satisfactory agreement had been reached: the government of
the Maldives ‘had undertaken to make over to us Gan Island and part of Hittadu Island as a gift for thirty
years in return for our external defence of the Maldives, and would accept a permanent representative of
Her Majesty’s Government in their capital. We would pay the Maldivians about £40,000 which had already
been committed in connexion with resettlement from Addu Atoll. In return for the defence facilities we
proposed to make them a gift of £100,000 (or, at most, £150,000) towards their general expenditure and a
grant of £700,000 (or, at most, £750,000) for technical developments to be paid over a period of not less
than five years. The authority of the Maldivian Government over the Addu Atoll would be restored over a
period of years on conditions to be approved by ourselves’. In discussion, ‘it was recognised that it would
have been preferable to have secured occupation of Gan for longer than thirty years. This period, however,
was acceptable for defence purposes; moreover, it might be extended, since provision for this was
contained in the proposed agreement. There was no question of developing a full-scale naval base on the
island’ (CAB 128/34, CC 3(60)4).
61 DEFE 7/2231, no 32 29 June 1960
‘Military strategy for circumstances short of global war, 1960–1970’:
memorandum by COS, forwarding report to ministers
[This report was signed by Lord Mountbatten of Burma (chairman of COS Committee
since 1959), Admiral Sir Caspar John (first sea lord and chief of naval staff since 1960), 
F-M Sir F Festing (chief of imperial general staff since 1958), and Air Chief Marshal Sir
T Pike (chief of air staff, 1960). Their report, D(60)32, is still withheld from the public.]
The attached Study examines and makes recommendations on our military strat-
egy for circumstances short of global war, on the tasks of the Services, and on the
consequent force requirements during the coming decade. Part I, which forms the
background of the Study, outlines the political aims of the United Kingdom, and
is in effect a summary of the report of the Future Policy Committee. In Part II we
have examined the complementary military strategy needed to fulfil our commit-
ments, and in Part III we have assessed the forces required to implement the
strategy.
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2. The most far-reaching conclusion from the military point of view of the Study
on Future Policy1 is that while our military commitments will remain at about the
same level as to-day, we cannot count on the use of our overseas bases. This is an
important conclusion and has very important repercussions, to which we refer again
below. On a number of issues the Study on Future Policy was not sufficiently precise
to enable us to evolve a strategy and the resulting force requirements without
making a number of additional or clarifying assumptions. These are listed in full in
the Summary of our Study and in Section A of Part III.
3. The most important assumptions which we have made are as follows:—
(a) That H.M. Government would not be prepared to embark on any operation
requiring the employment, at least initially, of a United Kingdom force exceeding
one Brigade Group with supporting naval and air forces.
(b) That H.M. Government would be prepared to take the risk of not being able to
mount an operation on this scale in more than one theatre at any one time.
(c) That a limited war would not take place in any one of the three main theatres
at intervals of less than two years.
(d) That any period of intensive fighting is unlikely to be prolonged (possibly a
matter of weeks rather than months), except possibly in the Far East where it
could be more prolonged if China were not openly involved. However, forces may
be required to be poised for a considerable time before an operation, and may have
to remain deployed for some time afterwards.
(e) That a long warning period cannot be relied upon.
(f ) That Gurkhas will continue to be available at least as long as commitments in
Singapore remain. We recognise, however, that there may be many circumstances
in which we would not be able to use them.
(g) We have further assumed that it will be politically acceptable that:—
(i) Naval forces, although continuing to be earmarked for assignment to NATO
on about the present scale, will be allowed greater permanent deployment
outside the NATO area. (i.e.) Category A forces will be reduced.
(ii) Land forces in Germany will be maintained at about their present level and
that, while this continues, up to one Brigade Group could be temporarily
withdrawn for operational use elsewhere.
(iii) In extreme circumstances a further Brigade Group could also be
temporarily withdrawn from Germany.
(iv) Some of the tactical strike and reconnaissance squadrons assigned to
SACEUR could be withdrawn for temporary use elsewhere.
4. We cannot emphasise too strongly that the strategy we suggest and the
resulting force requirements essentially depend on the acceptance of these
assumptions. We must also stress that we have calculated the known risks and
commitments and have little in hand to meet the unforeseen. In particular, for
example, there are great risks in assuming that not more than one crisis unavoidably
involving the United Kingdom would arise at the same time. Experience shows the
unreliability of assumptions and the frequency of the unexpected, particularly when
looking a long way ahead. While an assumption can be altered overnight, it would
take years to adjust our military position and organisation. For example, current
1 See document no 17.
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military manpower figures were based on having overseas fewer military units than
we are now called upon to maintain (Germany, Libya and the Caribbean are
examples).
5. There should be no misunderstanding of our intention to retain our present
bases as long as possible and certainly until it becomes counter-productive to do so,
and we do not believe that our proposals for our military policy during this period
will give rise to any dissension as regards the Mediterranean and the Middle East
generally. However, we feel that we should draw attention to the Far East which falls
into a somewhat different category. In this theatre we are committed to support
SEATO and hence we have to face the possibility of having to intervene militarily on
the mainland of Asia. Whereas the scale of our possible intervention cannot be great,
the cost could be very material, depending upon the way in which we decide to equip
our forces. So far as possible we should avoid becoming involved in large-scale
operations on the mainland of Asia, and if possible our operations should be confined
to those of the nature of anti-insurgency and suppression of internal rebellion. But
we have also to consider the question of the deterrent effect on the Chinese that our
forces in the Far East will be able to bring to bear and, to some extent, the degree to
which we might be able to influence American policy. Thus, whilst it would be
sufficient, for the purposes of the operation in which we would be prepared to
engage, if we were only to equip our forces with conventional weapons (and these of a
relatively old-fashioned type), we have concluded that to do so would not be the best
policy; you will accordingly see that we have recommended the provision in the Far
East of nuclear weapons for all three Services (although we realise that there may be
political difficulties over their storage in certain territories), and a sophisticated
system of air defence.
6. Whether or not we are to retain a capability for intervention in Kuwait and in
the Far East after the loss of our bases is a matter for decision by Ministers. Since we
have based this Study on the conclusions of the report of the Future Policy
Committee, which require such a capability, we have examined the means in which
we can fulfil this obligation. Whilst we have not yet been able to study in detail the
many practical problems involved, it seems that the only course which can offer the
means of achieving our aim is to develop progressively towards a strategy based on
the maintenance of small seaborne forces with floating stockpiles, and on the rapid
movement by air over long distances of land and air forces. If further study shows
such a course to be reasonable, we must stress that the speed at which we should
progress towards it must be regulated so as to avoid prejudicing the retention of
those bases which remain to us. We have no doubt that progressive development
towards a “double stance”, as we have called it, could prove very expensive.
7. It is clear that, of our current commitments, the one which would be most
difficult to fulfil and for which the preparations would be likely to be the most
expensive, is that of intervention in Kuwait if Aden and our footholds in the Persian
Gulf are no longer available to us (Kenya in this context is important, but not as vital
to us as Aden). Nevertheless, if the course we have proposed, namely the use of
seaborne plus airborne forces, should prove after further study to be impracticable,
the only alternative to giving up the commitment would be reliance on a wholly
seaborne force. While such a solution might be a practical proposition, it would be
even more expensive.
8. We particularly wish to draw attention to the problem of nuclear weapons, to
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which we have referred incidentally in paragraph 5 above, and which is considered in
detail in Appendix ‘B’ of this Study.
9. The most important aspects of this problem concern the policy for their
provision, their deployment and, of fundamental importance, their control. This last
factor has particular significance in relation to the nuclear weapons for the land
forces.
10. Although this Study examines only the force and logistic requirements for
circumstances short of global war, we should point out that in many instances the
forces required are the same as those which we already provide in fulfilment of our
other commitments. For example, the bulk of the naval forces is assigned to or
earmarked for NATO, but such forces as are required overseas are detached from the
NATO area by general agreement; similarly, the bulk of the bomber force in the
Mediterranean has the primary role of support for CENTO. These are complicating
factors which must be borne in mind, but we have not specifically isolated them in
this Study. Nor have we, in the assessment of our force requirements, taken into
account other complicating factors, such as the need to maintain a reasonable home
and overseas ratio.
11. In order to assist you in reaching decisions on the course which our future
strategy should take, we are inviting the Ministry of Defence to prepare, as a matter
of urgency, estimates of the variations in cost, compared with the figures in the
current long-term costings, of the forces needed for our suggested strategy. We
understand that rough figures, giving an indication of the orders of magnitude, can
be prepared fairly quickly; more accurate costings, based on a revised order of battle,
would take many months to prepare and must in practice await next year’s long-term
costings.
12. When these figures are prepared, we have no doubt that they will not show
any decrease on present costs; in fact the contrary is likely to be the case, particularly
for the period 1965 onwards when expensive new weapons will anyhow begin to
come into production. We would have liked to have been able to recommend military
policies which would have shown economies; but defence is an expensive business,
and as long as the United Kingdom continues to belong to the present number of
“clubs” and as long as we have to contribute to them on a fitting scale we can see
little hope of any reduction. The “clubs” to which we refer are well known to you and
are all governed by political considerations: the nuclear deterrent club, the British
Commonwealth, ANZAM, NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; and in addition to these we
have to keep our own house in order in our dependent territories overseas, and we
must be prepared to fulfil our obligations to friendly Governments who seek our
help.
We do not dissent from the recommendations in the report of the future Policy
Committee that we should continue to belong as long as possible to these various
organisations for, in present circumstances, this is the only way to maintain peace
and stability. But whether we should aim to maintain a military presence in an area
in which, for political reasons, we have been obliged to relinquish our bases, is
another matter and one which we suggest should receive further consideration by
Ministers; meanwhile, we have indicated in this Study a possible strategy for the
fulfilment of such commitments.
13. In this era of intensive political development we acknowledge that there can
be no finality about such a study. We therefore recommend that both the Study and
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the premises underlying it should be re-examined periodically. This should not,
however, be allowed to inhibit the continuing development of those forces and
facilities which are necessary to implement the currently recommended strategy.2
2 The prime minister minuted that he was pleased to get the report: ‘I have not had time to read it fully
but it will clearly be of great help to us in settling a number of difficult policy questions in the defence
field. I agree with the proposed procedure, namely to have a general discussion before the summer
holidays. We should aim to reach final decisions before the Defence Estimates for 1961/62 have to be
settled. H.M. 8.7.60’ (M241/60; no 37).
62 CAB 131/24, D(60)48 21 Aug 1960
[Military strategy for circumstances short of global war]:
memorandum by Mr Macmillan for Cabinet Defence Committee
Minister of Defence
Since the preliminary discussion at the Defence Committee on 27th July, I have been
thinking a lot about the problems raised by the Chiefs of Staff study of military
strategy for circumstances short of global war (D.(60) 32), in the light of your own
paper (D. (60) 39). I venture to send you some provisional thoughts, in the hope that
this might help us to make the best progress at the discussion the Committee will
have at Chequers at the beginning of October.
The Chiefs of Staff study, as I understand it, has suggested certain assumptions,
which, broadly speaking, are based on our existing commitments; it then draws
certain deductions, expressed in terms of forces and equipment; and it raises the
question of how these deductions would be affected if we were to lose some of our
bases, and whether we should now begin to adopt what is called a “double stance”. It
seems pretty clear (as the Chiefs themselves hint) that, even without moving to a
“double stance”, defence costs, including overseas expenditure, would rise on the
basis of this study.
Faced with this prospect, we really have no alternative but to re-examine our
commitments, in as realistic a way as possible.
I have therefore tried to imagine, in each of the main areas, what sort of operations
we might want to undertake in our own interests and might be able to undertake polit-
ically. Are we envisaging global war, limited war, or would it be “police” or “fire-
brigade” action (either in our own territories, or in other countries by invitation)?
According to the type of operations we would envisage in each area, so we can then
think what shape and size of forces would be necessary, and what sort of weapons they
would need. Then we should consider, in each area, whether we have international
obligations or commitments, whether specific ones under some treaty, or moral ones,
under which at present we have to plan to do more than what we would envisage doing
on our own account; and if there are any such obligations which involve commitments
of forces in excess of what we would envisage in our own purposes, then we should
consider whether to seek some relief from these commitments.
That is the way I have provisionally approached these problems, and it has led me
to the following provisional views in the main areas.
(i) Far East. We should never undertake a limited war on our own. In any
operations involving China we would inevitably be very subsidiary partners to the
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United States. For our own purposes, need we envisage anything beyond “presence”
forces, and the possibility of “police” action including jungle warfare against
guerillas? Although it is possible that Indonesia might give covert aid to disordered
territories, we would not embark on anything like limited war against Indonesia on
our own.
On this basis, surely we have no need for nuclear weapons of any kind in this area.
If the Indonesian threat is regarded as serious, there may be a case for BLOODHOUNDS
to defend the Singapore base, and perhaps for facilities for a Lightning squadron. For
the operations themselves no sophisticated aircraft, but some less sophisticated types
might be useful, both by their presence and for the general purposes in police type
operations with the necessary transport aircraft. The Army units would have to be
primarily suitable for police type operations, and would certainly not need
sophisticated S.A.G.W.1 such as THUNDERBIRD.
We have no specific force commitments to SEATO although we have an
understanding with the Australians to contribute to the Commonwealth brigade. We
have obligations to maintain internal security in Singapore and the Colonies, and to
defend these places and also Singapore and the Maldives against aggression. These
commitments to not seem to exceed our own requirements in the area.
(ii) Middle East. Apart from the particular case of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait, the
only military operations we would want to undertake would be of a “police” or
“internal security” type, e.g. to deal with a rebellion in Oman. As regards Kuwait, we
might envisage a “pre-emptive” operation on our own; this would be a “police-type”
operation but strengthened to deter an Iraqi attack. But if an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
had already occurred, how far would we contemplate what would amount to a limited
war operation on our own to get them out?
It seems common ground that we do not need nuclear weapons in this area. We
should need limited ground forces, suitable for police type operations, with great
mobility and air transportability. The need to be able to make a pre-emptive
intervention in Kuwait might justify the equipment of these strengthened “police”
forces with more sophisticated weapons, e.g. in aircraft and anti-aircraft. Are any
naval forces necessary either for protection or for landing troops? For these purposes
retention of the Kenya base and Aden seem essential.
We have specific commitments to ensure the security of Kuwait, to support the
Gulf Shaikdoms, and to maintain internal security in Aden and other Colonial
territories. But all these commitments are really in support of our own interest in
the security of Kuwait, and the question of relief from excessive commitments does
not arise.
(iii) Africa. Apart from the possibility of a major conflict which might result from a
Soviet incursion, e.g. in the Congo, the only operations we would envisage would be
internal security ones in Colonial and High Commission territories.
Again, all agree that there is no case for nuclear weapons; but we want limited
ground forces for “police” type operations, with great mobility and air
transportability. Here again (apart from the possibility of some obligation to Nigeria)
we do not seem to have any commitments which do not serve our direct interests.
(iv) Mediterranean. We need to maintain a military presence in certain areas, e.g.
Libya. And we may conceivably need to be capable of an intervention of a “police” or
1 Surface-to-air guided weapons system.
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“fire brigade” type, as in the case of Jordan. But a limited war in this area seems most
unlikely.
Apart from “presence” forces, e.g. in Libya, and garrisons in Cyprus, Malta and
Gibraltar, we might rely on United Kingdom-based forces (land and air) for rapid
intervention of the Jordan type. There seems no need for naval forces for our own
purposes, but we have to provide facilities for N.A.T.O. naval forces, including the
British element. If we have to keep bombers in Cyprus (whether with nuclear or non-
nuclear armament) in support of CENTO, then there may well be a case for some
sophisticated air defence of the Cyprus base.
Our commitments in this area go somewhat beyond our direct interests, since we
have specific commitments to support the present regimes in Libya and Jordan, and
general obligations to support CENTO and N.A.T.O. in the Mediterranean. These
general obligations may at present be construed in a way which is excessive having
regard to our direct interests. In particular the forces in Cyprus may be unnecessarily
large. There may be a case for seeking relief here.
I believe that an approach on the above lines might lead to deductions in terms of
forces and equipment significantly different from those in the Chiefs of Staff study.
Of course, the problem of how to carry out our obligations, even if they were
reduced, in the event of the loss of any of our bases, would still have to be faced.
In all this we must remember that we are trying to work out a basis for planning.
We cannot foresee how events may turn out. Whatever plans have been made, we
must still be ready to improvise against an emergency.
63 CAB 131/24, D(60)50 12 Oct 1960
‘Future developments in South-East Asia’: summary of conclusions in
officials’ report [Extract]
. . . 22. Thus the Committee envisages the following main roles for British defence
forces in the area by 1970—
(a) the security of remaining British territories;
(b) a contribution to the strategic deterrent;
(c) a much reduced contribution to land operations;
(d) training and otherwise strengthening defence forces of friendly countries.
23. The first is primarily a United Kingdom commitment. The others should be
discharged in the closest co-operation with our Allies.
24. As regards bases, in the long run our strategy in the area must come to
depend increasingly on airborne and seaborne forces operating from Australia and
New Zealand, the only permanent and reliable Western bases in the Eastern
Hemisphere. In addition, some centrally placed cantonment is needed for certain of
the ground forces required to discharge our Colonial responsibilities, so long as they
exist in the area. This cantonment should be as free as possible from risks of local
political blackmail and insecure communications, and these considerations point to
North Borneo. Although North Borneo cannot be expected to remain indefinitely free
from political pressures, at least for the period under review it is likely to be freer
from them than Malaya or Singapore. While nothing should be done which might
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hasten the loss of facilities in Malaya and Singapore, these factors should be
considered in connection with any future programmes for building permanent
accommodation for forces in the area.
25. Conclusions. Western policy in the area, in which the United Kingdom must
play her part, must continue to be to maintain peace and to sustain the free countries
by political action, economic aid and military backing. In addition, the United
Kingdom has certain special interests and obligations as the centre of the
Commonwealth and to her dependent territories and as a signatory of various
international treaties. She has a further special responsibility for the strength of
sterling.
26. At least throughout the next decade it will be necessary for the United
Kingdom to maintain a military presence and capacity to intervene in Eastern Asia.
The long-term trend during this period should be towards reducing capacity to
intervene in operations on the East Asian mainland with ground and tactical air
forces.
27. The Committee is driven to the concept of a diminished British military
presence in the area by 1970, not because interests and obligations will have been
reduced but because man-power and financial difficulties, coupled with uncertainties
about bases, force this upon the United Kingdom. The Committee further accepts the
concept (subject to balance of payment considerations) of more stress on economic
programmes. Such changes of role and of emphasis carry political and military risks.
It is therefore necessary to do what is possible to lessen these risks by, for example—
(a) helping the countries of the area to stand on their own feet and so lessen the
need for intervention; and
(b) sharing with friends and Allies commitments which in many cases are more
vital to them than to us.
28. A major effort to improve the strength and efficiency of the defence forces of
non-Communist countries in the area e.g. by military training would contribute to
their stability and security. Our efforts in this direction should be co-ordinated as far
as possible with Commonwealth and Western countries.
29. The Committee believes that Australia should make a bigger effort to provide
for her own defence and vital interests, but does not favour putting pressure on
Australia to do this. The United Kingdom could, and may have to, put itself in a
position where pressure comes from Australia and New Zealand on the United
Kingdom rather than vice versa.
30. There is every reason for the closest consultation with Australia and New
Zealand as well as with the United States in formulating United Kingdom defence
policy for the area. Our ANZAM obligations to Australia and New Zealand could not
be modified without their agreement.
31. Increased United Nations presence in the area might promote stability and
lessen the risks of incidents and hence the need for Western intervention or support.
It could take many forms—technical missions, political observers, or even in some
circumstances United Nations gendarmerie forces. American views on the advantage
of increased United Nations presence, if it connoted neutralism, would be important
and probably decisive. It is recommended that possible roles for, and consequences
of, United Nations activity in the area be studied.
32. Finally, the Committee wishes to stress that policy towards Eastern Asia and
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the scale of the United Kingdom effort there cannot be considered in isolation. They
are affected by the political and military situation elsewhere and by the strength or
weakness of sterling. For this reason and because the above conclusions flow from
assumptions which only time will test, United Kingdom interests in and policy
towards the area should be reviewed from time to time.
64 CAB 131/23, D 11(60)1 2 Nov 1960
‘Defence implications of West Indian independence’: Cabinet Defence
Committee minutes
[The Defence Committee considered a memorandum by Mr Macleod, in which he pointed
out that only the US base at Chaguaramas was still active, and this was much resented by
the government of Trinidad under Dr Eric Williams, supported by the federal government;
if agreement on bases could be reached this might influence Jamaica towards remaining in
the Federation, and thus smooth the path to independence (27 Oct 1960).]
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(D. (60) 52) describing the current state of defence planning for West Indian
independence and drawing attention to a possible request that we should join in
creating some form of regional defence organisation in the Caribbean.
The Colonial Secretary said that the purpose of the London Conference, which
was to start on 3rd November, was to undertake a broad review of the 1941 Leased
Bases Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States in so far as it
affected the Federation of the West Indies. Provided the Conference was reasonably
successful, discussions would be resumed later in Trinidad. If, as a result of the
referendum which it was hoped would be held early next year, Jamaica decided to
remain in the Federation, it was probable that the West Indies would become
independent in mid-1962. It was very desirable to complete negotiations about the
future of the American bases held under the 1941 Agreement before this date.
Although there might be some difficulties between the West Indies and the United
States authorities, particularly about the continued existence of the United States
naval base at Chaguaramas, he believed that there was a reasonable chance that
agreement would be reached. It was necessary, however, for the United Kingdom to
decide what attitude it should take towards the suggestions which were likely to be
made by the West Indians for making this agreement part of a regional defence
organisation.
It was generally agreed in discussion that we should do our utmost to see that
agreement was reached between the United States and West Indian representatives.
The importance of the Chaguaramas naval base to the Americans was now greater
than ever, since it was an essential link in their chain of defence against missile-
carrying submarines. On the other hand, it was a most suitable site for the
Federation capital. However, since both sides were anxious for an early settlement, it
was reasonable to hope that this difficulty might be overcome.
It was also generally agreed that we should discourage as far as possible any form
of regional pact which might lead to an expensive command structure and secretariat
and to a demand for force commitments. It would be preferable for separate bilateral
agreements to be concluded between the Federation and ourselves, and between the
Federation and the United States, accompanied if necessary by a separate joint
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declaration of common purpose. It was important that the Minister of Defence
should be kept in close touch with the progress of discussions to this end.
65 DEFE 7/2033, COS 2(61)1A 6 Jan 1961
‘Strategic importance of East Africa’: minutes of COS Committee
meeting [Extract]
[The governors were in London for an East African Governors’ Conference—see
document nos 124 & 126; on the question of East African defence, see minutes by
Macleod, document no 123 below.]
Lord Mountbatten welcomed the Governors of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, the
British Resident, Zanzibar and the Administrator of the East Africa High
Commission to the meeting and said that the Committee was honoured by their
presence. He recalled that they had kindly invited him to attend a meeting of the East
Africa Defence Committee last September, at which the Chiefs of Staff’s proposals for
the reorganisation of command arrangements in East Africa had been accepted; for
this the Committee were most grateful.
He proposed that their discussion should be based on the brief which they had
prepared on the future strategic importance of East Africa. . . .
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) It was very difficult to forecast with any certainty the likely time scale of
constitutional development in the East African territories. HMG had no specific
timetable in mind, but had made it clear that they would move forward when the
time and the circumstances were ripe. So far as Kenya was concerned it was clear
that a predominantly African state would in due course emerge, but HMG was
determined that every individual should have equal political status. Tanganyika
was the most advanced of the three territories in constitutional development and
might be ready for independence early in 1962. Uganda might be ready later that
year or early in 1963 if the problems associated with the relationships of the four
kingdoms could be resolved. Kenya was unlikely to be ready before 1964 or
1965. . . .
(e) The declared policy of the leaders of the principal African parties in East Africa
was against the maintenance of British forces in their territories after
independence. It was difficult to convince them of the wisdom of a contrary policy
in this matter at present, but later when these African leaders became Ministers it
was possible that they might modify their views. In assisting this process we could
point to the considerable economic benefits which the presence of British forces
brought.
Africans generally did not feel vulnerable to external attack and consequently
were strongly opposed to the stationing of white troops in their countries.
Moreover, they were under an illusion that they were not involved in the cold war.
Their outlook had however been deeply influenced by the recent turmoil in the
Congo and although they would not give it public expression, there was reason to
believe that events there had shown them the dangers of too rapid a constitutional
development or too complete a break with the Colonial powers. This applied
especially in Uganda and Tanganyika. On the other hand the extreme nationalists
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sought to lay the blame for the Congo, as for all other African troubles, on the
West and were quite impervious to reason in this respect.
(f ) There was real danger of inter-tribal fighting in all three territories; there were
also separatist elements, e.g. in Buganda, and amongst the Somali inhabitants of
north-east Kenya.
(g) It was difficult to assess whether the East African territories were likely to
achieve independence before Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland or vice-versa,
especially in view of the current series of constitutional conferences on the
Federation and its constituent territories. It appeared however that if the
Federation should break up, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland might well reach
independence before the East African territories. Meanwhile, the reinforcement of
the Federation and of the High Commission Territories of Basutoland,
Bechuanaland and Swaziland, would be greatly hampered by any restrictions on
our military facilities and overflying rights in East Africa.
(h) The close co-operation between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Rhodesian
Air Force, which involved periodic detachments by the latter to Kenya and to the
Arabian Peninsula, would be gravely prejudiced by the denial of overflying and
staging rights in East Africa.
(j) East Africa, and especially Nairobi, was a link of major importance in the
United Kingdom’s strategic air routes and also in our communications networks.
The loss of these facilities would call for major revision of our strategy.
(k) In considering the prospects for the continued stationing of British forces in
Kenya in the future, it should be borne in mind that the Africans were likely to
seek all possible material gain from the United Kingdom without giving anything
in return. They would be sensitive to anything which tended to detract from their
sovereignty or which might offend against the idea of pan-Africanism.
Any indication by us that we were considering abandoning our base in Kenya
would probably serve to intensify the pressure for our departure. On the other
hand, the economic benefits which the presence of British forces brought, the
reassurance which they gave against the threat of external attack and dangers
arising from the cold war, and the help which we might give in training and
equipping the forces which the territories would be bound to maintain after
independence, would all be useful arguments to be advanced in favour of our
continued presence. Moreover, it might also be possible to use as a bargaining
point the fact that at present the United Kingdom bore the cost of the King’s
African Rifles. If the East African territories were eventually to form a Federation,
any negotiations on these matters would probably have more chance of success if
they were deferred until the Federation had begun to take shape and were then
conducted with the Federation leaders rather than with the individual territories.
It was however too early to assess the prospects of success.
(l) Our bases in Kenya were of great importance for mounting and supporting
operations, especially in the Persian Gulf and in the remaining colonial territories
in Central and Southern Africa. For these purposes it was necessary to station
considerable forces there and to provide for large scale strategic moves in the
event of operations.
(m) Extensive building programmes for the Army and for the Royal Air Force were
in hand in Kenya. Considerable expenditure had already been incurred on these pro-
jects, which were necessary if we were to continue to have an important base there.
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In view however of the uncertain constitutional future of Kenya, Ministers were
examining the matter and might well decide that further expenditure was not jus-
tified. The Governor of Kenya1 considered that the continuation of these pro-
grammes was absolutely vital, both politically and economically, to the future of the
territory. In these and similar matters there was a conflict between the requirements
of United Kingdom strategy and those of Colonial policy in advancing the constitu-
tional development of dependent territories. Too often, as a result, both policies fall
between two stools and it was satisfactory that the Governor was so firmly in sup-
port of the continuation of the building programme.
(n) With the reduced size of our forces to-day, we could not afford to station
troops in any territory where political objections might, at a moment of crisis,
prevent our using them.
Even in the case of Malaya, where we had what might be regarded as a model
Defence Agreement, difficulties had already arisen over SEATO exercises. Nowhere
did we seem to have absolute security of tenure and absolute freedom from strings.
These factors raised doubts as to the value of fixed overseas bases and made more
attractive the concept of relying to a greater degree on increased mobility of our
forces. However it might well be that we were now too far committed in our
present policies to make such a drastic reappraisal. . . .
1 Sir P Renison.
66 CAB 131/26, D(61)65 23 Oct 1961
‘Defence policy’: Cabinet Defence Committee memorandum by Mr
Macmillan on reassessment
Minister of Defence
1. In the light of the discussions which I have recently held with the Ministers
directly concerned we can now re-define the political assumptions on which our
defence policy and strategy should be based. We cannot be sure that all the
developments predicated in the following paragraphs of this paper will materialise—
especially since some of them depend on future constitutional developments in the
Commonwealth or on the decisions of other Governments. But I am satisfied that we
shall make the best use of our limited resources if we re-cast our policies and plans
for the medium and longer term on the basis of the assumptions set out in this paper.
General assumptions
2. We shall continue to rely on all-regular forces, of a strength not exceeding
390,000–400,000.
3. The level of defence expenditure will be that set out in the Treasury report on
public expenditure and resources (C. (61) 88): annual oversea defence expenditure
outside Germany should be reduced as soon as possible by £35 millions below the
level of 1961–62.
4. We shall continue, throughout the 1960s, to maintain our independent
contribution to the strategic nuclear deterrent of the West, at the level of
expenditure now planned. This assumption will be reviewed early in 1962 when the
future of SKYBOLT should be more precisely known.
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5. We shall not be able to rely on using military bases or facilities in independent
countries overseas for any purpose which is not in full accord with the policies and
views of the Governments and peoples of those countries. Thus—
(i)i For the period up to 1970 we may count on having unrestricted use, for
military purposes, of facilities in:
Gibraltar
Malta
Aden
Adu Atoll
Seychelles
Bahrain
(ii) We must, however, expect to suffer restrictions on our freedom to use for
military purposes facilities in:
Libya
Cyprus
Kenya
The prospective area of Greater Malaysia, including Singapore
We may, however, be able to use these facilities in global war and in some
circumstances on a once-for-all basis for limited war.
6. Similarly, we must expect increasing difficulty in securing the exercise of
staging or over-flying rights for purposes with which the Government concerned are
not in sympathy.
Objectives of defence policy
7. The Commonwealth. We have an obligation to come to the assistance of any
Commonwealth country, dependent or independent, which is the victim of external
aggression. We should not, however, seek on this account to keep British troops in
emergent Commonwealth countries. We should encourage dependent territories to
take a greater share of responsibility for their internal security.
8. Europe. Our objective is to support the North Atlantic Alliance as a bulwark
against Soviet encroachment.
Future plans should be based on the assumptions (i) that some détente will be
secured, following some settlement of the Berlin question; and (ii) that on this basis
our contribution to the land forces of the North Atlantic Alliance will consist of four
divisions, each of two brigade groups, of which two divisions will be stationed in
Germany and two in the United Kingdom.
9. Mediterranean. Our objectives are:
To fulfil our commitments to NATO and CENTO.
To retain the special wireless stations in Cyprus and Malta.
To maintain our air staging and over-flying rights in Libya.
To provide for the internal security of Gibraltar and Malta, and for the internal
security and local defence of such parts of our sovereign base areas in Cyprus as
it is necessary to retain.
10. Future plans should be based on the following assumptions:
(i)i Malta will no longer be required as a major naval base. Our naval
requirements west of Suez will be met from bases in the United Kingdom with
forward facilities at Gibraltar and Malta.
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(ii) We shall not mount any land operations from Cyprus.
11. Middle East. Our objectives are:
To safeguard our economic stake in Persian Gulf oil, and for that purpose to
support the independence of Kuwait.
To discharge our obligation to protect the States in the Aden Protectorates and
the Persian Gulf.
To preserve the countries of the area from Communist influence.
To retain air staging facilities in Kenya if possible.
12. Future plans should be framed on the assumption that Kenya will not be
available as a military base after 1963, when it may be expected to attain independence.
13. Far East. Our objectives are:
To prevent Chinese Communist expansion throughout the area, by support of
SEATO and other means.
To preserve our links with Australia and New Zealand and to contribute to their
forward defence.
To safeguard Hong Kong against internal subversion.
14. Future plans should be based on the following assumptions:
(i) The project for a Greater Malaysia will come to fruition by 1963.
(ii) Within a Greater Malaysia we shall retain naval and air facilities in Singapore.
(iii) The Government of Greater Malaysia will assume responsibility for internal
security in their territory (including Singapore).
(iv) We shall maintain our contribution to the Commonwealth Brigade, which
will for the time being continue to be stationed in Malaya; but we shall seek to
secure the agreement of our Allies to a more realistic concept of land operations by
SEATO on the mainland of South-East Asia.
15. I shall be glad if you will arrange for the Chiefs of Staff to prepare, on the
basis of these political assumptions, proposals for a revised strategy to secure these
objectives.
I am asking Sir Norman Brook to arrange for the civil Departments concerned to
study, simultaneously, the implications for foreign, Commonwealth and Colonial
policy.
The results of these studies, by the Chiefs of Staff and by the civil Departments,
should be submitted for consideration by the Defence Committee as soon as possible.
67 CAB 131/27, D 1(62)1 12 Jan 1962
‘British strategy in the 1960s’: minutes of Cabinet Defence Committee
meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Defence (D. (62)
3) appending a report by the Chiefs of Staff on British Strategy in the 1960s.1
The Minister of Defence2 said that the Chiefs of Staff had prepared their report in
accordance with the directive issued by the Prime Minister on 23rd October, 1961 (D.
(61) 65).3 It had proved extremely difficult to devise a strategy which, while
1 Withheld in PRO. 2 Mr H Watkinson. 3 See previous document.
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adequately directed to the objectives laid down, remained within the cost specified,
especially since the assumptions made about the security of our overseas bases made
it necessary to provide for greater flexibility in the use of our forces. He could see no
alternative to the strategy proposed, which marked the first step towards reliance on
seaborne and airborne forces using forward operating facilities rather than bases in
the traditional sense. The costings which had so far been made could not be regarded
as final and further work was proceeding on them, but the best available estimate was
that the measures proposed would produce a saving of about £25 million in 1965–66,
rising to about £28 million in 1970–71, as against the requirement for savings of £55
million in 1965–66. Even so, the strategy involved great risks and our forces would
be stretched to the utmost. It was proposed to depart from the assumptions in the
Prime Minister’s directive in one major respect. The proposal to provide for the
support of NATO by stationing four brigade groups in Germany, with four in reserve
in the United Kingdom, would, although producing saving in oversea expenditure,
produce an increase in budgetary expenditure of some £7 million in 1965–66, rising
to £15 million in 1968–69. He recommended that we should not seek to change our
present deployment of seven brigade groups in Germany and one in the United
Kingdom. He sought his colleagues’ endorsement of the new strategy in principle, so
that further work on costings, for example those of the defence research and
development programme, and other more detailed studies, could be put in hand, and
the 1962 Defence White Paper drafted accordingly.
The following were among the points made in discussion:
(a) The most desirable strategy for the next decade, given the uncertainty of our
tenure of our overseas bases, would be the double stance, which would provide, as
an insurance against the loss of bases, large amphibious task forces capable in
themselves of mounting operations on the scale envisaged in our current plans.
The Chiefs of Staff had made an exhaustive examination of the double stance
strategy and had concluded that it was beyond our available resources. The
strategy proposed did not provide full insurance in this respect, but it would
provide for a continuing presence in the Middle East and Far East. It would allow
us to move later, if it proved necessary to do so, to a strategy in which our main
bases were the United Kingdom and Australia, but under which we would retain
some capacity, by the use of forward operating facilities, at for instance Addu Atoll
and Labuan, for defending our interests in the Far East and Middle East. We could
not at present contemplate accepting that the loss of a base, at whatever date it
might happen, must be followed by the total withdrawal of our influence from the
area affected. To announce a strategy which was clearly based on such an
assumption would prejudice our relations with our allies in NATO, CENTO and
SEATO.
(b) £120 million was included in the costings up to 1970–71 for the construction
of aircraft carriers which would be commissioned after 1970. It had proved
impracticable to design a ship which fulfilled the dual role of aircraft carrier and
commando carrier, but those in mind were not intended as capital ships, nor
would they be formed into a strike force. Although they would be allotted a role in
global war, they were required principally for cold and limited war tasks, in which
they would be used virtually as floating airfields. The aircraft they would carry
would not be specifically designed for naval purposes, but would be types common
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to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. They would form an essential part of an
amphibious task force and could not in limited war be regarded as more
vulnerable than any other naval vessel. The carriers would cost approximately £50
million each and the cost of their aircraft and of the vessels required to escort
them would be substantial. If our main bases east of Suez had to be given up the
scope for their employment might be limited. The requirement for carriers should
be considered in detail at another meeting; it was in any case necessary to reach an
early decision on the replacement of H.M.S. Victorious and this would provide a
suitable opportunity for a fuller discussion.
(c) No provision had been made for research, development or production for the
purpose of maintaining our independent contribution to the strategic deterrent
when the system based on manned bombers using SKYBOLT came to the end of its
useful life. The cost and complexity of strategic weapons was becoming so great
that it might in any case prove impracticable for us to provide a successor to
SKYBOLT; we might have to rely on the purchase of United States equipment and
weapons. It might perhaps be our best policy to make the most effective political
use of our possession of a strategic nuclear capacity within the next 10 years. For
the present, plans should be based on the assumption that there would be no
increased expenditure for a new generation deterrent; if at a later stage it became
necessary to revise this policy, the allocation of defence finance in general would
need to be reconsidered.
(d) It was generally agreed that it would be unwise to seek to reduce the British
Army of the Rhine (B.A.O.R.) to four brigade groups with four in support in the
United Kingdom. To do so would involve too great an increase in budgetary
expenditure on accommodation in the United Kingdom and on providing
equipment for the supporting brigades in both the United Kingdom and Germany.
The best solution in the longer term would probably be to provide six brigade
groups in Germany with two in the United Kingdom; this would provide a better
balance within the Army between home and overseas service. It would not,
however, be possible, for political reasons, to suggest any changes at present. The
single brigade group now in the United Kingdom and nominally assigned to NATO
did not involve any extra expenditure on NATO account. It formed part of the
strategic reserve. It would be possible to sustain B.A.O.R. at its present strength at
approximately 51,000 until the end of 1962; thereafter, on present recruiting
trends, it would fall to about 47,000. It would be militarily inadvisable to attempt
to maintain seven brigade groups at that figure and it might at that stage be
opportune to suggest a reduction to six.
(e) The changes in deployment proposed would result in reducing of the strength
of the Army to 173,000, which would involve considerable further problems of
redundancy among officers and the further disbandment or amalgamation of
units. Further consideration should be given to the timing of the changes involved
and to the date at which they might be announced. The future of the Gurkhas
should also be further considered; under the revised strategy only three Gurkha
units were required, as part of the garrison of Hong Kong. It might not prove
economic to maintain the overheads of Gurkha recruiting for this small force.
(f ) The Minister of Aviation4 said that some of the reductions proposed would be
4 Mr P Thorneycroft.
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unwelcome to industry; for instance, the order for BLOODHOUND would be halved. It
also appeared likely that there would be no requirement for the Rotodyne; this was
an issue of some importance which it would be advisable to consider in greater
detail at a later meeting.
(g) The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs5 said that the proposed reduction of
our forces in Malta might produce political reactions in the Island which might
result in our having to forgo its use for military purposes altogether. The question
of providing economic assistance to counterbalance the military reductions was
being urgently considered.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer6 said that he was grateful for the speed with
which the Chiefs of Staff had completed their studies and for the efforts which they
had made to secure reductions in defence expenditure at the cost of painful
readjustments to the size and shape of the Services. He was, however, concerned at
the prospect that defence expenditure might continue to rise. Many of the measures
proposed might well cost more than had been allowed for them; but even if this were
not the case, the planned figure of £1,787 million for defence expenditure in
1965–66 would be exceeded by some £23 million. Further, no account was taken of
prospective pay increases; if the current Services pay claim were to be met in full, the
cost would be some £35 million a year. It was however clearly impossible at this stage
to decide to reduce expenditure by abandoning any of our oversea commitments, but
the overall manpower Bill should be re-examined; reductions in manpower at
present rates of pay produced very large savings. Acceptance of the proposed strategy
in principle need not involve increased expenditure in the immediate future and he
was prepared to endorse it provided that further studies were put in hand,
particularly on manpower, to reduce costs to the planned level of £1,787 million
annually.
The Minister of Defence said that the proposals he had made already involved
considerable risks. If, however, it was essential to make further savings, he was
prepared to examine the possibilities of reducing Services manpower from 398,660
(as estimated by the Chiefs of Staff) to a figure nearer 390,000. He would also
examine the possibility of making economies in the purchase of nuclear materials for
defence purposes (to be effected in real terms, and not simply by transferring charges
from military to civil account) and would set in hand a review of the research and
development programme.
Summing up, the Prime Minister said that the strategy proposed was in general
that best adapted to using the resources available to us for the maintenance of our
influence in the coming decade. It did not go as far as the double stance, but it
provided a reasonable measure of insurance against a reduction in the facilities
available to us in overseas bases. A further effort should be made to reduce costs on
the lines proposed by the Minister of Defence, and the Committee should consider
separately, at a later date, the future of aircraft carriers and the requirement for the
Rotodyne. As regards the strategic deterrent, our efforts should be directed towards
maintaining the effectiveness of a system based on SKYBOLT for as long after 1970 as
possible and no plans should be based at present on the assumption that we should
provide for ourselves a further generation of strategic nuclear weapons. It would,
5 Lord Perth. 6 Mr Selwyn Lloyd.
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however, be open to Ministers to reconsider this question at any time in the next two
years. The strength of the British Army of the Rhine should be left at seven brigade
groups for the present.
The annual White Paper on Defence had perhaps outlived its usefulness, but it
would be necessary to produce a fairly full White Paper in 1962, which marked the
end of the five-year plan inaugurated in April 1957. It would be advisable to produce
it as far as possible in the form of a statement of the general principles governing
long-term strategy, and to avoid as far as possible commitments to specific weapons
or to details of deployment. . . .
68 CAB 129/109, C(62)63 13 Apr 1962
‘Intervention in Kuwait’: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Watkinson
During my recent visit to Bahrein I was very impressed with the continuing necessity
for our forces there and in Aden to be at a high state of readiness and for the
Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, to have as much authority as we can properly
delegate to him to act swiftly on the advice of the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.
Although communications between London and Bahrein have been improved, they
are by no means certain when conditions are adverse.
2. It is clear that the Iraqis have not lost their interest in Kuwait. Indeed while I
was there they were carrying out photographic reconnaissance with MiG aircraft. If
they press this form of surveillance our chances of carrying out successful
interceptions will be slight.
3. Since my return, the Chiefs of Staff have re-examined plans for re-entry into
Kuwait and are also examining various proposals for keeping our forces there at a
high degree of readiness. One difficult political problem has arisen. However much
we can reinforce the air defence of the Bahrein area, it is clear that with the Iraqi
introduction of advanced types of Russian MiG fighters and with the extremely short
flying distance from the Basra/Shaiba to the Kuwait frontier, it will be impossible to
guarantee a favourable air situation over Kuwait at the time of the introduction of
airborne troops without an attack on Iraqi airfields in this area very soon after any
Iraqi attack has been mounted. I am advised by the Chiefs of Staff that the Iraqi air
force available to support such an attack on Kuwait is likely to be one jet light
bomber squadron and two jet fighter squadrons. What I am now proposing is that we
should delegate authority to the Commander-in-Chief to carry out the necessary
attack on Iraqi airfields in this limited area in order to destroy Iraqi aircraft on the
ground and thus ensure a favourable air situation over Kuwait in the early stages of
any Iraqi aggression. Provided that communications were possible, the Commander-
in-Chief would obviously seek confirmation of his authority for this, as for other
action, from London. However, should communications fail, I think we should give
him the authority to act subject to two important safeguards:
(i) That the Amir must have formally requested assistance.
(ii) That the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, must have concurred in this action.
4. I therefore seek the approval of my colleagues to the extension of the
Commander-in-Chief’s authority accordingly. I attach a copy of the revised directive
to the Commander-in-Chief.
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69 CAB 131/28, D 3(63) 9 Feb 1963
‘Future defence policy’: Cabinet Defence Committee meeting minutes
The Minister of Defence1 said that the Government’s present policy could be
considered under three heads—the strategic deterrent; the forces in Europe under
our commitments to Western European Union (W.E.U.) and to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO); and the forces required to meet commitments east of
Suez. On the assumption that expenditure on the strategic deterrent had been
already largely settled on the basis of the Nassau Agreement,2 the only scope for
reductions in defence spending lay in the reduction of our forces in Europe or east of
Suez. In terms of commitments, forces in all areas, including reserves held in the
United Kingdom, were stretched to the limit. If commitments remained unchanged,
the forces could not be cut. But if the forces could not be cut, defence expenditure
could not remain constant; it would rise in step with the increasing cost of modern
weapons and means of transport. A reduction in commitments was not impossible;
but if, after examination, no acceptable reductions could be found, it would be
impossible to hold defence expenditure at a level of 7 per cent of the Gross National
Product (G.N.P.).
The Chancellor of the Exchequer3 said that our major commitments could not be
reviewed in isolation; the discussion must be informed by a realistic appreciation of
the financial and economic background. The level of defence expenditure now
forecast for 1963–64 represented a 10 per cent increase on the year before—an
unprecedented rise in time of peace. Apart from France and Portugal, we were
already carrying a heavier defence burden than any other European country. The
failure of the Brussels negotiations was a serious set-back to our hopes of
strengthening our international economic position. Moreover, in many parts of the
world we were now carrying, in effect, the burden of defending the economic
interests of our European competitors. Against this background the economy could
not stand a rising level of defence expenditure; it should, if possible, be reduced, and
at the very least held level. However painful military reductions might be, the
progressive weakening of the economy would not only make it impossible to meet
even the most essential of our military commitments but would have far more
damaging repercussions in other fields. In examining our present commitments and
the extent to which it might be possible to reduce them we should therefore examine
realistically the benefits which other countries derived from expenditure to which
they made no contribution, and ask ourselves against what enemy, in what
circumstances, and with what allies, our forces would be called upon to act.
Europe
The Committee then considered the implications of maintaining our present
commitments to W.E.U. and to NATO.
1 Mr P Thorneycroft.
2 An ambiguously-worded agreement with President Kennedy, under which the US would make Polaris
missiles available to Britain, Dec 1962. 3 Mr R Maudling.
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In discussion the following points were made:
(a) Our original commitment under the Brussels Treaty to maintain four divi-
sions or their equivalent fighting strength in Europe had been modified by agree-
ment. So far as W.E.U. was concerned it now consisted of a commitment to
maintain 55,000 men in Germany. No further reduction would be possible except
by agreement of a majority of the W.E.U. countries, who would be obliged by the
terms of the modified Brussels Treaty to take their decision in the knowledge of
SACEUR’s views. On the earlier occasion SACEUR had been able to certify that 55,000
men with modern weapons could be regarded as providing fighting strength
equivalent to the 75,000 men provided for originally. It would not be easy for
SACEUR to certify that a further reduction would satisfy the same criterion; but
much would depend on the political background. If, for example, our W.E.U. part-
ners and SACEUR himself, were anxious to make it possible for us to reduce our
forces in Europe, the assignment of the V-bomber force to NATO could be used as
a factor in the argument. Unfortunately, the present chairman of the United
States Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, had declared himself as resolutely
opposed to any reduction in our forces in Europe and was, indeed, pressing for an
increase.
(b) The political consequences of a major reduction in Europe, if it were to follow
so soon after the breakdown of the negotiations for our accession to the European
Economic Community as to make it possible to connect the two, should not be
overlooked. Any further reduction in Europe should be made with the support and
agreement of our NATO and W.E.U. allies rather than forced through against their
will. In the last resort we could abrogate the W.E.U. Treaty; but the effects on our
position in Europe and on our relations with the United States Government would
be damaging.
(c) Nevertheless, it would be right to seek to persuade the United States
Government and our partners in W.E.U. that a major reduction in our
commitment to Europe would be preferable to the reduction in our commitments
east of Suez, which would otherwise become inevitable. If they could be persuaded
to view the defence of the free world in global, not European, terms and could be
brought to appreciate the extent to which they themselves benefited from the
presence of our forces in the Middle East and Far East, they might be disposed to
help us to maintain those forces by reductions in Europe. We should now consider
therefore, how a more favourable climate of opinion might be created—perhaps
by a series of bilateral discussions. In the military sphere the links which were
already developing between NATO and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO)
might be of value in this educative process, particularly if a further link between
NATO and the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) could also be brought
into being.
(d) The economies which would result from a major reduction in Europe were
difficult to assess and could easily be exaggerated. The savings would be more
likely to show themselves in equipment than in manpower. The British Army of
the Rhine (B.A.O.R.) was at present organised in two divisions, containing seven
brigades. From a military point of view it would be more satisfactory to reorganise
in three divisions each of two brigades. Under such an organisation there would be
no reduction in manpower; and the commitment to W.E.U. would be unaffected.
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But there would be a reduction in the commitment to NATO, which was at present
expressed in terms of seven brigades. It would, however, be undesirable to begin
negotiation for a limited reorganisation of B.A.O.R. on these lines if it was likely to
prejudice our chances of success in subsequently negotiating much larger
reductions in manpower.
Middle East
The Committee then considered the scale of our present commitments in the
Middle East.
In discussion the following points were made:
(e) Our military commitments in Africa had substantially contracted. On the
assumption that, in the event of serious disorder, Southern Rhodesia could look
for support to the Union of South Africa, the only military operation which we
might be required to undertake would be directed to protecting the settlers in
Kenya; and after Kenya became independent such an operation, if it could be
mounted at all, would not of itself require the maintenance of substantial forces in
Aden.
(f ) Historically, the importance of maintaining our position astride the Suez
Canal, in Aden and in the Persian Gulf had derived from the need to protect the
route to India. When India and Pakistan became independent this requirement
was reduced; but no corresponding alteration had taken place in our military
dispositions. The main reason for this had been the discovery of oil in the Persian
Gulf; and it was in terms of defending our oil interests, particularly those in
Kuwait, that the maintenance of the military bases in the area was now justified.
(g) The economic validity of this justification, however, was questionable. The
economic benefits, both direct and indirect, that we derived from our interests in
the area might be found to be less than the cost of maintaining our forces; and a
detailed study of this aspect of the problem should be made.
(h) A withdrawal from Aden would not necessarily lead to the severance of our
communications or an interruption of our trade. Our ships still passed freely
through the Suez Canal, although our bases in the Canal Zone had gone. We still
traded with Africa, although our military presence in that Continent had been
substantially reduced. The oil exporting countries would continue to need to sell
their oil, whether or not we maintained troops in Aden; and, although the world
demand for oil was rising, there was still a surplus of production, which would
increase with the opening of new fields, e.g., at Abu Dhabi.
(i) But, apart from its arguable economic value, our military presence both in
Cyprus and Aden was important as exerting a general stabilising influence in the
Middle East and sustaining our continuing role as a major world Power. Our
prestige would decline if we were thought to have been compelled to withdraw our
forces because we could not afford to maintain them. It might therefore be
desirable to link any withdrawal from Aden or the Persian Gulf with a
reorientation of our policy in the Middle East, directed towards reaching an
accommodation with the Arab nationalist movements instead of continuing to
support the autocratic régimes in whose hands many of our economic interests
were still concentrated.
(j) In any reassessment of our position in the Middle East special regard would
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have to be paid to alternative means of discharging our treaty obligations to
Kuwait. The most effective course might be to encourage the Government of
Kuwait to raise its own national forces on a scale large enough to hold a
bridgehead against attack until the arrival of reinforcements from the United
Kingdom.
Far East
The Committee then considered the scope of our present commitments in the Far
East. In discussion the following points were made:
(k) The forces based on Singapore had four main roles: to meet our commitment
for the external defence of Malaysia; to discharge our obligations to SEATO; to
discourage the aggressive designs of Indonesia; and to provide reinforcements for
Hong Kong. With the possible exception of Hong Kong, it did not appear that any
of these roles could be abandoned without a fundamental change in our policy.
Moreover, apart from their military value our forces in the Far East had political
and prestige significance. Their withdrawal would be regarded as a major political
defeat and, quite apart from its serious effect on Australia, New Zealand and the
United States, would encourage the spread of Communism.
(l) It was difficult to envisage a situation in the Far East in which we might be
required to make, singlehanded, an opposed landing. In circumstances which
called for operations of this kind we should either be at war (in which case more
drastic and more effective methods—e.g., by air attack on the enemy’s territory—
would be needed) or we should be acting with our allies in SEATO (in which case
we should not be required to provide a self-contained assault force). But the
question was one of degree; we could not allow our forces to be run down to a
point at which no assault operations of any kind would be possible, especially since
landings in the face of opposition by guerrilla forces of the kind now operating in
Brunei might be required at any time. Even on the assumption that in future we
should only operate at the invitation of the local Power we could not afford to
reduce the all-round capability of our forces. The local Power might not be in
control of the situation; and our forces might meet unexpected opposition on
arrival or be required, after arrival, to extricate themselves from an untenable
position.
(m) For all these reasons, a major reduction in our forces in the Far East could
not be secured except by a reduction in our political commitments. This in turn
would involve the abandonment of our support of Malaysia; and it would make
little sense to maintain our commitment to SEATO once we had abandoned
Malaysia.
(n) Our commitment in Singapore had originally derived, like our commitment
in the Middle East, from the need to safeguard our position in India. But, now that
the total cost of maintaining our forces east of Suez was rising towards some £600
million a year, we should consider realistically the economic and political
consequences of withdrawal. In the last resort the defence of Australia and New
Zealand might be the only commitment to which it would be essential that we
should contribute; and that by itself might require a military posture wholly
different from that which we now maintained.
(o) If we must assume that the Communist Chinese Government would seek at
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some point to seize Hong Kong, their easiest course would be to provoke internal
disorder in the colony on a scale which it would be beyond the capacity of our
forces to contain and then to invade the territory under the pretext that we had
lost control of the situation. . . .4 If so, the present garrison, which had already been
reduced to the minimum required to maintain law and order could not be further
scaled down. On the other hand it would not be unreasonable to assume that the
Communist Chinese Government did not intend to subvert our position in Hong
Kong especially since they derived considerable economic benefits from the
present situation.5 . . .
4 Approximately 21⁄2 lines removed from Public Record Office copy under Section 5.1 of Public Records Act
(1958).
5 A further sentence here similarly removed.
70 CAB 130/190, GEN 796 21 May 1963
‘The implications of withdrawal from the Middle and Far East’:
minutes of a Cabinet (Official) Committee on Defence meeting
The Meeting1 had before them a note by the Chairman of the Official Oversea Co-
ordinating Committee (GEN. 796/2) and a memorandum by Sir Robert Scott2 (GEN.
796/5) on the implications of withdrawal from the Middle and Far East.
In discussion the point was made that if it were decided that defence expenditure
must be kept within 7 per cent of the Gross National Product (G.N.P.) the annual
increase in such expenditure must not be greater than 2 per cent. Present estimates
suggested that the increase would be nearer 4 per cent.
It was generally agreed that the Annex to GEN. 796/5 identified the changes in
present planning assumptions which it would be open to Ministers to adopt and
which would produce savings in defence expenditure of the right order of magnitude.
It would not, however, be reasonable to suggest that decisions which would have
serious political repercussions could be taken without a more accurate knowledge of
the financial background.
The Ministry of Defence were now engaged in the annual costing exercise for the
period up to and including 1968/69. This exercise was complex and could not be
compressed or curtailed if it were not to be misleading. Once the detailed figures
were available, it would be possible to produce for Ministers a paper suggesting ways
in which defence expenditure could be reduced in order to keep it within 7 per cent
of G.N.P., and giving a firmer indication of the levels to which defence expenditure
would be likely to rise if planning continued on the present basis.
A reduction in defence expenditure implied some reduction in the ability of the
United Kingdom to carry out its commitments. Any final paper for Ministers should
therefore also show what effect the various possible reductions in defence
1 The meeting was attended by Lord Mountbatten (chief of defence staff), Sir H Caccia (FO), Sir H
Poynton (CO), Sir S Zuckerman (M.D), W Armstrong (T), Sir A Snelling (CRO), Sir R Scott2, and M
Stevenson (Min of Power).
2 Commandant, Imperial Defence College, 1960–1961; formerly commissioner-general for UK in South-
East Asia.
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expenditure would have on the United Kingdom’s commitments. The issue for
decision by Ministers would then be to what extent it might be necessary to accept
the risks which would be involved in renouncing the ability to meet certain
commitments in the interests of containing defence expenditure. Ideally such a
balance between increased risk and increased expenditure should be struck in terms
of the development of the political situation in five or six years’ time, since only
towards the end of such a period would the effects of any decisions now taken not to
proceed with certain elements of the present defence programme make themselves
felt in reduced effectiveness. It would not however be possible in practice to disguise
for long the fact that decisions had been taken which would in course of time lead
inevitably to reductions of this kind, because it would be observed that the action
required to maintain our effectiveness in the long term, e.g. by the ordering of
replacement aircraft or ships or the construction of new barracks, had not in fact
been taken.
In further discussion, the following main points were made:—
(a) It was not possible to cost-account defence expenditure on a profit and loss
basis. Nor was it possible to consider defence expenditure purely in strategic
terms. Defence planning had to take account of wider political factors. Even
without a specific reduction in commitments there might be room for some
economies by a closer correlation of defence planning and political objectives.
(b) In the Middle East there was a clear economic interest for the United Kingdom
in maintaining supplies of relatively cheap oil. But the importance of Middle East
oil was not to be reckoned in purely economic terms; their security was more
important than their low cost in view of Europe’s dependence on oil and the
inadequacy of alternative supplies. Complete Soviet control of the area could be
disastrous and Arab unification could in itself be most damaging. In spite of
pressures from Arab nationalism it might be possible to retain after 1970 a base in
Aden as a sovereign area in an independent Aden federation, but this would no
doubt involve increased expenditure on economic development for the Aden
federation as a whole.
(c) There was no clear economic interest for the United Kingdom in the Far East.
Our main concern was to secure the general stability of the area as a barrier to
communism and the containment of Indonesia. There was a reasonable chance
that we could retain a base in Singapore into the next decade but nevertheless
Australia and New Zealand should do more to relieve the United Kingdom of some
of its burdens. The Japanese were showing an interest in undertaking defence
responsibilities in the area but this would raise wide political issues.
(d) Ministers had decided for political reasons not to make any reductions, at least
for the time being, in British forces in Europe. But such a reduction might be
possible at some stage if there were a general settlement in Europe. Meanwhile
more intensive efforts should be made to persuade the other member countries of
NATO that the defence efforts we made elsewhere than in Europe, (which in
themselves were of benefit to the West generally, especially in protecting oil
supplies) should be accepted as entitling us to provide a proportionately lower
share of the NATO forces than was now the case.
(e) Although the cost of re-equipping the armed forces with modern weapons and
maintaining servicemen increased faster than the growth of the G.N.P., there
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might be some compensating factor to be found in the increased efficiency of
automated weapon systems.
(f ) An immediate saving might be found by limiting the proposed carrier
programme to a replacement for Victorious in the first instance. If Victorious were
not replaced it was probable that the Fleet Air Arm would have ceased to be an
operationally effective force by about 1966. . . .
71 FO 371/170165, no 17 19 July 1963
[Review of Middle East policy, objectives and strategy]: memorandum
by Sir R Stevens1 to Sir H Caccia
On his return from a tour of the Middle East the President of the Board of Trade2
expressed to the Permanent Under-Secretary the view that it would be generally
advantageous if in our Middle Eastern policy our past imperialist traditions and
associations could be put aside and we could make a new start based primarily on a
mutually advantageous and straight-forward commercial relationship. The
Permanent Under-Secretary has asked me to make some comments on this thesis
before I leave the office.3 Here they are.
2. The President’s thesis is an attractive one and one to which I think most of us
who deal with the Middle East would subscribe in principle. It has to be recognised,
however, that, as so often, it is easier said than done.
3. In analysing why this is so it is necessary first of all to consider the various
obstacles which stand in the way of the policy advocated. I would list these obstacles
briefly as follows:—
(i) lingering traces of British imperialism;
(ii) Israel;
(iii) CENTO;
(iv) oil and our position in the Gulf.
I comment on each of these one by one.
4. Lingering traces of British imperialism. We have gone a long way in the last
five years towards disposing of the widely prevalent idea that no event of any
consequence can occur in the Middle East but the British will it. We have I think
made some impression on local opinion (though not, to judge from some fairly
recent correspondence, in all cases on our own representatives in the field) with our
policy of non-intervention in inter-Arab squabbles, and though private and press
comment in this country has sometimes shown traces of a more imperialistic
attitude of mind, we have consistently acted on the principle that our interests in the
area are those normally prevailing between fully independent sovereign states. The
point is not so much the policy we pursue as what the locals think we are up to. The
theory that we have special political interests, that we are pro-monarchist and anti-
republican, that we feel differently and more intimately about the Middle East than
any other area in the world and that one day we may want to stage a come-back—all
1 Deputy under-secretary of state at FO.
2 Mr F Erroll, Oct 1961–Oct 1963.
3 ie, to retire; he became vice-chancellor of Leeds University.
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this dies very hard. It must be admitted that when the Middle East is in its present
state of turmoil and we have to maintain the best possible relations with a number of
countries each of which is quarrelling with the other, it is very difficult so to conduct
ourselves as not to appear to one of them to be taking sides with the other.
Furthermore, the fact must be faced that on occasions our stand has appeared to be
influenced by internal Middle Eastern political considerations. This said, it must be
added that the Middle Eastern view of British policy does not always take a hostile
form. It is for example the gratifying belief that we are still a considerable power in
the world which causes countries like Lebanon and Saudi Arabia to ask us for
military missions. It is because they believe we hold a lot of strings in our hands and
know how to make our influence felt that disgruntled politicians in countries like
Iran try to come to us to seek our support. The “traditional British rôle” is in short a
state of mind in Middle Eastern countries which does not easily evaporate.
5. Israel. The existence of the State of Israel makes it difficult for the Arab,
particularly in neighbouring countries, to think of the British as benevolent,
disinterested traders whose one desire in the world is to sell them their products and
buy their goods. It may seem unfair that the onus of responsibility for Israel should
fall so heavily on us. It would seem that the Germans, for example, can effect a
rapprochement with Israel without incurring Arab hostility. The reasons are
however, as is obvious, historical. Israel is in a sense a lasting proof of the continuity
of British imperialism. The Balfour Declaration,4 the fact that Palestine was under
British administration and even the Tripartite Declaration all point ominously in our
direction. To some extent feelings on this subject have run so high for so long that
they are today in normal circumstances atrophied. I remember that Sir William
Hayter5 found it possible to tour the Arab countries in early 1958 without hearing the
word Israel breathed. Nevertheless it does not require much to start the nerve
jangling again. The one thing more than any other within the limits of probability
which would destroy any hope of a nice cosy long-term political relationship with the
Arab States and bring us back starkly to political realities would be if, as a result of
some collapse in Jordan, Israel went into the West Bank and we acquiesced in it
without vigorous protest. What would be involved here would be not just our
relations with neighbouring states but with the whole Arab world. The importance of
relations with Israel in the Arab estimate of the British image cannot be over-stated.
6. CENTO. Ten years ago the Northern Alliance was a major obstacle to our
relations with Egypt and other Arab states with the exception of Iraq. Since the death
of Nuri Said and the departure of Iraq from CENTO antagonism has become less
marked and there is in some quarters even grudging admission that this particular
involvement in the Middle East is not wholly disadvantageous to the Arab world.
Nevertheless it is viewed with some suspicion as an attempt to involve the Middle
East in East–West squabbles and it tends to associate us with Turkish and Iranian
sentiments about Arab countries. Since the Iranians in particular are anything but
impartial as between the monarchies and republics in the Arab world, the existence
of CENTO tends to reinforce the view that we too are inclined to take sides. This is a
disadvantage with which we have to live for the sake of the benefits, such as they are,
of CENTO itself.
4 1917, on a Jewish national home in Palestine.
5 Deputy under-secretary of state at FO, 1957–1958.
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7. Oil and our position in the Gulf. This in theory and on paper ought to be by
rights the Achilles heel of the President of the Board of Trade’s ideal relationship. It
could easily become so, particularly with the assistance of the Committee of Twenty-
four, in the next few months. But at present and in practice it is not. The reasons for
this are complicated and rather obscure, yet worth probing. One point
unquestionably is that we are present in force. We have shown our determination to
dig our toes in and it is not easy to throw us out. We have undoubtedly been helped
by the geographical situation of the Gulf, namely its remoteness from Egypt, and by
the fact that Nasser, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have been on consistently bad terms. Then
again the rather grizzly consequences of revolutions in other Arab countries have
given young revolutionaries in the Gulf pause. The combination of these factors has
provided us with a breathing space and we seem for the moment to have arrived at a
sort of modus vivendi with the major Arab powers who unquestionably in their
hearts resent our presence in the Gulf and Aden and would like to see us gone—if
they and not their rivals could take our place. Thus we have Saudi Arabia voluntarily
resuming diplomatic relations with us despite Buraimi,6 we have Iraq asking us for
arms despite Kuwait and we have Nasser speaking of the British position in the Gulf
with an air of detachment and referring to the value which Egyptian finances derive
from the passage of British oil through the Suez Canal. We must not be under any
illusions about the fragility of this state of affairs but the longer it can be made to last
the better. This suggests the conclusion that we should do nothing to disturb British
arrangements in the Gulf and Aden, even if they appear to conflict with the ideal
commercial relationship.
8. In fact I think I would go further than that and say that even if the major Arab
powers were considerably more vocal than they are at present we should still hold
our ground. If we were to dismantle our position in the Gulf and Aden, I doubt if we
should gain anything very solid in terms of either goodwill or commerce—not
enough to offset the advantages which we derive from our presence there which
apart from oil includes a very flourishing trade with the Gulf States.
9. As to the general relationship between politics and trade, our best relative
performance has been hitherto in those countries with which we have a former
“imperialist” connexion (e.g. Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Jordan). I question whether political
animus in the Middle East is a very serious obstacle to trade. Naturally if we break off
relations with a country, e.g. Egypt or Saudi Arabia, there is a falling-off of trade. But
apart from this trade does not fluctuate closely with the political barometer and any
inclination to blame our failures on bad political management should, I think, be
resisted.
10. These considerations point to the conclusion that the policy which we
pursue towards the Middle East at the present time is not a serious obstacle to a
satisfactory commercial relationship with individual countries and that a change of
policy designed exclusively with this end in view would not produce appreciably
better results and might have nefarious political consequences. This is true however
only so long as we do stick to our declared policy, particularly our policy of non-
intervention. If, for instance, we were to start taking sides openly in inter-Arab
6 The dispute over the Buraimi Oasis—on the boundary between Abu Dhabi and Muscat—became serious
from 1952, when Saudi Arabia invaded it. As the protector of the Trucial Oman States, the British
government in October 1955 decided to use the Trucial Levies to retake the oasis.
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squabbles, it would arouse antagonisms and certainly increase our own difficulties in
protecting our main economic interests such as oil. If we appeared to condone Israeli
occupation of the [West] Bank that could have most serious consequences for our
political and commercial relationship with all Arab countries. It could, inter alia,
stimulate an Arab boycott of British goods.
11. It may be useful if in conclusion I take this opportunity to set down a few
obiter dicta about British policy in the Middle East as of July 1963.
(i) In a sense Arab unity is a myth, and the almost certain failure of
Egypt/Syria/Iraq federation vividly illustrates this in a practical sense. Nevertheless
it is important to remember that in another sense each Arab state is a limb of the
same body and anything we do in one country is likely to affect our relations with a
lot of other countries at the same time. It is this factor which gives our dealings
with Arab countries a sort of extra dimension. Anything which savours of airing or
debating inter-Arab differences in non-Arab fora is strongly resented by all Arabs
as washing dirty linen before an alien public. We can however quite safely take a
public position in favour of a friendly negotiated Arab unity, though we may have
private doubts about its realization.
(ii) In terms of degree of British involvement we must draw a distinction between
the Eastern end of the Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula. (Libya is an
exception to this generalisation in the sense that Britain and American forces are
present but not in terms of their possible use.) In the first of these areas though
there is a tendency in some quarters to imagine that we have some interest in the
maintenance of the present régime in Jordan per se, our only real concern like
that of the U.S. and the U.N. is to avoid the renewal of hostilities between the Arab
States and Israel, or anything (like the partitioning of Jordan) which might lead to
this and notably the development of sophisticated weapons. It seems inconceivable
that we should ever want to intervene in the first by ourselves. In the Arabian
Peninsula we have a special and unique (though not exclusive) British interest and
we intend to keep in the area for as long as we can a military presence for quite
clear-cut defined reasons which have nothing to do with Arab politics and
everything to do with trade.
(iii) This said, it must be added, and underlined, that U.S. concern for the
maintenance of the status quo in the Arabian Peninsula is a new and extremely
encouraging aspect of the present situation. This bit of U.S. policy has received
much less attention than their so-called appeasement of Nasser and their abortive
efforts to bring about disengagement in the Yemen. Their policy is not so much a
contradiction as a balancing act. By trying to keep level with the progressive forces
in the Arab world, the U.S. Government has managed to improve its image in the
region as a whole à toutes fins utiles; and by this means they can afford to cling the
more tenaciously to their key positions. Their policy has also they believe caused
Nasser to realise increasingly the importance of his economic relations with the
West, which in turn has caused him markedly to moderate his anti-Western and
anti-British propaganda in the last six months. Alignment of U.S.–U.K. policies
regarding the Middle East is likely to be an increasingly important element in the
process of safeguarding the British position.
(iv) At the moment our image is certainly more tarnished than that of the
Americans, except at the top-monarchist level. One of the reasons why we are so
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widely associated with the forces of reaction in the Arab world is because of the
peculiarly reactionary character of most of the Persian Gulf rulers, with the
exception of the Amir of Kuwait. Because of our military presence the Arabs
assume that we are fully responsible for every action of the rulers. We might
consider more carefully than hitherto whether we cannot do more with the
assistance of our military presence to bring them up to date. This, it seems to me,
is one field in which we might be able to improve our image in other Arab
countries. I think this difficult problem should be discussed with Sir W. Luce when
he returns.7
(v) We see no immediate threat to our ability to retain our military presence in
Aden and our politico/military presence in the Gulf (though a change of Ruler in
Kuwait could open a new chapter). Partly because it is so divided, Arab nationalism
is not organised to eject us at present. The latest U.S. position tends to reinforce
our own. Yet, at the centre of this problem there is a curious (and so far
unexplained) paradox. The raison d’être of our presence is not political (politically
of course we should be better off without it) but economic—viz to help to
maintain the independence from each other of the oil-producing states and hence
ensure as far as we can that oil is available not merely or primarily in terms of
supply but above all on remunerative commercial terms. The latest forecast of the
world oil position in 1970 brings out our clearly increasing dependence on Middle
East supplies. And yet within the last few months the Treasury, the supposed
guardians of our balance of payments and of the contribution which sterling oil
makes to that, have been at pains to argue (in the defence context) that the present
arrangements for obtaining oil from Middle East producers has little value for
H.M.G. This case has been developed by innuendo rather than explicit statement.
It is for consideration whether when the present defence exercise is over we should
try to smoke out the Treasury a little more. It is not comfortable to feel that there
is an unresolved argument at the very core of an important element of our policy.
On the other hand, the status quo is based on F.O. rather than current Treasury
theory and it may be better to let sleeping dogs lie.
(vi) It seems obvious to me and I think this view is shared by the Ministry of
Power, that as long as Kuwait holds and as long as we can stay in Aden we should
do so. But what happens if one or the other goes? If as a result of a change of
régime Kuwait were to renounce the Anglo–Kuwaiti exchange of letters we would,
I think, have to look very carefully at our military commitment to defend Kuwait
and at the value of holding on in Aden from this point of view—in the light inter
alia of other oil developments in other parts of the Gulf. If Aden were to go first
(which is much less likely) I question whether we should want to try to construct
an alternative method of defending Kuwait, e.g. an aircraft-carrier which would be
both less effective and more provocative. It might at that stage be better to fall
back on non-military forms of insurance.
(vii) As regards Egypt, Syria and Iraq, we cannot do more at the moment than
hedge our bets. It seems fairly evident that the Arab world will be torn by divisive
forces for a long time. Whether this is a good thing or not it is undoubtedly partly
if not largely due to the fact that outside influences have held off thus allowing the
7 British Resident in Persian Gulf since 1961; formerly governor of Aden, 1956–1960.
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fissiparous tendencies to operate. One is tempted to say that the prospects for Arab
unity under Nasser have never looked poorer since he came into power ten years
ago; one must add that it is still just possible that these might prove famous last
words.8
8 Lord Home minuted: ‘I do hope that the President of the Board of Trade reads this excellent analysis’.
72 CAB 128/37, CC 48(63)3 25 July 1963
‘Future defence policy: aircraft carrier programme’: Cabinet
conclusions
The Cabinet had before them the following memoranda on future defence policy and
the aircraft carrier programme:
C. (63) 128 by the Minister of Defence.
C. (63) 132 by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
C. (63) 133 by the Chief Secretary, Treasury.
C. (63) 139 by the Secretary of State for Air.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer1 said that both social and defence expenditure
were increasing more rapidly than the growth of our national resources. If this
tendency were not checked, fresh measures of restraint would have to be imposed on
the private sector; and, since it would be unrealistic to suppose that wage rates could
be prevented from rising at least as fast as the growth in national productivity, the
only means of curtailing private consumption would be increased taxation. This, in
turn, would inhibit the growth of the economy, which alone would make it possible
to sustain increases in public expenditure without recurrent inflationary crises. In
the world-wide struggle against Communism the health of our economy and the
increasing prosperity of the West as a whole would have no less important a part to
play than military forces.
Our present strategy assumed that we needed to discharge three major roles,
namely, to retain an independent nuclear deterrent, to contribute forces to the
defence of Europe, and to maintain a military presence east of Suez. If it must be
taken for granted that in present circumstances we could not abandon either of the
first two roles, the future of our aircraft carriers must be examined in the context of
the third role, i.e., in terms of our ability to deter limited aggression on a world-wide
scale. But in the light of the country’s economic prospects it was arguable whether
we could afford to maintain this role throughout the 1970s, if no cheaper way of
doing so could be found than a perpetuation of our aircraft carriers. The Navy would
in any case have two carriers in service until 1980; what was now at issue, therefore,
was not the preservation of a carrier capability but its size, i.e., whether three
carriers were the essential minimum. Moreover, a new carrier would not need to be
ordered until 1965; and the longer a decision could be delayed the more clearly we
should be able to assess our future strategy and our need to retain carriers on the
scale now proposed.
1 Mr R Maudling.
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If, however, it were now decided in principle that a new carrier should be ordered,
the expenditure involved clearly could not be absorbed within the limits of existing
approved programmes. Either compensating economies would have to be found in
the defence programme itself or social expenditure would have to be reduced or the
balanced growth of the economy would have to be jeopardised.
The Minister of Defence2 said that, although our present strategy admittedly
required us to sustain three roles, it might become possible to reduce our
commitments in Europe in due course. But, so long as we sought to discharge the
world-wide role and, therefore, to maintain a military presence east of Suez, the Navy
could not survive as a fighting force without a carrier fleet. It could neither attack
nor defend itself. The development of a missile capability, which the Navy did not
now possess, might provide a partial alternative to the continued provision of carrier
support; but the development of new long-range missiles and of the ships to carry
them would be no less, and might be more, expensive than the maintenance of a
carrier capability. The Navy had at present four carriers, of which two would
continue in service until 1980. But the other two would reach the end of their
effective life in 1970–71; and they could not be safely extended beyond that date. No
more was at issue than the proposal to replace one of these two ships, with the result
that the carrier fleet would in any event be reduced to three in the early 1970s. This
reduction would itself involve some element of risk; but to allow the carrier fleet to
contract to only two ships would make it almost impossible to maintain a naval
presence east of Suez. Moreover, it would be very uneconomic, since the ships would
have to spend much of their time in transit instead of on station. Finally, the
prospective decline in the carrier strength could not be concealed; and it would be
assumed that the Government had decided to dispense with carriers altogether in
due course. This would have serious political repercussions; and it would be liable
gravely to affect recruitment to the Fleet Air Arm. In military terms alone, therefore,
a decision not to order another carrier might deprive us of the ability to maintain a
military presence east of Suez at a comparatively early date.
It now seemed probable that an aircraft could be developed for the common use of
the Navy and of the Air Force. This would not only make possible a more rational and
flexible deployment of air power but would also lead to closer working relationships
between the two Services in conformity with the purpose of the new organisation for
defence. Moreover, it should yield substantial economies, of the order of £150
million, by comparison with the development of two separate types of new aircraft.
These, coupled with a saving of an equivalent amount as the result of a decision,
which could be accepted, not to replace the second carrier to be withdrawn from
service in 1970–72, would more than offset the cost of one new carrier, together with
its aircraft. In addition, it should be possible to defer beyond the present decade more
than £70 million of defence expenditure which had been included in earlier plans.
In discussion the following main points were made:
(a) From the political point of view there was no scope for early reduction in any
of our major commitments overseas. But by 1970 it might no longer be necessary
to maintain forces in the Middle East for the protection of Kuwait; and in the Far
East Malaysia might have reached a political understanding with Indonesia which
2 Mr P Thorneycroft.
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would reduce the risk of war in that area. Moreover, no circumstances could now
be foreseen in which we should be required to mount, unaided, a landing against
opposition in any part of the world. Over the next 10 years, therefore, the need for
a carrier force east of Suez might disappear. But developments of this kind were
essentially speculative; so long as it remained possible that we might need to
deploy a military effort overseas during the 1970s, it would be unwise for the
Government to deprive themselves at this stage of the only means by which such
an effort could be sustained. It would be preferable to cancel, at a later point, a
decision which had been rendered unnecessary than to incur so serious a risk now.
(b) From the military point of view carriers offered advantages which no other
weapons system could match. In the absence of missiles, aircraft support was
essential to any kind of naval operation; and in many parts of the world only
carriers could provide such support. Moreover, they made possible a wide range of
political options, in that they were mobile; they could bring the threat of force to
bear openly or discreetly as the situation might require; and they were not
dependent on land bases, since they could stay at sea for periods of up to three
months at a time and could be refuelled and restocked at sea from supply ships.
The supply ships themselves would need access to ports; but a wide range of choice
would be open for this purpose in the Far East, particularly perhaps in Australia. If
provided with appropriate escorts, they would be capable of defending themselves
against any form of attack likely to be brought to bear against them in the
foreseeable future, short of conditions of total nuclear war. The possibility of
fitting the new carrier with nuclear propulsion, which would enable it to remain at
sea for longer periods, had also been studied. But, apart from the fact that this
would delay its entry into service by at least three years and would add about 40
per cent to its cost, it had not been thought right that the Government should seek
to gain its first experience of the problems of nuclear propulsion at sea in a ship of
such strategic importance.
(c) The Secretary of State for Air3 said that, if it could be assumed that the defence
budget would continue to rise, many of the operational arguments which had been
advanced in support of a new carrier might be thought to be valid. But, if defence
expenditure had to be stabilised or curtailed and more exacting priorities had
therefore to be enforced, a carrier could not be regarded as of such high priority as
to justify us in pre-empting on its behalf so large a proportion of the total
resources available for defence. Its role, although important, would be limited; in
particular, carriers found no essential place in any of the present contingency
plans which had been prepared to deal with various military emergencies.
Moreover, it would provide a relatively small capability in relation to its cost; and it
would therefore aggravate the tendency to disperse limited resources among too
many projects, a tendency which would result in our forces being weak in all roles
and effective in none. A decision on a new carrier should therefore be deferred
until certain studies now in progress, particularly into questions of air defence,
had been brought to a conclusion.
(d) In favour of deferring a decision it was argued that the Navy would in any case
have two carriers in service until 1980; that the case for a third carrier had not
3 Mr H Fraser.
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been conclusively established; that it might be possible to keep at least one of the
two older carriers in service longer than was at present envisaged; and that no
order for a new carrier need be placed until 1965. As against these considerations,
however, it was common knowledge that a decision had already been deferred for
three years; it was improbable that the factors on which any decision would have
to be based would be materially affected by any re-examination; and a further
deferment would be bound to provoke considerable political criticism.
(e) The development of a common aircraft for the Navy and the Air Force would
not be affected by the decision on the new carrier, except as regards the size of the
order for such aircraft. A common aircraft would be developed in any case as a
replacement for the Hunter and the Sea Vixen; and it would be capable of
operating from the carriers now in service.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that what was now at issue
was the structure and capability of the Navy not over the next few years but in the
decade after 1970. In that period the relative importance of Europe in the world-wide
confrontation between West and East might progressively diminish, particularly if
the conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Government on the prohibition of
the testing of nuclear weapons led gradually to some more general relaxation of
political and military tension. But no similar prospect had yet presented itself in the
Far East; indeed, the situation in that area of the world might develop in the opposite
direction. If so, we should face a corresponding need to strengthen the defences of
the free world east of Suez. It was in this context that it would be right to consider
the proposal to construct a new aircraft carrier. On the other hand, the discussion
had shown that it was possible to question the technical and professional
assumptions underlying this proposal; and it had also emphasised the danger that, if
we attempted to maintain a military role which we could not in the end afford, not
only would our military influence be diminished but the economy might suffer a
degree of damage which would weaken our position in the cold war even more than
the maintenance of a world-wide military presence might tend to strengthen it. The
Cabinet would wish to reflect further on these conflicting factors before reaching a
final decision.
The Cabinet:—
Agreed to resume their discussion at a later meeting.
73 PREM 11/4907, PM/64/51 20 Apr 1964
‘British and American strategic interests in South-East Asia and the
Indian Ocean’: memorandum by Mr Butler for Sir A Douglas-Home
You asked me to consider how we could spread the defence load in the Far East and
South-East Asia by involving the Americans in some way in our bases there. You
mentioned the balance of payments aspects. It has long been evident that the cost of
our defence arrangements in the Far East is quite out of proportion to the British
investment and trade stake in the region. This disproportionate effort is being
deployed less in defence of British material interests than in support of our American
and Commonwealth partners and in the general interest of the Free World, including
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the underwriting of freedom to trade in the area by Germans, Japanese and others.
The Americans, I believe, recognise our traditional rôle in the area from Suez to
Borneo. They would like to see us do more but are doubtful of our capacity. I do not
think it practicable, in view of their worldwide commitments, to ask them, or any of
the other nations trading in the area, to help us out financially. I do however
consider that there are prospects of persuading the Americans to associate
themselves more closely with our defence arrangements in this area, either by
making greater use of our existing strategic facilities, where appropriate, or, by the
development of other facilities, at points where the inhabitants have no anti-
colonialist complexes, or, better still, there are no inhabitants at all.
2. With this in mind, I should like, if you agree, to talk to Dean Rusk on the
following lines when I meet him in Washington next week:
(a) I would open by welcoming both his helpful remarks in public on Malaysia at
the SEATO Meeting, and his private words of encouragement to Carrington1 about
the limited offensive action we may be forced to take against the Indonesian build-
up. I would go on to assure him that we are doing our best to make certain that the
case against Indonesian aggression is first properly on record with the Security
Council, as well as in the press.
(b) While he knows we are committed to the defence of Malaysia, military activity
will not of itself end confrontation and for this an acceptable political solution is
needed. This could, as we agreed at Washington, be on “Maphilindo” lines.2
Sukarno must be forced or persuaded to withdraw his guerrillas and abandon his
aggressive designs.
(c) The Americans have been very helpful to us with Sukarno but we hope that
they can also do something, as they have promised in the past, to take a more
positive line in support of Malaysia. For instance one simple step would be if the
Seventh Fleet carrier task force now cruising in the Indian Ocean (Operation
Concord) could call at Singapore on its return voyage about May 10. It may be on
the late side to announce this now but I would repeat what I have previously said
to Rusk, namely that, subject to clearance with the Malaysians, we would welcome
visits by the Seventh Fleet in Singapore at any time.
(d) Once Indonesian confrontation has been abandoned and the Indonesian threat
to Malaysia has ceased to exist, our Singapore base could cease to be directed to
the narrow front in Borneo and could resume its wider rôle of assisting SEATO to
contain Chinese Communism and of acting as a link between the Indian and
Pacific Oceans.
(e) Consequently whether Indonesian confrontation ceases or not, we should
welcome increased American use of our facilities in Singapore as a clear
demonstration of United States/United Kingdom interdependence.
(f ) It would also be as well to look rather further ahead. As a first step in this
direction we welcomed the recent United States/United Kingdom talks on the
Indian Ocean and are glad that the Americans are prepared to supplement, but not
to replace, the traditional British strategic interest in this area, by the joint
development of new facilities.
(g) We think the concept of a central “austere base” on Diego Garcia in the Chagos
1 Lord Carrington, first lord of the Admiralty since 1959. 2 Malaysia–Philippines–Indonesia.
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Archipelago flanked by air staging-posts on Aldabra Island to the west, and, if the
Australians concur, on Cocos (Keeling) Islands to the east, would be a good
insurance against a breach of the existing Aden–Gan–Singapore line, of which the
weakest link at the moment seems to be Gan.
(h) To sum up, to the extent that future United States/United Kingdom
interdependence in round-the-world strategy may require land-based facilities, we
should look for points where the local political scene has no anti-colonialist or
anti-Western complexes, or, preferably, where there are no inhabitants at all.
3. I hope we may have a moment to discuss this before I leave for Washington on
April 26.
4. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Commonwealth and Defence
Secretaries since it so much concerns them and to the Secretary of the Cabinet.
74 CAB 148/1, ff 60–61 23 Apr 1964
‘The Indian Ocean’: minutes of Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy
Committee meeting (DO 18(64)2)
The Foreign Secretary said that the cost of our defence arrangements in the Far East
was out of proportion to the British stake in investment and trade in the region. Our
effort was deployed less in the defence of British material interests than in support of
our United States and Commonwealth partners and in the general defence of the free
world. He had therefore considered whether we could reduce our burden by
persuading the United States to associate themselves more closely with our defence
arrangements, either by making greater use of our existing strategic facilities, where
appropriate, or by the development of other facilities at points where the inhabitants
had no anti-Colonialist bias or, better still, there were no inhabitants at all. He
therefore proposed, at his forthcoming meeting with the United States Secretary of
State, Mr. Rusk, not only to re-emphasise the essential elements in our policy of
support for Malaysia against Indonesian aggression, but also to indicate that:
(a) We should welcome increased United States use of our facilities in Singapore
as a demonstration of United States–United Kingdom inter-dependence; and the
United States 7th Fleet should be invited to visit the base.
(b) We should welcome the joint development of new defence facilities in the
Indian Ocean.
(c) We favoured the concept of a central “austere” base on Diego Garcia, flanked
by air staging posts on Aldabra and, if the Australian Government agreed, on the
Cocos (Keeling) Islands, as an insurance against a breach of the existing
Aden–Gan–Singapore route.
The Secretary of State for Defence said that he agreed broadly with the Foreign
Secretary. It would be unduly optimistic, however, to suppose that these proposals
would provide any early relief from our burdens, since the United States authorities
did not contemplate the completion of a base on Diego Garcia in less than five years
at the earliest or the development of the flanking air staging posts in less than 10
years. Moreover, there were serious practical limits to the use by the United States
Forces of our base facilities in Singapore. In the light of these considerations the
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presentation of our views to Mr. Rusk might be slightly modified and amplified on
the following basis:
(d) Despite the pressures to which we were subjected as the result of Indonesian
policy towards Malaysia, our facilities in Singapore still provided an important
base for any operations which might be necessary under the South-East Asia
Treaty Organisation (SEATO): and they constituted an assurance of our capacity
and intention to contain Chinese Communism in South-East Asia. In addition
Singapore acted as a link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
(e) We should welcome an increased use by United States forces of our facilities in
Singapore (the extent of which was already known to them), although
constitutionally this would, of course, be a matter between the United States
Government and the Malaysian Government.
(f ) We welcomed the readiness of the United States Government to develop new
facilities in the Indian Ocean which would enable them to supplement, although
not replace, British strategic interests in the area.
(g) The prospect of the joint use of these facilities would provide a valuable
reinforcement of our existing air routes, particularly if our overflying and staging
facilities in Libya and Cyprus were put in jeopardy.
(h) Experience of these new developments might indicate other opportunities for
United States–United Kingdom interdependence in the provision of land-based
facilities which would help both countries in carrying out their global strategy.
In discussion there was general agreement with the Foreign Secretary’s proposal,
subject to the modifications proposed by the Secretary of State for Defence. It would
also be important to avoid allowing the United States Government to infer that a base
at, e.g., Diego Garcia would be in any sense a substitute for the existing bases at Aden
and Singapore.
In the light of the Foreign Secretary’s discussion with Mr. Rusk it would be
necessary to consider how the constitutional relationship of Diego Garcia to
Mauritius might need to be modified.
75 CAB 148/5, ff 99–103 23 Apr 1964
‘US defence interests in the Indian Ocean’: Cabinet Defence and
Oversea Policy (Official) Committee memorandum by FO, CO and
MoD (DO(O)(64)23)
As a result of discussions between United Kingdom and United States officials in
London, from February 25–27 a Memorandum (Annex I)1 was agreed for submission
to Governments.
Background
2. The Americans have at present no forces or bases between the Pacific and
Mediterranean, apart from a few naval vessels in the Persian Gulf. The United States
Administration supports our position in Aden and Singapore. Their interest in the
1 Annexes not printed.
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Indian Ocean area has gradually developed over the past few years and gained
impetus as a result of the Chinese attack on India in 1962. They have, however, been
restrained by considerations of finance and, although they showed interest in
establishing certain technical facilities on islands in the area, it was not until
December 1963 that their strategic interest took the positive and public form of a
decision to deploy a naval task force into the Indian Ocean from time to time. Formal
notification to Her Majesty’s Government of this intention took place on December
11 last and on December 19 the Foreign Secretary told Mr. Rusk in London that Her
Majesty’s Government welcomed the American decision and also confirmed our
readiness to receive a group of United States officials to discuss the development of
support facilities on islands under British control.
Strategic importance of the Indian Ocean
3. British strategy in this area has a three-fold aim:—
(a) To prevent the spread of communism by supporting the Central and South-
East Asia Treaty Organisations.
(b) To protect vital British and Commonwealth interests, for instance in the
Persian Gulf and Malaysia.
(c) To maintain an effective presence over the whole area so as to prevent the
development of a power vacuum.
This strategy depends at present on our use of the main bases at Aden and
Singapore and on our intermediate staging posts at Mesirah and Gan. Should any of
these facilities be denied us we should, if we wish to maintain our strategic aims,
have to reprovide the lost facilities elsewhere in the area. The possible construction
of suitably placed United States facilities across the Indian Ocean which we should be
able to use would therefore provide a very valuable insurance policy at a relatively
small premium against possible loss or limitation of use of any of these facilities. A
map of the area is at Annex II.
Analysis of United Kingdom/United States discussions
4. The Americans, as shown in the Memorandum, contemplate a greater defence
presence in the Indian Ocean to complement (but not in any way to replace) the
existing British effort in the area. This is likely to mean over a period of time:—
(a) Periodic visits by a naval task force;
(b) the installation of military communications and technical facilities;
(c) the development of base facilities (together with air staging posts) to support
United States forces.
5. It being established that Her Majesty’s Government had already welcomed
American intentions, the joint aim in the discussions was to find common ground for
the development of United States support facilities on British island possessions in
such a way that the United Kingdom would also enjoy the strategic benefits. It seems
clear that, even if their pace is slow, the Americans will definitely enter the area in
one way or another, and it is therefore in the United Kingdom’s long term interests to
strike the best bargain possible for the benefit of both countries.
6. The principles of such a bargain which the two delegations agreed to
recommend were that it would be Her Majesty’s Government’s responsibility to
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acquire land, resettle population and pay any necessary compensation. The United
States Government would be responsible for all construction and maintenance costs.
As regards joint use, the United States Government would share any facilities, during
development and subsequently, with the United Kingdom, and the two Governments
would consult as necessary about the establishment of any possible United Kingdom
military facilities that might be required (i.e. separate facilities from those developed
by the United States but in the same area).
7. From the defence point of view such a bargain should be extremely
advantageous to the United Kingdom and the joint recommendations in paragraph
12 of the Memorandum have already been strongly endorsed by the Chiefs of Staff,
though they point out that United Kingdom interests must be safe-guarded during
negotiations. From the international political point of view, the proposals are also
attractive. American interest in the area is likely to increase in any event, but as
shown in Annex B of the Memorandum the Americans are favourably disposed to
consultation with us on the political presentation of their actions. By offering our co-
operation we shall be able to influence these in a direction favourable to the policies
of Her Majesty’s Government. This influence would, however, be weakened if we
introduced unacceptable conditions before attempting to put into effect the
recommendations in paragraph 12 of the Memorandum.
8. We must, nevertheless, not overlook the United Kingdom’s reputation as a
Colonial power. It would be imprudent to expose ourselves to international and local
criticism of trafficking in Colonial territory without regard to the reasonable
interests of the colonies concerned (Mauritius and Seychelles). On the other hand we
must look to our broader responsibilities to our remaining Colonial territories all
over the world. As explained above, the United States proposals, if put into effect,
would provide a valuable alternative means of maintaining the free world’s defence
posture in the Indian Ocean and further East, which is essential if we are to continue
to be responsible in the last resort for the maintenance of law and order in and
defence of our remaining dependent territories in these areas.
Future action by the United Kingdom
9. There are, however, as the Americans recognised, considerable local political
and economic problems to be settled before we can authorise the Americans to make
any surveys. The principal difficulty lies in the fact that the most suitable island for
development as an American “austere” base is Diego Garcia in the Chagos
Archipelago which, though about 1500 miles from Mauritius, is under Mauritius
administration. We have to consider how best to arrange matters so that this island,
if developed as a base, together with the surrounding Archipelago, can be freed from
future political and economic encumbrances, which might nullify its strategic
usefulness. We must also consider how best to proceed in order to avoid damaging
our future political relations with an independent Mauritius, and, in particular,
risking the security of our important Naval Communications station on that island.
10. The course which would best satisfy our major interests would appear to be
to decide now to detach Diego Garcia (and other islands in the Chagos Archipelago),
and possibly the Agalega Islands from Mauritius, well in advance of Mauritian
independence, and to place these under direct United Kingdom administration. This
could be done by Order in Council, which could provide for the new territory to be
administered by a High Commissioner or Administrator who might be either a
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Service Officer (cf. the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus) or the Governor of the
Seychelles or of Mauritius (preferably the former) in his personal capacity (cf. British
Antarctic territory). When this has been done, or sooner if politically possible, we
should be able to tell the Americans that we were in a position to arrange a joint
survey. The Americans may however press us to arrange a survey more urgently,
before the constitutional action has been taken. We should therefore proceed with
that action as quickly as possible.
11. Formally, we have the constitutional power to take action without the
consent of the Mauritius Government, although it consists almost entirely of elected
Ministers. To do this, however, would expose us to criticism in Parliament and the
United Nations and damage our future relations with Mauritius. Moreover, in as
much as there would still be a local population, albeit very small in number, in the
Chagos Islands other than Diego Garcia, we might be criticised for creating for
strategic purposes a new Colony with a less advanced constitution than it
theoretically enjoys as part of Mauritius, and with no prospect of evolution. But this
criticism would lose most of its force if the action were accepted by Mauritian
Ministers in advance. It is therefore desirable to secure their positive consent, or
failing that, at least their acquiescence.
12. If we are to do this we are bound to take them reasonably fully into our
confidence at the outset. We have promised the Americans that we will consult them
before this is done and on the terms to be used. The Americans will be reluctant to
accept that the Mauritians should be told about the extent of United States
participation or about their specific strategic interests. In the short term it might at
first sight appear that, if only to avoid the risk of premature leaks, and the
consequent raising of the price, it would suit us better to confront the Mauritians
with a fait accompli or at most tell them at the last moment what we are doing. But
the Colonial Office are convinced, as is the Governor, that this would do lasting
damage to our relations with Mauritius and would adversely affect the facilities
which our Services now enjoy in Mauritius itself. We have considered whether the
Americans’ share in the enterprise could be concealed, but since it would eventually
become known, we could be charged with duplicity and the damage would be as great
and possibly greater. We might, however, be able to frame our explanation to the
Mauritians in language which the Americans would accept and which would refer to
the United Kingdom/United States joint interest in the Chagos Archipelago for the
defence of the free world in which the Mauritians might, as future members of the
Commonwealth, be expected to share. Such an explanation would eschew any
particular description of the nature of the strategic facilities or their purpose.
13. It must be recognised that there will be a demand for compensation, not only
to the private land owners in the Chagos Archipelago (a Seychellois consortium), but
to the Mauritius Government as the price of their consent, and possibly to the
Seychelles Government for loss of export duty on the copra which is exported
through Seychelles. There will also be a sizeable problem of re-settling the
inhabitants of Diego Garcia. Consideration of all three might best await the initial
consultation with Mauritius and subsequent surveys. We do not envisage asking the
Americans to accept any part of this bill.
14. There remains the question of Aldabra Island, which is at present under the
administration of the Seychelles. In paragraph 13 of the Memorandum the
Americans agreed to consider further the location of a site for a staging post in the
09-ConGov-Doc 53-81-cp  18/10/00  2:04 pm  Page 283
284 STRATEGY AND DEFENCE [76]
Western Indian Ocean, to balance their separate interests in staging facilities, which
we share, on the Australian-owned Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Eastern Indian
Ocean. The Americans considered Aldabra a potential site for the former purpose and
were glad to receive a copy of the survey already made by the Air Force Department.
If this idea were pursued, and we could achieve full and unimpeded use of Aldabra, it
would be a most useful strategic asset to the United Kingdom on an eventual round
Africa route to the Middle and Far East. The strategic importance of a staging post on
Aldabra would be greatly increased if, after Mauritius gains independence, we found
we could not rely on air staging facilities there in all circumstances. There would
therefore be advantage in considering how best to ensure that Aldabra Island be
retained indefinitely under Her Majesty’s Government’s direct control and at the
same time encouraging the Americans to pursue their interest in Aldabra as an air
staging post, which we would share. There might be advantage in detaching Aldabra
from the Seychelles at the same time as we detach Chagos, and possibly Agalega from
Mauritius but this needs further examination with the Governor.
76 CAB 148/1, ff 69–69A 6 May 1964
‘The Indian Ocean’: minutes of Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy
Committee discussion on Anglo-American defence interests (DO
20(64)2)1
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Chairman of the Defence
and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee (D.O. (64) 35) on United States defence
interests in the Indian Ocean.2
The Secretary of State for Defence said that the United States Government had
confirmed their readiness to proceed with the project of developing joint facilities in
the Indian Ocean. Moreover, they had undertaken to bear the substantial costs of
constructing and maintaining the proposed installations, leaving to the United
Kingdom the cost of acquiring the necessary land, resettling the population and
providing compensation. Although it was impossible at this stage to estimate what
these costs would be, these financial arrangements appeared to be greatly to the
advantage of the United Kingdom. Moreover, it was desirable on grounds of policy to
associate the United States Government as closely as possible with our defence
interests in the Indian Ocean. In these circumstances the recommendation in D.O.
(64)35 should be approved, on the basis that a joint survey of the area would now be
undertaken and that Mauritius Ministers and the Seychelles Executive Council would
be informed of the project in general terms but that final approval of the scheme
should await the outcome of this preliminary action.
In discussion the following main points were made:
(a) The joint facilities which we and the United States were proposing to develop
on Diego Garcia and Aldabra would safeguard access to the Far East but could not
in any sense be considered an alternative to our bases at Aden and Singapore.
(b) The importance of establishing a strategic air route round Africa would
1 Previous reference: see document no 74. 2 See also previous document.
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increase if, as seemed likely, air staging posts in the Mediterranean became
progressively more insecure.
(c) Even with United States assistance, however, the development of these
facilities would involve substantial additional expenditure on the defence budget.
It was therefore important that no commitment should be made at least until the
outcome of the joint survey was known.
(d) Her Majesty’s Government already had the constitutional authority to detach
the Chagos Archipelago and the Agalaga Islands from Mauritius and Aldabra from
Seychelles and to transfer them to direct United Kingdom Administration.
Nevertheless, it was desirable that both the local Governments should be induced,
if possible, to acquiesce in this excision. On the other hand we did not want to tell
Mauritius and Seychelles Ministers more than was absolutely necessary or to
inform them in any detail of the nature of the facilities to be created in the islands
in question since, if our intentions became at all widely known, we might find
ourselves under renewed attack from the Soviet Union and the United Nations.
(e) It had been agreed with the United States Government that we should consult
them about the terms of the communications which it was proposed to make to
Mauritius and Seychelles Ministers. It was also important to ensure that the
United Kingdom enjoyed joint use of any facilities which the United States
Government developed in these dependent territories and that the latter did not
develop exclusive rights of access as in the case of Ascension Island.
(f ) We must be ready to accept criticism in the United Nations that we were defer-
ring indefinitely the independence of the islands transferred to direct United
Kingdom Administration, although similar action had recently been taken without
criticism in respect of Perim3 and the Kuria Muria Islands.4 We should seek assur-
ances from the United States Government that they would support our position.
(g) It might prove preferable to move the small existing population of the islands
in question to islands remaining under their respective Colonial Governments, in
order to avoid any charge that we were preventing them from achieving
independence. It would also be important to avoid recreating the problem of the
political status of the local inhabitants by allowing the United States or United
Kingdom Services to import labour from colonial territories for work at the bases.
The Committee:—
(1) Took note with approval of D.O. (64) 35.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in consultation with the Foreign Secretary and
the Secretary of State for Defence, to draft the terms of an approach to the
Governments of Mauritius and Seychelles, informing them in general terms of our
intention to transfer the Chagos Archipelago, the Agalaga Islands and Aldabra
Island to direct United Kingdom control.
(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to instruct Her Majesty’s Ambassador at
Washington to consult the United States Government about the terms of this
approach.
(4) In the light of the action taken under Conclusions (2) and (3) above,
authorised the Colonial Secretary to approach the Governments of Mauritius and
Seychelles.
3 In Gulf of Aden, at entrance to the Red Sea. 4 Off the coast of Muscat and Oman, Arabian Sea.
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(5) Subject to the outcome of the approach under Conclusion (4), approved in
principle the despatch of a joint survey party to the islands in question.
(6) Agreed to give further consideration to the issues involved when the results of
the joint survey were known and an estimate had been made of the probable costs
of the scheme.
(7) Agreed that, in the meantime, no financial commitments should be entered
into.
77 FO 371/174488, no 13 17 June 1964
[Policy and strategy in the Gulf: Aden and Kuwait]: letter from Sir W
Luce (Bahrain) to R S Crawford (FO) [Extract]
Thinking ahead, there are two possible developments in this part of the world either,
or both, of which would have a very important bearing on our position and policy in
the Gulf and our military deployment in support of them. As I imagine that there will
be a review of British global strategy after the General Election, whatever the result,
this is perhaps the right time to take a closer look at these things. The two possible
developments I have in mind are:—
(a) the loss of our military facilities in Aden before perhaps the end of this decade
without the establishment of an alternative base; and
(b) the abandonment by Kuwait of our military support under Point 4 of the
Exchange of Notes of June 19, 1961.
2. . . . As regards (b) above, the possibility of Kuwait deciding to dispense with
our military support has long been in our minds and has been mentioned in
correspondence a number of times. . . . A combination of growing Kuwaiti confidence
in their own military strength, continued good relations with Iraq, pressure from
Egypt and an increasing tendency on the part of the Amir to defer to Kuwaiti opinion
in the Assembly could, in my opinion, bring about the shedding of our military
support even in the life-time of the present Amir. . . .
3. Neither of the two eventualities I have mentioned would, as I see it, change
our interests in the Gulf area. The loss of the base in Aden would not in itself do so
though it would seriously affect the present means by which we protect the most
important of those interests. The shedding by Kuwait of our military support would
relieve us of our main and most difficult military commitment in the Gulf but would
not ipso facto reduce our interest in Kuwait’s continued independence, though it
might increase the threat to that interest; nor would it affect our other interests in
the Gulf. Before I go further it might be useful to restate briefly British interests in
this area. They are:—
(a) the exclusion of communism and Russian political influence;
(b) continued access to oil supplies on reasonable terms;
(c) the safeguarding of our military lines of communication through Masira
Island.
These can be summed up in the primary interest of the continuance of political and
economic stability in the area.
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4. I see no likelihood that these interests will decline in the next 10–15 years. On
the contrary, close examination in 1963 of probable future oil consumption and
sources of supply showed that the free world, and Britain and Western Europe in
particular, will within that period require from the Gulf area at least twice as much
oil as they are getting now. As British and Western dependence on Gulf oil increases
so Russian interest in penetrating the area will grow. Similarly, our interest in the
continued stability of the area, far from declining, will grow stronger. It cannot be
said too often that within the general instability of the Middle East the Gulf is
inherently the most unstable sector of all. The seeming paradox of its present
stability by comparison with the rest of the Middle East arises solely from our
presence. It is in fact a power vacuum which we have filled for the past 150 years.
With the realisation that it is also the world’s greatest source of oil, power pressures
on the walls of the vacuum have increased and we correspondingly have had to fill it
more strongly. I think that it would in fact be more correct to say that there is a
vacuum within a vacuum; the outer vacuum includes Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia and
is under pressure from Russia and Egypt; the inner vacuum includes only the Gulf
States from Kuwait to Muscat and is under pressure not only from Russia and Egypt
but also from the above three components of the outer vacuum. We ourselves fill the
inner vacuum and, with one exception since 1958, the Americans and we between us
go a long way towards filling the outer one. The exception is of course Iraq which is a
weakness neither we nor the Americans can do much about at present.
5. It is a common theme in the British press and elsewhere today that the
presence of British troops in the Gulf is not the best way to ensure the continued
flow of oil, with the implication that it would be better to withdraw our forces and let
the Arabs’ desire to sell their oil do the rest. This seems to me a dangerously facile
and naive argument which ignores the realities of the situation. Of course no-one in
their senses would suggest that the presence of British forces can in itself ensure the
continued flow of oil or that these forces should be more than the barest minimum
required to maintain our position. But political and economic stability, which I do
believe to be essential to the continued flow of oil on reasonable terms both on the
present scale and even more in the greatly increased quantities which will be
required in the future, can only be maintained in a power vacuum by the exercise of
power. Our political position here, based on treaty relations with the States, would
collapse under external pressures were it not supported, and seen to be supported, by
military power. In order not to be accused of begging the question I should state
briefly the reasons for my belief that stability is essential to the continued flow of oil
on reasonable terms. I have often expressed my conviction that without the stability
we provide in this power vacuum the area would become a jungle of smash-and-grab;
the longer I serve here the stronger that conviction becomes. Iran would seize the
islands of Tunb and Bu Musa and would also quite possibly try to occupy Bahrain and
parts of the Trucial Coast; Saudi Arabia would want Bahrain and Abu Dhabi; Iraq
would be tempted to seize Kuwait; and Egypt would do her utmost to overthrow the
traditional regimes and establish her own hegemony in their place. A chronic state of
hostilities between Iran and the Arabs on the one hand and revolution and
internecine disputes in and among the Arab States on the other would create a
situation of such chaos that I simply cannot believe that the flow of oil would remain
unaffected; pipelines and other oil installations are favourite targets for sabotage. I
find it even more difficult to believe that the enormous additional capital investment
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required over the years to double the flow of oil would be forthcoming in such
conditions. Apart from the physical flow of oil, there would be two other threats;
first, the concentration of the sources of oil in fewer hands and therefore a greater
danger of the consuming countries being held to ransom; secondly, the
nationalisation of the production of oil by revolutionary Arab Socialist regimes
established under Egyptian or Iraqi influence, with all that this would mean in
dislocation of the oil industry, capital loss to British interests and damage to the
British balance of payments. Behind all this would loom the Russian and communist
menace, for only they would benefit from such a situation. These may sound alarmist
views to some but I am convinced that they are not exaggerated.
6. To return to the two eventualities I am envisaging, my conclusion from the
foregoing is that they should not affect our ends and aims of policy but that they
would inevitably affect our means of achieving them. Above all, they should not lead
to the withdrawal of visible military support for our political position and influence
in the Gulf; it is an obvious truism that it is better to deter trouble than to have to
intervene to cure it. On the other hand, we must recognise that it would not be
politically feasible locally, nor I imagine in H.M.G.’s wider interests, to build up a
military base in the Gulf area in any way comparable with the present base in Aden. I
will take first what I believe on the whole to be the most likely situation: the
shedding by Kuwait of our military support before the loss of our military base in
Aden. While this would put the future independence of Kuwait at greater risk and
would therefore increase the threat to an important British interest, it would also
relieve us of our heaviest and most difficult military commitment in the area, on the
assumption that we would not go into Kuwait after Point 4 of the Agreement had
ceased to hold good, and would therefore make the subsequent loss of the Aden base
less harmful. We should have to rely mainly on normal diplomatic means to meet
any subsequent threat to the independence of Kuwait, but I suggest that the
continued presence of a British battalion, a squadron of ground attack fighters and
some transport aircraft in Bahrain might still act to some extent as a deterrent
against an attack on Kuwait. It would not necessarily be known to Iraq or Egypt that
we would not intervene without the agreement of the Kuwait Government nor would
they necessarily know whether we had arrangements for the rapid reinforcement of
our forces in the Gulf. As for our oil interests elsewhere in the area, Kuwait oil has
hitherto dominated our thinking but it should be remembered that within the next
10 years British companies in the southern Gulf might possibly be producing some
70 million tons per annum of sterling oil—40–50 million tons from Abu Dhabi, 12
or more from Qatar and 10 or more from Muscat, the latter being of course still
problematical. To provide the necessary visible military support for our political
position, to deal with possible internal security requirements in Bahrain and Qatar
and to provide reinforcement if necessary for the Trucial Oman Scouts, I consider
that our minimum requirements of land and air forces would be a British battalion
group and the appropriate number of transport and communication aircraft. The
continued presence of a ground attack fighter squadron would be valuable and, as I
have suggested above, might provide some deterrent against an attack on Kuwait.
Similarly, the continued presence of an armoured car squadron at Sharjah would be
valuable as backing for the Trucial Oman Scouts. Any necessary reinforcement of
these forces in the Gulf would presumably continue to come from Aden, though
without the Kuwait commitment its scale and urgency would be greatly reduced.
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7. The next situation to consider is where, Kuwait having already shed our
military support, we lose the base in Aden. Our military requirements in the Gulf
would remain as described in the preceding paragraph and the only new problems
would concern their logistic support and their reinforcement if necessary. I imagine
that neither of these would present any insuperable problems particularly if, as I
believe would be politically feasible, logistic facilities in Bahrain were increased to a
minor extent.
8. The third possible, and much the most difficult, permutation is the loss of the
Aden base while we still have the Kuwait commitment. It would be for consideration
at the time whether circumstances, such as the strength of the Kuwait forces, had
altered to an extent which would justify a substantial change in our plan for
intervention with a view to reducing both its scale and urgency and thereby
mitigating the difficulties created by the loss of Aden. If no relief could be found in
this way we should be faced with the worst case: the present plan for intervention in
Kuwait without the use of Aden. . . .
9. It remains to consider the important question of the political effects which
either or both of the eventualities I am discussing would have on our position in the
Gulf and therefore on the political feasibility of the military ideas I have put forward.
The abandonment by Kuwait of our military support would, I think, be regarded by
the Gulf Rulers as a rash act but would not in itself be considered a reason for
weakening their relationship with H.MG. Indeed it could work the other way in that
they might conclude that the increased threat of a take-over by Iraq or of a pro-
Nasser coup in Kuwait would bring those same dangers nearer to them. The loss of
the Aden base would be a more serious matter. . . .
If we were forced out of Aden our prestige in the Gulf would suffer severely and
faith in our powers of protection would be correspondingly weakened; this in turn
might cause the Rulers to change their attitude towards us or at least to resist
committing themselves any deeper to us. . . .
10. You will note that throughout this letter, I have based my ideas on the
assumption that we shall maintain our political and military headquarters in the
Gulf in Bahrain. As long as we have the Kuwait commitment, the military
requirements are decisive in this respect and it is hardly credible that if we had been
forced out of Bahrain we should still have that commitment. I have considered
whether, having shed the Kuwait commitment, there would be any necessity for or
advantage in long-term planning for the loss of our position in Bahrain and Qatar
and withdrawal to a last-stand position in the Trucial States and the Sultanate of
Muscat. I have rejected this idea for a number of reasons:—
(a) The Ruler of Bahrain is and will probably remain, if handled aright, our most
genuine friend in the Gulf; against this, Bahrain is at present more susceptible
than the Trucial States to Arab nationalist subversion but I am reasonably
confident that provided Saudi Arabia remains stable the Bahrain security forces,
with the presence of British forces, can deal with any trouble which is likely to
arise from the local population; in addition, Bahrain being a small island, internal
security and defence are easier to control. Our security of tenure in Bahrain is
therefore probably as good as anywhere in the Gulf;
(b) Our unilateral withdrawal from Bahrain and Qatar would be a gross breach of
our treaty of obligations and a betrayal of our long-standing friendship with the Al
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Khalifa and would so alienate the Trucial Coast Rulers as to make our position in
that area untenable;
(c) Our abandonment of Bahrain would precipitate the danger of Iranian
intervention and the risk of Iranian/Arab hositilities which, to say the least, would
be acutely embarrassing to ourselves and the Americans;
(d) Apart from the above points, the cost of transferring our political and military
organisation from Bahrain to the Trucial Coast would be great and I doubt if it
could be justified for the sake of a last and necessarily precarious toe-hold on the
south-eastern corner of Arabia.
I think therefore that for present purposes we should continue to regard our
position from Bahrain to Masira as indivisible.
11. I think that it would not be out of place to add that while the first of the
interests mentioned in paragraph 3 above directly affects the Gulf area itself, it also
has many broader implications. The stability resulting from our presence in the Gulf
and the continuation in power of Shaikhly regimes and a merchant class dependent
on it makes the area unreceptive to communism at least until an educated proletariat
emerges. But that same stability, and the presence of the military forces on which it
is at present partly based, has a deterrent effect on possible Soviet ambitions in the
surrounding area in the context of limited war and subversion. . . .
12. I do not propose to make this letter even longer by considering possible long-
term policies for replacing the Pax Britannica in the Gulf area. This has been the
subject of much thought and of recent correspondence. This letter has been written
on the assumption that no such valid alternative solution for the stability of the area
has been devised before either or both of the eventualities I have discussed occur.
13. To sum up my conclusions:—
(a) Neither the abandonment by Kuwait of our military support nor the loss of our
military base in Aden within the next few years would change the nature or scale of
our interests in the Gulf area though they would affect the present means by
which we protect them;
(b) Continued stability in the Gulf area is the basic requirement for the protection
of our interests; assuming that no valid alternative to the stability which we at
present provide had emerged before either of the eventualities in (a) occurred, it
would be essential that H.M.G. continue to maintain the stability of this inherently
unstable area;
(c) Our special political position alone would not be sufficient to ensure stability
in a power vacuum; it must be seen to be supported by some degree of military
power;
(d) If we were relieved of the Kuwait commitment the necessary military
deployment within the Gulf would be modest in scale and certainly no stronger
than at present and should present no particular political difficulty;
(e) If we lost Aden but still had the Kuwait commitment the scale and urgency of
our intervention plan would no doubt require a stronger deployment of British
forces within the Gulf; political considerations rule out a base comparable with
Aden and would impose a limit on the scale of deployment;
(f ) In all the circumstances envisaged, the maintenance of our position in Bahrain
is a factor of great importance. . . .
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78 FO 371/174481, no 10 13 July 1964
‘Saudi Arabia, and the future of Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States’:
memorandum by D C P Gracie (FO)1
. . . Our main interest in the Gulf is in regular supplies of oil on the best obtainable
terms. Our subsidiary interest is in stability, which is valuable both in itself, and in
support of our main interest.
2. These interests are best served by the survival of the Shaikhly regimes,
because:—
(a) They represent the status quo. Their downfall might be violent, with
consequent disruption of supplies, damage to installations, and falling profits.
(b) Their overthrow would probably lead to the absorption of the Gulf States, by
one or more of their neighbours, and a consequent increase in OPEC’s collective
bargaining strength.
(c) They are less inclined to extreme oil policies than revolutionary régimes. The
attitude of the Shah and Prince Faisal, for example, is much more favourable than
that of men like Mussadeq (Abadan) Qasim (Law 80) Arif (Iraq’s OPEC policy)
Nasser (Nationalisation of Shell) and Ben Bella.2 This attitude reflects in part the
monarchists’ temperament, and in part their weakness. Their disqualification from
the Cold War game makes them dependent on us. Moreover, extreme policies lead
to instability, which threatens their survival.
3. It is therefore in our interest to honour our commitments to the Shaikhly
régimes. We must however remember that these interests and this policy conflict
with the ambitions of Nasser (and the growing number of Arabs, both in producing
and non-producing countries, who think like him). We work for the status quo,
disunity, and cheap oil; he for revolution, unity, and the maximum return on oil
under his own control, or at least his influence. Our strongest ally is the self-interest
of producing countries. His is Arab nationalism and xenophobia, whipped up by his
propaganda machine, and expressing itself finally in subversive activities. Two
consequences follow. First, our intervention must be kept to the minimum. If it is
too blatant, self-interest is submerged in hatred, the strongest unifying force in the
Middle East. Secondly, it is in our interest that the Rulers should not lose the support
of their people. The more they do, the greater Nasser’s opportunities for subversion.
Unfortunately, the Rulers are slow to reform, and we cannot compel them. The
people of Qatar and Abu Dhabi, at least, are becoming alienated from their Rulers.
4. The instrument of our policy is our military presence, which deters Iraqi
aggression on Kuwait and is at hand to support the forces of the Rulers of Bahrain,
Qatar, and the Trucial States in maintaining order. The removal of our forces would
lead to a power vacuum, which might encourage aggression by Saudi Arabia, Iraq
and Iran. These considerations still outweigh the argument that foreign troops in
Arabia themselves generate instability. At present, our forces are accepted by the
Rulers (who need them); by the Shah and Prince Faisal (who find their presence
1 Arabian Dept.
2 M A Ben Bella, a key figure in the Algerian war of independence, and Algeria’s first prime minister,
1962–1963, and president, 1963–1965.
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reassuring) and so far by Nasser (who has not liked to see any of the Gulf States
absorbed by Iraq, Saudi Arabia or Iran, and has himself been in no position to assume
the commitment). If the 1961 defence undertakings to Kuwait were abrogated, we
should have to examine whether the position could not be held by training missions,
and plans for intervention from the United Kingdom, backed by diplomatic pressure
from us and the United States. Until then, we should stay as we are, in a “hull down”
position; i.e., our forces should present the minimum target to nationalist attack that
is consistent with achieving our aim.
5. Our political presence in Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States consists of two
elements: first, the conduct of foreign relations, which derives from the exclusive
treaties; and secondly, jurisdiction, and a number of administrative functions, which
derive partly from custom and partly from agreements other than the treaties. We
have already begun to retrocede our jurisdiction and certain of our administrative
functions; but since we are allowing the Rulers to set the pace, progress is very slow.
Moreover, we have no plans to abolish the 19th Century Treaties, or to put the
conduct of the Ruler’s foreign relations on a new basis. This paper argues that we
should accelerate and extend the process we have begun.
6. The benefit to us from the political structure is nil. Although we say we are
responsible for the foreign relations of the Rulers, we have no control of policy. The
result is responsibility without power. We cannot persuade the Ruler of Qatar, for
example, to adopt a moderate policy in OPEC. Our efforts to induce the Rulers of
Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi to reform only embitter our relations with them. It is
difficult to think of an instance in recent years where by virtue of our political
position, we have been able to persuade any of the Nine Rulers to act contrary to
their own inclination.
7. The decisive reason for dismantling the structure is that if he chooses, Nasser
can use it as a fulcrum about which to exert pressure, first on our military position in
the Gulf, and secondly on the Kuwaitis, to get them to abrogate the 1961
commitment. The 19th Century Treaties are much better material at the United
Nations and on the “Voice of the Arabs” than 1965 Exchanges of Letters on the 1961
model, which Kuwait’s policy has made respectable. The Treaties (and the political
structure as a whole) are offensive to Arabs because they treat a part of the Arab
World as if it were still in the Indian Empire; because by excluding Arab
Representatives, they interrupt inter-Arab relations; and because they supply
convincing evidence that Britain controls policy in the Gulf, and is impeding reform
in order to exploit Arab oil, through the provisions which give her control of award of
concessions. Nothing could be more calculated to excite Arab xenophobia than a
campaign against the Treaties. The result would be strikes, sabotage and general
instability in the oil producing States of the Gulf. The fact that Nasser has not yet
detonated this weapon should not prevent us from taking steps to render it harmless.
8. There are a number of other arguments for dismantling our political
structure:—
(a) By enlisting the cooperation of the Saudis, we might achieve a settlement over
Buraimi, and a Saudi recognition of the independence of the nine States within
their present frontiers. . . . This would be the first step towards the Arabian
Peninsula solidarity, envisaged by Sir William Luce.
(b) Our political structure insulates the Rulers from international criticism,
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induces in them a false sense of security, and blinds them to the need for reform.
They thereby lose the support of their subjects, and store up trouble for
themselves and for us.
(c) It is a nightmare to administer, because of its many anomalies, and because it
allows us no power.
(d) It is contrary to our general policy of decolonisation.
(e) It will increasingly alienate the rest of the Arab world (and to a lesser extent
Asia and Africa) and frustrate our policies there. Odium can be borne if necessary;
but it is foolish for a trading nation to incur it unnecessarily.
(f ) If Nasser can represent the Gulf as a Colonialist issue, we must expect
indifferent support from the United States Government.
(g) If we reform of our own accord, we shall appear wise; if we are forced to
reform, we shall be thought weak.
9. Those who defend our political structure generally concede that it has no
intrinsic value, but argue first, that its abolition would prejudice our military
facilities, and secondly, that it must be kept going until the States are viable.
10. According to the first argument, abolition of the Treaties would mean in the
first place United Arab Republic and other Arab Consuls, who would incite opposition
to our military facilities; and secondly, alarm among the Rulers, who would fear a
scuttle, and would seek to “re-insure” by demanding the withdrawal of our forces.
The proposal attached to this paper meets the first objection by suggesting that
Saudi Arabia should, for the time being, represent the Rulers at the Arab League and
other Arab countries, and the second by proposing a change which we can show is
more one of form than of substance.
11. But the objections have in any case little force. Would United Arab Republic
Consuls add so much to Nasser’s power to make trouble in the Gulf States? They are
already full of his agents, and potential agents. His chief weapon is the radio, and
diplomatic relations would, if anything, inhibit its overt use. If proof of his power is
required, consider the strikes and demonstrations in several Gulf States in April
1963, or the cool touch of the Ruler of Qatar by Anwar Sadat3 for the Yemen War. A
United Arab Republic Consul could have done no better.
12. It is not clear how or with whom the Rulers would “re-insure”. Their grant of
military facilities is based on their need for money and security. Where else could
they go for these? Kuwait’s size and wealth meant that she did not need the income,
and could achieve the security by skilful diplomacy. Even so, she retained our
commitment to her defence. The Ruler of Bahrain lacks the cards, the skill and the
will to play such a delicate game. He is as dependent on us as the Sultan of Muscat,
who though a sovereign Ruler accepts the presence of British troops. (Compare also
Malaysia; and Libya, until she acquired an alternative source of income).
13. It is surely wrong to argue that our political structure should be kept going
until the States are viable. As the paper has attempted to show, our political structure
is in fact delaying progress by obscuring the need for it. The analogy with a Colony is
misleading, for in the Gulf we have no power to compel progress. The
administrations in Bahrain and Qatar were the work of the British advisers, not of
the Political Agents, and things have been marking time since their expulsion in
3 M Anwar el-Sadat, subsequently president of Egypt, 1970–1981 (assassinated).
09-ConGov-Doc 53-81-cp  18/10/00  2:04 pm  Page 293
294 STRATEGY AND DEFENCE [79]
1956 and 1960 respectively. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi treats his British Adviser with
contempt.
14. I therefore conclude that for the reasons given in paragraphs 7 and 8, there is
a prima facie case that our political structure in the Persian Gulf should be
dismantled; and I recommend that study should be given to the attached proposal.
79 CAB 148/7, ff 28–29, 32–36 22 Sept 1964
‘British policy towards South-East Asia’: memorandum by FO officials
for Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee
(DO(0)(64)59) [Extract]
Summary
This paper seeks to redefine British policy towards South-East Asia in the light of the
current situation and of likely developments over roughly the next decade.
2. It reaches the following conclusions:
(a) South-East Asia is of relatively little economic importance to Britain; but
politically we have a substantial interest in preventing its absorption by
Communism, and we need to maintain our effort in the area if we are to keep our
position as a world power and the United States’ principal partner.
(b) Communist absorption of South-East Asia can best be avoided by working for
the ultimate neutralisation of the area, in agreement tacit or formal between the
West and the Communist powers.
(c) This means a recognition by the West that any excessive desire to retain a
military presence and direct political influence in the area is likely to encourage an
unnatural alliance between local nationalism and communism. In the long term
Britain and her allies must accept that only a genuine non-alignment in South-
East Asia can make the containment of communism an attainable objective.
(d) Meanwhile, however, a delicate balance has to be struck between these dangers
of staying too long and the opposite dangers of withdrawing too fast. Any Western
“defeat” in South-East Asia will equally render impossible the long term objective
described above. Military measures will therefore remain essential until the
prospect of eventual agreement emerges more clearly.
(e) The Americans will have to make the running in both the military field
(SEATO) and the economic field (aid and technical assistance), but Britain’s power
to influence American policy will depend on our making a respectable
contribution.
(f ) A British military contribution will require the continuation for the time being
of our Singapore base, and also the continuation of our defence of Malaysia against
Indonesian hostility; our economic contribution should be mainly concentrated
on Malaysia.
(g) British policy must distinguish between what is attainable in the Continental
Region, where the proximity of China is the dominant feature; and in the
Archipelago, where the West is at less of a geographical disadvantage.
(h) In the Continental Region (Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam)
our objective should be the eventual emergence of régimes that combine being
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sufficiently subservient to be acceptable to China with being sufficiently non-
Communist to be acceptable to the Americans; however unsatisfactory in other
ways, in this respect the present state of Burma and Cambodia provides a possible
illustration. In Vietnam it must be recognised that there is at present no third
alternative to American involvement or Communism; but it is not at all impossible
that, with time, this situation could change.
(i) In the Archipelago some form of loose association between Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines (“Maphilindo”) probably offers the best hope for their future
stability. This will not be achieved as long as “confrontation” continues against
Malaysia and it is a British interest to continue support of Malaysia against this.
But we must accept that part of the price for such an association will probably be
our military withdrawal from the area. Australian and Japanese influence in the
Archipelago may grow and become a useful counter to Chinese pressure.
(j) A neutral South-East Asia will only be able to stand on its own feet with
substantial economic and technical aid. But such aid and technical assistance
should so far as possible be co-ordinated with other donor countries. Some form of
consortium of Western donors (including Japan) could provide the best means of
achieving this.
. . .
II. British interests
. . .
10. The first of these is that the whole area should not slide progressively into a
vassal relationship with China and subsequently into communism. The Sino-Soviet
split has given something of a new dimension to this problem. Except in Burma,
where only one of three main Communist groupings is pro-Chinese, Communist
parties throughout the area are either ideologically in sympathy with China or at
least subject to substantial Chinese influence and pressure. For the Soviet Union,
therefore the success of communism could mean a dangerous loss of power and
influence to the advantage of China. Russian influence is thus likely on the whole to
be exerted in favour of local nationalist but probably not Communist leaders.
Sukarno is a good example, and an indication that in this respect the Sino-Soviet
split is not likely to work in Britain’s favour. In any case, whatever the likely
development of relations between China and the Soviet Union, it must remain a
major British interest to prevent the decisive change in the balance of world power
that would result from the absorption of 230 million people into the Communist
system—whether it be of the Soviet, the “Titoist” or, perhaps most dangerous and
certainly most likely in Asia, the Chinese variety. Such a political triumph would
have worldwide repercussions highly damaging to Western interests in general and
to British interests in particular; whether in terms of alterations in voting strength at
the United Nations; of the impact on other countries (such as India or Japan) more
closely exposed to the threat of Communist expansion from the area; of the increased
military threat to Australia and New Zealand (see paragraph 12 below), not least
because bases for the bombardment and air or sea blockade of these countries could
be brought much nearer; or of the accretion to Communist economic and military
potential represented by the resources of South-East Asia. Perhaps most important of
all, the effect on the prestige and policies of the United States would be incalculable;
as it would in consequence be on the partnership between Britain and America
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elsewhere in the world and on American relationships with her other Western
partners in the Atlantic Alliance. This impact would be particularly damaging to us if
American opinion felt justified in attributing any substantial part of the
responsibility for Communist success to a failure by Britain to meet her
“responsibilities” in the area. This consideration, indeed, is related to our second
major political interest in the area.
11. This is, by playing the fullest possible role, political, economic and military,
in South-East Asia to contribute effectively to the global Anglo–American
partnership and to maintain that influence in the shaping of United States policies
that is cardinal to the conduct of our whole foreign policy. South-East Asia is of
major interest to the United Kingdom as a scene of conflict between the United
States and the Communist Powers which has in the past repeatedly given rise to
threats of war and may do so again in the future. Because of the obvious danger that
war starting in South-East Asia could ultimately imperil the United Kingdom, we
have a major interest in being able to influence United States policy in that region.
But the extent of our influence will depend, in the last resort, on the value to the
United States of our political and military support for their policies in South-East
Asia. There is no question of our military assistance being decisive or even perhaps
significant. But successive United States Governments have always attached great
political importance (mainly for domestic reasons) to British association with their
military commitments in this area. As long, therefore, as our military presence in
South-East Asia enables us to exercise a major influence on United States policies, it
is worth retaining for this reason alone. There is also the important consideration
that American support for British interests in other areas of the world is more likely
to be forthcoming if we continue to afford them support in South-East Asia. They
tend to regard this area as more vital than we do, but there are other parts of the
world where the reverse is true, and globally, we need their support more than they
need ours.
12. Thirdly, the denial of South-East Asia to a powerful enemy is vital to the
interests of Australia and New Zealand, countries where British investment has
increased in recent years and with which British trade will remain substantial; and to
which Britain is strongly bound by ties of race and sentiment, expressed in their
Commonwealth membership. Peace and stability in South-East Asia is of
considerable importance to the maintenance of these links and to the protection of
these important British financial and commercial interests.
13. Finally, we have a further positive interest which is to some extent the
counterpart to the apparently negative one set out in paragraph 10 above. If we wish
to deny the area to communism, it is essential that it should develop economically
and enjoy reasonable political stability. Without these pre-conditions, whatever we
or the Americans do will inevitably remain ineffective. So we have an important
general interest in the prosperity and political stability of South-East Asia.
III. Singapore
14. The Singapore base and the substantial military effort deployed from it (see
paragraph 8 above) were designed to safeguard these interests and in particular:
(a) to back up the efforts of the United States and SEATO in containing
Communism in South-East Asia;
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(b) to protect Malaysia, under our Defence Treaty commitment;
(c) to contribute to the forward defence of (and act as a link with) Australia and
New Zealand;
(d) to keep open communications between the Indian and Pacific Oceans;
(e) to provide a rear link for our military presence in Hong Kong and a base for
the defence of Fiji and other British Islands in the Pacific.
15. To examine these purposes in the reverse order, it is clear that (e) is
nowadays of no more than marginal importance. The loss of Singapore would shake
our position in Hong Kong and call in question our capacity to remain there; but the
Singapore base facilities are not essential for our Hong Kong garrison to remain
effective either for internal security purposes or as a trip-wire to identify Chinese
aggression. The Pacific Islands are unimportant, although internal security and the
denial of these islands to Communist strategy remain a Western interest.
16. The objective of (d) is important for our communications with Hong Kong
and even more important, particularly to the Americans and the Japanese, for
communications westwards to India. But communications between the two oceans
are not dependent on the Singapore base and could no doubt be kept open in its
absence.
17. As regards (c), Singapore is nowadays only one link in a chain of which many
of the other links are steadily weakening. Circumstances in the Middle East and
Africa over the next few years may bring us to the point where the only sure means of
military communication with Australia in an emergency will be the West-about route
via North America instead of east-about via Singapore; though an Indian Ocean route
may emerge from present Anglo–United States discussions.
18. The importance of (b) above is self-evident at present. But in establishing
Malaysia in order (among other things) to provide the right political environment for
our strategic deployment in the area, we have in fact created a situation in which our
strategy is largely nullified by the need to use most of our available forces to defend
Malaysia. In the long run, our interests will be best served by a political settlement
between Malaysia and Indonesia. The way in which a settlement could come about
cannot be foreseen, but in some circumstances it might be incompatible with our
continued tenure of the Singapore base.
19. The objective of (a) above, related as it is to our major political interest in
South-East Asia, will remain valid for some time to come. Its effectiveness is
diminished at present by the fact that the bulk of our land forces in the area have
their hands too full with the Borneo fighting (or with internal security duties in
Singapore itself) to be readily available for SEATO service. But the Singapore base
itself is not fully occupied with Malaysia’s war with Indonesia, and it would be
valuable as a centre for the deployment in an emergency of SEATO forces, including
British air and naval forces even if no British troops were available. Moreover, the
existence and proximity of this Western base is reassuring to Thailand as well as to
Malaysia.
20. British standing in the Far East has long been associated with the existence
of a large British base in Singapore. If this were given up, countries in the area (and
particularly Japan) might revise their policy towards us, although they would be less
likely to do so if alternative facilities were available which allowed a British military
presence in the Far East to continue.
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21. At present, therefore, Singapore remains important to the protection of our
interests in South-East Asia. But it seems clear not only that its long-term military
value is declining but also that politically it is becoming, however gradually, a liability.
22. It is true that nationalist opinion in South-East Asia seems less militantly
opposed to foreign bases than in the Middle East. Malaysia welcomes the base, at
present, in its struggle with Indonesia; and memories of the emergency are still fresh
in Kuala Lumpur. The base is also an important source of revenue and an element of
stability in Singapore island. But this attitude cannot long continue. Future
Malaysian Governments are likely to be more radical than at present and less tolerant
of foreign military establishments. The retention of the base, even if we had not yet
been specifically asked to leave, could progressively compromise our friendly
relations with Malaysia. But without this friendship the base would hardly be tenable.
Clearly our planning should be directed to establishing how our abiding political
interests in South-East Asia can be protected by means other than the Singapore
base, so that we shall be in a position to withdraw from it if possible before we are
requested to do so.
23. Singapore, however, looms at present so large in British policy-making
throughout South-East Asia that to devise policies for the day when we may decide to
leave it requires a radical re-appraisal. This paper will not try to specify the point in
time at which we can abandon all military interest in the area; nor to discuss how,
meanwhile, we could deploy military force once we had left Singapore—beyond
saying that, if we still thought it necessary and were prepared to pay the price (which
would be very large) the improved logistic techniques of the future could make it
feasible for us to keep an amphibious force in or near South-East Asian waters,
operating either from an “austere base” in the Indian Ocean or from a more elaborate
one in Australia. (The latter would of course require Australian agreement, but this
seems likely to become easier to secure, as Australia grows increasingly aware of the
threat from the north.) . . .
80 CAB 148/7, ff 270–284 12 Oct 1964
‘Report of the Long-Term Study Group’ (chairman, P Rogers),
Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee
(DO(O)(64)72) [Extract]
[In calling for this analysis of ‘politico-strategic policy’, ministers signalled their
intention to keep planning issues under regular review as a continuous process and part
of the normal business of policy-making. They sought investigation of ‘hypothetical
alternative policies’ rather than advice on current decisions, so that general principles for
future politico-strategic policy might be formulated and developed. The committee would
consist of representatives of the FO, CRO, CO, MoD and Treasury (CAB 148/5, ff 138–139,
note by Sir B Trend, 19 May 1964, DO(0)(64)29). The records of its meetings (8 June–19
Oct 1964) are in CAB 148/7; the memos generated are in CAB 148/8–10, DO(0)(S)(64).]
Introduction and terms of reference
The Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee decided on 8th May that the
Long-Term Study Group should be set up to carry out certain studies of the politico-
strategic considerations affecting United Kingdom interests in South East Asia, the
Middle East and Europe. . . .
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2. It will be seen that our terms of reference directed us in effect to make two
distinct but correlated analyses. First, specific studies of three areas; and secondly, in
the light of these, a study of the general principles by reference to which our future
politico-strategic policy should be formulated and developed.
3. The three areas were the Far East, the Middle East and Europe. In regard to
the Far East and the Middle East, we were instructed to assume that within the next
decade Britain had been deprived by one means or another of the bases at Singapore
or Aden or both; and on this hypothesis, to study how far the changed situation
would permit us to continue to protect and maintain our interests and to discharge
our remaining commitments; how far both the interests and the commitments
would have to be contracted or modified; and by what alternative means, whether
political, military or economic or a combination of all three, we could continue to
make an effective contribution to the peace and stability of the region concerned. In
the case of Europe, our purpose was to enquire whether Her Majesty’s Government
must regard themselves as indefinitely committed, for political or military reasons,
to maintaining troops in the European theatre at the present level and whether (and
if so, by what means) we could achieve a comparable political effect if their number
were diminished substantially.
4. These terms of reference represented a distinctly more radical approach than
that underlying previous studies of this nature in recent years. The main reason for
this was that previous studies had tended, largely because their point of departure
was the existing situation, to result primarily in a justification of that situation; or at
least in a reasoned acceptance of the British commitments arising out of it. It was
hoped that if the Study Group were asked to take as their point of departure, however
hypothetically, a substantially modified situation, this might enable them to throw
fresh light on the relevance of our existing commitments to our real interests. We
believe that this approach has been justified.
5. Our terms of reference emphasised that three separate studies were required
of three distinct problems. But each of these is also related to Britain’s position in the
world and the role she should seek to play during the next ten years; to the extent of
the strain on our Armed Forces that the military backing necessary to sustain this
role may entail; as well as to the financial problems involved in the maintenance of
substantial armed forces overseas; and to the general economic situation of the
United Kingdom. . . .
The three regional studies
9. The conclusions of the three studies which are circulated separately can be
summarised as follows—
(a) Singapore. The main long-term British interest in South East Asia is that it
should not fall under Chinese domination. . . .
(b) Aden. Our major interests in the area served by the Aden base are the
prevention of Communist domination and the maintenance of the supply of oil on
satisfactory terms.
These interests are best served by political stability in the area, by the Western
orientation of Iran, by the existence of the major oil producing Arab countries as
separate entities and by the maintenance of law and order in those countries.
Our military presence is an important factor in ensuring the continuance of the
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uneasy equilibrium of the area around the Persian Gulf and a total withdrawal
from the area would involve such serious risks that we could not voluntarily incur
them.
There are two views on the contribution made by our military presence in the
area to the support of our oil interests. On the one hand it is argued that it is not a
major factor and that so far as oil is concerned we could withdraw our forces from
the area and rely on normal diplomatic and commercial processes. On the other
hand it is argued that unless we maintain a military presence, at least in the
Persian Gulf area after a withdrawal from Aden, the probable breakdown of the
present uneasy equilibrium would seriously affect our oil interests.
There remains the question, which would have to be decided at the time, what
size our military presence in the Persian Gulf should be if we were going to
withdraw from Aden. The main military effect of withdrawal would be that, while
we could still go to the help of Kuwait if she were attacked, we should no longer
have the same chance of preventing Iraqi conquest of Kuwait as the present
military plan gives us. Our other interests and commitments in the area could
however be supported and maintained by some increase in the forces now
stationed in the Persian Gulf if certain alternative military facilities were built up
in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf area. Capability to intervene in East
Africa would be on a reduced scale.
A withdrawal would have to be preceded by political preparations designed to
ensure that we could leave in good order, with the minimum disturbance to the
area and with the co-operation necessary if we decided to create alternative
military facilities. This would require some demonstration, in particular to the
Shah of Iran and the Gulf Rulers, that our support for them would continue. It
would also be necessary at the time of withdrawal to make some reassessment of
our present degree of political and financial support for the Federal Rulers and the
moderate Adeni politicians in the South Arabian Federation. . . .
(c) Europe. Major changes in Soviet policy towards the West that could justify
reducing our present troop commitments are unlikely within the next ten years.
Changes in NATO strategy, however, and in the distribution of effort within NATO
may well have done so. But if we wish to reduce within the relatively near future
this must be done by agreement with our allies and not unilaterally. Otherwise we
risk both weakening the deterrent effect of NATO conventional forces in Europe
and the cohesion of NATO; and compromising Britain’s major political interests in
Europe and her relations with the United States.
Indeed, British troop commitments in Europe are more a matter of political
than military necessity since we have a major interest in increasing British
political influence in Europe and this in turn requires the maintenance of our
military influence within NATO. We can to some extent mitigate our man-power
problems by continuing to use outside the NATO area forces at present committed
to NATO without major difficulties with our NATO allies. But to achieve
modifications in the commitments themselves requires essentially political
methods to meet what is essentially a political problem. This means a more direct
British involvement in Europe, of which British entry into the European
Economic Community, as soon as this becomes possible, would be the clearest
possible demonstration. As members of the E.E.C. we should be likely to obtain a
more sympathetic hearing; and we should have demonstrated with conviction our
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political commitment to Europe. Moreover, an expanded E.E.C. might lead in due
course to a closer integration of European forces than now exists in NATO; and to
a situation in which British commitments could be substantially reduced. Entry to
the E.E.C. may be barred as long as de Gaulle remains in power. But if we keep it as
an objective, and meanwhile pursue our efforts for closer political association with
our European partners, this policy may in the medium term help us to surmount
some of the grave difficulties that will confront us if we seek to reduce our military
commitments in Europe.
Britain’s role in the world
10. In the light of these regional considerations we also have to take into account
the general consideration discussed in paragraph 6(d) that a withdrawal might be
required not primarily for reasons peculiar to the region concerned but because the
strain on the British economy caused by the effort of maintaining these
commitments had become unacceptable. These general aspects clearly involve the
second part of our terms of reference and the consideration of the general principles,
derived from our regional studies, on which our future politico-strategic policy
should be based.
11. It is almost a platitude to say that Britain’s world position has been
fundamentally transformed as the consequence of the two great wars of this century.
Whether or not we were before 1914 the greatest power, we were at least primus inter
pares. Now our position is clearly more modest in relation to that of the two super-
powers. Nevertheless a number of our commitments throughout the world still
derive in part from the status we achieved during the nineteenth century. They,
together with new commitments that we have undertaken in those areas, largely as a
result of our continuing presence there, represent a substantial strain on our
military and perhaps even more on our economic resources—the impact of this is
discussed below. But they also play their part among the many factors, intangible as
well as tangible, which for a variety of reasons enable us to exercise greater power
and influence throughout the world than our relative military and economic
strength actually justify; and conversely their abandonment would produce a
disproportionate effect upon our influence. This is primarily because of the role that
they enable us to play in an effective global partnership with the United States, and
through the North Atlantic Treaty, with the major countries of Western Europe.
12. This disproportion between our real and our apparent strength, and the
dependence on our allies and especially on the United States which is implicit in it,
means that the choice of a future role for Britain can only be partly ours. It is
unrealistic to think in terms of a completely independent British policy, whether in
relation to our friends and allies or to our potential opponents. On the other hand,
the same limitations apply in varying degrees to all other powers, not least to the
United States and the Soviet Union. Provided therefore that Britain accepts
realistically the limitations on her independence imposed by her own changed
standing in the world, she need not find her pursuit of a constructive foreign policy
substantially inhibited.
13. The prerequisite for such a foreign policy is a soundly based home economy.
For Britain, as a medium-sized industrial nation vitally dependent on imported raw
materials and sources of energy this implies two things. First, the ability to trade
globally with the minimum of restrictions and on the best terms obtainable. This
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itself means that Britain has a basic interest in peace and order and the sanctity of
agreements everywhere. These are the conditions of flourishing trade and they form
the economic basis for this country’s opposition to the advance of Communism, for
its various Alliances and for its support of the United Nations. It is sometimes
forgotten that Britain’s present ‘world role’ and world-wide commitments are largely
the historical reflection of this situation. The political and military power built up by
this nation has been intimately related to its economic requirements. But in the
changed world conditions of today—and even more of tomorrow—this situation
poses a twin problem: can Britain earn enough abroad to maintain world-wide
commitments whether on the present or on a substantially reduced scale? and if she
feels obliged to renounce them, will her power and influence in the world be so
diminished as to endanger her economic and thus her political independence?
14. This dilemma involves the relationship between the military instruments of
power and influence exercised in the conduct of British foreign policy, and the
economic load that they impose on the country and the limitations that result
therefrom in terms of British foreign policy. The Defence expenditure of the United
Kingdom represents a heavy burden on the national resources. It amounts annually
to about one-third of all Government expenditure and to about 7 per cent of the
gross national product. (As a comparison, the figure for Germany is just under 6 per
cent.) In economic terms three adverse influences can be distinguished. Firstly, the
man-power directly employed and the equipment supplied represent a diversion of
resources which might, alternatively, be adding to the national wealth. Secondly,
such is the complexity of modern military equipment that a very high proportion of
skilled scientific and technological man-power and a still higher proportion of the
most highly skilled is engaged on defence work. (The arguments for the indirect
benefits of technological “fall-out” have not been confirmed by experience.) It is
estimated that the Defence effort on scientific and technological development
represents, in terms of cost, about 40 per cent of all expenditure of this kind in the
economy as a whole, and that about one-fifth of all qualified persons engaged in
research and development throughout the country are employed on defence projects.
Thirdly, there is a direct burden on our balance of payments arising from defence
expenditure overseas, estimated at some £265 million. This is a significant figure in
relation to the margins within which our balance of payments situation is normally
to be found. Moreover, our recurrent difficulties in balancing our overseas payments
and receipts compel us to borrow from countries which our foreign policy is engaged
in influencing from day to day in the defence of our interests, or from international
institutions on which those countries have a powerful say. United Kingdom influence
in the world cannot for ever continue unaffected by this running pattern of need for
financial help, internationally, at frequent intervals. Indeed, that influence depends
not only on our military strength but also on our economic power and the respect
(or lack of it) which other nations have for our economic performance. . . .
18. Britain’s present power and influence depend essentially on her relationship,
political, military and economic, with three main groupings, Europe, the United
States of America and the Commonwealth. (Geography and history place Europe first
on the list, but the priority is not absolute as between the three.) With these areas we
share, to a substantial degree, a common heritage of political thought, a desire to
preserve our political freedom and a resistance to the pressures of international
Communism, whether of the Soviet or the Chinese variety. This has been the
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political and strategic justification for the network of alliances linking Britain with
various countries in these areas and for our policies at the United Nations. It is
unnecessary to speculate here on how these three relationships may evolve up to the
end of the century, nor where our major interest lies. But they are not mutually
exclusive for Britain, nor are they real alternatives.
19. If Britain allows herself to be excluded from Europe, she will be increasingly
isolated from what is becoming one of the main political and economic power
centres of the industrialised northern world. Such isolation will result in this
country finding itself progressively of lesser importance in the determination of the
great issues that have to be resolved between the United States, the Soviet Union and
the major powers of Continental Europe. The political and military dangers for
Britain of such isolation are clear. But the economic consequences can be just as
damaging, in terms both of our trade with the other industrialised countries and of
the competition which these powerful industrial complexes will present to our trade
with other parts of the world.
20. Likewise, Britain’s relationship with the United States will be of vital
importance to her for the foreseeable future. In one sense, it can be argued that it is
more vital to us than our relations with Europe, in that, largely as the result of allied
effort in NATO for the past fifteen years, the main threats to British and Western
interests, now and in the foreseeable future, are likely to arise outside Europe, in
areas where the total American preponderance in the Western effort is even greater
than in Europe itself. But quite apart from the difficulty of weighing a threat to
interests in one part of the world against the possible increase in a threat elsewhere
(e.g. in Europe) it should not be overlooked that the United States themselves attach
great importance to our connection with Europe. Our relations with the United
States will, therefore, depend substantially on the political role we are prepared to
play in Europe.
21. The third element in the equation is our relationship with the
Commonwealth. This is not merely a question of history or sentiment but of
economic, and political interest and military commitment. British trade with the
Commonwealth still represents nearly a third of our world trade. The
Commonwealth connection may in some degree strengthen our influence in areas
which are already important to us economically, and to a lesser extent militarily, and
whose significance to us commercially may well increase as their own development
progresses; this connection may come to be an important factor politically in the
establishment of a satisfactory long-term relationship between the under-developed
and the industrialised worlds.
22. Moreover—and this illustrates the inter-relationship between the three
groupings with which Britain is connected—we are able to turn the fact of our
involvement outside Europe to our advantage by using it to support our claim to be
sharing the global responsibilities of the United States more than any of her other
Western partners. This is especially important in connection with the growing
problem of Chinese power in the Far East, however small our contribution may be in
relation to that of the Americans; as well as with the protection of Western interests
in the Middle East, where our historical involvement gives us a foothold that the
Americans could not take over if we were forced out; and in Africa where the
Commonwealth connection also gives us a special position as compared with the
Americans—however inconvenient this may be in certain other respects. The United
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States seeks, to some extent, to share power and influence with any partner that is
prepared to exert them in the general Western interest. Our willingness to do this
contributes appreciably to our special relationship with the United States. The
validity of this relationship is often questioned; and it would be a mistake to claim
that the relationship of itself adds specifically to Britain’s power in the world. But
that the relationship exists is undeniable and it represents a major political
advantage to this country. To abandon it—which would be one of the consequences
of any decision by the British Government to withdraw from the world scene to a
purely regional role—would completely change the American attitude towards us.
We may be forced gradually in this direction through sheer financial inability. In the
long run, this will result in a gradual lessening of our political stature, and a change
in our economic role in the world at large. We could no longer claim to participate as
a major partner in the crucial East–West negotiations that will be necessary before
there can be any lasting settlement of outstanding world problems. The preservation
of the Commonwealth depends almost entirely on the magnetic influence of Britain
which in turn depends on our continued readiness to play a world role. This need for
global involvement should not affect the need for Britain, through a close association
with Europe, to keep a decisive influence in Europe’s relationship with the United
States. This role is important to us, but the more we withdraw from the exercise of
worldwide responsibility in partnership with the Americans the less we shall be able
to play it. Britain’s interests are worldwide and she cannot protect them alone. But
others will not help in their protection unless Britain herself is seen to be playing her
part. . . .
The balance of advantage
26. Our terms of reference themselves accepted a difference of degree between
our position in Singapore and Aden on the one hand and in Europe on the other. We
believe that politically Europe must, if largely for geographical reasons, remain our
first priority. Our economic stake there is substantial, and growing greater. But it
forms such an intricate part of the whole pattern of our relationship with Europe as
to make its importance difficult to assess in isolation. On the other hand, the military
justification for maintaining forces on the present scale in Europe is likely to remain
low. They serve essentially political ends. It might be possible, as our report on
Europe points out, to negotiate some modification of our present troop
commitments in Europe, and thus substantially mitigate our problems of military
resources and balance of payments, provided we were prepared to enter into some
closer relation with Europe. . . .
27. To make a choice between our interests in the Singapore area and those in
the area of the Aden base is more difficult. To some extent they are obviously
interdependent. For example, it would be idle to pretend that a British withdrawal
from both bases would not have profound political repercussions throughout the
area of the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Indian sub-continent. Two interesting
points also emerge with some clarity from the two regional studies. First, in South-
East Asia it can be argued that our military presence, however necessary for the time
being, for both political and strategic purposes, is irrelevant to our economic
interests; it is also substantially more expensive than our presence in the Persian
Gulf. In the latter area, however, even if we find it politically or financially expedient
to withdraw from the Aden base, the alternative military presence set out in the
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regional study would support our political interests, and may be judged a prudent
insurance for our economic interests. Secondly, in South East Asia our economic
interests, though not small, are relatively marginal in terms of our global economic
interests. The reasons both for our military posture in the area and for any
continuing involvement there after our withdrawal from Singapore would be
primarily politico-strategic: in particular the maintenance of our position in
Australia and New Zealand, on the one hand; and of our relationship with the
Americans on the other. But in the Persian Gulf, although there are powerful
political and strategic arguments for a continuing British presence, our main
interest is likely to remain economic—a major stake in the oil industry, dependence
on Middle East oil for over 20 per cent of the total energy supply of the United
Kingdom; and, if things went disastrously wrong, a possible balance of payments loss
of up to £200 million a year. It is also a paradox of this general situation that, whereas
on any assessment of British economic interests our need to maintain a military
position in Singapore is less than in Aden, the political obstacles to our doing so
seem likely to be substantially more intractable in Aden than in Singapore.
Summary of conclusions
28. It should be clear from the foregoing and from the relevant regional studies,
that political pressures may well be the decisive factor for Her Majesty’s Government
in reaching a decision to withdraw from Aden or from Singapore or both. Moreover,
it results from the considerations in the preceding paragraph that to summarise the
balance of advantage for Britain, if she were obliged to choose an area where
withdrawal would least harm her interests, is in any case difficult without over-
simplifying the issues. It is also bound to seem subjective, at least to the extent that it
requires a judgment on the respective merits of economic and political interests, and
of regional and global interests. To make such a judgment by a computation is
virtually impossible. But we set out below in summary form what seem to be the
main relevant considerations.
(i) Britain’s position in Europe, as was implied in our terms of reference, is of a
different nature to that in South East Asia or the Middle East. But her troop
commitments there are less relevant militarily, in the light of the likely military
threats to her interests in the next decade, than politically. The problem of
reducing them is essentially political. To meet it satisfactorily will call for a policy
of active association with Europe, designed in particular to ensure close
collaboration between Europe and the United States.
(ii) In the Middle East British interests will continue to be very substantial and
the implications of damage to them very great for this country. On the hypothesis
of a withdrawal from the Aden base, it seems likely that some increase in the
British military presence in the Persian Gulf area will be required after the Aden
base has gone.
(iii) In the Far East, the significance to our interests of the British position at
Singapore is more politico-strategic than economic. While our policies in the
short term will continue to require a substantial military involvement, it is
reasonable to hope that in the longer term the need for this may greatly diminish
in that a reasonably stable balance of power may have been reached. In the interim
period the political climate for maintaining the base in Singapore will probably be
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more favourable than in Aden. On the other hand, adequate alternative military
facilities are likely to be less readily available and could be substantially more
expensive. This would involve considerable help from Australia and New Zealand.
(iv) If in the long run a choice has to be made for financial reasons between
defence expenditure in the Far East and the maintenance of a military presence in
the Persian Gulf area, we believe that priority should be given to the latter.
81 CAB 148/4, ff 104–105 14 Oct 1964
‘Report of the Long-Term Study Group’: minutes of meeting of
Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee
The Committee had before them the report of the Long Term Study Group (L.T.S.G.)
consisting of a covering report (D.O. (O) (64) 72)1 and regional studies on Europe
(D.O. (O) (64) 68), the Far East (D.O. (O) (64) 70) and the Middle East (D.O. (O) (64)
73). They had also before them a memorandum by the Foreign Office (D.O. (O) (64)
59) on British policy towards South East Asia.2
The Chairman3 said that the Committee was much indebted to the departmental
representatives on the L.T.S.G. for producing such a useful report. The considered
views of the Chiefs of Staff on the report were still to come. He suggested that the
Committee should have a preliminary discussion of it and should consider in
particular how the report could best be submitted to Ministers.
The Committee first considered the three regional studies and endorsed their
conclusions in general terms. It was agreed that the studies should be regarded as
background information, prepared by the L.T.S.G., against which the covering
report, as a self-contained document, could be considered by Ministers.
In discussing the study on the Middle East the Committee took note that an
important issue was still unresolved between departments, namely the extent to
which British forces in the area were effective in maintaining law and order and
preventing the oil resources coming under unified control. There was, however,
general agreement that the continued maintenance of some form of military
presence in the area was more likely to preserve the present reasonably satisfactory
position than a withdrawal. The consequences of a withdrawal could not be proved
and the risks could not be accurately assessed.
A number of amendments to the regional studies on the Far East and Europe were
agreed and the Committee endorsed the conclusions of the Foreign Office
memorandum on British Policy towards South East Asia.
The Committee took note that the Government which would take office after the
General Election would be faced with a number of urgent and interrelated problems.
The most immediate would concern nuclear policy and the question of British
participation in the Multilateral Force. The regional study on Europe took the line
that it would be in our interests to become increasingly involved in Europe
politically and economically if we were to have any chance of reducing our military
commitments there. The arguments in the study were therefore relevant to the
question whether the United Kingdom should join the Multilateral Force since the
1 See previous document. 2 See document no 79. 3 Sir B Trend.
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Government’s decision on this issue would be regarded as a test of the extent to
which they were prepared to involve the United Kingdom in Europe as a matter of
general policy. The Committee were to consider the question of the Multilateral
Force at their next meeting and would need to decide how their recommendations
on it should be related to the report of the L.T.S.G.
The new Government would also be quickly faced with the scarcely less urgent
problem of dealing with a large balance of payments deficit and of considering ways
in which the increasingly heavy burden of public expenditure generally might be
reduced. This would involve consideration of the extent to which we could continue
to support the strain on our limited resources caused by our overseas commitments.
A balance would have to be struck between the pressing need to restore our own
economy and the value to us, as a trading nation, of being able to continue to exert
through our overseas commitments an influence on world affairs out of proportion
to our actual resources. Since the war our policy had been broadly one of
disengaging gradually from our overseas role with the least possible disturbance to
our general political and economic interests. This policy had been pursued with fair
success and there was no real option open to us other than a continuation of this
process whereby we would seek to cut down our commitments to match our
resources. This must be a gradual and orderly process since any abrupt abandonment
of our commitments would endanger the maintenance of stability which it was in
our interest to preserve. We therefore needed time to effect the necessary changes.
Ministers should be asked to endorse this proposition as the basis on which planning
for the future could be conducted. Since it involved the major assumptions that we
should not indefinitely maintain our bases in Aden and Singapore, Ministers should
be warned of the dangers involved, particularly of the difficulties which would arise
should it become known that we were in fact planning on the assumption of an
eventual withdrawal from the bases.
It would assist Ministers in arriving at a decision if the covering report set out
clearly the budgetary implications of withdrawal from the bases. The regional studies
on the Far East and the Middle East gave figures of £210 million and £75 million as
annual costs attributable to our military presence in the areas. These figures were at
variance with the figure of about £500 million as the cost of our forces East of Suez,
which had been calculated previously on broadly the same criteria. Furthermore, if it
were possible to do so, Ministers should be given some idea of the actual savings
which might be made by the withdrawal of our forces from these two bases.
The covering note should also include a reference to the part played by our
facilities in the Mediterranean, particularly in the chain of communications through
the Mediterranean and the Middle East to the Far East.
Certain amendments to the covering report were agreed including those
consequential on amendments to the regional studies.
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CHAPTER 3
Administrative Structures
Document numbers 82–99
82 DO 35/7973, no 26 9 Apr 1957
[Overseas Civil Service]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Mr Thorneycroft
(Exchequer) about proposed agreements with Nigerian government.
Minutes by A R Adair, J Chadwick,1 W A B Hamilton and J M C James
(CRO)
I am sorry to have to worry you at this time to ask your urgent intervention in a
difference of opinion between our two Departments in regard to the proposed
Agreements with the Nigerian Governments for a Special List of members of Her
Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service serving in Nigeria.
Because, with constitutional changes, the Secretary of State will cease to have
responsibility for overseas officers serving in Nigeria, they will have a right to retire
with lump sum compensation. It is, however, vital that as many as possible should
remain. Under the proposals, which you may remember were outlined in Command
Paper 9768 published last year, these officers could, if they surrendered their right to
retire with lump sum compensation, enter the service of the U.K. Government with
certain assurances as regards their future careers and pensions, but so long as their
services were needed by the Nigerian Governments they would continue to soldier on
in their present posts. The background against which these proposals were framed is
set out in Annexe A to my paper to the Colonial Policy Committee last year (C.A. (56)
6 of the 14th February, 1956) to which you may like to refer.2
The detailed working out of this scheme has been a prolonged business but we are
now broadly in agreement with three of the four Nigerian Governments (the
Government of the Eastern Region has not, owing to elections, been able yet to finalise
its views) and with the Treasury save for the one outstanding point of salaries . . . .
The original draft Agreement drawn up at the time of the publication of the White
Paper proposed, as is appropriate to a Service of H.M. Government, that salaries
would be determined by that Government. In negotiation last autumn with the
Nigerian Governments this proposal proved wholly unacceptable and to save a
breakdown it was necessary to propose that, failing agreement between the Nigerian
Governments and Her Majesty’s Government salaries should be determined by
arbitration. This provision has been accepted by three of the four Nigerian
Governments but not by the Treasury and that is why I am seeking your intervention.
1 G W StJohn Chadwick, generally known within CRO as ‘John Chadwick’.
2 See Goldsworthy ed, The Conservative government and the end of empire, 1951–1957, Part II,
document no 237.
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I am not sure that I fully comprehend the arguments the Treasury have advanced
against arbitration but as we understand them they are summarised together with
the counter-arguments, in the enclosure to this letter.3 Even if the arguments were
stronger than I now think, I could not possibly accept the Treasury proposal that
salaries should be fixed “in consultation with the Nigerian Governments”, leaving the
latter with a veto over any increases. The record of the Nigerian Governments over
this matter of salaries and allowances for overseas officers is, for political reasons
which are understandable, quite unreliable. I could not be a party to sponsoring a
scheme which invites overseas officers to surrender their rights to retire voluntarily
with compensation when conditions in Nigeria become too difficult, unless at the
same time it provides satisfactory safeguards for their conditions of service and in
particular for their salaries.
I see no hope of persuading the Nigerian Governments to accept the original
provision that salaries should be determined by Her Majesty’s Government. I fear
therefore that if it is not possible to agree that salaries should be arbitrable there will
be no course open to me but to announce to Parliament that it has proved impossible
to negotiate a satisfactory scheme with the Nigerian Governments. The effect of this
on our relations with those Governments and on the morale of the officers
concerned would be deplorable. Moreover, I must say that I would have the greatest
difficulty indeed in justifying a breakdown on the point now at issue on the strength
of the arguments advanced by your officials.
I would emphasise how disastrous it will be to Britain’s economic interests if
British officers—and therefore British guidance—are lost to Nigeria in the crucial
years ahead for that country of 32 million people. We supply annually about 45% of
Nigeria’s imports, in terms of cash £50 to £60 million a year. If British officers leave,
there may well be something like chaos in parts of the country. The Nigerian
Governments will try to recruit Germans, Italians and others and such trade as there
is will tend to follow the men. This will apply particularly to the big engineering and
supply contracts, which are increasing in value as physical development proceeds. In
hard cash we shall lose very much more than we shall gain if we cannot make this
agreement.
The Nigerian Constitutional Conference begins on the 23rd May and it is essential
that a decision on this matter should be made well before then. I should be glad to
discuss it with you in more detail at any time.
I am sending a copy of this letter to Alec Home, who is of course closely concerned
in view of the increasing likelihood of Nigeria’s early independence.
Minutes on 82
This letter from the Colonial Secretary raises issues of fundamental importance in
relation to the operation, so far as Nigeria is concerned, of the arrangements
envisaged for the future of H.M.O.C.S., outlined in Command 9768. These
arrangements are designed:
(a) to see that the interests of the officers concerned are safeguarded as and when
territories in which they are serving become independent, and
3 Not printed.
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(b) to prevent a general exodus of such officers, particularly at the transitional
period when their services are most needed to ensure continuity and efficient
administration.
2. The general problem was set out in C.A.(56)6 which was the origin of the
whole scheme and was accepted by Ministers, subject to certain amendments,
(CA.(56)15th Meeting). These decisions were embodied in Command 9768 and the
necessary legislation to translate them into effect is now in embryo in the draft
Overseas Service Bill.
3. The scheme envisages the setting up of a central pool of officers of H.M.O.C.S.
who will be in the service of H.M.G. in the U.K. and seconded to employing
Governments, the attraction from the officers point of view being that there would be
a guaranteed career, the United Kingdom Govt. being responsible for finding
employment for them as and when periods of their secondment to a particular
territory came to an end, and in the last resort if suitable employment could not be
found they would be kept on full pay up to a maximum of five years or until the age of
50 whichever was earlier.
4. Within the ambit of this general scheme is the creation of the “Special List” of
officers already serving in Nigeria, which, because of the deterioration of the morale
of the Oversea Service there and the numbers involved, is the territory where the
problem is of most immediate concern. The conditions of employment are, however,
subject to agreement of the employing Government and in the case of Nigeria (the
Governments of which are in broad agreement with the scheme in general), the
negotiations have reached the point of breaking over the question of settlement of
salaries. They would apparently agree to the Colonial Secretary’s suggestion of
leaving this to be settled by arbitration, and the Colonial Secretary, in the letter now
under consideration, has set out the reasons for accepting this proposal.
5. From his letter it appears, indeed, as if the whole scheme, so far as Nigeria is
concerned, may well break down unless the Treasury can be persuaded to agree. This,
as is pointed out by the Colonial Secretary, would have a most serious effect not only
on the morale of the officers now serving in Nigeria, but on our relations with the
Nigerian Governments. The C.R.O. interest in this matter is the same as that of the
Colonial Office in so far as after self-government is attained, we must hope that the
Federation of Nigeria, as new member of the Commonwealth, will not only govern
itself, but govern itself efficiently. We must, I think, accept the Colonial Secretary’s
assessment of the results of the Treasury maintaining their objection to arbitration
and, if so, it is for consideration whether it would not be as well now for our
Secretary of State to add his weight to the already very convincing arguments in the
Colonial Secretary’s letter. In case this is thought desirable, I submit a draft letter
which would, of course, need to be cleared with the Colonial Office.
A.R.A.
10.4.57
You will see from the Colonial Secretary’s letter to the Chancellor that the Special
List Scheme for Nigeria is once more in danger of breakdown, this time on the
question of arbitration in the event of H.M.G. & the Regional Govts failing to agree
on salary levels.
Mr Adair’s minute above summarises very clearly the background to the problem.
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It seems to me essential that the Secretary of State should be advised to support
Mr Lennox-Boyd’s refutation of the short-sighted arguments advanced by the
Treasury. The situation in Nigeria is already sufficiently alarming. There will be a
mass exodus of H.M.O.C.S. officers shortly if no adequate long term employment
agreement is reached. This will not slacken local pressure—already heightened by
the precedent of Ghana—for independence.
In short, unless the Colonial Secretary gets his way, the Secretary of State may be
faced, by say 1962, with assuming responsibility for H.M.G’s relations with an
independent but corrupt & disintegrating Federation of Nigeria. In such
circumstances, it would be difficult indeed to persuade an already reluctant S.
African Govt (and there would be others) to accept Nigeria as a fellow-member of the
C’wealth.
A draft letter to the Chancellor is submitted.
J.C.
11.4.57
I can understand the Treasury difficulty about agreeing to arbitration on salaries,
especially salaries in the higher ranges. But my view is that they must accept this, or
in some other way underwrite the liability to pay a proper salary by U.K. standards.
This is part of the price to be paid for premature independence and the retention of
Nigeria in the Commonwealth. It is not a subsidy to an independent Nigeria, but part
of the cost—payment deferred—of bringing Nigeria to competent independence.
W.A.B.H.
11.4.57
Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Chadwick and I all hope that the Secretary of State will intervene
with the Chancellor in support of the Colonial Secretary’s appeal.
2. I know from my own experience what a difference this scheme would have
made in Pakistan. All but eight or ten of the former British officers have left. The
Pakistan administration is chronically weak and still deteriorating. Hence the
repeated food crises and other, less advertised, failures in good government, which
lead to crippling waste and inefficiency. All this notably reduces Pakistan’s usefulness
as a member of the Commonwealth. More British officers would have stayed, but for
doubts about their future, which their inclusion in a “special list”, underwritten by
H.M.G., would have allayed. It is too late for this now in Pakistan, but the lesson is
plain in respect of the other weak and doubtfully viable tropical territories which we
shall inherit from the C.O.
3. My worry about making salaries arbitrable is that they are almost bound to be
fixed by any arbitrator at a rate lower than what H.M.G. (and the officers) think is
right. This would not produce the desired psychologically reassuring result. I have
therefore inserted two amendments in the draft, designed to meet the point in Mr.
Hamilton’s minute that if the Treasury do not agree to arbitration they must in some
other way underwrite the liability to pay a proper salary by U.K. standards.4
J.M.C.J.
12.4.57
4 Mr Alport minuted: ‘I agree fully’, and Lord Home initialled the file (15.4.57).
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83 DO 35/7973, no 27 16 Apr 1957
[HM Overseas Civil Service]: letter from Lord Home to Mr
Thorneycroft about proposed agreements with Nigerian government
My dear Peter,
I have just seen Lennox-Boyd’s letter to you of 9th April about the Special List of
members of Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service serving in Nigeria.1 Like him, I am
gravely disturbed at the possibility of the whole scheme breaking down over the one
outstanding point of determining salaries by arbitration.
2. While I appreciate the principle of the Treasury case against arbitration in a
matter of this nature, I feel that the stake here is really too great to make this a
breaking point. Surely we must accept the Colonial Secretary’s assessment of the
Regional Governments’ reactions, should Her Majesty’s Government persist in
refusing to meet them over this? Or if the principle that salaries should be arbitrable
is too big a hurdle to get over, ought we not to find some other way of underwriting
the liability to pay a proper salary by United Kingdom standards?
3. The future efficient administration of Nigeria is, of course, of very great long
term concern to me. The omens are already far from good. The determining factor
will be the retention for a number of years ahead of a reasonable proportion of the
present Oversea Administrative Service. This, I am convinced, will in turn depend on
the successful introduction of the Special List scheme.
4. A breakdown in the scheme at this stage would indeed be disastrous. Not only
would it spell doom to efficient administration in Nigeria; it would also have far
reaching consequences throughout the Commonwealth. However corrupt or
disorganised the administration of Government might become following a mass
exodus of expatriate officers, we should still have no eventual choice, now that Ghana
has set the pattern for the rest of Africa, but to agree to Nigerian independence. We
should then in some five to eight years time be left with the unenviable task of
attempting to persuade other member Governments of the Commonwealth—and in
particular South Africa—to accept an inexperienced and, at the least, ill-run African
territory as a fellow-member. The effect on Commonwealth unity would be serious
indeed.
5. Let me say that our experience with Pakistan and Ceylon leads me to place
particular emphasis on Lennox-Boyd’s remarks about our economic interests. Today
trade follows the technical adviser and administrator, just as in the past it followed
the Flag.
6. I would therefore urge you, not only on the grounds which Lennox-Boyd has
put forward, but also in the interests of our long term responsibility for relations
with an independent Nigeria, to agree that the principle of arbitration must now be
accepted, or alternatively that some other equally effective means should be found of
producing the same result.
I am sending a copy of this letter to the Colonial Secretary.2
Yours ever,
Alec
1 See previous document.
2 Mr Thorneycroft replied on 9 May indicating that he was prepared to agree arbitration should be
provided for on certain conditions (no 29).
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84 DO 35/7973, no 52 30 Dec 1957
‘Overseas Service Bill’: CRO circular tel (no 550) to high
commissioners explaining proposed organisation of HMOCS
Attached are copies of this Bill which had its first reading in the House of Commons
on the 6th December. The object is to provide legislative authority for the policy
announced in the White Paper of May, 1956, (Command 9768) on the organisation of
Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service which you will have seen but copies of which are
also attached. That policy was approved by the Colonial Policy Committee in May,
1956, and the Future Legislation Committee authorised the preparation of a Bill.1
2. There were two aspects of that policy. First it was proposed to prepare lists of
qualified persons who are ready and available for service on secondment to Overseas
Governments and, if the demand warranted it, to establish a central pool of officers
for service overseas. It is intended to test the demand for such officers by improving
the arrangements by which members of the Home and Overseas Civil Services could
be made available to Commonwealth countries without prejudice to their pension
rights. Clauses 4 and 5 of the Bill implement this intention so far as United Kingdom
officers are concerned and Governments of Colonial and Dependent Territories will
be asked in due course to make corresponding provision in their own pension
legislation to preserve the pension rights of overseas officers who take up
employment under the Bill.
3. The second aspect was the introduction of a Special List for officers serving in
Nigeria. Agreements were signed with the four Nigerian Governments at the
Constitutional Conference in June last and officers concerned have been advised of
the terms on which they may apply to join the Special List. The Special List Scheme
is a measure designed to assist the Governments of the Nigerian territories to retain
experienced overseas staff who otherwise might leave the service with compensation
for loss of career; chief among its attractions is an assurance by the United Kingdom
Government that they will endeavour to assign to other suitable employment any
officer who, due to Constitutional changes, is compelled to relinquish his post; it
provides inter alia that the officer will be kept on full pay, for as long as five years, if
necessary, while the United Kingdom Government are exploring the possibility of
alternative employment. The scheme involves the United Kingdom Government in
certain financial liabilities and the Overseas Service Bill includes legislative authority
to meet such liabilities. An offer to consider similar, but not exactly identical,
agreements has been made to the Governments of the Federation of Malaya and
Singapore; the Government of Malaya have suggested that the scheme should be
modified in certain respects and their suggestions are now being examined in
London.
4. The Bill would in form be capable of application to appointments such as have
hitherto been made by prerogative powers under the Colombo Plan etc. Such
appointments are however of an entirely different nature from those intended to be
covered by the Bill in that appointments made under aid schemes are financed
entirely by the United Kingdom Government. It is therefore improbable that in
practice we should wish the provisions of the Bill to apply to appointments made
1 See Goldsworthy, ed, Conservative government and the end of empire, Part II, p. 136.
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under technical assistance schemes unless the circumstances were exceptional. For
this reason the Bill has been drafted in such a way that its provisions need be invoked
only if there are administrative or other reasons which make it more convenient for
certain appointments to be made inside its scope (see Clause 1(5)).
5. It is also made clear in Clause 1(4) that appointment (to the central pool or
the Specialist) of officers who are at the time in the service of another
Commonwealth Government will require the consent of that Government.
6. You have discretion, if you consider that this would be useful, to give a copy of
the Bill to Commonwealth/Federation authorities for their information. If you decide
to do so you may draw on the above background to the extent that you consider
desirable. The Bill will have its Second Reading on 21st January.
85 CAB 128/34, CC 44(60)7 21 July 1960
[Proposed reductions in costs of Overseas Civil Service scheme]:
Cabinet conclusions
[By the spring of 1960 various reports were received about the dangers of an
administrative collapse in East Africa: progress in Africanisation was poor and European
officers, anxious and uncertain about future prospects, were beginning to resign.
Macmillan became worried about the morale of colonial service officers. From several
points of view stability and continuity in civil services was desirable. He feared it was
going to be impossible to keep the Kenya civil service going, ‘unless we can give some
kind of general guarantee of employment. . . . Is there not a sense of hopelessness
spreading through the remaining Colonies?’ (PREM 11/3237, minute to Macleod, M
173/60, 24 May 1960; see also DO 35/7972, draft letter to Sir C Ponsonby 26 May 1960).
Macleod, apparently, had been greatly concerned about this and was preparing ‘some
quite far-reaching proposals’ to deal with it (PM(60)32, 27 May 1960). Recognising that
expatriate officers needed some inducement to stay on—at present there was positive
disinducement because of the high compensation given for ‘loss of career prospects’—the
CO proposed that the UK government should take over the expatriate element in an
officer’s pay, leaving the local (independent) government to pay no more for a ‘European’
than it would pay for an African. Sir N Brook felt that this was a good plan to deal with the
immediate East African problem, but doubted whether it need be extended to all colonial
territories; since there was no one unified service anyway (despite the title), a
comprehensive scheme was not essential (minute 20 July 1960).]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (60) 116)
about the position of Her Majesty’s Oversea Civil Service.
The Colonial Secretary said that expatriate officers recruited from the United
Kingdom by the Governments of colonial territories were finding themselves in an
increasingly difficult position as the territories progressed towards and emerged into
independence. Their salaries and allowances, which were considerably higher than
those of locally recruited officers, were borne wholly by the local governments, who,
on attaining independence, were reluctant on grounds of economy to retain the expa-
triate officers in their employment. The consequent uncertainty about their personal
future was having a damaging effect on the morale of the expatriate officers, who were
resigning in increasing numbers when, or even before, their territories became inde-
pendent. Since the standard of education and of administrative ability among the locally
recruited officers was in many areas still at a low level, the point had been reached at
which there was real danger of a breakdown of administration in some of the territo-
ries which were approaching independence, especially in those in East Africa. In effect,
the whole of the United Kingdom’s colonial policy was therefore at stake.
10-ConGov-Doc 82-99-cp  18/10/00  2:05 pm  Page 315
316 ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES [86]
In the past the Government had been preoccupied with their duty to do justice to
the expatriate officer whom the new independent Government was unwilling to
retain in employment. A new approach was now necessary—to make conditions of
service such as would induce as many expatriate officers as possible to remain in the
employment of the local governments and to induce the local governments to retain
them. The Colonial Secretary therefore proposed that, for the future, the “expatriate”
element in the emoluments of the officers in question—that is, the excess of their
emoluments over those of locally recruited officers—should be borne, not by the
local government, but by the United Kingdom Exchequer. The cost of this proposal
was estimated at about £24 millions a year.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that the rapid increase in expenditure
overseas, together with the relatively small return it yielded, was resulting in an
alarming deficit on overseas account. He could not contemplate an additional
commitment of anything like the size proposed. If the situation in the Colonial
territories was so serious that some additional expenditure must be undertaken, he
could agree to it only on condition that compensating reductions were accepted in
analogous expenditure elsewhere.
Discussion showed that there was general agreement in the Cabinet that some
means must be found of averting a breakdown of the administration in the Colonial
territories, especially in Africa. The political effect of a breakdown would be
disastrous and it might in the long run involve expenditure far greater than that
proposed by the Colonial Secretary. On the other hand, it might be possible to devise
a scheme which would achieve the main object in view and at the same time cause
less difficulty to the Exchequer. Could it, for example, be made selective and limited
to those territories where the danger was greatest, i.e., to East Africa, or possibly to
Africa as a whole? Alternatively, it might be possible to persuade the local
governments, both before and after independence, to bear the whole or at least part
of some elements in the scheme, e.g., the £7 millions estimated for passage
allowances between the territories and the United Kingdom. On the question of
compensating reductions, consideration should be given to the relative priority of
the scheme proposed by the Colonial Secretary and, for example, loans for major
capital development in the independent Commonwealth countries, which were
unlikely ever to be repaid.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Colonial Secretary, in consultation with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and the Commonwealth Secretary, to consider urgently in the light of
their discussion how the scope of the scheme proposed in C. (60) 116 could best be
reduced and whether compensating reductions could be made in oversea spending
for which they were responsible; and to report to the Prime Minister.
86 CAB 128/34, CC 46(60)1 26 July 1960
‘Oversea civil service’: Cabinet conclusions, approving the scheme
[Macleod did not think he could possibly recommend confining the scheme to East and
Central Africa: such a restriction would undoubtedly be interpreted as ‘designed to bolster
up “imperial” interests and the interests of the white population there and this would do
us immense harm’; moreover ‘the pressure upon us to extend it later to other territories
would be overwhelming and we should merely reap ill-will instead of goodwill for
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bringing it in only in response to that pressure’; in any case, the anxieties in places such
as British Guiana were just as acute. He also urged strongly against cutting Nigeria out
on the grounds that it would be independent before the scheme could come into
operation: ‘Nigeria is a territory of cardinal importance to us in Africa’ and it would be
‘profoundly unwise’ to exclude it (PREM 11/3237, PM(60)47, minute to prime minister,
24 July 1960). With the agreement of the Commonwealth secretary, however, he
proposed that if the government offered to pay only half and not the whole cost of
passages the net cost of the scheme would be about £14 million a year. Macmillan was
attracted to this idea, and urged the chancellor of the Exchequer to agree to it (M 254/60,
minute 25 July 1960). After the Cabinet decision was taken, Macmillan wrote to Macleod:
‘I am sure we were right to accept your scheme in spite of the expense’ (M 260/60, 30 July
1960). Comments were then sought from governors (circular despatch from Lord Perth,
no 923/60: CO 1017/770, no 110, 31 Aug 1960); see also next document.]
The Prime Minister recalled that at their meeting on 21st July1 the Cabinet had
invited the Colonial Secretary to consider, in consultation with the Chancellor of the
Exchequer and the Commonwealth Secretary, what reduction could be made in the
scope of the scheme proposed in C. (60) 116 for relieving Colonial Governments of
the “expatriate” element in the emoluments of members of the Oversea Civil Service.
At the meeting which had been held for this purpose the Treasury had been
represented by the Financial Secretary, in the absence of the Chancellor of the
Exchequer on official duty abroad, and the Chancellor’s position had therefore been
reserved. Subject to this it had been agreed that if (i) Colonial Governments were left
to pay half the cost of passages of expatriate officers, and (ii) allowance were made for
the consequential savings of prospective future expenditure on the Colonial Office
Vote, and (iii) account were taken of the fact that the ultimate cost of pensions and
compensation would be offset by an eventual decrease in the cost of other parts of the
plan, the initial cost of the scheme could be presented as £14 millions, instead of £24
millions. The Commonwealth Secretary and Colonial Secretary were strongly in
favour of proceeding with the scheme on this basis.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that, as the offsetting economies had not yet
been identified, he was naturally reluctant to take them into account. Moreover, even
if the budgetary cost of the scheme could be said to amount initially to no more than
£14 millions, he would still be concerned at the strain it would impose on the
balance of payments of the United Kingdom. It was not possible to estimate with
precision what proportion of this additional money would in fact be spent outside the
United Kingdom. In a sense, however, these were points of minor difficulty. His main
concern was with the mounting cost of public expenditure as a whole and, within
that, the rise in expenditure overseas. On several recent occasions he had felt obliged
to draw the attention of his colleagues to the great danger which this represented to
Government policy as a whole. He considered it his duty, as Chancellor, to warn the
Cabinet that no fresh commitment involving expenditure should be undertaken at
the present time unless it could be matched by a firm assurance that the cost could
be offset by savings in other directions. He felt very strongly that the time was not far
distant when the Government would have to consider seriously some major
reduction in their oversea commitments. He doubted, for example, whether the
country would be able for long to carry the existing burden of military expenditure
both in Germany and in South-East Asia.
The Colonial Secretary said that, although this was not susceptible of precise
statistical calculation, he was confident that the great bulk of the “expatriate”
1 See previous document.
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allowances would be spent in this country and that the scheme would not impose a
significant strain on the balance of payments of the United Kingdom. On the main
question, while he respected the Chancellor’s anxieties, he was convinced that
without some scheme of this kind it would be impossible to maintain an efficient
administration in the dependent territories for which we were still responsible. All
recent experience confirmed the view that, unless something of this kind were done,
an increasing number of expatriate officers would feel compelled to look for
alternative careers elsewhere. In that event the administrative structure in territories
emerging towards independence would be undermined.
Discussion showed that there was general agreement in the Cabinet that in
present circumstances high priority must be given to the maintenance of an efficient
system of administration in Colonies advancing towards independence. In recent
experience in Africa and in Asia there was ample evidence that, without this, the
structure of society in emergent countries could easily collapse. This could imply,
not merely a failure of our Colonial policy, but serious damage to our investment in
those countries—which would impose a much more serious strain on our balance of
payments. Action on the lines now recommended would also help to re-establish
confidence among the European residents in East Africa. For these reasons there was
general agreement that the course recommended by the Commonwealth Secretary
and the Colonial Secretary was one which ought to be taken, even though it carried
with it an obligation to seek offsetting savings in other parts of the Colonial Office
Vote or in other sections of our oversea expenditure as a whole.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he did not dissent from the view that
high priority should be given to the measures necessary to preserve efficient
administration in oversea territories dependent on the United Kingdom. He had
however thought it right to warn the Cabinet that, in view of the balance of payments
prospects, additional expenditure for this desirable purpose ought not to be allowed
to increase the net total of our oversea expenditure.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved the proposals outlined in C. (60) 116, subject to the modification
that Colonial Governments should continue to bear one-half of the cost of
passages of expatriate officers in the Oversea Service.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to announce, in general terms, before
Parliament rose for the summer recess, that the Government proposed to transfer
to the United Kingdom Exchequer the “expatriate” element in the pay and
allowances of members of the Oversea Civil Service.
(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary to consider how far the cost of this new policy
could be offset by savings in other parts of the Colonial Office Vote.
87 CO 1017/771, no 171 31 Aug 1960
‘Service with overseas governments’: CO circular letter (from
W L Gorell Barnes) to all governors.  Minutes by Sir H Poynton and
Mr Macleod (nos 205 & 297) [Extract]
There comes to you by this mail a despatch from the Secretary of State enclosing a
draft memorandum which would form the basis of a White Paper about the future of
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the Overseas Service. (To describe it formally as a draft White Paper would be a
breach of Parliamentary privilege). As you will see, this despatch seeks the comments
of your Government and of Staff Associations on the scheme before it is settled and a
White Paper laid before Parliament. We are grateful for the care with which
Governors have examined our proposals sent to you under cover of Poynton’s letter
of the 11th July and for the very large number of constructive comments and
criticisms which they made. We have examined them all with great care and taken
them into account in recasting our scheme. . . .
3. The replies have generally, indeed with only one exception, welcomed the
scheme and we are very grateful for the terms in which Governors have expressed
this. One or two Governors, particularly in West Africa, have regretted that it comes
so late in the day, as indeed it does for West African territories in particular. As I think
you know, we here share this regret that our many attempts in the past to obtain
major schemes for the help of the Service failed to get Cabinet approval. Some other
Governors felt that some of the scheme was hardly applicable to their own local
circumstances. West Indian Governors felt indeed that their circumstances were so
different that the scheme might not be acceptable to their Ministers. We are
therefore only putting it to the West Indian territories very tentatively, by separate
despatch. Indeed, the replies of many Governors shew how extremely difficult it is to
try and cover in one scheme local circumstances which vary so very widely. We feel,
however, and I think the replies bear this out, that there is something in the scheme
which is of value to practically every territory and that the moral to be drawn is that
it should be made as flexible as possible. As you will see from the draft memorandum,
we have made it a good deal more flexible and specifically state that we are not tied to
its details but that within its general framework we are ready to discuss with any
Government which wishes to take advantage of it how its principles can be adapted to
the circumstances of that territory. This would include the possibility of adaptation
to those territories where there is at present no form of inducement or expatriation
pay, though we would not like to be committed at this stage to the extent or form of
any such adaptation. I hope Governors will feel that we have done this appropriately.
It is obvious that there will need to be quite detailed discussions with a number of
territories about its precise working out and application to them. . . .
Minutes on 87
We have now been able to get out to Colonial Governments the first draft of a White
Paper on the future of HMOCS. The initial semi-official replies from the Governors to
our proposals have been almost unanimously in favour though there is still some
hankering after a unified Commonwealth service accompanied by remarks on the
lines that while the Governor concerned appreciates the force of the arguments
against it the difficulties are not insuperable—but making no suggestions as to how
those difficulties should in fact be overcome. Only one Governor (Sir W. Goode of
North Borneo) poured cold water on the scheme saying that it was not only too late
but much too little. Lord Hailes and the Governors of The West Indies feel on the
whole that the scheme is not appropriate to conditions in The West Indies. In
general, however, I think we can say that the scheme has had a good reception,
though a number of Governors have raised points of detail which are being gone
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into. In addition to the official circular despatch and draft memorandum, a copy of
which I attach, we have sent a semi-official letter mopping up a number of points
made by various Governors.
The scope of the draft memorandum is best summarised by listing the
subheads:—
The existing arrangements for HMOCS
The Problem
The New Arrangements
Compensation
Procedure and Cost
The resettlement of Overseas Officers
The Development of local Public Services.
Future Oversea Recruitment. . . .
A.H.P.
6.9.60
This is a fine piece of work. I have no detailed comment now, but would like to see
before it is finally prepared for laying before Parliament.1
I.M.
9.9.60
1 The final version referred not to ‘members of Her Majesty’s Service’ but to ‘members of a common
Service under Her Majesty the Queen’ (para 10). This was in response to representations from Sir P
Renison (Kenya) that staff associations were upset by omission of any reference in the draft to serving the
Queen personally, whether before or after independence; the change was necessary to retain ‘for the
future, all the good chaps whom we so tremendously need unless you succeed in getting this right’ (no
276, 30 Sept 1960).
88 DO 35/10457, no 1 25 June 1958
[CO/CRO liaison in approaches to independence]: letter from Sir G
Laithwaite (CRO) to Sir J Macpherson (CO).  Minutes by Mr Alport,
Lord Home and Sir G Laithwaite
When we talked today about Nigeria, you asked me whether I was satisfied about
liaison and I said that I had heard no particular complaint about that and I thought,
in fact, that relations between the two Departments were very good.
But I promised to have a word with Snelling and the people who are handling
Nigerian affairs and see if there was any suggestion that I could privately make to you.
Snelling confirms that there is good liaison and a very friendly personal relation,
and that is obviously most valuable.
But he also makes a point which has, I think, got something in it. While we receive
major despatches, etc., he says that he does feel that we are rather in the dark about
day-to-day handling of decisions that could have a post-Independence importance,
and I can quite see that this could be the case.
I am not quite sure what the right answer is to this sort of problem. We worked
extraordinarily closely together in the latter stages of the Malayan experiment, but it
would have been helpful to us here if that very close process of collaboration had
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started even earlier. As you know, though I hope I may be wrong, I continue, in the
light of my own past experience, to be obsessed by the fear that we shall be driven to
accept Nigerian independence in April, 1960 (when she will be still more unready for
it than she would be even at the end of 1960), and that, of course, has a very close bear-
ing on the contingent arrangements we are always thinking about here—staff, etc.
Would there be anything to be said for some sort of small joint C.R.O./C.O.
Working Party on Nigeria? I would undertake that our representatives on it would
not butt in on what was your business. It would, I am certain, be very educative for us
here and there are aspects which never occur to one unless one is testing a problem
from a specific C.R.O. point of view which could be identified in an arrangement such
as this and over which we could perhaps be of some assistance. The sort of topics we
have in mind would not only be just political ones of the West Africa Department, but
also things falling within the purview of the Colonial Services and Economic Policy
Department.
I know that you are just off and that you will not want to give an answer to this
before you go. But would you, with your usual kindness, brood over it and we might
have a talk about it after you get back?
Minutes on 88
S of S
I think that the emergence of Nigeria to independent status will produce far more dif-
ficult problems for our department than in the case of Ghana or Malaya. I suggest that
it is of great importance that we should be clearly associated as active partners (behind
the scenes) with all that goes on in the future—perhaps even at Ministerial level.
C.J.M.A.
26.6.58
Sir G Laithwaite
Had I better send a note to Colonial Secretary or will your note to Sir J. Macpherson
do the trick?
H.
27.6.58
I’d prefer to deal with Macpherson first. CPC ensures ministers are brought in on
important developments.
G.L.
30.6.58
89 DO 35/10457, no 5 23 July 1959
‘CRO/CO liaison on Nigeria’: minute by M E Allen (CRO) on meeting
between officials
Mr. Snelling and I went to the Colonial Office on 22nd July for a first meeting with
Mr. Eastwood and other officials.
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2. The Colonial Office were, as was of course to be expected, very friendly and
helpful, and were entirely at one with us in the desire to make Nigeria’s transition
from Colonial status to independence as smooth as possible and as free of
complications for the future as possible. They accepted that it was primarily the
Colonial Office’s responsibility, until Independence, to ensure that their own “subject
departments” did not lay up difficulties for us in the future by e.g. making vague
promises of financial aid to Nigeria, as had been done in the case of Malaya; they also
agreed that it was primarily the Colonial Office’s responsibility to stop other
Departments like the Treasury or the War Office from laying up trouble for us after
Independence, and to see that other departments cleared up situations such as the
liquidation of War Office assets which might otherwise bedevil relations after we had
taken over.
3. We for our part undertook to encourage our own subject departments,
especially the Economic Division, to keep in touch with their opposite numbers in
the Colonial Office as a double check.
4. Before the meeting we had written to the Colonial Office to say that we could
not necessarily accept their view that, at the resumed Constitutional Conference
with Nigerian representatives at the end of September, the C.R.O. should be content
to have only an observer, who would not have the right to speak, on the U.K.
Delegation. The Colonial Office did not commit themselves on this, since they would
in any case wish to consult the Colonial Secretary. They suggested that the point
might not in practice be of much substance since the Colonial Secretary himself
would probably do nearly all the talking at the Conference. This question was
therefore left for further consideration.
5. The Colonial Office have sent us copies of draft briefs for the resumed
Constitutional Conference, and will welcome our comments on them. They will also
welcome us at the small Departmental Working Parties which have been set up to
examine various questions which may come up at the Conference, e.g. on U.K.
defence requirements in Nigeria and on constitutional drafting points such as the
position of the Queen in provincial legislatures.
6. We then went through a list of matters that had occurred to us in the C.R.O.
on the basis of Ghanaian and Malayan experience as deserving attention. Sir G.
Laithwaite will probably not wish to be burdened with details of all of these. The most
important one was our concern at the slow pace of Africanisation of the Public
Service in Northern Nigeria. Mr. Snelling expressed grave apprehension lest there
might be a breakdown of the Administration in Nigeria shortly after Independence,
and urged that, in addition to the Martin proposals designed to encourage expatriates
to stay on, the Northern Nigerian Administration ought to accelerate their schemes
for bringing Africans into the Public Service even if their educational and other
qualifications were not up to normal standard. The Colonial Office said they were
well aware of this situation, and that in fact the Northern Nigerian Administration
had already started to do this very thing. They admitted, however, that it was most
unlikely that by Independence the Northern Nigeria Administration would have been
Africanised to a point at which we need no longer fear a disruption. We shall clearly
have to keep stimulating the Colonial Office about this.
7. We also, with Ghanaian experience in mind, said to the Colonial Office that we
doubted whether it was worth giving Nigeria a rigid Constitution containing a great
many entrenched clauses; we thought that it became a goal of African politicians to
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alter rigid Constitutions, since they appeared to be a limit on their independence.
The Colonial Office pointed out that it was the Nigerians themselves who were asking
for entrenched clauses in the Nigerian Constitution, as a protection one against the
other. This would have to be discussed further.
90 DO 35/7999, no 18 8 Oct 1959
‘Suggested amalgamation of the CO and the CRO’: minute by O R Blair
(CRO)
Mr. Chadwick
The arguments against amalgamating the C.R.O. with the C.O. can be summarised
thus:—
(a) The existence of a separate office is living proof of the importance which the
United Kingdom attaches to the Commonwealth connection.
(b) An amalgamation would be unwelcome to Commonwealth governments.1 Few
are entirely free from eagerness to express their absolute independence at slight
provocation, and in new members such as Ghana their victory in the so-called
struggle for independence is usually described as “freedom from Colonial Office
rule”. Existing members would tend to shun the amalgamated office and
increasingly deal direct with the Foreign Office; this would blur and finally vitiate
the principle that relations between Commonwealth countries are different in kind
to those between foreign countries. (At flag A is a record of a hostile South African
reaction to a proposed amalgamation, and at B of a hostile New Zealand reaction.)
(c) For the same reason emergent colonies might prefer to emerge into
demonstrably complete independence—outside the Commonwealth.
(d) This confusion in overseas territories about the functions of an amalgamated
office would be matched by increased public vagueness at home on the status and
independence of such territories. On the other hand, foreign anti-colonial powers
would not lose their prey through a mere change of name; and to try to baffle them
by adding an organic change not only involves the pretence that our relations with
Member countries are the same as with colonies or Commonwealth States, but
threatens the Member countries with depreciation in the eyes of such foreign
powers.
(e) The C.R.O. stands sentry for Member countries so that proposals affecting
their interests may be challenged by its officials or in Cabinet. Where a Colonial
policy raises such a conflict no Minister who was responsible for both Colonial and
Commonwealth affairs could put the Commonwealth view as effectively as can an
independent Commonwealth Secretary.
(f ) The burden of ministerial responsibility for all Commonwealth territories
would be too much for one man—indeed, the Colonial Office alone makes
excessive demands on its head. Even if there were parallel offices under a
Commonwealth and a Colonial Minister of State the head of the office would bear
1 The Canadian reaction was perhaps the most unfavourable, being suspicious of any hint of ‘old-
fashioned colonialism’. India, Pakistan and Malaya were proud of their independence and wanted
independent and non-independent members kept distinct. The government of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, however, would welcome the disappearance of their ‘bogey’, the CO.
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an inescapably heavy load, and would be expected to travel widely throughout all
Commonwealth territories.
(g) Merger with the C.O. would (unless merely titular) so dilute the staff of the
C.R.O. that its traditions and techniques might suffer. The C.O. is not much larger
in total staff (it has only 14 more Administrative Officers in the 1959 Civil Service
List), but its officers have not been recruited for or trained in the task of
Commonwealth relations and many may be quite unsuitable for it. It has already
been found that few are prepared to serve overseas, and there is thus a danger that
the London Office would become a repository for officers without first-hand
experience of the Commonwealth or desire to acquire it.
(h) It is likely that the staff of the C.R.O. would have their career prospects
harmed by an amalgamation. This would affect the morale, and thus the efficiency,
of the office.
2. You asked me to look at the arguments against a merger of the C.R.O. with the
F.O. For ease of reference I record that all the above arguments, suitably modified,
have been, or could be, applied. Additional stress would be laid on the fact that
Commonwealth relations are different in kind from foreign relations, that C.R.O.
technique is less formal and more informative, that co-ordination with home
departments is more important, and that our special role in constitutional problems
has no F.O. parallel.
91 PREM 11/3378, M 37/60 [10 June] 1960
‘Future of the CRO’: memorandum by Mr Alport on amalgamation
with CO.  Minutes by Lord Home, Mr Macmillan, Mr Macleod
(PM(60)60) and T J Bligh (PM’s Office) [Extract]
. . .
2. There are undoubted attractions in the idea that we should work for the
eventual amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office with the Colonial
Office and the establishment of some sort of Commonwealth Service. I am very
doubtful whether, if such an amalgamation took place, independent Commonwealth
Governments, old and new, would be prepared to allow our diplomatic relations with
them to be conducted by an Office which was also responsible for administering the
substantial territories which will remain directly dependent for some time to come
upon the United Kingdom. The Canadians, for instance, have occasionally indicated
that they would like their affairs to be transferred to the Foreign Office. If this
happened all the others would follow suit. The effect would be that the
Commonwealth Relations Office as such would cease to exist and that all that would
be left for a Commonwealth Relations Office amalgamated with the Colonial Office to
handle, would be the residue of the dependencies which will remain in the Colonial
sphere. . . .
4. If my forecast that an amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office
and the Colonial Office would lead to a transfer of our present responsibilities to the
Foreign Office, I believe the Commonwealth could lose its identity and concern with
its special problems would make the Foreign Secretary’s burden almost
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overwhelming. The only way in which this could be avoided would be to add to the
immense responsibilities which the Prime Minister already carries. . . .
6. Whatever we may eventually decide, we cannot give effect to it without the
agreement of the independent Commonwealth. As I have said, I do not think that
they will easily accept an amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations Office and
the Colonial Office. I believe that the elimination of the Commonwealth Relations
Office with its present functions would be damaging to the cohesion of the
Commonwealth and to British influence among its members. I feel sure that a
reorganised and redesignated “Colonial Office” can play an important role in the
future, particularly if it is equipped to organise administrative, technical and
financial aid to the underdeveloped areas of the world. . . .
Minutes on 91
Prime Minister
The attached note, prepared by Mr. Alport, is a contribution to thought on a question
which is being keenly debated at present. You will perhaps have seen the reference in
the Economist to Mr. Alport’s speech at the Royal Commonwealth Society, which
ends up by saying that it thinks that we must get down to tackling the obvious
problems. It might well be thought therefore that the present is a good moment to
launch some new thought on the subject.
The note is nonetheless sent to you for your consideration at leisure. I am not
sending it at present further than you and Sir N. Brook as I don’t want to start a spate
of ideas before you are ready.
H.
10.6.60.
There has certainly been a great deal of talk [see the opening sentence of the
memo]—far too much of it by Mr Alport.
H.M.
11.6.60
Prime Minister
When I left the Office on Friday I had a parish of some 75 million souls but on
coming back to the Office this morning I find my parish has dwindled to about 40
million.
It does not of course follow from this that the work of the Colonial Office has dimin-
ished by half over the weekend: indeed, in many respects I think 1961 will be the
busiest year in our history. But at least two more large areas, Tanganyika and the West
Indies, are likely to become independent by 1962, and the unfolding of events is hav-
ing a very disturbing effect on the staff of the Department who wonder where their
future lies. Many of the younger people here have virtually no prospects of promotion
within the Colonial Office if it were to remain a separate and dwindling Department.
I am worried too about the future of the many professional Advisers whose sphere of
activity is also progressively dwindling but whose services could be of the greatest
value to the newly independent countries if there were some way of making these ser-
vices available without importing the continued association of Colonial status.
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The Select Committee on Estimates has recommended a merger between the
Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office. This is but one of a number
of recommendations in their Report. The other recommendations can all be dealt
with fairly easily through the normal routine of consultation. The recommendation
for a merger of the two Offices clearly raises issues of the highest policy and I hope
that it will be possible for you to arrange a talk with the Commonwealth Secretary
and myself in the very near future so that we may consider our attitude towards this
recommendation and the question of any inter-departmental machinery that may be
needed to follow it up. . . .
I.M.
3.10.60
Prime Minister
(1) Main recommendations of the Select Committee:
(a) The Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office should be merged
on the lines of a tripartite organisation as below:—
(i) the political side dealing with independent Commonwealth countries;
(ii) the “responsible” side for dealing with the dependent territories;
(iii) a functional side dealing with technical aid, social services, advice, etc., for
independent and dependent territories alike.
This should be done at once. The new Department should be known as the
Commonwealth Office with one Secretary of State and three or more Depart-
mental Ministers.
(b) The Colonial Office should revise its recruiting methods for overseas Civil
Service appointments, being more radical and energetic in recruiting locally and
from other Commonwealth Countries.
(c) An urgent and comprehensive examination of the organisation and terms of
service of the overseas Civil Service should be undertaken.
(d) A Committee of Enquiry should be set up to consider the establishment of a
Commonwealth Advisory and Technical Service.
There are a number of other recommendations on the need to make better estimates
and so on.
(2) Arguments for and against a merger
Against:
(a) The two Offices have different functions;
(b) In some fields a merger between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office
would be more appropriate;
(c) There would be too much work for one Secretary of State;
(d) The merger would be unacceptable to many independent Commonwealth
countries.
For:
(a) There would be a net economy;
(b) It would assure the future of the Colonial Office staff;
(c) The Commonwealth Relations Office would gain correspondingly;
(d) Functions of the two Departments have close affinities;
(e) There are disadvantages in the term “Colonial Office”;
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(f) Transition of dependent territories to independence would help in many ways,
especially economic and technical;
(g) There could be unified representation of all Commonwealth countries in the
international economic field.
The Committee did not appear to consider the possibility of a merger between the
Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office for which arguments are
sometimes put forward—for example, the Canadians have suggested that all their
useful contacts are with the Foreign Office and Foreign Office people. They think we
would be much better off with a Department of External Affairs dealing with the
independent Commonwealth countries and foreign countries; and a Commonwealth
Office to deal with the dependent territories.
T.J.B.
14.10.60
92 PREM 11/3378, PMM(UK)(61)40 2 Mar 1961
‘Department of Technical Co-operation’: Cabinet Office briefing for
Mr Macmillan on its setting up
[Late in 1960 it was noted in the CO that the US administration was streamlining its
organisation of technical overseas assistance, and Macleod agreed it was important
Britain should not lag behind the Americans in a matter of such obvious Commonwealth
importance (Sir H Poynton to Sir A Clutterbuck, 14 Dec 1960). Macmillan believed a
permanent technical department should be created, but regarded a merger between the
CO and CRO as premature (M 380/60, 4 Nov 1960). Sir N Brook chaired the committee
which set up the new department; his conviction was that aid to an overseas country
could be an important aspect of relations with it (minute, 6 Feb 1961). The Cabinet
decision was taken on 7 Feb 1961 (see document no 346 in Pt II). Sir Andrew Cohen (head
of CO African department, 1947–1951, gov of Uganda, 1952–1957, permanent UK
representative at UN Trusteeship Council, 1957–1961) wanted to be the permanent head,
and this was acceptable. Consultation with the Commonwealth was essential because of
the sensitivity of new Afro-Asian members—and especially perhaps Nigeria—to
accepting British technical aid after independence. The reaction of the prime minister of
Nigeria in fact proved to be neutral; Malaya raised no objection, and Nkrumah was
uncharacteristically silent.]
Ministers have decided that Commonwealth Prime Ministers should be informed of
the decision to set up a new Department of Technical Co-operation before any public
announcement is made. It would be helpful if a sentence welcoming this decision
could be included in the final communiqué of the Commonwealth Meeting.
2. The intention is to set up a central department to co-ordinate and direct the
work of all United Kingdom agencies concerned in the provision of technical
assistance to countries overseas, irrespective of their constitutional status. The
Department will be concerned, not only with the provision of experts and advisers
and the supply of equipment, but also with educational work e.g. the training of
students and the provision of teachers. The Department will be called the
Department of Technical Co-operation. It will be under the charge of a Minister, with
the status of a Minister of State, who will be responsible for initiating proposals for
technical assistance within the limits of policy laid down by the Secretaries of State
in charge of the three Oversea Departments.
3. The new Department will bring together, under single direction, the work on
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technical assistance which is now being done separately in the Foreign Office, the
Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office. It will also take over a small
amount of work of this kind which is now being done by the Ministry of Labour. It
will thus be able to provide a new central focus, and a fresh impetus and direction,
for all the United Kingdom effort to provide assistance to countries overseas. It will
account for its expenditure on its own Vote.
4. There is reason to think that some Commonwealth countries which have
recently attained independence may have misgivings about an arrangement by which
this new Department will be concerned with assistance to dependent territories—and
especially perhaps about the proposal that it should take over the functions of the
Colonial Office in respect of the Overseas Civil Service. These functions are the recruit-
ment, terms of service, transfers and promotions of members of the Overseas Civil
Service serving Governments of dependent territories; and the administration of the
new Overseas Service Aid Scheme under which the United Kingdom Government will
pay part of the cost of expatriate staff employed by oversea Governments. It has been
suggested, for example, that the Opposition in Nigeria might make this the occasion
to allege that our technical aid activities are tainted with “neo-colonialism” and are
merely attempts to find employment for displaced Colonial officials.
5. Ministers decided that the best course would be to explain our intentions
informally to one or two Prime Ministers separately before mentioning in plenary
session the proposal to establish this new Department. The Prime Ministers of
Malaya and Nigeria might be among those first to be sounded, since they are likely to
be the most sensitive on the issue. In these discussions the following arguments
might be put:—
(i) This is purely an organisational change within our domestic machinery in
Whitehall. It is designed to enable us to co-ordinate and centralise our
recruitment and other technical assistance activities which are at present
dispersed over a number of Government Departments and other agencies. The
objective is to give a better service to oversea countries and to enable us to satisfy
their requests for technical assistance more quickly and more effectively.
(ii) In this country it will help to mark the importance which the Government
attach to the provision of technical aid to less developed countries. It will also
stimulate the interest and activities of unofficial agencies in this field.
(iii) Independent Commonwealth countries will have day to day contacts with
the new Department. But broad questions of policy, including questions of capital
aid, will continue to be dealt with by the Commonwealth Relations Office.
(iv) It is important that the new Department should handle the work of
technical assistance to dependent, as well as independent, countries. We shall not
secure maximum efficiency unless all this work is brought under single direction.
And there is much knowledge and expertise which we have developed in relation to
dependent territories which can be made available to independent countries, as
desired, with great advantage to them.
(v) This does not mean that the new Department will be tainted with
“Colonialism”. On the contrary, a main purpose of this organisational change is to
separate these technical services from the Colonial Office.
(vi) In particular it should be easier under the new arrangements for newly-
independent Commonwealth countries to accept the Overseas Service Aid Scheme
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without risk of any “taint” of colonialism, since it will be administered by the new
Department and not by the Colonial Office as at present.
(vii) It is not intended to make any change in the duties or responsibilities of the
British Council or the Crown Agents.
(viii) This is not a preliminary to amalgamation of the Commonwealth Relations
Office and Colonial Office. Indeed, it can be said that the creation of this new
Department will meet one of the main practical arguments for such an
amalgamation.
6. If after these arguments have been deployed there still appears to be anxiety
on the ground that the new Department will be too closely associated with dependent
territories and ex-Colonial servants, we could agree to make the following
adjustment in the plan. It could be arranged that the Colonial Secretary would retain
his existing responsibility for the transfer, promotion and discipline of members of
the Overseas Civil Service in dependent territories, but would use the new
Department as his agent for the recruitment of staff. The cost of the White Paper
scheme in respect of staff serving in dependent territories would continue to be
borne on the Colonial Office Vote.
7. Timing. It is important that the public announcement about the new
Department should be made before 20th March, when a White Paper on our
technical assistance activities generally is to be issued in which there is a reference to
the decision to set up the new Department. We might therefore aim to make an
announcement on, say, 14th March, and include a passage in the final communiqué
of the Prime Ministers’ Meeting to be issued on 17th March. Legislation will be
necessary, and a Bill should be introduced into the House before Easter and given a
Second Reading after the Easter recess. It is proposed that the Department should
start operation on 1st July.
93 PREM 11/3378, M 228/61 12 July 1961
[Responsibilities of the new office of Secretary for Technical 
Co-operation]: minute from Mr Macmillan to Mr Vosper1
On your assumption of office as the first Secretary of this new Department of
Technical Co-operation, I should like you to know how I see the job which you are
undertaking.2
2. You will be taking over a number of existing activities of technical assistance
from the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office.
You will also be taking over the work which the Ministry of Labour have been doing
on the technical assistance activities of the United Nations.
3. Your general task will be to co-ordinate and develop the arrangements for pro-
viding technical assistance to Commonwealth countries, both dependent and inde-
pendent, and also to foreign countries, as may be required. In this and other respects
you will operate within the general policies of the three Secretaries of State. It will be
1 D F Vosper, MP, formerly minister of state at Home Office; leader of parliamentary delegation to West
Indies in 1958; subsequently Lord Runcorn.
2 For the Cabinet conclusions on establishment of the office, see document no 346 in Part II.
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your responsibility to consult closely with them especially on the political aspects of
your technical assistance activities in countries within their spheres of responsibility,
including questions of priorities as between countries receiving technical assistance
from us, and to act in agreement with them on these matters. You will of course be
concerned with policy relating to the broad field of technical assistance.
4. I expect you will find it profitable to encourage people in industry and
commerce, the professions, the universities and other sectors of our national life to
undertake a period of service overseas, and to seek to establish arrangements
whereby employers can be encouraged to release their staff for this purpose.
5. I attach some importance to the development of technical assistance on a
multilateral basis, especially within the Commonwealth. It will, I hope, be part of
your concern to see whether further arrangements are needed whereby help can be
channelled directly between Commonwealth countries.
6. The Select Committee on Estimates, in its Fourth Report, Session 1959/60,
developed certain ideas about the establishment of what it called a Commonwealth
Advisory and Technical Service, and recommended that the possibilities should be
fully investigated. It will be a function of your Department to make the appropriate
study.
7. This, of course, will find its place alongside your general responsibility for the
manning of the Oversea Civil Service. In this connection you will have noted that
there has been excluded from your concern for the Oversea Civil Service questions of
promotion, transfer and discipline in dependent territories, which are reserved to the
Colonial Secretary.
8. You are not, of course, inhibited from sponsoring new developments within
the general range of what is recognised as technical assistance and co-operation. It
will be open to you to shape these as may seem desirable, in consultation with the
appropriate oversea Department and other existing institutions. By these I mean not
merely other Departments of Government, but also organisations on the margin of
Government, such as the British Council. . . .
94 PREM 11/3814 26 Jan 1962
[Possible transfer to CRO of responsibility for Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland]: minute by Sir N Brook to T J Bligh
In your letter of 23rd January you asked whether legislation would be required to
transfer from the Colonial Secretary to the Commonwealth Secretary the
responsibility for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. You also asked how long it
would take to make such a transfer.
2. This transfer could be made without legislation and, indeed, without any for-
mal legal instrument. For the Office of Secretary of State is, in constitutional theory,
one and indivisible; and any Secretary of State can exercise any of the powers of any
other Secretary of State. The transfer could therefore be made by a simple decision of
the Prime Minister, announced in Parliament—as was in fact done when responsibil-
ity for the High Commission Territories was recently transferred the other way.
I have ascertained that there are a few Orders in Council relating to the Federation
(drafted by the Colonial Office, not by Parliamentary Counsel) in which the expression
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“Secretary of State” has been defined as meaning “the person holding office for the
time being as Secretary of State for the Colonies”. These references would need to be
corrected by an amending Order in Council; but this can be done at leisure. I cannot
discover, without enquiry through the Colonial Office, whether any legislation in the
two Territories themselves would require amendment. If this were necessary, there
would be political difficulty in getting the amending legislation through.
3. The time required to complete the transfer need not be very great. In London,
it would be a matter of transferring some staff and records from one Department to
the other. In Africa, it would be mainly a question of changing cyphers, re-routing
communications, etc.
4. You did not ask for my comments on the merits of such a transfer. For the trans-
action of business in Whitehall, it would be a tremendous advantage to have undivided
Ministerial responsibility for all three Territories. I need not enlarge on that. On the
other hand, the political difficulties would be considerable. For example:—
(a) The preamble to the Constitution of the Federation incorporates our
undertaking that “Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should continue, under the
special protection of Her Majesty, to enjoy separate Governments for so long as
their respective peoples so desire”. It is true, no doubt, that the obligation to
safeguard the interests of the African territories is one which rests on the
Government as a whole; but there is no doubt that African leaders in those
territories, and their supporters in our Parliament here, look especially to the
Colonial Secretary and his Department to see that that obligation is fulfilled. If it
were transferred to the Commonwealth Secretary, this would certainly be read as
an indication that we were shifting the balance of our sympathies in favour of the
European interests in the Federation.
(b) The transfer would certainly be distrusted by officials in the two northern
territories. The reactions of the Governors are unpredictable. At least one of them
might well resign.
(c) Apart from disquiet at the political implications of the transfer, members of
the Colonial Service serving in these territories would also be concerned about the
effect on their status and careers. For example, could they preserve their existing
opportunities for transfer to other Colonies?
(d) The Commonwealth Relations Office is not equipped to handle the direct
administration of dependent territories. To give them this responsibility now in
respect of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will not look consistent with the recent
decision to relieve them of the responsibility for the High Commission Territories.
95 PREM 11/3814 12 Mar 1962
[Proposed new ministerial responsibilities for the Central African
Federation]: letter from Mr Macmillan to HM The Queen
[Brook believed the Central African problem was straining the Cabinet system, and he
urged the prime minister to put a single minister in charge, but not one from the CRO
(‘this is not the moment at which to shake the confidence of Africans, or their sponsors in
this country’). He recommended Butler, who should be regarded as ‘fairly impartial as
between Africans and Europeans’: sympathetic to the latter as settlers, yet known as ‘the
holder of liberal opinions’ (Brook to Macmillan, 1 Mar 1962). At a meeting between
Brook, the prime minister, the chief whip, and T J Bligh on 7 Mar it was agreed Butler
10-ConGov-Doc 82-99-cp  18/10/00  2:05 pm  Page 331
332 ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURES [95]
would be best: he was very senior, had the ‘necessary art and skill’, would be acceptable to
Welensky and probably African leaders. Alternatively there was Thorneycroft, but he
could not be aviation minister as well; John Hare (minister of labour) was also thought
very suitable. Macmillan saw the two existing ministers on 5 Mar. It was clear Home
wanted to be relieved of responsibility for the Federation, but Maudling was less keen
about giving up his two colonies, despite the obvious anxiety they caused him. In writing
to Maudling on 9 Mar, Macmillan explained that the change was no reflection on his
handling of matters, ‘but the division of responsibility between two Ministers inevitably
threw a great burden on me personally. The world, alas, is too unquiet to enable me to
devote all my attention to this particular problem, important though it is’.]
Madam
Mr. Macmillan with his humble duty to The Queen.
As Your Majesty knows, I have for some time been concerned with the difficulties
thrown up by having two Secretaries of State responsible for different aspects of the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For it is only natural that the two Secretaries
of State and their Departments should tend to take slightly opposing views of any
particular problem. The Commonwealth Relations Office feel bound to argue for the
European-dominated Federal Government. And the Colonial Office feel strongly
their position as protectors of the people in the Northern Territories. It is quite right
and natural that the Departments should feel like this. But it has meant that policy
questions in regard to the Federation have been capable of resolution only by
collective decisions of Ministers, and, moreover, decisions based not on a single
channel of advice but on two.
The Lord Chancellor has in the past been a great help to me by taking the chair at
small Ministerial meetings in order to resolve, as far as possible, differences between
the two Secretaries of State and thus to bring before the Cabinet a considered and
broadly agreed recommendation. But this application of the Cabinet Committee
principle has not always led to a suitable solution. Nor does it help, for example, to
settle such questions as who would be the right person to meet Dr. Banda, the leader
of the majority party in Nyasaland, when he visits London a little later on. Should it
be the Commonwealth Secretary, who might feel it right that, as the Minister
responsible for the Federation, he should have the task of trying to persuade Dr.
Banda not to press for a secession? Or should it be the Colonial Secretary who might
feel that, since Nyasaland is still formally a British protectorate, the leader of the
main political party should be seen by him?
One possibility which occurred to me was to put the responsibility for the
Federation as a whole and the three Territories under the Commonwealth Secretary,
but although this would have led to all the advantages of undivided Ministerial
responsibility there would have been considerable political difficulties. In particular
the African leaders in the Northern Territories and their supporters in this country
look especially to the Colonial Secretary and his Department to see that our
obligations to them under the preamble to the Constitution are fulfilled. A change to
the Commonwealth Secretary would have been, quite mistakenly, read as an
indication that we were shifting the balance of our sympathies towards the European
interests in the Federation. And in addition the Commonwealth Relations Office was
not of itself equipped to handle the direct administration of dependent territories.
I decided, therefore, that the right course would be to arrange for a third Minister
to take over from both the Colonial Secretary and the Commonwealth Secretary all
their existing responsibilities for the Federation. This transfer of functions can be
made without any formal legal instrument provided the third Minister is a Secretary
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of State. As Your Majesty will know, any Secretary of State can exercise any of the
powers of any other Secretary of State. The transfer can therefore be made by a
simple administrative decision.
There is power to appoint eight Secretaries of State. At present there are only
seven. It would have been possible, therefore, to have appointed an additional
Secretary of State and transfer the Federation to him. But it would not be possible to
appoint an additional Minister in the House of Commons since, under the
Disqualification Act of 1957, the Administration is only allowed to have twenty seven
Ministers in the House of Commons and this number is already in post.
I have been considering the possibility of transferring one of the Departments, for
example, the Ministry of Aviation, to a Minister in the House of Lords thereby leaving
a vacancy for the appointment of an additional Secretary of State in the House of
Commons. But in the end I rejected this solution since it seemed to be wrong to
create a Minister with the sole responsibility of looking after the interests of the
Federation as I am not sure whether this would be a whole time job. It should not be
a permanent one because if the affairs of the Federation are satisfactorily settled it
will in a short time become independent and then be dealt with by the
Commonwealth Relations Office in the ordinary way. I therefore concluded that it
would be necessary to transfer the responsibilities for the Federation to an existing
Secretary of State. It was clear that this had to be someone who was both senior to
both the Commonwealth Secretary and the Colonial Secretary. The only person who
met this point was the Home Secretary.
As Your Majesty will remember, when the Government changes were announced
last October Mr. Butler was relieved of his duties as Leader of the House of Commons
and Chairman of the Conservative Party in order to devote all his time to running the
Home Office and to giving me special assistance over a wide range of public duties. It
could therefore be represented that in taking over the responsibilities of the two
Secretaries of State Mr. Butler was really acting on my behalf and doing something
which, had I the time, I would have done myself. I have asked Mr. Butler whether he
would be prepared to take on the new job and he has agreed to do so.
I have it in mind to make a Statement in the House of Commons on Thursday,
March 15 and to bring the new arrangement into operation on Monday, March 19.
I would like formally to recommend to Your Majesty this change in the
Administration. I would propose to send personal messages in advance of my
Statement to the Governor-General, Sir Roy Welensky and Sir Edgar Whitehead; and
cause appropriate messages to be sent to Lord Alport,1 the Governors of the Northern
Territories and the Federal High Commissioner in London.
I thought it would be right to set this out in a formal submission so that, should
Your Majesty wish to discuss it with me, the Audience tomorrow, Tuesday, March 13,
would be a suitable opportunity.2
With my humble duty,
I remain,
Your Majesty’s faithful and devoted servant,
Harold Macmillan
1 Formerly C J M Alport, who left the CRO in 1961 to become high commissioner to the Federation.
2 The Cabinet decision was taken on 13 Mar: CAB 128/36/1, CC 21(62)1. The parliamentary Statement was
made on 15 Mar: H of C Debs, vol 655, cols 1545–1547.
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96 PREM 11/3814 14 Mar 1962
[Proposed transfer of ministerial responsibility for the Central African
Federation]: tel (no 67) from Sir E Hone (N Rhodesia) to CRO.
Minute by Mr Macmillan
This came as a very great shock and I must tell you that I, and all my immediate
advisers, regard this decision as most unfortunate and feel that, coming at this time,
it cannot fail to revive deep suspicion of H.M.G.’s intentions for Northern Rhodesia.
2. The consequences may prove unwelcome. I fear adverse effects, both on the
plan for a smooth introduction of the new territorial constitution with the co-
operation of all political parties and on the prospects for a Federal settlement.
3. Africans in Northern Rhodesia have always regarded the Colonial Office as the
special guardian of their welfare and the guarantor of their political advance. My
predecessor and I have both stressed on earlier occasions when the amalgamation of
the Central African Departments of the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations
Offices has been rumoured that the projected removal of Northern Rhodesia affairs
from the wing of the Secretary of State for the Colonies was bound to arouse the
fears of Africans and be looked upon as a sign that H.M.G. discounted their special
rights as protected persons.
4. I regard the decision as a very considerable blow to our relations generally
with the African people, and coming at a moment when the African political parties
and Barotseland have still not finally committed themselves to participate under the
new Constitution, I fear it may tip the balance against our winning their co-
operation. Unless the suspicions that will inevitably be aroused can be allayed, the
announcement may provoke anew the risk of serious disorders in the territory.
5. You invite suggestions as to points which might be made in presentation of
the decision in order to help local understanding of it and acceptance of the change
of responsibilities.
6. I hope that it will be possible to avoid over-emphasising that H.M.G.’s purpose
is to secure centralised direction of policy while the future of Federation is worked
out. H.M.G. must not (repeat not) appear to be regarding the federation as a unit
whose component parts may be disposed and reordered as will best serve the federal
concept, and without regard to their individual interests, wishes or integrity. The
separatist tendencies current in each of the three territories gained strength
precisely because of the over-centralised nature of our federal association and the
repeated and contemptuous disregard in Salisbury and, it is suspected, in London, of
the feelings of the constituent territories. The greatest care will be needed to counter
any impression that H.M.G.’s move buttresses the unitary concept of federation and
represents a “victory” for the Federal Government.
7. Secondly, I consider it necessary to nail from the start any suspicion that
H.M.G.’s move presages, as has already been strongly hinted, a last desperate attempt
to preserve a federal association by the dismemberment of Northern Rhodesia.
8. I therefore urge most strongly that the Prime Minister’s statement should
(a) state positively that H.M.G. is determined to preserve the integrity of the
member states of the federation and will not countenance any plan for the future
of Central Africa which involves the dismemberment of Northern Rhodesia;
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(b) Stress that H.M.G. will continue to regard herself as directly responsible for
each of the three territories and that the new Secretary of State will retain an
individual concern for the affairs of the two Protectorates;
(c) Make the point that each of the four Governments will continue to enjoy equal
access to H.M.G. individually, the Federal and Southern Rhodesia Governments
through High Commissioner, and the Protectorates through their own Governors
respectively;
(d) Reaffirm that the recently announced Constitution of Northern Rhodesia
represents H.M.G.’s definitive decision for next stage of constitutional advance in this
territory and is not affected by the transfer of responsibility to the Home Secretary.
9. If it were possible for you to give me a personal message from yourself
emphasising these four points from the Prime Minister’s statement, together with
authority to broadcast it in your name to the people of Northern Rhodesia
immediately after H.M.G.’s announcement becomes public here, I think that might
also be of some help.
10. I am grateful to you and Lord Perth for personal message in your paragraph
4. It goes without saying that I most deeply regret this unexpected end to our close,
and I believe successful, association.
Minute on 96
Although we know from experience that the governor is rather hysterical, it is
important to meet his main points in text of statement and for supplementaries. How
far can the 4 points in para 8 be met? Certainly (b)(c) & (d); not (I think) (a).1
H.M.
15.3.62
1 Bligh arranged for a few drafting amendments to be made.
97 PREM 11/4117 19 June 1962
[Conversion of Colonial Policy Committee into an Oversea Policy
Committee]: recommendation from Sir N Brook to Mr Macmillan
I should like to recommend that the Colonial Policy Committee should now be
converted into an Oversea Policy Committee with rather wider terms of reference.
For some time past the Committee has been concerned mainly with problems of
constitutional development in dependent territories which are in the concluding
phases of advance towards independence. While these are in a sense problems of
Colonial policy, the decisions taken on them determine the future pattern of the inde-
pendent Commonwealth and increasingly touch on broader questions of international
relations. It is, for example, difficult in present circumstances to consider our Colonial
policy in Africa without having regard to our policy in the United Nations and our rela-
tions with the Afro-Asian group and with the other European countries who still have
interests in Africa. And, as we have recently seen, the Colonial problems of the
Caribbean impinge directly on our relations with the United States.
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I therefore propose that the Colonial Policy Committee should be abolished and
that in its place we should set up an Oversea Policy Committee with the following
terms of reference:—
To consider questions of oversea policy (other than defence policy) which concern more
than one of the oversea Departments.
I have ascertained that the Foreign Secretary, the Commonwealth Secretary, the
Minister of Defence and the Colonial Secretary would agree to this change.
If the new Ministerial Committee is established I would propose at the same time
to establish a new Official Committee to be called the Oversea Policy (Official)
Committee with correspondingly broad terms of reference. The existing Africa
(Official) Committee would then be abolished.
If you agree with these proposals I will arrange for them to be put into effect.1
1 Macmillan minuted: ‘I agree. H.M. 20.6.62’.
98 PREM 11/3816 5–6 Dec 1962
[Possible merger of CO and CRO]: minutes by P de Zulueta (PM’s
Office) and Mr Macmillan
Prime Minister
The Chief Clerk at the Foreign Office has asked me to find out informally whether
you had anything specific in mind when on November 22 in answer to Mr. Healey and
Mr. Gaitskell1 you spoke in terms of possibly amalgamating the Commonwealth
Relations Office and the Colonial Office.2 The reason for the Chief Clerk’s enquiry is
that the Plowden Committee3 have reached a tentative recommendation that the
right amalgamation is between the two “diplomatic” departments namely the C.R.O.
and the Foreign Office, rather than between the two “Commonwealth” departments.
This is because the C.R.O. and the Foreign Office perform practically the same
functions whereas the Colonial Office are engaged in the different task of
administration.
May I tell Sir Francis Rundall4 that your observations were obiter?
P. de Z.
5.12.62
NO. I think the Plowden Ctee are on the wrong track—altogether. I should oppose
strongly merging Commonwealth with F.O. Politically, it wd. be worse for us than
the Common Market.
H.M.
6.12.62
1 D W Healey, Lab MP; H T N Gaitskell, leader of the Opposition, 1955–1963 (died).
2 The prime minister said there was ‘a good deal to be said’ for amalgamation of CO and CRO: they now
worked closer together, separate, but under a single minister; ‘I think this tentative movement towards
getting the two offices together is a good experiment’ (22 Nov 1962, H of C Debs, vol 667, cols 1403–1405).
3 Lord Plowden, chairman of committee of inquiry into Treasury control of public expenditure,
1959–1961. Plowden recommended tentatively the amalgamation of CRO and FO, as the ‘diplomatic’
departments, different from the CO’s task of administration.
4 Deputy under-secretary of state at FO since 1959.
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99 CO 967/433, no 30 25 June 1963
[Amalgamation of Colonial Office with CRO]: letter from Sir H
Poynton (CO) to Sir C Jeffries1
Many thanks for sending me a copy of your article for The Times on “The Future of
the Colonial Office”. As you imply in your letter it takes a very different line from
what I have consistently advocated ever since I succeeded Jock Macpherson in this
post; and indeed lays particular emphasis on one or two of what I might term the
standard C.R.O. theses which I have been at pains to try and knock down. I had hoped
that I was now near to my goal of bringing an amalgamation of the Colonial Office
with the C.R.O. Consequently I must confess that I find your article distinctly
disconcerting, though I do not think it influences me to change my own beliefs.
In particular, I have been at considerable pains to try and remove the impression
that the work of the Colonial Office is so different from that of the C.R.O. (or for that
matter the Foreign Office) as has been frequently alleged, especially by successive
past Heads of the C.R.O. like Liesching, Laithwaite or Clutterbuck, who always
seemed anxious to keep the Colonial Office at arms length. Mercifully Joe Garner is
much more sympathetic. I do suggest that the days when the Colonial Office was a
direct administrative Department are long past. To give one example only, relations
between the Colonial Office and Singapore are no less diplomatic than those between
the C.R.O. and Kuala Lumpur. A very great deal of our work consists in negotiating
with Colonial Ministers.
Then again, you suggest on page 4 that from the point of view of the dependent
territories themselves it is not in their interests that British responsibilities for them
should be in the hands of an organisation whose main emphasis necessarily lies on
the separateness and independence of the countries with which it deals. You
therefore appear to want to accentuate the distinction between independence and
dependence. I, on the other hand, have always thought that it was right to play this
distinction down, e.g. by allowing Colonial Governments to take part in
Commonwealth conferences and so on. I can understand that the countries which
are already independent might think that there was something derogatory in sharing
a Secretary of State with the dependent territories. On the other hand I should have
thought that from the point of view of the dependent territories it was rather an up-
grading status to share the Secretary of State with the Commonwealth countries. In
any case, there is already an enormous area of overlapping between the two
Departments, particularly where you get dependent and independent territories in
the same geographical region or where a particular dependent territory is
progressing towards independence. Here I would say in passing that however much
one may try to rule a line between those countries which can aspire to independence
and those which cannot, the currency of sovereignty seems to get progressively
devalued and we have already examples of dependent countries which only a few
years ago we would have thought were totally incapable of independent sovereignty. I
agree that the ultimate residual work of the Colonial Office will have a higher
“administrative” quality and a lower “diplomatic” quality than at present, because
obviously it is in respect of the bigger territories which are constitutionally more
1 Retired joint deputy under-secretary of state at CO, 1947–1956.
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advanced that the diplomatic element in our work predominates. Nevertheless, as
our territorial responsibilities shrink, the size of the staff must shrink too. This
process has been going on already for three years or more, during which I have had
to find postings elsewhere in Whitehall for our own staff when and where I have been
able to. While we are running the Office down to the size which may ultimately
suffice to deal with the residual “rocks and islands” are we to dissipate throughout
Whitehall all our redundant experience and first-hand knowledge of the territories
which are graduating to independence within the Commonwealth? That would seem
to me completely wasteful. But with no clearer future for the Office I can only play
this run-down on a hand-to-mouth basis and the tendency is inevitably that I lose
many of the best people first, because other Departments will only take the best.
Obviously they would prefer to promote within rather than to take in an outsider.
Even if the residue of the Colonial Service were amalgamated with the residue of
the Colonial Office as you suggest (and incidentally I don’t know quite what happens
to the non-administrative branches of H.M.O.C.S.) I do not believe that even so one
could make, on the basis of the smaller territories alone, a Department of sufficient
political importance to warrant a separate Minister in the Cabinet. Nor would such a
course do anything to allay the anxieties of the existing Colonial Office, who see little
prospect of promotion in a shrinking Department and would, I know, be horrified at
remaining land-locked in a sort of “rocks and islands” Department of the kind you
envisage. But pooled with an expanding C.R.O. provided of course that the staff were
willing to accept the liability for service abroad and were thought suitable for it, one
can visualise an all-embracing Commonwealth Department with much wider
facilities for staff postings, promotions etc; and the peculiar knowledge and
experience of the Colonial Office staff could in that way continue to be utilised where
it is most nearly appropriate i.e. in the C.R.O.
I am sorry to write at such length. None of this is yet settled Ministerial policy, but
it is certainly my hope and ambition to bring this about before I retire and I shall
continue to press this view which I personally believe to be the right one and which I
know our own staff favour. I believe, too, that in the long run it will be more to the
advantage of the smaller territories themselves to have a large Department of first
class standing at the back of them in London rather than a thing of shreds and
patches which is all that the Rocks and Islands Department could be.
P.S. A lot of the most valuable functions of the C.O. for small territories have
already gone over to the D.T.C. which I suggest also weakens your argument against
C.O./C.R.O. fusion.
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CHAPTER 4
West, East, and the Horn of Africa
Document numbers 100–187
100 CAB 134/1555, CPC(57)12 7 May 1957
‘Nigeria’: memorandum for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee by 
Mr Lennox-Boyd on forthcoming constitutional conference
As my colleagues know, the Nigeria constitutional conference will open in London on
23rd May. It will be attended by some sixty to seventy Nigerian delegates and
advisers, representative of all the more important shades of political opinion in the
Federation, and will probably last till the end of June.
Outline of the present constitution
2. Since 1954 Nigeria—by far the largest of the dependent territories and with
33 million inhabitants—has been a Federation of three Regions (North, East and
West), the Southern Cameroons, and the Federal territory of Lagos (the Federal
capital). The residual powers are with the Regions.
3. This constitution was devised by my predecessor1 as the only way to save
Nigeria from disintegration, such is the diversity of the country and the deep-seated
distrust of the major tribes—Hausa/Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba—for each other (not to
speak of the fears of the many minority groups for these larger tribes).
4. There are large Nigerian majorities in all the executive and legislative organs
of government throughout the Federation, with the sole exception of the Southern
Cameroons Executive Council where there are four British to four Africans. There
are no British officials, except the Regional Governor, in the Eastern and Western
Executive Councils, no British officials in the Legislative Houses of these Regions,
and only three in the Federal and Northern Ministerial Councils (in addition to the
Governor-General and Regional Governor respectively) and in their Legislative
Houses.
5. The powers of the Federal Government include such matters—essential to
the administrative unity of the country—as defence, external affairs (in so far as
responsibility is delegated by the United Kingdom Government), the Nigeria police,
major communications, ports, currency, exchange control, external trade and
external loans.
6. The term “internal security” is unknown to the Nigerian constitution, but
“public safety and public order” is a concurrent subject, and the United Kingdom
Government’s ultimate responsibility for internal security is exercisable through the
1 Mr Lyttelton (S of S, 1951–1954), in 1954; see also document no 2(I), above.
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Governor-General of the Federation who has full discretionary power over the “use
and operational control” of the Nigeria police. Police supply is handled by the Federal
Executive and Legislature in the normal Parliamentary way, but is within the
portfolio of the (British) Chief Secretary of the Federation.
7. The Governor-General and the Regional Governors still have full reserved
powers and considerable discretionary powers. The reserved powers have been used
on three occasions in the East under the present constitution.
The demand for regional self-government in 1957 and for independence for the
whole country in 1959
8. When the last London conference met in 1953, the two major Southern
Parties, Chief Awolowo’s Action Group2 (in power in the West) and Dr. Azikiwe’s
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (N.C.N.C.) (now in power in the
East),3 had presented a categorical demand for “Dominion status” for Nigeria as a
whole by 1956. The majority party in the North, the Northern People’s Congress
(N.P.C.), led by the Sardauna of Sokoto, now Premier of the Northern Region, had
opposed the demand knowing that independence so soon would mean domination of
the “backward” North by the more “educated” Southerners. They had put forward as
an alternative formula self-government “as soon as practicable.”
9. The acute crisis which resulted nearly split the country and there was serious
rioting, with loss of life, in Kano which was prevented from spreading only by prompt
and firm action. The crisis was eventually resolved by my predecessor when he
secured agreement for the present federal form of Government and, as regards self-
government, to the following formula, recorded in the Conference Report (Cmd.
8934):—
“The Secretary of State for the Colonies informed the Conference that Her Majesty’s
Government were not prepared to fix a definite date for self-government for Nigeria as a
whole, the more so as the Northern delegation, representing over half the population of
Nigeria, was unable to depart from its policy of self-government as soon as practicable.
The Conference eventually accepted a declaration of policy that in 1956 Her Majesty’s
Government would grant to those Regions which desired it full self-government in
respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional Governments, with the
proviso that there should be safeguards to ensure that the Regional Governments did
not act so as to impede or prejudice the exercise by the Federal Government of the
functions assigned to it now, or as amended by agreement in the future, or in any way
make the continuance of federation impossible.”
10. A conference was to have been held last autumn to work out how to
implement the 1953 promise of Regional self-government, including the safeguards,
but it had to be postponed because of the Foster Sutton Tribunal of Inquiry into Dr.
Azikiwe’s corrupt practice and Ministerial misconduct in relation to the African
Continental Bank.4
2 Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Yoruba leader in Western Region, opposed to Azikiwe’s ‘Ibo nationalism’,
founder of Action Group, 1951.
3 Nnamdi Azikiwe, prime minister of the Eastern Region, 1954–1959, governor-general of Nigeria,
1960–1963, and first president of Nigerian Republic.
4 Sir Stafford Foster-Sutton, QC, chief justice of Nigeria, 1955–1958.
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11. At the forthcoming conference the West and the East will claim the promise
of Regional self-government, and my predecessor’s undertaking will, of course, have
to be honoured. At the same time I shall do my utmost to secure explicit provisions
for “good” government, for example, by safeguarding the public services, the
judiciary and the police from any form of political interference, and by preserving the
independence of the Attorneys-General (in relation to criminal proceedings) and of
the Auditors of Government accounts. (In the case of the Nigeria police this will
mean keeping them as a federal force under the discretionary control of the
Governor-General.) I also intend to insist upon adequate safeguards both for the
Federal Government and for the continuance of federation—in accordance with the
proviso to the undertaking given in 1953, as recorded in paragraph 9 above.
12. The Northern Region have said they do not want Regional self-government
till 1959. But in view of the new demand for independence for Nigeria as a whole in
1959 (with which I deal below), it is quite possible that at the conference they will
claim Regional self-government now. If they do, their claim will have to be met.
13. The most recent development, undoubtedly inspired to a large extent by the
grant of independence to Ghana, is the demand for independence for the Federation
as a whole, within the Commonwealth, in 1959. A resolution to this effect was passed
nem.con., in the Federal House of Representatives on 26th March, the Northern
members (who hold half the 184 elective seats) supporting.
14. Much at the conference will depend on how far the feelings of unity so
evident in the debate of 26th March survive, and surmount, the various serious
difficulties (e.g., on the allocation of revenues, the creation of more Regions or
States, the division of powers between the Federal and Regional Governments, the
control of the police) which are bound to come up when these controversial issues
are discussed. Moreover there is no doubt that Nigeria will not be ready for
independence, in any normally accepted sense of the term, so soon; and that there is
real danger for a good long time to come of the country disintegrating, and of
democratic institutions disappearing, if a guiding and restraining British hand is
removed from the Federal Government (and probably from the North also). In
addition there may be administrative chaos in the Eastern Region within a year or
two of Regional self-government, thanks to the largely corrupt, inept and
opportunist rule of Dr. Azikiwe’s N.C.N.C. in that Region.
15. On the other hand we cannot overlook certain factors:—
(a) the emotional pressure for independence is strong, certainly in the South;
(b) to resist too strongly and get all Nigerian politicians against us would be
valueless and dangerous, for we could hardly control the country if the population
were all against us; we must maintain a peaceful and quiet Nigeria, if only, to put it
no higher, in our ultimate interests as a trading nation (United Kingdom exports
to Nigeria run at the rate of £50–60 million annually). To lose the co-operation
and affection of Nigerians would be to risk future good relations, when the country
is independent.
16. This is the dilemma with which we are faced: either to give independence too
soon and risk disintegration and a breakdown of administration; or to hang on too
long, risk ill-feeling and disturbances, and eventually to leave bitterness behind, with
little hope thereafter of our being able to influence Nigerian thinking in world affairs
on lines we would wish.
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17. After careful consultation with the Governor-General and the three Regional
Governors, I have come to the conclusion that if the demand for independence in
1959 is put forward by the major Parties in unison—as I believe is likely—it would
be dangerous to resist it overtly. Indeed to do so might only have the effect of uniting
the Nigerians against us—at present our prestige and influence are high—and
increasing the pressure. If, however, we appear to yield with good grace while making
no unconditional promises at this stage, we should retain the present goodwill and
may be able to postpone the final transfer of power, certainly until late 1960 and
perhaps even till 1961 or 1962. (We know that Chief Awolowo, for example, does not
really expect independence to be administratively possible till towards the end of
1960 at the earliest.) In the meantime anything may happen: if, for example, the
Ghana experiment should fail, or administration break down in Eastern Nigeria,
enthusiasm for early independence may cool.
18. In addition to the demand for independence in 1959, I shall be under
pressure to agree to the removal of the three ex-officio Members (the Chief Secretary,
the Attorney-General, the Financial Secretary) from the Federal Council of Ministers;
and if the demand is pressed hard I think I must concede it, both to preserve goodwill
and because Nigerians ought to have the opportunity to learn the hard way while a
sufficient number of overseas officers are still there to help. The final change would
not then be so sudden. I may be able to keep the Financial Secretary and the
Attorney-General, and I shall if I can though I am not optimistic; but the Chief
Secretary will almost certainly have to go, being replaced by a Prime Minister, and
the post of Deputy Governor-General will then have to be created so that the holder
can assist the Governor-General with defence (including the police), external affairs,
and the Federal public service. (This would be on lines similar to what we had in the
Gold Coast in 1954 until independence.)
19. It will probably be necessary, at some stage in the conference, for Her
Majesty’s Government to make a declaration on these matters, and subject of course
to how the conference may go, I would propose, if necessary, to go as far as a
declaration on the following lines, bearing in mind that the life of the present House
of Representatives is due to run till late 1959:—
“The United Kingdom Government have noted the resolution passed in the House of
Representatives on the 26th March in favour of independence for Nigeria within the
British Commonwealth in 1959. In particular they welcome the increased sense of unity
among the political parties which enabled the resolution to be adopted without a
dissentient vote. For their part the United Kingdom Government have always firmly
believed that it is in the best interests of the peoples of Nigeria that the unity of the
country should be preserved.
The United Kingdom Government have agreed to certain changes in the constitution
to permit the appointment of a Prime Minister at the Centre and the withdrawal of the
ex-officio Members from the Council of Ministers during the period until the life of the
present House of Representatives comes to an end. (These changes will take effect as
soon as the constitutional instruments have been amended.)
If, in 1959, it is still the wish of the Nigerian people to attain independence within the
Commonwealth, and assuming that in the interim the Governments in the Federation
have demonstrated their integrity and capacity for good government, the United
Kingdom Government will consult with all the Nigerian Governments about
arrangements for the final transfer of power. These arrangements would have to include
special constitutional provisions to safeguard tribal and religious minorities, and full
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regard would be paid to the wishes of both the Northern and Southern sections of the
Trust Territory of the Cameroons under United Kingdom administration and to the
United Kingdom Government’s responsibilities under the United Nations Charter and
the Trusteeship Agreement.
Meanwhile, certain preliminary administrative steps are being taken. It has been
agreed that the Government of the Federation will assume responsibility for the
Nigerian military forces on 1st April, 1958. An expert study of the problems connected
with the establishment of a Central Bank and of a Nigerian currency has already begun
with the assistance of an adviser from the Bank of England; and further measures will
be taken towards training Nigerians for a future foreign service.”
20. Subject to developments in the meantime, I would expect it to be necessary
to ask the United Nations to hold a plebiscite in the British Cameroons in 1959 or
1960.
21. I seek the concurrence of my colleagues in the course outlined above, and in
making, if necessary, a declaration on the lines set out in paragraph 19.
101 CAB 134/1555, CPC 7(57)2 13 May 1957
‘Nigeria constitutional conference’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee Meeting1
The Colonial Secretary said that the conference would begin in London on 23rd May
and would probably last until 27th June. There had been previous conferences in
1953 and 1954 during which his predecessor had felt obliged to promise that Her
Majesty’s Government would grant, with safeguards, regional self-government in
1956 to those Regions which desired it.2 The main task of the present conference
would be to give effect to this undertaking. Of the three Regions, the North had been
the least enthusiastic for regional self-government: although it was the largest, it was
also the most backward, and feared domination by the more advanced East and West
Regions. But a unanimous resolution had recently been passed in the Federal House
of Representatives demanding independence for the Federation as a whole, within
the Commonwealth, in 1959. It was, therefore, likely that the representatives of the
Northern Region at the forthcoming conference would not only now express a desire
for immediate regional self-government, but would also join with the representatives
of the other two Regions in pressing for Federal self-government in 1959. If,
however, the representatives of the Northern Region still held to their desire for a
slower pace of advancement, they should be encouraged to put their point of view
firmly to the Conference and should be supported, to the fullest extent possible, by
the representatives of the United Kingdom Government. In such event there would
be a better chance of securing some modification in the Nigerian demand for Federal
independence as early as 1959. The difficulties and dangers of conceding this demand
were very considerable. Controversial issues, such as the allocation of revenues, the
creation of more regions, the division of powers between the Federal and Regional
Governments and the control of the police, would all need to be settled. Some of
1 See previous document, which was being discussed.
2 Goldsworthy, ed. Conservative government and the end of empire, 1951–1957, part II, document no
274, Cabinet memo on Nigerian constitution (17 Aug 1953).
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these, in particular the last two, would not be capable of quick solution; and it would
no doubt be necessary to set up a financial commission to enquire into the allocation
of revenues. The issue of the division of powers between the Federal and Regional
Governments might, however, be settled at the conference itself in the light of the
experience of the last three years. Apart from these difficulties, there was a real
danger that the immediate grant of regional self-government, particularly if linked
with the early achievement of Federal independence, would lead to an early
administrative breakdown in the Eastern Region. On the other hand, resistance to a
united demand for Federal independence would entail risk of serious disturbance and
a legacy of bitterness and hatred when the country eventually achieved
independence. The draft declaration set out in paragraph 19 of C.P.C. (57) 12 was
based on the assumption that, if the demand for Federal independence in 1959 were
put forward by the major parties in unison, it would be dangerous to resist it overtly.
The Commonwealth Secretary said that a declaration on the lines proposed in
paragraph 19, to be made during the course of the forthcoming conference, held
serious implications for the future of Commonwealth relations. The other members
of the Commonwealth were already uneasy about the manner in which, as it
appeared to them, the United Kingdom virtually committed them to agreeing to the
advancement of individual territories from colonial status to full membership of the
Commonwealth; and they were apprehensive that, as a result of this process, an Afro-
Asian Bloc might gradually be created within the Commonwealth itself. The grant to
Ghana of independence within the Commonwealth had been accepted under protest
by the South African Government and with misgivings by the Australian and New
Zealand Governments. To confront the impending meeting of Commonwealth Prime
Ministers with a declaration that the United Kingdom Government would, on certain
assumptions, be ready to consult with the Nigerian Governments about
arrangements for the final transfer of power in 1959, might lead to considerable
friction with the older Commonwealth countries. He was particularly disturbed that,
on the timetable proposed, Nigeria would achieve independence before the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It would, therefore, be preferable for Her
Majesty’s Government to seek to stipulate that regional self-government in Nigeria
should operate experimentally for a period of five years, and that at the end of this
period a commission should review future developments on the lines proposed for
the 1960 review in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
In discussion, there was general agreement that it would be desirable, if possible,
for Her Majesty’s Government to avoid making any commitment to grant Federal
independence to Nigeria in 1959. For this purpose it might be possible to redraft the
declaration in paragraph 19 of the memorandum in less precise language; in
particular, the United Kingdom Government might confine their undertaking to
consultation with the Nigerian Governments about a programme for further
constitutional advancement in which a constitutional commission (comparable, for
example, with the Reid Commission in the case of Malaya)3 might be made an
essential element.
Summing up the discussion, the Lord Chancellor4 said that it would be useful if
3 J S C Reid, Lord Reid (life peer, 1948), lord advocate of Scotland, 1941–1945, dean of Faculty of
Advocates, 1945–1948, chairman of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1956–1957.
4 Lord Kilmuir, in the chair.
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the Committee could consider an amended version of the declaration in paragraph
19 of the memorandum, designed to reflect the points made in discussion. In the
meantime C.P.C. (57) 12 should be circulated to the Cabinet under cover of a note
stating that the proposed declaration was being further considered by the
Committee. . . .
102 CAB 128/31/2, CC 42(57)4 22 May 1957
‘Nigeria’: Cabinet conclusions on constitutional advance
The Cabinet had before them:—
(i) A note by the Colonial Secretary (C. (57) 120) covering a memorandum on
the constitutional development of Nigeria.1
(ii) A note by the Lord Chancellor (C. (57) 122) to which was annexed a revised
version of the draft declaration of policy included in the Colonial Secretary’s
memorandum.
(iii) A further revision of the draft declaration, circulated by the Colonial
Secretary during the discussion.
The Colonial Secretary said that at the Nigerian Constitutional Conference in
1953 his predecessor had found it necessary to declare that in 1956 Her Majesty’s
Government would grant to those Regions of Nigeria which desired it full self-
government in respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional
Governments. At the forthcoming Conference the spokesmen of the East and West
Regions would undoubtedly demand the fulfilment of this undertaking. The
Northern Region, on the other hand, had intimated that they did not desire regional
self-government until 1959. But it was not certain that they would maintain this
attitude in view of the fact that the Federal House of Representatives had recently
adopted, with the support of the Northern members, a resolution demanding
independence for the Federation as a whole, within the Commonwealth, in 1959. In
these circumstances, and in the light of the political immaturity of Nigeria, the
Government were now faced with a difficult choice. Either they must concede
independence too soon and risk the disintegration of Nigeria and a critical
breakdown of administration; or they must seek to delay the grant of independence,
in which event they would provoke increasing animosity and disturbance and would
be unable, when independence was eventually conceded, to influence Nigerian
policies thereafter. If, as was probable, it became necessary for the Government to
make a fresh declaration of policy at some stage in the Conference, it would in his
view be appropriate that this statement should be on the lines of the alternative draft
which he had circulated during the discussion. This would make it clear that if, when
the life of the present House of Representatives came to an end in 1959, there was a
clear wish on the part of the Nigerian people for early independence within the
Commonwealth, the United Kingdom Government would confer with all the
Nigerian Governments to determine the processes whereby this wish might be
attained; and that these processes might well include the appointment of a
1 Originally CPC(57)12: see document no 100 above.
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Constitutional Commission, which would be required to make recommendations for
the framing of a constitution for a fully independent Nigeria, to review the working
of government and of the constitution in both its federal and regional aspects in the
light of the experience gained since the forthcoming conference, and to consider the
constitutional and other changes which would be necessary to enable the Federation
to become eligible for full membership of the Commonwealth.
In discussion there was general agreement that our objective at the forthcoming
conference should be to seek to avoid any precise commitment to grant independence
to Nigeria by a specific date. The Government of South Africa were already inclined to
question the right of the United Kingdom to promote Colonial territories to indepen-
dent status within the Commonwealth without the consent of the other self-govern-
ing members. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand had also shown concern
about the increase in the coloured members of the Commonwealth and the risk that
they might ultimately outnumber the older members. In Nigeria the issue was further
complicated by the recent agreement with the Prime Minister of the Central African
Federation that the decision on the Federation’s attainment of full membership of the
Commonwealth should be deferred until 1960. It was essential, therefore, that Nigeria
should not achieve self-government until after 1959. Moreover, it was not unreason-
able that we should stipulate that an independent enquiry should be carried out by a
Constitutional Commission before Nigeria could attain independence. Experience had
shown that the technical questions involved in a major constitutional operation of this
kind were liable to be numerous and complex; and it would be optimistic to assume
that after only a brief period of regional self-government the Nigerian peoples would
be competent to assume the responsibilities inseparable from full self-government on
a federal scale. For this reason, it would be wise to limit any formal declaration of pol-
icy to the minimum of commitment and to undertake no more than that we would
confer in 1959 with all the Nigerian Governments to determine the processes whereby
Nigeria might attain independence within the Commonwealth. The nature of these
processes and the period over which they would require to operate might be left for a
subsequent and less formal statement.
It would also be important that, in the process of granting independence to
Nigeria, we should retain such strategic concessions, in terms of over-flying rights,
the maintenance of staging posts, &c., as were essential to the fulfilment of our
defence policy.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Colonial Secretary to be guided, in the forthcoming conference on
Nigeria, by the general sense of their discussion.
103 DO 177/84, nos 1 & 4 8 Aug–21 Oct 1958
[Nigeria]: minutes on political situation and constitutional proposals
(C(58)171 & C(58)213), by M E Allen, A W Snelling, Sir H Lintott,
D L Cole & Sir G Laithwaite (CRO)
[Re C(58)171]: higher authority will wish to see without delay this important paper
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on the Nigerian Constitution. No date has
been fixed for it to be taken in Cabinet.
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The paper gives an interesting conspectus of the political situation, of the scope of
the resumed Constitutional Conference, and of the line which Mr. Lennox-Boyd
proposes to take at that meeting. Sir G. Laithwaite will certainly wish to consider it
before talking to Sir J. Macpherson about the various detailed points which are being
submitted to him separately.
With regard to the general political situation, it must, I think, be said that Nigeria
has not really reached a stage at which independence within two years would
normally be contemplated. Her politics are disruptive and parochial, her
personalities are at sixes and sevens, and the stability of her Administration is
threatened by the exodus of United Kingdom officers. But the milk being spilt, our
commitment to fix in 1960 the date for independence is virtually certain to lead to
the grant of independence in that year. It may be some small consolation to
remember that Somalia is also to become independent in 1960, and she will be even
less ready to run her own affairs. It does not look, however, as if Nigeria will be able
immediately to play the part in Africa for which her size, population and situation
cast her. She will, after all, be far and away the most populous State in Africa, and she
is situated at a nodal point of Commonwealth communications. She will be in a
position to influence developments in Africa more profoundly than little Ghana on
the periphery can hope to do. While we might at a pinch be prepared to contemplate
relations with Ghana of less than perfect amity, we may need Nigeria’s friendship
quite badly for strategic, economic and political reasons—and there may be
competitors for her favours—so it is of the greatest importance that we should do
whatever we can in the time that remains to ensure the emergence of a stable and
friendly Nigeria.
Within these principles the line which the Colonial Secretary proposes to take at
the Conference seems to be broadly such as gives the best chance for U.K./Nigerian
relations after 1960, except that, as we have already remarked in another context, the
emphasis does not seem to be sufficiently laid on the desirability of Nigerians
reaching agreement among themselves and then getting us to rubber-stamp it. A
settlement agreed among Nigerians is, after all, the only line that is likely to last any
length of time after Independence, and I am inclined to wonder, for instance,
whether, if the Nigerians all ask for the police to be regionalised (paragraph 10) it
would be prudent to resist them. In most Federations, after all, and even in some
unitary States like the U.K., the police is a regional affair.
The last sentence of paragraph 14 of the paper is of crucial importance. It implies
that if we are not satisfied about the prospects of the new Federal Government to be
elected at the end of next year, we must refuse Nigeria’s independence. We should
certainly agree with this line.
M.E.A.
8.8.58
The Colonial Secretary has submitted to the Cabinet a paper—C(58)171—setting
forth the line he proposes to take at the resumed Nigerian Constitutional Conference
later this month. We do not dissent from the proposals specifically put forward in the
paper; but there are some basic points on Nigeria which the Secretary of State could
usefully make at the present stage, either at the Cabinet meeting or, perhaps better,
to Mr. Lennox-Boyd alone at Chequers, on 7th September.
2. Should there be a “Lennox-Boyd Constitution” for Nigeria? The first and
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widest point is the question whether we should launch Nigeria, as we launched
Ghana, with a detailed and elaborate Constitution. The Colonial Office—and the
Nigerians—are going on the assumption that careful constitutional drafting will
continue on Nigeria, as with Ghana, until a very short time before Independence, and
that when Nigeria does become independent she will be launched with as
sophisticated and elaborate a Constitution as Ghana has (the Ghana Constitution is
attached). We understand that there is no formal commitment to Nigeria to this
effect; but constitutional and political progress in Nigeria has for years been based on
this assumption, and there are groups in Nigeria, notably the minorities, who (even if
mistakenly) look to the Constitution to be their future safeguard against oppression.
3. We accept, of course, that appropriate constitutional legislation must
accompany political emancipation; but there may be something to be said for
considering an alternative: that the United Kingdom should deliberately leave it to
the Nigerians themselves to draft and enact their own Constitution after they are
independent. This is what happened with India, Pakistan and Ceylon. India and
Pakistan in particular were started off with only the briefest amendment of the
constitutional provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, and both countries
spent a number of years happily drafting Constitutions to suit themselves (the
Pakistan Constitution is not even yet fully in effect). Ceylon admittedly had an
interim Constitution in 1946, but even she became independent with only a small
amount of legislation and then drafted her own Constitution. It could be argued that
Nigeria as a Federation will need special constitutional attention; but India and
Pakistan are also Federations: moreover, in India the major question of the Princely
States was left constitutionally as well as politically unsolved at Independence. In
Pakistan the whole fabric of the central Government had, of course, to be built up
from nothing. Admittedly, however, in both countries one national party, with a
distinctive philosophy of its own, commanded the loyalty of the vast majority of
citizens. This is not yet the case in Nigeria.
4. We are inclined to doubt, therefore, whether it is incontrovertibly necessary
to launch Nigeria with a detailed Constitution. It can also be questioned whether this
is desirable. The history of Ghana’s Constitution is not encouraging. Ghana’s
Constitution is, to begin with, not the kind of document to inspire the man-in-the-
bush. It is dated (unavoidably but perhaps unfortunately in all the circumstances)
from “the Court at Buckingham Palace”, and starts with three pages of definitions,
exceptions and revocations; there is then a whole page about the Governor-General,
half of which concerns his salary and that of his staff, and the next section, entitled
“The Executive”, begins: “The executive power of Ghana is vested in the Queen”. The
Constitution contains no such statement as figures in, for instance, the Pakistan and
Malayan Constitutions, of the purpose for which the State of Ghana has been formed
or the ideals it sets before itself, and I think the only human right which it enshrines
is that to compensation for property nationalised. So it is not surprising that the
Constitution has not inspired amongst ordinary Ghanaians any germ of the devotion
which, for example, Americans have for the United States Constitution, or that the
Ghana Government have already taken the first steps towards thorough-going
revision of their Constitution, notably in the direction of a Republic. Parts of the
Ghana Constitution, particularly those dealing with the Regional Assemblies, have in
any case never been put into effect, for cogent political reasons. So one cannot but
ask whether there is any point in doing again for Nigeria the elaborate constitutional
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work which was done for Ghana. If past experience is any guide, much of the work
will be wasted at best, and it may at worst bring resentment upon the United
Kingdom.
5. What is more, the Colonial Office are now proposing not merely to give
Nigeria at least as elaborate a Constitution as Ghana; but also to suggest to Nigeria
the entrenchment, as in Ghana, of substantial portions of it, even so insignificant a
point as the provision that Government accounts must be audited by the Auditor-
General. It seems to us that this attitude is liable to appear as either an expression of
distrust of Nigeria’s ability to run her affairs, or as seeking to lay an intolerable strait-
jacket upon the Government of an independent State. The history of entrenched
clauses in other Commonwealth countries (e.g. South Africa) is not encouraging.
Nothing should be entrenched that the Nigerians themselves are not asking for.
6. The Crown. The question of the Crown has also come up already. The
Government of the Western Region of Nigeria have asked that, while consolidating
the multifarious Constitutional Orders in Council which have been enacted in the
past in respect of Western Nigeria, the Colonial Office lawyers should in the near
future insert specific reference to the Queen when defining the composition of the
Western Regional Assembly. The Colonial Office are prepared to accede to this
request; and they say that in the interests of uniformity with the other Nigerian
Constitutions that are being simultaneously consolidated, they must write the Queen
into them all. This seems most undesirable. It is disproportionate that a request from
one Regional Government should cause action to be taken in relation to all the other
Regions, and the Federation, which none of them have asked for (indeed, if any of the
others should say they do not wish the Queen to be written into their Constitutions,
the situation could be most embarrassing). Moreover, we are not convinced that the
objective of keeping Nigeria under the monarchy is best achieved by putting
references to the Queen into the constitutional documents at every opportunity.
Until now, no tropical country that has achieved independence has given any sign of
wishing to keep the monarchy as Sovereign. It would surely be wrong to work on the
assumption—though this is not to say that it is impossible—that Nigeria will not
make some move away from the monarchy pretty soon after Independence. So there
is everything to be said for reducing the apparent “weight” given to the Crown in the
Nigerian Constitution, by deliberately referring to the Queen as few times as
possible; and above all for the United Kingdom never pressing the Crown upon the
Federation or any of the Regions. This course appears to offer both the best chance of
keeping Nigeria within the monarchy (by reducing the opportunities for critics to say
that the United Kingdom is still running Nigeria by means of the monarchy) and—if
Nigeria does decide to dispense with the monarchy—the best hope of minimising
the embarrassment when she passes the necessary legislation.1
7. The foregoing covers two basic ideas behind the Colonial Secretary’s Cabinet
Paper. The paper itself can be dealt with more briefly, and we agree with its
recommendations.
1 Mr Alport minuted on an earlier discussion of this point that ‘the Ghana lesson’ was quite clear: ‘Dr
Nkrumah is correct in saying that Anglo-Saxon ideas of monarchy are not appropriate to African States, &
Nigeria could be a source of great embarrassment to us’. He also added: ‘I hope that the negotiations
regarding the armed forces are going ahead. These new states must be made to face up to the full
implications of independence. C.M.A. 15.8.58’.
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8. Date of independence. The central question is, of course, the date of
Independence (paragraph 13 of the paper). We can certainly agree with Mr. Lennox-
Boyd’s intention not to go beyond the undertaking he gave at the Conference last
year: that if in 1960 the United Kingdom is asked by Nigeria to fix a date for
Independence, she will then fix it. What we know of the political situation in Nigeria
does not encourage us to think that the country will have achieved any great degree
of political cohesion by 1960, and we certainly should not wish the Colonial
Secretary to commit himself now to any specific date for Independence. We do not
want to run any risk of Nigeria becoming independent before the United Kingdom is
confident of her fitness to run her own affairs.
9. Minorities. On the problem of minorities (paragraph 9 of the paper), the
Willink Commission has now reported,2 recommending the creation of no new
States, on the ground that this was not the way to remove the fears and grievances of
the Nigerian minorities. We see no advantage to Nigeria in further regionalisation,
and hope that the Colonial Secretary will be able to resist demands for it.
10. In view of the special circumstances of Nigeria we can agree with Mr.
Lennox-Boyd’s proposal to resist pressure for the regionalisation of the Police.
M.E.A.
5.9.58
I agree fully. The experiment of settling a detailed constitution for Ghana before
independence has not been a success. It has come to be referred to in scornful terms
in Ghana as the ‘Lennox-Boyd Constitution’ & nearly every self-respecting Ghanaian
wants to win freedom from it. It is regarded as the legacy of the Colonial Office from
which Ghana has still to fight free. The idea of working out a detailed constitution in
advance is a novelty, not followed in the history of any other Cwlth country.
Relations in future years with Nigeria will certainly be happier if they have worked
out their own constitution & cannot blame us for the many defects it is certain to
contain.
Of course Nigeria must be launched with some constitution. There are already in
force constitutions for the Federation & the Western & Eastern Regions. One for the
Northern Region must be promulgated in 1959. The best course seems to be, as in
the case of India, to have an instrument making the minimum changes necessary in
these constitutions so as to launch Nigeria into independence & then to let her
adjust them to her own tastes after independence.
I also agree very much with what is said above about the Queen. Because Ghana
wants to become a republic & amend her constitution in other ways, the reaction of
the Colonial Office has been that the Queen & other features should be entrenched
even more deeply in Nigeria! This seems to me to be perverse in the extreme. It does
no service to the Queen to ensure that every unpopular step taken by an independent
Nigerian Govt is done in the Queen’s name. How can the man-in-the-bush on the
Niger Delta be expected to adopt our sophisticated notions of the role the Queen in
reality plays?
It seem to me to be worth making no small effort to ensure that our relations with
2 Nigeria: Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the fears of the minorities and the means
of allaying them (Cmnd 505, 1958).
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Nigeria are not dogged by the incorrigible paternalism of the Colonial Office & by the
legacy of a constitutional straight-jacket of, at any rate in part, UK manufacture.
A.W.S.
5.9.58
Secretary of State
I agree with the above, which is in line with submissions which you have already
approved & the substance of which I have already conveyed to the Colonial Office.
H.B.L.
5.9.58
The Secretary of State discussed this with the Prime Minister and the Colonial
Secretary at Chequers on Sunday. He has since minuted as follows:—
“(1) I agreed to the Paper. (C(58)171)
“(2) We thought that in the complicated circumstances of this Federation a
Constitution would have to be worked out.
“(3) The Colonial Secretary will try and keep the Queen out as far as possible.
“(4) He thinks 1960 will bring independence and that he cannot hold it beyond that.”
D.L.C.
8.9.58
C(58)213: In this report3 the Colonial Secretary sets forth what has been achieved so
far at the Nigerian Constitutional Conference, and seeks agreement to his informing
the Nigerians that H.M.G. are prepared to grant independence to Nigeria “in the
autumn of 1960”; he thinks this will mean October, 1960.
2. The proceedings at the Conference have revealed clearly that Nigeria still has a
long way to go before the different peoples and tribes in the country can develop a
proper national consciousness. There has been little evidence that the Nigerians have
yet learned to raise their eyes from their internal political divisions and see
themselves as a unit exposed to the cold winds of international life. Ideally, therefore,
there is much to be said for delaying Nigerian independence for some considerable
time. But as the Colonial Secretary points out, we cannot do this without gravely
damaging United Kingdom/Nigerian relations; so the Secretary of State will probably
wish to agree with Mr. Lennox-Boyd’s proposal for independence in the autumn of
1960. This is at any rate six months better than April 1960—the date we had feared.
3. The Colonial Secretary is certainly right in hesitating to assert that self-
government will in Nigeria be good government. The proceedings of the Conference
have already provided plenty of evidence to show that politics in Nigeria will be at
least as tough as in the other African countries. Despite all the well-meant efforts of
the Colonial Office to provide constitutional safeguards for minorities, it is fairly
clear that minorities which seek to oppose the Governments of the majorities will, as
in Ghana, find themselves last in the queue for the economic, social and other
benefits which the Government is able to distribute. Nevertheless, so far as the
United Kingdom is concerned it would appear that in the last resort we must make
sure that the Government of Nigeria is strong, even if possibly undemocratic or
unjust. The biggest danger facing Nigeria appears to be internal political disruption;
it is therefore necessary to take risks in ensuring that the Federal Government has
3 See document no 105 below.
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the power to keep Nigeria together. We have had a long running battle—which we do
not pretend to have brought to a satisfactory conclusion—with the Colonial Office
on this question. We think that in their concern to ensure the rights of minorities
they have gone too far in binding down the Federal Government. Time will show
whether they have been right in this course.
4. The Colonial Secretary’s paper also refers to the projected defence agreement
with Nigeria. A separate paper is being submitted on this for the Secretary of State’s
meeting with the other Ministers concerned before the Cabinet. The Nigerian
Ministers have accepted in principle that there should be a United Kingdom/Nigeria
Defence Agreement, and the Secretary of State will probably not wish to suggest in
Cabinet that agreement to the date of independence should be made conditional on
agreement being reached with the Nigerians on the details.
M.E.A.
21.10.58
I entirely agree with what Mr. Allen says.
The Constitution, which is in process of being agreed in Lancaster House,
frightens me. It is the most rigid and therefore the most brittle Constitution so far as
I know ever devised. All the Nigerians sitting round the table have been mainly
concerned to limit the power that other Nigerians sitting round the table will be able
to use against them after independence. Hence for instance the embodiment in the
Constitution as “Fundamental Rights” of virtually the whole of the European Human
Rights Convention (which incidentally we in this country cannot even apply in
Northern Ireland), so deeply entrenched that no single human right can be
abrogated (save in a declared public emergency) in the slightest degree except after a
two thirds majority in both Houses of the Federal Parliament and a simple majority
in the Parliaments in two of the three Regions. The Colonial Office have aided and
abetted the Nigerians in fabricating this rigid structure because they all think that
Ghana is going to the bad. We do not share this view, regarding strong government
in these new countries as essential. Strong government in Nigeria as I see it will be
impossible. Every law passed by the Federal or any Regional Government can be
tested in the courts against the Constitution—on the model of the American
Supreme Court. This is going to create tremendous uncertainty because it will in
some cases be years (including time for appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council) before it can be known whether a law that has been passed is legal or not.
We have seen something of these difficulties in India. I fear that it may not be very
long before somebody has to “do an Iskander Mirza”4 with the Nigerian Constitution.
A.W.S.
21.10.58
Secretary of State
I agree with Mr Allen and Mr Snelling’s comments. . . . As regards date of
independence, if we can postpone till Oct. 1960, so much the better from every point
of view. So far the Nigerians have been united on April 1960.
G.J.L.
21.10.58
4 Major Sahibzada Syed Iskander Mirza, president of Pakistan, 1956–1958.
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104 CAB 128/32/2, CC 71(58)5 11 Sept 1958
‘Nigeria’: Cabinet conclusions on resumption of constitutional
conference
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (58) 171)
on the Nigeria Constitutional Conference which was due to reassemble in London on
29th September.
The Colonial Secretary said that at the Conference in the previous year it had been
agreed that the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria should be granted regional
self-government. The representatives of the Northern Region had now informed him
that they wished to be given a similar status with effect from 15th March, 1959. In
accordance with his predecessor’s undertaking, he was bound to accede to this
request. As regards independence for Nigeria as a whole, an undertaking had been
given during the 1957 Conference that, if at the beginning of 1960, the new Nigerian
Parliament asked the United Kingdom Government to agree to full self-government
within the Commonwealth by a specified date in that year, Her Majesty’s Government
would consider it with sympathy and would be prepared to fix a date when they
would accede to the request. It now seemed doubtful, however, whether he would be
able to rest on that undertaking at the forthcoming Conference. The Governor-
General1 had represented strongly that we should be prepared to announce during
the Conference a date in 1960 on which we would agree to full self-government for
the Federation as a whole. Public opinion in Nigeria was conspicuously loyal to the
Crown and the Commonwealth connection, and it would be unwise to alienate this
sentiment by reluctance to prescribe a date for the achievement of Federal self-
government. A concession in this respect must, however, be dependent on our being
satisfied that the administration of the Regions would continue on satisfactory lines
in the interim and that, when Federal self-government was introduced, adequate
arrangements would be made to maintain the unity of the country, to preserve the
integrity of the police force and to assure us of the continuance of such defence
facilities as we should need to retain. These included staging and overflying rights for
our aircraft, together with the right to use the harbours at Lagos and Port Harcourt
in war. It had been suggested that, in addition, we should reserve sovereignty in
perpetuity over a small enclave of Nigerian territory which would provide a secure
and permanent base for our forces. This proposal would need further examination;
and its advantages would need to be weighed against the risk that it would appear to
imply that we doubted whether we could rely on the continuing loyalty of Nigeria.
For their part the Nigerians would need our help in building up their defence forces,
particularly by seconding British officers on suitable terms.
The Minister of Defence2 emphasised the importance of avoiding any uncertainty
about the defence facilities which we should need to retain in Nigeria as an essential
part of our means of reinforcing the Middle Eastern and Far Eastern theatres. The
Defence Agreement should, if possible, constitute an integral element in the
constitutional instrument establishing self-government rather than a separate
agreement to be concluded with Nigeria after the grant of independence. Moreover,
1 Sir James Robertson, 1955–1960. 2 Mr D Sandys.
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the strategic importance of Nigeria was sufficiently great to justify us in making
every effort to retain an enclave of territory under our own sovereignty.
In discussion there was general agreement that we should adhere to the policy, to
which we were committed, of granting full self-government to Nigeria, subject to
being satisfied as regards the essential constitutional and military safeguards. It
would be desirable, however, that further consideration should be given to the timing
of the proposed Defence Agreement. It was arguable that this Agreement might well
prove more reliable and command greater international respect if, on the Malayan
precedent, it was signed or at least ratified, by the Nigerian Government in the
exercise of their full powers after they had attained independence.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Invited the Colonial Secretary to be guided, at the forthcoming Conference on
Nigeria, by the considerations which had emerged during their discussion.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to circulate periodical reports on the progress of
the Conference and to seek further authority from the Cabinet if he found it
desirable to prescribe, during the proceedings, a specific date in 1960 for the
independence of Nigeria.
(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in consultation with the Minister of Defence, to
arrange for a further examination of the best means of securing our future
strategic requirements in Nigeria and of the most appropriate timing of the
conclusion of a Defence Agreement.
105 CAB 129/95, C(58)213 20 Oct 1958
‘Nigeria’: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Lennox-Boyd on progress of
constitutional talks
The Nigerian Constitutional Conference has now been in progress for three weeks.
We aim to finish on Monday, October 27th.
2. The Conference has gone reasonably well so far. Satisfactory agreement was
reached in the first week on the major question of the Police. The principle of a
single force under the ultimate control of the Federal Government has been accepted
under arrangements which will give Regional Governments a reasonable say in
establishment, administration and day-to-day operational use. Safeguards are
provided against improper political interference in Police matters. Agreement was
also reached with relatively little difficulty on the important matter of revenue
allocation. The recommendations of the Fiscal Commission headed by Sir Jeremy
Raisman were accepted as they stood.1 We have agreed on the detailed arrangements
for Northern Region Self-Government which will come into force on 15th March,
1959. We have reached agreement on a list of fundamental human rights which are
to be entrenched in the Constitution. Their basic purpose is to protect the rights of
the citizen against the State, but satisfactory provisions are to be included which
should enable the State to deal with emergencies and subversive activities. We have
dealt successfully with a wide range of lesser problems.
1 Sir J Raisman, deputy chairman of Lloyds Bank since 1953, formerly finance member of government of
India, 1939–1945; he chaired a similar fiscal commission for East Africa, 1960–1961.
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 354
[105] WEST AFRICA 355
3. Discussions on such matters as the judiciary, electoral arrangements and the
Public Service reflect a keen desire on all sides to ensure that these institutions are
kept out of politics. I have been encouraged by the evidence that the Northern
Region is ready to make a number of important reforms in its legal system which
should bring the administration of justice more into line with modern ideas.
4. All this is very satisfactory, the more so since it has been apparent that there
are still bitter and deep-rooted divisions, fears and suspicions among the different
races and political groupings. These fears are of course in themselves the driving
force behind the desire for a carefully worked out and detailed Constitution, the main
principles of which will only be alterable with difficulty.
5. It is unlikely that the Conference will succeed in allaying the fears of the
minority groups.2 I have a great deal of sympathy for the minority view but I can see
no other solution than to endeavour to construct a Constitution which will provide a
reasonable chance of fair treatment for all. Of greater importance, however, is the
major conflict between the predominantly Western Region Action Group and the
Northern People’s Congress, the major party of the North. It is apparent that for the
time being at least the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons which forms
the Eastern Region Government under Dr. Azikiwe is lining up with the North.
Consequently Chief Awolowo, the Action Group leader, has every reason to fear that
on independence the West may be faced with a North–East alliance. Partly, if not
mainly, for this reason he has pressed with great vigour for his major objective—the
weakening of the North by the creation of a Middle Belt State and for changes in the
Northern system of government. In so doing he has aroused bitter opposition from
the North and the Conference has at times (as I predicted) been a stormy one. At no
time has the hostility been directed at Her Majesty’s Government.
6. The major question before the Conference has been whether the Federation
should be broken up into more than the present three Regions. This remains at
present unsettled. After over a week’s debate I have told them that there can be no
question of new states being created before independence, if independence is to come
by 1960. I have proposed, however, that it should be recognised that the present
regional structure is not necessarily immutable and that provision should be made in
the Constitution for an orderly (but lengthy and difficult) procedure enabling the
changing of regional boundaries and the creation of new states. My proposals are still
being considered by the Conference but I think that it is likely that something on the
lines I have suggested will in the end be accepted.
7. This brings me to the question of the date of independence. At the public
opening session all the leaders repeated in clear terms their request for independence
within the Commonwealth by 2nd April, 1960. Since then there have been passing
references to the question but they have been content to get down to discussion of
the detailed problems requiring settlement without demanding that I agree to the
date ab initio. In private talks with the Federal Prime Minister and the others it has
2 Sir Henry Willink, QC, Master of Magdalene College, formerly vice-chancellor of the University of
Cambridge, was appointed to make a reassuring report, published as Nigeria: report of the Commission
appointed to inquire into the fears of the minorities and the means of allaying them (1958: Cmnd 505).
The report did not deny that minorities had genuine cause for alarm, but (optimistically) concluded that
ethnic differences would gradually die away; the division of Nigeria into more than three regions was not
recommended.
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been made clear to me that the date 2nd April, 1960 is only advanced for bargaining
purposes and that a date in the autumn of 1960 will in fact be acceptable. I have of
course had doubts whether if a free choice were open to us Her Majesty’s
Government would be right to contemplate relinquishing control even by the end of
1960. It is clear that there are great and probably irreconcilable differences between
the major groups and peoples. If the West continues to provoke the North and if
Chief Awolowo were, as he hopes, to win power at the Centre at the end of 1959, the
threat of an ultimate break-away by the North may become real. I would certainly not
like to assert that self-government will in Nigeria be good government. There is a
heavy responsibility on us therefore in taking a decision committing us to a definite
date for Nigerian independence as much as two years ahead. I have given this matter
very careful thought and have come to the conclusion that we should gain nothing
by postponing a decision. All the parties in Nigeria are now firmly committed in
public to securing at this Conference Her Majesty’s Government’s agreement to a
firm date. Relations between this country and Nigeria could not be better than they
are at the present time. To refuse the request would undoubtedly create an
atmosphere of bitterness and distrust which would prejudice our future relations
with an independent Nigeria and even if we were to refuse the request now we still
could not delay independence for much longer. We would only have succeeded in
giving the at present divided groups a common target—the United Kingdom—for
political odium. To continue to govern a discontented and possibly rebellious Nigeria
would also present wellnigh insoluble administrative problems in view of the transfer
of effective power that has already taken place in the domestic field. It might even
need substantial military forces.
8. I have, in accordance with the request of my colleagues at our last discussion,
pursued the question of a Defence Agreement with the Minister of Defence. We have
agreed on the list of facilities that we would want from Nigeria after independence
and I have discussed with the Nigerian Prime Minister and the Premiers the proposal
that there should be a Defence Agreement between our two countries. They welcome
the idea in principle and are agreeable to our working out the details before
independence with a view to having the agreement come into force at that time. The
Minister of Defence and I propose to discuss the details further with the Nigerian
Ministers during this week so that we can be sure that we shall get what we need
before I make any statement about the date of independence. The proposed
agreement will of course involve us in obligations to Nigeria. These are being
examined in consultation with the Departments concerned but I believe that they
will be such that this country must be prepared to accept if, on independence,
Nigeria is to remain firmly inside the Western orbit.
9. I now invite my colleagues to agree that, provided the Conference is able to
reach agreement on the outstanding questions and the Minister of Defence and I
secure satisfactory detailed undertakings about Defence, I should inform them that
Her Majesty’s Government are prepared to grant independence to Nigeria in the
autumn of 1960. I envisage that the date will be some time in October but I would
need to fix the exact date in consultation with the Nigerian leaders.3
3 The Cabinet agreed ‘that no useful purpose would be served by postponing this decision and forfeiting
Nigerian goodwill. The balance of advantage lay in adopting the Colonial Secretary’s proposal’ (CAB
128/32/2, CC 76(58)4, 22 Oct 1958). The Conference concluded with agreement to grant independence
from 1 Oct 1960. The target date was achieved.
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106 CAB/28/32/2, CC 81(58)9 18 Nov 1958
[Relations between Ghana and Guinea]: Cabinet conclusions
[Ghana became independent on 6 Mar 1957. For the documentation on the last two
months of the Gold Coast Colony, see R Rathbone, ed, Ghana part II 1952–1957 (BDEEP,
1992), document numbers 277 to 292. Mr Lennox-Boyd was in the Gold Coast 24–30 Jan
1957 finalising various constitutional matters: his visit had been slightly delayed by the
formation of the new ministry under Macmillan. The future of development funding and
of the role of the Colonial Development Corporation in independent Ghana were
particularly key issues: in addition to the documents selected by Rathbone, see document
nos 327–329 in Part II. For Sir C Arden-Clarke’s valedictory despatch (CO 554/1162, no
19A), 5 Mar 1957, see Rathbone, document no 291. The new high commissioner, I M R
Maclennan (previously assistant under-secretary in the CRO, 1955–1957), was cautiously
optimistic about the future (see Rathbone, p 416, n 3, 5 June 1957). The British
government’s main worries were over Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist pretensions, and fears of
communist infiltration: see document nos 384–386 in Part II. Ghana became a republic
in June 1960. In Feb 1964 it formally became a one-party state, the ‘national party’ being
Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party.]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary (C.
(58) 235) on relations between Ghana and Guinea.
The Commonwealth Secretary said that there was reason to believe that the Prime
Minister of Ghana, Dr. Nkrumah, was discussing with the Prime Minister of Guinea,
M. Sekou Touré, some form of close association between Ghana and Guinea. The
precise nature of this association was not known; but it might take the form of
federation of the two States or even the complete absorption of Guinea within Ghana.
Any proposal of this nature would be liable to raise serious issues of principle as
regards Ghana’s membership of the Commonwealth; and Dr. Nkrumah had therefore
been warned that the other members of the Commonwealth might react adversely to
Ghana’s association with a foreign country which had no historical or cultural
connections with the United Kingdom or any other Commonwealth country.
In discussion it was emphasised that any association between Ghana and Guinea at
a time when the latter country had elected to become independent of France would
be viewed with suspicion by the French Government and would be liable to
embarrass us in our relations with them. Moreover, Guinea was economically a poor
and backward country; and we should not allow M. Sekou Touré to suppose that, by
association with Ghana, he could obtain from us the economic assistance which he
had probably forfeited from France. Nor should we encourage Dr. Nkrumah in his
ambition to create a federation of West African States which, under his leadership,
might constitute a counterpoise to Nigeria after that country attained independence
in 1960. Other African territories were already showing signs of alarm and
resentment at this project.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that Dr. Nkrumah would
probably adhere to his intention to declare Ghana, in due course, a republic within
the Commonwealth. If he wished thereafter to develop the concept of a closer
association between Ghana and Guinea, the matter could be further considered at
that juncture. But in terms of Commonwealth membership it would be inappropriate
that this project should be pursued while Ghana maintained its present form of
allegiance to the Crown. It might be helpful if he sent a personal message to Dr.
Nkrumah, advising him to weigh the possible consequences of his proposal with care
before carrying the matter any further.
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The Cabinet:—
Invited the Commonwealth Secretary to submit to the Prime Minister the draft of
a personal message to the Prime Minister of Ghana about the implications, in
terms of Ghana’s membership of the Commonwealth, of his proposal to promote
some form of close association between Ghana and Guinea.
107 CAB 134/1559, CPC  2(60)4 18 Mar 1960
‘Sierra Leone’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
meeting on finance and defence implications of independence
[Under its 1956 constitution, the Sierra Leone Leg Co became a House of Representatives
and included 51 elected members. In 1957 Sierra Leone was viewed by Lennox-Boyd as a
difficult ‘border-line case’ (document no 2 (70) above), not yet ready for full internal self-
government. In 1958 the ex officio members were eliminated; the Executive Council became
purely African, under the chairmanship of the governor, Sir M Dorman, with Dr Milton
Margai as prime minister. At the constitutional conference of Apr-May 1960, pre-indepen-
dence constitutional changes were agreed; independence was reached on 27 Apr 1961.]
The Committee had before them a note by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (60) 6)
suggesting that at the forthcoming Sierra Leone Constitutional Conference he
should announce Her Majesty’s Government’s willingness to grant independence to
the territory towards the end of 1961, subject to the conclusion of a satisfactory
defence agreement.
The Colonial Secretary said that the main questions affecting the grant of
independence to Sierra Leone were finance and defence. As regards finance Sierra
Leone’s future viability on current account depended on taking effective measures to
prevent the illicit export of diamonds. Nevertheless, financial aid amounting to about
£11⁄4 million a year would have to be given for a year or two after independence; this
was roughly equivalent to the present level of assistance from Colonial Development
and Welfare Funds and for the upkeep of the Sierra Leone Regiment. The difficulties
created by financial uncertainty were however outweighed by the wider political
advantages of acceding at an early date to the Colony’s demand for independence.
As regards defence our main interest was to retain the facilities of Freetown
Harbour; Sierra Leone would have a reciprocal interest in obtaining undertakings
from us to assist in her defence problems. It was for consideration whether these
defence provisions should be contained in an agreement on the lines of that
negotiated with Nigeria or should rest on an exchange of letters.
Subject to a satisfactory conclusion of discussions on financial and defence
matters he proposed at the Conference to fix a date for independence towards the end
of 1961.
The Financial Secretary, Treasury,1 said that there would be no objection in
principle to a tapering military grant after independence, but other financial aid
should be confined to a scheme of technical assistance, to Commonwealth Assistance
loans and to the completion of any commitments outstanding under Colonial
Development and Welfare provisions. The terms of any announcement to the
Conference on financial matters should be agreed with the Treasury.2
1 Sir E Boyle.
2 For the financial arrangements, see documents nos 334 and 335, in Part II.
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It was suggested that there would be advantage in avoiding a complex defence
agreement of the type used by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation countries, though
it would probably be insufficient to rest the matter on an exchange of letters.
Consideration should therefore be given to drawing up a simpler and more
straightforward defence agreement covering at any rate our own requirements in the
territory.
The Prime Minister said that it would be desirable for the proposals for Sierra
Leone’s independence to be reported to the Cabinet, and bearing in mind that
independence was unlikely to take place before the end of 1961, further
consideration should be given to the question of her membership of the
Commonwealth being raised at the forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime
Ministers.
108 PREM 11/4483, PM(60)24 25 Apr 1960
[Sierra Leone]: minute (brief) from Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan
about premier’s visit
You are seeing Sir Milton Margai, the Premier of Sierra Leone,1 for a short time on
Thursday. The Premier’s English is unfortunately not very good and you will, I fear,
get an impression from him of vagueness. This is in fact quite wrong. He has led his
people with great courage over the years and he has firmly refused to let them push
ahead towards independence faster than he thought wise. The principle of indepen-
dence was in fact conceded by Alan Lennox-Boyd a year or so ago and the effective date
will probably be some time in the middle of next year. Sir Milton in the real sense of
the word has been the father of his people. He is a doctor who took his degree at
Durham and he has created in Sierra Leone an effective united front for the present
conference which has ensured its smooth running. I concluded with him this morn-
ing without any fuss at all the heads of agreement on defence relating to Freetown and
other matters. He has great understanding of the needs of his country and a full appre-
ciation of her weakness. All the same, Sierra Leone could well be a sort of New Zealand
in West Africa, certainly as long as Sir Milton holds the reins. He has a deep attach-
ment to this country and has every intention of keeping the links as close as he can.
2. Sierra Leone is just viable economically and I hope we will be able to give her
some small help with Commonwealth loans. It is particularly important to keep her
with the West bearing in mind the potential threat in Guinea from Communist
infiltration. There is no doubt that Sierra Leone will seek full membership of the
Commonwealth and the paper that has been submitted for discussion before the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting suggests that we should regard Sierra
Leone as really the smallest of the territories that can so aspire. I am sure for all
reasons of policy it would be wise for us to sponsor her, but Sir Milton of course
understands that the formal position is that all must in due course agree. This would
not in practice be until the May meeting of 1962, although a year from now Sir
Milton, who would by then have become a Prime Minister, would be in the same sort
of position as the Prime Minister of Nigeria is now.
1 Sir Milton Augustus Margai, recently appointed, and prime minister until his death in 1964; founder of
the Sierra Leone People’s Party, 1951.
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109 PREM 11/3047, PM(60)27 9 May 1960
[Nigerian defence agreement]: minute by Mr Macleod to Mr
Macmillan
One of the most important points to be discussed with Nigerian Ministers in the next
day or two is the preparation and signature of a Defence Agreement. Heads of
Agreement were initialled by the Prime Minister and the then Regional Premiers
during the Constitutional Conference in October 1958. They provided for the two
Governments to afford one another assistance in mutual defence; we undertook to
help in the staffing, administration, training and equipment of Nigerian forces; each
party was to enjoy unrestricted overflying and air staging facilities and we were to be
given leases:
(a) of a piece of land at Kano of up to 150 acres on which to build the staging
facilities we needed and
(b) if we applied for it, of about a further 1,000 acres on which to build an airfield
if for any reason Kano became unsuitable.
We were also in emergency to have such port facilities at Lagos and Port Harcourt
as might be required.
2. Since 1958 sentiment has changed very much throughout West Africa. Great
feeling has arisen about the giving of “bases” in Africa to outside powers. There is, I
hope, no fundamental change in Nigerian goodwill towards us, but this change in
general sentiment has naturally affected the attitude of Nigerian Ministers. Abubakar,
the Prime Minister1 is our very good friend, but I am convinced, and so is the
Governor-General,2 that we must broadly accept his judgment on what is politically
practicable.
3. A draft of a detailed Agreement was sent to Nigeria in March for their
comments. I only received them two or three days ago. Nigerian Ministers now
propose a major departure from what was agreed in 1958. Briefly, while convinced
that there is mutual advantage in a Defence Agreement, they do not think it would be
expedient even to discuss at the forthcoming talks the subject of the United Kingdom
being given a lease of land in Nigeria. They would however be ready to give us all the
facilities we could want at existing airfields and, if desired, to expand them to our
requirements at our expense. They would be ready to give us full over-flying and
staging rights for normal movements but would want us to get their agreement for
“extraordinary movements in times of emergency”. To put it crudely, as the
Governor-General says, they would be very glad to see their airfields used to help us
in a struggle in which we supported Blacks against Whites but might not like them
used if we supported Whites against Blacks. They would like us only to have extra
port facilities in emergencies “affecting both the U.K. Government and the
Government of the Federation”.
4. My officials will be discussing the position in detail with officials in the
Defence Departments and I will let you have my definite views as soon as possible. I
1 Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, first federal prime minister, 1957–1966 (died); a member of Northern
People’s Congress.
2 Sir J Robertson, who continued in office until Nov 1960.
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 360
[110] WEST AFRICA 361
feel sure however that if we are to retain Nigerian goodwill (without which no
Defence Agreement is worth anything) we shall have to drop the request for the lease
of land and rely on their good faith for the use of their own airfields. There is a
certain risk in this but the risk involved in holding to our request at this stage is
greater, for they cannot now reasonably hope to carry their people with them in an
undertaking to let us lease part of their land. They do indeed hint that it might be
possible to do something more definite for us after independence. If we rely on their
good faith, my first thought is that we could reasonably ask them in return to rely on
us to do our best not to embarrass them in staging and overflying aircraft and that
they should not seek to question our reasons for wanting to move aircraft through
Nigeria; but I am doubtful whether we should be able to get wholly unrestricted
facilities written into the agreement, or indeed whether it would be wise to try. . . .3
3 Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘It is not very satisfactory but it may be the best we can get. H.M. 9.5.60’.
Various ministers were consulted, and all seemed agreed that the goodwill of Abubakar was more
important than paper commitments, so they should drop most of the proposals to which Nigerian
ministers objected; they would have to send a British battalion to Southern Cameroons when Nigerian
forces were withdrawn, despite the cost.
110 CO 968/715, no 13 28 Aug 1960
‘Nigerian defence’: minute by Mr Sandys to Mr Macmillan on the
alteration of the agreement
Lord Home in his minute No. 48/60 of the 18th July to the Prime Minister spoke of
possible dangers threatening our Defence Agreement with Nigeria. The Prime
Minister directed that an examination should be made on the lines of paragraph 4 of
that minute, namely that proposals should be prepared recommending the minimum
which we need to do to secure the passage of the Agreement. This has now been done.
2. In a personal telegram the Governor-General of Nigeria takes the view that the
passage of the Agreement will not be prejudiced by the extent to which Her Majesty’s
Government are unable to lighten the financial burden of Nigerian defence. He goes
on, however, to say that he has no doubt that the Agreement will be more welcome,
and therefore more valuable to the United Kingdom, if, when it comes to the
legislature, Ministers can point to the tangible financial advantage flowing from it.
He has made two proposals which are in line with requests already put forward by the
Nigerian Delegation which was here in June, viz
(a) the United Kingdom should pay part of the cost of British servicemen
seconded to the Nigerian Military forces.
(b) the United Kingdom should pay the cost of training Nigerians in this country.
3. We have considered the proposal in sub-paragraph (b) above together with
officials of the other Departments concerned, and agree that we should help Nigeria
in this way. What is proposed is not a departure of principle, but that as far as Nigeria
is concerned we should set the ceiling of what we are prepared to spend under the
existing scheme for military training assistance in the United Kingdom for
Commonwealth countries at such a level that in fact we do train all the Nigerians
with whom we are asked to help (and for whom we can find places) free of charge.
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4. The total cost of all the training facilities asked for by the Nigerian
Government in this country in the year 1960/61 is estimated at £71,000 (that is,
Army £36,000, Navy £35,000, there is as yet no plan to start a Nigerian Air Force).
Increases in the number of places we shall be asked for may cause this figure to grow
slightly each year in the next few years. We can in fact find all the places we have
been asked for in this current year. We are already committed to some expenditure
on training of Nigerian servicemen under the existing Commonwealth Relations
Office scheme. The expenditure proposed above can be compared with the present
cost to us of training Pakistan servicemen in this country of £35,000 per year and of
training Malayans of £15,000 per year.
5. This expenditure will be well worthwhile. This year has demonstrated plainly
enough the vital importance of Africa, and especially of Nigeria as the largest, and in
the long run perhaps the most influential, of the newly independent countries of
Africa. Events in the last few weeks in the Congo have shown the value of British
trained African troops. Nigerians are already convinced of the value of the British
service connection. But if they feel they are not getting all the benefits they should
from the Defence Agreement, they know that there are other countries who are
prepared to offer training facilities on most generous terms. We have seen in Ghana
in the last few weeks how quickly in an African country, apparently firmly inclined
towards the West, a substantial body of opinion can grow up in favour of seeking
assistance from the Soviet Union.
6. If this proposal is accepted the Colonial Secretary will inform the Nigerian
Prime Minister that we will train all the Nigerians for whom we can find vacancies
without cost to the Nigerian Government. At the same time he will seek the Federal
Prime Minister’s agreement to a public announcement on the same lines.
7. Though we may be faced afterwards with requests for similar treatment for
Ghana, Pakistan and Malaya, we need not consider ourselves obliged to help these
countries more than we are doing at present. Ghana is in comparison with Nigeria a
rich country whose armed forces are (as they have recently demonstrated) on the way
to being well established. We help Pakistan already not only with the training of offi-
cers under the Commonwealth Relations Office scheme but also to the extent of about
£11,000 from our CENTO Military Training fund. Our financial assistance to Malaya
has been very substantial. But it has to be recognised that if we do help Nigeria in this
way it may be difficult to refuse similar assistance to Sierra Leone where there may
also be special circumstances, and whose financial problems are not less than those of
Nigeria. We may possibly have to help the West Indies also, to go no further.
8. The first of the Governor-General’s two proposals, that the United Kingdom
should pay part of the cost of British servicemen seconded to the Nigerian military
forces, raises more complicated problems and involves a departure from our past
policy for which however there may be a case on general grounds. Some preliminary
study of what would be involved has been made by the interested Departments. It is
proposed that this study should continue and that it should be directed towards the
consideration of a general offer, not peculiar to Nigeria, with recommendations as to
the best way of doing more to help newly emergent Commonwealth countries with
the cost of seconded British officers, and that estimates of the costs of the different
proposals which may emerge should be prepared.
9. This note has been agreed at official level with the Treasury, Foreign Office,
Colonial Office, Ministry of Defence and the three Service Departments.
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111 CAB 129/104, C(61)5 12 Jan 1961
‘Future of the Gambia’: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Macleod
[Both the CO and CRO had given some thought to the future of the Gambia before the
end of 1958 (CO 554/1516, esp no 19; DO 35/5418, no 55). In the autumn of 1960, the
governor, Sir E Windley, raised the possibility of telling the Leg Co that HMG would not
stand in the way of closer association with a neighbouring state, ie, Senegal (though he
had previously thought of Mali). A union with Senegal might seem logical, but there were
obvious practical difficulties in linking with a foreign country in the ‘franc zone’. The FO
advised doing nothing to obstruct such an association (FO 371/146486, no 2). The CRO
also felt it would be a sensible solution for this ‘impossible country’, a mere ‘comic strip’
(DO 35/5418, no 67). The CO view was more equivocal. It was important that it did not
become an indefinite financial liability to Britain (FO 371/146484, no 7): currently a
grant-in-aid was given of £200,000 pa (expected to rise to perhaps £500,000 in the
following year), quite apart from nearly £600,000 from CD & W. ‘From a purely
mercenary point of view, the sooner we could be quit of the Gambia the better’, wrote
Eastwood, ‘but of course mercenary considerations are by no means all. It would be no
light matter for the UK to divest itself of a country which has been associated with it for
very many years, and, like marriage, it is not an enterprise to be lightly or inadvisably
embarked on’ (FO 371/146485, no 20). Macleod—recognising that it was ‘only a river and
an extension of its banks, scarcely a territory in the ordinary sense of the word’—was
surprised more attention had apparently not been paid to a possible union with Sierra
Leone; he was informed that it had been twice administered from Sierra Leone, and twice
abandoned (1821–1843, 1866–1881); reconsideration in 1940 had also foundered on the
opposition of the governor and the people of Bathurst (CO 554/2150, minutes by Macleod,
26 Sept 1960, & P A Carter, 1 Oct). Clearly it was not an economic asset, and it was
becoming a political liability, as more territories in Africa became independent. Macleod
drew Macmillan’s attention to the problem (PM(60)18, 6 Dec 1960). Macmillan directed it
should be considered by the Cabinet. Macleod produced a paper for the Colonial Policy
Committee (CPC(60)26, 15 Dec 1960), substantially the memorandum printed here,
minus paras 9 & 10. Presenting it to the Committee, he argued that it was becoming
more and more anomalous: ‘we should be wise to formulate our own solution to the
problem before pressure in the United Nations and elsewhere began to build up against
us’ (CAB 134/1559, CPC 8(60), 22 Dec 1960).]
The Gambia consists of the Colony, a small area round Bathurst, the capital, which
has been British for some 200 years, and the Protectorate, which has been British for
65 years; this is no more than 20 miles wide at its maximum breadth but it extends
for some 180 miles inland on either bank of the Gambia River, right into the heart of
Senegal, which lies on either side of it. There are altogether about 250,000
inhabitants.
2. The people value the Commonwealth connexion but it is a backward and
impoverished country, dependent now on a grant-in-aid from us. It is obviously a
geographical anomaly and a thorn in Senegal’s flesh. Its existence hinders the
efficient use of the only important river in the area, makes it impossible to develop
the only good natural harbour (Bathurst), creates a small enclave of territory which
can only with difficulty sustain an economic existence and maintains an artificial
barrier between peoples of the same race.
3. The Gambia is too small and too poor (65,000 tons of groundnuts are its only
export) to become independent by itself. But when Sierra Leone becomes
independent next April it will (apart from Portuguese and Spanish possessions) be
the only Colonial dependency, British or French, left in West Africa. The people of
Senegal on either side of it are racially the same. The Gambia River could be of use to
Senegal and economically the country would probably gain by joining with Senegal,
for they might get the benefit of the subsidised prices paid by France for the 800,000
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tons or so of Senegalese groundnuts. Clearly there are strong arguments for the
Gambia joining Senegal.
4. It is no light matter to suggest that a country which has been British for many
years should join a foreign country, and there would clearly be practical difficulties,
of language, law and systems of administration. To harmonise the two economies
would also have its problems. Nevertheless, I have been reluctantly forced to the
conclusion that some kind of association with Senegal is the only possible future for
the Gambia. Sierra Leone, its nearest British neighbour, is too far away (300 miles)
and too weak financially to be able to take on this liability. Anyhow the geographical
anomaly would remain, and the people of the Protectorate have no kinship with
those of Sierra Leone.
5. The Chiefs of Staff consider that, although it is desirable that we should not
prejudice our staging rights in Bathurst unless there are compelling reasons for
doing so, there are no strategic reasons for obstructing association between the
Gambia and Senegal. They consider that it would be important to do what we could
to prevent the penetration of the resultant State by Powers hostile to the West. Our
Ambassador in Dakar advises that the present régime in Senegal under President
Senghor and Premier Momadou Dia is well disposed towards the West and likely to
pursue a moderate course in African and international affairs and not to be receptive
to Communist influence. The Senegalese authorities would welcome closer
association with the Gambia. The people of the Gambia itself despite their
attachment to the British connexion increasingly realise that their future must lie
with Senegal.
6. The Governor and three of his Ministers recently came here for financial talks
and during the course of these I took the opportunity to discuss this question with
them. The Ministers were quite clear that it is one which must now be faced. A good
deal of local discussion will be necessary before a generally acceptable policy
crystallises, but the Ministers, who were of different parties, were agreed that their
country ought not to be merged completely with Senegal but should maintain some
degree of separate identity and, if possible, its Commonwealth connexion. They had
in mind some kind of federal arrangement which would be achieved gradually,
leaving time for the two countries to grow together. The first step might be
assimilation of the two tariffs and interchangeability of the currencies (special
arrangements will in any case have to be made for the Gambia’s currency when
Sierra Leone becomes independent).
7. Gambian Ministers at present have only limited powers and they want “full
internal self-government” within the next year so that they will be able to talk to
Senegalese Ministers on terms of reasonable equality. I have promised to talk with
them about this some time in the summer. If things go well, I may at least be able to
agree to the appointment of a Chief Minister. In the meanwhile I expect no startling
developments.
8. The Gambian Ministers are clearly right in thinking that the process of
association should be a gradual one and the Governor and I would also wish to feel
our way. It is difficult to see the end of the process. We must recognise that, despite
the present wishes of Gambia Ministers, it might well be complete integration with
Senegal and separation from the Commonwealth. I think we must face this
possibility. The people of the Gambia should of course know of the difficulties in
maintaining the Commonwealth connexion if their relationship with Senegal takes
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the form of political union or federation and a final decision on their future should
not be taken until it is possible to determine clearly the wishes of the people.
9. The Governor and I feel however that we must be ready to take an initial step
soon. My immediate proposal is that we should take the initiative to the extent of
letting the people of the Gambia know that Her Majesty’s Government do not rule
out the possibility of their seeking a future with Senegal. The Governor has advised
and I agree with him that this would at least help to set minds working in the right
direction. I would wish to leave the timing of any such statement open. It may well
be best not to make it until the talks about constitutional development, but it might
possibly be better made before that if a suitable occasion arises—e.g., a speech by the
Governor in his legislature.
10. If my colleagues agree with my view on the future of the territory, I would
propose to inform the Governor that Her Majesty’s Government’s view is that if, after
the Gambia has advanced constitutionally, it appears to be the clearly expressed view
of the inhabitants that their future lies in an association with Senegal, Her Majesty’s
Government would not stand in the way, but would assist in any way they could in
initiating discussions on the subject between Gambian and Senegalese Ministers. I
would ask the Governor to consult me further on the precise timing and nature of
any public statement.
11. I shall be grateful for the approval of my colleagues to this course of action.
112 CAB 128/35/1, CC 2(61)6 24 Jan 1961
[The future of the Gambia]: Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 5)
about the future of the Gambia.1
The Colonial Secretary said that, when Sierra Leone attained independence in
April, the Gambia would (apart from Portuguese and Spanish possessions) be the
only remaining Colonial territory in West Africa. The Gambia was too small and too
poor to become fully independent alone, and Sierra Leone, the nearest British
territory, was too far away and not sufficiently strong economically to accept the
liability of a federation between the two countries. There were strong geographical
and ethnic reasons for the Gambia becoming part of Senegal, and this might provide
substantial economic benefits to both countries. The Chiefs of Staff considered that
there were no strategic reasons for obstructing an association between the Gambia
and Senegal, though they emphasised the need to prevent the development of
Communist influence there. The Senegalese authorities would welcome closer
association with the Gambia, and the people of the Gambia, despite their attachment
to the British connexion, increasingly took the view that their future must lie in
some form of association between the two countries.
Constitutional discussions would be held with Gambian Ministers during the
summer, and it was possible that some progress towards full internal self-
government, perhaps by the appointment of a Chief Minister, might be made early in
1962. Gambian Ministers, of various parties, themselves thought that any process of
1 See previous document.
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 365
366 AFRICA [113]
association with Senegal should be gradual. But this process might well end in
complete integration with Senegal and separation from the Commonwealth. It would
be desirable at some stage, perhaps in the course of the constitutional discussions, to
let the people of the Gambia know that the United Kingdom Government would not
rule out the possibility of their seeking an association with Senegal. This was in
accordance with the views of the Governor of the Gambia, who would consult further
about the timing and nature of any public statement to this effect.
Discussion showed that it was the general view of the Cabinet that, while
separation from the Commonwealth would be a matter of great regret, the best
prospect for the future of the people of the Gambia inevitably lay in some form of
association with Senegal. It would be desirable so far as possible to maintain some
degree of separate identity for the Gambia. It was suggested that it might be possible
to evolve a special status for Bathurst, which might become a free city serving the
interests of both countries. Moreover it would be unwise for the United Kingdom
Government to appear in any way to seek to hasten this development. The people of
the Gambia were well disposed towards the United Kingdom, and any impression
that we wished to sever our link with them must be avoided.
The Minister of Defence2 said that it was highly desirable that we should not
prejudice our staging rights in Bathurst. It was therefore desirable to try to provide
for a continuation of these rights by means of a defence agreement which would be
part of an eventual constitutional settlement.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that the United Kingdom Government should not obstruct the gradual
development of some association between the Gambia and Senegal if, after
constitutional advances had been made in the Gambia, that appeared to be the
wish of the Gambian people.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to consider further the timing and nature of any
public statement about the future of the Gambia.
(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in considering future constitutional
arrangements for the Gambia, to consult the Minister of Defence about provisions
for the continuation of staging rights in Bathurst.
2 Mr H Watkinson.
113 CAB 128/35/1, CC 15(61)5 21 Mar 1961
[Proposals for the future of the British Cameroons]: Cabinet
conclusions
[After Northern Nigeria became internally self-governing in Mar 1959, the administration
of the Northern and Southern Cameroons became the direct responsibility of Britain. A
plebiscite was held on their future, early in 1961, the upshot of which was the Northern
Cameroons became part of the Federation of Nigeria from June 1961 and the Southern
Cameroons became part of the Federal Republic of Cameroun in Oct 1961.]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 36)
about the future of the British Cameroons.
The Colonial Secretary said that, in the recent plebiscite on the future of the
British Cameroons after the ending of our present trusteeship under the United
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Nations, the Northern Cameroons had voted for joining Nigeria and the Southern
Cameroons for joining the Cameroun Republic.
The Cameroun Republic was disappointed at the result of the plebiscite in the
Northern Cameroons and intended to challenge its validity at the United Nations. It
should be possible to rebut any allegations against the propriety of the voting, but
the Republic would almost certainly be able to rally the support, not only of the other
French Community States, but also of France herself.
Administratively, there would be little difficulty in transferring the Northern
Cameroons to Nigeria and it was in our political and financial interest to complete
the transfer as soon as the agreement of the United Nations could be obtained. The
transfer of the Southern Cameroons to the Republic would give rise to more
difficulty. While the Republic at present appeared willing to co-operate in the
transfer, difficult problems would arise over the constitutional, financial and defence
arrangements and the future staffing of the public services and the police. All these
questions would need to be discussed with France, Nigeria and the Republic. While it
was in our interest that the transfer should be completed with as little delay as
possible, great care would be needed if we were to avoid a breakdown in
administration which could lead to a situation comparable to that in the Congo. The
Colonial Secretary said that he proposed to consider with the Foreign Secretary how
further discussions with the other Governments concerned could best be pursued.
Discussion showed that there was general agreement in the Cabinet with the
course proposed by the Colonial Secretary. Further consideration should, however,
be given as a matter of urgency to the best and quickest methods of reducing our
military and financial commitments in the Southern Cameroons.
114 CAB 128/35/1, CC 31(61)7 13 June 1961
[Future of the Southern Cameroons on independence]: Cabinet
conclusions1
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C. (61) 79)
about the future of the Southern Cameroons.
The Prime Minister said that there was a serious danger that subversive forces in
the Southern Cameroons, organised by Chinese Communists, would launch a cam-
paign of terrorism when the territory became independent on 1st October and, in con-
formity with the result of the United Nations plebiscite, entered into some form of
federation with the Cameroun Republic. Unless internal security could be preserved,
the administrative personnel, the great majority of whom were British, would leave
the country, as would the representatives of British commercial interests there. It had
therefore been suggested that the battalion of United Kingdom troops at present sta-
tioned in the Southern Cameroons should be allowed to remain, after 1st October, in
order to maintain internal security during the transitional period while the proposed
federation was established and to allow time for an adequate local security force to be
recruited and trained. It was also suggested that we should establish an Aid Mission,
consisting in effect of the existing administrative personnel, who would be invited to
1 Previous reference: see previous document.
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remain under the aegis of the new Department of Technical Co-operation. These mea-
sures would be additional to our continuing to finance the budget deficit of the terri-
tory, including the cost of maintaining the locally recruited security force. In default
of action on these lines, we might well be held to blame if there were a breakdown of
administration in the Southern Cameroons and perhaps in the neighbouring
Cameroun Republic, leading to the emergence of a Communist-dominated régime in
this area which would be particularly dangerous to Nigeria.
There were, however, strong financial and military arguments against accepting
these commitments. The cost of the proposed measures would amount to nearly £2
millions a year, and any addition to our oversea expenditure was particularly unwel-
come at present. The responsibility for ensuring stability in the Southern Cameroons
ought to be undertaken by the United Nations, and we had already stated publicly that
the United Kingdom forces would be withdrawn when our trusteeship came to an end.
There could be no question of leaving the battalion unless both the Prime Minister of
the Southern Cameroons, Mr. Foncha, and the Prime Minister of the Cameroun
Republic, Mr. Ahidjo, agreed to request it; but even then there was no precedent for
putting British troops under the command of a foreign Government in time of peace,
and we would be likely in any case to be criticised for maintaining a military force in
the territory. There was also a danger that relations between Mr. Foncha and Mr.
Ahidjo would deteriorate, and that our troops might become involved in a personal
struggle for power. Moreover, if terrorism broke out on an extensive scale, a single bat-
talion would be inadequate and would have to be reinforced: and this, in the light of
our other commitments, would be extremely difficult.
United Kingdom representatives were to discuss the future of the territory at a
meeting later that week with Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo, at which it was hoped that
French military representatives would also be present. It was therefore necessary to
decide whether to withdraw the United Kingdom battalion on 1st October and to
confine our assistance to such modest financial support as we could afford, or to
undertake these substantial additional responsibilities for the security and
administration of the territory for some further time.
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) British investment in the territory amounted to nearly £20 millions;
nevertheless these interests were not enough to warrant the continued
deployment of British forces after 1st October. The main issue was whether we
could afford the risk of the dangerous growth of Communist influence in this area.
(b) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff 2 said that conditions in the territory
would make it necessary to relieve United Kingdom troops every six months. It was
very doubtful whether a local security force could be recruited and trained in a
short time. There was no doubt that a single battalion would be inadequate to
maintain order if serious terrorism broke out, and in that event it would be
necessary to send two further battalions to reinforce it. In view of their interests in
the Cameroun Republic, it would be greatly preferable that the French should
accept the responsibility for security, including the training of a local force.
(c) Even if the current Army recruiting objective were realised, it would not be
possible to reinforce a battalion in the Southern Cameroons without losing our
2 F-M Sir F Festing.
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capacity to meet other military commitments which ought to have priority. For
example, it would be of greater importance to provide reinforcements for Zanzibar.
(d) It was very desirable that the training of a local security force should be
undertaken by the French authorities, on behalf of the Cameroun Republic.
Although the French maintained that they could not accept additional
commitments, they might be persuaded to undertake responsibility for security in
the Southern Cameroons if they thought that we would in any case withdraw
when our trusteeship came to an end.
(e) The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that if it were necessary to undertake
further commitments in the Southern Cameroons, offsetting reductions would
have to be made in oversea expenditure elsewhere. Nevertheless, he would agree
that some modest contribution, up to £1⁄2 million, might be afforded as a final
measure of assistance to the territory upon becoming independent.
The Prime Minister, summing up, said that it was the general view of the Cabinet
that, on balance, it would not be justifiable to undertake the additional commitment
which would be involved if a United Kingdom battalion were retained in the
Southern Cameroons after independence. The United Kingdom representatives at
the meeting with Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo should conduct their discussions on the
basis that it was our intention to withdraw the United Kingdom battalion after 1st
October. They should seek to ascertain what measures were contemplated by Mr.
Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo for the maintenance of the administration and of internal
security, and how far they were agreed about future arrangements for the territory
and its association with the Cameroun Republic. They could indicate that we would
be prepared to provide financial assistance amounting to £1⁄2 million to the territory
during the first year after independence, either to enable our expatriate officers to
continue in the administration or to support the budget. It was to be hoped that, in
the face of this attitude, the French authorities would realise that there was no
alternative but for them to accept future responsibility for security in the
Cameroons, as well as in the Cameroun Republic.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that the United Kingdom battalion in the Southern Cameroons should
be withdrawn after 1st October, and that our support for the territory should
thereafter be limited to financial assistance of not more than £1⁄2 million.
(2) Invited the Lord Privy Seal to formulate instructions for the United Kingdom
representatives at the meeting with the Prime Minister of the Southern
Cameroons and the Prime Minister of the Cameroun Republic on the lines
indicated by the Prime Minister.
115 CAB 128/35/1, CC 36(61)6 29 June 1961
[Future of Southern Cameroons]: Cabinet conclusions1
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Lord Chancellor (C. (61) 86)
about the future of the Southern Cameroons.
The Lord Chancellor said that the United Kingdom representatives who had taken
1 Previous reference: see previous document.
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part in recent discussions in Buea had found that there were serious differences
between the Prime Minister of the Cameroun Republic, Mr. Ahidjo, and the Prime
Minister of the Southern Cameroons, Mr. Foncha, about the relationship between
the two territories when the United Kingdom trusteeship came to an end on 1st
October. It had not therefore been possible to discuss the establishment of a
Southern Cameroon security force to be trained by the authorities of the Cameroun
Republic, and it did not seem likely that Mr. Ahidjo would agree that there should be
a separate Southern Cameroon force. In accordance with the Cabinet’s previous
conclusions the United Kingdom representatives had announced that the British
battalion would be withdrawn on 1st October; and, although a formal request for the
retention of the battalion had been made, it had subsequently become clear that Mr.
Ahidjo would not favour this course. It was likely that, when it was realised that the
British battalion was to be withdrawn on that date, officials of the present
Administration, including expatriate police officers, would begin to leave and most
expatriate employees of British firms would probably do the same. In these
circumstances it would not be practicable for us to provide an Aid Mission.
As a result of their discussions, the United Kingdom representatives had recom-
mended that military action should be taken before 1st October against one camp of
200 terrorists which had been located in an isolated area, that a consular post should
be opened at Buea on 1st October, and that the decision to withdraw the British bat-
talion should be announced immediately so that the expatriate officers and employees
who wished to leave might have reasonable time to make their arrangements. These
recommendations had since been approved by the Colonial Policy Committee. The
Committee had rejected a further suggestion that the British battalion might be kept
in the coastal area for a further year. There were serious military objections to this pro-
posal which, in any case, would have involved the risk that British forces might
become involved in disputes between Mr. Foncha and Mr. Ahidjo. The Committee had
also decided that we should offer £1⁄2 million aid to the Southern Cameroons, to meet
their immediate needs on the termination of our trusteeship, and that we should pro-
ceed with transitional arrangements for the ending of Commonwealth preferences in
order to assist the Southern Cameroons over the period during which alternative
markets for their products could be developed.
The Colonial Policy Committee had also considered the possibility that Mr. Foncha,
if he were unable to compose his differences with Mr. Ahidjo, might appeal to the
United Nations to extend our trusteeship beyond 1st October. It had been suggested
that it might be in our interests to encourage Mr. Foncha to make such an appeal, so
as to provide a further period in which to work out transitional arrangements to pre-
vent conditions in the territory from developing in a manner favourable for
Communist exploitation. It had, however, been pointed out that if this possibility were
raised in the United Nations it would arouse criticism and suspicions of our intentions.
In any event there was no certainty that at the end of an extension of our trusteeship
the situation in the Southern Cameroons would have become less difficult.
The Colonial Secretary said that, although it was highly probable that, with the
withdrawal of the British battalion and the departure of expatriate officials and
employees, the Administration in the Southern Cameroons would collapse, thus pro-
viding an opportunity for Communist exploitation, there seemed no alternative but to
accept these risks in view of the serious military and financial objections to continu-
ing our presence in the Southern Cameroons. It would, however, be worth examining
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a further proposal that had now been made, that during the period before their with-
drawal the British battalion should train, so far as possible, an additional security force
of some 120 reliable Africans which it was now thought it might be possible to recruit.
The Secretary of State for War2 said that the British force commander was
prepared to undertake the military action which had been proposed against a camp of
200 terrorists. In view of the local conditions, the chances that this operation would
achieve worthwhile results were not great. It should only be authorised on the
understanding that it would not prejudice a firm decision to withdraw the British
battalion in any event on 1st October, and provided that a careful explanation of the
limited nature of the operation was given to the troops involved.
In discussion there was general agreement that the decision to withdraw the
British battalion on 1st October should be confirmed. It was also agreed that it would
not be in our interests to encourage Mr. Foncha to seek an extension of the
trusteeship status of the Southern Cameroons. The proposal that in the meantime
the British battalion might train a small locally recruited force of reliable Africans
should, however, be further examined.
As regards the proposed operation against the terrorists’ camp, it was suggested that
it might be inadvisable to risk arousing strong terrorist reactions with which we were
not prepared to deal after 1st October. It was explained that the operation would be
more in the nature of a police action, and was more likely to result in the dispersal of
the terrorists than in their capture. It was also pointed out that we had been asked to
deal with this concentration of terrorists by the present Administration; and that, in
view of our current responsibilities as the trustee Power, the request could not easily
be refused. It would be unwise to pursue the operation if this involved risking a seri-
ous number of British casualties, and it should only proceed subject to the conditions
mentioned by the Secretary of State for War. The operational instructions should be
subject to his personal approval and that of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved the recommendations made in paragraph 10(a) of C. (61) 86.
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for War to arrange that the operational
instructions for the attack on the terrorists’ camp should be subject to his
personal approval and that of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary to arrange for further examination of the
proposal that the British battalion, before 1st October, should train a small locally
recruited force of reliable Africans.
(4) Agreed that the Prime Minister of the Southern Cameroons should not be
encouraged to seek an extension of the trusteeship status of that territory.
2 Mr J Profumo.
116 CAB 134/1558, CPC(59)2 10 Apr 1959
‘Future policy in East Africa’: Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
memorandum by Mr Lennox-Boyd
[This memorandum is discussed in Morgan, The official history of colonial development
vol 5 Guidance towards self-government pp 92 & 131–132. It reflects the conclusions
reached by a meeting of ministers, officials and East African governors at Chequers over
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the weekend of 24–25 Jan 1959, known as ‘the Chequers meeting’. The record of the
discussion was marked as EAC(59)1, a copy of which should have been filed in the CO
under the internal filing-code 720, thus eventually finding its place in CO 822/1819,
‘Conference with East African governors on future policy in East Africa, 1957–1959’.
Unfortunately there is no copy of the record in this file, nor any indication of where it
might be, and the record has not been located.]
On the 24th–25th January I discussed with the Governors of Kenya, Tanganyika and
Uganda and the British Resident, Zanzibar, our immediate and long-term aims in
East Africa. I have since been in correspondence with them and in this paper I seek
my colleagues’ endorsement of the conclusions we have now reached. It will be
convenient to examine the problem first in terms of the British interests involved.
British interests
2. The following is a suggested definition of the British interests involved:—
(a) The positive defence interest, i.e., the need for over-flying and staging rights
and the use of ports (vital for Her Majesty’s Government to reinforce rapidly to
protect its interests in Southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf and South-East Asia),
and the need to station in East Africa the forward reserve (again for use in
Southern Arabia, the Persian Gulf, Central Africa and the Far East), so long as
there is no alternative method of effectively protecting those interests (e.g., a kind
of “sixth fleet” defence policy).
(b) The negative defence and economic interest, i.e., the need to ensure that the
area is as friendly to the West as possible and, at the very least, is benevolently
neutral. Failure to secure this interest, even after the positive defence interest was
no longer important, would seriously prejudice British prestige and influence and
jeopardise British investments in the area.
(c) The need to do everything we reasonably can to ensure that people of all races,
who have made their homes in these territories with the encouragement of
successive British Governments, will be able to continue to live there in security
and to contribute to the development and prosperity of the area.
3. All these interests can be secured for certain only so long as Her Majesty’s
Government successfully retain ultimate control, i.e., so long as they or their agents
are in direct control not only of defence and external relations, but also of law and
order—the legal system, the Police and the internal security side of the work of the
Provincial Administrations.
Need for reviewing policy at this time
4. Up to the present time it has been possible to make notable constitutional
advances in East Africa (such as generally increasing the degree of unofficial
representation in the legislatures, associating unofficials—in some cases as
Ministers—with the executive work of government, introducing direct elections)
while still maintaining official control. The existence, at present, of Government
majorities in the Executive and Legislative bodies of all four territories means that
Her Majesty’s Government still retain full control. But the time is approaching,
certainly in Tanganyika and Uganda, when future constitutional advance will start
the process in earnest of tipping the balance of power in favour of unofficials. So long
as the territories are not allowed to advance beyond the stage of internal self-
government Her Majesty’s Government’s control in the vital matters mentioned in
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paragraph 3 will remain more or less unimpaired. But the experience elsewhere
suggests (a) that once the balance moves in favour of the unofficials rapid progress to
internal self-government is difficult to check and (b) that thereafter it is not likely
that the state of internal self-government itself can be maintained “intact” for more
than a very few years.
For these reasons it is important now, i.e., before full official control begins to be
eroded, to consider the general policy that should be adopted in East Africa having
regard not only to the long-term interests of Britain in this area but also (i) to the
implied or expressed commitments in the past, and (ii) to the present fast-moving
tide of African nationalism. Considerations arising from (i) and (ii) are discussed
below.
Likely effect of commitments already implied or expressed
5. It would be inconsistent with general British colonial policy to retain these
territories in perpetual colonial status. No date has ever been set by which self-
government or even internal self-government, would be achieved, but it can no
longer be doubted that both Uganda and Tanganyika will become fully self-governing
in the foreseeable future and that by that time power will be in the hands of
predominantly, if not wholly, African Governments. As regards Kenya (to which I
return later in this paper) I have maintained the line that I do not see any prospect in
the foreseeable future of Her Majesty’s Government’s relinquishing control; but it
will become increasingly difficult to maintain this uncertainty once there is a
significant transfer of power in the countries on her western and southern flanks.
Zanzibar, because of her small size and the complication of the Sultan’s domains on
the mainland, is in a special position and is separately dealt with in Annex I.1
African nationalism
6. The effect of this has to be taken seriously into account because:—
(i) its purpose is to secure a very early end of colonial status;
(ii) so far as the mainland territories are concerned, it seeks the creation of
African-dominated States; and
(iii) it cannot be assumed that pressure for political advance arising from it will
not be supported by recourse to organised and widespread violence.
7. The pressure of African nationalism, which will gain further momentum from
external sources, notably when the activities of the Pan-African Freedom Movement
for East and Central Africa develop, is most evident in Tanganyika and Kenya, though
the Arab nationalist campaign for early independence in Zanzibar constitutes no less
a danger. In Tanganyika the Tanganyika African National Union, led by Julius
Nyerere, dominates the political scene. It commands the support of the great mass of
the Africans and its influence is apparent through the length and breadth of the
country. There is no effective opposition either from moderate Africans or from the
non-African communities. A country-wide campaign initiated by Nyerere led, early in
1958, to the widespread acceptance of the notion that Tanganyika should be “free” in
1959, and that all members of T.A.N.U. would be expected to take part in a campaign
1 Annexes not printed.
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of “positive action” if freedom were not, in fact, achieved. Nyerere soon found that
the wave of nationalist hysteria he had set in motion was beyond his ability to
control, and it is doubtful whether he has made any whole-hearted attempt to check
it. Nyerere himself has been at pains to explain that he was misunderstood and that
all that he had in mind was “reasonable government,” by which he meant that the
official majorities in the Executive and Legislative Councils would give way to
unofficial elected majorities. He has made it clear that he expects this changeover to
be implemented within the next year or two and, more recently, he has been reported
as stating his intention of working for independence by 1963. The internal security
forces are weak and will require at least two years to be put on a sound footing. Steps
are being taken to expand the Police Force with all possible speed. Meanwhile the
Tanganyika Government could not engage in a real show of force with Nyerere
without invoking military assistance, with all the consequences this would be likely
to involve. In Kenya the situation is more complicated. The African nationalists,
supported, though only half-heartedly, by the Asians (excepting the Muslims) are
campaigning for a complete overhaul of the present constitution, their aim being to
break the present balance between the Europeans, Asians and Africans so as to pave
the way for a fairly rapid evolution of an African dominated country. Recent activities
of the African extremists suggest that they are preparing for a campaign of “Positive
Action” designed to put further pressure on the Government to yield to their
demands.
There may therefore develop a civil disobedience campaign which in the
atmosphere left by the Mau Mau rebellion is bound to lead to violence. Mboya’s2 main
card is probably, however, a long continued political war of nerves designed to cause
Europeans with roots in the country to lose their nerve and of their own accord to
leave.
Some Europeans are counter-attacking with the demand that Her Majesty’s
Government should expressly declare their intention to remain in control for a long
period of years. The position is one of constitutional deadlock in a fairly explosive
atmosphere; though Kenya is better placed than Tanganyika is at present to deal with
a serious threat to order.
In Zanzibar the Arab nationalists are campaigning for immediate independence;
but the effect of this extremism is to some extent allayed by the fact that the Afro-
Shirazis, who command considerably more support inside the territory, are anxious
that self-government should not come before they themselves are sufficiently
advanced to be able effectively to use it to entrench their position at the expense of
the Arab minority. The political atmosphere is unpleasant at times and serious
trouble is not out of the question, but probably less risk than in either Kenya or
Tanganyika.
In Uganda the situation is different, but equally complex and potentially
threatening. The conflicting interests of the African politicians and the neo-feudal or
traditional elements, headed by the Hereditary Rulers and their cliques, have
checked the growth of outright and monolithic African nationalism in Uganda—as it
has also checked the advance of democracy. Added to this conflict between
“democratic” and “traditional” elements is the present dislike in which the Baganda
2 Tom J Mboya, secretary of Kenya Federation of Labour and a campaigner for independence; general
secretary of Kenyatta’s Kenya African National Union.
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and their Kabaka are held by most of the other tribes in the Protectorate, and the fear
by the other tribes that premature self-government, before they have had time to
catch up with the more advanced Baganda, might lead to Buganda domination.
These conflicts serve as a check on demands for early self-government. But this is
none the less the uniform desire of all vocal political elements and of the Baganda—
who are pressing for separate self-government now in the hope that, if granted, they
will then be able to dominate or govern the whole of Uganda when Protectorate self-
government is reached. At present the political parties are divided, the two major
parties on denominational lines, and are weak, ill-organised and without effective
leadership. Notwithstanding they are capable of rousing the unthinking masses and
to some extent they have found common cause with the Kabaka and the Omukama of
Toro in attacking the Committee which has been set up to study certain aspects of
the Constitution. Moreover, a new party called the Uganda National Movement and
purporting to be nation-wide in scope has been giving cause for concern. Although
latest reports suggest that it does not as yet command much support outside
Buganda, its activities in that Province are following the customary pattern of
boycott, intimidation and general defiance of authority. The Buganda situation is
always fraught with danger and might lead to a recrudescence of the Buganda riots
(although for different reasons) of 1945 and 1949.
The Governor [Sir F Crawford] has been having exploratory talks with the Kabaka
in an endeavour to find some way through present difficulties and he is hopeful that
if an agreed basis for discussion can be secured it may be possible to pave the way for
a period of reasonable co-operation between the Kabaka and his Ministers on the one
hand and the Central Government on the other.
Possible courses of action
8. In broad terms one of three general lines of policy in the field of constitutional
development could be followed. First we could retreat before it and prepare for a
rapid withdrawal of British control. In terms of time this would probably mean that
the British would be out of East Africa by 1965. The consequences of such a policy
(quite apart from the probable loss of a vital defence interest) are not difficult to
imagine. Apart from the fact that there would probably be violence in Kenya we
should have handed over throughout the region to governments incapable of
standing on their own feet economically and lacking sufficient skilled manpower to
run the countries efficiently. There would thus be a most dangerous political vacuum
in a large area in Africa of which our enemies would be quick to take advantage and
which would seriously prejudice the British position further south in Central Africa.
Such a premature abandonment of our responsibilities would lead to a sharp fall in
the standard of living and consequently to widespread discontent. An impoverished
country with a discontented population would provide ideal ground for mischief
makers from Egypt or Russia.
9. A second choice would be to consolidate, so far as was possible, our position in
East Africa and to make it clear, as has already been made clear for Kenya, that there
is no prospect of the relinquishment by Britain of her ultimate control in the
foreseeable future. This policy might have some appeal to extreme diehard opinion
but its chief disadvantage is that it is probable that it could only be carried out if Her
Majesty’s Government were prepared and able to hold the area by force. In doing so
we should be isolated from even moderate world opinion and when the time
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ultimately came for us to withdraw, we should, in all probability, have left behind so
much frustration and bitterness that we could hardly contemplate securing the area
indefinitely as an area which was at least not actively hostile to us.
The policy of “gradualness”
10. I submit that both these choices should be rejected in favour of a third,
namely, the adoption of a “middle-road” policy. This, in effect, means the
continuation of our policy of step by step constitutional progress with the aim of
meeting the legitimate aspirations of the Africans while at the same time (i) securing
sufficient time for the countries to be more adequately equipped for the
responsibilities of ultimate self-government; (ii) drawing out the period during
which Her Majesty’s Government can retain control in vital matters.
In working out such a policy I submit that we should be guided by the following
considerations:—
(a) We should aim to control the pace of advance in Tanganyika and Uganda
sufficiently for us to have a period of about 10 years before these countries are
given more or less complete responsibility for their internal affairs, i.e., our
planning should assume that by about 1969 the Executive organ in each of these
territories will comprise elected Ministers (a majority of whom will be Africans)
with the portfolios only of the Chief Secretary, Minister for Finance and Attorney-
General reserved for officials.
(b) We should, so far as is practicable, ensure that the progressive advance
towards self-government is subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, the
most important of which are—
(i) that the institutions of Government we are evolving will not be abused by
those who would seek to establish an authoritarian position,
(ii) that the rights of all who have made their homes in these countries should
be properly safeguarded,
(iii) that these countries must be able in the long term to support reasonable
standards of living from their own resources at any rate on recurrent account,
and retain the confidence of investors, and
(iv) that there must be adequate numbers of local people to enable these
countries to be run efficiently when the time comes.
(c) We should ensure that during the next 10 years the countries should be able to
bring about such increases in their economic and social development as are
practicable having regard to the needs of the territories and the resources that can
be made available. At the same time we must avoid the danger that excessive and
continued dependence on United Kingdom aid, especially on recurrent account,
will mean that they can never become self-governing in any real sense.
(d) We should be prepared to be rather more forthcoming about time-tables of
advance than we have hitherto felt to be practicable. I do not suggest that we
should commit ourselves unreservedly to a date by which these countries will be
given self-government but rather that we should be prepared to indicate when
certain important stages (before the grant of full self-government) may be
expected to be attained subject to the fulfilment of the essential conditions.
In constitutional terms the problem can be narrowed down to the crucial question
when we should be prepared to consider the introduction of a majority of unofficial
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Ministers in the Government. Uganda has set up a Committee to study certain
aspects of the constitution, whilst Tanganyika is about to do so. I need not trouble my
colleagues with details about them. The important point in this context is that, when
decisions are announced after their recommendations have been considered, the
Governor of Tanganyika (certainly) and the Governor of Uganda (probably) will be
expected to announce when the next major steps forward (apart from the more
incidental matters remitted to the Committees) can be taken. In Tanganyika the
occasion for such an announcement will be approximately the end of this year, and in
Uganda perhaps a little later. Tanganyika can, therefore, be regarded as the key to the
situation in the sense that decisions announced for Tanganyika at the end of the year
will largely determine the pace of development for Uganda and elsewhere in East
Africa.
Constitutional programme in Tanganyika
11. We have been faced with a real dilemma in this Territory. On the one hand
the country and its people are, generally speaking, by far the most backward in the
region. On the other hand, against the background of the Government’s present
unpreparedness to have a real show-down with a highly organised country-wide
pressure group which is not checked by non-African pressure, it is unrealistic to plan
on the assumption that we can hold out against advances which, on strict merits, are
manifestly premature. The essential problem has been to deal with the demand for a
(virtually) immediate majority of elected Ministers in the Executive in such a way as
to ensure that Nyerere is not provoked to begin a serious campaign of resistance and
yet, at the same time, not to make concessions sufficiently far-reaching to start a
landslide in Uganda and possibly elsewhere.
The present Executive Council comprises Ministers (all of whom are officials),
other officials and some members nominated by the Governor. As from the 1st July
this body will be replaced by a Council of Ministers comprising 7 officials and 5
unofficials (3 Africans, 1 Asian, 1 European, all of whom will probably be drawn from
the elected members). This, although a major advance, falls short of T.A.N.U’s idea of
“responsible Government” by 1959, but Nyerere has been induced to accept this
mainly on the strength of the Governor’s undertaking (given when he announced
this forthcoming change with other measures last month) to consider the question
of further constitutional advances, to promise a statement on these and to include in
that statement a forecast of when (if there is no untoward developments) it may be
expected that unofficial majorities will be introduced into the Council of Ministers
and into the Legislative Council.
I have considered very carefully with the Governor and with other East African
Governors what the outline of that next statement should be. We are agreed that he
should announce the intention to increase the number of unofficial Ministers from
the 5 (who will take office in July of this year) to 7 (not necessarily, although
probably, all elected) for the period 1961–65. During this period the number of
official Ministers would remain at 7, so the officials and unofficials would be equally
balanced. The Governor would go on to express the hope that nothing would prevent
the Government from considering during the life-time of the 1961–65 Legislative
Council the possibility of working towards an unofficial majority (7 unofficials and 5
officials) for the period, which would certainly be for at least the life-time of the
Legislative Council, from 1965. These changes which would see Tanganyika through
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until 1969 (at least) would be subject to law and order being maintained and to the
country’s showing (on grounds of performance, &c.) that they are justified. No
commitment would be given beyond 1969, but the Governor would make it clear that
the next stage would be a substantial measure of internal self-government so that
people would not expect to be fully self-governing immediately after 1969.
It will be seen that the programme conforms with the considerations (a), (b) and
(d) in paragraph 10 above.
Although the Governor has repeatedly told Nyerere that a very early introduction
of an unofficial majority is not practical politics we cannot rule out the possibility
that there may be the strongest opposition even to an announcement which is as
forthcoming and forward-looking as the one outlined above; and that we may well be
faced with the threat of a widespread campaign of violence to bring pressure on the
Government to make even further concessions. I am quite sure, however, that it
would be far better to stand firm and meet the challenge than to give way. It would I
think be a little premature now to attempt to assess the risks in detail and to
calculate what would be necessary to contain them. I am, however, remaining closely
in touch with the Governor on this aspect and propose somewhat nearer the time
when the matter will be put to the test to give my colleagues an assessment of the
risks involved in pushing through with this programme.
Although a corresponding programme has not yet been formulated for Uganda it
can be assumed that the Tanganyika programme would set the seal for a similar pace
of progress in Uganda and possibly also in Zanzibar. It is not possible to judge the
consequences in Kenya which I discuss in detail in the following paragraph.
For the moment I seek my colleagues’ endorsement of the policy advocated in
paragraph 10 and their general approval of its implementation for Tanganyika as
outlined in the present paragraph.
The special problem of Kenya
12. The path of constitutional development cannot be seen so clearly in Kenya as
in Uganda and Tanganyika. The essential problem is how to provide for greater
participation by the Africans in political matters, while at the same time retaining
the confidence, particularly of the Europeans, in Her Majesty’s Government’s resolve
not to hand the country over in circumstances which would mean domination by
Africans grossly ill-equipped to run the country effectively. The aims of the
extremists on the African and European sides are in vivid contrast. Whereas the
former wish to see us open the door to the creation of full democracy (i.e., African
domination) the latter are unwilling to see a single change. I am sure that any policy
which implied support for either would have disastrous consequences not only for
Her Majesty’s Government but for the great mass of the people in the Colony. I have
been much encouraged by the statement of policy that was issued at the beginning of
this month by a group of people of all three races, led by Mr. Blundell, who is
resigning his position as Minister for Agriculture to take over the leadership of this
group. In its general approach to a number of important issues including the
political evolution of the country, educational policy and land policy, this group has
evinced a most heartening liberal attitude which could augur well for future inter-
racial co-operation. This approach has naturally attracted strong criticism from
extremists on both sides and I believe it to be of cardinal importance that in the very
near future I should make a statement of policy on Kenya which would, in its
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 378
[116] EAST AFRICA: GENERAL, UGANDA AND ZANZIBAR 379
essence, have the effect of lending support to the moderates; and I hope that I may
have an early opportunity in Parliament of doing so. At the same time I should like to
make one more effort to break the present constitutional deadlock. As reported in
paragraph 7 the Africans and some of the Asians are very anxious that a full-scale
conference should be summoned with a view, as it were, to making a fresh start. The
position of the African and Asian Ministers has become more difficult as a result, and
there is a danger that if I do nothing they may feel impelled to leave the Government.
I have it in mind to suggest, when I make my statement, that a conference should be
held at an appropriate time, making it clear that we cannot expect to have it in the
life-time of the present Administration. I would also make it clear that any review of
the present constitutional arrangements must be conducted against the background
of those features of the present Constitution which I regard as fundamental to
Kenya’s future. I refer here to the need to maintain the principle of a multi-racial
Executive (although I envisage that in time the racial balance in the Executive must
move in favour of the Africans), to prevent the extension of representation on a
communal basis, to maintain and develop the principle of representation on a non-
communal basis and, finally, to preserve in the Constitution a device designed to
ensure that there is no racial discrimination.
In the situation outlined above it would be clearly premature to attempt to lay
down for Kenya the kind of constitutional programme envisaged for Uganda and
Tanganyika. Nevertheless our principal purpose must be to ensure that we can find a
way out of the present deadlock not only to prevent an explosion but also to make it
possible for the people in Kenya to move along at roughly the same pace as that
envisaged for their neighbours.
Need for a general statement on East African policy
13. I have considered whether I should seek an early opportunity of making a
general statement of policy covering the Region as a whole. I have concluded that
such a statement is not necessary at this juncture. The time might, however, come
later on when it might be useful for a general statement to be made and in that event
I would propose to make one following generally the lines of the provisional draft
attached as Annex II of this paper.
At this stage I merely ask my colleagues to note that I am keeping the possibility in
mind and that, should it subsequently appear that a statement was advisable, I would
consult the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in regard to the financial implications,
before making it.
The long-term future
14. In view of Her Majesty’s Government’s long-term interests in this Region,
and of the fact that, even with the controlled policy of constitutional development
advocated above, it will not be long before a substantial transfer of power begins to
take place, I believe that no time should be lost in trying to devise a method by which
Her Majesty’s Government might retain for a considerable, if not indefinite, period
some control in the area in matters of vital concern. Four possibilities suggest
themselves:—
(a) To maintain ultimate power in the vital matters in Kenya for an indefinite
period, leaving the other (mainland) territories to become fully self-governing.
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(b) To maintain control by Her Majesty’s Government over Zanzibar, including
Mombasa and the coastal strip, leaving the rest of Kenya and the mainland
territories to become fully self-governing.
(c) To develop all the mainland territories, and possibly also Zanzibar, as fully self-
governing territories but associated under a Federal-type structure controlled (for
a time at least) by Her Majesty’s Government.
(d) To abandon the idea of working towards any of these “physical” solutions, but
to allow these territories to develop normally towards full self-government and
rely on defence and other agreements for the securing of any interests which
might still be vital to Her Majesty’s Government.
East African Land Forces
15. The point raised in the preceding paragraph is a matter of long-term policy
and I doubt whether it would be wise to try to reach definite conclusions for some
time. But we must prepare for all eventualities by seeking to ensure that the control,
which we now have, of the local defence forces is not prejudiced, particularly after
the crucial period beginning in 1965 or thereabouts. To this end I believe that Her
Majesty’s Government should assume the cost of these forces from the earliest
convenient date. The Governors and the British Resident are strongly in favour of
this and the detailed implications are now being studied at the official level by the
Departments concerned. I attach very great importance to this and hope very shortly
to be able to make definite proposals to my colleagues on this subject.
Financial implications
16. In paragraph 10 (c) I referred to economic and social development. I cannot
emphasise too strongly the importance of this aspect of our policy. If, through finan-
cial stringency, these territories have to cut back severely on their economic and social
(particularly educational) programmes the whole aim of trying to secure a planned
constitutional development will be gravely jeopardised. If the Governments are not
able to demonstrate that their programmes, aimed at increasing prosperity and at
bringing the local people on in sufficient numbers to be able more or less to run things
for themselves, are being conscientiously carried forward, we shall be suspected of try-
ing to hold African advancement back deliberately and, what is more important,
African advancement will in fact be held back. The Governments are apprehensive on
this score, more particularly in the cases of Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar where
there is marked anxiety lest our whole aim of ensuring that constitutional advance
shall be reasonably gradual should be frustrated through shortage of money.
The financial position of the East African territories is by no means strong.
Revenues have suffered serious shortfalls as a result of the decline in world
commodity prices; and the costs of maintaining even their programmes of social and
other developments are mounting. Kenya will cease to draw Emergency aid and loan
assistance from Her Majesty’s Government after the current year but she is going to
be hard put to balance her normal budget (even after making serious expenditure
cuts) after 1960–61, let alone build up the reserves which went to help pay for the
Emergency. Tanganyika is entering a period when her expenditure will outstrip her
revenue for several years to come at least, and Her Majesty’s Government will in any
event have to come to her aid, particularly as she will have to incur heavy
expenditure to get the internal security forces on a proper footing. Uganda, though
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her reserve position is marginally better, has had to budget for a deficit this year and
(having also to incur heavy expenditure on the internal security forces) will face a
more substantial deficit next year which is bound to affect the previous level of
expenditure on social and economic development—which has served in some part to
keep that Protectorate tranquil so far. In Zanzibar the clove industry has received a
severe set-back; clove prices have fallen drastically; there is a severe depression in the
trade; and she is budgeting for a deficit in 1959. Her reserve position is still, however,
relatively strong.
If it should be decided to take over the cost of the East African Land Forces that will
afford some relief to the budgets of the East African territories. But I cannot rule out
the possibility that further relief may be necessary, beyond this, on recurrent account.
I have already referred to the fact that Tanganyika may well in any event qualify for
grant in aid and her needs will be examined in consultation with the Treasury. I shall
be making separate proposals in relation to Zanzibar. A detailed study is being made
of the financial position in Uganda, and our conclusions will be reported to the
Treasury when that is complete. So far as Kenya is concerned it is to be hoped that
assistance on recurrent account will not be required after the current financial year.
In this paper, therefore, it is not my purpose to seek anything more than the general
endorsement of my colleagues of the policy that Her Majesty’s Government should be
ready to give financial assistance, under such conditions as it may be necessary to pre-
scribe, when necessary, to enable the local governments to maintain their normal ser-
vices at acceptable levels and to carry the recurrent costs of reasonable development
programmes. The need to assist these territories on capital account is well established
and I hope that either through Colonial Development and Welfare assistance or by
means of Exchequer Loans we shall be able to meet the bulk of their needs.
Conclusion
17. In summing up I invite my colleagues agreement to the following
proposals:—
(i) That the gradual policy of step by step development in constitutional affairs
should be maintained and that, in pursuance of this, the broad programme
outlined for Tanganyika in paragraph 11, should be endorsed.
(ii) That, as regards Zanzibar, our aim should be, generally, as expressed in
paragraph 9 of Annex I bearing in mind the considerations in paragraphs 10–13 of
that paper.3
(iii) That Her Majesty’s Government should undertake, as and when necessary, to
provide financial assistance on recurrent account to one or more of the four
Governments, subject to normal consultation with the Treasury as the occasions
arise, in order to ensure that the local Governments can carry out their economic
and social programmes at acceptable levels.
I also ask my colleagues to note that I hope shortly to make definite proposals in
relation to the cost and administration of the East African Land Forces.4
3 This stated that the aim (much as in Kenya) ‘should be to produce a society which is essentially non-
racial in outlook. Too rapid an advance would defeat this aim, but concentrated effort must be put into the
task of raising the educational and living standards of the Africans’; the qualification mainly concerned the
sovereignty of the Sultan over a ten-mile coastal strip of Kenya.
4 See document no 118 below.
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117 CAB 134/1558, CPC 1(59) 17 Apr 1959
‘Future policy in East Africa’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(59) 2)1 in which it was suggested that our policy in relation to the future
constitutional development of our East African Colonial territories should be one of
gradual constitutional development, with the aim of meeting the legitimate
aspirations of the Africans, while at the same time securing sufficient time for the
countries to be adequately equipped for self-government, and extending the period
during which the United Kingdom Government could retain control in vital matters.
On this basis, it was recommended, in particular, that in Tanganyika “unofficials”
should attain equality of representation with “officials” on the Council of Ministers in
1961 and that an “unofficial” majority should be permitted from 1965 to 1969, when
the territory might be expected to attain a substantial measure of internal self-
government, though not full self-government. In Zanzibar it should be our aim to
produce a society which was essentially non-racial in outlook; the immediate task
was to improve the educational and living standards of the Africans. Finally, it was
suggested that the United Kingdom Government should undertake, as and when
necessary, to provide financial assistance on recurrent account to the Governments
of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar to enable them to carry out their
economic and social programmes.
The Colonial Secretary said that the action we took in Tanganyika would
determine the pattern of what would be expected in the other territories. The
Governor had undertaken to make a statement later in the year on the question of
future constitutional advances, and in particular on the date by which it could be
expected that “unofficial” majorities would be introduced into the Council of
Ministers and the Legislative Council. If his present proposals were broadly
acceptable to the Committee he would bring the terms of the statement to be made
by the Governor before his colleagues at a subsequent meeting. The future of
Zanzibar might be especially important to us strategically, since the Sultan’s
sovereignty extended to a strip of land on the coast of Kenya including the port of
Mombasa; this might provide the means of our retaining a useful base for defence
forces on the mainland if at a later date we were denied such facilities in Kenya.
In discussion the following were the main points made:—
(a) Considerable doubt was expressed about the validity of our positive defence
interests as defined in paragraph 2(a) of C.P.C. (59) 2. It would be helpful to have a
fundamental examination of what our ultimate strategic objectives were, and of
whether it would be possible to safeguard these interests in some other way than
retaining military bases, staging posts and over-flying rights on the African
Continent. It would also be helpful from the point of view of planning the
construction of expensive installations to have an appreciation of how long we
were likely to be able to retain defence facilities in the various territories on the
African Continent and in the Near and Middle East generally.
1 See previous document.
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 382
[118] EAST AFRICA: GENERAL, UGANDA AND ZANZIBAR 383
(b) It might be to the advantage of the satisfactory development of some of the
territories in the African continent if an examination were made of the possibility
of redrawing the boundaries; these had in the main been drawn up in the course of
the nineteenth century without any particular regard to economic or ethnic
considerations. The Government had already contemplated the possibility of
British Somaliland linking up with Somalia at some time after 1960. However, the
fact that other European powers besides ourselves, and other independent
Commonwealth countries would in many cases be concerned with any proposed
boundary changes made consideration of the subject very difficult.
(c) Over the last 200 years we had tended to follow the same pattern in our
Colonial policy, i.e. leading Colonial territories by gradual stages from a purely
direct rule by British officials to a system of parliamentary democracy based on
that practised in the United Kingdom. It was open to question however whether
this process of evolution was appropriate in present circumstances, and
furthermore whether the United Kingdom’s political system was necessarily the
best form of democratic government for these territories, and in particular for
those where difficult racial problems were likely to persist.
(d) It was important that the Government should take an early opportunity of
making a public statement to the effect that the United Kingdom fully upheld the
pledges and agreements which had been made with the Sultan of Zanzibar and his
heirs in the past.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the long-term future of
the African continent presented a sombre picture. The Committee were in general
agreement that we should not surrender our interests and responsibilities in the East
African territories, but that we could not maintain the existing position unchanged.
Therefore our policy in regard to these colonial territories should be one of step by
step constitutional advance. But we should consider in what way this could most
safely be done, and should re-examine the nature of our interests which we should
aim to preserve. Recent developments in other countries had raised the question
whether our form of parliamentary democracy was necessarily the best for these
territories, or whether some other form of democratic government might lead to
their acquiring greater stability when they became independent of the United
Kingdom. There would be advantage in studies being made of this problem, and also
of the extent to which we needed to retain strategic facilities in Africa and the Near
and Middle East. In the meantime the Colonial Secretary should proceed with his
proposals in regard to Tanganyika and bring the text of the Governor’s proposed
statement later in the year before the Committee at a subsequent meeting. . . .
118 CAB 128/34, CC 2(60)4 18 Jan 1960
‘East African Land Forces’: Cabinet conclusions on their future
[In his memorandum, Macleod argued that it was increasingly important ‘to insure
against the risks of advance towards responsible government. Our position in East Africa
may be gravely prejudiced if we have no effective means of controlling constitutional
development in Kenya’. . . . As a brake on advance, internal security forces should be
insulated from local political control. Vital interests in the area would need to be
safeguarded even after independence (CAB 129/100).]
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The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (60) 1) on
the future of the East African Land Forces.
The Colonial Secretary said that in 1957 it had been decided that administrative
and financial responsibility for the East African Land Forces (E.A.L.F.) should be
transferred from the War Office to the local Governments. It was now evident that
constitutional development must proceed less rapidly in Kenya than in the other two
East African territories. In these circumstances there would be military and
administrative advantage in our resuming control of the local forces; and he
proposed that the United Kingdom Government should assume administrative and
financial responsibility for E.A.L.F. from 1st July, 1960. As a matter of principle it
might be thought that local contributions should be sought from the Colonial
territories towards the cost of these forces, but he would prefer to have authority not
to insist on any such contribution if it appeared that a concession on this point
would help to secure a successful outcome of the forthcoming conference on the
constitutional development of Kenya. In presentation, neither the political nor the
financial aspect of his proposals need be stressed; they could be represented as an
improvement in the organisation of the local forces. In fact, the financial assistance
they would provide might have a decisive effect on the conference, since it would be
recognised that our proposals would enable the local Governments to apply
additional resources to more constructive purposes, such as the development of
agriculture and education.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer1 said that he would like to have further time to
consider the financial implications of these proposals. The resumption of
responsibility for these local forces seemed to be contrary to the policy normally
applied in territories moving towards independence. If there were to be no local
contributions, we should be committed to expenditure of some £3 millions a year.
Moreover, this transfer might be regarded as establishing the principle of United
Kingdom support for the local forces of other Colonies moving towards
independence.
The Cabinet’s subsequent discussion centred mainly on the political issues
involved in this proposal. The following points were made:
(a) The measures now suggested would (however they were presented) seem to be
a reversal of the policy adopted in 1957. Our resumption of full control of E.A.L.F.
might be justified if it could be shown to be part of a general plan under which
Colonies emerging towards independence would be guided towards accepting a
continuing measure of United Kingdom authority; it would, however, be more
difficult to defend in relation to territories moving relatively quickly towards
complete independence.
(b) The movement towards independence was likely to proceed more slowly in
Kenya than in Tanganyika or Uganda. In these circumstances there might be
differences of opinion in the local legislatures about the continuance of financial
support for E.A.L.F. On the other hand, even if financial responsibility were
assumed by the United Kingdom it might, on political grounds, be difficult to
maintain a composite force indefinitely. It was possible that local political opinion
would become hostile to the continued recruitment of African troops if they were
under British control.
1 Mr Heathcoat Amory.
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(c) It would be useful to know whether leading African personalities in the three
territories were likely to regard the financial attractions of the scheme as
outweighing any political disadvantages. In Tanganyika and Uganda especially, the
alternative to the resumption of United Kingdom control might be that opposition
to expenditure on the forces would develop in the local legislatures. In that event
the Governors would have to exercise their reserved powers to provide the
necessary financial support for E.A.L.F.; and measures of this kind, taken in an
emergency, might lend support to the view that the United Kingdom Government
were adopting a reactionary policy.
Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that the Chancellor of the
Exchequer should have an opportunity for further consideration of the financial
implications of this proposal. The Cabinet’s discussion had, however, suggested that
its political aspects were even more important than its financial and administrative
aspects. While it would have the advantage of removing control of E.A.L.F. from
discussion in the local legislature, it could be presented as a reversal of the policy
which we normally adopted when Colonial territories were moving towards
independence. The weight to be attached to these opposing political considerations
should determine the decision to be taken on the proposal and he suggested that the
Cabinet should resume their consideration of the matter in the following week.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Took note that the Chancellor of the Exchequer would give further
consideration to the financial consequences of the proposal outlined in C. (60) 1.
(2) Agreed to resume their consideration of this proposal at a meeting in the
following week.
119 CO 822/2262, no 8 15 Jan–30 May 1960
[Constitutional development in Uganda]: CO minutes by Sir H
Poynton, J W Stacpoole, F D Webber, W B L Monson and Lord Perth
[Uganda had had a Leg Co since 1921; it was enlarged in 1953 and in 1955, when a
ministerial system was introduced. In 1958 direct elections of African representative
members were held, but Buganda held aloof. In 1960 Leg Co composition was broadened
and membership confined almost entirely to elected members; the Executive Council
became a Council of Ministers. A general election was held under the new arrangements
in Mar 1961, resulting in a majority for Benedicto Kiwanuka’s Democratic Party. Internal
self-government was attained in Mar 1962, with Kiwanuka as first prime minister; see
further below, document no 133.]
. . . I assume as our starting point that we are all agreed that our objective is the
development of self Government in Uganda, by as liberal and rapid stages as can
safely be digested, leading towards ultimate independence if Uganda “has what it
takes” to exist as an independent nation. This can be properly regarded as as issue of
principle involving, if you like, the ethics of Colonial policy.
3. But in Uganda (and here again I think we are all agreed) there are two aspects
of this problem which reflect an internal conflict—(a) the nature of the central
structure or Government and (b) the relationship between the Kingdoms and the
centre. Whether in striving for the agreed objective one should tackle (a) first and
then try to fit (b) to (a); or vice versa; or whether one should try and tackle both
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aspects simultaneously and comprehensively, is not in my view an issue of principle
(or ethics) but a plain matter of tactical expediency and therefore of intellectual and
political judgment. I would not myself be too alarmed about immediate political
repercussions in Uganda over our handling of the matter if we can really convince
ourselves that our tactics are the best suited to the objective. Mr. Webber’s
memorandum is very cogent on paper but I do rather wonder whether it grips the
longer term political realities.
4. For myself I am very anxious that we should not go too far on either (a) or (b)
in isolation from each other; because the more that policy crystalises on either aspect
the more difficult it will be to concoct an effective mixture. On the other hand (and
here I agree with Mr. Webber) it would never do simply to shelve the Wild Committee
Report1 while we set up a wholly separate enquiry on “relations of the Kingdoms with
the centre”; because, among other reasons, that would be equally prejudicial and
provocative the other way round—i.e. it might be taken as indicating that H.M.G.
had decided to consign the Wild Committee Report to the waste-paper-basket and
had come down in favour of the opposite approach.
5. Might it not, however, be possible to appoint a general Commission of enquiry
from outside Uganda (United Kingdom or United Kingdom with other
Commonwealth members) to go into the whole political and constitutional problem
of Uganda, taking evidence and using the Wild Committee Report as one of the
“Documents in the case”. This is not shelving the Wild Committee Report nor is it
belittling its value. On the contrary, the very fact that the Wild Committee found it
necessary to stray outside their strict terms of reference (aspect “a”—or a part of “a”)
into “aspect b”—Part IV of the Report—lends support to the view that the two
aspects are inseparable and that a comprehensive enquiry from without is desirable. I
believe that with a little presentational ingenuity such a Commission could be
represented as an adaptation of the recommendation in paragraph 182 of the Wild
Committee Report itself for a Conference.
6. If we acted quickly on this (and particularly if membership were drawn from
the United Kingdom only, though I think this would be a pity) we ought to be able to
get a Commission into the field by the summer and I see no reason why they should
not be asked to report by the end of 1960 which still gives a margin of time before the
1961 elections. The time-table is on the tight side, I agree; and one might have to
consider whether the 1961 elections should not be held late in 1961 instead of early
(as recommended by the Wild Committee in paragraph 55), so as to give adequate
time for consideration, in Uganda and here, of the proposed Commissions’ Report.
7. There are, no doubt, bugs in this proposal. There always are. But my instinct is
that something on these lines, designed to cover the dual approach without scrapping the
Wild Committee Report as such, is essential if we are to get at the right ultimate solution.
A.H.P.
15.1.60
Mr. Webber
A decision on the Uganda franchise is now urgently needed and you asked me to
summarize the issues. Elections have been promised “as early as can be arranged in
1961”. Before then Uganda must amend their electoral law and register their voters.
1 J V Wild, administrative secretary of Uganda, 1955–1960, chairman of constitutional committee, 1959.
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We have promised Sir F. Crawford2 to put the matter to the S. of S. as soon as
possible.
All that the S. of S. is committed to is “a further extension of the franchise.” I
attach opposite a copy of the 1958 franchise provisions. According to official
estimates, these already give the vote to 80 percent of all African men and 20 percent
of women in the constituencies where registration took place in 1958. In Buganda
the proportions might be higher. The present franchise is thus a very wide one. The
choice now lies between going at once to universal adult suffrage, and stopping at
some, rather awkward, half-way house. We have asked the Governor to suggest what
this compromise might be, but so far he has not done so. The Wild Commission
recommended universal adult suffrage. The Governor is strongly in favour of it and
so are the Representative Members. The rulers have not declared themselves on the
issue, but the demand for universal suffrage is one which they would find it no easier
than we to resist openly. Apart from this wide local demand, the best argument in
favour of conceding universal adult suffrage at once, is that to refuse it would be to
forfeit goodwill which we badly need. There can be little reality in the distinction
between a “qualitative” franchise including 80 percent of the male population, and
universal adult suffrage. There is also the point that the physical task of registration
would be much simplified if a comprehensive franchise were adopted.
The main argument on the other side comes from Kenya, Tanganyika and perhaps
Central Africa (you may like to consult Mr. Watson about this). Mr. Coutts,3 in his
letter at (3) on EAF 102/298/09, makes it clear that he feels that universal adult
suffrage in Uganda would put the Kenya Government in a very difficult position. It
should also be mentioned that the Cabinet’s agreement to any concession on
franchise was somewhat grudging. If, therefore, he decided on universal adult
suffrage, the S. of S. would no doubt wish to consult his colleagues again.
I am sceptical of the argument about repercussions. Extremists will be no more
extreme, and moderates no less moderate because of advance in a neighbouring terri-
tory. When Uganda secured its present wide franchise the Governors of Kenya and
Tanganyika prophesied woe, but I doubt whether that advance did much to excite
similar demands elsewhere. The real effect of giving the vote to another million or so
leaders [?electors] will be small in any case. The same people will ensure their election
by the same arts. On the other hand, to deny the extension might well queer the pitch
for the talks with the Representative Members in June. On balance, therefore, I hope
we shall advise the S. of S. to come down in favour of universal adult suffrage.
As to timing, if we are not going all the way, we shall have to put proposals to the
Governor at once. But if the decision goes the other way, there might be much to be
said for withholding its announcement until the June talks (it would in any case be
difficult to get Cabinet approval before the end of this month) even though this
would make the timetable for registration etc. tighter.
J.W.S.
6.5.60
Please see Mr. Stacpoole’s minute above. I am sorry to have laboured under this
problem for so long especially as we are running short of time.
2 Governor of Uganda, 1956–1961.
3 W F Coutts, chief secretary of Kenya, 1958–1961; governor of Uganda (as Sir Walter Coutts), 1961.
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2. I should like to make two general observations. First, on the face of it, Uganda
has not lived up to the political expectations aroused some years ago. It was made clear
some time ago that Uganda would be developed primarily as an African state and then
it seemed a reasonably fair assumption that the Protectorate would move along pretty
fast leaving Kenya and Tanganyika with their settlement problem some way behind. At
that time Uganda was also financially on the crest of the wave. But the picture is quite
different now both politically and economically. When one analyses the situation I think
it must be admitted that Uganda have got very little to show for the fact that they have
had a ministerial system for quite a long period. A handful of nominated Africans admit-
tedly have gained some experience in ministerial duties, but we still have to wait for
African elected Ministers to appear on the scene. This seems remarkably odd in a terri-
tory which was meant definitely to develop under predominantly African leadership.
3. Thus, notwithstanding, having fallen back in the race they are more and more
sensitive over developments in Tanganyika. And even the Governor has warned us that
the statement of the form of the constitution for Tanganyika may mean that he will
have to advise going further than he expected would be necessary when considering
earlier this year with the Secretary of State the decisions to be taken on the Wild
Report. I think we must deal with the franchise question against the general back-
ground of what our line should be in June when we see the representative members.
The crucial points are really the extent of the unofficial majority and the question
whether there should be a Chief Minister. As regards the first of these points, I think
that we ought to avoid stating in advance of the Uganda elections what the precise
composition will be. But when the time comes I think we must try to get as many expe-
rienced African elected Ministers as is feasible. In a sense the other two territories are
far more “Africanised” than Uganda. As regards the Chief Minister, I am quite sure that
it would be a mistake to move any further from the present position.
4. It is on the assumption that we shall not move materially from the line already
taken over the Wild Report that I advocate that Uganda should be allowed to move to
universal suffrage. I need not elaborate the case on Uganda merits, but, so far as East
Africa is concerned, we must clearly look at the possible effects on the situation in
Tanganyika and Kenya. . . . I have discussed the point with Mr. Fletcher-Cooke.4 Mr.
Nyerere is not for his part wedded to the idea of universal suffrage. But he is under
constant pressure on this account from Oscar Kambona5 and others. Mr. Fletcher-
Cooke considers his position would be weakened if Tanganyika had to fall behind
Uganda in this respect. On the other hand, we clearly could not alter the present
ruling in Tanganyika without delaying the elections for at least six months. Mr.
Fletcher-Cooke thinks, however, that the more important consideration is the
Trusteeship Council. If a decision could be postponed until the end of June, the
situation could be “ridden” domestically in Tanganyika. But a decision which was
announced while the Council was still considering the Visiting Mission’s Report
would mean that a great amount of pressure would be brought to bear. So far as
Kenya is concerned I think we would be in considerable difficulties if both
Tanganyika and Uganda got universal suffrage on this round; but I should have
thought myself that provided Uganda was isolated the difficulty would be
considerably minimised. Although we could in fact concede universal suffrage in
4 Chief secretary of Tanganyika, 1959–1960; deputy governor, 1960–1961.
5 Minister of education in first Tanganyika Cabinet, May 1961.
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Kenya without altering the substance of the Lancaster House agreement, there
would, of course, be a great outcry that the Secretary of State was, within a matter of
months, making more concessions to the Africans, and the European position would,
politically, become very difficult indeed.
5. The political advantages of making this concession in Uganda’s case are clear.
The recent decisions on Tanganyika will strengthen the opposition of those who
condemn the decisions on the Wild Report as not going far enough and at least the
grant of universal suffrage would show that the Secretary of State was not being
completely intractable.
6. Ministers may wish to discuss this. Subject to discussion I think we should:—
(a) tell Uganda that the Secretary of State is hoping that it may prove possible to
concede universal suffrage but that he would like to avoid making a decision
public until towards the end of June. This, as well as easing the Tanganyika
difficulty, would give the impression that the Uganda delegation were going home
with something in their pockets. We should ask them whether a delay for that
number of weeks could be managed from the point of view of mechanics;
(b) Give Kenya and Tanganyika arguments for going ahead in Uganda alone,
saying that we would hope that any such decision would not be public until
towards the end of June and asking for comments.
7. I have, of course, only dealt with the East African side, but I realise that the
situation in Central Africa will also have to be taken account of. . . .
F.D.W.
26.5.60
. . . 2. The Secretary of State spoke to me about this subject during H.M’s Reception
for the Corona Club last night and said that, while he fully recognized that in Uganda
terms it was a complete nonsense to reject the recommendation for universal adult suf-
frage, he did not see how he could agree to this without both endangering the settle-
ment reached in Kenya and prejudicing seriously his position for the Nyasaland
Constitutional talks. (You will remember that the Secretary of State has promised
Federal Ministers that he will not move to universal adult suffrage in Nyasaland and
that if it were introduced in Uganda on the argument that Uganda was a predominantly
African state the same argument could certainly be raised for its extension to Nyasaland).
3. With respect, while sharing Mr. Webber’s and indeed the Secretary of State’s
own feelings on the matter, I can only agree with the Secretary of State’s views as I
have recorded them. This will lead to the paradoxical position that in order to avoid
being forced into giving a concession which would in fact make no practical
difference in Uganda, we shall have to show a greater willingness to admit Africans to
positions of real power and responsibility in the Executive. This is the line which Mr.
Webber takes in his draft opposite, but I am afraid that this must just be faced. I
therefore agree with the draft telegram opposite.
W.B.L.M.
26.5.60
I too am sure a qualitative franchise is necessary. I also believe any announcement
should be after the Delegation’s visit here. . . .
P.
30.5.60
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120 CAB 134/1559, CPC(60)1 4 Feb 1960
[Proposals for constitutional reform in Uganda]: memorandum for
Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee by Mr Macleod
1. Introduction. Proposals for constitutional reform contained in the report of a
Constitutional Committee . . . will be debated in Legislative Council in the latter half
of February. In this paper I shall recommend the line to be taken on the principal
issues, and I will consider separately with the Governor when, in relation to the
debate, our decisions should be made known. For the convenience of my colleagues I
here attach a note on the general political situation in Uganda at Annex II.1
2. General considerations
(a) After the autumn elections the Legislative Council in Tanganyika will consist
predominantly of Elected Members, the great majority of whom will be Africans. The
present official majority in the Executive will be replaced by an Unofficial Majority
(probably nine Unofficial Ministers2—including five Africans, one of whom may be
“Chief Minister”—to three Officials).
(b) If I can get an assurance of sufficient support from the main groups at the
Kenya Conference I may be able to recommend certain important moves forward in
Kenya, in particular:—
(i) a rearrangement of the Executive to provide for the inclusion of three or four
African elected Ministers;
(ii) a change in the composition of Legislative Council to give Africans at least
parity with the other races combined;
(iii) an introduction of a common roll on a very wide franchise (to produce the
effect in (ii)), though counter-balanced by arrangements to ensure the return of an
adequate number of members who have the genuine support of all communities.
(c) It is accepted that Uganda must develop as a primarily African State.
It is clear that important steps forward must now be taken though it may be
neither prudent nor practical to go quite as far as has been agreed for Tanganyika. I
envisage that the changes would be implemented after fresh elections to be held first
half of 1961.
3. The present constitutional position in Uganda
(a) The executive.—There is a majority of seven officials to five unofficials, the
latter all nominated, made up of three Africans, one Asian and one European.
(b) The legislature.—The “official” or Government majority is maintained
through the appointment of nominated (back-bench) members. On the
representative side the Africans are already in a majority over the Europeans and
Asians combined.
(c) The franchise.—Direct elections for Africans only were introduced in 1958
and were held (in the districts which opted in favour of this system) on a qualitative
but wide franchise. . . . There is no common roll: the European and Asian Members
are nominated.
1 Not printed. 2 Unofficials: not civil service office-holders.
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4. The constitutional committee. The main task of the Committee was to
consider the possibility of establishing a common roll, how many members should be
returned on this basis and how non-Africans could be adequately represented. It was
not, however, excluded from advising on such subjects as the composition of the
Executive or of the Legislature taken as a whole.
5. Recommendations. I have, for the sake of completeness, summarised in Annex
I the principal recommendations in the Committee’s Report: but I need only trouble
my colleagues with matters of major principle.
(a) The executive. I think that, as for Tanganyika, the principle of moving to an
Unofficial Majority must be accepted and, as a consequence, we must accept a
reduction of the officials to five. But the Governor should not be tied to selecting all
his Unofficial Ministers from among the Elected Members. Thus the new Council
might comprise seven Unofficials and five Officials. The Governor should, I suggest,
aim at selecting up to five Africans from the Elected Members and be free to appoint,
by nomination, one or two non-African Ministers (from within or without the
Legislative Council). It is, of course, possible that if the present confused political
situation in Uganda came to be reflected in the result of the next elections, or if there
were not among the candidates who are elected a sufficient number of Africans
capable of taking charge of Ministers, the Governor might well have to nominate
some African Ministers from outside the Legislative Council.
(b) The legislature. We should accept that the Legislative Council should become
predominantly elective in character; but that the Governor must retain his freedom
to appoint a sufficient number of nominated members to the Government side to
ensure a working majority. In choosing his Elected Ministers the Governor would
naturally seek to appoint people (whether on a single party or “coalition” basis)
whose followers would be prepared to sit on the Government side. This would obviate
the need for extensive nomination.
(c) Common roll, minority safeguards and franchise. I am strongly in favour of
having direct elections on a Protectorate-wide scale with no option offered of indirect
elections. When the present franchise was introduced in 1957, District Councils were
left free to decide whether or not they would accept direct elections in their Districts
for the next Legislative Council elections, or whether they preferred the then existing
system of indirect elections through District Councils acting as electoral colleges. If
neither of these two courses open to the District Councils were adopted, the
Governor had the power to nominate someone to represent a District. In the event,
10 members of the present Legislative Council were returned after direct elections;
two after indirect elections, and one was nominated by the Governor. The present
lack of uniformity only serves to accentuate the disunity in the country.
I agree that, in the circumstances of Uganda, no special electoral safeguards for
non-Africans are called for.
My instinct (and that of the Governor) is to agree to universal adult franchise,
particularly if I have to concede as much (for some of the common roll seats) for
Kenya. The present franchise . . . is already very wide and not far off universal adult
suffrage. We cannot concede less than has been conceded for Tanganyika and may
well have to go further. An early decision will be needed if elections are to be held in
the first half of 1961 but I may wish to defer a final decision until after my visit to
Central Africa. I therefore propose that the Uganda Government should express
themselves as very sympathetic to the principle of a wide extension of the franchise,
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and that the detailed implications are now being closely studied with a view to
reaching a decision in time for elections to be held during the first half of 1961.
6. Buganda. We can expect that there will be strong pressure from progressive
and intellectual elements for the adoption of all the proposals in the Committee’s
report (or, where there is divided opinion, the extreme proposals), but not from the
Kabaka3 and the other rulers who have great influence in their areas. But I must
warn my colleagues that even the lines of policy advocated in paragraph 5 will
accentuate the present differences with the Kabaka and his Government, and even
the most careful handling of the situation may not avoid a complete break. They (and
indeed the traditionalists in the Agreement Districts of Toro, Bunyoro and Ankole)4
will see these changes as a decisive move to the transfer of power to democratic
elements in the country as a whole whose first act on independence might be to
destroy the hereditary rulers and their Governments. The Kabaka’s Government are
campaigning for self-government now for Buganda in order to insulate Buganda
from these dangers. They have hitherto, in contravention of the Agreements, refused
to take part in Legislative Council and, generally, are in violent opposition to any
constitutional development at the centre. Conversely, the democratic elements both
in Buganda and throughout the rest of the Protectorate would be dismayed at any
attempt to delay constitutional advance pending a settlement of our difficulties with
Buganda.
There are two distinguishable problems:—
(a) To consider, having regard not only to past pledges that the status and dignity
of the Rulers will be safeguarded in future constitutional changes, but also to the
diversity and complexity of Uganda (Buganda and the Agreement Districts, tribal,
ethnic, and language diversities) the best form of government which should be
evolved for the country as a whole so as to ensure that, after British protection has
been withdrawn, the Rulers shall be able to maintain their position and, perhaps
more important, the country develop in peace and unity. This raises the question
whether a “unitary” or “federal” type of government will be best for the future
Uganda and what is to be the relationship of the parts (the “ordinary” Districts as
well as those having Agreement status) to the whole; and where, for example,
residual powers should lie.
(b) To review from time to time the arrangements incorporated in the Agreements
for the administration of Buganda while the Protectorate, including that province,
remains under British protection. The Governor is already negotiating with the
Buganda Government for the revision of the present Agreements with a view to
having a revised constitution for Buganda in 1961.
With the implementation of the proposals in paragraphs 5 Uganda will move away
from “official” government towards early responsible government. The time is
therefore shortly approaching when a full study should be made of the form of
government that will be best suited to a self-governing Uganda. The Kabaka and his
supporters prefer that if Her Majesty’s Government will not grant self-government to
Buganda in isolation, such a study should be undertaken and completed before fresh
3 H H Edward Frederick W D W M L Mutesa II, kabaka of Buganda, crowned 1942; educated Makerere
College, Uganda and Magdalene College, Cambridge; exiled 1953 to 1955; first president of Uganda,
1963–1966. For Macleod’s opinion of his obstinacy, see document no 31 above.
4 The ‘protected’ Agreements negotiated with HMG dated from 1900–1901.
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elections are held and constitutional changes at the centre implemented; and the
other Rulers are equally nervous lest constitutional change should undermine their
position.
Although I think that the announcement of Government policy on the changes
advocated by the Constitutional Committee should be made soon, I also think that
such an announcement should be linked with a renewal of the pledge to ensure the
maintenance of the position of the Rulers and a statement of intention to set up the
enquiry to consider the problem outlined at (a) above. I envisage that such an
enquiry would be made by a small body of outside experts and not (as suggested by
the Constitutional Committee) a large-scale conference. I should like to leave open
the question of when the enquiry should start or finish, but without leaving any
doubt that the constitutional changes at the centre arising from the Constitutional
Committee’s Report would be made in the first half of 1961.
7. Conclusion. I invite my colleagues to endorse the proposals in paragraphs 5
and 6, and to agree that a statement by the Governor embodying them should be
made on or about the 15th February.
121 CAB 134/1559, CPC 1(60)1 8 Feb 1960
[Discussion of Wild Report on Uganda constitution]: minutes of
Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(60) 1) regarding future constitutional development in Uganda.1
The Colonial Secretary said that proposals for constitutional reform contained in
the report of the Constitutional Committee (the Wild Report) were shortly to be
debated in the Legislative Council and it would be necessary for the Governor to
make some statement of intention in regard to the principal issues. Whilst it was
generally accepted that Uganda must develop as a primarily African State, the local
political situation was complicated by the special position of Buganda,
constitutionally the most advanced province of the territory with its own Ruler (the
Kabaka), parliament and ministerial system.
Although the majority of the Wild Committee had recommended that the leader of
the majority party in the Legislative Council should preside over the Council of
Ministers and have the title of Chief Minister, he would not propose to move as far as
this at the present stage, in view both of the repercussions on Kenya and of the lack
of suitable Africans of the required calibre; instead he proposed that there should be
an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers (seven unofficials to five officials)
the Governor retaining power to select the unofficial Ministers either from within or
without the Legislative Council. The recommendation that the Legislative Council
should become predominantly elective in character could be accepted, but the
Governor must retain freedom to appoint sufficient Nominated Members to ensure
the Government a working majority. As regards franchise, his instinct was to accept
the recommendation of the Wild Committee for universal adult suffrage, but in view
of the repercussions that this would have on other territories he would propose that
1 See previous document.
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the Governor should state that the Government were very sympathetic to the
principle of a wide extension of the franchise and that the detailed implications were
being studied with a view to reaching a decision in time for elections to be held in
1961. This would give time for the matter to be considered in the light of
developments elsewhere. The key to the situation would lie in the results of the
Kenya Constitutional Conference. If universal adult suffrage were to be introduced
for common roll seats in Kenya, he would propose that universal adult suffrage
should be adopted in Uganda; but if the suffrage in Kenya were to remain at a level
similar to that in Tanganyika, it would be necessary to devise some qualification,
albeit very low, for Uganda.
The Governor’s statement was unlikely to be acceptable to the Kabaka of Buganda
and the Rulers of the other Agreement Districts, who had expressed concern at the
transfer of power to democratic elements and who wished to preserve their position
by obtaining self-government. He therefore proposed that when announcing the
Government’s intentions in regard to the Wild Report the Governor should also
renew Her Majesty’s Government’s pledge to ensure the maintenance of the position
of the Rulers and also announce the intention of Her Majesty’s Government to
institute an enquiry into the best form of government which should be evolved for
the country as a whole. Nevertheless, it was not certain whether this would satisfy
the Kabaka, and even the most careful handling of the situation might not avoid a
complete break.
The following were the main points made in discussion:—
(a) Although it would not be possible to move to a Chief Minister system in the
Council of Ministers at the present time, it might be possible to move in that
direction at a later date if a cohesive political group developed and a suitable
African leader came forward as a result of the 1961 elections.
(b) There had been no demand from the European and Asian minorities for
constitutional safeguards, although both communities had been represented on
the Wild Committee. It would however probably be necessary for the Governor to
nominate some non-Africans to the Legislative Council in order that these
communities should be represented when questions such as taxation policy were
being considered.
(c) An announcement of the extension of the suffrage in Uganda would have
repercussions not only in the neighbouring East African territories, but also in
Nyasaland and the other territories of the Federation, where it would be most
difficult in the foreseeable future to go beyond some form of qualitative franchise
for Africans. On the other hand it would not be easy to defend the retention of a
qualitative franchise in Uganda, since the existing qualifications were already very
low. Moreover, it would be embarrassing if the Governor, in addition to rejecting
some of the more substantial recommendations of the Wild Report, had also to
reject that for universal adult suffrage. It would be important to avoid falling
between two stools in Uganda—satisfying neither the Kabaka and the other Rulers
on the one hand nor the democratic elements in the country on the other. It would
therefore be appropriate to announce, as proposed, the Government’s sympathy
with a wide extension of the franchise, and to take a final decision on the matter
in, say, June 1960, by which time the franchise arrangements for the Central
African Territories were likely to have been completed.
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[d] If the Kabaka took action to oppose the holding of elections in Buganda on the
lines to be announced by the Governor, and to prevent the electorate from
expressing their will, a break with him might become unavoidable. In this event it
might be desirable to take steps to have a new Kabaka appointed, rather than
repeat the action taken in 1953 when we withdrew recognition temporarily.
[e] The Katikkiro (Prime Minister) of Buganda had been given leave of appeal to
the Privy Council on the question whether Buganda was required to submit
representative members for appointment to the Uganda Legislative Council. It
would be to our advantage to have this appeal disposed of as quickly as possible,
and the question of speeding up the proceedings should be examined.
[f ] The proposed Committee of Enquiry into the pattern of future Government in
Uganda might take the form of a smaller version of the Monckton Commission.2 It
might be largely composed of outside experts from the United Kingdom, but local
advisers could be attached to it as necessary. Its main task would be to recommend
whether Uganda should develop as a unitary or a federal state. It would be of great
importance for the matter to be settled before we relinquished our responsibilities
in the territory, since otherwise there would be a risk of subsequent civil war.
Although we could not control the course of events after we left, our aim as regards
the pledge to be given to the Kabaka and the other Rulers was to ensure their sta-
tus as constitutional rulers insulated from local politics and safe from deposition.
[g] It was possible that the territories of East Africa might ultimately decide to
join in a wider federation, but the time to consider this would be when they were
approaching independence.
Summing up the discussion the Lord Chancellor said, that the Committee was in
general agreement with the proposals put forward by the Colonial Secretary. In view
of the Prime Minister’s particular interest in African affairs however and of the
possible repercussions of developments in Uganda on the position in Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia, it would be desirable for the Colonial Secretary to mention the
proposals at a meeting of the Cabinet as soon as possible after the Prime Minister’s
return to this country, and for the Governor’s statement in the Legislative Council to
be deferred meanwhile.3
2 See document no 146, n 2, below.
3 At a Cabinet meeting on 18 Feb 1960 there was reaffirmed general agreement with the proposals for
constitutional advance, ‘which would be slower than in Tanganyika but faster than that now proposed for
Kenya’. Despite some misgivings, it was agreed on balance to be sympathetic to the principle of universal
adult franchise (CAB 128/34, CC 10(60)5).
122 CO 822/2263, nos 147 & 151 11–26 July 1960
[Current political problems in Uganda]: CO minutes by J W Stacpoole,
F D Webber, W B L Monson and Lord Perth
We now know that the Buganda Government will not co-operate in the election, and
that the negotiations between them and the Governor over the Buganda constitution
have broken down. The Governor said long ago that if the Buganda Government
would not co-operate, the election would be run by Protectorate Government staff.
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The practicability of this will now be tested: registration is to begin in Buganda on
1st August.
Merely to put our heads down and bash on with the election regardless seems to
promise nothing but disaster. At the best, a successful election held despite the
Rulers’ opposition might discredit them (but that is surely unlikely). Otherwise, an
election which was successfully boycotted in Buganda would do none of the things
we hope for from it; and at the worst the attempt to organise an election in face of
opposition could lead to serious disorders and humiliating withdrawals. There could
be few worse times for such a crisis, against the background of the Congo and
coinciding with Nigeria’s independence celebrations. In fact, [part] of Mr. Kintu’s
statement1 is a clear threat to boycott nominations, and the Buganda are experienced
in boycotts. The most likely sequel to an unsuccessful election is a period in which
the present political situation continued and worsened, and an atmosphere in which
the Relationships Commission2 could not work successfully; in short a complete
collapse of our whole policy.
I feel that the only hope of averting this is a direct intervention by the S. of S. with
the Rulers. The Governor has tried very hard with them but he has failed. [A letter]
suggests that the Rulers believe that they can drive a bargain with the S. of S., and
does not close the door on the meeting with him which they originally proposed. I
think there is room for negotiation with them. They want, in effect, federation before
an election is held. We want the election to be held without prejudice to the
federation issue. There is not much between us.
I submit a draft reply following so far as possible the Governor’s suggestions in his
covering savingram but also designed to keep the door ajar; and a draft covering
letter to the Governor, sounding him on the prospects of engineering a meeting
between the S. of S. and the Rulers either before or during his visit in September. I
am sure that the S. of S. would agree to this if he felt that it had a real chance of
success.
J.W.S.
11.7.60
Please see Mr. Stacpoole’s minute above. We must deal with three main issues which
are all linked:—
(a) How to get Buganda to take part in the elections (149).
(b) The reply to be made to the Rulers (142).
(c) The terms of reference of the Relationships Commission. . . .
3. It seems that Buganda Ministers have agreed to reserve their position over the
elections against the possibility that they will get some assurances in advance which
will enable them to take part. Their letter to the Governor shows that they want
either a declaration now that Uganda should have a federal form of government or
“successful” conclusion of the present talks; and they have been told that neither of
these conditions can be met.
4. We are, therefore, left with the problem of how to get the Buganda
Government to co-operate in the elections, bearing in mind that they have
1 Mikaeri Kintu, the Protestant katikiro (chief minister) of Buganda.
2 Lord Munster, formerly under-secretary of state at CO, 1954–1957; chairman of Uganda Relationships
Commission, to consider relations  between the kingdoms and the central government.
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successfully resisted every persuasion and pressure to get them to send
representatives to the present Legislative Council and that they are determined that
Uganda should be committed to a federal form of government before they offer any
kind of co-operation. The task looks pretty impossible to me and we should not build
up any hopes that we shall succeed. The Governor’s solution is in effect that the
terms of reference of the Relationships Commission should be used as the medium
for persuading Buganda that their position for the future is not being prejudiced
because of the fairly imminent implementation of the 1961 constitution. . . . [T]he
Governor expresses the view that the terms of reference must include a pretty
pointed reference to the Buganda Agreements.
5. It seems to me that there is a lot of misunderstanding in Buganda minds,
though I suspect that it is more deliberate than genuine. I doubt myself whether the
Governor can effectively take matters much further with them and I think that the
situation now calls for a personal intervention by the Secretary of State designed to
spell out as clearly as possible how he sees the future taking shape. The best way
would be by having the sort of discussions we had last month with the representative
members. But they may be difficult to arrange in the near future and in any event the
Buganda representatives at any rate would probably go on prevaricating before
saying definitely whether or not they will come to London. In these circumstances
we might I think start off with a written message to the Kabaka and get the
Governor’s reactions on this idea. . . .
6. Much of our problem is bedevilled by the continued harping on such
meaningless words as “federal” or “unitary”. I think we have got to get over the fact
that whatever is devised for Uganda there will be a central government of some sort
and that government will be developed as closely as possible on Westminster lines.
The essential question will, therefore, be how much rope the local governments will
have. The next point is that we have got to be clear in our own minds about what we
have meant by resolving to preserve the dignity and prestige of the Rulers. Although
the Commission would doubtless tackle the question with an open mind, it is already
implicit in the assurance we have given that Buganda and the other Agreement
States are, so far as H.M. Government is concerned, going to enjoy a special position.
But I think we are going to have the greatest difficulty in getting the willing
acquiescence of the politicians in terms of reference which include this theme. If we
go further, . . . the chances of getting “agreed” terms of reference are slight indeed. I
agree, therefore, with Mr. Stacpoole that we must do what we can to avoid an issue
over the terms of reference themselves and let the real contest take place when we
have the Commission’s recommendations.
7. For my own part I have always envisaged that Buganda and the other States
would remain in Agreement relationship with the central government so long as
H.M. Government was in control. If the Buganda Government honour the
Agreement (and even the present Agreement gives them a great deal of autonomy)
they would stand a far greater chance of this special relationship surviving after
independence. Furthermore, it ought to be obvious that their attempt to insulate
themselves from developments at the centre is a political dead-end for Uganda, and
that they will be wiser to devote their energies to ensuring that they gain as much
influence as possible in the central government. . . .
F.D.W.
15.7.60
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Please see (149) and (150) opposite, in which the Governor reports on his efforts to
stop the Kabaka’s Government “sabotaging” the holding of elections under the new
Uganda constitution to the Protectorate legislation. He is trying to persuade them to
withdraw their opposition and, among other things, asks the S. of S. to be ready to
receive a delegation in the near future. The date-line for all this is the 22nd August
when registration is due to begin in the rural parts of Buganda so that a delegation
would, I fear, have to be fitted onto the end of the Nyasaland talks or follow directly
on them.
2. Mr. Webber’s draft sets all this in the context of the other Uganda “negotiations”
in which the Governor and the Secretary of State have been involved—with the Leg.
Co. delegations and with the Rulers—and rightly concluded that the Buganda “crisis”
could not be dealt with ad hoc. I agree with the general outlines of Mr. Webber’s review
and in fact would have expected the Governor to have done this sort of thing for us.
But I doubt if we should write to the Governor just as Mr. Webber proposes. He may
feel that we are trying to do his job for him (certainly, as I have said, I think he should
have done it) and he has of late shown himself hyper-sensitive over comments from
here. I have therefore recast Mr. Webber’s draft in a form more directly related to the
Governor’s savingram and transferred the bulk of Mr. Webber’s comments on the
importance of the representative members (which the Governor seems to play down
too much) to a separate letter from myself. But I would like to stress my indebtedness
to Mr. Webber’s draft.
3. Even so, the reply is too long to be telegraphed, even despite the shortage of
time, but as we and the Governor are in some danger of growing apart on these
issues, it is worth while dealing with the matter at some length. We should warn the
Governor by telegram of the mail on which the savingram leaves and of its sub-
stance.
W.B.L.M.
18.7.60
Secretary of State
This is all very difficult and I fear I haven’t had time fully to study the papers.
Generally I think the line proposed is right as we do not want elections which fail
and at the same time we must not give way to the Rulers.
Two thoughts occur to me:—
(a) A special message to the Kabaka alone does play up his importance. What
about the other Rulers? In fact would it be wiser to include most of the draft letter
to the Kabaka in a letter to the Omugabe as Chairman of the Rulers’ Meeting and
send copies to the others including the Kabaka.
(b) As time is very short, with August 22nd as the day for registration and you
yourself not being in Uganda until mid-September, I suppose I might help by
seeing a delegation here at the beginning of August, if they wanted to come.
P.
19.7.60
Last Wednesday we sent off to the Governor of Uganda a number of communications
(summarised in the Telegram at 157) suggesting that instead of pursuing a number
of separate negotiations locally, he should seek to bring about a direct meeting
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between the Secretary of State and the Rulers. We envisaged that this meeting would
lead to an understanding (parallel to the understanding already arrived at with the
“politicians”) about the next stages in constitutional advance in Uganda. The
immediate problem was, and still is, what answer should be given to the open threat
by the Buganda Government to sabotage the elections to be held next February. A
crucial date is 22nd August when registration is due to begin in Buganda. . . .
4. Whilst we were still considering how to reply to all this, a further telegram
(No. 492) at 161 opposite arrived. This reports that the Kabaka has written to the
Secretary of State asking that the Constitutional Committee discussions should be
transferred to London. The Kabaka’s letter should arrive here tomorrow. The
Governor asks for authority to refuse this request, not obviously in answer to the
letter itself but in discussion with the Kabaka’s Ministers; at the same time, he would
inform them that the Secretary of State would be willing to receive them early in
August. He also foresees that the Kabaka may himself wish to come to London and
suggests that this should be encouraged.
5. There remain, therefore, very few points of difference between the Governor
and ourselves. The main ones are:—
(a) that he still seems to see a possibility of disposing of Buganda’s opposition to
the elections by satisfying them over the terms of reference of the Relationships
Commission;
(b) that he wishes to continue the Buganda Constitutional discussions locally; and
(c) that he still thinks that the Kabaka’s Ministers might be invited rather than
the Rulers.
6. The new factor is the personal intervention of the Kabaka. It is very hard to
tell how for the intransigent attitude of his Ministers has his support. The Governor
is no longer sure that the Kabaka will not be willing to come to London. . . . I feel that
given a little more time the Governor might have developed rather further the line
he has taken in 161. Even though time is short, it seems imprudent to turn down the
main request in the Kabaka’s letter before we have even seen it. It may well be that
we shall have to turn it down in the end but it seems a pity to break off at once this
correspondence which we ourselves wanted to open.
7. I suggest, therefore, that you might like to send a short holding telegram on
the lines of the draft attached and that we should then wait until we have the
Kabaka’s letter before considering further what the next step shall be.
J.W.S.
26.7.60
123 FO 371/146498, no 20 16 Dec 1960–12 Jan 1961
[East African defence and a federation]: minutes by Mr Macleod to
Mr Watkinson (MoD)
Your minute of the 6th December.
2. I agree that the K.A.N.U. policy statement on this matter (the relevant extract
from which is attached)1 is disquieting and that we must consider its implications for
1 Not printed.
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the security of tenure of our bases in Kenya. It is however difficult to make a valid
assessment now. In a recent telegram the Governor says that it is impossible to
forecast how K.A.N.U. will look at this question if and when they achieve power as
much depends on personalities, the extent to which other demands are met and
other imponderables.
3. As you know, the East African Governors will be discussing defence matters
with the Chiefs of Staff during the informal conference I am having with them next
month.2 I hope that that Conference will enable us (against the background of
defence and other considerations) to clear our minds on the right way to move
politically in the foreseeable future. One matter which will be very prominent in our
discussions will be the attitude we shall take on the question of an East African
Federation. My own tentative view is that if things went reasonably well over the next
year or so there might be a strong chance of bringing a federation into being say by
late 1962 or early 1963. The constituent units in the federation would be self-
governing, but independence for the federation as such might be deferred for 2 years
or thereabouts.
4. These are very tentative views, but if we can achieve the creation of a
federation on the lines I have described it seems possible that a Federal Government,
which would no doubt be responsible for defence, might take a less extreme attitude
than K.A.N.U. now does. Even so it would be asking a great deal of them to expect
them to agree to the stationing of U.K. forces in East Africa unless those forces were
committed in part if not in whole to the defence of the federation. We must also
expect any Federal Government to be reluctant to allow the use of facilities in the
federation for the conduct of “Colonial” operations. In short, therefore, I would
expect even a Federal Government to drive a hard but not necessarily unacceptable
bargain with us.
5. If a federation cannot be achieved and we have instead an independent Kenya
with which to treat, it is not impossible that they will recognise a number of strong
reasons for seeking a close understanding on defence matters with us. Much will
turn on the general political climate in Africa (more so than if we have a Federation
to deal with), but there should be scope for arrangements which maintained some,
though not all, of the facilities we now enjoy. We cannot however expect facilities for
“Colonial” operations and it must be doubtful whether we could station troops for
use in the Gulf in an independent Kenya.
6. Whichever way the constitutional development of Kenya proceeds therefore I
can see little prospect of our retaining the right to station troops in Kenya primarily
for U.K. purposes. We may at best secure arrangements on the Malayan lines.
Meanwhile I believe that we should be able to count on the use of our existing
facilities3 until the end of 1965.
7. I know that you cannot wait long for a more definite assessment, and I must
emphasise that even in January we shall be working to some extent in the dark
inasmuch as we shall still be uncertain of the political situation emerging in Kenya
after their elections in the spring. In view of what I have said above, I would hope
that it could be possible to defer a final decision over further commitments for new
works services until say the early summer. If, however, this is difficult from your
2 See document no 65 above. 3 At Mackinnon Road Base, some 60 miles by rail from Mombasa.
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point of view perhaps we could discuss. What I am particularly anxious to avoid is
that overt action should be taken in the immediate future which would indicate that
we were on the run. This would be yet one more very serious knock to confidence.
On the other hand, I am not suggesting that we should openly take the
uncompromising line that whatever Mr. Mboya says we intend to hang on to the base.
This would make the position much more difficult than it now is. I only hope that we
can find some way of walking the tight rope which will give us the best chance, when
we have the elections over and new African Ministers in positions of responsibility, of
negotiating something satisfactory to ourselves and East Africa.
I.M.
16.12.60
Thank you for your minute of the 23rd December about our security of tenure in
Kenya.
2. I have now discussed this question with the East African Governors. The
Governor of Kenya cannot at the moment say with any certainty whether KADU or
KANU will emerge as the majority African party at the next elections. KADU have
refrained from making any pronouncement about the future of the British bases in
Kenya and there is no reason to believe that they would necessarily wish to demand
the withdrawal of U.K. forces in terms similar to these used by KANU. Nevertheless
their present attitude is one of suspicion and distrust, as they undoubtedly still fear
that U.K. troops are in Kenya for the purpose of repressing them should the occasion
arise. If KANU is successful in the elections, the Governor believes that there is every
chance of their being brought to see in time the advantages to Kenya of having
British troops stationed there; but he emphasised that in view of their election
pledges it would be imprudent immediately to raise the question with KANU
Ministers. He also thinks that they may come to appreciate the importance of the
military assistance which they can obtain from the United Kingdom and that they
may find substantial reasons for quietly dropping their present demand for the
liquidation of the base. Similarly the Governor considers that KADU’s present
distrust can be overcome and that they too could be brought to the same attitude.
The Governor therefore believes that there is a reasonable chance that we should be
able to remain in Kenya perhaps indefinitely although we might well have to accept
some restrictions on our freedom of action after Kenya achieves her independence.
3. We were agreed at the Governors’ Conference4 that the aim of policy should be
the establishment of an East African Federation, if this could be done without
prejudicing the establishment of stable Government. The Governors all agreed that if
we have to deal with a Federal Government on the subject of defence such a
government would be far less likely to take an extreme view and that there was every
chance that we could reach an acceptable settlement with it.
4. The Governors emphasised that it was fundamental to the success of their
endeavours that African Ministers should not be rushed. They must first be educated
in the realities of government and be brought to understand the many difficulties
and problems facing them. When that point is reached they would then be more
likely to appreciate the force of the considerations which should lead them to accept
arrangements for close co-operation with the U.K. in matters of defence.
4 See next document.
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5. The foregoing consideration is of particular importance in the context of the
works programme. The Governor of Kenya has emphasised strongly to me that any
falling off in the volume of work would immediately be interpreted as a sign that
H.M.G. were thinking of pulling out and that this would strike a severe blow at
confidence in Kenya as well as aggravating the serious unemployment problem
which already exists. We cannot afford further damage to confidence in Kenya. Loss
of such confidence in the last year has already led to embarrassingly large outflows of
capital which have been barely staunched and the effect on Government revenue has
been such that we have had to agree in principle to aid the Kenya budget to the
extent necessary to avoid cuts in essential social services which would otherwise have
been inevitable in view of the prospective revenue deficit of about £3 million on the
current year. Increase in unemployment would of course add to the problem of
maintaining law and order, which is so important in the present state of affairs in
Kenya. For all these reasons the Governor therefore urged that we should continue
to maintain the works programme at its present level. I fully support this view and
very much hope you will feel able to meet me on it.
6. The Governor thought it might be possible to discuss with the new
government of Kenya some time in the latter half of this year the question of the
future development programme for our facilities, but he recommended that we
should not raise it in the first few months of the new administration. This of course
could only be decided in the light of events but I shall certainly keep the question
under review. . . .
I.M.
12.1.61
124 PREM 11/4083, EAC(61)1 5 Jan 1961
East African Conference of Governors meeting: review of objectives
and political development in East African territories.  Annex:
summary of governors’ statements [Extract]
[This conference was attended by Sir P Renison (Kenya), Sir R Turnbull (Tanganyika), Sir
F Crawford (Uganda), Sir G Mooring (Zanzibar), E B David (KBE, 1961; administrator of
the East Africa High Commission, 1959–1962), and CO officials.]
The Secretary of State, opening the Conference, said that it was one of a series held
from time to time and would be conducted informally. It had been hoped that
consideration of the Raisman Report1 would be virtually complete before the
discussions took place, but this had not proved possible. In any case, many things
had happened in East Africa on a much wider range of subjects on which it was
important to take counsel together. Since last year constitutional developments in
Tanganyika and the African pressure for Federation had broadened the scope of the
Conference. It was important to form a common view on what Her Majesty’s
Government’s attitude towards a possible federation of the East African territories
1 Sir J Raisman, chairman of Lloyds Bank, formerly finance member, government of India, 1939–1945;
chairman of fiscal commission for Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1952, for Nigeria, 1957–1958,
and East Africa, 1960–1961.
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should be before the conference to be held in Dar-es-Salaam in March. The Secretary
of State thought it essential that the initiative for a federation should come from East
Africa. If possible, he would like to see Her Majesty’s Government asked to help in
making plans for a federation in East Africa. He would welcome views on the
likelihood of this.
An immense number of changes had taken place since the last Conference, two
years ago, and the views and conclusions at the 1959 Conference had been rapidly
overtaken by events. Important landmarks since then had been the setting up of the
Raisman Commission, Tanganyika’s rapid constitutional advance, the Lancaster
House Conference on Kenya, the Conference on the Public Service, the White Paper
on the Overseas Service Aid Scheme,2 the appointment of the Flemming
Commission3 and the constitutional changes in Uganda and Zanzibar.
The Secretary of State thought that the discussion should begin with a “second
reading debate” in which Governors would give their views on likely political
developments in the immediate future in their territories. They would have to make
a number of assumptions. The most important matter of all was how long we were
likely to remain responsible for East Africa. If it was possible to achieve a common
mind about this it would govern all other considerations. Her Majesty’s
Government’s responsibility in East Africa was not merely for defence and security;
above all things, Her Majesty’s Government had to discharge its responsibility to all
the peoples of the East African territories. We should be faced with a dilemma,
namely, what should be done if for various reasons it proved impossible to remain for
very long in any territory, but there was still much to be done if one was to feel
confident about the state of affairs one left behind. The position of the public service
would be particularly important. If, with the publication of the Flemming
Commission’s recommendations and clarification of the scope of the Overseas
Service aid scheme, we could turn the attitude of the service towards staying on in
East Africa, this would simplify the other problems. It was important, therefore, to
achieve clear thinking about the objectives.
. . . Sir Patrick Renison: how long [had we] in Kenya [?]. His answer was that we
needed as long as we could possibly get and that the idea of Federation gave us
perhaps a little longer breathing space than would progress towards individual
territorial independence. In Kenya he wanted to move at the pace at which Africans
could solve the problems facing them. Moral and treaty obligations made the
problems far more difficult. He believed that the new Government would work with
us on these problems if they were sure that we were going to help them to achieve
their own objectives of a surely-based independence. The problems were the Masai,
the coastal strip and Mombasa, security of land tenure, restoration of economic
confidence, the land claims of minority tribes, the position of Her Majesty’s
Government’s military bases, the Somalis, the future of the Overseas Civil Service
and localisation and the future of the East Africa High Commission and the
possibility of Federation. It was clear that Kenya was not nearly ready yet for full
independence. The Kenya time table might have to be modified if the opportunity to
set up a Federation was to be grasped at the psychological moment.
Nyerere had talked to him as if a Chief Minister in Kenya and he could get together
and work out the problems quite simply on their own; he did not appear to realize
2 See document no 346 in Part II. 3 On civil service salaries for East Africa. 
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 403
404 AFRICA [124]
that it would in fact be a major operation to plan and develop the structure of
Federation.
Turning again to Kenya he said that he did not believe that the local African
leaders wanted disturbances, bloodshed and a new Emergency situation. There was
an extremist group of whom Oginga Odinga was the prime example who wanted
African domination at any cost, if necessary at the cost of economic chaos, the
driving out of all Europeans and the collapse of the structure of a modern state. The
more powerful and more moderate group, among whom he would include Mboya,
wanted to run their own country but wanted to run it as a modern state complete
with its developed economic structure. The problem was to build up these moderate
leaders and help them to get these ideas across. He mentioned that he was far more
depressed by the apparent depression in this country about East Africa than he was
about the East African situation itself. . . .
The Secretary of State said that he very much agreed about the need for a strong
central federal government in any federation which might be set up. This had been
one of the difficulties in The West Indies. It was suggested that, if the federal
government were strong, local politicians would gravitate towards it especially if they
saw the important economic consequences for their territories of the successful
operation of federal services. There would be considerable attraction in appearing as
East African representatives on the world stage rather than as representatives of their
own countries alone. It was also suggested that there was more hope in East Africa
for federation which, unlike the West Indies, had at least some common institutions
to start with. The experience of Nigeria showed that it would be important to have
direct elections to the Centre and that there must be important jobs to do there. If
these two points were covered there should not be great difficulty in attracting able
politicians to the centre. It was pointed out, however, that it would probably be
difficult to find enough good men to cover both federal and territorial posts. It
seemed likely that Nyerere would be keen to go into a federal government. He
obviously had the idea of federation very much in mind and he was probably sincere
about it.
It also seemed that Nyerere’s leadership was accepted for the moment by
politicians in Kenya as a whole in the matter of Federation but it was possible that
the elections were diverting their attention from the wider issues which would
eventually lead to rivalries.
The Secretary of State said that this appeared to be a suitable moment to draw
together preliminary thoughts on the future political timetable. This might be
summed up by saying that we wanted to go “as slow as we dare” but that the possible
prize of Federation might make us willing to go faster. There seemed to be no
problem of timing in Zanzibar and the problem in Tanganyika was only one in
relation to the other territories; but there were real problems in both Kenya and
Uganda. The view of Sir Frederick Crawford was that we should aim at a final date of
1964 in Uganda and that there was risk in telescoping development, but it depended
on the outcome of the conference in this summer of 1961. In Kenya we might
perhaps be thinking also of 1964 as a possible Final date.
In the ensuing discussion the following points were made. In Kenya there were
special reasons for avoiding undue haste. If there could be a cushioning period of
internal self-government in all territories before the Federation became independent
this might give us more leeway. Federation appeared to be our major objective with
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separate independence a pis-aller if we could not obtain that goal. Federation would
not only be a goal in itself but might help to hold the position at full internal self-
government which in Kenya, for example, would give us more time to discharge our
moral obligations before our responsibility there ceased. Nyerere wished to be able to
talk federation to equals in Kenya and Uganda. It was possible that there might be an
opportunity to have a Chief Minister in Uganda after the elections and this indeed
might help in managing the Baganda. However, if it was not possible to have a Chief
Minister in either Kenya or Uganda it might be that Nyerere would be willing to talk
to Ministers whose voices combined would be held fairly to represent African
opinion. The task in 1961 was to discover the African viewpoint in all the territories.
If H.M.G. took the initiative it might well stampede them into an anti-Federation
attitude. The sooner an agreed African view was secured the better: it must be from
them that the request for the necessary steps prior to Federation must come.
Sir Hilton Poynton suggested that the Conference might think in terms of the
following procedure. First, a request from Tanganyika after the March conference
asking H.M.G. to get into touch with other East African Governments (and
Opposition parties) to sound out opinion on the issue of Federation. The second
stage would be the collection of African views and the third stage a Working Party, if
possible set up at the request of the African politicians, which would lead to the
fourth stage of a full-scale conference to examine the whole problem.
It was agreed that a paper should be prepared outlining the position reached so far
in the discussions on federation.4
Annex to 124
. . . 2. Sir Patrick Renison–Kenya
(a) Forthcoming general election
(i) results to be announced on 27th February.
(ii) Probable result:
10 European seats: Cavendish-Bentinck Coalition Party and Blundell’s New
Kenya Party about equal with Coalition Party probably having greater support.
33 African seats: Kenya African National Union seem to be leading in 18 and
Kenya African Democratic Union in 13. (2 are Somali seats in the North—
uncertain whether voters would go to the polls).
(b) Internal discussion in K.A.N.U. might lead to split after elections with
consequent gains by K.A.D.U. K.A.N.U. majority would be better as K.A.D.U.
Ministers would be second rate. If parties were about equal, coalition might have to
be considered but would be very difficult to work.
(c) African politicians seemed anxious to avoid violence.
(d) The new Government would work with us on the many outstanding problems
if they thought we would help them to achieve soundly based independence.
(e) The idea of Federation might perhaps give us some much needed breathing
space in Kenya though African leaders did not seem to understand what it would
involve. Europeans and Asians seemed keen on the idea.
4 Macmillan minuted on this report, which was 14pp long (foolscap, single-spaced): ‘I have glanced
through this: but it is very long & hard to read. . . . At first sight, no-one seems to worry very much about
the Europeans. H.M. 5.1.61’. He asked T J Bligh for a summary (which follows as the annex).
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(f) A satisfactory public service must be maintained.
(g) If the idea of Federation should be accepted at the Dar-es-Salaam conference
in March with a consequent demand for the early appointment of Chief Ministers in
Kenya and Uganda, it might be possible to appoint one in Kenya by the end of the
year (or possibly even by August if necessary) if the right man could be found.
(h) Kenyatta was the main problem. K.A.N.U. had said they would not accept
ministries unless he were released. K.A.D.U. had not gone as far as this. K.A.N.U.
might not carry out their threats for fear K.A.D.U. would form a Government but
they might find they had built up such pressures that they could not come into the
Government. A K.A.D.U./European coalition would not last.
(i) There was no need for extra troops in Kenya, but any necessary action would
have to be swift.
3. Sir Richard Turnbull–Tanganyika.
(a) The Conference in Dar-es-Salaam in March could be followed by self-
government in mid-May.
(b) Administrative staffing was one of the big problems in Tanganyika. European
District Commissioners would have to be replaced by Africans—they were doing
this. Displaced Europeans would be employed on other work.
(c) About 40% of the expatriates (mainly the best officers) would probably stay
after independence.
(d) The immediate problem therefore was Africanisation and recruitment. An
African Government would want to get technical staff from other than British
sources—except police and educational staff.
(e) The present Government was generally doing well: if no progress could be
made towards federation it would have to press for independence in 1961: this would
have to be conceded by June 1962 at the latest. It would be important to have a
Conference on federation before the end of 1961.
4. Sir Frederick Crawford–Uganda
(a) There was no prospect of a predominant African party in Uganda which was
bedevilled by the problem of the four kingdoms, especially Buganda. The main
problem was to sort out internal relations in order to produce a constitutional
pattern for the future.
(b) The report of the Relationships Commission was an essential prelude to such a
plan and would not be available until the middle of the year. Meanwhile attempts
were being made to get more Africans into the Government and the Civil Service.
(c) After the February elections there would be an African majority in Legislative
Council and an unofficial majority (probably African) in Executive Council. The
Democratic Party and the Uganda People’s Congress were running more or less level
with the Democratic Party perhaps a little ahead. There were difficult tribal
differences to be resolved.
(d) The programme seemed to be:
(i) constitutional conference mid-1961;
(ii) preparatory work until late 1962 followed by new elections;
(iii) in 1964, final negotiations for independence.
(e) A firm timetable might help remove uncertainty in Uganda which was
affecting morale.
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(f) It was possible that a Uganda representative could attend discussions on
federation in the autumn. It would be important to discover African views on the
subject as soon as possible.
(g) Uganda was fortunate in having well organised local government. Many
expatriates would want to stay.
5. Sir George Mooring–Zanzibar.
(a) No one party was expected to gain a majority at the general election on 17th
January. A coalition was probable and the Zanzibar Nationalist Party had the most
likely candidate for Chief Minister.
(b) Zanzibar’s finances were precarious and if help did not come from the U.K. it
would come from the Communists.
(c) Zanzibar political parties were generally either in favour of federation or could
be persuaded to accept it.
(d) In a political vacuum, Zanzibar would move to independence in three to five
years, but it seemed likely that they could fall in with a programme designed for East
Africa generally.
6. Mr. E.B. David–East Africa High Commission
(a) The High Commission had no separate political problems.
(b) A Federation would be a very artificial creation which it would be difficult to
establish. It would have to have a very strong centre. . . .
125 PREM 11/4083, M 15/61 8 Jan 1961
[Cabinet differences on East African policy]: minute by Mr Macmillan
to Lord Kilmuir.  Enclosure: letter from Mr Macleod (6 Jan)
You were probably conscious in the discussion about Africa last week of certain
differences, almost tensions, which may easily build up inside the Cabinet and the
Party. I am sending you a copy of a letter which I have received from Iain Macleod for
your private information. Alec1 has not written to me but he has spoken to me since,
of course from the rather different angle. He is thinking of a much longer period.
Lord Salisbury has written to me a letter about the situation in Kenya actually on the
limited subject of European education, but in fact clearly disturbed. There are
considerable dangers here awaiting us, and I would like to have a talk with you about
the whole situation when you have thought about it. We spoke on the telephone but
this is just to put in on record.
Enclosure to 125
I was a little worried by the reasoning behind what Alec Home said last night in
relation to Kenya. Of course it would be splendid if we could be sure of seven or eight
years there, but I simply don’t believe that this fits in with the facts of life in Africa
1 Lord Home, foreign secretary.
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today. As you know, the neighbouring territories, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar,
are all moving swiftly ahead not as a result of conferences with me—indeed my part,
as you know, has been limited to reducing some of the proposals that were made—
but as a consequence of their own parliamentary proposals which we have approved
in the C.P.C. The Kenya Conference over which I presided deliberately went much
slower than any of these and it was and is my policy that Kenya should move slower
than anywhere else and in fact as slowly as possible. But this doesn’t mean eight
years, and if we tried to achieve this we would in less than a year, because we could
not keep our intentions secret, have a Cyprus on our hands again. I do not see how
we can tell Kenya that because she has 1% of European settlers amongst her
population, and even though her Africans are on the whole abler and better trained
than the other territories in East Africa, she cannot have advance that is at least
comparable with theirs.
As you know, we are holding the East African Governors’ meeting at the present
time and we had decided by agreement to take as our main objective overriding all
others that East Africa should be held as firm and faithful friends of the free world
and should not become sympathetic to the Sino-Russian cause. I quote the
consensus of opinion of all the Governors from an agreed memorandum:—
“. . . there was a greater possibility of securing the objective if we were prepared to move
reasonably quickly with the African tide (while at the same time getting the emergent
Governments to fall in with measures designed essentially and exclusively to keep the
new administrations stable) than if we sought to qualify independence by keeping some
form of British physical presence. Sir Richard Turnbull expressed the matter as follows:—
‘I think I should preface what I have to say in reply to your letter by endorsing the view
expressed by Renison, David and Mooring in their recent letters to you, that to attempt
to retain authority in East Africa by means of continued British administrative or
economic control (however light it might be and however skilfully disguised) would be
an act of great unwisdom.’ ”
David is the Administrator of the High Commission and Mooring the Resident in
Zanzibar. Crawford, who is the Governor of Uganda and whose letter came later,
agrees to the full with this. These five men are all professionals with a lifetime of
service and I am certain that what they say is right.
It isn’t that I don’t share to the full the anxieties that Alec Home gave expression
to. It is simply that I am quite sure that the path on which we have embarked is the
right one. It isn’t enough to say that it is full of danger. Of course it is. But so is every
other path in colonial affairs, as you well know. All we can do is to try and follow the
road that seems the safest in front of us. I have felt for some time that many of the
Party and some of my colleagues were looking for ways that provided us with a safe
colonial policy. I wish there was such a thing; but I am sure there isn’t.
126 PREM 11/4083, PM(61)7 10 Jan 1961
[East African Conference of Governors]: minute by Mr Macleod to Mr
Macmillan.  Enclosure: ‘Summary of principal conclusions’ (EAC(61)18)
The East African Governors’ Conference has concluded. It was an exceptionally
useful one and all the Governors were satisfied that we now have a clear line of policy
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in East Africa to pursue. The best summary of it is in the attached paper. Much of
course depends on the conference at Dar es Salaam and whether we can persuade
Nyerere, the Chief Minister of Tanganyika, to accept this line. He will be in London
on the 23rd of this month and I am seeing him. I think it likely that he will be ready
to do this.
2. All the smaller problems that we looked at, whether it was of the coastal strip
or the future of the Somalis, and many other points, seemed to us all to be much
easier to solve in a federal framework. In particular, both the European political
parties in Kenya put support for federation into their manifestoes [sic] and the
Governor of Kenya tells me that it would be very much welcomed by the business
community. Nevertheless it remains of great importance that we are not seen to take
any initiative in this matter. To do so would arouse all the old fears which did so
much to bedevil Central African federation. It is our hope that we can make this
appear throughout to be an African initiative. . . .
Enclosure to 126
I. Political and constitutional
1. The establishment of an East African Federation should be the aim of policy,
but this must not prejudice the possibility of establishing stable government and
particularly in Kenya of solving special problems.
2. No initiative should be seen to be taken by Her Majesty’s Government.
3. The constitutional conference in Tanganyika in March, should, if possible,
result in the following:—
(i) the implementation (by mid-May, 1961) of internal self-government for
Tanganyika, (namely no official Ministers; no reserved powers in internal matters;
Governor and Deputy Governor to withdraw from the Council of Ministers at that
date; Public Service Commission to become executive on 1st August, 1961);
(ii) an approach by the Chief Minister of Tanganyika to other political leaders in
East Africa, resulting in a request to Her Majesty’s Government to convene before
the end of 1961 a conference of all concerned in East Africa (including Zanzibar)
to discuss the possibility of establishing a Federation. . . . It would be important to
involve as many political leaders and leaders of special groups as possible;
(iii) in the event of (ii) the March conference would not fix a date for
independence for Tanganyika.
(N.B. The United Nations would have to be got to accept this procedure.)
4. The Federation Conference, if it can be convened and if it is successful, should
if possible avoid setting a target date for Federation but should set the date for the
completion of the preparatory work. If, however, it is necessary to set a date for
Federation political considerations at the time will affect it; the choice lies between,
for example, 21st December, 1962 and 1st July, 1963. The Federation would initially
be dependent and it would be made clear that from the date of its institution
Tanganyika would have “regional independence”.
5. There should be no fundamental changes, other than the introduction of
Parliamentary Secretaries, for the present in the executive organisation of the East
Africa High Commission, but the Central Legislative Assembly should be
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reconstituted by April, 1961 on the lines proposed by the High Commission at their
last meeting, subject to the retention of the seven ex officio members.
II. Defence and internal security
1. The base in Kenya should be maintained and the works building programme
should be continued as planned. In future, the term “facilities” should be used rather
than “base”.
2. If possible, the retention of such continuing facilities as are required should
be negotiated at independence, including the right to move forces across the
territories by land, and to overfly and stage.
3. The present arrangements in respect of The King’s African Rifles should be
maintained. On the attainment of full internal self-government by Tanganyika
responsibility for the operational control of the Tanganyika battalions for defence
should remain with the East Africa Defence Committee, and responsibility for the
operational control of units of the K.A.R. made available by the East Africa Defence
Committee for internal security in Tanganyika should rest with the Governor of
Tanganyika in his discretion. The constitutional implications of this should be
discussed further with the Governor.
4. If a Federation is established, the principles governing the deployment of the
armed forces of the Federation in defence and internal security roles should be as
follows:—
The normal deployment of the armed forces of the Federation should be the
responsibility of the Federal Government. For the purposes of the defence of the
Federation the Federal Government should be free to change that deployment. At the
same time the Federal Government must keep in close touch with territorial
governments about their likely requirements for assistance from the Federal armed
forces in internal security operations. The movement of Federal armed forces for
internal security purposes should only take place at the request of the responsible
territorial authority concerned, i.e. the Governor in his discretion before and during full
internal self-government. Forces thus made available by the Federal Government
should operate in support of and under the general directions of the territorial authority
concerned in accordance with a directive previously agreed between the Federal
Government and that authority.
III. Public Service
1. Every attempt must be made to ensure that a higher proportion of the Public
Service should be prepared to stay on than at present appear to be contemplating
doing so, particularly in Tanganyika. During the next two or three months the tide of
opinion must be turned. Her Majesty’s Government has done much already to
achieve this and will consider any further recommendations by Governors. But the
main attack on this problem must now be made in East Africa.
2. Their financial position is unlikely to allow East African Governments to meet
their full share of the bill for compensation schemes.
Particular issues arising on the Public Service in the individual territories and
East Africa High Commission are covered in the Minutes.
IV. The Raisman Report
1. The Report is a “package deal” and every effort must be made to persuade East
African Governments to accept it as such.
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2. It should be sent to Governments under cover of a purely formal despatch
accompanied by a Secret and Personal letter giving arguments to be used in
persuading Councils of Ministers and legislatures to accept it.
3. The Report should be published simultaneously in the United Kingdom and
the East African territories at the beginning of February. There should be no press
conferences but the Press should be briefed similarly in all territories prior to
publication on the basis of the background briefing referred to in paragraph 2.
4. The timing of territorial debates presents a problem. If the Report is debated
by the present legislature in Uganda this should if possible be in such terms that the
attitude of the new legislature towards it is not prejudiced.
5. The aim should be to implement the Report on the 1st July, 1961, and the
necessary preparatory steps, including legal drafting, should be in hand as soon as
possible.
V. Special minority problems
(a) Mombasa and the Coastal Strip
1. It was agreed that the best solution for Mombasa and the Coastal Strip would
be for Mombasa to become a Federal port (though not necessarily the Federal
Capital) and that the problem of making the Coastal Strip Federal territory should be
further examined.
2. The British Resident would advise, after the new Government had been
established in Zanzibar, whether the Secretary of State should make an approach to
the Sultan during his visit at the end of March.
(b) The Somali problem
1. After the establishment of the new Government in Kenya the Governor
should seek the views of African Ministers on the problem and should arrange for
them to visit the area to show them that it was likely to remain a financial liabil-
ity and that the Somalis would not accept administration by African District
Officers.
2. African Ministers might then be ready to subscribe to an authoritative
undertaking that the area should continue to be administered by British Officers,
and, as the only practicable means of avoiding a movement for secession which no
Kenya Government after independence could resist with its own military forces, to
promise that administration by British Officers should continue after independence.
The alternative policy of establishing the Somali area of Kenya as a separate entity
under direct British Colonial administration after Kenya’s independence was unlikely
to be acceptable to world opinion.
3. It was recognised that the situation in the area as independence approached
might be such as to necessitate invoking the good offices of the United Nations to
reconcile the conflicting claims of Kenya, the Somalis, Somalia and Ethiopia.
4. For the present, the Governor should continue to take the line that there was
no question of separating the area from Kenya and that the position would be
carefully considered before independence.
(c) The Masai
1. It was accepted that whatever the formal legal position might be it was
essential that Her Majesty’s Government, which recognised the special position of
the Masai, should continue to work for a new agreement between Her Majesty’s
Government and the successor authority.
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(d) General conclusion
1. If a Federation Conference were held in December, 1961, papers should be
prepared for discussion on the general problem of minority groups and nomadic
pastoral tribes in order to draw the attention of the African leaders to this subject.
127 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)7 11 Apr 1961
[Personal impressions of East Africa and Aden after a visit]:
memorandum by Mr Macleod for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
I am circulating for the information of the C.P.C. some personal impressions and
notes on my visit to East Africa and Aden during the Easter recess.
I. Tanganyika
2. On the face of it everything seemed to go extremely smoothly, but in fact we
had a good deal of hard, although very friendly, bargaining behind the scenes. In
the end I am very satisfied with the result, particularly with the agreement which
we have that we will make as few changes as possible in the relationship with the
East Africa High Commission. This is of the first importance to the other territories
and of course keeps all the doors open to Federation. There is a really remarkable
spirit of friendship and goodwill and progress in Tanganyika, but there is one anxi-
ety which bulks large in my mind and that is the complete absence of any form of
opposition to the ruling party, who control every seat except one in the House. The
present leaders, particularly Julius Nyerere, are of very high calibre and I do not
doubt that their intentions are wholly admirable. But such a monolithic state of
affairs is not very satisfactory. The influences that are strongest, apart from the
British connection, seem to me those of India and Ghana and in both these cases
one party has an overwhelming influence. Nationalism may well grow in
Tanganyika, although certainly Nyerere himself is much more of the pattern of a
Nehru than a Nkrumah.
II. Zanzibar
3. There were abortive recent elections in Zanzibar which finished in a dead heat
between the two parties, the Afro-Shirazis and the Arab Nationalists. A caretaker
coalition Government is working reasonably well, but there is to be another general
election on the 1st June and this time the number of seats is to be made odd instead
of even. Assuming this produces a result, we ought to have a government and its
head will be a Chief Minister. There is something to be said for and something to be
said against each of the parties. The Afro-Shirazis, who represent both the Africans
and the original inhabitants of the island, are likely to win in the end because they
represent greater potential voting power. On the other hand, the calibre of their
leaders is very weak and they are not much disposed towards the Sultan. They are,
however, more attached to the British connection and more dependent on us. The
Arab Nationalist Party is largely thought of as the Sultan’s party. Its men are much
abler and they are better organised; but it is to some extent under the influence of
Cairo and there has even been some Communist penetration, although the British
Resident does not think this has gone very deep. On balance I would prefer to see the
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Afro-Shirazis win and it is Sir George Mooring’s view that this is the most likely
outcome.
4. I stopped off in Kenya for an hour or two to meet in particular the leaders of
the African parties who pressed on me the necessity for Kenyatta’s release. All
arguments of political expediency point to his release, but for myself I am sure that
we cannot yet contemplate it. After all, the logical consequence of the decision we
took as a Cabinet not to release him at the time of the election is that we would not
release him now in response to clamour. KANU, the slightly stronger party and much
the more militant, wants him released and made Chief Minister. This of course is
unthinkable. The prospects of KADU co-operation are rather more hopeful and I have
been seeing Mr. Ngala,1 their leader, in London. They did surprisingly well in the
general election and with European and Asian support, which they would get, a good
government could certainly be formed and I am sure that confidence would return to
Kenya.
5. It is worth noticing that European feeling about Kenyatta’s release is much
stronger in Britain than in fact it is in Kenya, where the Sunday Post, which is the
mouthpiece of extreme settler opinion, was the first newspaper to call for his release.
Nevertheless I do not believe that we should bow to expediency and I will of course
bring to the C.P.C. and Cabinet any major issue affecting Kenyatta which is raised.
For the moment the Governor is concentrating on trying to find a formula which
will leave his hands free in terms of his broadcast but yet will enable Mr. Ngala to
whip his party in opposition to the inevitable motion for Kenyatta’s release which
KANU would move at an early meeting of the Legislative Council. Obviously this is a
very difficult formula to find.
III. Aden
6. I had a short but absorbing visit to the Colony and the Protectorates. Here our
overriding interest is to preserve our strategic position for as long as possible and to
this end to adjust our political thoughts and actions. Nevertheless this is a very
difficult exercise to carry out because Aden is a very politically conscious place. The
Governor, Sir Charles Johnston, and the C.-in-C., Middle East have together evolved
a plan for doing this which I will not go into in detail in this paper because I intend to
put a separate paper to the C.P.C. probably in about three weeks’ time when both Sir
Charles and the C.-in-C. will be in this country and could if wished attend our
meeting.2 All I will say is that my visit convinced me that their plan is the best one,
although it is full of complications and indeed dangers.
7. It is worth adding that the T.U.C. movement, which had done so much to
bedevil Aden over the last few years, seems completely out of the picture at present
and there was a total lack of response to their call to demonstrate against my visit.
Indeed I did not see a single hostile placard or hear a single cry raised while I was
there. This is a result of the order forbidding strikes without previous recourse to
conciliation or arbitration machinery which we introduced in the summer of last
year.
1 R G Ngala, who became minister of state for constitutional affairs and administration after
independence.
2 See document no 200 below.
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128 PREM 11/4083, PM(61)60 28 June 1961
[East African policy]: minute by Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan
Two matters of the first importance have happened in relation to East Africa in the
last day or two. Both may have profound consequences for the future and they may
represent something of a break in the clouds that have been surrounding Kenya in
particular.
First of all, the talks in relation to the High Commission which became necessary
because of Tanganyika’s coming independence have gone exceptionally well, as you
may have seen from the press, and there was a remarkable spirit of friendliness
amongst both Government and opposition from all three mainland territories. More
significant still, there was a real desire to move towards East African federation, and
all the various arrangements that we made about the future of what is at present the
East Africa High Commission were planned deliberately by the conference to leave
the door open for federation. As you know, it is the considered view of all the
Governors in East Africa and of myself that virtually all the problems of East Africa
will be easier to solve in the context of federation and it was encouraging to see this
advance.
Secondly, for the first time both African parties in Kenya have shown a willingness
to come together and a willingness to discuss matters relating to land and security of
title. Naturally they put forward the usual demands in relation to Kenyatta, but his
shadow seems to be growing a little smaller on the Kenya scene. If we can now get
talks that may lead to agreement on the sanctity of land title it will be an immense
advance and a real relaxation of tension both in Kenya and in the House of
Commons. Lord Delamere, who is President of the K.N.F.U., is welcoming this new
approach in a statement that he is issuing today and the people like Anthony Hurd
and Patrick Wall1 to whom I have spoken in the House were also very pleased with
this news and are writing to The Times to say that they hope this is the beginning of
a better atmosphere in Kenya. It is at least encouraging that we have been able under
the umbrella of the East African talks to have these Kenya discussions and they seem
to bear some promise for the future. . . .2
1 Sir Anthony Hurd, MP (Con) for Newbury, chairman of the Conservative Agriculture & Food Cmtee,
H of C, since 1951, and the first MP to visit the Falkland Islands (1956); P H B Wall, MP (Con)
Haltemprice, E Yorks, parliamentary private secretary to Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food,
1956–1957, chairman of the Conservative East and Central Africa Cmtee, 1956–1959.
2 Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘This is certainly encouraging. H.M. 29.6.61’.
129 CO822/2327, no 15 25 July 1961
[Zanzibar constitutional development]: memorandum by Mr Macleod
for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee (CPC(61)27)
[In 1960, following outline proposals by Macleod (Mar 1960) and the recommendations of
a report by Sir H Blood (June 1960), who had been appointed constitutional
commissioner, a degree of responsible government was granted. Elected ministers, one of
whom was chief minister, formed the majority in Executive Co, and in the Leg Co there
was a large elected majority. In 1962 universal adult suffrage was introduced. Internal
self-government was started in June 1963.]
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I circulate for information a report on my discussions with Sir George Mooring, the
British Resident of Zanzibar, about recent developments in the Protectorate, and
especially the emergency situation which started with the riots of the 1st June.
2. A Commission of Inquiry is being set up to look into the causes and
development of the disorders and the steps taken to deal with them. The Lord
Chancellor has agreed to release Sir Stafford Foster Sutton from his duties as
President of the Pensions Appeals Tribunals for this task. I expect the Commission to
begin work in mid-September (an earlier start is not possible because of the necessity
to dispose of criminal cases before the Commission begins to hear evidence) and the
report should be available before the end of the year.
3. It would be premature to attempt a full assessment of the political forces at work
in Zanzibar until the Commission of Inquiry has reported and there has been a longer
period of adjustment after the disorders. But it seems clear that the riots were a symp-
tom of the struggle between extreme elements of the two main political parties, the
Arab dominated Nationalist Party and the African dominated Afro-Shirazi Party. The
left-wing Arabs look for support mainly to Cairo and even to Peking and Moscow; the
more extreme Africans fear and are implacably opposed to a foreign policy orientated
in these directions and to undiluted Arab rule, and see their future in some form of
alliance with the mainland African territories. This accounts for their close relations
with the Tanganyika African National Union, which can exercise considerable influ-
ence on them. How far these extreme wings represent the main body of opinion in
their parties is uncertain. The Nationalist Party relies greatly on its pro-Communist
Secretary-General for political inspiration but there are signs of disagreement between
him and the relatively moderate Arab leaders who have become members of the
Government.
4. Meanwhile the situation is quiet but potentially dangerous and the two
opposing factions are kept apart only by the presence of additional security forces in
the form of a battalion of King’s African Rifles from Tanganyika. It may be necessary
to replace this force by British troops later in the year. Special measures are in hand
to strengthen the police force.
5. Political opinion in the Protectorate is at present confused. Out of a
population of some 300,000 there are about 40,000 Arabs and possibly double that
number of Africans who have recent or fairly recent connections with the mainland.
In between these two racial groups is a substantial but undefined section of the
population, who think of themselves primarily as Zanzibar citizens and as subjects of
the Sultan, to whom they are in the main loyal, rather than as having any particular
loyalties outside Zanzibar; these are somewhat loosely termed Shirazis. Political
power lies in the votes of the Shirazis, and the Nationalist Party has shown
considerable political skill in securing a substantial switch of support from the Afro-
Shirazi Party, which swept the board in the 1957 elections, to the Nationalist Party,
the June elections resulting as follows:—
Zanzibar Nationalist Party 10 seats
Zanzibar and Pemba People’s Party 3 seats
so, coalition of above 13 seats
Afro-Shirazi Party 10 seats
A Government has been formed with Mohamed Shamte, a Shirazi and member of
the Z.P.P.P., as Chief Minister; the other four Ministers are Arabs and members of the
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Z.N.P. The elections took place on a wide franchise and the British Resident does not
think that universal adult suffrage, which might well be introduced before the next
elections, would be unlikely to cause any substantial change in the situation.
6. The disorders have brought normal political life in Zanzibar to a standstill and
the situation is worsened by the refusal of the Opposition to take their seats in the
Legislature and co-operate with the Government. This attitude may have a serious
effect on the security situation in the immediate future and the first task is to
persuade the Opposition to seek a solution of their political problems by
constitutional means.
7. The long-term task in Zanzibar is to secure the establishment of a stable
Government capable of maintaining law and order and also one that would seek to
maintain a satisfactory and appropriate relationship with the other East African
territories. At first sight an African Government might appear to suit us better since
there would then be little difficulty about Zanzibar joining up either with an East
African Federation or with Tanganyika. But the Africans in Zanzibar have shown
themselves to be inept and inexperienced politically and the British Resident thinks
that if they could form a Government they would be constantly impeded by the
predominantly Arab Civil Service. Furthermore the more extreme Africans are
opposed to the Sultan and this might give rise to a difficult position involving H.M.G.
in view of our Treaty obligation to protect and secure the throne of the Sultan and his
successors in the dynasty. On the other hand the Arabs are more intelligent and
energetic; many of them hold senior posts in the Administration and it is difficult to
envisage a successful Government in Zanzibar without them. Perhaps the most
hopeful aspect of the situation is that to remain in power the Arabs will probably
have to rely on a substantial body of relatively moderate Shirazi opinion; it is
encouraging that there are no Arab extremists in the Government and that the Arabs
have voluntarily accepted a Shirazi as Chief Minister.
8. Providing the situation remains stable in the meantime, I hope to convene a
Constitutional Conference in February or March, 1962, in London, to which all
political parties and the Sultan would be invited. The intention to hold this
Conference may be an important factor in securing the return of the Opposition to
the Legislature and I will be considering with the British Resident how best to
proceed on this. Subject to the outcome of such a conference, I do not envisage that
Zanzibar should proceed to independence without first having another General
Election, possibly on a wider franchise; nor that a date for independence could be
either much before or much after Kenya’s independence.
9. Although it would be premature and undesirable to make any public reference
to such a possibility at the present stage, the future of Zanzibar may be one of those
problems for which a solution can be more easily found in the wider context of an
East African Federation. Many of the Arab leaders must realise that a completely
independent Zanzibar is scarcely viable, while the Africans might find less difficulty
in reconciling themselves to local Arab dominance if they knew that, through
participation in such a Federation, they had the protection and support of their
kinsmen on the mainland. The delegates at the recent talks on the future of the East
African High Commission Services agreed that, if the Government of Zanzibar
wished to participate fully in the new Common Services Organisation, their
Governments would be pleased to consider, in consultation with the Government of
Zanzibar, the basis on which such participation might be arranged.
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130 CO 822/2327, nos 159 & 164 22 Aug–13 Sept 1961
[Zanzibar’s demand for independence]: CO minutes by B E Rolfe,
W B L Monson, and Sir H Poynton
. . . 2. Before considering the actual correspondence from Zanzibar it might be as
well to set down the basic requirements from H.M.G’s point of view which should be
met before Zanzibar can become independent. These requirements would seem to
be:—
(1) A policy directed towards closer association with the mainland territories;
(2) A stable security situation, i.e. H.M.G. would have to be satisfied that law and
order was being and could be maintained after independence (or at least for a
reasonable period after);
(3) There would be a settlement which would enable H.M.G. honourably to
discharge its obligations under the 1890 and 1895 Agreements with the Sultan.
3. The position on (1) above seems to be reasonably encouraging since the
Zanzibar Government have indicated their intention of joining the Common Services
Organisation and Paragraph 4 of 158 shows that Ministers would be prepared to
enter into an East African Federation. The missing piece is the failure so far of the
A.S.P.1 to attend meetings of the legislature and co-operate in other ways in the
Government of the country.
4. The Security position is still obviously confused and uncertain; but although
racial animosities and tensions are likely to remain, a political solution satisfactory
to the A.S.P. (the missing piece in (1) above) would go a long way to stabilizing the
situation. It would seem undeniable that time is needed to enable passions to die
down and the riots of 1st June to become fainter in the public memory. The problem
of reinforcement in the event of serious disorders after independence will be a
difficult one unless Zanzibar joins with the mainland territories in a Federation.
5. The future of the dynasty, and the two agreements—see (3) above—will
depend very much on the political future of the Protectorate. It would seem to be a
secondary although important matter and one that can only be settled when
decisions about the political future have been taken—presumably at the
Constitutional Conference early next year.
6. To turn now to further consideration of constitutional matters, at present
there is a simple majority of elected members in the Executive Council and a
substantial majority of elected members in the Legislative Council. To take the
Legislature first, very few changes would be necessary in the Constitution of the
Council if it were desired to press on with a transfer of power to local ministers; the
number of elected seats would probably remain roughly the same and there might
not be any great advantage in widening the franchise which according to advice we
have received probably enfranchises more than 80% of those who would be eligible
for the vote under universal adult suffrage. It would certainly be possible to
introduce internal self Government on the basis of the existing legislature.
7. The present situation is therefore, that the stage of political advance now
reached in Zanzibar can in theory be equated with responsible government; in
1 Afro-Shirazi Party.
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practice because of the immaturity and inexperience of the recently appointed
ministers and the tense political situation which has made it difficult for the
Government to get down to ordinary ministerial routine, it cannot be said at the
moment that responsible government actually exists. Conditions in Zanzibar are very
far removed, for example, from those in Tanganyika after the elections a year ago. In
these circumstances it is ridiculous to talk of independence in 1961 and this is not a
request which should be taken seriously but rather a move in the political game. All
the same it is odd that the paper circulated by the Civil Secretary to the Executive
Council seems to accept what is implied in the demand, i.e. that Zanzibar can
proceed direct from its present condition to full independence.
8. However, the pattern of constitutional development from now on may well be
rather different in Zanzibar from that in colonial territories which have reached
independence and it might be as well at this point to examine the implications of the
introduction of full internal self-government.
9. At this stage not only do the ex-officio members withdraw from Executive
Council (paragraph (2a) of the Ex.Co. note) but, far more important, the British
Resident ceases to preside over the council. In Zanzibar the Sultan is the sole
legislative authority and in carrying out this function he normally takes the advice of
the Executive Council and the Legislature; nevertheless under Section 76 of the
Council’s Decree his power to make laws without consultation or advice is preserved.
The constitutional basis upon which the British Resident exercises his influence
derives from his presiding over Executive Council and if he were to withdraw from
the Council his power to affect policy and to intervene in internal matters would be
removed and his functions would become purely advisory in this range of matters. As
H.M.G’s representative he would still retain a formal right to advise on foreign affairs
in accordance with the terms of the 1890 Agreement. He would retain none of the
other last resort powers normally available to a governor at this stage of
constitutional advance. In other words the British Resident, and therefore H.M.G.,
would at the stage of full internal self-government lose their power to intervene in
the internal affairs of Zanzibar. The consequences of this would probably not be very
serious except for the effect on the expatriate Civil Service for which it would
obviously have important implications. . . .
B.E.R.
22.8.61
The questions raised by this despatch are being “processed” in the Department. . . . In
the meantime Ministers should know that Sir George Mooring has proposed that our
target in Zanzibar should be full independence by the end of 1962 and in any case not
later than the date of Kenya’s independence, and to this end a constitutional
conference should be held by the Secretary of State early in the new year.
Sir George Mooring was very unhappy about the prospects of what he called
“scuttle” when he was over here a few months ago, but he has evidently now come
round to the view that plans for an early withdrawal of British influence in Zanzibar
is the lesser risk out of a series of risks which are very great indeed. He is probably
right in recommending that Zanzibar should get its independence at much the same
time as Kenya, if only because with Kenya gone our capacity to keep two battalions in
reserve for Zanzibar’s internal security needs goes too. I am not sure that it is even a
safe assumption that we will be able to keep, or wish to keep, troops in Kenya during
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the penultimate stage of its development towards independence, but this is
something which we shall have to consider in the Kenya context.
In any event, the route to independence in Zanzibar will, because of the peculiarly
informal basis on which our influence in the Island rests, have to be pursued through
a different route than that followed elsewhere—see paragraph 15 of the despatch.
I am sending a copy of this minute to Mr. Morgan, and asking him to bear in mind
during his further examination of the question:
(i) that because of the coastal strip complication we shall probably be having a
meeting with Kenya and Zanzibar Ministers in early December at the latest, and
may be pressed then to express a view on the independence situation. We should
not forget that since the coastal strip issue has been brought to a head by Kenya’s
progress towards independence, Zanzibari pride is not going to let Zanzibar
Ministers sit down silent about their own progress when an issue arising from
Kenya’s is on the agenda.
(ii) Sir Andrew [sic; Alexander] Clutterbuck at an informal discussion with Sir
Hilton Poynton recently asked that we should somehow steer Zanzibar’s progress
to independence so that the road ahead lay clear to Federation, and that there
would be no question of a country of 300,000 inhabitants being a candidate for full
Commonwealth membership.
W.B.L.M.
11.9.61
. . . I think Sir G. Mooring is right in reaching the conclusion that the independence
of Zanzibar must be closely synchronised with that of Kenya but I am not entirely
convinced at present that the date of Zanzibar’s independence must be “in any case
not later than the date of Kenya’s independence”. The date of announcing a date for
independence may turn out in political terms to be just as important as an actual
date of independence which could perhaps be a little later, though not much later,
than Kenya.
I would agree with what Sir G. Mooring says in paragraph 12 that a continuation of
British control will not solve the fundamental problem of Zanzibar, i.e. the racial and
political conflict between Arabs and Africans. I am not sure however that I entirely
agree with him when he says that it would in fact defer a solution of the problem and
that the only hope for a solution is for the two groups to be forced by circumstances
to work out a means of living together. If that means that we should just pack up and
go leaving them to make the best of a bad job then I think there is a real danger that
Zanzibar would degenerate into civil war after independence; that the Arab element
would invoke (or receive unsolicited) help from the U.A.R. while the Africans would
seek help from Tanganyika with the possible result that an international tension
might be created between East Africa and the Middle East. In other words I am sure
that during the remaining period of British control we must do everything we can to
provide a basis on which the two groups can live harmoniously together; that
presumably would be one of the main purposes of the constitutional conference
which Sir G. Mooring suggests should be held at the earliest possible convenient date
in the new year. (Incidentally, the department should keep in touch with the Legal
Division about the timing of any such conference.)
This brings me to what Sir G. Mooring describes as “the second vital factor”
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namely “no effort should be spared in trying to weld Zanzibar into an East African
regional organisation and Federation”. Here I agree with Sir G. Mooring in general
and as regards the regional organisation the first steps are already in hand. . . . It is
difficult to see how the timing of this will work out but I am not sure that I would go
quite so far as Sir G. Mooring when he says in paragraph 12 of the despatch:—“If the
rest of East Africa forms a bloc before Zanzibar can join the difficulty of getting
reasonable terms for Zanzibar may be increased, and the danger of Zanzibar being
drawn off into some sort of Pan-Arab association may be increased”. I should have
thought that what was wanted to aim at here was to get recognition from the
mainland Governments (analogous to the procedure adopted in respect of the
Common Services Organisation) that if Zanzibar wishes to join an East African
Federation they will be welcome as a Unit territory in the Federation on the same
constitutional level as the three mainland territories. This is in effect what Nigeria
said they would be prepared to do for the Southern Cameroons if the Southern
Cameroons voted in favour of joining Nigeria. If that is recognised from a fairly early
stage in the proceedings and Zanzibar is given the opportunity of being associated
with any discussions about the establishment of the Federation I should not have
thought that it was of crucial importance whether Zanzibar joined as a foundation
member or acceded rather later on; but these are all points to be considered when we
know a little bit more clearly how the major question of East African Federation is
going to develop.2
A.H.P.
13.9.61
2 The S of S minuted: ‘Very interesting. I agree entirely with Sir H. Poynton’s minute’ [nd].
131 CO 822/2328, nos 213, 215 & 218 15 Dec 1961–13 Feb 1962
[Zanzibar’s demand for independence]: CO minutes by J C Morgan,
W B L Monson, Sir H Poynton, Mr Fraser, Lord Perth, F D Webber,
and Sir J Martin
We spent most of yesterday in discussing with Sir George Mooring the main lines of
future Zanzibar policy. . . .
3. Sir George Mooring’s dominating theory is that further constitutional
advancement can only be given to Zanzibar if there is a coalition of the two main
Parties, and without an election before Independence. He has tried to persuade the
Parties to come to the Conference in a coalition, but because of the activities of the
left-wing of the A.S.P., this seems unlikely to occur. I will not attempt here to set
down all Sir George’s reasons for pinning his faith to the coalition, but they are based
primarily on the fact that Zanzibar is divided almost equally between the two Parties,
both in an electoral and a population sense, and that even if the franchise is altered,
that that situation will persist; and this is coupled with the fact that the division is
not on a political but a racial-cum-social basis, something which cannot be changed
for perhaps decades. His reason for saying that there must not be an election before
Independence is that he could not guarantee at any time that such an election could
be held without risk of bloodshed, or at any rate the need for substantial
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reinforcements. Further, even if such an election were held, he holds that the
situation would still not be altered and the Parties would still be approximately
equally represented in the Legislative Council.
4. Sir George therefore recommends that the line to be taken at the Conference
by the S. of S. is to say that he will only set a date both for “internal self-government”
and for Independence on condition that a coalition of the Parties comes into
existence and persists, without any election, throughout the whole period up to
Independence. In the Department, we could readily accept that the existence of a
coalition might be made the condition of a date to be given for the beginning of
“internal self-government”; but we have had some doubts as to whether the
imposition of such a condition would make it possible also to set a date at the time of
the Conference for Independence. This is a very difficult question, but we have to
bear in mind that it may be equally difficult, with or without the condition, not to set
a date for Zanzibar’s independence, when progress on the mainland is so rapid. It is
clear that Sir George himself wants the S. of S., on those conditions only, to set dates
both for internal self-government and Independence.
5. Sir George and we recognise that there is a great risk in the course which he is
proposing, which is that, after the coalition has come into being, one or other of the
Parties (most likely at present the A.S.P.) will decide to break it up and try to force an
election before the date of Independence arrives. It would have been made clear that
in that situation the promise of an Independence date was no longer valid;
nevertheless HMG would then find itself in the position of having to maintain order
in Zanzibar through a longish period, involving a garrison, possibly even up to June
1964 when, unless the present Decree is amended, there must be an election in any
case. If therefore the course recommended by Sir George is to be adopted, we shall
have to get the assent of the defence authorities to accept the risks involved in the
consequences of the failure of the “gamble” to get Zanzibar into independence with a
coalition. On the other hand, Sir George thinks, and we agree, that it is not a feasible
alternative to give independence to Zanzibar on the basis either of the present ZNP
Government or, if circumstances should alter, so that the ASP were an equally
narrowly based Government, an ASP Government. If Sir George Mooring’s
arguments are finally accepted, we shall of course try to set out this argument in a
way which disposes in turn of the various alternatives.
6. On the above assumptions, we considered the date. We still think that the date
is related to the date of Kenya’s independence. We had thought that there might be rea-
sons to make the date two or three months after Kenya’s independence. We now think
however that there would be greater advantage if the date could be set two or three
months before Kenya’s independence—this would mean that if things then went wrong
we should still be physically in a position to intervene rapidly to maintain order. But it
is not essential to twist the policy to gain the advantage, and by and large it would be
acceptable if the date of Zanzibar’s independence were the same as that of Kenya.
7. But in relation to the date, there is one important consideration, which is that
we must achieve a period of minimum of six months from the introduction of an
executive Public Service Commission to independence, so that all entitled officers
may be able to work out their period of six months notice before independence if they
wish to do so. The reason for this is that all those officers know very well the basic
fact that (unlike Tanganyika) the removal of actual British physical control from
Zanzibar is likely to be the signal for disturbances and bloodshed.
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8. On the question of the Sultan, Sir George now appreciates that the 1890
Agreement stands or falls as a whole. Both Parties in Zanzibar profess loyalty to the
Sultan. It is therefore thought that it will be best if the Sultan can agree to remain in
Zanzibar after independence as a constitutional monarch, that position being
entrenched in the Constitution. He should however be afforded the opportunity of
declining this honour. In other words, if he does not trust the situation and the
entrenchment, he must be pensioned off by HMG. But rather than offering
immediately to pension him off, it may be politically far preferable to tell him that he
should continue to serve as a constitutional monarch on the basis of an undertaking
by HMG to provide him with a pension if at some future date he is forced to abdicate.
There may be difficulties about the acceptance of such a contingent liability, but we
shall examine this further.
9. As to the form of internal self-government, we feel that we have now overcome
most of the difficulties, and Sir George has accepted the view of the Department that
any “normal” changes can be made in the present Council’s Decree, so long as we
retain in the Decree certain provisions which maintain for the British Resident in his
discretion a veto power in respect of certain legislation, and in particular in respect
of external affairs, defence, and the use and operational control of the police; also the
legislative framework of the Public Service. We shall be working this out in greater
detail, but I may remark that this solution is very much on the lines of one which you
recently suggested on the papers. . . .
P.S. I should have mentioned that we don’t now think that there is a possibility of
steering Zanzibar into Independence with East African Federation at the same time,
unless we are prepared to ‘sit on bayonets’ for a considerable time while the
movement for Federation develops, if ever it does!
J.C.M.
15.12.61
Sir Hilton Poynton
You minuted on the subject of Zanzibar’s independence on the 13th September1 and
may therefore be interested to see the note opposite in which Mr. Morgan has
recorded the course of the latest discussions which we have had with Sir George
Mooring during his present leave in this country. Sir George Mooring has moved, I
think, somewhat closer to the view you expressed in the penultimate paragraph of
that minute. In particular, he no longer feels that we must willy-nilly get out of
Zanzibar when we leave Kenya which was the basis of his earlier advice and he is
seeking authority to tell the politicians in Zanzibar that they will not get
independence unless they form a coalition and that there will be no further election
before independence. (As the note explains, the latter point reverses the provisional
decision of the last Secretary of State).
The Department support Sir George Mooring but with respect I myself think the
authority for which he asks goes too far. By all means let him continue to press the
two parties to form a coalition, and by all means let him make it clear to them that if
a coalition is formed the prospects of a successful outcome for Zanzibar at next
March’s Constitutional Conference are going to be much brighter. But in the last
1 See previous document.
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resort one cannot force the political parties to be moderate if they are not going to be
moderate and a straight statement of “no coalition, no independence” may in effect
be counter-productive.
In short, I think Ministers should reserve until much nearer the Conference—
possibly during the Conference itself—the decision whether they should insist on a
coalition as a prerequisite of independence.
As regards the elections, if we get a coalition I agree that there is a very strong case
for going forward to independence without holding further elections; if we don’t
again I think Ministers would be well advised to reserve their position for the
meantime.
If this view is accepted by Ministers, the note will require revision accordingly
before circulation to other Departments.
As regards other Departments, two points arise:
(i) Commonwealth membership for Zanzibar. The Department suggest that we
should tell the C.R.O. that, if they could devise a second-class Commonwealth status,
we would not object to it being applied to Zanzibar. I understand the reasons for, and
sympathise with the feeling behind, this view—but Zanzibar opinion is very touchy
on being treated as second-class as compared with its mainland neighbours. The
Zanzibaris in fact regard themselves as being superior characters to the mainlanders
who for so long were, in their eyes, infidel slaves and barbarians. A refusal by the
Commonwealth to give them the same sort of status as Tanganyika therefore would
lead to resentment and might very well, particularly if an Arab Government was in
power, make them turn completely over to the Egyptians. In my view, therefore, we
should let the C.R.O. know this point on the other side of the ledger and leave them
to strike the balance as to how British interests would best be served as far as
Zanzibar membership of the Commonwealth is concerned. Mr. Pritchard2 in Dar-es-
Salaam is anxious to visit Zanzibar and they might very well consider asking him to
take a formal discussion on the spot and make his recommendations to them before
they reach a final decision.
(ii) Defence. As far as this is concerned, we should work on the basis of providing
Ministers with advice as to what military assistance from our own resources would be
required to keep us in Zanzibar after we can no longer draw on the troops stationed
in Kenya. I am somewhat frightened to see that Sir George Mooring considers a
brigade would be the size of garrison needed to keep the peace during an election,
but I suppose this is the major commitment we should have.
Our enquiries, on the basis that one is planning for the worst, ought to be on the
assumption that we will not be able to draw on British troops in Kenya. It is true that
the Secretary of State wishes to discuss with the Minister of Defence the preservation
of some sort of British military presence in Kenya after independence. If this were
achieved, it would facilitate our ability to hold on in Zanzibar but we would not know
until after the Kenya Constitutional Conference at the earliest, and more probably
not until after elections have been held in Kenya in say the autumn of this year,
whether there is a hope of our keeping a military presence in the country. My reason
for reaching this conclusion is that it would only be with the Government which
2 N Pritchard, high commissioner, Tanganiyka, since 9 Dec 1961.
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would carry Kenya into independence that we could negotiate an effective settlement
of this kind.
W.B.L.M.
10.1.62
Minister of State
I find myself very much in agreement with Mr. Monson on this. . . . In general as I
think you know my instinct with all these constitutional conferences is that it is a
mistake for the Colonial Office to show its hand too early in the proceedings. If one
does, one finds oneself defending a Colonial Office thesis against all comers and any
changes which are made are interpreted as concessions wrested from H.M.G. If on
the other hand the Colonial Office sits back and listens until the Conference, as is
usually the case, shows signs of getting thoroughly snarled up because the local
politicians cannot agree with each other then there is a much better chance in my
opinion of the Secretary of State being able to get agreement to a ruling by himself as
a deus ex machina and with less flavour of an imposed result. On the other hand
unless we have some fairly clear idea at the back of our own minds before the
Conference opens it may be very basic [sic; drastic?] in what I imagine may be a fairly
short conference to go to the Colonial Policy Committee or Cabinet in the middle of
the Conference. This is much easier with a long drawn out conference where a day or
two’s delay in the middle does not matter quite so much.
It is taken for granted in these memoranda and minutes that we shall have to
agree that independence is the ultimate answer and I think that it is right. I do not,
for example, think that it would be practical politics to make the independence of
Zanzibar conditional upon Zanzibar becoming a state in an East African Federation.
In other words I think we are committed to agreeing in principle that Zanzibar can
become independent on its own. This brings me on to the point about
Commonwealth Membership. In considering this I think we have first to recognise
that if Zanzibar becomes an independent nation on its own it will be eligible for
membership of the United Nations. Its small population will be no bar here since
there are already one or two members of the United Nations with populations even
smaller than Zanzibar. Iceland is one. Political immaturity or lack of economic
viability would certainly be no bar to membership in an assembly which has a
preponderant Afro-Asian vote. It is this fact which to my mind makes the question of
Commonwealth membership even more difficult than it otherwise would be.
Hitherto all departments and the other Commonwealth countries have been opposed
to anything like second class membership—this was brought out very clearly in the
report of the group of Commonwealth officials which met at Chequers in July 1960.
Recently Sir Norman Brook has asked the United Kingdom Departments concerned
to review the Chequers report and there is a Working Party which is studying this
question.3 I am not sure offhand how far it has got and I am not delaying the papers
for research though I am trying to find out separately. So far the only alternative
which anyone has been able to think of (apart from halting the smaller territories at
some status short of independence, like Singapore) is something on the lines of what
New Zealand and Western Samoa have agreed upon, namely that Western Samoa was
3 See document nos 534 and 544 in Pt II.
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made independent but then voluntarily asked New Zealand to look after its external
relations and defence in return for which Western Samoa, I understand, is not
applying for United Nations or Commonwealth membership. I am extremely
doubtful however, whether such an arrangement would be negotiable with Zanzibar
even as a temporary measure pending ultimate absorption into an independent East
African Federation which would be a full member of the Commonwealth. We shall
have to go into this more closely with the Commonwealth Relations Office between
now and the opening of the Zanzibar Conference.
On defence I have no comments on Mr. Monson’s minute.
A.H.P.
11.1.62
I am not happy about the Zanzibar Paper. Concentrated and distilled the formula
seems to look something like this:
(i) Elections = bloodshed.
(ii) If these cannot be avoided by a coalition—no independence; but
(iii) No independence = bloodshed.
Could we discuss?
H.F.
18.1.62
The more I read the intelligence reports the more I am struck with the constant
reiteration of the theme of growing Communist influence.
If it is right and the Communists have decided to make a real set for Zanzibar with
the thought that if they can win this small country (and because it is small it should
not prove too difficult or expensive to do this), it would of course provide an
admirable base from which to operate in Eastern Africa, all up and down the coast in
fact.
I think we perhaps should have an urgent security appreciation of the risk of it
going Communist and then consider whether we ourselves can face this or whether
we should not be tough and hang on to Zanzibar, cost what it may. Our excuse of
course would be the racial troubles and how we are not prepared finally to withdraw
until we are much more certain that the country will stay quiet after independence.
The trouble with all of this is of course that we would have perhaps to keep a large
force there. In one way this would not be a bad thing as it would be relatively easy to
move from there to East Africa. However I imagine climate and accommodation are
both against stationing troops for any time.
Generally if we are thinking of hardening in any part of Africa as regards our
policy, isn’t Zanzibar, which is small, the place to do it?
P.
25.1.62
. . . 2. On purely Kenya grounds, E.A.D. “A” take the view that Zanzibar’s indepen-
dence should not come before Kenya’s; so it follows that if a date for Kenya’s inde-
pendence is not given at the end of the forthcoming conference the same should
apply for Zanzibar. But the issue is not very straightforward. It is conceivable that
at the Kenya Conference the Secretary of State might have to take the line that
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he cannot name a date for independence now, but he agrees that elections should
be held as soon as practicable and is ready, at a convenient time, after those elec-
tions have been held, to hold discussions with the incoming government at which
he would hope it would be possible to determine a date for independence. If this
line were adopted in these terms also for Zanzibar, we might be in some difficulty
since (subject to any particular Zanzibar complications over franchise, of which I
am not aware) Zanzibar might be able to organise an election some months
sooner than Kenya. In these circumstances—assuming Zanzibar acquiesced in the
Secretary of State’s offer—although the “formulas” adopted for each country at
the forthcoming conferences were in line, it might be difficult to hold Zanzibar’s
independence until Kenya’s. If this proved to be the case and if for purely
Zanzibar reasons an earlier date had to be set, this would be bound to react on
Kenya, however readily at the conference they had accepted the Secretary of
State’s delaying formula.
F.D.W.
8.2.62
I attach opposite the draft of a Cabinet paper for next week’s C.P.C. and which seeks
in particular directions as to whether we are prepared to accept that the better
course is to link Zanzibar independence with Kenya independence in timing
whenever the latter comes. The matter was mentioned in discussion between the
Secretary of State and Lord Perth on the one hand and the British Resident on the
other on the 1st February (see (219), but I am not sure what views the Secretary of
State himself holds. The paper has been drafted, however, on the basis of discussions
in the Africa (Official) Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Trend, which
reached the conclusion that Mr. Macleod’s earlier assessment that Zanzibar would
have to become independent about the same time as Kenya was still sound.
Lord Perth had raised with the Department the question whether we should not
make special arrangements to stay on in Zanzibar to counteract communist ability to
use the island as a base to penetrate the mainland. This was also discussed with Sir
George Mooring, who took the view that it was unlikely the communists would get
control of Zanzibar and that they might, with the opening of Iron Curtain country
Embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, switch the heat off Zanzibar.
We have touched on this aspect of the question in the draft and taken the view that
we cannot, because of the latter consideration, make Zanzibar a bastion against
communist penetration of the mainland. . . .
Mr. Webber raises in his last minute the question as to what we shall do if at the
end of the day the Secretary of State does not name a date for Kenya’s independence
but offers to hold discussions on the question after elections have been organised. I
agree with him that we could not use the same formula for Zanzibar if we were to
take as the governing factor that Zanzibar and Kenya independence should be more
or less simultaneous in time; but if we did decide that this was the right course for
Kenya, it would be perfectly possible so to arrange things in Zanzibar, e.g. by saying
that we wanted experience of a certain length of time of internal self-government so
as to estimate whether communal passions had died down sufficiently, that the two
events could be brought together very closely in time. . . .
W.B.L.M.
8.2.62
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Sir John Martin
I think I ought to put you in the picture as regards Zanzibar. We have submitted to Ministers
the draft opposite which was based on interdepartmental discussion in the Africa (Official)
Committee. That Committee reached the view that it was a practical impossibility for us
to maintain our position in Zanzibar if and when we had left Kenya. As I said in my minute
above, we drafted our submission to Ministers on the basis of these minutes.
Lord Perth’s minute of the 9th February above suggests, however, that we should
make the establishment of a coalition or stable government after elections a prior
condition of our granting independence in Zanzibar and the Secretary of State has
asked us to consider further the reference to stable government—see Private
Secretary’s memorandum of the 12th February opposite.
If Lord Perth’s suggestion is intended to be no more than a bluff which we would
deploy against the Zanzibar politicians in order to force them into coalition or
otherwise keep the peace, I would not object to it. If, however, this is to be H.M.G.’s
firm policy, I cannot advise Ministers that we should pursue it unless we can
persuade the Ministry of Defence to alter their present attitude that they are not
prepared to commit British troops up to the battalion strength required plus the
capital expenditure of their accommodation indefinitely in Zanzibar.
I ought to add that none of us in the Department here have any liking as Colonial
Office officials for the decision that we should get out of Zanzibar willy-nilly. It goes
against all our instincts and training but we have to accept that the ability to
continue our protecting position in Zanzibar depends upon our capacity to exercise
protection and unless we are provided with the tools to do this job in the shape of
guarantee of British troops in sufficient strength, we could not advise our Ministers
that they should commit themselves to staying on in Zanzibar.
W.B.L.M.
13.2.62
Minister of State
Please see Mr Monson’s minute above. In the circumstances I do not think we should
tie our decision in any way to the outcome of the elections and recommend that the
proposals in para 8 of the paper should stand as drafted.
J.M.M.
13.2.62
I agree no change—in fact if there is disorder we couldn’t go anyhow & I’ll make this
point orally!
P.
13.2.62
132 PREM 11/4600 1 Feb 1962
[Zanzibar constitution]: record of a discussion at a meeting between
Mr Maudling and Sir G Mooring (Zanzibar)
The Secretary of State’s brief for this meeting was the paper entitled “Zanzibar
Constitutional Conference.” Lord Perth, Mr. Monson and Mr. Morgan were present at
this meeting.
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2. Sir George Mooring explained that the Zanzibar Government had agreed to
coalition with the Afro/Shirazi Party and had offered coalition, but the Opposition
Party would only agree on condition of the holding of an election in the period of
interval self-government and before independence. This was in fact the only issue
which now divided the Parties (except for a relatively minor difference of opinion as
to whether the minimum age for the franchise should be eighteen (ASP) or twenty-
one (ZNP)). There had already recently been two elections in Zanzibar, which had
produced precisely the same results, a virtual tie. The differences between the parties
were based on social and tribal factors and not on policy. The Shirazis, who
supported the Afro/Shirazi party were those of more recent mainland origin; the true
Zanzibaris of older Island origin tended to follow the Zanzibar Nationalist Party.
Apart from the racial and social differences, the main difference between the Parties
was that one was in and the other out. This situation was unlikely to change. If
elections were held, this would relight the flames of controversy; the country people
would tend to attack the landlords, and there were many old scores to pay off. There
would be bloodshed even if the elections were policed to the nth degree. The British
Resident would wish to avoid new elections if at all possible.
3. The Secretary of State suggested that the answer might be for Zanzibar to
remain dependent for a period. Sir George Mooring said that this would be all right if
H.M.G. were prepared to pay the bill and to provide the necessary troops for a
garrison. He thought one battalion would be required, so long as there was the
possibility of reinforcement from elsewhere. With such a moderate garrison and
some money for development, it would be possible for us to stay in control of
Zanzibar. Some people in Zanzibar were in any case fed-up with the politics, in
particular the Asian community and the traders. These would be relieved if Britain
stayed. The Afro/Shirazis would not oppose our staying with any strength, because
the Africans would like the opportunity to catch up with the Arabs. They would of
course have to make a show of objection. On the other side there would be an outcry
from the Arabs, particularly the young left-wingers, and our continued stay was not
likely to be a happy one. It was also relevant that there was no accommodation for
troops in the Island.
4. In answer to a question from Lord Perth, Sir George Mooring said that he did
not think there was a great chance of the communists imposing control over
Zanzibar during the next five years. There was the possibility that the opening of
Russian and Chinese Embassies in Dar-es-Salaam might take the heat off the
communist effort in Zanzibar. But in certain conditions the Zanzibaris would swing
towards the communists, for example, if they did not get financial assistance from
the West, or if Commonwealth membership was denied to the country on
independence. Generally the conditions for communism did not exist in Zanzibar. It
was true that there was a landlord class, but the workers were also landowning, even
if only as squatters. There was virtually no industry in the islands. Those who had
flirted with communism had done so mainly to get some easy aid in their general
“fight against imperialism”. Young men had found that they could not get
scholarships anywhere else, and had therefore gone beyond the Iron Curtain. The
reason for this was not merely that scholarships in the West were not available, but
very largely that they were not themselves qualified to take them up. So it was the
Zanzibar “rejects” who went to communist countries for training.
5. Sir George Mooring thought that it would be possible to retain control of
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Zanzibar if they were given a reasonable measure of internal self-government; and
the excuse for holding on would be the impossibility of holding elections in present
conditions.
6. In reply to a suggestion from Lord Perth that there would be bloodshed in any
case if the British left, Sir George Mooring again said that coalition was really the
best thing for the Island from every point of view. Many people in Zanzibar agreed
with this view and it was simply opposed by the Afro/Shirazi leaders’ insistence on
elections before independence.
7. The Secretary of State mentioned the possibility of the forthcoming Kenya
Conference breaking down. There was discussion of the possibility of giving Zanzibar
independence even if it had not been given to Kenya. Sir George Mooring pointed out
that it would be difficult to retain control in Zanzibar after Kenya had become
independent, but, from Zanzibar’s point of view, it would not present difficulty if
Zanzibar were independent before Kenya.
8. On the question of the Coastal Strip, Mr. Monson mentioned the manifesto of
the Z.N.P. about the Robertson Report,1 stating that it was worthless; but this had
been largely due to their dislike of the allegation in the Robertson Report that no one
in Zanzibar had paid much attention to the interests of the Sultan’s subjects in the
Coastal Strip.
9. There was a discussion of the difficulty of giving full Commonwealth
membership to Zanzibar. Sir George Mooring stated that his attitude was that it
would be most unfortunate if, in the event of it proving to be necessary to exclude
certain territories from full membership of the Commonwealth, this were linked
directly with an application for membership by Zanzibar. It was a question for the
Arab/Zanzibari leaders of pride and face. The Secretary of State tended to think that
despite the obviously unsatisfactory situation which was building up as to
Commonwealth membership, it would probably prove impossible to deny such
membership to Zanzibar if and when it became independent.
10. Sir George Mooring gave the Secretary of State some account of the
character of the Sultan and the political leaders in Zanzibar, and referred to the
generally cosmopolitan atmosphere of the islands.
1 Sir J Robertson, governor-general of Nigeria, 1955–1960, commissioner to examine the question of the
Kenya Coastal Strip, Oct 1961. See document nos 117, 126 and 130 above.
133 CO 822/2264, nos 265 & 266 2 Feb 1962
[Uganda]: minutes on ‘problems’ with chief minister, Mr Kiwanuka1,
by W B L Monson and Lord Perth to Mr Maudling
At (265) and (266) there are letters from Sir Walter Coutts in which he recounts his
difficulties with his Chief Minister and proposes:
(i) that the constitution for internal self-government should be amended to
retain the ultimate control in the Governor’s hands for the period between the 1st
1 Mr Benedicto K M Kiwanuka, president of the Democratic Party, who became chief minister in 1961,
and first prime minister of self-governing Uganda in Mar 1962, but who lost the election of April 1962 to
Dr (Apollo) Milton Obote (see note 3 below).
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March and the new Government at the end of April when the elections will be over
((265), paragraph 19). (This in effect means no self-government until after the
election, though the Governor would withdraw from the discussions of the
Council of Ministers);
(ii) that the Secretary of State should threaten the Chief Minister with this unless
he modifies his economic policies ((266), last paragraph).
Sir Walter Coutts’ letters should if possible be read in full.
The essence of his complaint is that the Chief Minister is ready to use all the short-
term means available to let him win the election at the cost of:
(a) crippling Uganda financially;
(b) breaking the civil service machine;
(c) undermining the main principles of constitutional government.
Added to that is his apparent determination to break the Kabaka’s Government which
jeopardises our policy for Uganda as determined at the last Conference.
Mr. Webber and Mr. Stacpoole think that the Governor is over-severe. I agree with
Mr. Stacpoole that the Chief Minister was not too well handled by the last Governor2
but I doubt if comparisons with what the Leader of the Opposition might do have any
real significance in the present discussions. The point is that Mr. Obote3 may be as
dictatorial as Mr. Kiwanuka but if he took office after an election and with the
prospect of a long time in office he would probably be more responsible.
I must agree too with the Governor’s view that all these difficulties spring from the
decision to let the Chief Minister become Prime Minister before the elections
(paragraph 17). The anti-British complex may be more recent but its effect on the
expatriate service is just as alarming as the financial danger. I doubt in fact if we will
in the short time left restore Civil Service morale.
Legal advice is that the Governor’s proposal could not be concealed by drafting and
the change in policy would come out into the open.
The East African Department recommend against the Governor’s proposal and
suggest in effect that the Secretary of State should give Mr. Kiwanuka a ticking-off
but “more in sorrow than in anger”.
There are great risks in either course. The Governor’s proposal, while welcome to
Mr. Kiwanuka’s opponents, would give Mr. Kiwanuka a magnificent election platform
(“Vote for Ben, the victim of Imperialist bad faith”); he would take the policies for
which he has been criticized to the electorate and his opponents would probably go
one better (sic). The Department’s proposal may well have no effect, given Mr.
Kiwanuka’s unwillingness to accept advice (paragraph 14 of (265)) and may also
make him take this as his platform.
The matter is complicated by timing. The Order-in-Council will have to be made
between the 22nd and 26th of this month.
Mr. Kiwanuka arrives this week-end to see the Secretary of State on his wages
policy and on finance for the compensation scheme. We shall be advising the
Secretary of State to support the Governor on the wages point and turn down Mr.
Kiwanuka’s proposal: we shall also advise that the Secretary of State should try to get
2 Sir F Crawford retired Oct 1961.
3 Founder of the Uganda People’s Congress (1960). Dr Obote was prime minister of independent Uganda,
1962–1971, and president, 1967–1971 & 1981–1985.
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agreement with Mr. Kiwanuka on a statement that compensation cannot be settled
except in the general financial talks to be held in about three weeks’ time, i.e. about
the same time as the Order-in-Council will be made.
We have one weapon in our hands in finance, if we assume, that is, that Mr.
Kiwanuka as leader of a predominantly Catholic party is not thinking of help from
behind the Iron Curtain and also if it can be assumed that no Western source of help
will finance “unsound” projects. But the extent to which we should rely on this
weapon will not be clear until the financial talks start and that is almost
simultaneously with the date of the Order-in-Council.
So much for the background. I now turn to the tactics for Mr. Kiwanuka’s visit. I
have not had the opportunity to discuss this with the Attorney-General, whose arrival
today with further comments from his Governor has been delayed, but I will of
course report further if he has anything to say which has a bearing on the line I have
taken. Mr. Kiwanuka is being asked to see you at 4.30 on Monday afternoon. It will be
virtually impossible to obtain Treasury concurrence to the line which the Governor
wishes us to take on wages or on the statement we would like to negotiate about
compensation in time for you to be able to give a decision to Mr. Kiwanuka. In the
circumstances we suggest that on Monday you should primarily listen to what Mr.
Kiwanuka has to say to you and promise to give him your answer at a subsequent
meeting on Wednesday. These tactics will make it possible for you on Monday to talk
in rather more general terms and I hope that after after reading the Governor’s letter,
you may feel able to take a fairly robust line with Mr.Kiwanuka in spite of the risks
this may involve. (It is as usual a matter of judgment which risk is the lesser of the
risks that confront us but I think it is worthwhile trying to frighten Mr. Kiwanuka
with the consequences of his conduct on his own position and, subject to whatever
transpires in the talks, that we may find the lesser risk lies in accepting the
Governor’s advice. I should add that on this I differ from the views of the East African
Department as expressed in Mr. Webber’s minute above).
I suggest that opportunity might be taken of Monday’s meeting to remind Mr.
Kiwanuka of the debt which he owes to the Colonial Office and of the way we have
been in the past ready to show confidence in him.
He is in fact only in his present position because we refused to suspend elections to
the Legislative Council in the face of a boycott by the Kabaka’s Government and our
action in doing this plus the numbers of police and troops whom we moved into
Buganda for the election secured him seats in Buganda which gave him a majority in
the Legislature.
We also appointed him Chief Minister in a much shorter time after his party had
won the election than any other political leader in like circumstances in Africa,
including both Mr. Nyerere and Dr. Banda who had overwhelming victories in the
elections, whereas he was returned on a minority vote. Finally, your predecessor
carried through last September’s Conference proposals under which it was planned
that Mr. Kiwanuka should become Prime Minister of an internally self-governing
Uganda at the beginning of next month and in advance of the general election.
You may feel able to express your disappointment, in the light of this past history,
over many of Mr. Kiwanuka’s recent actions, e.g. his action vis-a-vis expatriate civil
servants, especially those described in paragraph 8 of (265); his attempts to secure
public appointments without reference to the Public Service Commission
(paragraphs 11 and 12 of (265) refer); actions such as these have caused both the
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Governor and yourself concern about the effect which they will have on the
expatriate staff which Uganda will continue to need after independence; you may like
also to express your concern about the manner in which Mr. Kiwanuka seems
inclined to disregard the long-term effect of his financial proposals and the manner
in which he has not felt able to co-operate with the Governor on a number of these
matters which are of great significance to the future of the territory; and in fact your
concern has been that in these matters Mr. Kiwanuka may have been endangering
the completion of the programme of work before Uganda’s independence which was
agreed in London last September and October; reluctant as you would be to consider
revision of that programme, it is a question whether the right course is not for you to
reconsider your predecessor’s decision particularly as regards the move to internal
self-government, at any rate to the extent of leaving more power than was
contemplated in the hands of the Governor until the period when the election was
over and Uganda politicians could take a more reasoned view of the problems which
lie ahead of their country. . . .
W.B.L.M.
2.2.62
Secretary of State
In my minute set up on the file today about the Governor of Uganda’s troubles with
his Chief Minister, I said I would report further on anything that transpired in the
talk I was to have with the Attorney-General on his delayed arrival this afternoon.
I have now spoken to the Attorney-General and the main points which emerged
from our talk were:
(i) The Governor wished the Attorney to emphasise the importance which he
attached to his proposal that he should be given reserved powers to cover the
period of internal self-government up to the election in order to save the country
from reckless acts by the Chief Minister;
(ii) There is likely to be at least one further resignation from the Cabinet over the
Chief Minister’s treatment of his colleagues. More significantly, perhaps, Mr.
Obote, the Leader of the Opposition, had got to hear of the proposal to remove Mr.
Simpson from the Uganda Development Corporation4 and had gone to the
Governor asking that he should do what he could to prevent any decision being
taken in this matter until the election was over;
(iii) The Attorney-General suggested that the Secretary of State might, in
speaking to the Chief Minister, emphasise that it was not the normal practice of
Governments, e.g. in this country, to introduce substantial and drastic changes in
policy in the weeks immediately pending a general election; that in introducing
self-government in advance of the election the British Government had assumed
that this convention would be followed by Mr. Kiwanuka but if it was in fact his
intention, once powers had been transferred from the Governor for the short
period in advance of elections, to make substantial changes in policy, it would be
necessary for H.M.G. to give the Governor powers to veto such of those changes as
4 J T Simpson, member of Uganda Leg Co, 1950–1958, and East African Central Legislative Assembly,
1957–1960, 1962; chairman of Uganda Development Corp since 1952.
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were of such importance that they would normally be left for the Government
returned at the election to consider and put into effect.
W.B.L.M.
2.2.62
Ben Kiwanuka’s visit.
I have not yet had the opportunity to read the Governor’s letters in full, but
reading Mr. Monson’s minute, two things occur to me.
1. I am sure it is right to be tough about his action about the Civil Service.
2. The money questions are much more difficult. The fact is that Kiwanuka is
fighting for his future. He has against him a pretty unholy alliance of Obote and
the Yeka-Kabaka5 parties.
Kiwanuka got in the last time as he swept the board in Buganda, and great courage
he showed in doing this and we owe him and his party a debt as but for their courage
we would never have brought the Kabaka’s people to heel.
This time he will certainly get far fewer if any seats in Buganda against the Yeka-
Kabaka Party. He has therefore to try and rally supporters outside, and the only way
that he sees is by spending money. As you know he has been pretty clever in what
money he proposes to spend and why and if we stop him he would have a good cry
“The money belongs to the farmers; I want to give it to them but H.M.G. prevents
me”. On the other side it must be remembered that he has shown great courage in
introducing income tax on Africans. All in all I am not the least bit surprised about
what appears to us irresponsible financial behaviour. But isn’t this one of the
penalties of full internal self-government? I know it will be objected that if he does
use the cotton and coffee funds now, the development of the country is threatened.
This may or may not be true. After all Tanganyika didn’t go into independence with
large reserves for development, nor will Kenya. Why should Uganda be the exception?
As I said at the beginning, I have not read the letters in full but I am not clear that
Kiwanuka is wholly irresponsible, although I would repeat I entirely agree that he
should be severely reprimanded on the Civil Service.
P.
2.2.62
5 Usually known as Kabaka-Yekka Party (ie ‘Kabaka Only’).
134 CAB 128/36/1, CC 17(62)4 27 Feb 1962
[Financial assistance to Uganda after independence]: Cabinet
conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (62) 40)
on the extent of the financial assistance which might be offered to the Uganda
Government.
The Colonial Secretary said that Uganda was due to achieve internal self-
government on 1st March and to become independent in October. Discussion had
been proceeding in London with representatives of the Uganda Government on the
payments to be made by the United Kingdom Government towards the cost of
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compensating expatriate officers and towards further economic development in
Uganda, and if these could not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion the date for
the introduction of internal selfgovernment would have to be deferred. It would be
particularly unfortunate if postponement were caused either wholly or partly by
difficulties in settling the amount of the United Kingdom contribution towards
compensation for officials. The discussions had been based on proposals approved by
the Treasury which in the case of compensation fell some £700,000 short, and in the
case of development aid just under £2 million short, of what he himself had thought
would be a reasonable amount. On the two heads taken together, the amount
required, in his judgment, to make a settlement probable was £14.5 million and the
offers so far made totalled £11.9 million. He believed that on a long view it would be
to the advantage of the Government, both politically and financially, to improve upon
these offers, which would be difficult to defend in the light of the more generous
arrangements recently made for Tanganyika.
The Chief Secretary, Treasury,1 said that in his view the Tanganyika settlement
had been unduly generous and would prove to be an embarrassing precedent unless
its effect could be corrected by a more economical settlement for Uganda. The
development scheme for Uganda which had been prepared by the World Bank was
attractive but it would cost more than Uganda or the United Kingdom could afford in
present circumstances. The development aid so far offered would enable more
development to be undertaken than had been carried out in recent years and,
although it might be reasonable to improve the Government’s offer under the
compensation head, an improvement in the offer of development aid would be
inconsistent with the Government’s stated aim of containing growth in public
expenditure at home and overseas.
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) It would not be practicable to settle the compensation question forthwith
and leave development aid to be settled later. There might, however, be something
to be gained in comparable negotiations with other territories if the Government
accepted full responsibility for compensation from the outset. This would enable
development aid to be considered on its merits and in a less emotional
atmosphere.
(b) Although the amount of Government expenditure overseas was running
ahead of the limit of £180 million which the Government had approved, the
amount attributable to Uganda would be £4 million less over the next two years
than under the Colonial Secretary’s earlier proposals.
(c) Colonial territories generally paid close attention to the amounts of aid
given on independence and it was difficult to contest Uganda’s claim to treatment
not less favourable than that given to the neighbouring territory of Tanganyika. It
was important, however, that in other cases yet to arise the Cabinet should have in
advance a clear statement of the scale of commitments to be expected; for it
seemed clear that in relation to economic conditions in the United Kingdom the
financial assistance which was being provided overseas was over-generous.
Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that, while the cost of
relinquishing Colonial rule was proving to be high, it was probably better to accept
1 Mr H Brooke.
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definite, if large, financial commitments on independence than to risk the indefinite
and larger expenditure involved in prolonging Colonial rule against a risk of collapse
of law and order. There seemed to be no acceptable means of varying the offers
already made to the Uganda Government which would fall far short of the total
proposed by the Colonial Secretary. But it would be intolerable if a further offer did
not produce a settlement and he suggested that, in continuing negotiations later that
day, the United Kingdom representatives should indicate that if this offer were not
accepted forthwith it would be withdrawn.
The Cabinet:—
Agreed that the representatives of the Uganda Government should be offered the
financial settlement proposed by the Colonial Secretary in C. (62) 40 on the basis
that if it were not accepted forthwith it would be withdrawn.
135 CO 822/2328, no 234 1–23 Mar 1962
[Zanzibar constitutional development]: minutes by J C Morgan and
W B L Monson
The Colonial Policy Committee paper on Constitutional Development in Zanzibar
(CPC(62)2)1 concluded by recommending:—
(1) that we should accept that Zanzibar be granted independence at about the
same time as Kenya were granted independence;
(2) that, if possible, a coalition of the existing Parties should be formed as a
preliminary to independence;
but:
(3) that such coalition should not be made a condition of independence;
(4) that, therefore, if the Opposition Party are unwilling to enter coalition, I [Mr
Maudling] should arrange at the Conference for elections before independence;
(5) that I should have discretion to arrange for such elections either before or
after a move to internal self-government.
2. When this paper was considered by the Committee on 16th February most of the
discussion centred on the desirability of the period of self-government before the grant
of independence being as long as possible. The Minutes reflect this and refer specifically
only to the second of the recommendations set out above. The conclusions were:—
‘The Committee:—
(1) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in the course of the forthcoming Zanzibar
constitutional conference, to make every effort to secure a coalition of the two
main parties as a necessary condition to the attainment of self-government.
(2) Agreed that it should be a main object of our policy in the negotiations to
secure the maximum possible duration of the period of internal self-government
in Zanzibar’.
3. For clarification, Lord Perth wrote to Viscount Kilmuir suggesting that it had
been tacitly understood at the meeting that if attempts to secure a coalition failed, it
would be necessary to adopt the course of elections before rather than after
1 14 Feb 1962: see CAB 134/1561, memorandum by Mr Maudling.
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independence, although whether those elections should be before or after the
introduction of internal self-government would be left open. The Lord Chancellor
has, however, replied that he does not consider the meeting to have authorised our
proceeding on these lines. He suggests that the difficulty rests not in the timing but
in the threat to security which holding elections presents and that, if the attempt to
form a coalition fails, the Secretary of State should again approach the Committee
with an assessment of the dangers of the elections and an indication of the troops
necessary to maintain law and order.
4. These points were in fact covered in the Committee paper as follows. Given
the racial background and the fact that disturbances took place in June, 1961, the
holding of elections would very probably precipitate further disturbances. These
could, however, be kept in check providing sufficient forces were available; two
battalions would be required, one actually in the islands and one ready to reinforce.
Further examination at the present stage is unlikely to alter this assessment.
5. The Department have consulted Mr. Monson, and in these circumstances we
suggest that the Secretary of State should be prepared to reach a final conclusion as
to elections during the course of the Zanzibar Conference itself, and in direct
consultation with the British Resident, on both political and security aspects. He may
think it necessary at that time to consult the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence,
assuming that time will preclude full reference to Cabinet or C.P.C. . . .
J.C.M.
1.3.62
. . . The British Resident is emphatic that, in the event of coalition (Mr. Morgan’s Case
I) there will be considerable ill-feeling directed against us in Zanzibar if we do not fix
a date for independence. We are in fact on the dilemma of having elections (and
bloodshed) or coalition and independence which we have always foreseen.
As we are not fixing a date for Kenya, however, we shall, if we are prepared to stick
it out and subject possibly to reinforcement of Kenya from Europe, be able to
maintain our position in Zanzibar and as I understand it the C.P.C. considered that
the governing factor should be not so much what happens in Zanzibar itself as the
implications of a decision in Zanzibar on advancing independence in Kenya.
The best way consistent with the Cabinet decision to handle the Zanzibar
Conference, if the parties agree on coalition, seems to me to be that the Secretary of
State should welcome the coalition; should say that, as foreshadowed in his opening
speech, we cannot ignore the events of last year and that be must see how coalition
works in practice before he could agree to our giving up our protection of Zanzibar;
but that he would, in the light of experience of the coalition and of internal self-
government, be ready to discuss the timetable again towards the end of this year. (I
suggest towards the end of this year on the basis of three or four months for drafting
the internal self-government constitution plus say at least three months of internal
self-government). In the event of deadlock (Mr. Morgan’s case II), I should have
thought agreement on internal self-government on the basis of the present
Administration but no date for independence was the right course to follow. . . .2
W.B.L.M.
23.3.62
2 Lord Perth minuted: ‘I think we can delay fixing an independence date. P’ [nd].
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136 CO 822/2266, no 378 8 Oct 1962
‘Uganda: future as an independent country’: despatch from Sir W
Coutts to Mr Sandys [Extract]
. . . 2. When I arrived in Uganda on 18th November, 1961, the first Uganda
Constitutional Conference had already charted the course for Uganda’s transition to
internal self-government, and your predecessor had already announced not only that
Uganda would attain internal self-government on 1st March, 1962, but that, provided
the necessary discussions could be completed and arrangements made in time,
Uganda would attain Independence on 9th October, 1962. The time-table was fixed,
and it is a matter for both congratulation and relief that Uganda’s dash to freedom
has not been seriously checked. The preparation of the country for independence
during the last year has called for an immense effort, in particular from members of
the civil service, and the achievement of independence tomorrow is in large part due
to their industry, patience and devotion.
3. Before I arrived in Uganda, I had the privilege of attending the Constitutional
Conference at Lancaster House during September and October 1961 and thus had an
exceptional opportunity to study Uganda’s problems before I reached the country,
and hear about the conflicting attitudes and shades of opinion of the country’s
various parties and regions. The outcome* of the conference was generally welcomed
in Uganda as a most constructive way out of the difficulties that had threatened to
hold up the country’s progress, particularly the question of the relationship between
the Central Government and the kingdoms, notably Buganda. At separate talks in
London at the time of the conference negotiations with representatives of Buganda
were brought to a satisfactory conclusion, and a new draft Agreement initialled, by
which Buganda’s place in Uganda was clearly defined.
4. It was most fitting that my predecessor, Sir Frederick Crawford, was able to
sign the new Buganda Agreement, 1961, on 31st October, 1961, just before he left
Uganda, as the burden of long, difficult and frustrating negotiations had fallen very
much on him personally over the previous months. Although this new Agreement
gave Buganda a very much freer hand to manage her own affairs without
intervention from the Central Government it did retain sufficient overall control to
the Central Government to make it possible for Uganda to look forward more
hopefully to Independence as one country.
5. As it is not easy to describe the situation at my arrival and the events that
followed without some description of the immediate past, I must give a brief account
of the closing months of my predecessor’s term of office. The signing of the Buganda
Agreement had brought to an end the sterile period of the previous two years, in
which the leaders in Buganda had increasingly tried to insulate the kingdom from
what was going on in the rest of the country. The most important expressions of
these efforts were the Lukiiko declaration in the closing days of 1960 that Buganda
should become independent on 1st January, 1961, the Kabaka’s Government’s
boycott of the Uganda Relationships Commission, and later of the general election of
March 1961. The Kabaka’s Government opposed the holding of direct elections in
Buganda most bitterly and did all they could to prevent the people of Buganda from
taking part.
* Report of the Uganda Constitutional Conference 1961: Cmnd. 1523.
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6. The elections of March 1961 were the first in which all parts of the country
and all communities voted directly, by secret ballot and on a wide common roll
franchise for the members who were to represent them in the legislature. In spite of
the open hostility of the Kabaka’s Government, sufficient people in Buganda had
registered as electors and stood as candidates for a member of the Legislative Council
to be returned from each constituency. The political parties, which had already
gained experience of electioneering in direct elections in a number of districts in
1958, urged their supporters to register in defiance of the Buganda Government’s
ban but only the Democratic Party had much success in mobilising their supporters.
As a result the Democratic Party won 20 of the 21 Buganda seats outside Kampala.
7. In the rest of the country the elections passed off quietly, with large
registrations and heavy polls. The Democratic Party won 24 seats and the Uganda
People’s Congress 34, the remaining three seats going to minor parties and
independents. As a result of their success in Buganda the Democratic Party secured a
substantial majority in the Legislative Council and it was therefore from their ranks
that my predecessor appointed 10 Ministers to form, with the remaining 3 officials, a
new Council of Ministers. . . .
24. The conclusions of the second conference have been published,* and it is
only necessary for me to note that discussions followed the usual labyrinthine course
of main talks, side talks, outside talks, boycotts and returns. Although much time
was spent in discussing the demands of the Kingdoms and Busoga, the leit motif
which ran through all the deliberations was the determination on the part of
Buganda to improve its position and the equal determination on the part of the
Government, backed by the rest of the conference, to concede nothing. Because of
these strains it looked at the end of the first week as though Uganda would
disintegrate into 14 separate kingdoms or districts. When it became apparent,
however, that the time was limited and that if no agreement was reached by 27th
June there would be no independence in October, some sanity and a measure of
compromise entered the negotiations.
25. The main difficulty confronting the officials at the conference was to pursue
a policy of restricting the Baganda without destroying the Kabaka Yekka–Uganda
People’s Congress alliance. Obote demonstrated to the full his political skill and
astuteness in keeping the Baganda and, eventually even the Batoro,on the field of
play.
26. Any one of the issues might have split the Government, but the one most
likely to do so was that of the Lost Counties dispute. In the end your predecessor’s
solution did not satisfy either the Baganda or the Banyoro, but at least we were not
all precipitated into the Reichenbach Falls. Altogether the conference, despite many
difficulties, was successful in achieving agreement on almost all the matters before
it, and in laying down the pattern for Uganda’s Independence Constitution.
Inevitably, some of the decisions merely put off the argument into the future,
particularly on aspects of the Uganda–Buganda relationships, but sufficient
agreement was reached to enable Uganda as a whole to look forward to the appointed
day for independence with reasonable optimism for the country’s future stability.
27. The end of the conference on 29th June brought to an end the tranquillity
which had descended on the country while its leaders were away, and apart from the
* Report of the Uganda Independence Conference, 1962: Cmnd. 1778.
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pressing urgency of the preparations for independence, legislative ceremonial and
administrative, the Government had to wrestle with security problems, and a wave of
industrial unrest particularly in Kampala and the Eastern Province. Security forces
were fully committed to containing incursions and preventing Hutu–Tutsi clashes on
the Rwanda border, to the maintenance of peace in Toro district where separatist
demands by Baamba and Bakonjo tribesmen had led to violence, and to the restraint
of the raiding and lawlessness which threatened to become endemic in Karamoja. On
the brighter side, the last months before independence saw the highly successful Nile
Centenary exhibition at Jinja in July, the signing of a new Ankole Agreement in
August and the departure of the Prime Minister to attend, as an observer, the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in September at which Uganda’s
application to join the Commonwealth was approved. A little over a fortnight before
independence a final Toro Agreement was signed, the last in the line of agreements
which ever since the beginning of the Protectorate have played so important a part in
the constitutional history of Uganda, and have variously protected the rights of
subject peoples, sustained tribal pride, entrenched privilege, and provided those parts
of the country so fortunate as to be in on the game with an endless source of
negotiation dispute and journeyings to London. I hope that the passing of the
agreements will be duly mourned among the lawyers and the airline managers, and
that no more malign fetish takes their place in the Uganda of the future.
28. Recently there have been renewed signs of political strain and division
behind the outward show of national unity, as expressed in the new national flag (the
earlier choice of colours under the Democratic Party Government having been
modified by its successor) the national anthem and the coat of arms, the decorations
and the plans for independence. In spite of the Uganda People’s Congress–Kabaka
Yekka alliance in the Central Government the Buganda Government appeared to
become increasingly disenchanted with the June settlement, and the lack of any
tangible benefit to Buganda from the alliance, and showed disturbing signs of
reverting to old habits of thought. The Kabaka’s Ministers pressed more urgently for
police control in Buganda to be handed over to them and there were reports of
overtures to the Democratic Party leaders. A sudden resurgence of argument over
the wording of the Constitution, accompanied by statements and veiled threats, and a
public dash to London in traditional style showed how little confidence the Baganda
had in their nominal partners. Although the crisis passed almost as quickly as it
arose, it revealed how deep is the conflict between Buganda’s aspirations and the
emergent Uganda nationalism, and how shallow was the apparent acquiescence of
Buganda in the October 1961 and June 1962 settlements.
29. It might be useful, at this point, to attempt some assessment of the
equipment with which Uganda enters independence, and how the country stands
after 60 years of British protection. First and foremost among its assets, I feel, must
rank the charm, urbanity and good sense of its people: whatever its other
deficiencies, Uganda has a heritage of good manners and lack of bitterness which
many more opulent nations might envy. Nature’s endowment has been, however,
more equivocal, apart from the considerable beauty of its scenery and the country
cannot face the future with the prospect of wealth that once seemed so certain.
Uganda is perhaps unfortunate in having enjoyed its economic boom too early: the
period of high cotton and coffee prices in the late ’40s and early ’50s led to economic
and social development on a scale that was not paralleled elsewhere in East Africa,
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but that early promise has not been entirely fulfilled and Uganda faces a present
darkened by financial stringency and economic lethargy. Nevertheless, in relation to
its population the country is well endowed with fertile, well-watered land on which a
wide range of tropical products can be grown and livestock raised, with abundant
capacity for hydro-electric power, well developed towns and, by African standards,
excellent communications. The abnormally high prices obtained for its two main
primary products a decade ago obscured the fact that in a tropical country like
Uganda it is easy, too easy, to maintain a subsistence level of life with a few frills and
additions, and very hard to pass from this to a growing dynamic economy based on
agriculture. In spite of very considerable advances in the development of Uganda’s
natural resources over the years, an increase in the living standards of the people is
still dependent on an improvement of agriculture, and strenuous efforts will be
necessary to raise standards of husbandry, diversify crops, develop new agricultural
techniques and persuade the farmers to adopt them. Although Uganda derives useful
benefits from other parts of the economy, such as its valuable fisheries, forests and
plantations, no development in these fields can have the effect comparable to a
general raising of standards of farming and animal husbandry throughout the
country. . . .
31. Uganda at present offers little scope for a dramatic and large-scale
development of industry, but very solid foundations have been laid, both for the
processing of the country’s main agricultural products such as cotton, coffee, sugar
and oil seeds, and in the complex of industrial undertakings, many under the control
of the Uganda Development Corporation. This corporation, wholly owned by the
Government, has been a most potent and impressive instrument of development in
Uganda, and includes cement and fertiliser production at Tororo, a cotton mill at
Jinja, a chain of hotels and widely distributed agricultural interests.
32. A mission from the World Bank visited Uganda in 1960, and its Report*
suggested the lines on which a Five-year Development plan might be drawn up,
giving pride of place to schemes designed to raise the output of peasant cultivators,
through improved agricultural credit, the encouragement of co-operatives and
increased extension services, and to develop such parts of the economy as would yield
the most rapid return, such as the tourist industry. On the basis of the World Bank
Report, a Development Plan has been drawn up, and it will be one of the most
important tasks of the independent Uganda Government to attract the outside
assistance which is vital if the plan is to be put into effect. Uganda’s capacity to
finance development from its own resources is for the present negligible, with its
current Budget deficit estimated at half a million pounds, and reserves amounting
altogether to £3 million. To overcome the further heavy handicaps of being mentally
and physically so far from the outside world and of being politically uninteresting, if
not positively boring, the country will need all the sympathy and assistance that can
be given if it is not to relapse into a stagnant, if seemingly lush, equatorial slum.
There is evidence of a great deal of willingness to help on the part of the United
States and West German Governments. There is no need for me to rehearse the
massive and generous assistance which has been forthcoming from Her Majesty’s
Government, but I would plead that British assistance should seem, as well as be,
magnanimous.
* The Economic Development of Uganda: Government Printer, Entebbe 1961.
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33. In the field of social services Uganda has achieved an enviable position in
East Africa, which is undermined only by the present difficulty of paying for what has
been achieved. Makerere University College has for long by its existence given
Uganda the educational leadership of East Africa, and should have given her the
intellectual leadership also. The expansion of education, particularly primary, junior
secondary and technical, under the inspiration of Sir Andrew Cohen, laid the basis
for the satisfaction of the country’s educated manpower requirements in the future.
At the primary level opportunity exists for half the nation’s children to receive the
basic elements of education, but the present need is for more secondary places, and
the Five-year Development Plan, based on the recommendations of the World Bank
Report, includes among its most urgent and important features a programme to
double the secondary school places in five years. It is from this level that the leaders
of the future emerge, and it is to the deficiencies at this level in the past that Uganda
owes its present shortage of mature, trained and educated manpower. Although the
educational system can be transformed in half a decade, as Uganda’s history has
shown, it takes up to 20 years for that transformation to be evident in the country’s
life, and it is here that the absence of dynamic (even if costly) educational policies in
the ’thirties is most felt. The consciousness of present deficiencies finds its most
potent outlet in the demand for overseas scholarships, and the enormous growth and
popularity of overseas education in recent years, with the attendant problems,
political overtones and opportunities for foreign countries in the East and West to
seek influence in Africa by this means is too well known to need description here. . . .
35. In large part, the capacity of the country to sustain what has already been
achieved, and to take advantage of every opportunity that offers for further advance,
will depend on the Civil Service. The Uganda Service has been, like its counterparts
in Kenya and Tanganyika, very heavily dependent on expatriate staff in the higher
ranks, and in the professional and technical branches. Possibly it may have been
overstaffed for present conditions, both political and economic, as a result of the
expansion in all fields of Government activity in the ’fifties. A major step to promote
Africans into the higher ranks was taken in August 1961 with the introduction of the
Limited Compensation Scheme, and with the replacement of this Limited Scheme by
the General Compensation Scheme in March this year the need to promote Africans
to the highest levels of the Service became a matter of vital necessity. The rate of
departure of expatriate staff under the General Scheme is heavy, but not crippling. Of
the 1,260 expatriate staff on the permanent establishment, 110 left under the Limited
Scheme, and a further 490-odd have left or will leave under the General Scheme by
March 1963. The recruitment of replacements overseas, in cases where no local
candidate is available, has been good and for this the country is much indebted to the
Department of Technical Co-operation and the Crown Agents. The morale of those
who remain is difficult to assess, but can best be described as wary. Although the
Uganda People’s Congress–Kabaka Yekka Government, as soon as it came to power,
made serious efforts to undo the damage done by its predecessor, and encourage
essential expatriate staff to stay, there are already signs of disturbing trends that will
almost certainly induce further departures. Generally speaking, it appears likely that
very few of the “old” permanent and pensionable expatriate staff will be left by the
1963. So long as there is no development which puts Uganda in a bad light in the
world news, there is no reason to assume that contract recruitment will diminish.
But the brunt of the Government’s work in the future must inevitably fall on the
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African Civil Service. What chance is there that men, often trained in a hurry and
almost without exception without any real experience of the heavier responsibilities
of Government, will stand up to the strains which are now being put upon them, and
which will grow with almost geometrical progression as the months go by? The
Africans in the Uganda Civil Service are split broadly into two groups: the privileged
few who are now getting right to the top, and the very much larger number who hold
posts in the medium and lower ranks of the Service. Those at the top or near it have
the expatriate staff to help them at the moment, but the testing time will come next
year, when they will stand virtually alone. It remains to be seen whether the few will
have the sense to realise how difficult life will be, and will be able to keep the ship of
state on a relatively even keel. The larger numbers in the lower ranks will, for the
most part, continue as they have done in the past, to do a reasonable job of work; and
at the routine level of Government the wheels, although grinding, should continue
to turn. The Service of the future will then be very different from the Service of the
past; a handful of well-educated, able but inexperienced Africans with a sense of
power rivalled only by their political masters; a decreasing number of expatriates,
mainly on contract, who will continue to supply the skills which Uganda does not
have yet in sufficient quantities, and, one hopes, will continue to advise, help and
train their successors; a corps of Asians, with the bleak likelihood of discrimination
in the Civil Service and in public affairs alike, unless they are prepared to gulp the
medicine of citizenship without real knowledge of its consequences: but no doubt
willing, as so often in the past, to turn in a good day’s work for its own sake; and a
much larger block of well-tried and useful African junior staff, who may manage to
keep services for the public going at a moderately efficient level; although things may
be queasy further up. That this amorphous band will find it difficult to keep to the
standards we have become accustomed to in the past, is undeniable; that they may
find it impossible to stand up to the numerous strains of the coming years is likely,
and in that case we may expect a kind of modified chaos in 1964 and beyond: but
much more likely, perhaps, in the remarkable way of Africa, they will rise to the
occasion and get by.
36. In no way will independence bring greater problems to Uganda than in
defence and security. The last three years have brought great changes on its borders,
and the country will face potential threats particularly on the Congo and Rwanda
frontiers with only limited ability to reinforce its own slender forces. The Uganda
Battalion of the King’s African Rifles will provide an admirable Uganda Army, but
even supported by the generosity of Her Majesty’s Government, and with the planned
recruitment of a further company, it will still be a tiny force when matched against
the large and well equipped armies to the west and north. Should a combination of
internal disorder and external threat arise, the Uganda Army and Police Force would
be stretched to the limit, and if political considerations prevent reinforcement from
Kenya or Britain the country would be very vulnerable. The Government will, I am
sure, be very tempted to increase the size and improve the equipment of its army as
soon as it turns its eyes to Uganda’s position in Africa, and in the present financial
climate will almost certainly turn for help to those who are ready to offer it most
cheaply. There is every hope that Uganda will quickly arrive at a defence agreement
or understanding with Tanganyika, and this in itself would reduce the country’s
isolation.
37. Uganda goes forward into independence with some political uncertainty. The
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Prime Minister enjoys virtually unaminous support from his own Uganda People’s
Congress Party, but this party does not quite command an overall majority in the
National Assembly. The alliance of the Uganda People’s Congress with the Kabaka
Yekka movement has shown no outward signs of splitting in the Assembly, and the
Opposition Democratic Party has not fully recovered from electoral defeat and the
elimination of all its Baganda leaders from the Assembly. Nevertheless a major crisis
between Obote’s Government and the Buganda Government would throw an
intolerable burden on the Uganda People’s Congress–Kabaka Yekka alliance. The
Baganda leaders at Mengo might well then try to align their Kabaka Yekka members
in the Assembly with the Democratic Party, and so bring down the Uganda People’s
Congress leadership. Such a development cannot be ruled out, and the Democratic
Party has indeed tried to bring it about, but a number of factors may make it unlikely
for the time being. No occasion has yet arisen to determine the strength of the
loyalty to Mengo of the Kabaka Yekka members of the National Assembly, particularly
those who are Ministers of the Uganda Government: it is possible that in a conflict,
many might not prove as amenable to the decrees of the Kabaka’s Ministers as the
latter’s past experience with the Buganda Lukiiko might lead them to assume. Even
the Kabaka’s personal influence might not be decisive with a few when not supported
by the other means available within Buganda to secure obedience. It also seems likely
that very considerable political manoeuvring would be required before a
reconciliation with the Democratic Party was acceptable to many Kabaka Yekka
members. This may, of course, be largely a matter of personalities, and there is as yet
no serious challenger to Obote. It used to seem inevitable that the country’s leaders
should come from Buganda, yet increasingly in recent years the Buganda system has
discouraged the emergence of political leaders, as potential rivals to the Kabaka, and
turned out instead what is on the surface is a breed of courtly and able sycophants.
The only thing that can be certain is that Obote will take very vigorous and possibly
unpalatable steps to consolidate his position after independence.
38. As Uganda’s Prime Minister, Obote has had so few months to develop from a
veteran of the Opposition into the national leader, and is in character such a close
man, that it is difficult to forecast how he will guide Uganda’s course in African and
international affairs. As one who owes his position more to political astuteness and
skill than to a consistent political philosophy, a tactician rather than a strategist, it
will take a good deal of experience in the rough and tumble of world affairs for him to
reach international stature. His Cabinet contains men of the extreme Left as well as,
by African standards, conservatives of a deepish shade of blue. For the time, anyway
the Government is likely to follow rather than lead opinion in East Africa, and to be
much influenced by Tanganyika. Public opinion has been too much preoccupied with
domestic issues to respond to remoter voices although a minority are admirers of the
Nkrumah image.
39. Uganda therefore enters its independent future with its basic conflict of
nationhood unresolved, a difficult legacy for the new State. As the conflict arose
partly from history, and partly from the way Uganda had been developed under
British tutelage, it did not, I think, lie within our power to resolve it. Whether
Uganda can develop a proper sense of nationhood while it contains within its narrow
borders such divisions of loyalty it is difficult to say. This applies not only to
Buganda, but to all the other regional loyalties that are such a feature of the Uganda
scene, and have led to the setting up of such a cumbersome machinery of
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government for such a small, and poor, country. I think that one must before long
digest the other, and at the moment it seems that as Buganda missed its chance of
dominating and perhaps even swallowing the rest of the country, by turning aside in
recent years into dreams of separation and secession, it is now likely that the rest of
Uganda will gain a greater feeling of unity, and ultimately digest Buganda. So long as
individual Baganda continue to share in the Government of Uganda, both as
Ministers and civil servants, the separateness of Buganda will probably be eliminated
gradually, by slow erosion: but the possibility of an earlier convulsive incorporation
cannot be disregarded. However achieved, the growth of a sense of oneness is
without question Uganda’s most pressing need, exceeding even the urgent economic
difficulties that face every emergent African State, and it is to the encouragement of
this sense that the efforts of Uganda’s friends must chiefly be directed, even if in the
immediate future Uganda adopts policies repugnant to the British tradition, and to
Western ideals of tolerant democracy.
40. In conclusion I would pay a tribute to my fellow workers in all walks of life
but particularly to the Civil Service for their devoted work for Uganda during this last
testing period. I end by saying with Mark Antony “Unarm, Eros; the long day’s task is
done”.
137 CO 822/2329, no 289 [16] Oct 1962
[Zanzibar constitutional development]: minute by Mr Sandys to Mr
Macmillan
[The government would have preferred an all-party coalition to run Zanzibar up to
independence, believing that tension between the main parties had already resulted in
heavy loss of life in the mid-1961 elections and showed no signs of abating. Their refusal
to agree meant a constitutional deadlock, dangerous in so far as it increased the influence
in both main parties of their ‘extremist fellow-travelling wings who blame the deadlock
on us’ (CO brief, 8 Oct 1962).]
Last April my predecessor as Colonial Secretary1 reported to the Cabinet that he had
not been able to secure a Coalition Government of the two main parties in Zanzibar
as a necessary condition of the attainment of self-government. He also told
Parliament on 12th April that, in the absence of agreement between the Zanzibar
Ministers and the Opposition delegates, it had proved impossible to settle the
timetable for further advance towards independence.
2. The British Resident has now reported that further efforts to get the main
parties to agree on a Coalition Government have failed. On the other hand the
Government Party has now submitted proposals envisaging the grant of internal self-
government to the present Government, to be followed by elections and immediate
independence thereafter. These proposals are unacceptable as they stand, especially
since we could not be committed at this stage to the grant of independence
immediately after the elections but, insofar as they recommend elections before they
are due in the normal course of events, the proposals represent a concession on the
part of the Government Party which might, if the Opposition can be induced to
agree, provide a way out of the present constitutional deadlock. The British Resident
1 Mr Sandys succeeded Mr Maudling in mid-July 1962.
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favours a programme covering the early introduction of self-government, to be
followed by elections, after which negotiations on arrangements for independence
would be started.
3. If such a proposal were to be accepted, the timetable for constitutional
advance would be approximately:—
Internal self-government –January/March 1963
Elections –June 1963
Independence –subject to negotiation but not before December, 
1963, at the earliest.
4. I see no major difficulty in acceding to a proposal on these lines if it represents
an agreed approach on the part of both Parties. During the period of self-government
the British Resident would retain control of external affairs, defence and internal
security. With agreement between the parties the risk of disturbances should be
greatly reduced. The date and conditions of Zanzibar’s independence will still fall to
be negotiated after the elections. It has been the policy of the British Government to
reduce the present dangerous tension in the Protectorate through agreement
between the parties. If you agree, I therefore propose to authorise the British
Resident to open negotiations with Government and Opposition parties on the lines
that, although the Government’s proposals are unacceptable as they stand, the
British Government would be prepared to consider a joint approach covering the
grant of internal self-government under the present Government, followed by
elections as soon as practicable and thereafter negotiations on independence.
5. I have examined possible repercussions elsewhere (e.g. Kenya, where internal
self-government is not likely to be attained until October 1963) and have concluded
that no major objections arise on that score.2
2 Internal self-government was introduced in June 1963. After an election in July a coalition government
was formed between the Zanzibar Nationalist Party and the Zanzibar & Pemba People’s Party, which had
won a majority of seats (though not of votes) over the Afro-Shirazi Party. Final arrangements for the
transfer of power were made at an independence conference in London in Sept 1963, and Zanzibar
attained full sovereign independence on 10 Dec 1963 under the Sultan as head of state. The government
was overthrown one month later in a coup d’état led by the Afro-Shirazi Party. The Revolutionary Council
ratified the integration of Zanzibar and Tanganyika as a single state in April 1964, renamed the United
Republic of Tanzania on 29 Oct 1964.
138 DO 168/75, no 240 4 Dec 1963
[East African federation prospects]: letter from Mr D W S Hunt
(Uganda) to J Chadwick (CRO)
[On 5 June 1963 the prime ministers of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya jointly pledged
themselves to a political federation in East Africa. However, Zanzibar (fearing being
swamped) stood aside, while Obote’s enthusiasm soon evaporated. He feared that Uganda
would be a junior partner, and he was influenced by Nkrumah’s opinion that it was a ‘neo-
colonialist plot’. Meanwhile Hunt had taken over as governor in 1962.]
Stephen Miles1 sent us a copy of his letter IP 43/8/1 of 22nd November to Norman
Aspin on the subject of East African Federation and the desirability of bringing to
1 F S Miles, East Africa High Commission Office.
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bear such influence as we can to persuade Kenya and Tanganyika to pay the price for
Uganda’s membership.
2. The basic premise, I suppose, is that the establishment of a Federation of East
Africa with a reasonably strong central government would be of advantage to Britain
in that it should create a greater area of potential economic viability better able to
defend itself. It would have, from our point of view, some administrative convenience
in having one government instead of three to deal with on foreign affairs, economic
aid and indeed such contentious issues as Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. We
might hope (but no more) that a strong and reasonably self-confident Federation
would give more scope for those African politicians who are open to reason on these
matters and less scope to Nkrumah to play disruptive games. Finally, at the very
least, it would mean two fewer votes against us at the United Nations, or three fewer
if Zanzibar came in. Miles’s point that, if there is no Federation of the three
countries, Tanganyika is more likely to break up the East African Common Market
than to federate with Kenya, and thereby affect the market for goods produced in
Kenya with British capital, is no doubt a valid one; but it seems to me in the long
term to be of less importance than the broader political advantages.
3. If we do for these reasons wish to see an East African Federation established, is
there anything we can do to help it on? Miles suggests we might try to persuade
Kenya and Tanganyika to pay Uganda’s price; but what would that price now be?
Certainly Entebbe for capital and a not less than number three job for Obote are
essential so far as Uganda is concerned; but I am afraid that, though these might
have been sufficient when I wrote my Despatch no. 4 in August, the price has, as I
said in my Despatch no. 9 in November, since risen steeply. More basic fears have
come to the surface. Uganda is worried that a federation might prevent her
controlling the movement of unemployed or landless Kenyans into Uganda to
compete, successfully because of their superior intelligence and diligence, for the
limited amount of employment or to cultivate empty land, of which Uganda has a fair
amount. She would therefore want to retain Uganda citizenship, principally because
distinct citizenship would be necessary for the exercise of inter-territorial control.
Unless the federal constitution promised more effective machinery than the present
industrial licensing system to control the distribution of new industrial enterprises
Uganda would, I think, wish to retain her present freedom to compete by inducement
for foreign industrial investment, a policy which is beginning to show some results.
Several Uganda Ministers, I know, are reluctant to contemplate a federation
arrangement which would take from them the control of their own armed forces.
And if there is one argument of Nkrumah’s which really carries weight with Obote it
is the undesirability of reducing the number of African votes in the United Nations.
Uganda’s price, therefore, may be so high as to make the use of the term “Federation”
inappropriate.
4. For Britain to try to influence Obote in the direction of accepting an improved
offer by Kenyatta and Nyerere would defeat our object. (I realise Miles is not
proposing this.) We have now got Obote to say in public that he believes that Britain
is prepared to leave the matter of federation to the free decision of the East African
countries; but I believe that his suspicion that our interest, and the Americans’, in
federation is in some way sinister, is sufficiently near the surface to be revived not
only by our raising the subject with him, in whatever general terms, but also by any
word that might come to him that we had been urging federation on Kenya and
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Tanganyika. Any approach to these two countries would, therefore, need to be
extremely circumspect.
5. There is another reason for circumspection, if I may turn from Uganda to the
other two countries. I believe both Miles and Stanley will confirm that there are anti-
federation elements in both TANU and KANU. Le Tocq2 tells me that Adu3 has
expressed to him the view that Nyerere must settle the federation business one way
or another before the next general election in Tanganyika, for fear that it may
become an issue which would divide his party. Adu’s view was that if the issue could
be settled in favour of federation in time it would not be a matter of controversy; but
that if it is not settled, Nyerere might feel bound to take the line that he had done his
best, that the other East African countries were unwilling, and that Tanganyika must
now embark on a course of greater independence not greater inter-dependence. This
might easily entail, as Miles fears, the break-up of the East African Common Market
and the stultifying of EACSO perhaps to the point of dissolution. In Kenya, while
Odinga has been committing himself more firmly to federation in recent speeches I
doubt if his shirt is as firmly on federation as Mboya’s. My point is that anti-
federationists in both countries could easily seize upon any British pressure in the
direction of federation as a means of discrediting the idea for their own personal
advantage.
6. The foregoing seems to point to doing nothing as being our best means of
fostering the enterprise. That is not to say that our people in Kenya and Tanganyika
should not, if given an opportunity in an atmosphere they feel to be right, try out as a
personal expression of views the proposition that Kenya and Tanganyika should
improve on their offer to Obote; but I do think that anything in the nature of an
initiative on our part would be more likely to lead to the outcome we do not desire.
The conclusion is depressing but, I think, unavoidable. . . .
2 E G Le Tocq, an official in the High Commission, previously an assistant secretary, CRO.
3 A L Adu, secretary-general of East Africa Common Services Organisation (EACSO), 1962–1963; a
Ghanaian, one of the first African district officers, and formerly first permanent secretary in Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, 1957, and secretary of Cabinet, 1959. He served on Sir N Brook’s Commonwealth Officials’
Study Group in July 1960 as Ghana’s representative (see document no 534 in Pt II).
139 CAB 148/1, ff 194–197 4 Feb 1964
‘The policy implications of [security] developments in East Africa’:
note for Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee by
the chairman (Sir B Trend)
The recent intervention by British forces at the request of the Governments of
Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya to suppress mutinies of African troops has forced us
to consider our policy towards these Governments in the longer term, since
decisions whether to go forward with positive action directed to increasing the
stability of the local governments or to withdraw cannot be taken in isolation.
2. It is natural that we should take an initiative in this matter. East Africa has
been a sphere of British influence for many years; and, rightly or wrongly, our allies
consider that it is our responsibility to arrest the spread of Communism in this part
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of the world. The Americans have made it very plain that this is their view. If we shirk
this responsibility, our international standing is bound to suffer.
3. Moreover, we have direct interests of our own at stake. The safety and
prosperity of the British settlers in Kenya and other African territories depend on the
maintenance of order and the development of trade and international confidence. In
addition, we have substantial financial and economic interests in East Africa; and, for
strategic reasons, we wish to be able to continue to rely on existing overflying and
staging facilities in this area. For all these reasons we should be reluctant to
acquiesce in the establishment of an effective hostile presence in East Africa.1
4. Against this background there is clearly a strong case for our responding to
requests for either military or economic help from the Governments concerned. But
it must remain a matter of judgment how far, given the present climate of opinion in
the United Nations and elsewhere, it would be in either our short or our long-term
interests to take an initiative in the absence of specific requests to do so.
5. There is no doubt that the Governments concerned have been badly shocked
by their inability to control events in their countries. It has been demonstrated that
law and order in these countries are at present fragile and that the existence of the
old K.A.R. battalions under their present control reduces rather than enhances
stability. The extreme weakness of the governmental and administrative structure,
including the police, has also been made clear. The great dangers to these
governments of the official and unofficial fostering of elements intended to subvert
other African countries has been made obvious.
6. The emergency intervention of British forces has momentarily saved the
situation. For some time ahead the local governments can, if they have the will, work
to restore their effective control under cover of the British presence; but that
presence of itself is bound to become increasingly distasteful to the mass of local
political opinion; and its effectiveness as a cover will consequently be reduced as time
goes on. The crucial question is whether the local governments have the capacity to
take advantage of this relatively short breathing space to take effective steps that will
enable them to regain and maintain control once the British forces have gone. If they
cannot do this, our intervention and presence will have done little more than to
postpone the day on which chaos arrives.
7. If any real good is to come from our intervention, therefore, the local
governments will have to take drastic and difficult measures during the short time
that we can remain. These measures will involve a degree of leadership that may not
be within the capabilities of the present Heads of the Governments. So far as we are
concerned, however, there are only two real alternatives—to cut our losses, on the
assumption that there is no hope for reasonable government in the area, or to go all
out to promote the stability of the present governments. The former alternative
would involve such drastic steps as an expensive and politically difficult campaign to
remove and compensate as many as possible of the white settlers and a general
abdication of our responsibilities in the area.
1 This was certainly the view of Mr Sandys. He believed the risk of renewed insecurity to be very real, and
therefore ‘we must do what we can to sustain the present moderate Governments’. He added: ‘This will
undoubtedly cost money, but the alternative may be a collapse of the present order in East Africa. This
would seriously affect our interests and influence in that area, and might involve us in an extremely
expensive rescue operation to extricate British communities, and help in re-establishing them elsewhere’
(CAB 148/1, ff 216–217, DO(64)16, memo, ‘East Africa—defence arrangements’, 24 Feb 1964).
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8. For practical purposes, therefore, we consider only the second alternative.
There are two main fields to be considered, military and governmental. In the
military field the best means of promoting greater stability would seem to lie in
fostering the existing tendency towards the formation of some joint security system,
which would involve the federalisation of defence forces. If the three regional
governments agreed in principle in the near future, it would be possible for us to
build up, fairly rapidly, a system of training missions, which, given the continued
acceptance by the governments of their responsibilities, might result in relatively
loyal, if not particularly efficient, armed forces in the fairly near future. A continued
British military presence in Kenya, perhaps on the basis of a battalion operating as a
demonstration unit at the centre of the Federal defence system, might remain
politically acceptable for rather longer than British forces in any other role and
would lend stiffening to the training process.
9. In parallel with the training mission, special effort would have to be devoted,
less obtrusively, to increased British assistance to local police forces and Special
Branches. If an additional training mission for this purpose were accepted, it could
work to some extent in parallel with the defence forces on the intelligence side and
might assist in preventing a reoccurrence of the recent type of trouble.
10. In promoting measures of this kind we should be putting our money on the
existing governments in the countries concerned and should be assuming that they
have the will and the means to sustain their authority and to maintain law and order
in their territories. In so doing, we might be mistaken; there can be no assurance
that, whatever we may do to help them, the existing governments will survive and
will not be overthrown by more extreme elements. On the other hand, they are at
present well-disposed towards us even if only temporarily; and, by comparison with
any visible alternative, they are moderate and uncommitted in their general
sympathies. Moreover, we cannot wait; we must use the material that is to hand. But,
if the defence measures which we have suggested are to have a reasonable chance of
success, we must be prepared to supplement them with parallel measures to
strengthen the political authority of the governments concerned. This means that we
must be prepared to respond to requests for increased financial and technical
assistance; and that we must be ready to take whatever steps we can—by means of
our information services, both overt and covert, and by various techniques of
counter-subversion—to present our intervention in the most favourable light and to
convince local public opinion that it is evidence not of neo-colonialism on our part
but of a genuine attempt to help the peoples of the area to live free and independent
lives.
11. We must repeat, however, that our intervention, in both military and civil
terms, will not be easily defensible, either in the countries themselves or in wider
international circles, unless it is seen to be a response to explicit invitations from the
countries concerned. From this point of view it is for consideration whether the
circumstances offer the opportunity for some kind of Commonwealth initiative,
since, if the operation were seen to be a joint endeavour by a group of
Commonwealth countries rather than by the United Kingdom alone, this would not
only ensure that the burden was more equitably shared but would also provide less
opportunity for charges of neo-colonialism against ourselves. There are already
indications that the countries concerned are thinking of seeking assistance from e.g.
Germany; and, although we could not reasonably object to a NATO presence in the
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 449
450 AFRICA [140]
area, we might be able to maintain closer control over developments if intervention
were confined to the Commonwealth.
Zanzibar
12. The fact that the revolution in Zanzibar2 was successful in establishing a
government that includes a number of Communists provides a source of real danger
to the success of any efforts that we could devote to the re-establishment of stability
on the mainland. We have therefore examined the policy that we should adopt
towards the new regime in Zanzibar.
13. If there were immediate danger to British lives, we should, of course, inter-
vene at once. Such action, in the light of recent events, would be politically defensi-
ble; and it would only be necessary for the military authorities in the Middle East to
bring up to date plans that they had already made. Similarly, if the High Commissioner
at any time judged that there was a risk that a real threat to British lives would develop,
we should put ourselves in a position to evacuate British citizens.
14. Nevertheless, circumstances may not develop in this way. There may be no
threat, either immediate or contingent, to the safety of British citizens in Zanzibar;
but the situation may remain unsatisfactory in the sense that Zanzibar may continue
to show all the signs of acute political instability without relapsing into open
violence. In these circumstances we shall have to ask ourselves whether it is
acceptable that a focus of hostile and subversive influence off the coast of Africa
should be allowed to persist indefinitely. It is arguable that, provided that the
mainland governments remain firm, no great harm would be done in leaving
Zanzibar to go its own way. But it is equally arguable—and the United States
Government hold this view emphatically—that it would impose an undue strain on
the mainland governments to expect them to withstand indefinitely the pressure of
an organised centre of disaffection so close to their shores. This is a matter of
political judgment. But, on the assumption that Ministers endorse the latter view, we
shall have to decide how best to deal with the situation.
15. 3
16. For these reasons the disadvantages of intervention might be thought to
outweigh the advantages unless it was not only made in response to a specific request
from Karume4 but was also publicly endorsed and underwritten by the three
mainland governments and commanded the full support of the United States. Even
so, we might have to face considerable trouble in the United Nations.
2 Jan 1964; see document nos 137, n 2, and 390 (para 6) in Part II.
3 This paragraph, of approximately 24 lines, removed from PRO copy under Section 3(4) of the Public
Records Act (1958).
4 Sheikh Karume, leader of the Afro-Shirazi Party and president of Zanzibar since the January revolution.
140 CO 822/1448, no 166 13 Jan 1959
[Proposed timetable for constitutional advance in Tanganyika]: letter
from Sir R Turnbull (Tanganyika) to W L Gorell Barnes (CO)
[Towards the end of 1956, the governor of Tanganyika, Sir E Twining, came to the
unexpectedly drastic conclusion that the European and Asian communities were not
strong enough to sustain a genuine multi-racial society; accordingly they should make a
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transition towards relying on African leadership and start by ‘co-opting’ Julius Nyerere.
The government, after due reflection, was disposed to accept this advice; see Goldsworthy,
ed, The Conservative government, document nos 298–300. In 1957 the official members
of the Executive Council were redesignated as ministers, and at the same time, six
assistant ministers (four African, one European and one Asian) were appointed—they
became ex officio members of Leg Co. The Leg Co which met in 1959 was composed of a
Speaker, seven ex officio, sixteen nominated and thirty elected members; the latter, being
a majority, together forming the Tanganyika Elected Members Organisation, led by
Nyerere.
Meanwhile, Sir Richard Turnbull had taken over as governor in 1958, having come
from Kenya, where he had been chief secretary, 1955–1958. Turnbull quickly decided to
recommend speeding up the pace of constitutional advancement. Gorell Barnes accepted
that this must involve the CO in an ‘agonising reappraisal’; Perth thought there was a
good practical case for proceeding slowly; Macpherson shared Gorell Barnes’s sense of
dismay, and although he believed that ‘the only effective way of dealing with African
nationalism . . . is to roll with the punches’ and keep the initiative, he was ‘at present’ in
favour of putting the brake on Turnbull’s ideas. Lennox-Boyd agreed; recognising that
quickening the pace of advance was ‘a formidable issue’ of the highest importance, he
asked for a ‘Chequers weekend’ of discussions with Turnbull and his fellow East African
governors, the intention being that this might be the most effective way of applying the
brake (CO 822/1819, minutes 30 Dec 1958–5 Jan 1959). The Chequers meeting (24–25
Jan 1959)—see document no 116—did indeed seem to have the desired effect, but within
months Turnbull returned to the charge: see next document.]
I am writing to you on the difficult subject of a timetable for constitutional advance
for Tanganyika. I fully realise how firm we have been in the past about refusing to be
drawn on this matter and the reasons for our having adopted such an attitude; but I
feel that the time is rapidly approaching when our interests—and I mean
Commonwealth interests as well as local Tanganyika interests—will best be served
by some indication of the sequence of the constitutional steps we have in mind, and
when each step can reasonably be expected to be taken. Indeed, after the
recommendations of the Post Elections Committee1 have been considered and
adjusted, and agreed by the Secretary of State, we shall have no alternative but to
make some kind of further constitutional announcement, and I do not see how, in
making that statement, we can avoid presenting some specific plan for the years
ahead.
I think it may help you in thinking about this matter if I set out a forecast of the
phases through which we can expect to pass between now and April 1960. Assuming
that the problem is not complicated by the intrusion of additional factors, such as a
new political party or a deliberate campaign of subversion sponsored from outside
the Territory, we can, I think, expect the following:—
Phase I. Starting March 1959. My announcement of the introduction of unofficial
ministers (on a 2–1–1 basis) into the Government and of the terms of reference of
the Post Elections Committee. I shall also have to make some reference to
subsequent constitutional changes in relation to the further development of the
Ministerial system and explain that this is a matter which should be dealt with by
the Government and the Secretary of State rather than by a local Committee.
Nyerere,2 in the debate on what I have said, will almost certainly ask for an
assurance that these constitutional matters will be considered by the appropriate
authorities at the same time as the terms of reference of the Post Elections
1 Chaired by Sir R Ramage: see note 7 to next document.
2 Julius K Nyerere, president of Tanganyika African National Union (TANU); he became chief minister in
1960 and president on independence, 1962–1985.
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Committee are being considered by that Committee; he will also be likely to ask
that an announcement on future constitutional matters will be made at the same
time as we announce our acceptance, modification or rejection of the
recommendations of the Committee. I do not think it will be possible for us to
avoid giving these assurances.
Phase II. Starting July 1959. The beginning of the interim period, i.e. the
replacement of the Executive Council by a Council of Ministers containing four
unofficial ministers and the relegation (if you agree) of the Executive Council to a
subordinate position. The present indications are that Nyerere will join the
Government and do his utmost to make the new machine work until the Post
Elections Committee and the body responsible for working out constitutional
changes have reported. We can, I think, assume that he will do what he can to play
down the cry of “self-government in 1959”; although, as I have already observed in
another letter to you, the expectation of sweeping changes is so strong that
however hard Nyerere tried he could not expunge the idea from the people’s
minds. Generally, we can expect support from the responsible nationalist leaders
during this period; but the irresponsible elements may well try to exploit the
frustration which, in some areas and in some sectors of the community, will be felt
when “uhuru” does not come in 1959. There is also a possibility of a new political
leader using the situation to advance himself and to discredit Nyerere. (I have in
mind Oscar Kambona who is due to return to Tanganyika this year).
Phase III. Starting between November 1959 and March 1960. The Government’s
views on the recommendations of the Post Elections Committee are made public.
The leaders of TANU, who still have very hazy ideas about the mechanics of
legislation and of electoral changes, will imagine that it will be possible to hold an
election forthwith. In fact, of course, we shall need a minimum of nine months to
vary the constituency boundaries, amend the legislation and draw up new voters’
rolls. The very earliest therefore that an election could take place would be
September 1960; even this would be a scramble and we might well have to put it
off until 1961. The longer we can spin out the process, the better for us,
provided—and the proviso is an important one—that we can carry the
responsible nationalist leaders with us and get them to lend their support to our
explanations of what is going on.
In spite of the hopes which have been placed in the Post Elections Committee
the effect of its recommendations will be far less than the effect of the
announcement of the results of our examination of the constitutional future.
TANU has staked everything on securing a majority of elected members in the next
Legislative Council and, at the same time, a majority of unofficial elected ministers
in the Council of Ministers; and the strength of the movement should not be
underestimated. The constitutional body will therefore have to decide whether to
sustain the policy of the gradual approach by requiring that the arrangements for
the interim period shall be continued for the life of a further Legislative Council
before more unofficials are introduced into the Government, or to accept the
TANU demand and see how it can best be modified and adapted to make the
changes as least disadvantageous as possible.
I propose to have a look at the probable results of adopting each course. The effect
of rejecting the TANU demand and of requiring the interim arrangements to be
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continued for a further four years would, I am convinced, be most unhappy. Briefly
we could expect the following:—
(a) Nyerere would lose face to such an extent he would be compelled to leave the
Government;
(b) he might stage a walk-out of Legislative Council; if he did he would take all the
African and Asian elected members and one or two of the Europeans with him;
(c) TANU would start on its long-promised campaign of positive action; the
campaign would take the form of defiance of all authority—that of the
Government and of the Chiefs and the Chiefs’ Councils, Courts, Government
offices and Native Authority. Barazas would be boycotted; unlawful courts
sponsored by TANU would be set up; the Unions would weigh in with strikes and
the hooligans with noisy demonstrations; there would be intimidation of the
loyalists and besetting of their shops and businesses. (I don’t exaggerate this; we
have had a trial run in the Lake Province);
(d) The European and Asian plantation industry would be singled out for attack; I
don’t see how it could survive if the campaign were in any way prolonged.
In other words we should find ourselves faced with civil disturbances on a very
wide scale. It is not unlikely that they would be planned and assisted from outside the
Territory, and timed to coincide with similar action in other parts of East and Central
Africa.
The other alternative would be to accept TANU’s demand and to attempt to water
down the ill-effects by bargaining for safeguards such as the Territorial Council and
the introduction of the fully elected majority in two or three stages instead of at one
single step. It is, I fear, inevitable that such a move, quite apart from forcing the pace
in a way which we have all been trying to avoid, and presenting grave embarrassment
to our neighbours, would bring with it many of those bad results which naturally
follow the assumption of authority by those unfitted to exercise it. But I should be
less worried about the behaviour of the new Ministers than about the reactions of the
TANU adherents in the towns and the Provinces; for in this exercise we should not be
dealing with rational disciplined men anxious for the dawn of an era of sweetness,
light and co-operation, but with a collection of peasants with a very limited
knowledge of Tanganyika, and almost none of the outside world; prominent amongst
them, especially in the towns, would be hooligans anxious to turn the tables on those
who, so they will have been taught, have been their oppressors. We could expect six
months of disorder during which time the minor TANU officials in the Provinces
would demonstrate their capacity to play a leading part in the government of the
country by bullying and extortion and by insolence to District Commissioners.
How would we handle each of these two conjectural situations? I don’t want to
appear alarmist but I should be deceiving myself if I said that I had sufficient force at
my command to cope with the kind of situation which would arise if the full weight
of TANU were organised against the Government. (One of the reasons for the Lake
troubles having died down is that the central directive of TANU was on our side; here
they would all be against us). The Police Force is so small that it scarcely makes itself
felt outside the towns; there are no Tribal Police; the machine upon which we depend
for the maintenance of law and order in the rural areas was designed for an earlier
day, and cannot now be relied upon except in fair weather conditions; and we have no
money. I could build up an organisation capable of containing anything that the
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positive action men could produce in 1960; but I should want financial assistance on
a substantial scale and a lot more men. The situation would be very different from
that which existed in Kenya from 1950 onwards; for TANU would have a 90%
following, and unless one wanted to provoke a civil war, it would be almost
impossible to organise any strong body of loyalists. Indeed, we might not be able to
recruit the extra Police we should need; TANU would prevent it.
We could certainly suppress the agitation but the cost would be prodigious; Egypt
and Russia would encourage the malcontents; the Americans would sympathise with
them; and the Labour Party would make an issue of it in the United Kingdom. We
should end up with the population embittered and the plantation industry wrecked.
If we adopted the second alternative we should have to face, as I have said, a bad six
months of arrogance and general showing off; but I think we should have the
strength to deal with the sporadic kind of indiscipline that could be expected; and we
should have all but the extreme nationalists with us. In these circumstances we
could use our security forces promptly and vigorously without fear of serious
repercussions in the Legislative Council. (I should explain that the African Back
Benchers on the Government side are as scared of TANU as is the Indian Association).
With regard to the Central Government my feeling is that if we accepted the
principle of an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers it should not be beyond
us to work out a programme which would ensure the continuance of a stable,
sensible Government for a considerable time ahead. I don’t deceive myself that the
move would not be premature; but these chaps will be little more ready for self-
government in fifty years time than they will be in fifteen, and it may be better to
take the chance of going ahead too fast than to risk a wholesale insurrection which
would certainly destroy the economy of the country and might have even more
dangerous consequences.
We should have to make the best bargain we could. If we handled the matter in the
right way and had a fair share of the luck which so often determines what happens at
these conferences, we might be able to get, in return for our acceptance of the
principle of an unofficial majority, both the Territorial Council and agreement to a
reasonably long period of continuing Colonial Office control. What I should hope to
get would be:—
(a) the introduction of the Territorial Council;
(b) the reorganisation of the Government on the basis of five official ministers,
four unofficial elected ministers (i.e. the four we propose to appoint this year) and
three unofficial nominated ministers; these nominated ministers would be
replaced after the life-time of one Legislative Council by three more unofficial
elected ministers.
The four elected ministers in the 1960/61–1964/65 Government would be the two
Africans, the one European and the one Asian. For the nominated members I should
like to have one European and two Africans; but I should be reluctant to commit
myself on this point at present for our foremost need will be a Government that can
continue to function efficiently. The seven elected ministers for the
1964/65–1965/69 Government would be four Africans and three others; and provided
we chose the two European ministers aright we ought to be able to rely upon them to
side with the Officials to prevent the Africans from perpetrating any major
nonsenses.
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All this brings me back to the question of the timetable. The arguments for it are
these:—
(a) For some years past we have stressed both here and at U.N.O. that we have
accepted the duty of preparing the Territory for self-government as rapidly and as
thoroughly as possible; we cannot go on putting off the announcement of a
programme—even a tentative one—for very much longer.
(b) The nationalists learnt a lot at the recent Accra Conference and a campaign of
“positive action”—if it were introduced—would be likely to be well planned and to
cover the whole of the Territory.
(c) Even if we can avoid mentioning a date for self-government in connection with
the British Somaliland announcement we shall not be able to avoid inferring a
date; the nationalist leaders here have no illusions about the state of advancement
of the Protectorate and would redouble their demands for a date for Tanganyika.
(d) The proposal to grant Nigeria independence in 1960 is well known and much
talked about.
(e) If Nyerere accepts a Ministry and is to continue as a Minister for any length of
time, it seems to be most desirable that I should agree with him certain matters of
basic policy; and the most important of such matters from his point of view is
certain to be future constitutional development. If he becomes a Minister in July
1959, and if, when, the outcome of the Post Election Committee’s deliberations are
made known, no announcement, acceptable to him as a compromise, is made as
regards a constitutional timetable, it is unlikely that he would continue as a
Minister. The probability is that he would resign from the Government so as to
make a political sensation; there would then be a real danger of his embarking
upon another exercise on lines similar to the present “self/responsible
Government in 1959” which would soon get completely out of control.
(f) The African nominated members of the Government side in the Legislative
Council are what I would call responsible nationalists. They are not members of
TANU, but they are in sympathy with TANU’s ultimate aim; I am advised by my
Ministers that it is doubtful if they would accept the Government whip if by doing so
it meant irrevocably antagonising TANU; indeed, on one occasion we have been
forced into an ignominious climb down through our inability to be certain of their
support. The announcement of a timetable would strengthen them and ensure their
allegiance. If we have not their full support we cannot pursue the policy I think is
necessary—that of constitutional carrots combined with a stern disciplinary whip.
(g) Both the Civil Service and the local investors are becoming very uneasy in
their minds; it would reassure them all if they knew roughly what period of service
under the Colonial Office they still had before them, and in the case of the
plantation industries what programme of planting and developing they could
safely embark upon.
(h) It can, I think, be argued that if we agree now upon a stage by stage
programme of constitutional development in the Territory, the result will be that
we will in fact retain our direct responsibility for Tanganyika for a longer period
than we would if we did not; and that when the ultimate transfer of power takes
place it will be made in a more harmonious atmosphere, thus preserving the
British influence after full independence, than if we had not had a planned
timetable.
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(i) I have a feeling that Nyerere, who fully recognises how dependent he is upon
the expatriate officials both as administrators and as technical men, would fall in
with the programme I have suggested.
This, then, is the picture as I see it. Unless you feel that I am on quite the wrong
lines I would like to include a passage in my March address to Legislative Council on
the lines that:—
(a) The first constitutional change in the structure of the Government is about to
be made.
(b) While the Post Elections Committee is at work I shall be in consultation with
the Secretary of State concerning the possibility of further advances in this field.
(c) An announcement concerning these further advances will be made when the
outcome of the Post Election Committee’s report is made known.
(d) But if there is a further outbreak of organised defiance of the law and
contempt for authority such as occurred in the Lake Province, the Government
will have to devote all its resources to keeping the peace and maintaining the rule
of law, and constitutional change will just have to wait.
I am aware that a great deal of what I have said in this letter is conjecture and
that much of it will be far from palatable to the Secretary of State. Briefly, we have
to decide soon which of two possible alternatives we are going to adopt; one would
be likely to result in civil disturbances on a scale which would be beyond our
resources to cope with; the other would seriously endanger the whole concept of
the gradual approach and could not fail to damage the position of the other East
African territories. What I have suggested I should say in March commits us to
neither line.
I should welcome your advice as to how we would set about studying the
implications of the dilemma that confronts us.
141 CO 822/1449, no 229 12 May 1959
[Tanganyika: proposed constitutional advance]: letter from Sir R
Turnbull to W L Gorell Barnes.  Minutes by Mr Amery, F D Webber,
W L Gorell Barnes, Sir J Macpherson, Lord Perth and Mr Lennox-Boyd
[Turnbull first indicated by telegram that he was making new proposals. This telegram
went straight to the S of S via Gorell Barnes, who minuted: ‘I do not believe that in the
last resort we can stick out against the Governor’s wishes if he sticks to them, and if the
other two Governors, having been consulted, do not raise any objections. On the other
hand, I am extremely unhappy about the way things are going in Tanganyika’. He
suggested that Turnbull’s convictions must be tested against ‘our doubts and worries’; he
was particularly concerned about the “slippery slope” possibilities and repercussions
elsewhere in East Africa. Lennox-Boyd minuted that it was ‘disturbing’: ‘We gave consent
at Chequers to the phased programme for Tanganyika on the assumption, almost the
assurance, that there was a very good chance of delaying the approach of virtual internal
self-government until 1969. I agree that it is essential to test the depth of Sir R Turnbull’s
convictions on this & that a probing telegram should be sent at once. . . . I think the
prospects of a showdown in Tanganyika are steadily growing’ (minutes, 6 & 7 May 1959,
& 12 May). The very difficult decision to be made, then, was whether to stick with the
Chequers Plan or take the calculated risk of accepting the ‘Turnbull Plan’ for a much
speedier constitutional advance (minute by W B L Monson, 31 Aug 1959).]
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I am writing to you to fill in the gaps of my long constitutional telegram to the
Secretary of State. Let me start by admitting that I did not foresee that T.E.M.O.1
would develop into the monolithic, strictly disciplined structure that it has become.
We had hoped, judging on past performances and conversations prior to the election,
that at least a few of the Europeans in Council would ally themselves with the
interests of the Chiefs and would exercise a moderating influence on T.A.N.U; I had
envisaged a Right Wing of the Opposition which would have been strong enough
either to have abstained from voting or on occasions to have voted with the
Government. The Asians are so daunted by the whole nationalist movement that I did
not expect to see them deviate in any way from the strict party line.
The fact that events have not moved as we hoped they would is largely due to the
transfer of the Chiefs’ allegiance to T.A.N.U; it took some time for the effects of the
statement they made in the second week of March to sink in, but there can be no
doubt that it had a profound effect on both Europeans and Asians. The result has
been, as I indicated in my telegram, that T.E.M.O. has been immensely strengthened
and that at present there is not one of its members who would be willing to incur its
displeasure. The Europeans in particular feel that if their future in the Territory is to
be assured they must now prove themselves to be the champions of constitutional
advance; they must lead now lest they find themselves on the shelf in the future.
They are therefore urging Nyerere ahead rather than attempting to put a brake on
him. T.E.M.O. is in fact—at least to all outward appearances—an example of the
precise kind of institution that we have for so long been advocating. It is a non-racial
body of Tanganyikans, every member of which is dedicated to the development of a
non-racial society, and has cheerfully subordinated his traditional feelings to the
furtherance of the Organisation’s aims. Further, it contrives to give the outside and
uninformed world the impression that all communities are at one in their demand
for early and sweeping constitutional advances, and that the Government, for selfish
and personal reasons, are deliberately delaying the developments that a united
Tanganyika is so eagerly awaiting. The cement that binds T.E.M.O. together is not
only a temporary and rather emotional loyalty, plus a fear of the consequence of
defection, but a common determination to replace the present form of Government
by one in which unofficials will have a numerical superiority.
Another factor which is influencing T.E.M.O. and the African politicians in their
quest for the great panacea of an unofficial majority is the financial situation. There
is a growing feeling, encouraged I suspect by the Americans, that it is better to be
broke and independent than to be broke and have to rely on the United Kingdom; the
latter plight may ensure enough help to provide the essential minimum but the
former will open the way to entry into the Territory of untold millions of dollars. The
whole thing is rather reminiscent of the attitude “If-only-I-had-an-airgun-I’d-be-
happy-and-well-behaved”; and just about as susceptible of being explained away by
rational argument.
There is at present no prospect of a split in T.E.M.O. The solidarity recently
displayed in the debate on Section 63B is an example of the willingness with which
even the more responsible European members will subordinate their opinions to
those of the Organisation. Rocks upon which it might founder are those of revulsion
from extreme statements, self-preservation and lessons of experience; but I have little
1 Tanganyika Elected Members’ Organisation.
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faith in any of them. Lady Chesham2 has already shared a platform with Mwakangale3
in which he gave vent to one of his usual anti-European tirades; one would expect the
Europeans to recognise the need for a properly equipped Police Force, but the 63B
episode is an indication of what is likely to happen when the Police Estimates are
considered by Council in the forth coming Budget debate; and lessons of experience
take so long to sink in that we should be unwise to place any reliance upon them. We
could, I suppose, break this unity by exploiting the places of weakness which cannot
fail to exist between the Africans and the Asians, and the Africans and the Europeans,
but there would be a grave danger in attempting to split the Organisation on racial
lines, and I certainly do not contemplate a move of this sort. Generally, therefore, my
forecast is that T.E.M.O. will hold together until they achieve their target of a
majority of unofficial ministers; once that point has been gained, difficulties and
jealousies are likely to arise, and the Organisation may perhaps split up into
moderate and extreme factions.
Looking ahead until the end of the present session, it is clear that if we are to put
through any matter which is in the least contentious, we shall have to use our official
majority. I shall have no hesitation about doing so, but a point that we have
continually to bear in mind is that our backbenchers are almost as committed to the
idea of a majority of unofficial ministers as are the members of the Opposition, so
that every time we use the majority we are likely to weaken the resolve of the men
upon whom we depend to provide that majority. When the new session opens, we
shall have to tread very warily; we shall in fact be in for a period of Government by
agreement. If we come to some point of principle upon which it is impossible to
compromise, we shall just have to grasp the nettle—but in doing so we must be
certain in our minds that the circumstances are such as to warrant the jettisoning of
the recent advances and a return to a fully official government. I need scarcely say
that I should not like the idea of retracing our steps; we know by experience that a
period of impasse must be followed by a period of negotiation and bargaining, and
that the outcome is likely to be concessions on a far more lavish scale than we would
originally have been prepared to grant.
It is possible that I may have misjudged the situation and that a change will be
apparent after the entry into the Government of the five Unofficial Ministers; but the
more experienced of our present Ministers feel that, unless we re-examine our
strategy, we shall be faced with this monolithic block of opinion until a stage is
reached at which there is an Unofficial Elected Chief Minister and a majority of
Elected Ministers.
How then are we to extricate ourselves from the embarrassing position of
Government by the permission of T.E.M.O; how can we devise a fulcrum upon which
we can base ourselves in order to control this steadily rising pressure and at the same
time secure the reasonable co-operation of the Elected Members? My present
thinking inclines me to the view—a view which is shared by Trotman and Davies, as
well as by Fletcher-Cooke4—that the only way open to us is to divert the energies of
2 Mary, Lady Chesham, wife of the parliamentary secretary of state, Ministry of Transport, since 1959.
3 J B Mwakangale Mugogo, TANU member and president of Rungwe African Co-operative Union Ltd,
1959–1961.
4 A E Trotman, minister for natural resources, 1957–1960 (knighted 1961, but died before the Letters Patent
issued). M J Davies, minister for constitutional affairs, 1959. J Fletcher-Cooke, minister for constitutional
affairs, 1956–1959, chief secretary, 1959–1960 (sometime acting-governor), deputy governor, 1960–1961.
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this monolithic force into channels in which it will have a feeling of responsibility
and the appearance of responsibility, but in which it cannot tamper with matters of
real importance, such as the maintenance of law and order, the Civil Service, the
overall economic structure and the ordinary development of African Local
Government.
Our first step should, I think, be to plan for an election in 1960. I am aware that we
hoped in our Chequers talks to postpone this move until 1961, but it is now even
more important to resolve the present impasse; and in any case, the pressure for an
election as soon as is reasonably possible after the Post Elections Committee has
reported, would be extremely difficult to withstand. Having appointed a Post
Elections Committee and accepted, possibly in a modified form, the
recommendations it makes, we could not, especially in the present political climate,
deliberately hold off from going to the polls. It will take some time to amend the
Order in Council, amend the relevant legislation and draw up new Electoral Rolls,
but I believe that we would be subjecting ourselves to justifiable criticism if we
strung this process out for longer than nine months. We have, too, to bear in mind
that a U.N. Mission will be visiting the Territory in the summer of 1960.
You will remember that I proposed at Chequers that after this election we should
move to an unofficial majority composed partly of elected unofficials and partly of
nominated unofficials, and that I subsequently amended my ideas to provide for a
parity of officials and unofficials for the next period. My reasons for dropping the idea
of specifically nominated unofficial ministers was that it was apparent, even in
February, that no African would accept a Ministry unless he had the backing of
T.A.N.U. behind him. The idea of a half and half government is still an attractive one
and would, I think, have been acceptable to a divided T.E.M.O; but it certainly won’t
to the present Organisation, for it has committed itself so often and so publicly to a
majority of unofficial ministers that it now could accept nothing less. And since the
five unofficial ministers who are about to join the Government will have to be
associated with our December statement, I do not see how we shall be able to avoid
moving to a majority of unofficial ministers after the next election; the majority
would be of one only and there would be no question of T.E.M.O. forming a
Ministry—Ministers would be appointed by individual invitation as at present. The
racial composition would be four Africans, two Europeans and one Asian. There
would be a chance, I am told, of Nyerere coming in if he could get the Educational
portfolio. This arrangement would be expected to last for the life of one Legislative
Council; towards the end of 1963 the whole position would be reviewed in order to
consider what move forward should be made after the 1964 elections. 1963 may seem
a little early, but we have to remember that in that year there will be yet another U.N.
Visiting Mission in the Territory and that we shall wish at that time to have our
politicians occupied with domestic matters of real weight and not with the cooking-
up of imaginary grievances.
T.A.N.U.’s second major demand concerns the introduction of an unofficial
majority into the Legislative Council. Here we come to the most difficult of our
problems. Once having accepted a majority of unofficial ministers in the Executive
Government, we could scarcely cavil at the introduction of a majority of elected
members in the Legislature; and I doubt if there would be any point in retaining
power to make extra nominations to the Government side, for by that time it will
have become so difficult to find back-benchers willing to be enlisted for the express
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purpose of defeating T.E.M.O. that we might just as well certify and have done with it.
But we cannot allow ourselves to get into a position in which a majority of unofficial
ministers supported by a majority of elected councillors could dictate policy which
would touch the pockets not of Tanganyika taxpayers but of the United Kingdom. It is
for this reason that I suggested that we might have to adopt some constitutional
device, such as the diarchy principle, which would give Legislative Council full
control over a wide range of subjects but would give the Governor sole powers in
relation to others. The more I think of this idea the more I am attracted by it; it
would prevent the ministerial majority or the parliamentary majority from
monkeying with the Police, or the K.A.R. (if they are still under our control), and
would enable us to take steps which would remove the growing misgivings of the
expatriate civil servants. Unfortunately, I have never worked with such a system and
am still not properly informed on its advantages and disadvantages, and its possible
long term results; I shall be examining the idea in consultation with Fletcher-Cooke
and Cole5 both of whom know something of its working, and will let you have more
definite proposals as soon as I can.
In the 1960–1964 period it will, I hope, be possible for our energies to be devoted
to solving some of the dozen major problems which are now being neglected while
people shout for “Uhuru”, and the Government tries to avoid a campaign of passive
resistance. I am well aware of the possibility of our having to contend in this period
with extreme factions which, under the influence of Ghana, Nigeria, the Congo, or of
countries further afield, will demand even more sweeping and even more rapid
changes. Such a development would, one hopes, result either in dividing T.E.M.O. or
in consolidating the Organisation in a moderate line; but in the present political
climate of Africa the reverse might equally well happen, and I therefore come back to
the desirability of some kind of diarchy in which the Budget would be broken up into
Order in Council subjects and Legislature subjects. If we had the essential law and
order matters under the Governor, and the remainder under the Legislative Council,
we should be in a much stronger position than if we had to seek the authority of an
unwilling, or possibly semi-disaffected, House every time we needed an extra Police
vehicle.
The following period from 1964–1968 is too far ahead for any reliable forecast. The
Legislative Council of those years will, I suppose, be the last one before internal self-
government is thrust upon the country, and the way in which we weather the period
will depend on a score of factors none of which can be properly evaluated today.
There will be party politics, intense emotional demands for universal adult franchise,
and constant interference from the Trusteeship Council; there may even be a Labour
administration in the United Kingdom. The Chief Secretary will, I imagine, be
replaced by a Chief Minister, who will become the Leader of the House, and will, with
his political colleagues, be largely responsible for the formulation of policy in the
non-reserved field. Civil Service ministers will retain the portfolios of Finance,
Economic Development, Legal Affairs and Internal Security; and it will be up to us to
ensure that there is proper minority representation in the Government. On the
assumption that the country will still be in need of financial aid, it should not be
difficult to extend the diarchy constitution into this period.
5 J S R Cole, QC, attorney-general, 1956–1961.
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Mention of the Territory’s financial position brings me back to the point I made
earlier about the supposed advantages of insolvent independence over insolvent
dependence. The Africans are convinced that America will play the role of the fairy
godmother; and some of them are already saying “And, of course, there is always
Russia”. I know how strongly H.M.’s Treasury feel about being used as a milch cow
for overseas dependencies, but I am convinced that if we are to hold the position here
from 1960–1968, and to keep some reasonable degree of control when internal self-
government is achieved, H.M.G. will have to put their hands fairly deeply into their
pockets. An annual subvention specially intended for secondary education and for the
training of local civil servants would probably make all the difference between an
orderly ten years and a precipitate slide to premature self-government in the hope of
getting aid from outside the Commonwealth.
There are a number of other matters I could usefully touch upon in this letter, but
it is already far too long, so I will save myself for the next round. I should add that, on
the assumption that the Post Elections Committee will turn down the idea of a
Territorial Council, we should retain the Executive Council for the 1960–1964
period, and indeed for as long as T.E.M.O. retains its present monolithic quality.
Minutes on 141
I can’t help being disturbed by the contents, and even more by the tone, of these and
other recent telegrams from Tanganyika. They seem to run counter to the
conclusions which, as I understood them, we had reached at the Chequers meeting.6
2. I appreciate that the Governor is up against very great difficulties. What
concerns me most is that his telegrams give the impression either that he doesn’t
realise that we are being pushed off the Chequers line, or that he doesn’t greatly care
if we are. We seem to be reverting to the policy of drift which the Chequers meeting
was called to correct.
3. Should we stick to the Chequers line even if it involves using force? Should we
abandon it in favour of more concessions? I don’t pretend to know the answer; but I
do feel that we ought not simply to acquiesce in the abandonment of the Chequers
line without very careful consideration here and, if necessary, with the Governors
concerned.7
J.A.
13.5.59
Mr. Gorell Barnes
. . . 2. Before coming on to the main argument, I should like to make the following
points in outline:—
(1) Timing of Governor’s next statement. There is no point at all in delaying this
merely for the sake of delay. After all, at Chequers we consistently talked about
6 Held on 24–25 Jan 1959: see document no 116 above.
7 As a result of this minute, Gorell Barnes arranged for Mr Amery to see the whole file, to make it plain
‘that we have all been worried by this and that, as yet, no passes have been sold’ (14.5.59).
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“January 1960”. Furthermore, if the Ramage Committee finishes its work by the
end of July,8 there will be, as the Governor says in his letter to Sir Frederick
Crawford (233), five months of the present year in which to do the business. But
having said all that, I feel very doubtful whether it would be right to aim at a
further statement this year. We must not forget that the Post Elections Committee
will be doing some extremely important work in connection with the
representative side of Legislative Council and the minorities representation, and
that we shall have to do our best to work out very carefully where the
recommendations are likely to lead us. The abolition of the compulsory tripartite
vote is one of Nyerere’s four demands. It is equally in our interest to abolish it if in
so doing we can secure some effective representation of Asians and Europeans in
the new Legislative Council which will not be the farce that the present
representation of these races is. Therefore, we must put the Governor on notice
that when he has got the report of the Committee in his hands we expect that his
people will be doing the necessary statistical homework so that we shall all have a
clear idea of where the recommendations may lead us so that, if necessary, we
can have some effective alternatives to consider.
This is all bound to take time. So also will the necessary consultation with the
East African Governors on all aspects of the matter. But this apart, there is the
important question raised in (231) by Sir Frederick Crawford. I should have
thought it very important that we should at least know where the Wild Committee
is likely to take us before final decisions are reached on Tanganyika.9 If this is
accepted we shall have to put this to both Governors with the aim of getting
Tanganyika to be a bit more relaxed about the timetable and getting Uganda to
complete their work with all possible speed. I think also that if Mr. Nyerere sees the
Secretary of State he should be left with no expectation that final decisions will be
announced before the end of the year; so he could be equally assured that
Government is not dragging its feet.
(2) Date of next Tanganyika election. I do not much like the thought of an election
immediately on top of a visit by the Visiting Mission. On the other hand, whether
we have the election in 1960 or 1961 is not so important as the content of the
Governor’s next statement. I think the principle we should work on is that as soon
as decisions have been reached and that statement made, we should begin
preparing for a new election and that in order to avoid putting too much strain on
the Administration we should aim at having the elections in February 1961. On
this basis the new Government would come in more or less at the outset of budget
planning for the year 1961/62.
(3) Security. In coming to decisions now we must bear in mind that the Governor
will have no significantly stronger police forces at his disposal at the end of the
year than he has now. We had some time ago a full assessment by the Governor of
what might happen and would be needed to contain it and we need not go over
that particular exercise again. But we ought to find out from him whether, if we
decided on a policy which fell short of T.A.N.U. demands, there was a reasonable
prospect of his being able to nip in the bud large scale disaffection, e.g. by a sort of
8 Sir R Ramage, chairman of Public Service Commission, Uganda 1956–1959, chairman of post-election
constitutional committee, Tanganyika, 1959.
9 See document no 121 above.
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“crash action” involving the detention of T.A.N.U. committee men in all branches,
or at any rate in the branches in the most difficult parts.
(4) No decisions on the next steps in Tanganyika should be taken without
careful regard to the position of the Civil Service. Their deteriorating morale has
been dealt an inadvertent blow by the Governor’s recent speech to the Association
at which he assured them that there would be a need for expatriates for some years
to come. This is not the assurance they wanted. They would like to see the air
cleared by a definite statement of when self-government will be granted and an
equally definite statement that before the date people will be given an option to
take compensation worked out more or less on Ghana lines. They are not only
worried about present cost of living; they are also worried about the gradual
erosion of their conditions of service. They fear that it is not the intention to
compensate them and that they will therefore be compelled to stay on in a
Tanganyika where life will become more and more unbearable for themselves and
their families. (If this were the case they would probably leave the country anyway
despite the financial risk). The T.A.N.U. people are openly telling them that there
will be no compensation and on the general political plane the Europeans have
been told that they will be the house-boys in the new Tanganyika.
(I mention this here because it is no use talking about carrying on in an ordered
way the policy of preparing the people for self-government if we have no effective
instrument to carry that out. It may well be that Nyerere genuinely realises that
without British help even after self-government the country will relapse into
chaos. If that is the case it is important that the Civil Service should be, so to
speak, a weapon that we can use effectively in any negotiations; and the best way of
ensuring that would be to pay them compensation at some very early date and
then put them all on a contract basis. For Tanganyika alone this might cost
something of the order of £10 million. The money might not have to be paid at the
time but could perhaps be funded against the time when they finally severed their
connection with the country). What we do not want to happen is to have a long
painful row about the “criterion” of readiness for self-government and find that
through sheer desperation much of the Civil Service have decided to throw in
their hands. We must find a way of building up their morale and confidence,
ensuring that the best of them continue to serve the country and at the same time
ensuring that they are not exploited by local politicians. I do not see how this can
be done, if H.M. Government is not prepared to foot the bill. Another possibility is,
of course, that of taking over the Civil Service charges including future pensions
on a United Kingdom vote.
(5) The “new” situation described in the Governor’s letter is not in fact markedly
different from what he described to us at Chequers or what we could reasonably
have assumed would develop from his analysis then. It is true that subsequently
the Chiefs came out in favour of T.A.N.U. and that the so-called Independents have
equally joined forces with the other Elected Members. But at Chequers Sir Richard
Turnbull had had no great hopes in the Chiefs forming a moderate counter-weight
or indeed in there being any kind of solid opposition to T.A.N.U. in the months to
come. So we must not be unduly persuaded to think that the Chequers’ strategy
should be revised because of a so-called new situation. The Chequers’ strategy was
devised with pretty well full knowledge that T.A.N.U. was a monolithic creation
with a very powerful influence in the country. The two things which have
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happened since March 17th and which are of considerable significance are (a)
Nyerere’s refusal to join the Government and (b) the continuing all-out onslaught
on the Government since the March 17th “concordat”. We realised at Chequers
that the programme would lead to trouble at the end of the year but we were not
sure whether there would be earlier trouble in March. In coming out into the open
immediately after their grudging acceptance of the March 17th agreement,
T.A.N.U. and their adherents have, I think, shown their true colours; and we must
keep this point in mind.
3. The crucial question to be decided is whether the next step (it does not much
matter whether it is 1960 or 1961) should be to introduce an unofficial majority in
the Council of Ministers and whether to safeguard vital interests we should put into
operation the kind of diarchical system the Governor is now thinking about. On
strict merits the country will not be ready for an elected majority in 1960 or 1961.
Unfortunately the same is true of 1964 or 1965. So those of us who are aware that we
have been working on a programme which would delay the introduction of an
elected majority until 1965 are bound in all honesty to ask ourselves whether
(realising that on merits both timetables are ludicrous anyway) it is worthwhile
having a serious row for the sake of four years when to all intents and purposes
everyone on the other side is united and happy and giving such a wonderful example
of multi-racial co-operation. Is it not better to preserve this precious asset (people
will ask) even if it means fore-shortening the period when power will be transferred?
Have we not said all along that we shall not relinquish our responsibilities until we
are satisfied that the races have learnt to live with each other?
I doubt if we could attempt to answer this question at this juncture. I rather agree
with Sir Richard Turnbull that there will probably not be a half-way house (e.g. parity
of unofficial and official Ministers) between the position as from the 1st July and an
unofficial majority. But until we have seen the outcome of the Post Elections
Committee Report we should not necessarily rule out the original Chequers’
possibility of having an unofficial majority in 1961 but partly nominated. More
important, by the time we come to consider that report and to make final decisions
on Tanganyika’s Ministers, we shall be very close to a general election here if we are
not in fact in the throes of one, so no final views can be taken now. Sir Frederick
Crawford told me on the 31st May that if Tanganyika advanced their timetable by four
years he would in all probability have to do the same though there would be no case
for doing so on the strict Uganda merits. There would almost certainly be pressure
for a major advance in Zanzibar and we should have all this hanging over the Kenya
conference.
My own view on this is that leaving aside the repercussions in the other territories
it would be a complete abrogation of responsibility to launch responsible
government so soon as 1960 or 1961. We have gone very quickly in Tanganyika and
we must consolidate—in the interests of the people themselves. I do not believe that
Nyerere is a moderate and I think that once he gets control the Europeans and Asians
will have a very bad time of it. We can after all face the world with a clear conscience
on Tanganyika.10 We have gone a long way to meet the desire of the nationalists for
greater responsibility and we have more than sufficiently carried out our obligations.
10 Sir J Macpherson wrote in the margin against this sentence: ‘This is very important’.
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By the time we are ready to reach final decisions the unofficial Ministers will have
been in operation only a very few months in the course of which there may well have
been only one meeting of Legislative Council. They will not have had to take any
share in the formation of even one budget. Except in isolated cases, there is no
effective local government. The output from the educational system is still
appallingly inadequate.
4. If because of reluctance to have a major clash in Tanganyika T.A.N.U. must be
given its head, I doubt whether it would be quite so simple as agreeing that there
should be an unofficial elected majority after the next elections. There would in fact
be a terrific tussle about the 7 unofficial portfolios. I doubt myself whether even at
this stage Nyerere would join the Government. The most that we could expect from
him is that he would join the Government under these circumstances provided that
he was accorded a position of leader of Government business or equivalent. I feel
quite certain that he will not accept a portfolio until he is or within sight of being
Chief Minister. Anyway, assuming some sort of concordat was reached at the end of
the year on the basis of 7 unofficials to 5 officials, the Government would from that
point onwards be subjected to the same kind of pressures as now. “The presence of 5
officials in the Government holding important portfolios would be anachronistic in
modern Tanganyika, etc. etc.” Attacks in the countryside would be intensified against
the Government and the Civil Service and we should remain under pressure to
declare a date for full self-government and, for example, to convene a large scale
London conference within a few years to work out details. In the meantime little
progress will have been made to localise the Government machine and to keep the
country economically on its feet. If, therefore, our minds are thinking in terms of
giving way on the unofficial majority issue, we should not assume that that will give
us any reasonable breathing space to prepare a long term policy for organising
extended control by H.M. Government over vital matters affecting the area as a
whole.
5. You will doubtless wish to send these papers forward with a view to discussion
with Ministers. Subject to that discussion I think that the points to be made in reply
to the Governor are as follows:—
(a) We recognise his difficulties but he will not be surprised that his letter has
caused some alarm and despondency here. We shall be interested to see his further
thoughts about a diarchical system. We shall study those with great care though
our first reaction is that we stand a greater chance of success in preserving H.M.
Government’s vital interest in Tanganyika or the area as a whole if we move by way
of controlling transfer of power rather than by at the outset dividing power. It is
probably very difficult to put into force any kind of a formal diarchy in a country
where we are committed to the eventual grant of full self-government.
(b) We cannot come at this juncture to a clear decision on the content of the
Governor’s forthcoming statement (a) because of possible election complications
this end and (b) we should first have digested the Ramage Committee Report. For
the moment, however, he should work on the basis that the official majority will
not be relinquished on the next round.
(c) We hope there can be some gentle toughening up vis-a-vis the more
outrageous utterances of T.A.N.U. so that they can be immediately forthrightly
denied.
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(d) We are concerned that police expansion is not going ahead as rapidly as we had
hoped. If we foresaw a real row at the end of the year has he plans to nip it in the
bud by e.g. the rapid arrest of T.A.N.U. leaders (assuming, of course, the proper
legislative preparation).
(e) We are very concerned about the Civil Service. We understand there is a
petition on its way to the Secretary of State and assume he will soon be letting us
have his comments on it.
(f ) We know that they are all keen to have the statement come out in the magic
year 1959, but with the best will in the world we cannot guarantee that. Here make
the points in paragraph 2 (1) of this minute. Therefore we hope that anything that
is said locally from now on on this point will be to lower rather than to raise
expectations.
(g) As regards the date of election, we quite see his point about having no
unnecessary hiatus. We are rather dubious about having an election in the year of
the visiting mission; and in any case if the statement should be delayed until
January or February there may not be all that amount of time. Is there any reason
why we should not plan for an election in February, 1961?
(h) We might tell the governor that the Secretary of State if he sees Mr. Nyerere
intends to give no ground away at all and to emphasise the present
unpreparedness of the country for first stages of responsible Government.
6. In addition to the discussion with Ministers I now propose, I think we should
also discuss with O.S.D. the service aspects. This need not be confined to Tanganyika.
There has, as you know, been correspondence with Kenya and others about the
compensation scheme and so on, but I feel that we should have a fresh look at this in
the light of what I have said in paragraph 2 (4).
F.D.W.
10.6.59
In my view Mr. Webber has made a most able analysis of an extremely difficult and
dangerous situation. The Secretary of State will, I feel sure, wish to have a discussion
on it, and in the meantime I do not feel that I would help by adding to Mr. Webber’s
minute. Indeed the only comment I would like to make at this stage is that, whatever
the ultimate decision, I feel fairly certain that, even if it is taken during the next two
or three months, it should not during that period be promulgated or probably even
communicated in definite form to Sir R. Turnbull. Whilst we have to do what we feel
is right in Tanganyika, we must, I think, also try so far as possible to avoid in present
circumstances any action which would lay us open to the accusation, however
unjustifiable, of provoking trouble in the one territory in East and Central Africa
which, to all outward appearances, is “getting along happily”.
W.L.G.B.
10.6.59
I agree with Mr. Gorell Barnes’ comment on Mr. Webber’s excellent analysis. My only
comments, in advance of discussion, are as follows:—
(i) It is, of course, much easier for us in London to say “Apply the brakes and have
a show-down” than it is on the spot. We can write a minute or draft a telegram and
then leave the Office and go to our safe home surroundings. If we are woken in the
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night it will only be to consider the terms of a further telegram to the Governor. I
recall that a stage was reached during the 1953 Nigerian Conference when Mr. Oliver
Lyttelton—as he then was—decided to break off negotiations because the Nigerian
delegates were being very difficult. He said to me “Jock you can go back and govern
with troops”. I replied “That is a very agreeable prospect—for six months or a year.
Then what? You can’t govern indefinitely with the aid of machine guns. The time will
come to resume negotiations, and these will almost certainly have to be with the
same characters”. This memory is inspired by the references in Mr. Webber’s minute
(para. 2 (3) and paragraph 5(d)) to crash action involving the arrest and detention of
TANU leaders.
(ii) The situation in Tanganyika is unique in my experience, in that the
Governor has no one, except his officials, opposing the head-long rush to “Uhuru”.
The Europeans and Asians are buying “protection” by jumping on the TANU band-
wagon and the Chiefs also have capitulated. In no other Colonial territory that I
know of (even all-African territories) has such a situation occurred. As Sir Richard
Turnbull remarks TEMO presents to the outside world the achievement of what we
have long been aiming for—a non-racial organisation dedicated to the develop-
ment of a non-racial society. And they are united in desire for constitutional
advance (cf. the bouquets handed out, from both sides of the House of Commons,
in the recent adjournment debate). The only opposition to this is the Governor and
his officials, and I have a strong feeling (strengthened by what Mr. Webber has told
me of his experiences during his recent visit) that it is known to, or suspected by,
T.E.M.O. and T.A.N.U. that the Governor is more ready than we in this Office to
make concessions. And the overseas civil servants, as a whole, feel that the skids
are on, and are thinking about “golden bowlers”. (Paragraph 2(4) of Mr. Webber’s
minute).
(iii) In spite of what I have said above I am not in favour of any quick easy
surrender to pressure to accelerate the pace of constitutional advance. Even
ignoring the fact that Tanganyika is part of East Africa, the Chequers programme
was pretty speedy, given the position in Tanganyika regarding Civil Service,
economic viability, educational standards etc. As Mr. Webber says, we can face the
world with a clear conscience. It won’t be easy to get our case accepted but we can
be very forthright, and we might do some lobbying—in the Commonwealth
countries and perhaps more widely in the U.N.—so as to put Nyerere back in the
dilemma he was in when the Governor made his statement on 17th March. . . .
J.S.M.
15.6.59
All v. difficult! & with Nyerere soon over an early meeting is necessary—if only to
decide what to say to him after consultation with the Governor. I feel v. much with
Sir John Macpherson in (iii) above but there is much to be considered.
P.
15.6.59
I have been greatly helped by Mr Webber’s excellent minute & am ready to discuss.
A.L-B.
18.6.59
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142 CO 822/1450, no 242 4 July 1959
[Tanganyika: economic and financial issues in constitutional policy]:
letter from Sir R Turnbull to W L Gorell Barnes
In starting this second part of my letter I propose to assume that we are agreed that
our objectives should be:—
(a) to restore the economic viability of the country in the shortest possible time;
(b) to enlist the active support of TEMO and TANU in our economic development;
and
(c) to prevent any decline in the confidence of the Overseas Civil Service.
I shall consider against this assumption what form financial aid from H.M.G.
should take in order to achieve the objectives I have described.
My first observation must be that when looked at from this angle, the form of
financial assistance outlined in Webber’s letter to me, EAF. 63/7/01 of the 15th April,
and confirmed in his Secret telegram No. 387, seems to be open to serious criticism.
It appears to us that we are in danger of being required to adopt two policies which
are virtually contradictory; on the one hand we are to aim at putting Tanganyika
“back on its financial feet within five years” and (to quote paragraph 5(b) of Webber’s
letter of 15th April) to keep services “at a level consistent with this aim”; and on the
other, we are proposing to proceed with a policy of step-by-step constitutional
development accompanied by an expansion of the Police Force over the next four
years, and a complementary increased expenditure on education. The methods by
which it is proposed we should be assisted are:—
(i) close control by H.M. Treasury to secure all possible economy;
(ii) a “built-in” economy factor in the form of interest free loans, presumably
repayable after five years; and
(iii) the diversion of C.D. & W. funds, on which our capital programme must
largely rely, to finance recurrent votes, thus reducing the capital monies available
for our development, and, so it will be asserted in the Legislative Council,
handicapping our chances of recovery.
We ourselves hope to be guided by the World Bank Survey Mission as to the course
we should follow to make the country viable in the shortest possible time. I have
little doubt that the Mission will recommend capital expenditure in various
directions, and particularly for the development of water resources and roads; but
apart from the assurance in your Secret telegram No. 387 that any recommendations
the Mission might make would be carefully and sympathetically considered on their
financial merits, there has been no indication from the London end that assistance
will be given in a form specifically designed to accelerate the pace of economic
development so as to increase wealth and taxable capacity.
A local re-examination of our financial prospects suggests that Tanganyika would
have a reasonably good chance of being able to stand on its own feet if two major
conditions could be satisfied; they are:—
(i) that some, if not all, of the burden attributable to an expensive expatriate civil
service and of the army should be lifted, and that in other respects Tanganyika
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should be required to stand on its own feet and to limit its level of services to the
available finance; and
(ii) that in addition to the new C.D. & W. allocation of £6 million already
announced, a loan should be provided, interest free for ten years, for key economic
development.
I propose to comment briefly on the fulfilment of these conditions, in reverse
order.
Our capital programme has been financed in recent years approximately one
third by C.D. & W. grants, one third by miscellaneous receipts and the draining
down of reserves, and one third from loan. No further reduction in reserves is
practicable; those which remain must be held against the possibility (and in one
instance—Uruwira Minerals Ltd.—the virtual certainty) of contingent liabilities
having to be met. And because of our difficulties on recurrent account, loan
expenditure will have to be severely restricted. Development effort will therefore
have principally to rely on our new C.D. & W. allocation at £6 million. Generous
as this allocation is, I am convinced that, in our circumstances, some supplemen-
tary assistance for key development—notably for the development of water
resources and roads—must be an essential part of any aid programme which is to
become effective by the time Tanganyika achieves self-government. I do most
strongly urge that the need for such special assistance should be accepted. We
should, of course, be guided in the use of it by the recommendations of the World
Bank Survey Mission as endorsed or modified by your own economic experts. I
would add that an announcement that H.M.G. had decided to make a special
interest free loan to assist in financing the recommendations of the Mission would
serve to dispel both the mistrust of H.M.G.’s intentions presently entertained by
the elected members and the general feeling of uncertainty that is manifested in
the commercial world.
The other condition for placing Tanganyika back on its financial feet is closely
related to the problems facing the expatriate civil service. We are examining every
possible means of accelerating local recruitment to the higher posts; but it is
plain that it will take at least ten years before anything substantial is achieved,
and even then reliance on overseas officers is likely to be far greater than at the
corresponding stage of constitutional progress on the West Coast. Our foremost
needs, therefore, in the difficult transitional period ahead of us are to improve the
prospects of recruitment, to encourage existing Overseas Officers to remain in the
Service, and to persuade them to continue in service after self-government has
been achieved. May I once again urge that H.M.G. should seriously consider grant-
ing aid in the form of an acceptance of the responsibility for inducement
allowances, passage costs, and such education allowances as may be decided upon;
you will remember that I originally made this proposal in paragraphs 32 and 33 of
my Secret despatch No. 1091 of the 3rd November, 1958. It could be made a con-
dition of such aid that the Local Government would be required to accept the full
liability in respect of pensions. If this were done, the financial commitment to
H.M.G. would gradually taper off as the number of expatriate officers diminished,
and the principle that permanent subsidisation of services should not be accepted
would be preserved.
I am confident that if these steps were taken, the anxieties about compensation
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for loss of career in the Civil Service which are now tending to loom so large in
the minds of officers of junior and middle seniority, could easily be allayed. I
understand that the stage at which compensation has been offered in other territo-
ries has been the point at which the Secretary of State through an official minis-
ter—normally the Chief Secretary—has ceased to have a final say as to the terms
and conditions of service of officers appointed by him; but I can see no reason why
events in this territory need follow the pattern that was established on the West
Coast. The major figures of TEMO, in particular Nyerere himself, have admitted,
on any number of occasions, the extent to which they are dependent on overseas
officers remaining in the Tanganyika service; and I am confident that in expressing
these views they have been completely genuine. They realise, too, how inexperi-
enced even the best candidates for Ministerial office are, and Nyerere can foresee
the difficulties that he would have to face on this account when he becomes Chief
Minister. It seems to me, therefore, that he would be willing to accept the some-
what illogical position in which, even when there is an unofficial majority, led by a
Chief Minister, the Secretary of State, through an official minister in the
Government, or through the Deputy Governor, would retain full control insofar as
overseas officers were concerned. The need for compensation for loss of career
would not then arise until full internal self-government was achieved. If by that
time Nyerere and his Elected Ministers had learnt to face their responsibilities
realistically, and had been seen to be ready to protect the Civil Service from the
damaging attacks to which it is now being subjected, the prospects of persuading
overseas officers to enter the service of a self-governing Tanganyika should be
greatly improved.
I do not think I need stress how important it is that we should apply ourselves
early to these civil service problems. If we cannot hold off an unofficial majority
after September/October 1960—and I am convinced that we cannot—it is impera-
tive that we should start now to prepare the Service for the change; the longer we
delay, the more difficult will be our task in dispelling rumours, allaying imaginary
fears and restoring morale generally. The greatest danger that faces Tanganyika is a
move to responsible government without the backing of a trained upright civil ser-
vice, large enough and experienced enough and patient enough to see the country
through the uncomfortable years of transition. We must not risk a melting-away of
the Overseas Civil Service because Kenya or Uganda can’t keep in step or because
the pattern of H.M.’s Treasury’s thinking has not yet caught up with the realities of
1959.
I must apologise for raising in one letter so many fundamental issues. But the
lines of constitutional advance, economic development and civil service morale
are now converging upon a point; and that point is likely to be reached some
time between October and December this year. It is of the utmost importance
that we should devise plans now that will ensure that when the time comes,
these three essential elements of orderly progress can be combined into a har-
monious whole.
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143 CO 822/1450, no 246 13 July 1959
[Tanganyika: constitutional development]: letter from Sir R Turnbull
to W L Gorell Barnes.  Enclosure: letter from Sir R Turnbull to Sir F
Crawford (Uganda) (9 July)
I have sent a somewhat rough and ready reply to Freddie Crawford’s letter No. 1202
II of the 25th June which he copied to you, Baring and Potter.1 I had not intended to
pass copies round until we had settled some of the points raised in my two letters to
you of the 3rd and 4th July;2 but on reflection I think you at any rate should see right
away what I have said. Briefly, the point is that if we move too fast we shall embarrass
our neighbours; but if we don’t move fast we shall lose the chance of developing on
the lines we have set ourselves. Present indications are that in 1960 we could without
much difficulty form a Government with an unofficial majority, on the 7 : 5 basis, in
which three of the seven would be non-Africans; by 1962 after three years of certain
bickering and probable disorders the chance would have passed. TANU or its
successor party (which would certainly be an advocate of some kind of “black”
nationalism) would, as I foresee it, be most unlikely to accept either the 7 : 5 ratio or
a three sevenths proportion of Europeans and Asians amongst the unofficial
Ministers; and the only kind of advance open to us at that time might well be an
unofficial majority which was exclusively African or in which non-African
representation was token only.
The “partnership-principle” is already under attack here by the left wing of TANU,
and Nyerere is being criticised for his co-operation with the Europeans and the
Asians. At present he can hold off the extreme elements of his party, but the longer
he takes to bring home the bacon the less will be the authority he can exert. And
influences outside Tanganyika which are ill-disposed towards partnership are likely
to become stronger rather than weaker during the next few years; Ghana and
Nigeria, French West Africa, the Congo, Egypt and Russia, are all likely to increase
their championship of a black African solution to all the political problems of the
Continent. We don’t want to find that in waiting for Uganda we have missed our own
’bus.
Enclosure to 143
I shan’t be in a position to send a detailed and properly reasoned reply to your letter
of the 25th June until I have concluded some exchanges I am at present having with
the Colonial Office about the form of our financial aid. I am therefore sending you an
interim answer to many of the points you have raised; I am not copying it elsewhere.
1 In this letter, the governor of Uganda expressed ‘considerable concern . . . seriously alarmed at the
prospect of a purely arithmetical and purely political solution in Tanganyika, because of the adverse effect
it would have on our attempts to hold the position here’. He then told Turnbull that the proposed speed
for Tanganyika would be a ‘definitive embarrassment’, going beyond the orderly ‘step by proved step’
agreed at Chequers, and unrelated to the availability of a sufficient number of experienced African
administrators; it was folly to put Africans in a dominant position in the executive and legislature if
suitable men were not available.
2 See previous document.
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 471
472 AFRICA [143]
First, the timing of the statement which we have undertaken to make—if we
can—at the end of the year. I don’t honestly think that we can put it off until after
December. Nyerere and TEMO are about to embark upon a campaign for the
introduction of an unofficial majority into the executive Government before the end
of this year, and the adoption after an early election in 1960 of an arrangement
whereby:—
(i) with the exception of the Ministers for Defence, External Affairs and Legal
Affairs (not, you will notice, Finance) the Government would be entirely composed
of unofficials; and
(ii) every member of the Legislative Council, except for those three official
Ministers, would be elected.
This, I need hardly say, is quite beyond the bounds of possibility; I have already told
Nyerere that I don’t propose any changes until after the next election (which, as we
see it, could not possibly be held before September, 1960). I shall have to make this
point in public many times in the next few months. But if I am to hold the present
position, that is to say, keep the five unofficial Ministers in the Government, and
prevent a defection of our African backbenchers, I must announce the nature and
date of the next constitutional move before the end of the year; and, in my opinion,
that move will have to be an unofficial majority in the executive Government (5
officials and 7 unofficials) after an election in September, 1960. TEMO won’t much
like it, but by working on the five unofficial Ministers I may be able to induce them to
agree. As I think I mentioned in an earlier letter, TEMO now represents all the
elected members of Legislative Council without a single exception; and TANU, of
which TEMO is now the Parliamentary party, has behind it all the Africans (except a
few extremists), all the Chiefs and all the Native Authorities.
Would there, I wonder, be any chance of your hurrying up your Constitutional
Committee so that you would not be left behind when our proposals are made
known?
Secondly, the composition of the elected side of the Legislature. This will, of
course, depend on the outcome of Ramage’s committee. What I have to bear in the
back of my mind is that in a year’s time it may have become quite impossible for us to
get any Africans of repute to accept nomination to the Government side of Legislative
Council for the purpose of forming a majority so that a predominantly official
executive Government could outvote TEMO. I cannot think of a single potential
nominated member who is not in sympathy with TANU; and if I tried to enlist a
corpus of backbenchers for the purpose of outnumbering the nationalists, the whole
system would be unlikely to survive the first division. (The African backbenchers
have already reached a stage in which they speak in sympathy with the opposition
and then reluctantly vote with the Government). It is my intention to retain the
power to nominate, but merely for the purpose of seeing that communities such as
the pastoral people, the Arabs, the Goans, etc., who may not be popularly represented
amongst the Elected Members, still have a look-in; but it is apparent that in
Tanganyika we shall not be able much longer to go on using Nominated Members as
a device to achieve a majority.
For a working majority I think we shall have to rely upon these members of the
opposition who are in sympathy with the moderate nationalists (under Nyerere)
crossing the floor and sitting on the Government benches. The Government side
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would then be composed of official Ministers, unofficial Ministers, Nominated
Members and Government supporters from amongst the Elected Members. The
decision who should cross the floor and who should remain is one that will have to
be made by the executive of TEMO. After the election it should be fairly clear who are
prepared to accept the Government policy (and TANU’s present policy) of a co-
ordinated effort by Africans, Europeans and Asians, and who are likely to form the
nucleus of an extreme group. I would hope that Nyerere would bring the moderates
across with him, leaving the wild men to form an opposition. TEMO won’t much like
this, for it will be the first time that their unity has been assailed; but it seems to me
to be the logical starting point for a second party. Incidentally, there are already signs
of a split in TANU on these lines; Nyerere is being accused in certain TANU circles of
being too ready to listen to the Europeans and Asians, and something like a minor
revolt in the party may develop.
In your third paragraph you ask what TANU mean by “a majority of elected
members in the Legislature”. What they have in mind is a combined total of 82
members of whom all but three would be elected. I myself would like to see about 45
Elected Members, and I hope that, in spite of the intense pressure that will be
exercised upon it, Ramage’s committee will be able to recommend something of this
sort; indeed, without going wildly outside their terms of reference, they cannot very
well do otherwise. As I mentioned in an earlier paragraph, one of our greatest
anxieties concerns our inability to find men who will allow themselves to be
nominated to the Government side in order to preserve a clear Government majority.
I could easily fill Legislative Council with Heads of Departments, but that would
make the Legislature quite ridiculous and would probably result in a break-down of
the whole box of tricks. I shan’t be able to form a clear picture on this issue until
Ramage has reported and until I see how the unofficial Ministers stand up to TANU’s
demand for an unofficial majority in the Government in 1959.
Fourthly, you stress the need to make a real attempt to co-ordinate the rate of
political progress with the rate of economic development and of the Africanisation of
commerce and industry and of the public service. I agree with you entirely that this
would be the only rational way to lay down tolerably solid foundations. Nothing
would please me more than to be able to announce that we proposed to defer all
constitutional advance until we had in the country a sufficient number of Africans of
experience, ability and integrity to fill posts in the public service, and in commerce
and industry. But I cannot see that happy position being achieved in less than twenty
years. And what would happen in those twenty years? There would be at least two
major insurrections; the first in 1960 or 1961, working up from a series of strikes,
boycotts and campaigns of positive action; and the second in 1970 by which time the
nationalists would have profited from their earlier experiences and would have laid
on something that we should not have a chance of holding; it would be a
combination of Mau Mau and the Maji Maji rebellion,3 with all the support of modern
techniques in guerilla warfare, sabotage and fifth column activities. You, I know, are
in the happy position of having a number of dissident groups; but here every African
is a nationalist and we should be faced with a situation very much like that in Cyprus
but without the Turks. I cannot imagine that H.M.G. would be willing to see all the
3 Maji-Maji Rebellion in German East Africa, 1905–1906, in which between 200,000 and 300,000 Africans
died.
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East African Forces and the Middle East Strategic Reserve deployed in Tanganyika to
look after sisal estates and Greek tobacco plantations when they should be available
to protect our vital oil interests in the Persian Gulf; nor could H.M.G. possibly defend
such a situation in the Trusteeship Council.
I agree that there is a danger that the standards of administration in Government
services will drop, but looking at the examples of Ghana and Nigeria, it doesn’t seem
to me that they are going to drop any further in the 1960’s than they would if we
deferred any further advances for another twenty years. In any case, as I have said, we
could not hold off without paying a price in bloodshed and military involvement
which would be out of all proportion to the results likely to be achieved, and, in the
long run, utterly pointless. We are, after all, under an obligation to make Tanganyika
self-governing, and it would be better to reach that consummation too early with the
people on our side than after a campaign with the people irrevocably against us. Our
first interest must surely be to maintain peaceful conditions and public confidence so
that the solutions to political problems can be sought in a tranquil atmosphere, and
so that when the final change comes about, Tanganyika will look to us and not to the
Soviet bloc to keep the country supplied with technicians and as a source of
manufactured articles.
Fifthly, the question of Africanisation. I share your apprehensions about the lack of
Africans of education and character, to run the public services, and the problem of
producing enough of the right kind of men. In fact, I know that it can’t be done
within the time at our disposal; I am therefore once again in correspondence with
the Secretary of State about the position of the Overseas Civil Service, and am
attempting to get it reorganised on a basis whereby H.M.G. would be responsible for
inducement pay and leave passages, and would guarantee suitable compensation
terms at an appropriate time. When I say “an appropriate time” I have in mind that
compensation should not be offered until we have got through the period of
responsible Government and are approaching full internal self-government with a
totality of Elected Ministers.
I now come to the main point you raise in paragraph 7. Is it right, you ask, because
of purely political considerations and a doubtful security situation, to move towards
responsible government and hand over a country before it is anywhere near ready to
stay on its own feet? The answer, as far as we are concerned, must be that if the
alternative is to undergo a period of insurrection in which British influence would be
seriously damaged, and local European and Asian interests virtually destroyed, it is
not wrong. You say that the answer, as far as Uganda is concerned, is that premature
self-government would be likely to lead to a civil war; the answer, as far as
Tanganyika is concerned, is that to defer self-government too long cannot fail to lead
to a civil war or its equivalent. If we do not accept the risk involved we may lose the
chance that we now have to co-operate with a moderate form of nationalism and lay
down the basis of some kind of partnership. It is essential for us to use Nyerere whilst
he is still powerful; if we wait too long, he will be ousted by the extremists; and with
him will go all hopes of an enduring European influence in Tanganyika. Indeed, 1960
may present the last chance we shall have to prevent Tanganyika from becoming a
purely African state. If we got into a shooting match here, Nyerere would quickly be
displaced as a leader, and instead of him we should have a group of hairy men
demanding “Africa for the Africans”.
I agree entirely that our common problem seems to be how best to hand [sic] on,
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 474
[143] TANGANYIKA 475
and for how long; it is also at what point to hang on. In the past two years there has,
in Tanganyika, been a gradual dissociation of Government from the people, and the
only hope I see of re-establishing a proper relationship is to get the nationalists into
the Government while their brand of nationalism still follows the pattern that we
have been advocating.
Turning to your eighth paragraph, it seems to me that during the past two or three
years the problems of Tanganyika and Uganda have been getting less and less alike.
You have a multiplicity of political parties and a complicated dynastic problem
which, although doubtless extremely tiresome in their own way, do provide a kind of
built-in brake. We, on the other hand, have the monolithic nationalist party with
virtually no competitors, supported by a Parliamentary organisation of Europeans,
Asians and Africans, which function as a kind of built-in accelerator. If we go too fast,
it is damaging for you; yet if we hold the position to a point at which we are driven
into an Emergency, you will be equally damaged and so too will Kenya and the
Federation. But the main difference is this. Uganda is going to be an African state;
you can afford to hold on for twenty years and to undergo boycotts, strikes and
passive resistance; at the end of it your prospects of being an African state will be
undamaged—they may even be improved. But in Tanganyika we aim to be a
partnership state; if we hung on for twenty years, we should, at the end of that time,
emerge not as a partnership state but as an African state—and a very embittered
one—with no hope of re-establishing the European interests and influence that
would have been destroyed.
I agree that it would be extremely useful for us to meet and talk over these
matters; I am planning a couple of days at the end of August at the Seronera National
Park Camp in the Serengeti Plains. Would you care to join me there? There is an
excellent airstrip and some magnificent scenery.
Coming next to your suggestion that TANU might be cut down to size by re-
establishing and re-asserting, possibly with Police assistance, the former undoubted
power and authority of the Native Authorities, this device was exploited by Twining
between 1954 and 1958, but without success. The Native Authorities are designed to
cope with all kinds of situations but not with politicians; and the result was a gradual
weakening of the Chiefs and the Authorities, and an increasing unwillingness to
counter TANU propaganda, until, in March this year, the Chiefs Conference threw its
hand in and publicly announced its wholehearted support of TANU and of all TANU’s
policies. On the occasion of TANU Day, earlier this week, Marealle sent the President
a flamboyant telegram indicating his full support; and Fundikira, one of the more
influential Chiefs and now a Minister, is completely and openly committed to TANU.4
I don’t propose to discuss the diarchy principle in this letter. On further study of
the matter it looks to me too as though it is almost certainly a non-starter; in any
case, I have produced various financial ideas to the Colonial Office which, if accepted,
will obviate the necessity of any constitutional juggling of the kind that I had first
contemplated.
We, like yourself, contemplate moving gradually towards a position in which
Ministers from the Elected Members of the Legislative Council will cross the floor in
increasing numbers to join the Government. We already have five. As I have said, it
4 Chief A S Fundikira, chief of Unyanyembe, 1957–1962, member of Leg Co since 1958.
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looks as though in October 1960 we shall have seven. The remaining five Civil
Service Ministers would be the Chief Secretary and the Ministers for Finance, Legal
Affairs, Provincial Affairs and Security. How long we should be able to hold that
position, I don’t know. It will depend on what kind of a rival party sets itself up when
we introduce the unofficial majority, on our finances, on the outcome of the survey
by the World Bank Mission, on the findings of the U.N. Mission which comes here in
the summer of 1960, and on events in Nigeria, Ghana and the Congo. Like yourself, I
foresee the three civil Service Ministers remaining during the last stage of
responsible government, followed by a period of full internal self-government in
which there would be no Civil Service Ministers at all and in which the Governor,
assisted by a Deputy, would retain control of a number of reserved subjects. The Civil
Service would be protected by a Public Service Commission based on Order in
Council legislation and not on a local Ordinance. . . .
144 CAB 134/1558, CPC (59)20 12 Nov 1959
‘Constitutional development in Tanganyika’: Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee memorandum by Mr Macleod
Introduction
The Colonial Policy Committee at their meeting on 17th April, 1959 (C.P.C. (59) 1st
Meeting), approved a programme of constitutional advance for Tanganyika and
invited my predecessor to bring before them at a later meeting the text of a proposed
statement by the Governor which was to include a forecast of when unofficial
majorities might be introduced into the Council of Ministers and the Legislative
Council. . . . Since then there has been considerable pressure from Tanganyika for the
statement to be made before the end of this year. The Tanganyika African National
Union (T.A.N.U.) gave its supporters a pledge at the last election that they would
achieve “responsible government” in 1959. Before my own visit to East Africa was
announced the leaders of the Tanganyika Elected Members Organisation (T.E.M.O.)
offered to come to this country to put their case before me. The Governor has warned
me that I shall be expected to make some kind of statement when I go to Tanganyika.
I have invited him to come to London for prior consultation in the week beginning
16th November.
Developments since April 1959
2. The programme approved by the Colonial Policy Committee in April was
broadly as follows:—
(1) An announcement would be made early in 1960 that—
(a) the number of unofficial Ministers would be increased from 5 to 7 for the
period 1961–65. The number of official members would remain at 7 and there
would be an equal balance between officials and unofficials;
(b) consideration would be given during the 1961–65 Legislative Council to the
possibility of working towards an unofficial majority of 7 unofficials to 5 officials
for the period 1965 to 1969.
(2) These changes would be subject to law and order being maintained and to the
country showing on grounds of performance, &c., that they were justified.
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(3) No commitment would be given beyond 1969. The Governor would make it
clear that the next stage would be a substantial measure of internal self-
government so that Tanganyika would not expect to be fully self-governing
immediately after 1969.
3. The Governor’s present recommendations to me are:—
(1) that an unofficial majority in the Council of Ministers of 7 unofficials to 5
officials should be introduced in the autumn of 1960;
(2) that within 2 years from that date the unofficial majority should be increased
to 9 unofficials to 3 officials; but
(3) that if Mr. Nyerere is not prepared to join the Government except as Chief
Minister, we should accept in 1960, as an alternative to (a) above, the 9 : 3 ratio of
unofficials to officials as the ratio appropriate to the introduction of a Chief
Minister post;
(4) that, subject to points of detail, the recommendations of the Post-Elections
Committee which, under the chairmanship of Sir Richard Ramage, has recently
reported on the racial composition of the representative side of the Legislative
Council and on franchise qualifications should be accepted. The main
recommendations of this Committee are summarised in Annex I.1 (I draw
particular attention to the expansion of the franchise which is proposed.)
4. The main reason why the Governor has so significantly revised the views
which he expressed at Chequers in January has been the unexpectedly united front
shown by the elected members of all three races in the Legislative Council in
pressing for rapid constitutional advance and in which the European and Asian
elected members have been no less vocal than members of T.A.N.U. members. This
has been accompanied by a rallying to the support of T.A.N.U. of the Chiefs and other
traditional “responsible” elements in the country who might have been expected to
favour a more gradual progress. The five unofficial members of the Council of
Ministers have in general behaved in a sensible and responsible manner. The
Governor’s officials advisers generally consider that, if we were to reach an
accommodation with T.A.N.U. (as he thinks we would on the proposals set out in
paragraph 3 above), there would be a better prospect of holding the position for some
years at least, during which political controversy would be stilled and energies
devoted to much-needed economic development and to building up a firm system of
local administration. As the Governor sees things, it would be essential to the success
of such a plan that Nyerere should himself join the Government and, though he
would oppose as strongly as he could a move to the appointment of a Chief Minister
at the next stage, he would be prepared to accept it if there was no other way of
securing Nyerere’s acceptance of a Ministerial post —hence the recommendation in
paragraph 3 (3) above.
The alternative before us
5. The risks in adopting the Governor’s proposals are obvious. In the first place
Tanganyika and its people are, generally speaking, by far the most backward in the
East African region, and in particular the financial position looks like being
1 Not printed.
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extremely difficult over the next few years. Secondly, although Nyerere’s leadership
of T.A.N.U. has so far been comparatively responsible, there are considerable “wild”
elements2 within it and the pressure for constitutional advance this year has derived,
at least in part, from the wish to satisfy them. The party might therefore not be
content to stay put for a further period of years but might agitate for an early advance
to full self-government. Thirdly, the advance would inevitably have repercussions in
other territories in East Africa. Constitutional matters are currently under review in
Kenya and Uganda. So full a measure of advance as is now proposed would certainly
not make it easier to pursue a policy of prudent gradualism in Kenya, Uganda and
Zanzibar. Kenya with a constitutional conference immediately pending might be
particularly embarrassed by the franchise proposals. The latter could have
repercussions too in Central Africa where we have so far accepted, e.g., in the
Northern Rhodesian Constitution, the premise that the franchise should be confined
to “responsible” persons and have adopted a comparatively high set of qualifications
for that purpose. In the face of so wide an extension of franchise in Tanganyika as is
now proposed it would be difficult to resist the application of similar standards in
Nyasaland when we come to consider constitutional advance in that territory and
this might in turn prejudice the position already achieved after considerable
controversy in Northern Rhodesia.
6. Despite this sombre prospect it seems to me that the risks in the opposite
direction are the greater. T.A.N.U. could undoubtedly take “positive action” sufficient
to lead to a virtual break-down of administration. With the inadequate police
resources at our disposal we should be hard put to contain the emergency and world
opinion would blame the resultant widespread disturbances on the obstinacy of Her
Majesty’s Government in the face of a united demand from Tanganyika which had
been pressed by constitutional means and in a “reasonable” manner. The counter-
arguments about the repercussions on the rest of East Africa are very difficult to
make sound convincing and have already been largely discounted publicly by
Nyerere. We should not underestimate the chance which a change would give us to
get the energies and undoubted prestige of Nyerere and his associates devoted to the
real tasks of government in Tanganyika which lie in economic and social
development.
7. The Governor’s assessment that, if we do not concede the unofficial majority
(and announce in the very near future our intention of so doing) we may be faced
with serious disturbances and may lose the opportunity of some years of constructive
effort, seems to me to be soundly based. I feel sure therefore that we should abandon
any hope of securing accommodation with Nyerere on the programme referred to in
paragraph 2 above, and that we have no choice but to move straight to an unofficial
majority in 1960. I am impressed by the need to ensure that the changes we
introduce will result in Nyerere’s joining the Government, and, if it were the only
way to secure this, would accept him as Chief Minister. I doubt whether any change
which left him on the Opposition side could be anything but very short-lived. If we
are to pin our faith on him there is everything to be gained by doing so at the outset.
8. If we do so, can we be sure that we will not be faced with pressures for a very
2 This was very much the language of Sir R Turnbull: in a telegram of 20 Aug 1959 he referred to his
intention to ‘smack down’ the ‘wild men’ of TANU, i.e. the ‘lunatic fringe’ and those ‘not under proper
control’ from the centre, who were threatening ‘positive action’ (CO 822/1450, no 254, to S of S).
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early grant of independence? I have referred in paragraph 4 above to the hopes for a
period of stability following the changes in 1960. Nyerere told my predecessor that he
envisaged that he would first work towards the elimination of the three official
Ministers, which he hoped to achieve by about 1963; there would follow another
period of about three years during which there would be a wholly elected Council of
Ministers and internal self-government. He would thus expect to achieve
independence in 1966 or thereabouts. My provisional view is that if events were to
conform broadly to this pattern, we could at least ensure that they moved in four-
year stages which would correspond to the normal life of the Legislative Council; on
this basis if everything went well with Nyerere we should have to accept
independence by 1968. We are bound to be pressed from about 1960 onwards to
telescope the time-table but I think that we would have every justification in digging
our toes in. Having yielded to the demand to have the major share of responsibility
we should be on much firmer ground in resisting further premature changes,
particularly if it became manifest that Nyerere was falling down on the task of
building up sufficient human and material resources to make independence a reality.
Indeed the difficulties of this task may become so important in future that we should
find ourselves when the time came in a position where we could justifiably stave off
the grant of independence beyond the 1968 date suggested above. Moreover the grant
of the major responsibility in the administration to elected members may very well
bring to the surface the latent jealousies, fears and clash of interests that at the
moment are concealed within the “monolith” of T.E.M.O. If this happened our ability
to meet outside criticism of a deferment of independence would be at least enhanced.
With so many imponderables in the situation I see no reason why we should limit
our scope for manoeuvre in future by any public announcement of a programme for
constitutional advance as contemplated last April (see paragraph 2 above). Nor do I
think that we should be pressed (except in the United Nations) to make such a
statement; though Nyerere may have revealed his thinking to my predecessor, the
Governor tells me that he has never publicly referred to a date for independence and
has been careful to avoid mentioning one in private discussion with Government
representatives. His motives may be different from ours but our interests march
together in avoiding commitment to a time-table.
9. The Governor’s recommendations on the Council of Ministers are the crux of
the matter but any statement on the next constitutional steps will have to have
regard to the introduction of an unofficial majority into the Legislative Council and
to the recommendations of the Ramage Committee. The first of these issues raises no
difficulty if it is agreed that we should concede an unofficial majority in the Council
of Ministers. For in that event there would be little purpose in (and indeed strong
objections to) perpetuating the present arrangements whereby a Government
majority in the Legislature is secured by nomination. The point in the Ramage
Committee’s recommendations which raises difficulty is the franchise. The
difficulties arise mainly from repercussions outside Tanganyika. I shall explore with
the Governor the possibility of reducing these, e.g., by restoring a literacy
qualification but I doubt if this is worth pursuing à l’outrance in face of the
unanimous finding of the Committee. It is clear at any event that an extension of the
franchise could hardly produce a more “nationalist-minded” legislature than that
produced by the present limited franchise. It might indeed possibly throw up some
more conservatively-minded Africans and give a little more stability to politics.
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10. The other Governors in East Africa will, I believe, feel that we must accept
the inevitable in Tanganyika but would prefer that decisions were not announced
until their own immediate constitutional problems had been solved. But the
Governor of Tanganyika has, with the authority of my predecessor, given an
assurance to his Legislative Council that these matters will be dealt with at this end
with all possible despatch and I do not think that I can possibly hold up decisions on
Tanganyika until February or March. I will keep the other Governors and the British
Resident in Zanzibar informed of my discussions with Sir Richard Turnbull. There
might be some room for manoeuvre in the actual terms of my announcement so as
to minimise the repercussions outside Tanganyika, though I do not suppose that I
shall be able completely to remove the other Governors’ misgivings.
11. I ask my colleagues to agree that I should discuss with Sir Richard Turnbull
on the basis of the proposals outlined in paragraph 3 above, and that I may have
discretion, if I think it necessary, to go so far as (3) in that paragraph; and to agree
further that I should make an appropriate announcement when I am in Dar-es-
Salaam in December.
3 Macleod minuted on a draft of this memo: ‘I approve this paper—I like it very much. 10.11.61’
145 CO 822/1451, no 308 16 Nov 1959
[Tanganyika]: CO note of a discussion on policy between Mr Macleod
and Sir R Turnbull
The Secretary of State opened the discussion by saying that it was his intention to
put proposals relating to constitutional development in Tanganyika to the Colonial
Policy Committee in the near future and, if necessary, later to the full Cabinet. He
was convinced that there ought to be a substantial step forward and that there was
everything to be gained by making it as quickly as possible. There was a risk that the
announcement of detailed proposals for Tanganyika in December might prejudice
the possibility of the Kenya Conference producing useful results and it was therefore
his view that an announcement should be made in December indicating that H.M.G.
were prepared to agree in principle to the introduction of unofficial majorities in the
Council of Ministers and the Legislative Council after the elections in 1960, and were
prepared to accept the recommendations of the Ramage Committee subject to
certain minor modifications. The detailed proposals for the constitution of the
Council of Ministers’ allocation of Portfolios and other related matters would be left
to be worked out at a Conference to be held in London in February to which Mr.
Julius Nyerere and a small number of his colleagues would be invited.
2. The Secretary of State said that he had originally intended that he should
make a statement on these lines during his visit to Dar-es-Salaam in December; but
after discussion with the Governor he now felt it would be right for Sir Richard
Turnbull to make an announcement at the opening of the Legislative Council on the
15th December, i.e. two days before the Secretary of State arrived in Dar-es-Salaam.
3. The Secretary of State said that this would be a dramatic step and a very great
advance on the programme agreed at Chequers. He therefore invited Sir Richard
Turnbull to comment on recent political developments in the Territory and explain
why the rate of advance now proposed was thought to be right.
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4. Sir Richard Turnbull pointed out that since the Chequers meeting there had
been significant changes in conditions in neighbouring territories. There had been a
great upward surge of nationalism in the Belgian Congo which had not been
foreseen. There had also been trouble of a rather similar kind in Nyasaland; and now
Ruanda Urundi was in a state of turmoil. On the whole these developments had not
greatly influenced the thinking of the leading political people in Tanganyika because
their minds had been directed to their own internal political problems. But if H.M.G.
failed to produce an acceptable answer to those problems, then it could not be
expected that Tanganyika would remain immune from the trend of events elsewhere
in Africa. Mr. Nyerere had started his campaign in 1957 with a demand for
independence in 1959 but once the war cry had caught on he had brought down his
sights to achieving responsible Government in 1959. There was complete unity in
the Territory on this point.
5. Sir Richard Turnbull then turned to the question of the Chiefs. At the time of
Chequers he had hoped that a combination of traditional native Authorities and
some of the Europeans in the Legislative Council might result in the adoption of a
somewhat more gradual pace of advance than that advocated by T.A.N.U. In the event
he had been proved wrong, the switch over of the Chiefs to T.A.N.U. (which was
understandable and right from their point of view) taken with the complete unity of
all representative members in the Legislative Council had led, if anything, to a
quickening in the pace of advance.
6. In his view the country was nine-tenths behind Mr. Nyerere but there was a
minority, which should not be under-estimated, who were opposed to his multi-
racial approach and who took a purely black African nationalistic line. The focus of
this opposition was probably Oscar Kambona who had just returned from a course of
study in the United Kingdom and had taken over his old post of General Secretary of
T.A.N.U.
7. Generally speaking, Mr. Nyerere still had a great crusading appeal in the
Territory and his hand would be strengthened with a promise in 1959 of responsible
government. In reply to a question from the Secretary of State, Sir Richard Turnbull
confirmed that in his judgment it was both expedient and right to promise unofficial
majorities in both the Councils. He added that the Conference of Provincial
Commissioners, which was not an easy body to convince, were unanimous in their
agreement on such a policy. In reply to a later question Sir Richard said that the
concession of unofficial majorities in principle would be sufficient to satisfy Nyerere.
8. Discussion then turned on the statement to be made on the Ramage Report.
The possibility of deferring a detailed statement until after the Kenya Conference was
considered, but Sir Richard Turnbull advised strongly against such a course which
would hold up preparations for the election. It was most important in his view to make
a substantive statement on the Report in December. The possibility of modifying the
Ramage proposals in certain respects in order to decrease any adverse effect they
might have in neighbouring territories, particularly Nyasaland, was examined. Lord
Perth suggested that it might help the Nyasaland situation if a literacy qualification
could be included in Tanganyika, the public justification for such a course being that
nobody who had been enfranchised under the existing arrangements should be dis-
enfranchised under the Ramage proposals. The Secretary of State considered that this
idea should be further examined and that a telegram should be sent to Sir Robert
Armitage seeking his views if this seemed desirable.
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9. The Meeting concluded with a summing up on the basis of paragraph (1)
above. The additional point was made that the advantages of the 9 : 3 formula would
not emerge until after the Kenya Conference. The aim should be at the February
Conference to embody final decisions on this and other points in a package deal with
Mr. Nyerere; in the meantime early consideration should be given to the preparation
of an outline of the matters to be discussed at the Conference.
146 CAB 134/1558, CPC 6(59)1 20 Nov 1959
‘Constitutional advance in Tanganyika’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee meeting
The Committee had before them memoranda by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies (C.P.C. (59) 20 and 22)1 proposing that a statement should be made in
Tanganyika in the following month to the effect that Her Majesty’s Government
accepted the principle that unofficial majorities should be introduced into the
Council of Ministers and into the Legislative Council of Tanganyika after the 1960
elections, that the precise arrangements would be discussed with representatives
from Tanganyika at a Conference in London in February 1960, and that the
recommendations of the Ramage Committee would, subject to certain detailed
amendments, be implemented.
The Colonial Secretary said that all communities in Tanganyika were agreed on
the desirability of making an early move towards responsible government, and there
was general support for the Tanganyika African National Union (T.A.N.U.) under the
leadership of Mr. Nyerere. It would therefore be important to induce Mr. Nyerere to
take office after the 1960 elections even if this meant appointing him Chief Minister
in the Council of Ministers with an unofficial majority of nine unofficials to three
officials. As regards the conclusions of the Ramage Report, the most difficult item
was the suggested widening of the franchise to increase the electorate to about 11⁄2
millions. Agreement had however now been reached in the Council of Ministers for
rather more stringent tax qualifications and for a literacy qualification, with the
result that the electorate would amount to just under one million. It was not
considered that the proposed advance in Tanganyika would create any serious
difficulties in Kenya, where it would obviously not be possible to make such a rapid
advance, but it was proposed to minimise any repercussions on the Kenya
Constitutional Conference to be held in January 1960, by deferring any more detailed
announcement until negotiations had been held with Tanganyikan representatives in
February.
In discussion it was pointed out that the proposed changes in Tanganyika, and in
particular the widening of the franchise, might hamper the work of the Monckton
Commission2 and have grave repercussions on the future of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Tanganyika was one of the most backward territories in
East and Central Africa and the widening of the franchise in the way proposed could
1 See document no 144 above.
2 Sir Walter Monckton, chairman of Advisory Commission on Central Africa, 1959: see document no 495
in pt II.
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not fail to give rise to similar demands in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was
most unlikely that these could be conceded, in view of the existing state of relations
between Europeans and Africans in those territories, and in any event they would not
be acceptable to the Southern Rhodesian Government. There would therefore be
advantage in delaying the announcement of any changes until the Monckton
Commission had reported, and in limiting the extension of the franchise as narrowly
as possible.
On the other hand it was argued that conditions in Tanganyika were quite different
from those in the Central African territories, in that the proposed constitutional
advance was supported by all sections of opinion in Tanganyika and that there was
general confidence in Mr. Nyerere’s ability to guide the peaceful development of the
country on multi-racial lines. Moreover, Tanganyika was a Trust territory and we
were continually being asked in the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations for a
timetable of its constitutional advance. It would be difficult to justify our actions to
world opinion if we refused to take the present opportunity of making a peaceful
advance towards Tanganyikan self-government which had been put forward in a
reasonable and constitutional manner. The alternative course of resisting the present
requests and retarding the rate of progress carried the distinct risk that T.A.N.U.
would adopt a policy of non-co-operation or even violence, leading to a breakdown in
the administration which, owing to the inadequacy of the police and the general lack
of sympathy which we should encounter not only in Tanganyika but in the United
Nations, we should find it hard to contain.
In further discussion it was pointed out that it would be important to ensure that,
if the proposals were implemented, the Governor retained adequate reserve powers
to enable him to deal with any deterioration in the situation. The present proposals
in fact provided for the crucial portfolios of Defence, Law and Provincial
Administration to be retained by officials.
Summing up the Prime Minister said that before reaching a decision on the
matter it would be useful to have a further discussion at which the Governor of
Tanganyika should be present. It would also be helpful for the Committee to be
provided with information on the existing qualifications for and extent of the
franchise in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Kenya; and the views of the
Governors of Kenya, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland should be obtained on the
possible repercussions on their territories of the proposals set out in the Colonial
Secretary’s memoranda. It would also be useful for the Committee to know what
reserve powers the Governor of Tanganyika would retain until Tanganyika obtained
independence. . . .3
3 The Cabinet endorsed the recommendations of the Colonial Policy Committee: see CAB 128/33, CC
60(59)8, 26 Nov 1959.
147 CO 822/2299 3–18 July 1960
[Tanganyika]: minutes on procedures for grant of independence, by
W B L Monson, Sir J Martin, Lord Perth and Mr Macleod
. . . It may be worthwhile examining further [the] basic premise [of the papers on this
file] viz. that the best (sic) we can hope for is that Tanganyika should get full internal
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self-government say from the 1st July (1961) and independence say 12 months’ later
(1st July, 1962). This contrasts with the view put forward in the S. of S.’s paper for
the Colonial Policy Committee only eight months ago1 which envisaged that we
would have to accept independence by 1968 and that, while we should be pressed
from now onwards to telescope the programme we would have every justification for
digging our toes in. (The reasons given for such optimism were that Mr. Nyerere
himself wanted “to go slow”; that the grant of responsibility might bring to light the
latent jealousies within the TEMO monolith and that our position would become
stronger if it became clear that Nyerere was falling down on the job of building up
the human and material resources, required to make independence a reality).
The change in thinking seems to have come with the gloss the Visiting Mission put
on the S. of S.’s remarks to them. . . . I was not here when the S. of S. met the Mission
or when his brief was prepared and cannot therefore judge how far the telescoping of
the programme, which was envisaged last November, was accepted then. But it is
worthwhile looking again at the reasons which seemed last year to give us hope for
delay and consider what validity is still left in them. Mr. Nyerere has destroyed the
first of the two reasons in the bracketed part of the last paragraph by moving pretty
well in line with the pressures of his “wild men” while at the same time adroitly
preserving his reputation as an “enlightened” nationalist; there remains the lack of
native resources in Tanganyika to run an independent state. This is certainly no less
obvious now than it was last November—if anything, with the decline in morale of
the expatriate service it is the more evident. There is however little sign among
public opinion that this would be accepted as a reason for resisting TANU demands
(as we thought eight months ago it might); if anything opinion seems rather to put
the onus on H.M.G. to see that countries like Tanganyika keep their present
administration after independence.
This does not exclude the possibility of a change in view as Congo affairs develop—
but this could cut both ways. The course of events in the Congo argues for a “testing
period” for the Tanganyika new style government but it seems likely that the U.N.O.
will have, in addition to separating the Congolese and the Belgians from each other’s
throats, to mount quite a large scale exercise in re-establishing administration in the
Congo and they may feel that, if they can do this in an independent country, a fortiori
they can do it in one of their own Trusteeship Territories, if the local politicos and the
administering authority fall out over the speed of advance to independence.
If therefore Ministers feel that it is not practical politics (and with respect this is
essentially a political decision) to try and arrest for more than a short period the
pace of “emancipation” on the grounds of administrative immaturity there is every-
thing to be said for keeping to the sort of time-table envisaged in the drafts.
Tanganyika will not be significantly more “ripe” for independence in 1963 than in
1962 and it is not worth H.M.G’s while needlessly to incur odium by arguing for
1963 rather than 1962, once the decision has been taken that we cannot hold the
position until Tanganyika’s native resources are sufficient to the needs of an inde-
pendent state.
1 See document no 144.
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 484
[147] TANGANYIKA 485
But this decision will have repercussions on Tanganyika’s neighbours and for that
reason, I propose also a second “Chequers” with East African Governors in December.
W.B.L.M.
21.7.60
. . . It is startling to read again paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State’s memorandum
circulated to the C.P.C. last November, and realise how far and how fast we have
travelled since then. The idea of staving off the grant of independence till 1968 or
even later now seems wholly unrealistic. It is clear now that we are dealing not
simply with Nyerere but with TANU as a whole over which it is not too easy for him to
maintain his leadership; but the changed outlook derives principally from the series
of events in Africa since the C.P.C. paper was written. I think we must now recognise
that it is necessary to plan on the assumption of independence in 1962. It is already
known in UN circles that we are thinking in these terms. I agree that this points to
the need for a second “Chequers”—if possible before the end of the present year.
J.M.M.
22.7.60
Congo events may dampen the enthusiasms of U.N.O. for very early independence? I
like the idea of Nyerere & one or two others coming over say in October & going
home with the promise of a meeting early in 1961. It would give us a chance to talk
over with him the problem of the EAHC & why we feel we must play things a bit
slow—think out the implications of the Raisman report2 which won’t be ready until
October. In this connection it will be recalled Nyerere has shown anxiety on this
whole question of the E.A.H.C.
Generally I think the drafts are on the right lines tho’ if the above thinking
commends itself we may want slightly to recast the letters. Furthermore before they
go or at about the same time shouldn’t we at least inform C.P.C. of what is in the
wind remembering only 9 months ago we said 1968!
P.
27.7.60
I agree with the idea and the timing of the meeting of Governors. But I am a little
doubtful about the procedure for the motion for Tanganyika. It is, of course, a
precedent that will tell against us at once, particularly in Kenya, where they will go
for a similar motion. But it may be that it is the right answer.
I am not too concerned with the inconsistency between now and last November.
The wind has been gathering force since then and in any case I told the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference, and they accepted it without
comment, that Tanganyika would be independent by 1962 or 1963. So the thinking of
us all has speeded up and I do not think I need special permission from the C.P.C. for
this proposal, although it may at an appropriate moment be right to mention it to
them.
I think independence by July 1962 is reasonable, but I am much less happy about
full internal self-government by the 1st July, 1961. I should have thought that the
2 On an East African common market.
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constitution just coming in should run for a year and that we should aim at October.
In any case, knowing the Administration in Tanganyika, if we tell them we are
thinking of July we will certainly never get a date later than July and I feel therefore
that that date should be altered to October.
If this is acceptable I have no other proposals on the drafts, which can go ahead.
Naturally we can have a discussion if the department wish.
I.M.
28.7.60
148 CO 822/2040, nos 38 & 46 30 July–2 Aug 1960
Tanganyika: formation of a new government: telegrams (nos 125 &
127) from Sir R Turnbull to W B L Monson (CO). Minutes by W B L
Monson and Mr Macleod
[Governor Turnbull suggested (tel no 34, 21 July 1960) that a ministry might be formed
before the general election on 30 Aug; he argued that 87% of the electorate had expressed
its wishes, with fifty-eight TANU candidates being unopposed, so the outcome was
‘academic’; to anticipate the result would allow ministers to get down to work earlier.
When the S of S refused to agree (tel no 123, 28 July) Turnbull pressed again. The
election resulted in an overwhelming victory for TANU, winning 70 out of 71 seats.]
(1) 30 July 1960
I recognise that action suggested is not in accordance with precedent and agree that
constitutionally speaking it has its unusual aspects. But I cannot agree that there is
any possibility, theoretically or otherwise, that the person emerging after Polling Day
as likely to command majority support will be other than Nyerere. Surely our whole
constitutional exercise is based on this assumption.
2. If there is trouble in Nyasaland all eyes will be focussed on that territory.
There will be wave of sympathy with replaced Africans; and Europeans and Asians
who are already naturally somewhat jittery as a result of the Congo debacle may
display open apprehension and mistrust. Result would be most damaging for the
good racial relations which in spite of outside influence we are still managing to
maintain. To avoid this situation I shall need something to occupy the public mind
and distract it from speculation on the rights and wrongs of federation issues. I also
have in mind points made in paragraph 2 of my Personal No. 117.
3. I trust therefore that you will not dismiss the possibility of forming a new
Government before the General Elections have been completed. Indeed unless
Federation affairs settle down I shall probably have to press for it. Nyerere is not
making an issue of this matter but he too is worried about the effect federation and
the Congo upsets are having on European and Asian morale and about the excuses
they may provide for Townships spivs to misbehave.
(2) 2 Aug 1960
I have had further discussions with Nyerere and Vasey1 about our present
uncomfortable situation in which, as a result of nomination day, TANU has power but
no executive responsibility.
1 Sir E Vasey, minister for finance and economics, 1959–1960, and minister for finance, 1960–1962.
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2. Nyerere recognises that there are bound to be many issues in which TANU as a
Government will not be able to follow the lines advocated by TANU as a party. But in
the present circumstances he is inhibited from taking a TANU Government line and
is compelled to continue to give some support to the party line even if the latter is
extreme. Example is the question of South African boycott over which TANU as a
party are trying to outbid Ghana in ferocity of their threats.
3. Although Nyerere and the present elected Ministers are doing all they can to
maintain confidence by appropriate speeches, they would be infinitely more effective
if they could speak as members of the new Government.
4. In these circumstances I am now firmly of the opinion that unless
constitutional obstacles are unsurmountable we should ask Nyerere to proceed with
the formation of the new Government as soon as constitutional documents have
been completed.
Minutes on 148
The minutes above deal with the suggestion that Mr. Nyerere might take up office as
Chief Minister in Tanganyika on the 8th August, rather than the end of September
which was the date previously in mind. Sir Richard Turnbull, after in (34) saying he
would like if possible to avoid this step, two days later in a Top Secret telegram
recommended that he should be given authority to make such a change. The United
Kingdom Press at the same time reported that this question had been “referred to
Cabinet”.
2. The minutes above are, on the whole, against a change to the earlier date. I
would not myself make too much fuss about moving to the August date if, by so
doing, we either avoided a row or collected any goodwill.
3. Having said this, however, I find it difficult to assess the weight behind the
Governor’s recommendations. It is not clear to me whether TANU will in fact make a
row if they have to wait until the end of September. The fact that their leader is
behaving decently with the Governor suggests that they wouldn’t. On the other
hand, I do not believe that if we let them into office at the beginning of August that
we would reap any positive goodwill for this move. Secondly, Sir Richard Turnbull’s
recommendation for the move seems to me to be based on his fears of repercussions
of security trouble in Nyasaland which we may well be able to avoid anyway.
4. In this, as in other matters, Sir Richard Turnbull is at the moment at a
“volatile” stage of his thought (the authorship of the phrase should be attributed to
the S. of S. rather than to myself), and I agree that he might be invited, as in the
draft, to take the United Nations implications of his move into account before
making a final recommendation.
W.B.L.M.
26.7.60
I think it would be wholly improper for Sir Richard Turnbull to appoint Mr. Nyerere
at this stage. As a politician the suggestion offends me very much and it seems to me
beyond argument unconstitutional. The election has not taken place and, although
people may be pledged to a certain individual, they can—and indeed it has happened
in the past—withdraw their support. There is, of course, no likelihood that they
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would do this, but we must not anticipate the actual holding of the election, nor be
thought or seen to influence it.
I would like to see a re-draft of the telegram putting this point firmly to the
Governor. Unless we do this I am afraid we will go dithering on.2
I.M.
27.7.60
2 The reply to the governor stated that after careful consideration the S of S ‘remains unshaken in his
belief that it would be wrong to adopt the course you propose’. There was ‘reasonable hope of a respectable
settlement in Nyasaland’, which should remove Turnbull’s main ground of anxiety—but if not, would it
make any difference? The S of S was ‘frankly not impressed by line taken by Nyerere. Indeed, if it is a
matter of showing enough leadership to restrain spivs in the townships or wildmen in his own party, one
is surely entitled to look to Nyerere showing this, whether he is leader of the majority party or Chief
Minister as well’ (CO 822/2040, no 40, tel no 130, 2 Aug 1960).
149 CO 822/2299, no 16 25 Aug 1960
‘Tanganyika: constitutional advance’: telegram (no 137) from W B L
Monson (CO) to Sir R Turnbull
Have discussed letter under reference [9 Aug] with Secretary of State.
2. We are agreed with you on
(a) constitutional conference in London in March; and
(b) an announcement to that effect when you address Legislative Council on 11th
October.
We also had implicitly accepted aim in (c) of your paragraph 2.1
3. We accept further that in any statement we should:
(a) endeavour to avoid ruffling the newly-fledged feathers of your Legislature by
implying that they are on trial by making performance a prior condition of any
conference though this has presentational difficulties for us vis-a-vis United
Kingdom opinion—see 4 (a) below—and
(b) that, since the next stage of constitutional development in Tanganyika clearly
cannot be anything else but self-government, we might as well reap such credit as
we can by using that phrase in any announcement about the conference.
4. The Secretary of State sees, however, very great objection to your proposal
(paragraph 4 of your letter) to name a date for self-government in advance of the
conference for two following reasons:
(a) The procedure of naming a date for self-government and leaving the details to
be worked out at a conference in six months’ time strikes the Secretary of State,
and would also strike his colleagues in H.M.G. and Parliament, as well as the
public here generally, as painfully reminiscent of the way the Belgians announced
the independence of the Congo and of the procedure which has led to the
lamentable debacle which now has embroiled us all. (At the moment people have
1 This stated that the S of S ‘should have an opportunity of demonstrating that his actions match the
statement he made to the members of the United Nations’ Visiting Mission on the 25th April this year’.
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given Nyerere credit for advocating policies far different from those of Lumumba
and H.M.G. credit for having brought the people of Tanganyika forward with a
greater sense of realities than the Congolese. With respect we doubt whether
much of the credit would survive the public use of arguments in paragraph 3 of
your letter. It might be accepted that the elections have returned a Council where
experience of public affairs is very much the exception rather than the rule, but
view would be held that Nyerere might have been expected in these circumstances
to show greater powers of leadership over his less sophisticated followers.)
(b) The Secretary of State is worried also about the possible effect on the Civil
Service of announcing a date before we have any experience of how the new
Government will work. We hope that the recent announcement about H.M.O.C.S.2
(and in due course the Salaries Commission) will put new heart into them but
obviously the period in which they will require most careful nursing is at hand as
the new Government and Legislature are finding their feet. If the certainty of
compensation in October, 1961, is firmly fixed in their minds, how many are going
even to try and make the readjustment?
(c) In this connection we also had doubts about proposing that the conference
would by its terms of reference have to review “progress of the financial and
administrative adjustments”. By thus playing down the transition to self-
government, we see a risk of deterioration in relations between Ministers and Civil
Service and of encouraging the latter to leave, since the emphasis on
“adjustments” of the kind suggested gives politicians an opportunity, they may
well like to take, to blame lack of progress to self-government on the Civil
Service’s failure to get on with the job fast enough to suit the uninformed views of
the electorate.
5. In the light of the above the furthest any statement in October could go,
seems to us to be:
(a) To repeat assurance to Visiting Mission (but in the Secretary of State’s own
words).
(b) Make clear H.M.G.’s sympathy to Tanganyika’s aspirations and readiness to
help.
(c) Stress many important issues of policy to be determined by the new
Government within the sphere of responsibility now entrusted to it; in addition
there are many policy issues directly arising out of any proposed future advance
which will require examination and to which Ministers will no doubt also wish to
address their minds in coming months.
(d) That in these circumstances a taking stock of the position in March, 1961,
would be appropriate.
(e) Secretary of State therefore will summon a constitutional conference in
London in March for the purpose of advising him on the attainment by Tanganyika
of self-government and of considering the steps which would have to be taken to
prepare the way for independence and the termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement.
6. My immediately following telegram contains text of statement which might be
2 See document no 87 above.
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made on these lines. It is of course open to amendment within the limits indicated by
Secretary of State’s view in preceding paragraphs.
7. We should be grateful for your advice whether action on these lines will be
sufficient to forestall independence resolution. If it doesn’t, we may not be so
distressed since, ever since the Secretary of State made his statement to the Visiting
Mission, we have recognised that resolution of this kind might in any event be passed
as a bargaining counter. United Nations reaction to statement may be more
important and we should be grateful for United Kingdom Mission comments
whether statement on lines suggested would be sufficiently positive for Fourth
Committee purposes (events in Congo may have damped a little enthusiasm at
United Nations for very early independence?).
8. As to letter to Nyerere, Secretary of State would be ready to write himself if it
can help. There is risk, however, which he is anxious to avoid that unless ground has
been thoroughly prepared correspondence will be used for horse-trading and we
think it important to be much clearer about probable reactions of Nyerere and his
colleagues before letter from the Secretary of State is sent. The Secretary of State
feels that, in any case, any letter he sends should be shorter than your draft, e.g. it
might keep to lines of proposed statement in my immediately following telegram,
leaving details of self-government and matters for study to be explained by you. We
imagine in any event Nyerere is certain to consult you before Legislative Council
meeting and if it then appears that independence motion is likely to be moved early
this might be appropriate time for opening negotiation with him by means of a
letter. . . .
150 CO 822/2300, [no 108] 22 Nov 1960
[Tanganyika: discussions with Mr Nyerere]: minute (PM(60)64) by Mr
Macleod to Mr Macmillan
You have probably seen that Julius Nyerere, the Chief Minister of Tanganyika, was
here for a few days. He came partly to discuss what would happen at the
Constitutional Conference for Tanganyika to be held in March and partly to tell me
his ideas for East African federation. He is, as you know, probably the wisest and best
of the African leaders that we have, at least in East and Central Africa. He believes
firmly in federation for Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Zanzibar and is prepared to
put back Tanganyika’s independence, which is clearly not far away, to achieve this. He
has been sounding African leaders in the other territories and believes they will all
agree, but he doesn’t feel that a conference on federation could have much effect
until they were all at the Chief Minister stage.1 He, of course, is already a Chief
Minister; Zanzibar is just about to have one, and Uganda will probably move to one
after the elections in the first quarter of next year. Kenya, of course, is unpredictable,
but most people now seem to hold the view that on the whole it would be easier to
move fairly swiftly to an African Chief Minister for Kenya and then to play
independence along. I have not finally made up my mind on this but I rather think
1 The record of meeting with Macleod states that ‘Mr Nyerere conceded that the East African territories
need not go at the same pace, but he felt that their feet should be on the same road’ (no 94, 18 Nov 1960).
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that this judgment is right. For one thing, it would largely dispose of the problem of
Kenyatta, who otherwise is a candidate, even in detention, for such a position.
2. Obviously federation for East Africa is a wonderful prize and I have always
wanted to achieve it. I believe we can, but I am sure that we must not show ourselves
too anxious now. You will remember how one incautious sentence from Oliver
Lyttelton about federation in 1953 caused a furore which took years to die down and
was partly responsible for the Buganda troubles at that time.2 Moreover, with Central
Africa in mind we must not be seen to impose or be thought of as imposing
federation. But if we can get the impetus for this to come from the Africans
themselves—and I believe we can do this—then all will be well. This explains why
the papers, very wisely and very helpfully, have been describing our position as one of
“cool interest”. This is the position that I am sure we must maintain, but in fact
nothing would suit our plans better. Many of the problems, including the racial and
tribal ones in Kenya and the troubles in Uganda, could fall into place in the wider
setting of a federation.
3. Accordingly the March conference becomes more important. I am sure it
would be right to hold it in Dar-es-Salaam and I would go out myself for a short time
to take the chair. We would have no difficulty in agreeing (indeed Nyerere and I
agreed on everything while he was here) as to what should happen in the steps for
full internal self-government. We would then cover the position of independence by
giving a date for independence but following it with a formula which would indicate
that if plans for a federation in East Africa matured they would take precedence. This
will need careful wording, as a Trust Territory to the United Nations. It is very much
our showpiece there and we must not be suspected of dragging our colonial heels. If
this programme works out—and I will, of course, be consulting the East African
Governors on it—then it may be that in March we could start an initiative towards
federation for East Africa. It would, of course, have the incidental but very important
effect of adding cohesion to the movement for federation in Central Africa. . . .
2 Lyttelton was S of S for colonies, 1951–1954. In 1953, in citing the supposed virtues of the Central
African Federation, he casually referred to the possibilities of a federation in East Africa; the kabaka felt he
had to take a stand against this. See Goldsworthy, ed, Conservative government and end of empire, Part II,
document no 294, for Cabinet conclusions of 19 Nov 1953.
151 CO 822/2301 10 Feb–7 Mar 1961
[Tanganyika constitutional development]: minutes by W B L Monson,
J C Morgan and Sir J Martin on title of prime minister
Sir John Martin
The Secretary of State spoke to you and me yesterday about Kenya telegram No. 131
Secret and Personal, copy attached, and indicated the lines of a message which he
would like to send to Sir Richard Turnbull pending general departmental discussion
with him on the Tanganyika Constitution which is fixed for next Wednesday
afternoon.
2. Mr. Pearson was good enough to prepare a draft on the lines directed by the
Secretary of State which is attached (A). I have discussed this draft with Mr. Morgan
and we have three main comments on it:
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(1) There is something astray in the logic of the drafting which seems to imply
that had Mr. Nyerere been prepared to go ahead with Federation we would have
been willing to concede independence for Tanganyika, presumably as part of a
federation as early as 1961. Quite the contrary is the case and we think the point
which has to be put to Sir Richard and to Mr. Nyerere is that we are now dealing
with a situation de novo.
(2) It is clear that Mr. Nyerere is going to press very strongly for the 31st
December 1961 and, important as Sir Patrick Renison’s points are, they will be
equally valid against a date in 1962.1 At some stage therefore we have got to give
Tanganyika its head as against Kenya (and in fact Kenya Nationalists have had
Tanganyika held up to them as an example of how fast they can go if they followed
Lancaster House policies). In the last issue, therefore, a difference of three months
ought not to be significant one way or the other as between Mr. Nyerere and
ourselves provided always we can get the necessary administrative work done
within the time. A December dateline for this will run us pretty hard but we think
it might just be done.
We therefore feel that we should not say flat out at the moment to Mr. Nyerere
that he can not have 1961 but that we should warn him that he is unlikely to get it
in the situation with which we are now confronted.
(3) There is also the question of the Premiership v. Prime Ministership. You
yourself spoke to me about this this morning and hoped that we should not turn it
down out of hand at this stage. The Secretary of State referred in his discussion to
complications which this question would have in British Guiana, and we shall be
looking further into this. In the meantime again we think we ought to warn
Nyerere that it is not so simple as he thinks and as in fact the Governor (who
admittedly has not been fully briefed by us on this) may have given him to think.
I submit a revised draft telegram with these points in mind.2
W.B.L.M.
10.2.61
At the Secretary of State’s meeting with the department this afternoon about the
policy for Tanganyika’s independence, Federation, and the future of the East Africa
High Commission, he indicated that he would wish to send immediately to Sir R.
Turnbull a telegram stating his views on (1) the timing for independence and (2) the
title of “Prime Minister” of “Premier”. He said that on the former point the telegram
should be somewhat “truculent”, although less so on the latter. It was also our
understanding that he wished to send this telegram immediately, and not to defer it
until the paper, now in preparation on the general policy, has been discussed by the
C.P.C.
2. It is our understanding that this telegram is, however, only the first round in
carrying out the staged argument with Mr. Nyerere, through the Governor, on which
the S. of S. decided at the meeting. The first stage is to insist on both the March 1962
date and the title “Premier”. If however Nyerere resists on either or both of these
1 Sir J Martin wrote in the margin here: ‘I don’t altogether agree. (It is not just a question of 3 months,
but of the year 1961 as against the year 1962)’.
2 Sir J Martin commented here: ‘I think this shows the red light clearly enough for the moment. J.M.M.
10.2.61’.
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points, then, at the second stage, we are to fall back on the concession of title “Prime
Minister” on the understanding that Nyerere does not press for the 1961 date. If
thereafter it appears that Nyerere will be really in extreme difficulties, with
consequential disorders, etc., in Tanganyika, we are to fall back on the third stage,
which is to try to reverse the concession so as to give way on the 1961 date, but to
continue to insist on the title “Premier”. If, finally, this will not work, for the reasons
indicated above, then we have to go, at the fourth stage (absit omen) to conceding
both the 1961 date and the title of Premier. . . .
J.C.M.
20.2.61
The thinking, as I understand it, of the S. of S. on the subject of the title of “Prime
Minister” at the self-government stage in Tanganyika, is revealed in my minute of
20th February, which records the attitude adopted by the S. of S. at his meeting on
that date. Briefly, the S. of S. is not prepared to make an ultimate sticking point of
either the date for Tanganyika’s independence or the title of “Prime Minister”; but he
could, according to circumstances, use either of these points as a bargaining counter
for gaining the other. On the whole it is more important, although not vital, to get
Nyerere to agree to March 1962 as independence date rather than to get him to agree
to the title of “Premier”. Thus, if the S. of S. continues to argue for the title of
“Premier”, he may at the end be able to “bargain” “Prime Minister” for the later date
for independence.
2. We have not heretofore revealed any of this reasoning to Sir R. Turnbull, but
have set out the open arguments by analogy which are contained in Mr. Monson’s
letter at No. 130 (to which Sir R. Turnbull refers) and in the telegrams Nos. 131 and
136. It would of course be possible now to reveal this tactical reasoning to Sir R.
Turnbull, but I am strongly inclined to think that it would be unwise to do so. I
therefore suggest that the S. of S. should reply in “non-committal terms” as in the
draft herewith, without arguing any further at this stage, but with the intention of
letting Mr. Nyerere know that the matter will be discussed with him privately before
it has to come up in open Conference (if at all). So draft herewith.
J.C.M.
7.3.61
I agree with Mr. Morgan that we should not reveal our tactics to Sir Richard Turnbull
at this stage otherwise we are liable to find him “upping” the title of Prime Minister!
2. I am rather surprised after our correspondence previously to see Sir Richard
Turnbull discounting so heavily the British Guiana arguments and the arguments as
regards possible repercussions in Kenya and Uganda of the adoption of the title of
Prime Minister at the next stage. It is very much for consideration whether we
should pursue these matters further with him in correspondence, but if it is thought
worth while it might be done as in my m.s. addition to the draft opposite. This is
deliberately pursuing the tone of “truculence” which we adopted at an earlier stage.
3. On the other hand I would myself discount heavily the argument which he
himself adduces at A/ on page 3 of his letter. I have confirmed with Mr. Rogers that
already in preliminary correspondence we seem to have successfully cleared up all
the points on which Tanganyika Ministers might want hard bargaining with us at the
Conference. (This is not to say that we shall not have hard bargaining there, but it
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will be with the European Civil Service Association, whose attitude is not likely to be
affected in the slightest degree by the grant of the title of Prime Minister to Mr.
Nyerere).
4. Sir Richard Turnbull has a point that we did not comment or criticize the use
of the term in correspondence at an earlier stage. For this oversight I must take the
blame.
W.B.L.M.
7.3.61
Secretary of State
. . . With reference to [the penultimate sentence in para 2] in Mr. Monson’s minute
I think it would be better not to argue the point further with Sir Richard Turnbull
now. It seems pretty clear that you will in fact have to concede the title “Prime
Minister” though it will be for decision at Dar-es-Salaam at what point this
concession can most profitably be traded in. I would therefore omit Mr. Monson’s
manuscript addition to the draft and limit it to the first (type-written) paragraph.
It is however for consideration whether it might not be well to comment on Sir
Richard Turnbull’s apparent acceptance of the view that the prospect of federation
has fallen away. It might be worth while adding to the reply sentences as follows—
I hope that in referring to the prospect of federation as falling away, you do not mean
that you think we should abandon the idea of working back to federation after
independence. It may be that the opportunity has been lost, but I still feel that an
ultimate federation of the three East African territories is a great prize which we should
not lightly abandon.
J.M.M.
7.3.61
152 CO 822/2301, no 127 11 Feb 1961
[Tanganyika: advance in date of independence]: telegram (no 67) from
Mr Macleod to Sir R Turnbull about the alarm felt by Sir P Renison
(Kenya)
I very much appreciate the grounds for anxiety which Renison has expressed.1
2. My discussions with Nyerere in London were on the basis of a programme
whereby Tanganyika would proceed to independence within an East African
Federation and would only reach independence when the Federation became
independent as a whole, though within the Federation it would proceed as quickly as
possible to the widest measure of regional independence which we could devise.
3. The proposals which are now being discussed would bring Tanganyika to
independence on its own and at a rate faster than had been contemplated even for
regional independence within a Federation. This is a new situation which H.M.G. will
have to consider and in that consideration they will not only have to take into
account the programme of legislation etc., referred to in the second sentence of
1 See no 123 on this file: tel to S of S from gov of Kenya (tel 131), expressing alarm about advance of
Tanganyika date into 1961, when Mar 1962 ‘was bad enough’.
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paragraph (f) of your note of your meeting of 6th February with Nyerere but also
satisfy themselves that the date ultimately negotiated will not be detrimental to their
responsibilities in other parts of East Africa. I do not want Nyerere to be under any
illusion that against this background it is going to be a quick and easy matter for him
to pocket a date in 1961 for independence and I should like you to tell him from me
that, though I am considering the changed situation as rapidly as I can I do not think
that I will find it justifiable to proceed as rapidly during 1961 as he has in mind.
4. I should like you to warn him at the same time that I attach greater
importance to the title of Prime Minister than he appears to do. I should find it very
difficult to establish a precedent in East Africa for moving directly from Chief
Minister to Prime Minister status and, if Nyerere argues that this is an unimportant
step that argument can be turned round the other way as a reason for not taking it.
5. I hope to be communicating with you and the other Governors further within
a week or so but am most anxious that you should take holding action indicated
above in the meantime.
153 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)5 27 Feb 1961
‘Independence of Tanganyika’: Cabinet memorandum (C(61)32) by
Mr Macleod
In “Colonial Problems in 1961” (CPC(61) 1)1 I surveyed the situation in East Africa
and the Committee agreed (CPC(61) 1st Meeting) to resume discussion in the light
of my discussions with the East African Governors.
2. This paper deals mainly with Tanganyika. (I shall be presiding over a
constitutional conference in Dar-es-Salaam towards the end of March).
East African Federation
3. At the conference in January the Governors agreed that the aim of policy
should be the establishment of an East African Federation.2 There were two
important qualifications: (a) it would be essential to ensure that the territories enter
Federation as a result of the freely expressed desire of the inhabitants, in order to
avoid any accusation that Federation had been imposed in the interests of the United
Kingdom; (b) the aim to establish a Federation should not prejudice the possibility of
establishing stable government, particularly in Kenya, and of solving certain special
problems with which that country is faced.
4. When advocating Federation Mr. Nyerere had expressed the view that if the
countries deferred coming together until after they had severally gained their
independence the chance of Federation would probably be lost. Therefore, his
argument was, they must move to Federation and independence at one and the same
time. Since Tanganyika could already look forward to independence in the very near
future, the other territories (Kenya in particular) should be brought rapidly to a
stage  of constitutional development roughly (not necessarily precisely) corres-
ponding to the stage that Tanganyika had now reached. He knew that Kenya and
Uganda were following somewhat behind Tanganyika and, for the sake of securing
1 See document nos 36 & 37 above. 2 See document no 126.
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the prize of Federation, he was ready to defer the date of Tanganyika’s independence.
I am certain that in speaking of such deferment he did not envisage more than a
short delay.
5. I have not been able to give Mr. Nyerere any assurances about the possibility of
further constitutional advance in Kenya or Uganda. Even when I am taking the
Tanganyika constitutional conference, the new Kenya Government will barely have
been in office and the Uganda elections will still be ahead of us. In these
circumstances the Governors and I had hoped that it might be possible to bring
about agreement at the Tanganyika conference as follows:
(a) Implementation by mid-May 1961, of full internal self-government for Tang-
anyika.
(b) A statement, the purpose of which would be to set a notional date for
Tanganyika’s independence, subject to its possibly having to be adjusted if in the
light of subsequent events it should prove practicable to lay definite plans for an
East African Federation.
6. While the Governor of Kenya could naturally not commit himself about the
immediate future in Kenya, our hope was that it might prove possible for there to be,
perhaps before the end of the year, a conference of all concerned to discuss the
possibility of a Federation. If the conference proved abortive, we should inevitably
have to set forthwith a date for Tanganyika’s independence.
7. Since my discussions with the Governors I have had further talks with Mr.
Nyerere. He is quite certain that a date for Tanganyika’s independence must be set at
the March conference and he now insists that it must be before the end of 1961. He is
also disheartened at the apparent failure of African leadership in the neighbouring ter-
ritories—in Kenya in particular. He does not necessarily rule out ultimate Federation
but he feels that it is no longer for him to go on taking the initiative. He has told the
Governor that he would like Tanganyika to remain in the East Africa High Commission
after its independence. This would preserve links which could help the later estab-
lishment of a Federation. I think he fully understands that, certainly at this juncture
and possibly for some time, it may not be possible for H.M.G. to make forward moves
in Kenya, still less in Uganda, of a nature that would make him reasonably certain that
there could be a general East African preliminary conference during this year.
8. I think we must accept this and we, therefore, now have to consider (1) our
future policy for Tanganyika itself and (on the assumption that before Tanganyika is
independent it will not have proved possible for any definite steps to be taken in
relation to Federation); (2) the relationship of an independent Tanganyika with
Kenya and Uganda through the East African High Commission.
Policy in Tanganyika
9. The next move in Tanganyika is the introduction of internal self-government.
Mr. Nyerere has asked for the arrangements to be completed in April; there are
important local reasons connected with the budget session of the Legislative Council
for meeting him, and I propose to accept that date.
10. Mr. Nyerere has asked that with the introduction of internal self-government
the post of leader of the Government should be designated “Prime Minister”. There
are some objections to this and although I don’t intend to make a major issue of it, I
hope to persuade him to accept “Premier”.
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Date of independence
11. Mr. Nyerere is insisting on independence before the end of this year. If it were
not for the very great difficulties arising over the future of the East Africa High
Commission, it is just possible that all the administrative and legislative arrangements
could be completed by the 31st December. But these difficulties do exist and cannot be
ignored. Moreover, I cannot ignore the effect on Kenya and Uganda if a date were fixed
at the March conference for independence in 1961. In Kenya in particular, until the new
Government is well into the saddle, firmly capable of maintaining law and order and with
the tide of confidence turning, it is vital to do nothing to encourage the expectation of
early further constitutional advance. Since the Kenya African National Union are them-
selves pressing for independence in 1961, a decision in this sense for Tanganyika would
clearly give such encouragement. Therefore, I am sure that I must try very hard to secure
agreement to a date early in 1962. Indeed, if it became clear that by insisting on this date
there was no chance of reaching agreement in Tanganyika, where I am sure we must not
at this stage impose a solution, we should have to consider bringing the date forward say
to the 31st December, 1961. We shall have to get a resolution terminating the
Trusteeship Agreement passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which will
be in session at the time of the conference and just after. Provided Mr. Nyerere is satis-
fied, I do not foresee undue difficulty in getting their agreement to either date. I believe
the decisive argument should be its effect on Nyerere’s own position. His continuance
in power is vital to us in East Africa, and if independence by the end of December 1961
is essential to maintain his position I am sure we should agree. I should add that the
Governor believes the 1961 date to be essential, but I wish to confirm this for myself.
Relationship of an independent Tanganyika with the East Africa High Commission
12. If Tanganyika is to become independent by the spring of 1962 or earlier, we
have to consider the future of the East Africa High Commission and of the Common
Market in East Africa. The present structure is described in the Appendix.3
13. Mr. Nyerere has told the Governor that he wishes Tanganyika to remain in
the High Commission structure including the Central Legislative Assembly and that
he regards the maintenance of the Common Market as vital. He foresees this as a
means of keeping in existence inter-territorial co-operation which could provide the
basis on which Federation could later be constructed. Insofar as we regard the
establishment of Federation as being in the interests of H.M.G. and of the East
African territories, we should try to meet him on this. Unfortunately it is
impracticable to secure the result Mr. Nyerere wishes by a simple maintenance of the
status quo. The High Commission is a “colonial” institution subordinated to Her
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom. This is reflected in the provisions of
the High Commission Order in Council under which (a) the High Commission is
required to observe instructions given by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State,
(b) the High Commission has reserved legislative powers, (c) the Crown acting
through a Secretary of State can disallow High Commission laws, and (d) High
Commission laws prevail over territorial laws and may amend or suspend them.
Further, the High Commission is constituted for all three territories by Order in
Council; after independence it would probably not be appropriate for Her Majesty in
Council to have legislative powers over Tanganyika.
3 Not printed.
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14. We have, therefore, to devise a solution which is practicable, which preserves
the substance of the existing arrangements as far as possible which does not
prejudice the discharge of our responsibilities for Uganda and Kenya while they are
still under our control, and which at the same time will be defensible in the United
Nations as not derogating from the sovereignty of Tanganyika. The United Nations is
likely to be suspicious on this question and we may face difficulties.
15. There are only two practicable solutions. The first would provide for the High
Commission to remain for Kenya and Uganda only, and for Tanganyika to use its
services on an agency basis. We may have to fall back on this. The main disadvantages
are that in practice it is likely to be difficult to reach a satisfactory agreement about
the costs to be borne by Tanganyika and we should have to introduce immediately a
compensation scheme for any members of the staff who did not wish to continue to
serve in Tanganyika and who could not be absorbed in Kenya and Uganda. The
second alternative, which I at present favour, is that a new joint organisation should
be established by Agreement between Kenya and Uganda (acting with the authority of
H.M.G. in the U.K.) on the one hand and independent Tanganyika on the other. This
solution also has its difficulties, particularly as to reconciling my responsibility
towards the staff of the present E.A.H.C. with a scheme likely to be acceptable to the
United Nations. I am now consulting the East African Governors, the Administrator
of the E.A.H.C. and the U.K. Mission to the United Nations on this scheme, and
cannot formulate a final view until I receive their advice.
16. I invite my colleagues to agree that at the March Conference I should agree
that Tanganyika will become independent not later than the spring of 1962; and to
take note of the lines on which I am trying to work out a solution to the problem of
the future relationship between independent Tanganyika and a regional organisation
akin to the East Africa High Commission.4
4 This paper was discussed by the Cabinet on 7 Mar 1961 and the proposals approved (CAB 128/35/1,
CC 11(61)7).
154 CO 822/2301, no 138 2 Mar 1961
[Tanganyika: title of prime minister]: letter from Sir R Turnbull to Mr
Macleod
I hope you will forgive me for addressing you upon a subject which I know you will
wish to regard as closed; I refer to the title by which the Chief Minister should be
known when we enter into the period of Internal Self-Government.
In spite of the view you have so clearly expressed in your recent telegram,1 I feel it
my duty to report to you once again the misgivings I feel at the course of action that
is proposed.
May I again set out the arguments I have used in favour of the adoption of the title
“Prime Minister” rather than “Premier”. For the past year or more it has been taken
for granted by the public, the Ministers, the Civil Service and myself, that “Prime
Minister” would be the title used at the stage of Internal Self-Government. I have
used the term in conversation with the Chief Minister and in correspondence with
1 See document no 152.
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him and other Ministers, and, without comment or criticism, in correspondence
with the Colonial Office. The Permanent Secretaries and others who are engaged
upon the reconstruction of the Ministries necessary for the next constitutional move
all employ the term “Prime Minister”, and in the working papers relevant to the
changes, the expression “Prime Minister’s Office” constantly occurs. The term
appears in both the English press and the vernacular press when constitutional
changes are being discussed; and I myself have not hesitated during the past twelve
months to employ it in both public and semi-public utterances concerning the
changes which will be introduced in the next constitutional phase.
I agree that had there been a prospect of the East African territories moving into
Federation, it might well have proved embarrassing for Tanganyika to have had a
Prime Minister on entering into Self-Government, for when the other territories
reached that particular point in their constitutional progress, they, too, would have
demanded Prime Ministers, and we might have reached the ridiculous position in
which there were four, or even five, such appointments within a single constitutional
framework. But surely, when the prospect of Federation falls away, so, too, does the
objection to “Prime Minister”. I have examined the argument set out by Monson in
his letter of the 17th February, but it seems to me that the case against having a
Prime Minister for British Guiana rested largely upon the hope that later, and in any
case before final independence, British Guiana might join the Caribbean federation.
What causes me concern is this: the whole country—the people, the politicians,
the Civil Service and the press—are keyed up to expect an announcement that when
we enter the next constitutional stage the Chief Minister will become the Prime
Minister; and an insistence upon the title of “Premier” rather than “Prime Minister”
will inevitably arouse widespread disappointment and dismay, and will provide the
opponents of the Government (particularly the Communist-supported African
National Congress) with an excellent opportunity to declare that Nyerere had been
the dupe of a Colonialist trick, and that the imposition of the title of “Premier” rather
than “Prime Minister” means that full Self-Government has not in fact been
achieved. Sensible men will be unaffected; nevertheless, an atmosphere of suspicion
will be created, and, although I do not suggest that the Conference would founder on
this point, the hard bargaining which faces us, especially in regard to Civil Service
matters, would become correspondingly more difficult. I accept that the demand that
the Chief Minister should become a Prime Minister rather than a Premier is largely
an emotional one and that the Ghana precedent may be one you do not wish to
follow; but Africa is an emotional country and Ghana is regarded by every African as
having set the perfect pattern for constitutional development. If I thought there were
any prospect of our seriously embarrassing Kenya and Uganda by our using the term
“Prime Minister” in what is, after all, the ultimate stage in our move to
independence, I would be less importunate; but, as things are, I remain of the view
that by requiring Nyerere to call himself Premier, we should be importing into the
March Conference an unfortunate and avoidable possibility of discord.2
2 Macleod replied that since Nyerere was being ‘non-committal’, ‘you will not expect me not to be equally
non-committal at this stage’—he would discuss on arrival in Dar-es-Salaam. He added: ‘I hope that in
referring to the prospect of federation as falling away you do not mean that you think we should abandon
the idea of working back to federation after independence. It may be that the opportunity has been lost,
but I still feel that an ultimate federation of the three East African territories is a great prize which we
should not lightly abandon’ (no 139, 8 Mar. 1961).
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155 CO 968/724 3 Mar 1961
[Future of the Tanganyika battalions of King’s African Rifles in
relation to independence]: letter from W B L Monson (CO) to Sir R
Turnbull
One of the subjects to be mentioned at the Constitutional Conference, in relation to
the further stage of independence, is the future of the Tanganyika battalions of the
King’s African Rifles. We understand that Nyerere has said that he may not wish to
maintain an Army after independence, and will be prepared to rely for internal
security, and presumably local defence, on the police (possibly augmented by a
gendarmerie recruited from the present K.A.R.). We also are aware of the strong
feeling when EALFO1 ran the force that Tanganyika was not getting value for money
in respect of its military contribution, and that it would be more economical to
replace the K.A.R. with Armed police units.
2. We have given this question a good deal of thought and have come to the
conclusion that it would be very unwise, to put it mildly, for Tanganyika to embark
on independence without an Army. In the first place, there will be a continuing
requirement for a military force to support the police in internal security situations,
and the psychological value of “calling in the military” is far greater than merely
bringing in an additional armed police unit. Secondly, the situation in the Congo
(and possibly Ruanda Urundi) is such that Tanganyika must expect to have at least for
some years a threat of armed incursions from that quarter mounted by military
forces, which can only be successfully resisted by her own military forces. Looking
further ahead one cannot ignore the possibility of serious disorders in Portuguese
East Africa which might well have repercussions across the border. We have found in
similar circumstances in the Southern Cameroons that a military force is essential to
deal with such problems. Finally, if Tanganyika is to play the important role in
African affairs that its size and population warrant, it will require to have the
resources of a small and efficient Army at its disposal. There is no other
Commonwealth country, and probably no other independent country in the world,
which has found it possible to dispense with an Army and we feel that Tanganyika will
be making a grave mistake if they give up the K.A.R. for reasons of economy. From
the U.K. point of view (and I believe this would go for all other members of the
Commonwealth) a Commonwealth member which could not defend itself with
military forces would be something of an anomaly. We think therefore that when this
matter is touched on at the Constitutional Conference the Secretary of State should
urge the Tanganyika Government to retain the K.A.R. as a military force and should
make proposals to this end.
3. We have considered, in consultation with the War Office and the
Commonwealth Relations Office, the implications of such a decision, and I enclose a
paper2 (in a form of a draft brief for the Secretary of State) which sets out our agreed
view. We shall be grateful for your comments and the comments of the G.O.C. on this
paper. It does not claim to be more than a very brief outline of the problem; if its
general lines are agreed at the Conference we envisage that East Africa Command
1 East Africa Land Forces Organisation, which consisted of the ministers i/c defence in the three territories.
2 Not printed.
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will have to prepare a detailed plan, possibly in consultation with a joint Working
Party from the War Office and the Colonial Office for further discussion with
Tanganyika Ministers. We therefore intend that the Conference should not get
involved in details at this stage. We also hope that the financial implications can be
left for inclusion in any general financial settlement. Meanwhile we hope that you
will feel able to speak to Nyerere about the importance of keeping an Army and the
need for a detailed examination of the problem. . . .
156 CO 822/2218, nos 119 & 122 1 Aug 1961
[Financial assistance to Tanganyika]: letter from Mr Macleod to
Mr Selwyn Lloyd (Exchequer).  Minutes by W L Gorell Barnes (CO)
and Mr Sandys (CRO)
[In Mar 1961 the government announced that Tanganyika would become independent in
Dec 1961 after seven months’ of internal self-government, during which Nyerere was the
first prime minister. In June 1961 the National Assembly declared its desire for
Tanganyika to become a member of the Commonwealth. However, the Tanganyika
government was so dissatisfied with the proposed financial assistance after independence
that it threatened to withhold co-operation over Colonial Service compensations.
Macleod argued that this would have ‘very serious’ consequences: amounting to ‘a
complete breakdown of our policy in East Africa and very probably to the loss of our
influence in this area to the Iron Curtain countries’. He did not like blackmail, but
thought that the British government could at least meet them by letting Tanganyika draw
both the £5 million development loan offered and the balance of their CD & W allocation
up to mid-1964 (£4.75 million); and by giving some help on service compensation.
Reasonable generosity, he argued, was essential: the House of Commons clearly felt ‘it
would be a tragedy if we lost the friendship of the one territory in East and Central Africa
whose progress towards independence has been smooth and peaceful’. So a substantial
contribution to the financing of Tanganyika’s development plan ought to be made (CO
822/2218, no 106, minute to chancellor of the Exchequer, 27 July 1961). The Cabinet
accepted the substance of these arguments. Turnbull was ‘profoundly grateful’ to Macleod
and Perth for the risks they had been prepared to take, and ‘for proving such bonny
fechters1 on our behalf’ (CO 822/2219, no 116, tel to Macleod, 16 Aug 1961.]
With further reference to my Minute of 27th July, Edward Boyle2 will have told you
that it was finally decided that the Governor should come to London. He has now
arrived, and I have been consulting with him.
2. Sir Richard Turnbull reports very gloomily. He is convinced that unless the
Tanganyika Ministers are given their “minimum” terms or something equivalent to
them, they will reject our offer of aid and repudiate all the agreements they have
made with us about the Overseas Service. If this happens the Service will leave en
bloc and we shall certainly be faced with a breakdown of administration and indeed of
law and order. Nor will the consequences be confined to Tanganyika. What line the
Tanganyika Government would in such circumstances take about the arrangements
for inter-territorial co-operation in East Africa which we were so happy to secure a
few weeks ago, I do not know. But certainly the repercussions in the other two
territories of the events which would follow in Tanganyika would be very severe and
we might well be faced with the same situation in those two territories. If that
happened then our East African policy would be in ruins and in one way or another
the cost to the Exchequer would be very large indeed.
1 Scottish expression: ‘fighters’. 2 Sir E Boyle, Bt, financial secretary to the Treasury, 1959–1962.
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3. I am afraid that we have to deal here with a situation in which resentment at
what Nyerere considered the smallness of our offer produced emotional and
pathological consequences in his mind and in those of his Ministers and resulted in a
state of mind which does not respond to reason and amounts to a very dangerous
degree of incipient antagonism.
4. Time too is not on our side: Sir Richard Turnbull tells me that the delay in any
announcement and the rumours which are current have led to this rising feeling of
resentment and suspicion spreading from the Government outwards towards the
public in Dar-es-Salaam. He believes that if we do not do enough to reverse this trend
within the next few days it will be too late. The Opposition are putting down an
official motion and will no doubt raise it in tonight’s debate.
5. As Edward Boyle knows, Vasey has been doing his best to put our offer in a
favourable light to Nyerere but has met with no success. I have seen a letter which
Nyerere wrote to Vasey and in which he made use of the most bitter expressions
relating to what he evidently regards as extreme meanness on the part of H.M.G. and
has made the particular points that our present “poverty” cannot be compared with
the real poverty of Tanganyika (average national income of £19 per head), and to the
glaring contrast which exists in Tanganyika itself between the living standards of the
African population and those of the expatriates, particularly the Civil Servants for
whom they consider so much is being done.
6. In these circumstances I am afraid that the proposal which I put to you in my
earlier minute will not be enough and that we shall have to give much more in grant
than we had previously contemplated. If you can agree to the balance of the C.D. &
W. money all being paid within the current C.D. & W. period—i.e. by the middle of
1964, we can take credit for about £1m. from this. I am sure however that we must
meet Nyerere’s figure of an additional grant £5m. by providing £4m. over and above
this. To offset this in some degree I would propose that the Commonwealth
Assistance loan should be offered only as something we should make available if it is
necessary for the fulfilment of the Tanganyika Government’s development plan of £8
million per annum over the next three years and that the maximum should be
reduced from £5m. to £4m.—but of course all drawable over the next three years if it
is in fact required.
7. I realise that this is a formidable proposal to put before you in the present
circumstances and I would not be putting it if I were not convinced that failing to act
along these lines would have the disastrous consequences I have indicated above.
8. If you accept these proposals the effect will be to increase the grant money by
£4m. beyond what was originally provided for in our earmarkings of C.D. & W.
money and in the figures on which our current “ceilings” are based. In present
circumstances I must do everything I can to help and therefore I am prepared to
contribute £2m. from the exiguous unearmarked C.D. & W. reserves still remaining
to me. Taking account of the proposals I have put forward for Kenya Land Settlement
and for interim schemes for the small islands in The West Indies (two expenditures
which certainly cannot be avoided) this would leave me with only £11⁄4m. in the
unearmarked reserves which have to last until March, 1963. With all the problems
that are likely to face me over the coming months this is to take a very big risk. But
in view of the high stakes I feel I must take it and I shall do my best to avoid having to
come to you again: indeed I would not do so save in an emergency as serious as the
present one.
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9. Even so I am afraid that there is still a gap of £2m. and I feel I have no
alternative but to ask that that be provided by newly voted monies. As against this we
are of course saving £750,000 a year as from March next in respect of the cost of
Tanganyika’s share of the East African forces and under the new proposals the
Exchequer will get back approximately £264,000 a year (at current rates) in respect
of the £3m. loan for commutation of pensions instead of nothing under our original
proposals. Further, there is the possibility that we may save some part of the
Commonwealth Assistance loan for the Tanganyika Development plan through the
attempt to treat it as money of last resort. . . .2
Minutes on 156
I must say that I still think that a £4m. parting present taking account of, but not
related to, various items—e.g. military, diplomatic, subscriptions, etc. would in
some ways (notably creation of precedents) be easier for the Treasury as well as for
us. And there is the Sierra Leone precedent for such an approach to the problem.3
W.L.G.B.
31.7.61
The Minister of State, Sir Richard Turnbull and I went over to the Treasury this
morning to discuss with Sir Edward Boyle and Mr. Taylor4 the Secretary of State’s
minute of this morning to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sir Edward Boyle had
not actually seen the minute and we started by giving him a copy to read.
2. At the Minister of State’s request Sir Richard Turnbull described the
atmosphere in Dar-es-Salaam and the psychological causes of it.
3. The Minister of State said, that, whilst we were convinced that we now had to
do more than was strictly arithmetically necessary and to do a lot of it in grant form,
we had constructed our proposals in such a way as to give the Tanganyikans an
incentive, if the Americans and Germans came forward in proper fashion, not to draw
more of our loan money than was absolutely necessary. He said that, if the plan now
proposed was agreed, he proposed that a message should at once be sent to the
American and German Governments telling them what we had had to do and why
and saying that we relied upon them not to take advantage of the size of our offer but
to do as much as possible themselves and so render it unnecessary for us to put up
our loan money.
4. Mr. Taylor pointed out that if our proposals were accepted, this would be a
breach of the ceiling on overseas aid which the Chancellor was trying to establish.
We admitted this but pointed out that, if we had been allowed to make the offer we
had originally proposed and which we believe would have been accepted at that time,
this would have involved no breach in the ceiling. Mr. Taylor was inclined to question
this.
5. Mr. Taylor also tried to argue that the full £4m. of additional grant could
technically only come from C.D. & W. funds. I said that this was not correct. Our
2 Macmillan telephoned Macleod to say he supported him on this and had notified the chancellor
accordingly.
3 See document no 107. 4 A W Taylor, under-secretary at Treasury since 1957.
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£6.75m. would no doubt be drawn on first and then, if what we proposed was agreed,
the C.R.O. would later on need to take a Vote in respect of the remaining £2m.
6. Sir Edward Boyle clearly understood the nature and causes of the African
reaction to our offer. He said that what was worrying him was whether we were in
fact strong enough to play the sort of role which Africans in former Colonial
territories seemed to expect us to play and whether we should not rather have to
insist on sharing that role with other Western powers. I said that I was sure that we
should have to adopt a consortium approach to emerging and newly independent
countries in Africa and indeed elsewhere as quickly as we could. We had already more
or less succeeded in getting on to this basis with the Canadians and Americans in The
West Indies. The Minister of State had been working very hard to sell the idea to the
Germans and we were in constant touch with the Americans. There were difficulties.
In the Colonial period other powers were loath to help on any considerable scale and
we on our side had to hold back on one or two key points to avoid our authority being
undermined. Against this background the difficulty was to get the other Western
powers sufficiently involved before independence discussions actually took place.
After independence it was much easier, and in this particular case of Tanganyika I
thought we would have succeeded in establishing a firm consortium approach before
independence if we had been a little more lucky. We certainly tried to do so.
7. The Minister of State in reply to a question from Sir Edward Boyle said that what
we did would no doubt have some bearing on what we afterwards had to do for other
East African territories just as the size of our present aid to Kenya and the recent £5m.
grant to Nigeria had been factors in influencing the Tanganyikan reaction to our
original offer. He was determined however that we should press on as hard as we could
with developing a consortium approach to these problems and he certainly hoped that it
would be possible to adopt this approach in the final settlement with The West Indies.
8. Sir Edward Boyle said that he could not of course give an answer to the
Secretary of State’s proposal this morning. Indeed it was a matter which raised
questions of the highest policy concerning on the one hand our policy in Africa and
on the other hand our ability to place some limit on our overseas aid expenditure. He
would report the discussion to the Chancellor and in particular explain to him the
emotional factors involved.
W.L.G.B.
1.8.61
I have seen the Colonial Secretary’s two Minutes of 27th July and 1st August.
2. We must obviously do our utmost to ensure that Tanganyika achieves
independence in a spirit friendly to the West. A well-disposed Nyerere could play the
same moderating role in East Africa as Abubakar in West Africa. Ill-disposed, he
could become an East African Nkrumah, the more dangerous in that we have
continuing responsibilities for Tanganyika’s immediate neighbours. It will besides be
most damaging to our standing in Africa and elsewhere if we have to admit a moral
defeat in a territory which has been regarded as a pattern for orderly and rapid
development towards independence within the Commonwealth.
3. I very much hope therefore that you [the Chancellor] will be able to approve
the Colonial Secretary’s proposals.
D.S.
1.8.61
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157 CAB 134/1555, CPC 15(57) 6 Dec 1957
[Kenya: constitutional changes]: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee meeting
[The first African elections in Kenya took place in Mar 1957, but deadlock ensued when
the African minister on the Council of Ministers was defeated, and none of the eight
newly elected members to the Leg Co was prepared to accept office. After Mr Lennox-Boyd
had held talks in Nairobi without reaching agreement, constitutional changes were
inevitable. These came into force in April 1958: the number of African elected members of
the Leg Co was increased from eight to fourteen, ‘specially elected’ seats were introduced,
and a new Council of State set up, designed to protect communities from harmful
discriminatory legislation.]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(57) 35) about the method of nominating candidates for election to inter-communal
seats in the Kenya Legislative Council and the composition, functions and powers of
the new Council of State for Kenya.
The Colonial Secretary recalled that the Cabinet had endorsed his proposals for
constitutional change in Kenya, which included the creation of twelve inter-
communal seats to be filled in equal proportions between the three races through
election by the whole Legislative Council, but had asked that the Colonial Policy
Committee should consider his detailed proposals for the nomination of candidates
for election to these seats, and also for the composition, functions and powers of the
Council of State which would, amongst other things, be responsible for approving
any alteration in the total number of inter-communal seats or in the method of
filling them (though the proportion between the races would remain fixed for ten
years).
As regards the nomination of candidates for the inter-communal seats the
possibility had been considered and rejected of requiring a measure of racial support
for nominations, since this would tend to work against the nomination of moderate
Africans, and also of allowing official members of the Legislative Assembly to take
part in this process, although it would be both proper and desirable that these
members should be allowed to vote at the electoral stage. It was proposed therefore
that candidates should be nominated by five members of the Legislative Council who
were not Government officials, and that there should be no requirement of support
by a minimum number of members of the race concerned. At the moment African
candidates for communal seats had to comply with fairly high qualifications related
to the highly selective roll upon which they were elected. Qualifications for
candidates of other races were less exacting. To adopt existing racial qualifications for
candidates for the inter-communal seats would be held to perpetuate discrimination
between the races. He therefore proposed to require only a simple literacy test
together with the age limit of twenty-five years in force for African elected members,
relying on the method of nomination and election to ensure that suitable candidates
were in fact put forward.
The Council of State, which would be essentially a political rather than a judicial
body, would have to consider whether or not a measure differentiated against any one
race in the light of the definition appended to C.P.C (57) 35. But though it would be
given powers of delay, their duration would be limited to twelve months, and the
final decision on proposed legislation would rest with Her Majesty acting on the
advice of the Colonial Secretary. It would be important that the Council’s
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composition should not be based in any way on sectional representation and it was
proposed therefore that appointments to it should be made by the Governor. Since
the Council of State would not form a standing second chamber in constant session,
there should be no serious difficulty in building up a suitable membership.
In discussion there was general agreement with these proposals. It was however
suggested that it would be advantageous to work towards the removal of the
differential qualifications required for African candidates generally for the Legislative
Council and the Colonial Secretary undertook to consider the possibility of having a
uniform age of twenty-one years for election to both communal and inter-communal
seats. It was also suggested that a somewhat shorter definition of a differentiating
measure might be appropriate.
In discussion of the general question of the future of the multi-racial society in
Kenya the following points were made:—
(a) Continuance of a system of communal representation alone was bound to
involve further pressure for additional African seats and so to the swamping of
European interests by the mass African vote. The present plan aimed to channel
African racial aspirations into a system of parity between the races, and might lead
ultimately to the creation of a common roll with votes cast for candidates of all
three races on the lines now being tried out in Tanganyika. Such a system must
depend for its success on the creation of moderate African opinion based on a solid
economic stake in the country, and the ten year period of parity between the races
represented in the new inter-communal seats should provide an opportunity for
this.
(b) Although to start with the European element might be expected to have the
dominant voice in elections to the intercommunal seats, this would not
necessarily remain the case as more seats on the Government side came to be
filled by Africans.
(c) It would be valuable if the Committee could have a further discussion of this
general topic with a view possibly to formulating a statement of policy on the
future of Colonial territories for presentation to the Government’s supporters. . . .
158 CAB 128/33, CC 33(59)4 4 June 1959
[Kenya: events at Hola detention camp for Mau Mau detainees]:
Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of State for Colonial
Affairs (C. (59) 92) on the events leading up to the death by violence on 3rd March of
11 Mau Mau prisoners detained in the Hola Camp in Kenya.
The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs1 said that on that date 85 prisoners had
been taken out of the camp under escort to work on digging a trench. On their
refusal to work they had been beaten by warders, with the result that 11 had been
killed and 23 seriously injured. As part of the process of rehabilitating the prisoners
in this camp, a senior superintendent in the Kenya Prison Service, Mr. Cowan, had
1 Lord Perth.
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drawn up a plan which “assumed that the party of detainees would obey the order to
go to work but, should they refuse to work, they would be manhandled to the site of
work and forced to carry out the task.” This plan had been approved by the Kenya
Minister of Defence, without reference to the Governor, but it had not been seen by
Mr. Sullivan, the Camp Commandant who was to be responsible for putting the plan
into effect. The use of force to compel detainees to work was illegal, but the Kenya
Government maintained that Mr. Cowan’s plan must be read in conjunction with the
Prison Standing Orders and Ordinances, which made it clear that men could not be
forcibly made to work by beating them. There was no evidence that the oral
instructions given by Mr. Cowan to Mr. Sullivan contemplated the beating of the
detainees. Moreover, Mr. Sullivan had disobeyed his instructions in failing to inform
the detainees in advance that they were to be put to work and in taking them to the
site of work in a single large party instead of a number of small groups. It was also
open to question whether the orders on the use of force which he had given to the
warders in charge of the party were within the law. A senior examining magistrate
had conducted a full enquiry into the incident and had found that some of the force
used was illegal. But the surviving detainees had refused to give evidence and the
magistrate, whose findings had subsequently been accepted by the Attorney-General
of Kenya, had concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to justify the
prosecution of Mr. Sullivan or any of the prison officers under his orders. The Kenya
Government had instituted disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Sullivan and his
assistant, the findings of which would be published as soon as they became available
towards the end of the present month. A strong independent committee had also
been appointed to advise on the future administration of the detention camps; and
the Kenya Government were considering whether an enquiry should also be held
into the incidence of scurvy in the camps, which the medical evidence suggested
might have contributed to the deaths of the 11 detainees. Meanwhile, the Opposition
had tabled a Motion of Censure on the Government, and it was known that it was
their intention, when this was debated, to press especially the argument that the
Kenya Government had authorised the use of illegal force.
In discussion it was recognised that a distinction must be drawn between the
responsibility of Mr. Sullivan and his subordinates and that of the senior officers of
the Kenya Prison Service and the Kenya Government itself.
On the first point, discussion showed that the preponderant opinion in the Cabinet
was that the available evidence was insufficient to justify the institution of criminal
proceedings against individuals, and that no further enquiry instituted by the United
Kingdom Government was likely to secure enough evidence for that purpose. But it
was clear that Mr. Sullivan had been present at the killing of the detainees and
further evidence bearing on his responsibility for their death might emerge from the
disciplinary proceedings against him, which were to begin that day. No final decision
on the position of Mr. Sullivan and his subordinates could therefore be taken until
the result of the disciplinary proceedings was known. The Opposition had been
unwilling to defer their Censure Motion on that account because these proceedings
were, in accordance with regular practice, to be conducted in private.
On the second point, it was recognised that action taken against subordinate
officers of the Kenya Prison Service would not in any event suffice to allay the public
anxiety which this incident had aroused in this country. The general feeling of the
Cabinet was that on the considerations then before them the Government would not
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be able to defend the action of the Kenya Government but should concede that the
Cowan plan ought never to have been formulated or approved. It was therefore for
consideration whether the United Kingdom Government should assert its authority
over the Government of Kenya or, alternatively, should institute some form of
enquiry into the whole conduct of the Kenya Government in relation to the
detention camps. In addition to the primary issue of the use of force on these
detainees, such an enquiry might also cover the incidence of scurvy in the camp and
the unfounded statement issued by the Kenya Government immediately after the
events on 3rd March that the deaths of the detainees were attributable to the
drinking of contaminated water.
The Prime Minister said that he would prefer to postpone further consideration of
these aspects of the matter until he had been able to discuss them with the Colonial
Secretary after his return to this country.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that debate on the Censure Motion tabled by the Opposition in the
House of Commons should be deferred until 15th June.
(2) Agreed to resume their discussion at a later meeting after the Colonial
Secretary’s return to the United Kingdom.
159 CAB 128/33, CC 34(59)3 11 June 1959
[Kenya: policy of rehabilitation at Hola Detention Camp]: Cabinet
conclusions1
The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C. (59) 97 and
98) on the policy which had been followed for the rehabilitation of Mau Mau
detainees by forced labour and on the line which the Government might adopt in the
forthcoming debate in the House of Commons on the Motion of Censure tabled by
the Opposition as a result of the death by violence of 11 prisoners in the Hola Camp.
The Colonial Secretary recalled that in 1954 the Cabinet had authorised the policy
of compulsory labour as part of the process of rehabilitating the 70,000 Mau Mau
members and sympathisers who were then held in detention camps in Kenya. This
policy had proved eminently successful and the number held in detention had been
reduced to under 1,000. He proposed, in the debate, to describe the history of the
emergency, to justify the policy of rehabilitation and to emphasise its success. But it
was likely that the Government would be pressed to institute some further enquiry,
of a judicial nature, in addition to that already carried out by the examining
magistrate in Kenya and to the disciplinary proceedings which were now being taken
against the Camp Commandant, Mr. Sullivan, and his assistant, and to the enquiry
which was to be undertaken into the future administration of the detention camps.
Acceptance of a request for a further enquiry might call into question the whole
policy of rehabilitation by forced labour. On the other hand, as it was not possible, in
advance of the results of the disciplinary proceedings, to assess how far the Kenya
Government, or the senior officers concerned, bore any responsibility for the events
1 Previous reference: see previous document.
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at Hola, refusal of a further enquiry might fail to convince public opinion that the
matter had been fully and properly investigated.
In discussion it was pointed out that a further enquiry could not be expected to
elicit any relevant facts additional to those which had emerged from the examining
magistrate’s investigation. Nor was it likely that the results of the current
disciplinary proceedings would throw any more light on the responsibility of senior
officers of the Kenya Government or of the Kenya Government itself, since Mr.
Sullivan could not now plead that he was acting on the orders of his superiors
without contradicting the evidence he had already given before the magistrate.
Moreover, the main criticism of the Opposition would be directed to the plan drawn
up by Mr. Cowan, a Senior Superintendent in the Kenya Prison Service, which
contemplated that if the detainees at Hola refused to go to work they should be
“manhandled to the site of work and forced to carry out the task.” The Kenya
Minister of Defence, who had that day been invited by the Colonial Secretary to
forward a statement explaining why he had approved the Cowan plan, would probably
argue that the plan was to be read in conjunction with the Prison Standing Orders
and Ordinances, which made it clear that men could not forcibly be made to work by
beating them. The interpretation of the plan would, however, be affected by a letter
written by Mr. Cowan in 1957, which was available to the Opposition, describing an
earlier occasion when batons had been used and injuries inflicted on prisoners at
another detention camp.
On the other hand, if the Government were to take the line that an enquiry was
unnecessary since all the facts were known, it followed that the Government must
accept the findings of the examining magistrate. This implied that disciplinary action
might have to be taken, not only against Mr. Sullivan and his assistant, but also
against Mr. Cowan and other senior officers. Whether criticism of the Kenya
Government would be justified would depend to some extent on the reply received to
the further enquiries which the Colonial Secretary had already made. There was
much to be said, on political grounds, for not ruling out entirely the possibility of
some further investigation. The Government might take the line that, in the light of
the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Sullivan and his assistant,
they would not exclude a further enquiry if this were necessary to decide where
responsibility for the events at Hola lay.
As regards the legality of the policy of rehabilitation by forced labour, which the
Cabinet had approved in 1954, it was open to question whether the Kenya
regulations constituted a breach of the Forced Labour Convention of 1930, or the
Convention on Human Rights. But there could be no doubt that the way in which the
regulations were put into effect at Hola on this occasion involved a breach of both
Conventions.
Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that the Government should
emphasise in the debate the successful rehabilitation of the great majority of the Mau
Mau detainees through the policy of forced labour. This policy had, however, become
progressively more difficult to operate as the detainees were reduced to a hard core.
The policy should not be repudiated; but, in the light of the recommendations of the
Fairn Committee,2 it might well be necessary to modify its operation in the future.
2 R D Fairn, director of UK prison administration, 1952–1960, chief director of Prison Commission,
1960; chairman of committee on detention camps in Kenya, 1959.
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The Government would have to admit frankly in the debate that the way in which the
policy had been applied on this occasion at Hola had undoubtedly been wrong. In due
course the Government would have to decide where the responsibility lay. But the
facts were known, and there was therefore no need for a further enquiry on this
account. When the results of the disciplinary proceedings were available, the
Government would have to decide what further action to take; and, if it were not
then possible to decide where the responsibility lay, the possibility of a further
enquiry would not be ruled out.
The Cabinet:—
Agreed that in the forthcoming debate on the Motion of Censure in the House of
Commons the Government spokesmen should follow the line indicated in the
Cabinet’s discussion.
160 PREM 11/3030, T 161/60 8 Feb 1960
[Kenya: constitutional conference]: tel (no 279), report by Mr
Macleod to Mr Macmillan (in South Africa)
[In a previous telegram to the prime minister, reporting on the London conference,
Macleod had said he was afraid the Europeans were ‘being very unimaginative’. He was
‘deeply anxious to protect the position of the New Kenya Party but this cannot be done by
standing still and I must try and chart some way to achieve this and at the same time for
the move forward [sic] in Kenya without which a major explosion is certain’ (T 116B/60, 1
Feb 1960). Macmillan thought this ‘very interesting’ and asked what he thought the effect
would be in Southern Rhodesia (T133/60, 4 Feb)].
The Kenya Conference is now in a much more promising situation than seemed
possible at the beginning or even a week ago. This does not mean that agreement will
be reached, although that is not impossible, but that there is now a good chance of
the main groups agreeing to work whatever constitution we finally lay down. The
Conference itself, consisting of more than fifty members, is hopelessly unwieldy and
I have in fact been operating mainly with meetings with small groups. The most
encouraging thing is that Blundell’s New Kenya Party1 and the African elected
members have at last begun to talk between themselves and Blundell is now showing
real leadership and a new understanding of how swiftly things are moving in Africa. I
think it would help him and me very much if you would send him a message through
the Home Secretary and I suggest a draft in my immediately following telegram.
2. Probably about Wednesday of this week I will put forward a final paper which
will be something of a compromise between the points of view of the New Kenya
Party and the Africans. At many points their own plans are now surprisingly close.
Nothing of course, could bring Group Captain Briggs2 into this, because he opposes
all forms of advance for all races except Europeans but he has no sympathy whatever
here. The Asians and the Arabs are on the sidelines and would accept whatever is
finally agreed. I had a very large meeting with our Party a few days ago, and, although
some of them are understandably anxious about the pace of events in Africa, it turned
out to be a very good meeting. All this of course, may go wrong, particularly if
1 M Blundell, leader of the New Kenya Group/Party, formerly minister of agriculture, 1955–1959; a
businessman whose hobby was botany.
2 L R Briggs was founder of the United Party (1959), dedicated to opposing any concessions which might
lead to African rule.
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Mboya3 decides to play the situation for a break, which he may well do. But at present
we have a reasonable chance.
3. You ask what effect this will have on Southern Rhodesia. I am afraid there is
naught for their comfort4 wherever Southern Rhodesia looks in Africa today, and
Whitehead’s5 speech shows that he realises this. The pace of events in Somalia,
Tanganyika, Uganda, which we are considering today in the Colonial Policy
Committee,6 and above all in the Congo, are bound to have serious effects on the
future of Central African Federation, and the territories within it. All the papers here
applauding your speech7 comment with one voice that “things in Africa can never be
the same again”. Somehow we must try and get this into the heads of the men in
Salisbury, but I do not underestimate for a moment the magnitude of the crisis that
is now very close to us in the affairs of the Federation.8
3 T J Mboya, secretary of Kenya Federation of Labour, general secretary of KANU, 1960.
4 Naught for your comfort was the title of a famous anti-apartheid book by Fr Trevor Huddleston
(Sophiatown, Johannesburg, Provincial of the Community of the Resurrection in South Africa, 1949–1955),
published in 1956.
5 Sir E Whitehead, prime minister of Southern Rhodesia since 1958.
6 Document no 121.
7 The ‘wind of change’ speech, see document no 32 above.
8 Mr Macmillan minuted about this sentence that it was ‘rather formidable, but probably true. H.M.
9.2.60’ (M 22B/60).
161 PREM 11/3031, PM(60)7 17 Feb 1960
[Brief for prime minister’s meeting with New Kenya Party]: minute by
Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan
[Rather unexpectedly, the New Kenya Party had rejected the plan (‘wholly satisfactory to
HMG’) presented by Macleod to the constitutional conference with the support of its
leader, Michael Blundell, and accepted reluctantly by the African elected members (led by
Ngala) and the Asians. The Party eventually came round, provided safeguards could be
reached on rights of minorities. (The Cabinet briefly discussed the possibility of
safeguarding Europeans after independence ‘either by some form of bicameral
government or by the introduction of some residual power or veto analogous to that
proposed for the Turkish minority in Cyprus’: CAB 128/34, CC 8(60)2, 12 Feb 1960, & CC
9(60) 7, 16 Feb). Macleod asked Macmillan to see Blundell and the NKP, because ‘they are
going to have a very tough time when they go home, for they are taking a much more
courageous line than any Europeans have dared to take in the complex problems of
Africa, and much hangs on their success’ (minute, 16.2.60). In his detailed briefing for
the prime minister, he described Blundell—whom ‘you know quite well’—as having
shown ‘tremendous qualities of leadership in the past week and I think now will go
through with it. But he is trying to ride many different horses. He has considerable vision
but no grasp of detail’. The other members of the Party were W Havelock, H Slade, M
Amalemba and C B Madan. At their meeting Macmillan ‘spoke of the extreme importance
of the multi-racial approach and thought that the success, or otherwise, of Mr Blundell’s
party might set the pattern for the whole future development of Africa. If the multi-racial
approach failed the likelihood was that the whites would be driven out of Africa and this
could only be of profound detriment to the black. It was therefore of extreme importance
to have patience . . .’. This he followed with a characteristic exhortation about the
Commonwealth as the best hope for world peace (note for the record, 17 Feb 1960).]
You are seeing five members of the New Kenya Party this evening and this will be
very helpful.
Their position as a party is that provided reasonable agreement is reached on the
safeguards they will accept the basis of the proposals that I have laid down, which as
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you know are a major step forward but retain all real power, particularly in the
Executive, firmly in the hands of the Government and the Governor. None of the
major demands with which the Africans arrived here, i.e. universal suffrage, Chief
Minister and, above all, responsible government, have been met; but it is wholly right
for Kenya to move away from the basis of communal representation to that of
common roll. As you know, it is a major aim of our policy that, although we must
move fairly swiftly, yet we should move more slowly in Kenya than anywhere else in
East Africa, or perhaps indeed in any other of our territories. All the same, for
reasons which you know well, the settler community in Kenya will be seriously
disturbed for a time and this is bound to be reflected in what I hope will be only
temporary support for Briggs. Briggs has in fact no following whatever in the House
of Commons, and not even the Suez Group would support him. All our support is for
Blundell’s non-racial approach and I am sure you could make this clear. You might
add that you intend to give the interview with Meadows,1 which will emphasise the
importance we attach to this approach.
The group, however, have had tremendous stresses put on them in the last month,
partly because they represent so many different communities and because the New
Kenya Party is the only genuinely non-racial party that I know of in Africa; and also
one must remember that many of them are really very small people and are
particularly sensitive to the criticism that of course comes to them from their
constituents. In short, the message is “Courage, mes braves”. If they will play this
situation hard they will certainly slay Briggs and hold Kenya for the future. But they
are very worried people.
1 P H Meadows, deputy permanent secretary in PM’s Office.
162 CAB 128/34,  CC 64(60)9 15 Dec 1960
[Kenya: land policy]: Cabinet conclusions
[Perhaps alerted by a visit from Blundell early in July 1960, Macmillan asked if anything
could be done to reassure Europeans in Kenya, an aspect of the problem ‘made all the
more important by the situation in the Congo’ (PREM 11/4329, M 244/60, minute to
Macleod, 9 July 1960). On 14 July, the Cabinet agreed that in future ‘land use should be
governed by economic principles’, ie, that the Highlands should be opened ‘to good
farmers of all races and tribes’. Resettlement schemes on land at present unused or
under-used would be worked out; but there remained the problem that European farmers
were deeply concerned about future security of title to their land (fearing wholesale
expropriation or unfair compensation or limitation of holdings to an uneconomic size).
The economy was under serious threat and capital was being withdrawn. The Cabinet
therefore accepted that an alleviation of these worries would be ‘both fair and
economically necessary’, and asked Lord Kilmuir to chair a committee. Various options
were put forward, but their conclusion that essentially all would depend on goodwill
stopped far short of what the settlers wanted, which was a financial guarantee by HMG
against expropriation. The government ruled this out on grounds of excessive cost, and as
possibly a measure even providing an incentive to a future Kenya government to seize
European land (CAB 128/34, CC 42(60)3, 14 July 1962; PREM 11/4329, minute by F
Bishop to prime minister, 14 Dec 1960).]
The Cabinet had before them a note by the Lord Chancellor (C. (60) 186), to which
was annexed a report by a Committee of Ministers on the future security of title to
land in Kenya and a draft of a statement to be made by the Government.
The Lord Chancellor recalled that, in accordance with the Cabinet’s request at
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their meeting on 14th July, a Committee of Ministers had been appointed under his
chairmanship to study the problem of the future security of title to land in Kenya.
The Cabinet had previously agreed that various schemes suggested for compensating
property-owners or guaranteeing their title could not be accepted, and the
Committee had therefore considered alternative methods of safeguarding property
rights in Kenya and reassuring investors and the owners of property.
Provisions which would give reasonable protection to property could be
entrenched in the fundamental law of an independent Kenya. There would, however,
be no certainty that a future Kenya Government would not ignore or abolish these
safeguards, and a formal agreement under which they undertook to observe the
constitution would give rise to special difficulties. Economic sanctions against a
breach of property rights must be expected to be more damaging to the United
Kingdom than to an independent Kenya. The most practical way of proceeding
seemed, therefore, to do everything possible to encourage a sense of responsibility in
the African leaders in the territory. The example of Tanganyika, help in securing
assistance from international organisations, and the offer of a conference on the
economic development of Kenya might serve as inducements. But certain recent
statements by African leaders had not been helpful in reassuring property-owners.
Meanwhile, it had become necessary to make some further statement, as promised
by the Colonial Secretary, before the Christmas recess. A statement on the lines of
the draft annexed to the Committee’s report, emphasising that constitutional
advance must be conditional on a reasonable attitude towards the continued
protection of fundamental rights, including property rights, would serve to reinforce
a recent statement of the Kenya Government to the effect that land belonged to those
of all races who held legal titles to it and not to the Africans as such.
In discussion the Cabinet reaffirmed their view that any form of guarantee to the
European property-owners in Kenya would be beyond the resources of the United
Kingdom Exchequer and might even serve as a direct incitement to expropriation.
The draft statement prepared by the Lord Chancellor’s Committee went as far as it
was possible to go and might help to restore confidence among investors and
property-owners in Kenya. It might, however, with advantage be amplified by the
inclusion of a passage indicating that the United Kingdom Government were
concerned, not only to protect the rights of property-owners, but with the whole
policy of land settlement and development in Kenya.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved the proposals in the report annexed to C. (60) 186.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to make a statement on the lines of the draft
annexed to the report, amplified by the addition of a suitable reference to the
Government’s general concern with the whole policy of land settlement and
development in Kenya.
163 PREM 11/4083 11 Jan 1961
‘The East African problem—concentrated on Kenya’: minute by Lord
Kilmuir to Mr Macmillan
I. It is essential to state the difficulties and consider the chances of overcoming
them.
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(1) The short period before the estimated date of complete independence
(Tanganyika 1962, Kenya 1964, Uganda 1964, Zanzibar 1964/6) presents two difficulties.
(a) As Tanganyika is a trust territory, any extension there may rouse suspicion at
United Nations.
(b) The shortness of the period will alarm the settlers and their supporters in
Britain.
(2) It is difficult to envisage an efficient and capable Chief Minister for Kenya after
the elections next month.
(a) Mboya and Gichuru1 are inexperienced and unstable.
(b) The K.A.D.U. leaders are “second rate”.
(c) There is the shadow of Kenyatta2 in the background.
(i) If, as generally believed, he is a bad and reckless man, his release would do
nothing but harm and probably cause bloodshed. He will not do a Monck.3
(ii) If he is not released, the K.A.N.U. leaders have said that they will not take
ministries.
(d) It is said that a European/K.A.D.U. coalition would not last.
(3) This raises the third difficulty, namely with whom from Kenya can Nyerere
negotiate the preliminary stages of a federation (which after the C.A.F., it might do
better to call a “Federal Union”, but I continue to use federation in this note).
(4) The fourth difficulty is that a federation must be an African inspiration and not
a British idea far less imposition; and therefore cannot be played as a heaven-born
piece of statesmanship on our part but only as our desire to forward an African idea
which we think is good.
II. Our objective must be to find a solution which
(1) Is obviously beneficial to Kenya and East Africa;
(2) Provides the maximum protection for settlers and their property;
(3) Is recognised by the Party as being intellectually respectable and positive
action, and not merely a drift into surrender.
III. Immediately after the Kenya elections next month it should be possible:
(1) To refuse to release Kenyatta;
(2) To threaten K.A.N.U. with European/K.A.D.U. ministers unless K.A.N.U. co-
operates.
(3) If it is known that Nyerere is likely to request Her Majesty’s Government to
sound out opinion on a federation after the March conference, that this may allow
the K.A.N.U. leaders to take office without loss of face.
(4) To include the human right of property provision in the constitution, and
announce the entrenchment of the constitution by the necessity of a 3⁄4 majority of
the Legislative Council. The latter may present difficulties at the ‘Chief Minister’
stage where the Legislative Council is de jure advisory but de facto the Governor does
1 J S Gichuru, first president of KANU (a teacher at the Alliance High School, whose pupils included
R Ngala and O Odinga); became minister of finance in 1963.
2 Jomo (Johnstone) Kenyatta, Kikuyu leader, imprisoned 1952, elected president of KANU while still
detained; became an MP 1961; prime minister, 1963, president of Kenya, 1964–1978 (died).
3 General Monck, first duke of Albemarle, who deserted the royalist cause in the English Civil War; but
was then instrumental in bringing about the restoration of Charles II.
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not reject the advice of Ministers commanding a majority except in extreme
circumstances, but in spite of such difficulties it is not impossible.
IV. The situation without federation
(1) If federation were not being considered the programme would as I understand
it be in these three stages—
(i) a chief minister period,
(ii) a period of full internal self-government with defence and foreign affairs reser-
ved and probably something like the Singapore arrangement as to internal security,
(iii) full independence.
(2) It is contemplated that Kenya should reach stage (iii) in 1964.
(3) A sidelight on this from my own angle is that there are 700 African barristers
in Nigeria, but out of 300 qualified lawyers in Kenya, only 10 are African.
(4) There would in 1964 be an obvious danger of expropriation (some settlers
probably fear something much worse) against which the only safeguards would be
the fear of losing external investments, and any entrenchments in the constitution
which could be subverted by a united African vote in the legislative.
(5) On the other hand, a strong “official-on-the-spot” view is that an attempt
seriously to lengthen the period of incubation for independence would mean rebellion
and bloodshed in addition to a loss of the friendship that exists for Britain and the West.
(6) It is difficult to believe that the position vis-à-vis the European population
would be appreciably better in 1967 or 1968.
V. It seems to me therefore that it is worth our while to give serious consideration to
federation:
(1) The advantages of federation are fairly set out in E.A.C. (61)16 para. 2.
(2) I believe that if states voluntarily enter a federation, the chances of
maintaining a constitution containing human rights and fundamental freedoms
(including property) are real because all the various stresses in favour of the rights of
the federation, the rights of the states and the rights of the individual create a desire
to leave the constitution of the federation unaltered.
(3) Therefore a voluntary federation with human rights as to property as part of
the constitution and a strong federal court to pronounce on these rights has a real
chance of being effective in defence of European property.
(4) I had written the foregoing before seeing the Principal Conclusions of the
Governors’ Conference.4 These do not affect my view that the procedure and
timetable elaborated in E.A.C.(61)16 in paragraphs 3,7 and 10 should be our aim.
(5) I feel that we must not forget that our inspiration and achievement in the
twentieth century is making nations who voluntarily remain our friends.
4 See document no 126.
164 CO 822/2235, nos 55 & 58 13–14 Apr 1961
[The question of Kenyatta’s release]: minutes by Lord Perth and Mr
Macleod (PM(61)40) to Mr Macmillan
[The Cabinet agreed on 21 Feb 1961 not to release Jomo Kenyatta, accepting Governor
Renison’s advice that release would prejudice ‘political development and possibly
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security’ and should only follow the firm establishment of the new government.
Meanwhile he would be removed to a less remote location. On 27 July it was agreed, with
misgivings, to release him; the governor was satisfied that any security risk could be
contained and Macleod thought delay would provoke a serious situation (CAB 28/35, CC
9(61)6 & CC 44(61)5).]
The more I think on Kenyatta the more I am convinced we are right to bend all our
efforts to get KADU and others to form a government. Once it is formed we have got
to be prepared to give it every backing so that when Kenyatta is released it will
nonetheless carry on unflinchingly. What you would in effect be doing is backing the
Rest, who are in fact in the majority, versus the Kikuyu and Luo (two-thirds versus
one-third). Knowing the fears of the Rest such a government might, if launched and
strongly backed, last a long time. It certainly represents the best chance for
European interests.
At the moment the formula is of top importance. In a sense the best person to
judge its drafting is Ngala himself, the only difficulty here being just how far you or
the Governor can tell him what is in mind. In this connection I find the latest
telegram to you from Renison (No.52) somewhat disappointing in that he is worrying
that Kenyatta is the same as he was in 1952 and hence urging caution on the form of
release. I think I would have been surprised if he were not the same, and the only way
that I see to deal with this is either to keep him indefinitely restricted, which is
scarcely on now, or a strong government of the Rest which sticks it over the next
months, and over the next years can produce the goods for its followers.
P.
13.4.61
Since early March the Governor has been attempting to form a new Government.
After the elections the Kenya African National Union had 19 seats and Kenya
African Democratic Union 15 seats, the New Kenya Party (7 seats) and at any rate
some of the Asians would be prepared to support the African party which was willing
to take portfolios in the new Government. So, with this support, either of the African
parties could command a majority in the Legislature.
After protracted discussions the K.A.N.U. representatives have told the Governor
definitely that they will not co-operate in forming a Government unless Kenyatta is
released immediately. The K.A.D.U. representatives have always taken what seemed
to be a fairly uncompromising stand on this, inasmuch as they too were pressing for
Kenyatta’s release; but on the 7th April the Governor reported that the prospects of
co-operation by K.A.D.U. were improving.
There is a distinct difference in the approach to the Kenyatta problem between the
two African parties. K.A.N.U. want immediate release and have urged that Kenyatta
should be enabled to assume political leadership. K.A.D.U. from various motives, also
press for his release but, representing by and large the group of tribes who are fearful
of Kikuyu/Luo domination in the country, have no desire that Kenyatta should come
back, into power. To say the least, therefore, K.A.D.U. are uncommitted on the
question of Kenyatta’s political future.
Mr. Ngala (the K.A.D.U. leader) has been in London during the last few days. I have
seen him on several occasions and it has been noticeable that he has, while pressing
for immediate release, not gone so far as to say that unless Kenyatta is released
immediately his Party will not co-operate in forming the Government. I and the
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Governor have felt that it might well be possible to produce a formula which would
enable Mr. Ngala to offer to co-operate; and I have been discussing with the Governor
the precise terms of such a formula. Its basic component would be a sufficiently clear
indication to Mr. Ngala that Kenyatta’s release, given fulfilment of the Governor’s
conditions, was a matter of months rather than years. I am hopeful that if we can
give him enough to enable him to show to his followers that through co-operation he
has produced reasonably concrete results we shall be able to solve the present
deadlock. He may be able to win some support from the K.A.N.U. side and, all in all, I
believe that an alliance of K.A.D.U. with the moderate Europeans in a new
Government is in Kenya’s long term interest. . . .1
I.M.
14.4.61
1 Macmillan minuted: ‘Many thanks. This is a difficult question both in Kenya & at Westminster. No
doubt you will discuss with me before any decision is taken. Certainly the Governor seems to have played
it very well so far. H.M. 15.4.61’ (no 62).
165 CO 822/2235, no 76 26 Apr 1961
‘Our next moves in Kenya’: letter from Mr Macleod to Sir P Renison
(Kenya).  Annex: draft statement for governor [Extract]
. . . This idea of coming over here before Legislative Council meets coupled with your
reference to KADU’s “tentative” agreement with your provisional text leads me to ask
where you stand with KADU. I had assumed that present negotiations were complete
and that it was now a question of settling the portfolios. Is this the position, or, as
paragraph 2 of Griffith-Jones’1 telegram personal No. 67 seems to suggest, are KADU
sticking out for further concessions before finally committing themselves?
If this is the case the position is not at all healthy and emphasises to my mind the
need for caution. As I said in my telegram personal No. 183, I am with you on the sort
of timetable you have in mind for the next (limited) steps. But before definite
decisions are taken on these matters we must be quite clear where all this is taking
us, bearing in mind that African pressure for very early self-government is going to
intensify. Can you let me know as soon as possible how you see things developing
over the next two to three years, given reasonably stable government? The two
constitutional “adjustments” you have in mind are in themselves relatively small
matters from the purely constitutional point of view. Politically, and in Kenya terms,
they are of immense importance. The Africans will not be content to stop at a
composition of 6 Africans to 3 Europeans in the Council (I assume the Europeans
will not seek a quid pro quo but wouldn’t bet on it). The argument will be that now
that there is an African Chief Minister it is clearly time that the constitutional
arrangements, including the franchise, were altered to fit the new pattern, that a
Chief Minister obviously cannot operate within the archaic Lancaster House
framework, etc; and my guess is that, whatever the NKP may think about London
conferences, the Africans will want one in a matter of months.
1 E N Griffith-Jones, QC, attorney-general and minister for legal affairs, 1955–1961, deputy governor,
Dec 1961, and acting governor between 1959 and 1962.
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Do you see things necessarily going so fast? Or putting it another way, if we do
open the flood gates is there any hope of reconciling the Europeans to it?
The other associated question relates to Kenyatta. He is now essentially a political
rather than a security problem. When he is released will we be able to hold out against
the inevitable pressure to change the law so that he can sit in Legislative Council? Will
KADU remain a sufficiently coherent and determined force to enable us to ride the
pressure for fresh elections and indeed to make it clear to all the world that in the view
of H.M. Government Kenyatta has no place in the leadership of Kenya?
I hope you will forgive these random questions, but I do think it is important that
any constitutional concessions now must be viewed in the general context of the
pace of development which we are prepared to swallow in Kenya. Do you, for
example, consider that having backed KADU and set in train a fairly quick process of
constitutional revision it would pay us (say once we have Chief Ministers in both
Uganda and Kenya) to work definitely for an early Federation conference?
I have written in this sense because I am quite sure that once you mention
publicly the possibility of discussion on the appointment of a Chief Minister and
broadening the base of the government, these will be taken as concessions already
granted. I am therefore extremely anxious that your reference to the possibility of
some limited adjustments should be put less directly. I have tried my hand at some
alternative words in the enclosure. You will see that I have also altered the passages
about constitutional conferences and avoided the suggestion that H.M. Government
will gladly rubber stamp any agreed proposals the Governor is able to put up. Would
you telegraph your comments?
I realise the difficulty that KADU will, as I understand it, have seen your earlier
version. If it would help I should have no objection to Ngala being told “in
confidence” that I am very sympathetically disposed to the idea of making a fairly
early appointment of a Chief Minister and of adding two Africans to the Council of
Ministers but that I am quite sure that to announce these changes (or discussion of
them) straight away would seriously impair the Government’s chance of getting off
to a good start. If confidence is undermined by precipitate changes Ministers will be
seriously handicapped in their plans to strengthen the country’s economy. Crawford
and I have taken much the same line, over the appointment of a Chief Minister, with
Kiwanuka in Uganda.2
Annex to 165
The Lancaster House Constitution has been brought into being because Her
Majesty’s Government themselves recognised that a sufficient measure of agreement
had been reached among the groups present at the 1960 Conference, that it should
be the next stage in Kenya’s constitutional development. Nor, of course, will it be the
last stage and now that a government has been formed it is natural that the people
should begin to consider the methods and timing of future constitutional advance.
Our first task is to govern the country sensibly and in so doing restore confidence in
it. The sooner we can do this the sooner we shall be able to build on the foundations
laid down at Lancaster House. I am sure that we can do this and so prepare the way
2 See document no 133 above.
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for advancing as surely to a sound independence as has recently been accomplished
to our admiration in other countries of the Commonwealth.
I believe that in charting the course to our next major target it may well be natural
and fruitful to consider some adjustments here and there within the broad
framework of the constitution now being inaugurated; and I intend in the reasonably
near future to discuss possibilities in this direction with my Ministers. If, as I hope,
we can reach a sufficient measure of agreement, I believe that adjustments could be
made without the necessity for full-scale conference negotiation. Thus I contemplate
that given stability and good government we will be able progressively to broaden the
base of our new government pending our next great step forward.
166 CO 822/2241, no 7 19 May 1961
[Kenya: pace of constitutional development and the Kenyatta
question]: letter from Mr Macleod to Sir P Renison
Thank you for your letter of the 12th May. I am most grateful to you for meeting me
so fully over the text of your speech at the opening of the Legislative Council, and for
the extremely interesting letter which accompanied your draft. I have been thinking
about the crystal-gazing which you attempted, and I should like in this letter to put
to you the points that have occurred to me. They concern the future pace of
constitutional development, and the handling of the Kenyatta question.
As regards constitutional development, we are in agreement both about the nature
and the timing of the next steps, namely the appointment of a Chief Minister and the
possibility of additional African seats in the Council of Ministers. And I also very
much agree with what you say about the possibilities of Federation. I am not,
however, absolutely sure of your provisional thinking as regards the pace. In
paragraph 6 of your letter to me you envisaged, given stable government, progress
after the appointment of a Chief Minister at the sort of speed that took place in
Tanganyika. This, of course, would be pretty fast: Tanganyika had their Chief Minister
in September 1960 and internal self-government this month—something like 9
months later, and there will be an even shorter period before independence. But I see
from your letter of the 5th May to Garson1 (about the Chief Secretaryship) that you
think that it may be 2 years or so before Kenya moves to complete internal self-
government. I fully recognise that, given the special problems of Kenya which you
explained so clearly at the Governors’ Conference in January,2 such a timetable might
well be the answer if we could consider Kenya in isolation and I certainly do not want
to suggest that we should force the pace. But I wonder whether it would be wise for
us to bank on having even this period of grace. My experience is that once you have
reached the stage in which Kenya is now, events develop an impetus of their own. For
example, I think we are likely to find that there is pretty consistent pressure from
K.A.D.U. for fairly rapid constitutional progress on the grounds that this is necessary
if they are to maintain their position and not to be branded as ‘stooges’ by K.A.N.U.
Secondly, apart from the internal political pressures, we may, as we recognised at
the Governors’ Conference, find it desirable to move faster than we should otherwise
1 A D Garson, assistant secretary in CO, 1948–1962, in change of appointments and transfers in Colonial
Service. He was a low-profiled successor to Sir R Furse. 2 See document no 124.
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have done in order to secure federation. We shall have a clearer idea of how this will
work out after the discussions in June.
You also indicate in paragraph 7 of your letter that K.A.D.U. would wish all the var-
ious changes to take place without a conference or fresh elections. I do not feel too
sure about this. I should have thought that a conference in preparation for internal
self-government (and perhaps also to name the date for independence) was almost
inevitable. Furthermore, although we may be able to make the immediate adjustments
we have in mind without any great fuss, sooner or later I think that we are bound to
be faced with pressure to reconsider the electoral system. This of itself would be a
major matter and could not, I think, be decided without a full scale conference.
As regards Kenyatta, it will be excellent if the timetable works out as you hope. Here
again, however, K.A.D.U. may well feel that their survival in the face of K.A.N.U. pres-
sure will depend on their keeping the initiative and I think that it may be difficult to
resist moving him to Kiambu as soon as the house is finished unless there is a diffi-
cult security situation in the Kikuyu areas. It is most encouraging and obviously right
that you have been able to associate Ngala with Government policy over Kenyatta.
Although it is unavoidable, it seems to me that this may in due course present us with
something of a dilemma, particularly when the time comes to make the actual deci-
sion about his release. The difficulty that I have in mind is that, although this decision
will have to be reached primarily in the light of the situation in Kenya and the condi-
tions which you laid down in your broadcast, we shall not be able to ignore completely
the repercussions outside Kenya. I have in mind both the state of public opinion here
both in parliament and in the country and also the sort of consideration described in
the telegram of the 25th April from the Acting High Commissioner in Salisbury which
was repeated to you. I do not for one moment wish to suggest that such external con-
siderations should dictate timing. But I do want to sound a mild note of caution; it is
possible that for reasons of this sort I and my colleagues may feel bound to urge a fairly
short extension of his restriction after the date you might have in mind, and the prob-
lem therefore is on the one hand to continue to carry Ngala with us and on the other
to avoid being too closely committed with him when the decision about the date of
Kenyatta’s release has to be made.
I shall be very interested in your reactions to these thoughts and I look forward to
having a full discussion of these questions when you are here in June. Meanwhile you
may like to talk this over with Hugh Fraser,3 and I enclose an extra copy of this letter
for you to show him.
3 Parliamentary under-secretary of state, 1960–1962.
167 CO 822/2235, no 120 14 July 1961
[Kenya: constitutional timetable for internal self-government and
possible future progress]: tel (no 350) from Mr Macleod to Sir P
Renison [Extract]
. . . 4. It may be of value if I now clarify my views on desirable course of events in
Kenya in immediate future, particularly in relation to achievement of internal self-
government:—
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(a) I hope that before the end of year it will prove possible to have Chief Minister
and broaden base of Executive. I do not contemplate that Governor and all (repeat
all) ex officio members should then leave Council.
(b) I am opposed to an election this year.
(c) Grant of internal self-government will have to be preceded by detailed
discussion (or conference) and by resolution of certain outstanding special
problems e.g. protection of minority rights, the Coastal Strip and the position of
the Civil Service. If K.A.D.U. can remain firmly based, it may be possible to go into
internal self-government without serious amendment of present constitution e.g.
in relation to representative basis of Legislative Council. But, for your own
information, it would be prudent not to discount the possibility that, despite our
best efforts to avoid it, the turn of political events may force us into major
amendment of Lancaster House constitution before internal self-government is
achieved.
(d) I do not wish to have discussed this year either in Nairobi or London date for
independence.
(e) I contemplate that there will be full scale conference after self-government has
had a “run” in order to negotiate independence, and that such independence
should be preceded by elections. . . .
7. So far I have dealt only with what, from my point of view, would be ideal, and I
realise that my conception may present serious difficulties for K.A.D.U. and discount
pressure we are likely to get from K.A.N.U. As regards latter, there are two factors to
be considered:—
(a) Following release of Kenyatta there may (repeat may), despite all we can do to
build up your present Government and their contribution to making the release
possible, be some shift of support from K.A.D.U. to K.A.N.U. This would put them
in strong position to press for immediate full-scale re-negotiation of constitution
and elections.
(b) K.A.N.U. have strong card in desire of many to get from them satisfactory
assurances about property. If you, as I, believe that effective assurances from that
Party are of crucial importance to a settlement, we cannot blink our eyes to the
fact that we may have to pay a heavy price.
8. A further consideration is our own desire to get effective federation going.
Some optimism was expressed in London based on assumption of extent to which
Kenya (and Uganda) would have moved by or before new organisation was set up. I
have the feeling that Nyerere is not prepared to press for federation conference until
he is satisfied that Kenya at any rate is in sight of full internal self-government, i.e.
Council is no longer advisory to the Governor, representative basis of Legislature is
“democratic” and H.M.G. have lost power of disallowance in internal subjects. If we
fear that delay may put Nyerere off federation altogether, this, of course, will also
affect what we finally want to get out of forthcoming constitutional discussions in
Kenya.
9. I fully realise, of course, that paragraphs 7 and 8 argue against more limited
terms of reference proposed in paragraph 4 above. Here is a real dilemma. It really
amounts to this. It would be wrong to let K.A.D.U. down. It is impossible to give
them internal self-government, as the term is normally understood, this year. On the
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other hand, K.A.N.U. and external pressures, including our own desire not to
prejudice federation, may force us to agree to discussions the outcome of which
might well be fatal to K.A.D.U. . . .
168 CAB 128/35/2, CC 61(61)6 9 Nov 1961
[Kenyatta, and possible constitutional developments in Kenya]:
Cabinet conclusions
[At a preparatory meeting of the Colonial Policy Committee, Macmillan said that the
proposed removal of a disqualification for election to the Leg Co of anyone who had
served a sentence of imprisonment for more than two years would enable Kenyatta
eventually to became chief minister—‘a thoroughly distasteful prospect’. But it was
recognised that, as the new S of S Maudling said, debarring him from full participation in
politics was illogical, and he would be less dangerous inside the Leg Co than outside it
(CAB 134/1560, CPC 11(61), 7 Nov 1961).]
The Colonial Secretary said that tribal tensions were increasing in Kenya and the
best hope for the future was to work for a constitutional conference in the early part
of 1962 to devise satisfactory safeguards for minority interests. There would be little
chance of guiding such a conference to a successful conclusion unless Kenyatta, who
was the elected leader of the majority party, was enabled to sit in the Legislative
Council by the removal of the disqualification now applying to anyone who had
served a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years. When the Cabinet had
authorised Kenyatta’s release from restriction it had been hoped that an African
Chief Minister might have been appointed before this disqualification was removed.
However, in view of the failure to effect an accommodation between the majority and
minority parties in Kenya, this had not been possible. The Governor and the minority
parties agreed that in these circumstances it was advisable that the disqualification
should now be removed. They believed that Kenyatta’s performance as a member of
the Legislative Council would not enhance his stature in the eyes of Africans
generally. If the disqualification was to be removed, it seemed desirable that this
should be announced without delay.
In discussion grave misgivings were expressed about the possibility that Kenyatta
might become the Prime Minister of an independent Kenya. It seemed highly
undesirable that the United Kingdom Government should take any positive action
which might contribute towards that result. It was true that his current visit to
London was attracting comparatively little publicity, and that he was strongly
opposed by the minority parties in Kenya. On the other hand, he had become the
leader of the majority party and was accepted by other African statesmen as the
spokesman of Africans in Kenya.
It was also suggested that it was doubtful whether the removal of the
disqualification would increase the chances of bringing the constitutional conference
to a successful conclusion. Kenyatta was an evil man who must be held responsible
for the brutalities of the Mau Mau movement.1 It would be impossible for the
European minority in Kenya to rely on constitutional safeguards under a
Government controlled by him.
1 The foreign secretary, Lord Home, had said precisely this at the meeting of the Colonial Policy
Committee.
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In further discussion the following points were made:
(a) The continuance within the Commonwealth of an independent Kenya under
the leadership of Kenyatta would seem to many people to be inconsistent with the
moral principles which had hitherto been the basis of the Commonwealth
association.
(b) If we were to avoid chaos in Kenya, the only alternative to working for a
satisfactory constitutional settlement leading to early independence was to
continue our colonial rule. But this would involve a heavy financial and political
burden.
(c) The best framework for satisfactory safeguards for minorities in a
constitutional settlement would be the delegation of substantial powers to the
various tribal regions of Kenya.
(d) In the longer term the best hope for stability in Kenya lay in some form of
federation with the other East African territories.
(e) The European minority in Kenya might well think that, faced with the prospect
of a Government led by Kenyatta, their only real safeguard was the maintenance of
British troops in Kenya.
(f ) If it were agreed that the removal of the disqualification was inevitable, the
timing of any announcement would need careful consideration. Such a decision
might be more acceptable, especially to certain sections of opinion in this country,
if it were not taken until the Colonial Secretary had personally visited Kenya and
consulted with the various interests there.
The Cabinet:—
Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the question of removing the
disqualification on Kenyatta to be considered further, in the context of the nature
and timetable of likely constitutional developments in Kenya, at a meeting of
Ministers in the following week.
169 CAB 134/1560, CPC 12(61) 15 Nov 1961
[The future of Kenya]: minutes of a meeting of the Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee
[The Committee considered a memorandum by Maudling, ‘Kenya’ (14 Nov), in which he
argued that the situation was ‘explosive and deteriorating’ and could lead to ‘great
disorder in Kenya, possibly reaching even Congo proportions’. He believed it was ‘quite
impracticable to contemplate ruling Kenya for an extended period’; they were committed
to independence as a goal, and a delay of more than 18 months was impossible, as Uganda
would become independent ‘next year’. A conference therefore seemed unavoidable. That
Kenyatta would ultimately become prime minister might be unpleasant, but it could not
be prevented, and was ‘inescapable’.]
The Committee considered a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (61) 30)
on the future of Kenya. In it he expressed the view that there were only two ways of
restoring confidence and avoiding great disorder in Kenya—either we should
continue for some years to rule Kenya and provide the necessary forces for this
purpose, or we should, through a conference, find a solution upon which both
majority and minority interests could agree. The latter would require the removal of
the restriction preventing Kenyatta from becoming a member of the Legislature. He
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recommended that our policy should be to concentrate on holding a conference and
making a success of it. The alternative would lead to another outbreak of Mau Mau
and leave us in no better position when it had been crushed at great cost and effort.
The Prime Minister said that this was a valuable paper setting out clearly the grave
dangers of the Kenya situation and the issues which faced us in dealing with them.
The Kenya problem was very intractable; more than almost anywhere else it
consisted of a combination of problems each of great difficulty in itself—there was
the problem of the white settlers; this was complicated by the fact that Kenya was a
poor country, its economy depending upon the sale of crops produced by Europeans;
there was the problem of tribalism; and there was a grave security problem. He
agreed with the Colonial Secretary that the right course was to aim at a solution by
means of a constitutional conference early next year, even though this meant the
removal of Kenyatta’s disqualification for membership of the Legislature. But if the
conference were to succeed we must try to obtain agreement on a form of
constitution which did not include unfettered Parliamentary sovereignty on the
Westminster model. If there were to be any hope of allaying the anxieties of
minorities (and especially the European minority, particularly when faced with the
prospect of an independent Kenya with Kenyatta as Prime Minister), it would not be
enough to include adequate guarantees: it would also be necessary to ensure that the
guarantees were deeply entrenched by provision which made it as difficult as possible
for the local Legislature to amend the constitution in those respects. The terms on
which England and Scotland had united proved successful because both parties to
the union were, on the whole, reasonable people, but in relation to Kenya something
more like the constitution of the United States of America seemed desirable.
The Lord Chancellor1 agreed that the right course was to hold the proposed
conference and that for this purpose Kenyatta would have to be relieved of his
disqualification from membership of the Legislature. In his view there were four
main principles by which to judge fitness for independence—a viable economy; an
independent judiciary; a workable form of parliamentary government; and a general
stability which in principle allowed for the protection of minorities from oppression.
On the whole he would accept that Kenya could survive economically, especially if it
could be brought into an East African Federation. The quality and independence of
the judiciary were at present satisfactory. The achievement of a workable form of
parliamentary government would be one of the main aims of the conference, as
would also be provision against the dangers of tribalism and the oppression of
minorities. In all these matters the balance was finely poised, but he did not think
that we could contemplate a long period of United Kingdom government by force
and the only alternative aim of policy seemed to be a successful conference.
In discussion it was generally agreed that of the choices before us the right one
was to relieve Kenyatta of the disqualification from membership of the Legislature as
a necessary element in aiming at a successful constitutional conference early next
year.
The following were the other main points made:—
(a) Every effort must be made to ensure that any constitution for an independent
Kenya, particularly under Kenyatta as Prime Minister, should contain safeguards
1 Lord Kilmuir.
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for minorities which were both adequate in themselves and accepted as such by
the minorities. Moreover, the constitution should be so drawn as to put the
maximum difficulty in the way of any abrogation of those safeguards. It was
suggested that, when independence had come, only force could in the last resort
prevent a ruthless and determined government from tearing up the constitution
and imposing their will on the country; but against this it was argued that it would
be a mistake to undervalue the importance of adequate constitutional checks upon
the sovereignty of parliament, since even a thoroughly ill-intentioned government
might to some extent be deterred if the only way to the achievement of their evil
ends involved flagrant illegality.
(b) It was generally recognised that the security problem was complex and serious.
We had to face the risks not only of a general collapse of law and order—for
example, if the police force were suborned or otherwise became incapable of
effective performance of its duties—but also of irresponsibility or misuse of local
armed forces: we had seen an example of this kind of danger last year in the Congo
where the Army had revolted despite the fact that the loi fondamentale was not at
all bad in itself. In Kenya today the local forces were quite good but this depended
entirely upon the presence of British officers, whose withdrawal would reduce the
local forces to an armed rabble. We had perhaps been somewhat slow in training
local officers and we should at once endeavour to remedy that difficulty with all
possible speed, although this would inevitably take time and we might still be
faced with a grave situation if there were a gap between withdrawal of British
officers and the provision of sufficient reliable African officers to take their place.
We might be faced with a difficult choice between the involvement of British
officers in internal affairs and the acceptance of serious disorder if the local forces
were left to operate without British commanders or other support. The position
might be better if Kenya entered an East African Federation as a result of which
internal security became a Federal responsibility, but it was doubtful whether such
Federal forces as were likely to be available could deal effectively with a major
breakdown of law and order in Kenya. All these considerations raised the question
whether we could agree in the proposed conference to arrangements for
independence for Kenya which, however satisfactory in other respects, did not
include adequate provision for the maintenance of law and order and the
protection of the constitution against violation.
(c) There was some discussion of the land problem and it was agreed that our aim
should be to achieve acceptable safeguards for the position of the 3,500 European
farmers who in effect largely supported the whole country: without safeguards
sufficient to induce them to remain, the state of the economy would rapidly
become disastrous. On the other hand it was also agreed that, so long as the Kenya
African National Union (KANU) adhered to their promise not to adopt measures
prejudicial to the use of land fully developed by Europeans, there was much to be
said for doing everything to meet KANU’s demands that all undeveloped land
should be made available for Africans to farm.
(d) It was noted that independence was likely at once to bring the Somali problem
to a head. The Somalis would not placidly accept black African rule in Kenya, and
the new rulers of the country would find it difficult to deal with a move by the
Somalis to take the Northern Frontier Province out of Kenya into the Somali
Republic.
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(e) Discussion also touched on the question of bases. We had assumed that we
could not hope for any length of time to maintain our existing bases in an
independent Kenya, although their loss would have damaging repercussions upon
our ability to maintain a proper reserve in the area and consequently upon our
capacity to operate in the Persian Gulf. It might be worth while seeking to retain
some land in the coastal strip on which we could maintain an air strip and a
refuelling point. It was recognised that, although this might be of some use for a
crash operation, it would not contribute to the long-term need in Kenya for
stabilising security forces. The Minister of Defence undertook to consider the
point and send a note on the subject to the Colonial Secretary.
Summing up the Prime Minister said that this had been a useful discussion of an
extremely intractable problem. The Colonial Secretary’s memorandum should be
circulated to the Cabinet and he would raise the subject in Cabinet on the following
day. . . . 
170 CAB 128/35/2, CC  63(61)5 16 Nov 1961
[Kenya: proposed constitutional conference early in 1962]: Cabinet
conclusions
The Colonial Secretary said that the minority tribes in Kenya were increasingly
fearful of Kikuyu domination and the European settlers were increasingly con-
cerned about their own future. The economic situation was deteriorating and cap-
ital investment was lessening with the growing loss of confidence. In this
situation the only alternative to continuing colonial rule, and providing the neces-
sary troops to enforce it, was to work for a constitutional conference which would
lay down adequate safeguards for minority interests. These safeguards should be
enshrined in the constitution in such a way as to make it as difficult as possible
to override them after the country achieved independence. A constitution that
gave adequate protection to the African minorities would be likely to afford rea-
sonable protection to the European settlers. He would be in a better position to
consider what form these essential safeguards should take after his forthcoming
visit to Kenya. His aim was to hold the constitutional conference in the early
months of 1962.
If this constitutional conference was to have any prospect of success, it would be
necessary to remove the disqualification which at present prevented Kenyatta, and
others who had served a sentence of imprisonment of more than two years, from
becoming members of the legislature. Subject to the Cabinet’s agreement, he
proposed to announce just before his departure for Kenya that this disqualification
would be abolished.
Discussion showed that the Cabinet were in agreement that the best hope of
resolving the potentially dangerous situation in Kenya lay in working for a
constitutional conference in the early part of 1962. They also agreed that, if such a
conference were to have any prospect of success, it was necessary to remove the
disqualification which applied to Kenyatta, repugnant though this step would be to
many sections of opinion in this country.
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Serious doubts were however expressed about the likelihood that agreement would
be reached, at a constitutional conference, on safeguards which would be regarded as
satisfactory by the minority interests in Kenya. Moreover, even if safeguards were
entrenched in a constitution, there could be no assurance that they would not be
illegally overthrown by the majority party once Kenya had become independent.
Nevertheless, a satisfactory constitution, which might in some respects follow the
United States model, would provide at least a legal obstacle to the abolition of
minority rights, and a study should be undertaken urgently of the best form of
constitution for this purpose.
It was recognised that the African minorities, and certainly the European settlers,
were likely to feel that the only reliable safeguard would be the continuing presence
of British troops or of security forces under the control of British officers. But, given
the leadership of the majority African party, it was unlikely that British personnel
would want or would be allowed to remain after independence. The situation would
be different from that in Tanganyika, where the Prime Minister was prepared to rely
on British officers to maintain law and order.
In further discussion the following points were made:—
(a) The possibility of maintaining some British forces in Kenya after indepen-
dence should be seriously considered. Even if they were retained only for train-
ing purposes, and even though their value in an emergency might be limited to
rescuing European settlers, their presence would give some degree of confi-
dence.
(b) It was suggested that no reliable safeguards could be provided for European or
other minorities after independence unless provision were made for land
resettlement which the majority African party accepted as equitable. European
settlers could not hope to retain their existing holdings intact, even though it was
true that the economy of Kenya depended on the agricultural production of these
holdings.
(c) If the European settlers decided to leave, through fear of the future or because
their land was expropriated, the Government would be under heavy pressure to
pay them compensation. This would be a precedent for similar claims by settlers
displaced from the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
(d) The financial implications of the various courses which events might take in
Kenya would have to be worked out by the time a constitutional conference was
held. The cost of maintaining British forces there, meeting claims for compen-
sation, and providing financial assistance to an independent Kenya could involve,
in the aggregate, an intolerable burden to the Exchequer.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that the disqualification from membership of the legislature which
applied in Kenya to anyone who had served a sentence of imprisonment of more
than two years should be removed; and authorised the Colonial Secretary to make
an announcement to this effect in the following week.
(2) Agreed that the Colonial Secretary should aim at convening a constitutional
conference on Kenya in the early part of 1962, with the object of reaching
satisfactory safeguards for minority interests.
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171 CAB 128/35/2, CC 75(61)6 19 Dec 1961
[Kenya: preparation of a constitutional conference about
independence]: Cabinet conclusions1
The Colonial Secretary said that, while there were still differences of view between
them, the Kenya African National Union and the Kenya African Democratic Union
were making a determined effort to narrow the gap. There was now some hope that
workable proposals would be put forward from the African side before the opening of
the constitutional conference in February. If the conference went well it would be
possible to envisage elections in the later part of 1962 leading to independence in
1963. The position of British forces in Kenya after independence might be difficult.
The Africans would be reluctant to become involved in a conflict between the great
Powers; but they were anxious to remain in the Commonwealth and it might be best
to leave this question until the constitutional conference had been held and in
subsequent discussion to emphasise the Commonwealth rather than the British
purposes of the military facilities which we wished to retain.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) The future of the European settlers would turn on the safeguards to be written
into the Constitution. These would not, however, be sufficient to re-assure them
unless there was a reasonable prospect that they could be enforced. Though
progress was being made with the training of African officers for the King’s African
Rifles it would be impossible to produce by 1963 enough middle-rank and senior
officers to be sure of maintaining disciplined forces under African control. It would
be preferable to plan for the retention of a proportion of European officers. To re-
assure the European settlers it was also desirable that we should be able to retain
at least some British troops.
(b) The breakdown of law and order in the Congo had awakened opinion in other
African countries to the dangers of conferring independence too quickly. The
Nigerian Government were sponsoring a resolution in the United Nations
suggesting ten years as the period within which it might be reasonable to aim at
independence for all African States. It was possible that a move on our part to slow
down the timetable for the independence of Kenya might command more support
than had been assumed hitherto. There was, however, a serious risk that such a
course would lead to an explosion. The business community in Kenya were in
favour of an early settlement, which they believed to be preferable to a
continuation of the present uncertainty.
(c) It would not be easy to maintain that British military installations in Kenya
were meeting the needs of Commonwealth defence; nor would it be acceptable to
do so if this resulted in restrictions on our use of these facilities. It might be better
to abandon the idea of keeping a base in Kenya and to rely on periodical training to
maintain some British military presence in the country.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Colonial Secretary to circulate before the opening of the constitutional
conference in February a paper setting out his proposals for a Constitution in
Kenya and assessing the risks involved in delaying independence beyond 1963.
1 Previous reference: see previous document.
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172 CAB 134/1561, CPC(62)3 30 Jan 1962
‘Kenya constitutional conference’: memorandum by Mr Maudling on
objectives, for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee [Extract]
At their meeting on the 19th January Cabinet invited me to circulate a paper setting
out my proposals for the Constitutional Conference and assessing the risks involved
in delaying independence for Kenya beyond 1963.1
The objective
2. In a sense the primary purpose of the Conference will be to decide on the full
internal self-government constitution for Kenya. But the political groups have been
considering many issues which relate to the full independence constitution. I do not
believe that it would be in our interests to regard these issues as outside the terms of
reference of the Conference, given what I believe must be our ultimate objective in
Kenya. I would define this objective in the following terms. It is not possible for us,
even if we wished, to secure the continuance of European political power in Kenya.
That passed away at the last Lancaster House Conference. Arithmetic and African
nationalism are against this. The best that we can hope to achieve is the orderly
transfer of power to a securely-based and African-dominated Government which is
genuinely anxious to see Kenya develop as a modern state, to avoid chaos, civil war
and a relapse into tribalism, and genuinely prepared to respect the rights of
individuals of any race. Nor is it likely that we shall see in Kenya a Government
which is actively pro-Western in its foreign policy. The most we can expect is one
which is not committed to either side in the East/West struggle and one which,
because it is reasonably stable, does not offer too many opportunities for exploitation
and penetration by the Communist powers. I therefore believe that the constitutional
proposals for which we seek acceptance at the Conference, the tactics which we adopt
during the Conference and the timetable which we have in our minds should be
primarily directed towards this ultimate objective. . . .
The date of independence
12. I have discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sort of timetable for
independence that is likely to be practicable in different political situations. It is
governed by the mechanics of arranging a general election and by the question
whether or not new political groupings emerge. I do not believe that it would be in
our interests to attempt to delay independence beyond the dates which political and
administrative practicabilities indicate. Any suggestion that we were deliberately
dragging our feet would be likely to unite African opinion against us and might
seriously prejudice our chances of achieving our ultimate objective. It will not
improve the economic position of the country, nor can it be in the ultimate interests
of the European community in Kenya, for us to give any impression that it is their
presence which results in Kenya progressing less rapidly than Tanganyika and
Uganda. Furthermore, such a delay might give the Kikuyu extremists an excuse for
adopting terrorism once more and lead to their securing an increased number of
adherents in the country—as well as external support.
1 See previous document. The meeting was on 19 Dec, not 19 Jan.
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13. In view of recent events in Tanganyika, I do not believe that by setting an
early date for Kenya’s independence we should facilitate the establishment of an East
African Federation with Uganda and Tanganyika, but in any case, with the Kenya
situation as it now is, I believe that the practicable timetable for Kenya is virtually
dictated by purely Kenya considerations.
14. It is inevitable that I shall be pressed at the Conference to name a date for
independence. Whether or not this will be practicable will depend on the course of
events during the Conference and on whether it ends in general agreement on the
constitutional proposals. I believe that if there is general agreement, it would be
impossible for me to refuse to set a date which might be in general terms and would
almost certainly have to be subject to conditions. In certain circumstances it might
be impossible to defend setting a date later than the end of 1962 or the early part of
1963; in others a later date might be defensible. But I shall have to see how events
develop before I can make a firm recommendation on this point.
Recommendations
15. I invite my colleagues to endorse my general proposals as described above
and in the Annex and, in particular, to agree that:
(1) We should seek to achieve the orderly transfer of power to an African-
dominated Government commanding the widest possible support in the country
and having as its objective the development of Kenya as a modern democratic
state;
(2) Our tactics during the Conference should be directed towards this end and we
should take every opportunity to bring about any new political alignment which
offers a sound prospect of our attaining our ultimate objective;
(3) We should have particular regard during the constitutional negotiations to the
necessity to secure adequate safeguards for fundamental rights including property
rights;
(4) We should not seek to delay the date of independence beyond what is
practicable in the light of purely Kenya considerations and we should be prepared,
subject to progress during the Conference, to fix a conditional date before the
Conference concludes. I attach the greatest importance to our reserving our
position on this because (see paragraph 5) if there is no change in political
alignments and the Kenyatta group seem likely to achieve power, we shall have to
consider the implications of this for our future policy very carefully.2
2 At the Colonial Policy Committee to discuss this memorandum, Maudling stressed the importance of
making a success of the conference, since ‘failure would leave us with an even more intractable problem
than at present’: the extremists in KANU might obtain ‘a real ascendancy’. The Committee regarded the
financial outlook as ‘extremely sombre’ (CPC 4 (62)4, 16 Feb 1962).
173 CAB 129/108, C(62)22 6 Feb 1962
[Policy objectives at the Kenya Conference]: Cabinet memorandum by
Mr Maudling
The Kenya Conference, which opens on 14th February, is designed to settle the
future Constitution of Kenya. If we follow the normal precedent established
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elsewhere the conference, if successful, would be followed by a new General Election
based on revised franchise arrangements, a period of full internal self-government
starting either just before or just after the elections, and then further negotiation
with Her Majesty’s Government leading up to ultimate independence.
2. It is widely believed that the date we have in mind for independence is some
time in the first half of 1963.
3. The people who most impressed me during my visit to Nairobi two months
ago were the Provincial Commissioners. They gave me their unanimous advice:
(i) That the rate of advance to independence, which they assumed would come in
the spring of 1963, was too rapid.
(ii) They could think of no way in which it could now be slowed down.
Must we really accept this advice, or is there some way, either of taking some of the
dangers out of independence, or of retarding the date, or of doing both? This is the
question we shall have to settle in the course of the coming months.
4. The dangers themselves are not difficult to see. In political maturity the
indigenous people of Kenya are far behind even the West Africans. The number of
trained administrators, and the number of officers and senior non-commissioned
officers available are very small. There are strong tribal antagonisms that can easily
be fanned into violence by irresponsible leaders and they are based on fears, that have
much substance, of Kikuyu domination. There is a large European population with a
great and long-established stake in the country. Land-hungry Africans are casting
jealous eyes on the European lands, but it is European agriculture that provides the
foundation of Kenya’s economy. Over everything broods the threat of Mau Mau, the
influence of the ex-detainees in the Kenya African National Union (K.A.N.U.), and the
persistence of personal violence. Small wonder in these circumstances that
confidence is rapidly disappearing and that the economy of the country is running
rapidly downhill. The European farmers and the European administrators, upon
whom the country depends, have little incentive to stay.
5. These dangers can be avoided only if we can ensure an administration that is
adequately efficient and incorrupt (standards are bound to fall to a considerable extent
in any case), a Constitution which provides reasonable protection to the individual and
to minorities and which cannot be taken away by legal means, and reasonable confi-
dence that law and order can be maintained by security forces operating under the
control of a Government that itself respects the Constitution. We shall have ultimately
to decide whether in our view there is a reasonable chance of this being achieved on
independence. If we think there is not, we shall have to face up to all that is involved
in postponing independence and continuing to govern ourselves, probably in such cir-
cumstances by decree and without any African co-operation.
6. I think it is important that we should take our decisions in stages and in the
right order. For example, the question of maintaining facilities for British forces in
Kenya cannot be tackled adequately until there is a responsible Government with
whom to negotiate. Approaches at the moment to the two political parties cannot
produce anything but a rebuff. The stage we are now facing is the Constitutional
Conference, and our aim in this, I suggest, should be to try to frame a Constitution
which gives the maximum of legal protection to minorities and to individuals.
7. The two parties—K.A.N.U. and the Kenya African Democratic Union
(K.A.D.U.)—have been working hard on their constitutional ideas with the
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assistance of Sir Ralph Hone,1 whom I sent out as constitutional adviser, and other
legal experts whom they are employing. While I am encouraged that they should be
tackling this task so seriously, it must be admitted that their ideas are still far apart.
K.A.D.U. are pinning their faith to what they call a federal or regional system, while
K.A.N.U. are in favour of a single unitary system of government, with substantial
powers for local government units entrenched in the Constitution.
8. But though their views are at present wide apart, I believe, myself, that under-
neath it all there may be more potential agreement than appears at first sight. If we
can sweep away the verbiage about federalism and unitary state, and so on, and come
down to the hard facts of powers and safeguards, we may be able to reach some agree-
ment. What K.A.D.U. and their supporters need is protection for minority tribes in
such matters as land rights, tribal customs, etc., in a form which cannot be destroyed.
K.A.N.U. are prepared to make reasonable provision in these matters, and the problem
will be to ensure that this provision is lasting. I doubt if a provision that amendments
to the Constitution can be made only by say a 75 per cent. majority will be adequate,
but I believe it should be possible to devise a system whereby features of the
Constitution which affect minorities can be changed only with the consent of certain
bodies outside the central Parliament, e.g., the local or tribal authorities. If this can
be done we shall have achieved something really worthwhile for the minority tribes.
9. The position of the Europeans is more difficult. K.A.N.U. obviously are
determined to separate the Europeans from the African tribes, and if they wish to do
so, I don’t see how it can be prevented. Protection for the Europeans must lie in a Bill
of Rights and an independent judiciary. Both these are provided for in the K.A.N.U.
and, I understand, K.A.D.U. proposals but the problem from the European point of
view will be to ensure that in practice they will be fully effective. This, it seems to me,
is the real debt we owe to the European community in Kenya.
10. I conclude, therefore, that so far as the present conference is concerned, we
should try hard to get agreement on a Constitution that provides, so far as any legal
system can provide, protection for tribal minorities and for European individuals.
11. Looking to the future, the great question will be, to what extent it is likely that
an extremist group or party would overthrow such a Constitution, thus leading to a
breakdown of law and order on a major scale. On our answer to this must depend the
view we take about the date of independence and the future of British forces. I suggest
we cannot make this assessment now, until we have seen how the conference goes,
and until we have had a few months’ experience thereafter. In the meantime, however,
there will be clear advantage if the “moderate” wing of K.A.N.U., led by Mboya, can be
split off from the party generally, and in particular from the extreme group—men of
violence and of Communist contacts—led by Kenyatta, Odinga2 and Ngei.3 The
Governor thinks that this could perhaps be done. While I would not rate the chances
very high, it would be so much advantage for the future of Kenya and for the solution
of our problems there, that I think the possibility is well worth pursuing, and I shall
take any opportunity of doing so that presents itself at the conference.
1 Sir (H) Ralph Hone, assistant legal adviser to CRO and CO since 1954; governor of North Borneo, 1949–1954,
with previous Colonial Service experience in Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Gibraltar and Malaya.
2 A Oginga Odinga, Luo Union leader, 1952–1957; minister for lands and surveys, 1957–1961; minister of
justice, 1961–1963; vice-president of KANU, 1960–1966; vice-president of Kenya, 1964–1966.
3 P Ngei, deputy general-secretary of KANU, 1951–1952 (Mau Mau detainee, 1953–1961); founder and
president of African People’s Party, 1962–1963; holder of many ministerial posts after 1964. 
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174 CAB 128/36/1, CC 12(62)5 8 Feb 1962
[Kenya: the timing of independence]: Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (62) 22)
on constitutional development in Kenya.1
The Colonial Secretary said that the Kenya Constitutional Conference would open
in London on 14th February. Its object was to settle a Constitution for Kenya during
the period of internal self-government. In the light of precedents in other territories
it would be generally assumed that the transition to full independence would take
place about a year or 18 months after the attainment of self-government. Refusal to
accept an early date for independence would probably lead to further outbreaks of
violence, which would further reduce confidence in the country’s future and
intensify its economic problems. On the other hand, the early grant of independence
might leave Kenya with an unstable and inefficient government, which would be
equally disastrous to the economic prospects of the country. The first task was,
however, to seek agreement on a Constitution with strong safeguards for African
minorities and for the European settlers. It would then be a matter for judgment how
far such a Constitution was likely in the event to be overthrown by unconstitutional
means. Much would depend on the encouragement of moderate African opinion. The
Colonial Secretary said that he intended to do all he could to isolate the extremists in
the Kenya African National Union and to persuade its more moderate members to
make common cause with the Kenya African Democratic Union.
The Chief Secretary, Treasury,2 outlined the financial prospects of Kenya. On the
best assumptions Kenya would need economic aid at the rate of about £30 million a
year for many years ahead. Unless some confidence in the country’s stability could be
restored, it would decline into complete bankruptcy. The cost of compensating
European settlers for their land alone would amount to about £140 million. It was
therefore important that the gravity of the situation and the need to restore
confidence should be impressed from the outset on those attending the
Constitutional Conference and that no promise should be given or implied that the
United Kingdom Government would compensate displaced European settlers or
increase the level of economic aid. We would continue to accept the obligations
which flowed from our responsibility as a Colonial power; but we could not accept
responsibility for additional aid which might be called for as the result of
mismanagement by an independent state.
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) The question of safeguards was vital in the framing of a Constitution for self-
government. So far as possible such safeguards should be independent of the
legislature, particularly where the rights of African minorities were concerned. It
would be difficult to devise stronger safeguards for the European settlers than a Bill
of Rights and an independent judiciary, but the possibility might be considered of
conferring on the European members of the legislature some right of veto on
measures affecting the vital interests of the European settlers. It must, however, be
recognised that any Constitution now devised might break down during the period of
self-government, thus requiring us to resort to direct rule. Even if it survived into
1 See previous document. 2 Sir E Boyle.
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the period of independence, it might be overthrown by revolution. It should be
remembered, however, that predictions of political breakdown following the grant of
independence to other territories—most recently, for example, the Cameroons—
had not been borne out by the event; and in terms of administration, of public
services, and of training Africans for the duties of government we had laid in Kenya a
stronger foundation than in African territories administered by other Powers. Kenya
was, for this reason less likely to relapse into the kind of chaos which had followed
the grant of independence to the Congo. It would not be possible to form a proper
view of the prospects until the Conference had started and had made some progress;
much would depend on the emergence of a moderate African leadership.
(b) The grant of early independence to Kenya would be dangerous in the extreme.
Responsible local opinion was unanimous that the advance of independence was too
fast but there was almost equal agreement on the dangers of trying to slow it down.
From every point of view it would be preferable to lengthen the period of self-
government to something of the order of five years if means could be found of doing
this without provoking a violent African reaction which would have the effect of
further weakening confidence in Kenya and accelerating its economic collapse. It
might be possible to devise some form of trusteeship under international,
Commonwealth or United Nations auspices which would be acceptable to African
opinion. Short of this, it might be possible to associate some other countries, in an
advisory capacity, with our continuing administration of Kenya. These possibilities
should be examined.
(c) The threat to Kenya’s economic stability was of paramount importance. It put
Kenya into a different category from other territories whose independence had
already been granted or promised. The Government would be justified in
withholding independence from territories which were not economically viable and
had no reasonable prospect of becoming so. It was for consideration whether a frank
explanation of Kenya’s economic difficulties would not be accepted by world opinion
and even by the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations as justifying delay. There was,
however, a real danger that this might cause the Soviet Government or the Chinese
Government, which was known to be taking an increasing interest in African affairs,
to offer such economic aid as was needed to support the economy of an independent
Kenya. We might then find ourselves obliged to grant early independence to Kenya in
circumstances which would draw the country into the Communist camp. Even so,
there would be advantage in obtaining a more general recognition of the economic
difficulties facing Kenya and to this end it might be helpful if some independent
authority, possibly the World Bank, could be invited to make an objective survey of
Kenya’s economy and prospects.
(d) During the period of self-government it would be possible to use British troops
to maintain law and order. It would be more difficult to arrange for a British mili-
tary presence after independence. But, if we made it plain that we were not propos-
ing to retain a military base in Kenya after independence, it might be possible to
arrange for a number of British troops to be stationed in the area, particularly for
training puposes. Even so, the main burden of maintaining law and order in an
independent Kenya would fall on the King’s African Rifles. By the middle of 1963
only half the officers of this force would be African and it might be necessary for the
Government to second British officers at United Kingdom expense to maintain its
efficiency. It would be in our interest to do this: the consequences of failing to main-
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tain organised forces at the disposal of government had been shown only too clearly
in the Congo.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Took note that the Colonial Secretary, at the outset of the Kenya
Constitutional Conference, would emphasise the economic difficulties facing
Kenya and would seek to concentrate discussion on the problem of a Constitution
for the period of internal self-government.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to consider whether some form of trusteeship
for Kenya during the period of self-government could be devised and whether it
would be to our advantage to invite some international authority to review Kenya’s
economy and prospects.
(3) Agreed to resume their discussion at a later meeting in the light of develop-
ments at the Conference.
175 CAB 128/36/1, CC  22(62)4 20 Mar 1962
[Kenya: compromise proposals for self-government]: Cabinet
conclusions
[In the memo considered at this Cabinet, Maudling argued the case for working for a
coalition, even though KANU would react violently: ‘But I believe that these risks must be
faced. To go faster now would be inexcusably reckless. The consequences of slowing down
may be serious, particularly as regards calls upon our limited resources of money and
military manpower, but the consequences of going full steam ahead straightaway into
independence might well be catastrophic’ (CAB 129/109, C(62)53, 19 Mar 1962).]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (62) 53)
on developments in the Kenya Constitutional Conference and the possible courses of
action now open to the Government.
The Colonial Secretary said that the Conference had been unable to reach
agreement on a constitution for self-government in Kenya and the delegations from
Kenya were now looking for a lead from the United Kingdom Government. He
proposed to put to them the outlines of a constitution which struck a balance
between the proposals by the Kenya African National Union (KANU) for a strong
Government at the centre and those of the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU)
for a federal system of government. The details of any such compromise constitution
would have to be worked out later with the active participation of both the main
African parties. This could best be secured within a coalition Government, headed by
an official, which would have the framing of the new constitution as its main task
and would be more of a constituent assembly than a normal Government. If the
constitution could be agreed in this way, elections would be held under it, possibly at
the end of 1962, and the period of self-government leading to independence would
then begin.
The least palatable feature of these proposals was that it would be necessary to
include Kenyatta in the coalition Government. If, however, he joined such a
Government, he would find it more difficult to satisfy his extremist followers, and the
moderate element in the KANU party might gain greater influence. Whatever course
was now adopted a serious security situation might well arise and there could be no
question of withdrawing British troops from Kenya.
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The Colonial Secretary said that he also envisaged a larger programme of
resettlement of landless Africans who in present circumstances presented the gravest
threat to security. It would be necessary to purchase European farms and to equip
them for African use. It was likely in any event that some of the European farmers
would leave the country and claim compensation; and in the absence of any scheme
of African land-settlement fighting would be likely to break out for possession of the
deserted farms.
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) One possible course would be to adjourn the Conference, announce that it
would be reconvened in, say, six months’ time, and continue the present Government
in office. The objections to this were that it would be likely to lead to early outbreaks
of violence, since there would be no restraint on the extremists; that it would be a
wholly negative policy; and that all the delegations to the Conference (including the
representatives of the European settlers) and the Governor were strongly in favour of
an attempt to bring in a coalition Government at this stage.
(b) The hopes originally entertained that Mr. Kenyatta’s influence would decline
once he had been released from confinement had not been fulfilled. He could not
be relied upon to honour any undertakings or to respect any constitution if he
once attained full power. It could therefore be represented as unprincipled as well
as dangerous to offer him any position of responsibility. On the other hand it
would not be practicable at the present stage to contemplate the formation of a
coalition Government without him. He was still the acknowledged leader of his
party, and his political influence was still considerable. His powers were, however,
declining; and if he took office in a coalition Government his capacity to cause
trouble would probably be less than if he were free to act independently. Even the
representatives of the European settlers now accepted the impossibility of exclud-
ing him.
(c) It would not be easy to form a coalition Government, and the attempt might
well fail. From some points of view this might be an advantage, particularly if the
failure came about in such a way as to divide the extremist from the moderate
element in the KANU party. If such a division in KANU led to a substantial weakening
of their general position in Kenya it might be possible to encourage KADU to
continue in office at least for the time being and to entrust to them the task of
working out the details of the new constitution, possibly with the assistance of the
moderate element in KANU. These possibilities could not, however, be seriously
discussed until the attempt to form a coalition Government had been made and the
likelihood of success or failure could be judged more accurately.
(d) The financial implications of a large resettlement programme would need
careful examination. Considerable expenditure would be involved and it would not
be easy to frame the resettlement proposals in such a way that they did not lead
inevitably to demands for compensation from the European community as a
whole.
(e) In any event the security situation was likely to be dangerous. It would not be
possible to contemplate the withdrawal of British forces at any time before
independence and there might even be need for reinforcement. The possibility of
withdrawing troops from Germany for this purpose should be considered; if this were
impracticable, present plans for reducing the Army to a strength of 173,000 might
have to be re-examined.
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The Cabinet:—
(1) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to present to the Kenya Constitutional
Conference proposals for a self-governing constitution in Kenya based on the best
attainable compromise between the proposals of the Kenya African National Union
and the Kenya African Democratic Union.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to explore the possibility of forming a
coalition Government in Kenya to work out the details of such a new constitu-
tion.
(3) Took note that the Colonial Secretary would discuss with the Chief Secretary,
Treasury, a programme for the settlement of Africans on land to be purchased from
Europeans.
(4) Invited the Colonial Secretary to report to the Cabinet the outcome of his
enquiries under Conclusions (1) and (2) above.1
1 Only towards the very end of the constitutional conference did Kenyatta demand that a firm date should
be set for Kenya’s independence. In view of the difficulties of making any new constitution work, the
Cabinet believed this was an ‘unreasonable demand’ which must be refused; if Kenyatta also insisted that
Oginga Odinga should be included in the coalition government this would also be refused, as Odinga ‘was
known to be in touch with the Soviet Government’. The Cabinet thought the Kenyans were concentrating
too much on political and racial issues to the exclusion of facing up to the ‘critical economic situation of
Kenya and the urgent need to re-establish confidence in its future’ (CAB 128/36/1, CC 20(62)4, 8 Mar; &
CC 25(62)7, 30 Mar 1962).
176 CAB 128/36/2, CC 44(62)6 5 July 1962
[Kenya: land settlement scheme]: Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (62) 101)
outlining a programme for the settlement of Africans on land to be purchased from
Europeans in Kenya.
The Colonial Secretary said that he had discussed this scheme with the Chief
Secretary, Treasury. He proposed that over the next five years funds should be made
available for the settlement of about 70,000 African families on 1 million acres of
mixed farming land now owned by Europeans, and that the Government should
indicate their willingness to participate in an extension of the scheme at the end of
this period, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. The rate of settlement and
the expenditure involved would be spread evenly over the five-year period. He hoped
that arrangements could be made for existing schemes to continue and to be co-
ordinated with the new scheme. The cost of buying and settling 1 million acres was
estimated at about £16.55 million, of which £7.55 million would be grant and £9
million loan; but the total amount of additional money required would be about
£12.65 million, since funds for some existing schemes would be absorbed into this
larger plan.
The administrative resources of the Kenya authorities would be fully stretched by a
scheme on the lines proposed and he did not think that anything on a larger scale
would be practicable. The scheme would not resettle all the landless unemployed
Africans and it would not affect more than about half of the mixed farming area
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owned by Europeans. It should, moreover, be recognised that the substitution of
African for European farmers would involve some decline in the general standard of
farming, with corresponding loss to the Kenya economy. But, if there were no
scheme of this kind, large numbers of European farmers would abandon their farms
and the local tribes would fight for possession of them. The scheme would also have
the advantage of offering a means of dealing with the claims of some European
farmers who might otherwise make a strong case for direct compensation from the
United Kingdom Government. He sought authority to discuss the outline of the
scheme with Kenya Ministers and to make an announcement about it during his
forthcoming visit. Further discussions would then be held both with the Kenya
Government and with the Treasury about the detailed arrangements for putting the
scheme into effect.
In discussion there was general agreement that it would be right to proceed with a
scheme of this kind. It was not possible to estimate at this stage how many of the
3,000 European farmers at present in Kenya would wish to stay, but it was believed
that a fair proportion would be encouraged to do so by the knowledge that this
scheme would guarantee a reasonable market in land for at least five years. The
scheme offered the best hope of avoiding in Kenya a situation comparable with that
which had arisen in Algeria through the dissatisfaction of European settlers. Care
should, however, be taken to ensure that the proposed announcement carried the
concurrence of the Kenya Government and that it was presented, not as a scheme for
rescuing European farmers, but as one to secure the orderly settlement of Africans.
The Kenya Government should be left in no doubt that this commitment would be a
first charge on the financial assistance to be provided by the United Kingdom
Government for development purposes.
The Cabinet:—
Approved the proposals outlined in C. (62) 101 for a scheme of land settlement in
Kenya.
177 PREM 11/4083 7 June 1963
[East African federation and Kenya independence]: tel (no 336) from
Mr M MacDonald (Kenya) to Mr Sandys
It is true that when you were in Nairobi I thought it might be possible to carry on
with internal self-government until well into next year, and possibly until the middle
of it. If independence for Kenya could be kept as an isolated problem, that prog-
ramme might be practicable and agreeable to all concerned here. For example, about
two months ago Bruce McKenzie told me that KANU leaders were beginning to
realise that independence in 1963 would not be possible, and that some time in 1964
would be wiser.
2. However, partly no doubt owing to their own political emotions, and partly
owing to pressure from the Tanganyika and Uganda Governments, Ministers are now
clearly thinking of independence towards the end of 1963. I believe that a prime
motive in this change of attitude is desire to establish federation. President Nyerere
stayed with me at Government House a couple of nights ago; he, Mboya and
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Kambona1 dined privately with me; and I also had a talk with Nyerere alone. This all
followed their conference and agreement on federation that afternoon. When I put to
Nyerere that it might be difficult to reach the political agreements between the three
Governments and to make all the practical and constitutional arrangements
necessary to establish federation within a comparatively few months, he agreed with
this, but said the three Governments must succeed in a very early achievement of
federation. He said that at the moment enthusiasm for federation amongst their
publics had grown again, and that Ministers must seize this opportunity to achieve
actual federation before doubts arise and zeal wanes once more. He and Mboya both
told me that Uganda had made difficulties earlier, but is now in agreement that
federation should take place; and, again, they wished to make speed with federation
before that situation might change. On the other hand federation cannot actually
take place until Kenya is independent, and therefore the time-table depends in part
on date of that independence. My three dinner guests all expressed strong hopes that
the British Government would appreciate the position, and that H.M.G. would put no
obstacles in the way of attainment of Kenya’s independence at the earliest practical
date, not only for its own sake, but also so that federation can be achieved at the same
time or immediately afterwards.
3. No doubt there is an element in all this of putting pressure on us to speed up
Kenya’s independence; but in my judgement African leaders’ zeal to achieve
federation at or about the same time is equally sincere and serious. They are making
arrangements to get on at once with practical preparations for federation. Thus a
working party of six Ministers (two from each territory) is being established
forthwith to begin negotiations. A working party of officials will do all the detailed
work under their guidance. The working party of Ministers will all regard this as
their top priority, and will meet at frequent intervals, chiefly in Nairobi, where they
will have the active help of Adu2 and EACSO experts. As you know, it has been
announced that the three Heads of Governments with their principal colleagues will
hold a further conference in the third week of August, in the hope that they will then
be able to reach a firm and final agreement on terms of federation. After that the
detailed instruments will be prepared as rapidly as possible.
4. Mboya has told me privately that Kenya independence conference should
follow not precede this federation conference. I have no doubt that the East African
Ministers all hope and intend that independence conference should therefore take
place in September at the latest. I have emphasised to Mboya that date must be one
which is convenient to U.K. Ministers as well as to Kenya Ministers and I have
mentioned that Ministers in London are liable to have many long-standing
commitments round about that time of the year. Mboya understands this, but very
much hopes that you and your colleagues will appreciate the need to work to a
programme which enables Kenyan independence and East African federation to take
place without undue delay.
5. It seems to me, however, that we are in a position to make our agreement to
an independence conference in, say, September or October at least partially
dependent on federation conference in August (or whatever date it is held) having
achieved reasonable results. No doubt it would be imprudent and impracticable to
1 O S Kambona, Tanganyika minister of education, etc. 2 Adu: see document no 138, n 3.
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make that a firm condition but we could have an understanding with Kenya
Ministers that the two problems are to some extent linked together. I need not spell
out details now.
6. A sound East African federation is, of course, a dream answer to many of our
Kenya problems. I, therefore, believe we should show ourselves co-operative in
aiding establishment of that at earliest practicable date. If Mboya is speaking the
truth (as I believe he is) in saying that their intention is that independence and
federation should be established on the same day, or within a very short while of each
other, our policy might well be that, on present form, we regard the two aims as
linked together, and that date for independence might depend a bit on date when
federation also can be achieved.
7. I think it important for us not to appear to be dragging our own feet, or to wish
to make the East African leaders drag their feet on federation. So I hope it will be pos-
sible for you to see Mboya on one of the dates proposed about ten days from now, with
a view to reaching some at least tentative understanding on date for an independence
conference. If we show this readiness, I believe we shall maintain the confidence which
your recent visits to the East African territories have established in H.M.G. and that,
at the same time, we shall lose nothing substantial in the way of an unnecessarily hasty
timetable for independence. Unless I am mistaken, I think that the East African
Ministers will find that just about the whole of remainder of this year at least will be
needed to complete all necessary preparations for federation, and this circumstance
should put some brakes on too much haste towards Kenya’s independence. In any case
it would be imprudent to contemplate a postponement of Kenya’s independence
beyond sometime in the first half of next year, and if it comes a few months earlier in
return for establishment of a sound federation, the gain will be greater than any loss.
178 CAB 128/37, CC 41(63) 24 June 1963
[Kenya: arrangements for and implications of independence]: Cabinet
conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (63) 105),
to which was appended the draft of a communiqué announcing that, subject to the
necessary steps being completed in time, Kenya would become independent on 12th
December, 1963.
The Colonial Secretary1 said that, in the light of developments in recent weeks,
there was now a reasonable prospect that a Federation of Kenya, Uganda and
Tanganyika would be established. Such a development would be welcome since, apart
from its economic advantages, a Federation would tend to reduce the risk of tribal
dissension in Kenya and to reinforce the position of other minority groups.
The three Governments hoped to bring the Federation into being by the end of the
year, in order that it might be represented at the United Nations in the 1964 session.
If objections on our part delayed the independence of Kenya and, therefore, the
establishment of the Federation beyond the end of 1963, we should incur the odium
of appearing to frustrate the Federation and should lose the goodwill of all three
countries concerned. For these reasons we must now contemplate an earlier date for
1 Mr Sandys, holding the office jointly with the CRO since mid-July 1962.
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the attainment of independence by Kenya than we had previously envisaged. We
should accept 12th December, 1963, as the relevant date and should publicly
announce our intention to take the steps necessary to this end, including a
conference to settle the final Constitution of Kenya in September.
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) So far as possible the safeguards for minorities contained in the present
Constitution of Kenya should be preserved. Some concession might have to be made
to the view of the Kenya African Nationalist Union (KANU), from whose members the
present Kenya Government was largely drawn, that the present safeguards were
unduly restrictive in that they virtually precluded future constitutional changes of
any kind. But the fact that the Constitutional Conference would have to reach
conclusions very rapidly might help to keep changes to a minimum. Moreover,
membership of the Federation would itself restrain a future Government of Kenya
from making arbitrary constitutional changes; and this in turn would tend to
strengthen the position of the minorities. The European inhabitants of Kenya would
be likely to welcome the establishment of the Federation as tending to promote
greater stability in the area as a whole.
(b) The problem of Zanzibar’s nominal sovereignty over the region of Kenya
known as the Coastal Strip could probably be solved by an arrangement with the
Sultan of Zanzibar under which, subject to a process of consultation yet to be worked
out in detail, sovereignty would be effectively ceded to the Government of an
independent Kenya.
(c) It would be necessary to enter into consultation with the Governments of
Ethiopia and Somalia in an attempt to find a solution to the problem of the Northern
Frontier District before the attainment of independence by Kenya. The establishment
of the Federation might also be of value in this context, since the Northern Frontier
District, while representing a substantial area of Kenya, would form a less significant
part of a Federation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika; and this fact might make it
politically less embarrassing for the Government of Kenya to accept the secession of
the District to Somalia.
(d) The acceleration of Kenya’s independence by some six months, which the
timetable now proposed by the Colonial Secretary involved, would make it the more
important to decide our future military dispositions in Africa and the Middle East. It
had always been envisaged that, when Kenya became independent, United Kingdom
troops would be withdrawn over a period. Under the earlier plans this withdrawal
would probably have had to be completed in six months, i.e., by the end of 1964. It
might now be possible, however, to extend this period to 12 months, i.e., from the
end of 1963 to the end of 1964. It would remain important, however, that the troops
withdrawn from Kenya should be transferred to Aden, where new accommodation
would have to be provided for them. It would also be desirable to build up Kenya’s
own military forces, a process which would take at least 18 months; to ensure that,
once the withdrawal of United Kingdom troops had started, it should be brought
rapidly to completion; and to negotiate with the Kenya Government satisfactory
arrangements for our retention of longer-term military facilities in Kenya itself, in
particular the continuation of over-flying rights, the maintenance of certain radio
stations, the provision of training facilities and the right to establish and make use of
leave and rest camps. The strength of our negotiating position in these respects
would be likely to depend on the extent to which we should be prepared to provide
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assistance to the Government of Kenya in connection with the equipment,
organisation and training of their own forces.
(e) The most serious difficulty to which the proposed acceleration of the timetable
would give rise might be in relation to the current negotiations about the future of
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It would now become difficult, if not
impossible, to defer the grant of independence to Nyasaland for as long as would
otherwise have been desirable; and this would in turn intensify pressure for
corresponding acceleration in the case of Northern Rhodesia, to whom it might
become necessary to concede a self-governing Constitution in the autumn of 1963.
The problem of Southern Rhodesia would then become even more intractable than
at present. Further discussions with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Mr.
Winston Field, and with the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky, were due to start in the next few days. If a public
announcement that Kenya was to attain independence in December 1963 were made
on the eve of those discussions, the task of our negotiators would become even more
difficult. It would be helpful, therefore, if the public announcement could be delayed
for at least a week or 10 days, during which we could inform Mr. Field and Sir Roy
Welensky of our revised intentions as regards Kenya, together with the justification
of the course which we proposed to adopt.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the balance of
advantage appeared to lie in arranging for Kenya to attain full independence in
December 1963. But no public announcement to this effect should be made until the
First Secretary of State2 had had an opportunity of ascertaining the probable
reactions of Mr. Winston Field and Sir Roy Welensky. The Government of Kenya
could reasonably be asked to accept the short delay involved, on the ground that we
required further time in which to assess the implications of the redeployment of
United Kingdom troops in Kenya on the basis of the revised timetable.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed, in principle, that Kenya should be granted independence in December
1963.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to make a public statement to this effect in
the near future.
(3) Agreed to defer a decision on the precise form and timing of this statement
until the First Secretary of State had been able to ascertain, and to report to the
Cabinet, the reactions of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and the Prime
Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to the Government’s
decision to accelerate the attainment of independence by Kenya.
2 R A Butler, as minister i/c Central African affairs.
179 CAB 128/38, CM 1(63)5 22 Oct 1963
[Kenya independence conference settlement]: Cabinet conclusions
[This was Sir A Douglas-Home’s first Cabinet meeting as prime minister. The main points
at issue at the London conference, between spokesmen for KANU and KADU, were control
of the police, control of the public service, and provision for amendment of the
constitution after independence. Full acceptance of KANU’s demands would probably
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produce a KADU revolt; refusal of any changes would probably lead to revocation of the
constitution by KANU on independence; to delay independence could provoke a unilateral
declaration of independence by KANU. The situation thus seemed critical (CAB 128/37,
CC 60(63)3, 15 Oct 1963). However, an acceptable settlement emerged from the
conference, and Kenya became independent on 12 Dec 1963).]
The Colonial Secretary said that at the conclusion of the Kenya Independence
Conference the representatives of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) had
accepted a limited number of changes in the Constitution approved at the Lancaster
House Conference in 1962. These changes were less drastic than those which they
had originally demanded; and, if we had refused them, the Kenya Government might
well have declared the independence of the Colony by a unilateral act. In that event it
would not have been realistic to seek to hold the country by force; but our relations
with the local Government would have been endangered, the European population
might have had to be withdrawn and the minority tribes would have been deprived of
the protection offered by the Constitution as it now stood.
On the other hand there remained a danger that the representatives of the Kenya
African Democratic Union (KADU), who had not accepted the limited changes in the
Constitution, might seek to provoke tribal disorder. There appeared to be a division
of opinion within KADU itself, however, between those who favoured recourse to
violence and those who advocated moderation. The longer a decision was delayed the
less was the risk that large-scale disorder would break out; and such isolated
incidents as might occur should be capable of being dealt with by the Kenya police
and the Kenya African Rifles.
In discussion the Cabinet expressed their appreciation of the skill and persistence
with which the Colonial Secretary had brought exceptionally difficult negotiations to
a more successful outcome than had at one time appeared possible.
The Cabinet:—
Took note, with approval, of the statement by the Colonial Secretary.
180 CAB 128/38, CM 7(63)5 21 Nov 1963
[Kenya: land settlement and the future of European farming land]:
Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C.P. (63) 18) and
the Chief Secretary, Treasury (C.P. (63) 19) on the future of European farming land in
Kenya.
The Colonial Secretary said that recent developments in Kenya, especially in the
central Kikuyu region, were giving rise to growing anxiety about the future of the
European mixed farmers. Increasing numbers of landless Kikuyu were invading this
region; and thefts of stock, destruction of fencing, and attacks on property were
becoming increasingly frequent. Resistance by the European farmers might
precipitate racial disturbances; and the Government would be faced with a critical
situation if military intervention became necessary in order to protect European
lives. Apart from the practical difficulties of such an operation, the political effect of
using United Kingdom troops for this purpose after Kenya had become independent
would be very damaging. These developments were disappointing, particularly in the
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light of the earlier expectation that there would be a secure future in Kenya for the
European farming community. But it was now clear that, at least in the central
region, the position of the Europeans would gradually become untenable; and the
Government therefore had no alternative but to take prompt action if law and order
were not to break down.
For this purpose we should immediately announce that we would assist the
Government of Kenya to purchase some 350,000 acres of land in the central region
over the next 31⁄2 years, at a cost of about £3.1 million. We should also indicate
forthwith that the projected review of the existing land resettlement schemes would
be advanced to a date early in the following year, thus implying that we contemplated
further substantial transfers of land in the near future.
The Chief Secretary, Treasury,1 said that, whereas the Government’s policy of
land purchase in Kenya had hitherto been intended to settle Africans on land previ-
ously occupied by European farmers, the present proposal would be seen to be
designed primarily to compensate European farmers for the effects of constitutional
change. Such a modification of policy would be liable to have wider repercussions.
In particular, the inducement to the local government to maintain law and order
would be removed; and there would be no justification for confining the proposed
action to the central region of Kenya or for refusing similar treatment to European
farmers and business men in other parts of Kenya and, in comparable circum-
stances, in other territories. Moreover, progress with the main settlement scheme
did not justify its sudden expansion. Of the 650,000 acres bought under the scheme
only 100,000 had so far been settled by Africans. There was no reason, therefore,
why the 350,000 acres now in question should not be included in the main scheme
if it were necessary to give priority to settlement in the central region. Some exten-
sion of the scheme might become necessary in due course; but, if so, it should be
discussed with the Kenya Government in the context of the financial arrangements
which would have to be negotiated between the United Kingdom and an indepen-
dent Kenya.
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) If the Kenya Government were unable or unwilling to restrain the Kikuyu
tribesmen who were gradually invading the central region, the knowledge that
European farmland was to be bought and resettled by Africans over a period of 31⁄2
years might not lead to any easing of tension. Indeed, it might merely encourage the
Kikuyu to take over the farms immediately by force. On the other hand local opinion
inclined to the view that the announcement of an extended settlement scheme would
tend to reduce the danger of violence.
(b) If we were to avoid creating the impression that the main purpose of the new
arrangements was not to resettle Africans but to compensate Europeans, with all the
dangers of repercussion which this would entail, we should present our action in
relation to the central region of Kenya as being part of an accelerated review of the
settlement scheme in general. We should therefore refrain, if possible, from
specifying either the acreage or the expenditure involved.
(c) The risk of repercussions should not, however, be exaggerated. If the pro-
1 Mr J Boyd-Carpenter.
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posed new scheme secured a relaxation of the present tension in the area, it might
become possible to stabilise the situation of the European farming community
elsewhere in Kenya and so to limit the size of the United Kingdom’s commitment.
On the other hand, a breakdown of law and order in the central region at this
stage would be more likely to lead to disorders elsewhere, possibly extending even
beyond the borders of Kenya. If the situation deteriorated to a point at which it
became necessary to contemplate the total withdrawal of the European farming
community, the assets at risk might amount to some £140 million.
(d) It was arguable whether it would be to our advantage to seek to link the
proposed extension of the present settlement scheme with the financial negotiations
which we should have to undertake with the Kenya Government on or after the
Colony’s independence. If the two issues had to be considered together, the urgency
attaching to the extension of the land resettlement scheme would compel us to
advance the date of the wider negotiations. If so, we might be compelled to make
concessions in those negotiations in order to secure a rapid solution of the problem
of the resettlement scheme. If, on the other hand, the issues were dealt with
individually, the total cost of two separate negotiations might well be greater than
the cost of a single, combined settlement.
(e) Any payment to European farmers under the proposed arrangements should, if
possible, be confined to United Kingdom citizens. There might be objection to
providing from the United Kingdom Exchequer compensation for, e.g., South African
farmers in Kenya.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that there was general
agreement in the Cabinet that action must be taken to alleviate tension and anxiety
in the central region of Kenya and that it should be based on some extension of the
present land settlement scheme to include more European farming land in the
affected areas. An early announcement to this effect would be desirable; and the
Ministers concerned should therefore give further consideration to its precise terms,
particularly the extent to which it should specify the degree of commitment which
the Government were prepared to assume and should be linked with the wider
financial negotiations which we should shortly have to undertake with the
Government of an independent Kenya.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Colonial Secretary, in consultation with the Chief Secretary, Treasury,
and in the light of the considerations which had emerged from their discussion, to
submit to the Prime Minister the draft of statement, to be made in Parliament at
an early date, about land settlement in Kenya.
181 CAB 128/31/1, CC 15(57)5 4 Mar 1957
[Somaliland and the Horn of Africa]: Cabinet conclusions on policy
[Burke Trend and his officials faced a problem of reconciling conflicting interests. Good
relations with both Ethiopia and the Somali peoples were essential, if only for British
strategic overflying rights (Nigeria–Nairobi–Aden); Ethiopia was in addition valuable as
traditionally anti-Egyptian and therefore an obstacle to Egyptian or communist
penetration of Black Africa via the Nile. But the Somalis wanted to unite on
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independence, and this was opposed by Ethiopia—and also by the USA, France and Italy;
yet Britain had to protect Somali tribal grazing rights in the Haud of Ethiopia. Moreover,
if an enlarged independent Somalia fell into unfriendly hands, this would have serious
consequences for the defence of Kenya. The officials’ report could see no answer except to
make Somalis and Ethiopians work together (PREM 11/2582, minute to prime minister,
1 Mar 57). In the event the Ethiopians felt the British Government was doing much for
the Somalis but nothing for them.]
The Cabinet had before them a report by officials (C. (57) 38) about the Somaliland
Protectorate and the Horn of Africa.
The Colonial Secretary said that the approaching independence of Somalia made
it urgent to evolve a firm policy for the Horn of Africa. Our efforts to maintain our
position in the Aden Protectorate would be frustrated if the Somali peoples united
under influences hostile to us. He therefore endorsed the recommendation in para-
graph 39 (a) of the report that we should make a sustained attempt to induce the
Ethiopians and Somalis to work together, and that we should seek to persuade
other Western Powers to join with us in promoting this objective. The prospect
that a Greater Somalia, if it came into being with our encouragement, would have
expansionist designs on the Ogaden could be used as a means of persuading the
Ethiopian Government to carry out more satisfactorily their obligations in respect
of the Haud under the Agreement of 1954. Although elements in British
Somaliland would doubtless continue to press, on racial grounds, for the union of
all Somali peoples, the strength of this agitation would be reduced if the griev-
ances relating to the administration for the Haud by Ethiopia were removed. As
regards other possible courses of action, the support of the French would not be
forthcoming for the union of the Somali peoples, and the Italians would not be
prepared to retain responsibility for Somalia when their trusteeship came to an
end in 1960.
The Foreign Secretary said that it would not be to our advantage to foster the
creation of a Greater Somalia which would need to be supported by a substantial
subsidy if it was not to come under Arab domination. Our interest lay, therefore, in
building up Ethiopia as a counterpoise to Arab expansionism in the Horn of Africa.
The Ethiopian Government were themselves anxious to restore friendly relations,
which had deteriorated solely because of the local difficulties which had arisen in
connection with the administration of the Haud.
Discussion showed that the Cabinet were in agreement with the views which
had been expressed. If, however, the course proposed was to be followed, some fur-
ther consideration might need to be given to modifying the guardedly encouraging
statement which Lord Lloyd1 had been authorised to make in the previous year
about a possible association between the Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia
after 1960.
The Cabinet:—
Approved, subject to the points made in their discussion, the recommendation in
paragraph 39 (a) of C. (57) 38, and authorised the consequential action outlined in
that paragraph.
1 Parliamentary under-secretary of state at CO, 1954–Jan 1957. See document no 2 (para 168), and
Goldsworthy, ed, Conservative government and end of empire, Part I, document no 97.
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182 CO 847/74, no 13 16 May 1958
Report on a visit to Somaliland: minute by W L Gorell Barnes (CO) to
Mr Lennox-Boyd
On Sunday last, May 11th, I flew over to Hargeisa for the day from Aden and spent
some 3 or 4 hours talking to the Governor,1 Mr. Carrel,2 and Mr. Drysdale,3 who had
come in for a few days from Jigjigga.
2. The road from the airport to Government House goes right through the whole
length of Hargeisa. In view of the alarmist speeches which Mr. Bernard Braine4 has, I
understand, been making, it may be worth while recording that throughout the
length of our drive there was hardly a group of Somalis who did not salute the
Governor or wave to him as the car went by with the Union Jack flying.
3. The Governor and his advisers asked me to look into a number of points
concerning C.D. & W. schemes and so on, which are being pursued in the
Department and with which I need not trouble you. But the greater part of the
discussion was taken up with two subjects—constitutional development and
relations with Ethiopia.
4. It looks as though the mixed commission which has been set up to go into the
question of making the Legislative Council more representative, and is at present
taking evidence, will recommend that an official majority should be retained at the
next stage, and that of the unofficial Members one-third should be indirectly elected
through the tribal organisations, one-third directly elected on a qualitative suffrage
in the towns, and the remaining one-third nominated. This is apparently in
accordance with the wishes of most of those who have been consulted.
5. The Governor and his advisers are at present considering whether at the next
stage they should recommend a start of Somali participation in the executive, e.g. by
appointing some Parliamentary Secretaries or something of the kind. Mr. Carrel fears
that anybody who accepted such posts would become labelled as “Government
stooges”, and that their position would be prejudiced when constitutional
development goes further. I myself, however, am inclined to feel that we should not
be deterred by this and that, provided that any Somalis who accepted the post do so
with their eyes open about possible short-term prejudice to their future careers, it
might well be a good thing to have 2 or 3 sound Somalis in the executive.
6. The Protectorate Government are also thinking of suggesting that, when the
arrangements for the next stage as eventually agreed between us are announced,
there should also be announced, as was done in Tanganyika, an intention to appoint
fairly soon thereafter a commission to start considering the next stage thereafter.
7. We all agreed that the need at the moment in the Protectorate was:—
(a) that there should be some change next year but that it should not be so radical
that there is any danger of our losing control of the government;
(b) that, whilst refusing to go too far next year, we should give an indication that
we were considering further advances at some future date; and
1 Sir T Pike, since 1954.
2 P Carrel, commissioner of Somali affairs, 1953–1959; chief secretary, 1959–1960.
3 J G S Drysdale, British liaison officer in Somaliland since 1955.
4 MP (Con) for SE Essex.
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(c) that we should undertake in 1959 no definite commitments about future advance
or about eventual union with Somalia, but should be ready to make fairly rapid
advances in both these respects if and when we are really satisfied that the inde-
pendent Somalia is both capable of existing as a country and reasonably friendly.
8. In my view the sort of proposals which the Protectorate authorities are
considering are well conceived to meet this situation. But we are in no way
committed and the Governor, when he has made up his mind on outstanding points,
will of course submit his proposals for the Secretary of State’s consideration.
9. The situation in regard to relations with the Ethiopians is, I am afraid, much less
satisfactory. The new Vice-Governor of Harar, though more ready to talk “off the record”
than his predecessor, is at least as determined to get control of the tribes, and shows no
sign of wishing to operate the 1954 Agreement in a friendly and co-operative manner.
He has told Mr. Drysdale off the record that there is no prospect whatsoever of the
Ethiopians ever agreeing to a list of Protectorate tribes which would be acceptable to
us. Mr. Drysdale is fairly certain that there will, within a month or two now, be another
challenge to the position of the Liaison Officers such as took place two years ago; and
he does not believe that on this occasion there is much hope of high-level intervention
leading to a détente, as it did in 1956 when you spoke to the then Foreign Minister.
10. None of us were any more able to think of any solution to this Haud problem
than we have been over the last 3 or 4 years. We were all agreed, however, that it was
better to put up with the strains caused by operating the 1954 Agreement rather than
to give up our rights under that Agreement, and leave the Somali tribes to the mercy
of the Ethiopians; and this was the best message we could think of giving Mr.
Drysdale to take back to his staff who, I gather, are a little apt to become depressed
and wonder where this whole business of the Haud is going to end.
11. The fundamental importance of the Haud has recently become a little
overlaid by the greater, immediate importance of aid to Somalia. But we must not let
it get forgotten, and I have arranged for the Governor to send us a despatch setting
out some of his worries for the future and, when it has been received, I will, if it
seems suitable, circulate it to the Official Africa Committee as the basis for a further
discussion of these matters there.
12. My hunch is that, whereas our own treaty obligations make it impossible for
us to find any solution to this problem, it may be easier for the Americans eventually
to take some fruitful initiative. I draw a crumb of comfort from the fact that the new
American Consul-General in Mogadishu, a Mr. Lynch, whom I met in Aden on his way
to take up his post, seemed to me to be a solid and sensible citizen. I told him that I
knew our authorities in the Protectorate would be very glad to welcome him at any
time and arranged for Sir T. Pike to ask him over when a decent interval had elapsed.
183 CO 1015/1923, no 10 16 Dec 1958
[Proposed policy in Somaliland and Aden]: minutes of Chiefs of Staff
Committee meeting (COS 102(58)1) on military and political
implications
The Committee considered a report by the Joint Planning Staff, examining two draft
Colonial Office papers entitled “Policy in the Somaliland Protectorate” and “Policy in
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Aden Colony and Protectorate”. The report showed the military implications of
political proposals for the Somaliland Protectorate and Aden.
A. Somaliland Protectorate
Lord Mountbatten1 said that the crux of the problem appeared to be one of timing.
Political advancement in the Somaliland Protectorate would inevitably lead to a
demand for advancement elsewhere, particularly in Aden. In view of the great
importance of Aden from the defence point of view, it was desirable that advancement
in Somaliland should not proceed more quickly than was absolutely essential.
Sir Dermot Boyle2 agreed, and said that since the Somaliland Protectorate was far
less politically advanced than Aden, it would have been expected, looking at the
matter objectively, that the granting of independence to the Somaliland Protectorate
would have followed that of Aden.
Sir Francis Festing3 said he agreed that from the military point of view there were
good grounds for delaying the grant of independence to the Somaliland Protectorate.
In his experience we acquired very little good will by voluntarily abdicating our
responsibilities in dependent territories; it was simply interpreted as weakness. This
was particularly true in the Middle East.
Mr. Gorell Barnes (Colonial Office) said there were three reasons why it had
become essential to grant independence to the Somaliland Protectorate in the near
future. Firstly, we had ceded, in 1897, one-third of the territory to Ethiopia and never
got it back. This precedent was the “Achilles’ heel” of our position. Secondly, whereas
we had developed Aden very considerably, and the inhabitants were multiracial, we
had created virtually nothing in Somaliland, where the population was almost
entirely of one race. Thirdly, the neighbouring territory of Somalia, a United Nations
protectorate administered by the Italians, was to be granted independence in 1960.
For these reasons the United Kingdom was compelled to move with the tide.
Although in the event subsequent negotiations for union with Somalia might be long
drawn out and even abortive, if we attempted to impose delay on the progress
towards independence, not only might it involve holding the country by force of
arms but it was likely that the U.A.R. would have an opportunity to make political
capital by espousing the cause of Somaliland.
He agreed that advancement in Somaliland would lead to increasing demand for
independence in Aden. Nevertheless, it had been estimated that such a demand would
arise in any case within a year and consequently we had not a great deal to lose.
Since the draft Colonial Office paper had been prepared, it had been decided that,
when the Colonial Secretary visited the Protectorate next February, he would not
include in his statement any specific date for the achievement of self-government,
nor would he make any promises as regards the implementation of proposals that
might be made for association between the Protectorate and Somalia.
B. Aden Colony and Protectorate
Lord Mountbatten said it must presumably be accepted that eventually independence
would be granted to Aden. When that occurred we would no longer be able to rely on
1 Chairman of COS Committee; first sea lord, 1955–1959; formerly last viceroy of India, 1947.
2 Marshal of the RAF, chief of air staff, 1955–1959.
3 F-M, chief of imperial general staff, 1958–1961.
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using it as a military base, in all circumstances, whatever treaty rights we might
enjoy. Obviously it was militarily desirable to retain our facilities as long as possible;
he was doubtful whether it would ever be practicable to use force in Aden to insist on
our defence rights. He believed that the Committee should now institute a study on
alternative means of supporting military operations in the Persian Gulf without the
use of Aden. Such an examination should be undertaken in the context of Part II of
the study on Middle East policy by the Official Committee on the Middle East. At the
same time the Committee’s view on policy in South West Arabia should be brought
up to date. When the study was completed it would then be possible for the
Committee to advise Ministers on the military consequences of the timing of political
advancement in Aden.
Sir Francis Festing said that during his visit to Aden he had been led to believe
that there was no pressure from within the colony itself for independence. He did not
see how it would be possible to evolve any strategy for the Persian Gulf which did not
involve the use of Aden. The security of our tenure in Aden had always seemed to him
to be more assured than almost any other colonial territory.
Mr. Gorell Barnes (Colonial Office) said that the Colonial Office were now inclined
to accept the proposals of the Governor for progressive steps towards independence.
The Governor advised that unless we did so we should antagonise the Arabs and drive
them into the arms of the U.A.R. and so in the end be forced out even sooner. The
situation had been adversely affected by the revolution in Iraq. There were obvious
dangers in the Governor’s proposals and the Colonial Office were carefully weighing
the arguments. There was less urgency in coming to a decision over Aden than there
was in the case of the Somaliland Protectorate and no decisions were likely to be
taken until the Colonial Secretary had visited the territory next February. The
Colonial Office would welcome the further advice of the Chiefs of Staff after they had
carried out the study suggested by the First Sea Lord. . . .
184 CAB 134/1557, CPC 16(58)1 22 Dec 1958
[Somaliland Protectorate]: minutes of a meeting of Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee, on policy
[At an earlier meeting of the Colonial Policy Committee (21 Nov 1958) Mr Lennox-Boyd
explained that the governor considered that he should announce that acceleration of
constitutional development was being considered: ‘The timing of this further
announcement would need careful examination, particularly in relation to the situation
in Aden, where the Governor had reached the conclusion that we should now reverse our
previous policy and allow the Colony to accede to the new Western Aden Federation,
when it was constituted if the leaders in both the Federation and the Colony so wished.
He was therefore anxious that no further announcement about the political and
constitutional future of British Somaliland should be made before the Western Aden
Federation had been established early in the following year. On the other hand it was
desirable that such an announcement, if approved, should, if possible, be made before the
middle of March, when elections were due to take place in Somaliland and a large part of
the population migrated to the Haud and the Reserved Areas for several months. The
content of the further announcement would also need very careful consideration. It was
the considered view of the Governor of Somaliland that, unless we were prepared publicly
to accept in principle a union between the Protectorate and Somalia after 1960, anti-
British feeling in Somaliland would become dangerously high. The Governors of our East
African territories recognised that a concession of this kind to Somali sentiment, coupled
with the accelerated constitutional advance in the Protectorate which it implied, would
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increase the difficulty of controlling the pace of constitutional development in East
Africa. But they regarded this risk as preferable to the emergency [sic] of a hostile
Somaliland, under Egyptian influence, in the near future’. The Committee agreed further
consideration was urgently required (CPC 14(58)).]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(58) 24) regarding our future policy in the Somaliland Protectorate.
The Colonial Secretary said that, in accordance with the Committee’s decision at
their last meeting, the Governor of the Protectorate had made a statement
announcing the introduction of an electoral system into the Protectorate
Government for the first time. He had also indicated that this step was designed to
prepare the way for further advances, on which he hoped to make a further
announcement before the end of March. The context of this further announcement
now required consideration.
The Protectorate was of little value to us, and the defence facilities which we
required there (mainly staging and overflying rights) were useless unless we could
retain similar facilities in Ethiopia and acquire corresponding facilities in Somalia.
The fact that Somalia was due to achieve independence in 1960 had given rise to a
demand in the Protectorate for union with that country in a Greater Somalia, and
the Governor was probably right in recommending that, in these circumstances,
the right policy for the United Kingdom Government to pursue as regards the
Protectorate was one of progressive disengagement. But both the timing and the
method of this process required careful consideration. While the Governor believed
that the forthcoming statement would only achieve its maximum impact if we
were to fix a date (e.g. 1962) by which the Protectorate would achieve full self-
Government, it might be wiser, and less damaging as regards our East African ter-
ritories, that no specific date should be mentioned at this stage. As regards the
method of disengagement the alternatives were to offer the Protectorate self-
Government or the prospect of some association with Somalia. The Governor felt
that nothing less would suffice than an unqualified undertaking that, at any time
after the end of 1960, we would, if Somalia and the Protectorate so wished, pro-
mote discussions between the two countries about the possibility of a closer associ-
ation between them. It might be preferable, however, to avoid too definite a
commitment on this point until it could be seen how an independent Somalia
developed. At the same time we should give private assurances to the Protectorate
Somalis that we should not stand in their way if, in due course, they wished to
associate with an independent Somalia. On these assumptions he proposed to
make, during his forthcoming visit to the Protectorate, the statement at Annex B
to C.P.C. (58) 24.
In discussion the following points were made—
(a) Need we, for the purposes of this statement, go beyond indicating that by
1960 there would be an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council and that
Somalis would be given executive responsibility in the Government? In the light of
our experience with other dependent territories, which we had guided to indepen-
dence, it might be inadvisable to encourage the Protectorate Somalis to advance
too rapidly to self-Government or to amalgamate with Somalia into a larger unit
which might subsequently seek to absorb those areas in Northern Kenya and
Ethiopia which were peopled by Somalis. On the other hand unless we made timely
concessions to the growing pressure for constitutional advance in the Protectorate
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we should face increasing hostility on the part of the local population; and the
Governors of our East African territories regarded this danger as less acceptable
than the risks inherent in an acceleration of the pace of constitutional advance in
the Protectorate. If we made it clear that self-Government (as distinct from inde-
pendence) was within the reach of the Protectorate Somalis, they were less likely to
adopt precipitate policies and might well prefer, on reflection, to remain to some
extent under our protection.
(b) It was important to retain the confidence of the Ethiopians, who were
potentially a more reliable barrier than the Somalis to Communist or Egyptian
expansion in Africa. It would therefore be desirable to discuss our intentions with the
Ethiopian Government in an endeavour to allay their suspicion that, by encouraging
the union of Somaliland with Somalia, we were threatening them with encirclement.
On the other hand, if the Somalis become aware of these discussions, they would
assume that we had been persuaded by the Ethiopians to adopt a less generous
attitude towards their own aspirations than we might otherwise have done; and from
this point of view it would be preferable to give the Ethiopian Government only a few
days advance warning of the forthcoming statement.
(c) It might be to our ultimate advantage to work towards a Greater Somalia
within the Commonwealth. It would be undesirable, however, to make any overt
move in this direction until Somalia attained independence in 1960.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that there appeared to be no
alternative to an advance in the constitutional status of British Somaliland; and in
these circumstances the Colonial Secretary’s proposals offered the best chance of
maintaining our interests in the area and of influencing the Protectorate Somalis in
the direction of retaining a link with the Commonwealth after attaining self-
Government. The draft statement at Annex B of C.P.C. (58) 24 could therefore be
approved in principle, subject to further examination of points of detail. It might, for
instance, be desirable to refer, in paragraph 6, to the end of the United Nations
trusteeship of Somalia rather than to the territory’s achieving independence. The
precise stage at which we should consult the Ethiopian Government required further
consideration; but we should give them a timely warning of our intentions in general
terms, in an attempt to convince them that it was in their own interests to recognise
that some form of association between the Protectorate and Somalia was inevitable,
and to press them to settle their frontier dispute with the Protectorate. It would be
helpful if such consultations were sponsored by the United States Government, who
provided substantial financial assistance to Ethiopia and were also committed to
provide economic assistance to an independent Somalia but were politically less
involved in the area than ourselves. . . .
185 CAB 128/34, CC 24(60)5 5 Apr 1960
[Somaliland Protectorate: future policy and independence]: Cabinet
conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Minister of State for Colonial
Affairs (C. (60) 65) about the future of the Somaliland Protectorate.
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The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs1 recalled that early in 1959 the Colonial
Secretary had announced that if, when Somalia attained independence, the
Legislative Council of British Somaliland resolved to effect some form of union with
that country, Her Majesty’s Government would be willing to arrange for negotiations
to take place. It had at that time been thought that the Italian trusteeship of Somalia
would not be brought to an end until December 1960, and that thereafter the
discussions necessary to effect union with the Protectorate could not be completed
until towards the end of 1962. Now, however, Somalia was to become independent on
1st July, 1960, and public opinion in the Protectorate had turned strongly in favour
of achieving both independence and union with Somalia on that date. A resolution
calling for immediate steps to that end was to be moved that day in the British
Somaliland Legislative Council. The Governor had reported that anything in the
nature of an official declaration that this time-table was impracticable would provoke
disturbances in the Protectorate which the local police and security forces could not
be relied on to handle. The Minister of State therefore proposed that the Governor’s
representative should be authorised to make, in the course of the debate in the
Legislative Council, a more forthcoming statement which would be tantamount to
agreeing that unofficial discussions between the Protectorate and Somalia might
begin at once.
In discussion serious misgivings were voiced about this proposal. Such a
statement would prejudice our relations with the Ethiopian Government, since we
had given them to understand that we would do nothing to promote union before
Somalia attained independence. It would also prejudice the relations between
Ethiopia and the successor State, to the serious detriment of the latter. The situation
would become even worse if the discussions on union were to lead to a joint
declaration in favour of the creation of a Greater Somalia embracing, not only
Somalia and the Protectorate, but also the Somali minorities in Ethiopia and Kenya.
Moreover, there were many complex problems to be solved before the Protectorate
could attain either independence or union with Somalia, and precipitate action could
lead to administrative and financial chaos. To accelerate constitutional advance in
British Somaliland under pressure of the kind which had developed would also have
unfortunate consequences in other dependent territories in Africa.
On the other hand, it was clearly desirable to avoid a situation in which law and
order could only be preserved by the transfer of British troops to the area. It might be
possible to reassure the Ethiopian Government by a statement in the United
Kingdom Parliament disclaiming any intention on the part of Her Majesty’s
Government to encourage or support any claim for incorporation in a wider Somali
union of any territory other than Somalia and the Protectorate.
Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that it was the general
feeling of the Cabinet that some concession must be made to the demand in
British Somaliland for independence and union with Somalia on 1st July. A state-
ment on behalf of the Governor should therefore be made in the Legislative
Council on the following day, to the effect that Her Majesty’s Government recog-
nised that the resolution of the Council was a clear expression of the wish of the
1 Lord Perth.
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people; that there were many practical problems to be settled before the
Protectorate could become independent and the Governor was willing to initiate
discussions about these at once; that union with Somalia would similarly give rise
to practical problems; that these were primarily a matter for the people of the
Protectorate themselves and if they wished to initiate preliminary, unofficial dis-
cussions with political leaders in Somalia, Her Majesty’s Government would not
prevent that. Thereafter it would be necessary to decide in the light of develop-
ments whether it would in fact be practicable to grant independence to the
Somaliland Protectorate on 1st July.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, in consultation with the Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs, to prepare, and submit for the Prime Minister’s
approval, the draft of a statement to be made in the Legislative Council of British
Somaliland on the lines agreed in the Cabinet discussion.
186 CAB 134/1559, CPC 4(60)1 27 Apr 1960
‘Constitutional development in Somaliland’: minutes of Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a note by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (60) 12) in
which it was suggested that at the forthcoming talks in London with elected
Somaliland Ministers we were likely to be confronted with a request to grant the
Somaliland Protectorate independence towards the end of June in order that an
independent government of the Protectorate could make formal arrangements for a
union with Somalia immediately after the Italian trusteeship of that territory came
to an end on 1st July, 1960. The Colonial Secretary would stress to the Somaliland
Ministers the difficulties of making arrangements for independence in such a short
time, but if nevertheless they continued to press for this date, he considered that we
should accept it rather than lose Somali goodwill and risk the development of a
situation in which it might be necessary to use British troops for the maintenance of
internal security. The memorandum went on to suggest the way in which particular
matters might be handled in the forthcoming talks.
Although some misgivings were expressed about the speed with which we were
withdrawing our protection from Somaliland, and in particular on the consequences
for overseas officers serving the Protectorate Government, there was general
agreement that in the last resort we should accede to a request for independence in
time to enable the Protectorate to link up with an independent Somalia on 1st July,
1960. The following were the main points made in discussion:—
(a) It seemed likely that the Protectorate would form two of eight provinces in a
new united Somalia. Although according to legal advice the government of the new
state would be the heir at law of the Anglo/Ethiopian Treaty of 1897, the
Anglo/Ethiopian Agreement of 1954 which related to grazing rights would lapse. If
these rights were to continue after independence it would be necessary for a new
agreement to be negotiated between the Ethiopian Government and the Government
of the new state.
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(b) We needed to secure overflying rights over the existing territory of the
Protectorate and of Somalia and we also wished to continue to use the B.B.C. relay
transmitter at Berbera. Such agreements would however have to be negotiated with
the Government of the new state. This might be no easy matter, though we should
endeavour to ensure that we were not committed to giving financial assistance to the
new state until we had secured the facilities we needed.
(c) It would be necessary to continue some financial aid to the new state, partly in
order to ensure that United States and Italian contributions were also continued. Our
aid should commence at not more than £1.422 millions per annum, and should taper
off over a maximum period of five years.
(d) We should make every effort to get the new Government to accept
responsibility for the payment of compensation and pensions to the overseas officials
who would be displaced, but it might be necessary for Her Majesty’s Government to
assume this responsibility, at any rate until the new Government was constituted.
Any payments by Her Majesty’s Government on this account would be set against the
figure of financial assistance to be agreed.
(e) It was of great importance that we should do all we could to preserve and
improve relations between the Ethiopian Government and the new Government of a
united Somalia. We should also try to associate the Italian Government with the
discussions and other arrangements which would be necessary before the union of
Somaliland and Somalia took place. We should stress to the Italians the need for
goodwill towards Somali aspirations and the dangers, if we failed to assist them, of
the new state being alienated from the West.
(f) We should not wish the new state to become a member of the Commonwealth,
and there was no indication at present that they would wish to apply for membership.
If the matter were raised by Somaliland Ministers at the forthcoming discussions, the
Colonial Secretary should say that the matter would be one for the Government of
the new state; he should in no way encourage the idea that we should be in favour of
such an association.1
Summing up the discussion, the Prime Minister said that in the last resort we
must agree to a demand by Somaliland Ministers for independence in order that the
Protectorate might link up with an independent Somalia on 1st July, 1960. If the
Government were to be criticised for withdrawing our protection so early we should
argue that the policy was entirely consistent with that adumbrated by the then
Colonial Secretary in his statement on 9th February, 1959; that our action was fully
in conformity with public opinion in the Protectorate; and that the timetable had
necessarily been advanced by the decision that Italian trusteeship of Somalia should
end on 1st July, 1960.
Subject to the points made in the Committee’s discussion the talks with
Somaliland Ministers should be handled on the lines suggested by the Colonial
Secretary. It would be important to keep closely in touch with the Governments of
other friendly countries, in particular the Italian and Ethiopian Governments, in
order to enlist their sympathy and goodwill for the creation of the union, to preserve
so far as possible Western influence in the area, and to prevent the new state from
falling under the influence of Egypt or the Soviet bloc. . . .
1 See next document.
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187 CAB 128/34, CC 34(60)5 2 June 1960
[Possible admission of Somali Republic to the Commonwealth]:
Cabinet conclusions
[When in January 1960 Macmillan heard that the US State Dept believed HMG should let
it be known that the entry of the Somali State to the Commonwealth was not
contemplated, he minuted: ‘I cannot agree to [this]. Why can’t the Commonwealth grow?
I must be consulted about this. H.M. 6.1.59’ (on tel from Sir H Caccia, PREM 11/2582).
But the Colonial Policy Committee were opposed to entry (see previous document); so
were the Chiefs of Staff—‘an unworthy little place’. Macmillan, however, continued to
favour the Somalis retaining some link with the Commonwealth.]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Foreign Secretary (C. (60) 91)
about the admission to membership of the Commonwealth of the new Somali
Republic which was to come into being on 1st July, when Somaliland and Somalia
united.
The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs1 said that the arguments against
admission of the new Somali Republic to the Commonwealth were very strong. It
would not for many years be a financially viable State but would be dependent on aid,
not only from ourselves but also from the United States and Italy. Its admission to
the Commonwealth would, moreover, antagonise the Ethiopians, the French and the
Italians, the last of whom had made it clear that in that event they would discontinue
their financial aid. While there was no evidence of any definite desire on the part of
the Somalis to join the Commonwealth, it would be embarrassing to have to refuse a
formal request if one should be made; and it was therefore proposed that the Consul-
General at Mogadishu and the Governor of Hargeisa should be instructed to adopt a
discouraging attitude if any informal approach were made to them.
In discussion it was suggested that, while admission of the new Somali Republic to
the Commonwealth might do something to counter Communist infiltration, the
reactions of the Ethiopian Government, who were already deeply suspicious of our
intentions, would be so hostile that they in turn would be likely to become more
subject to Russian influence. In view of the attitude of France and Italy, the balance
of advantage therefore lay on the side of discouraging any advances which the
Somalis might make, and our intention to do so should be made clear in strict
confidence to the other Governments concerned.
The Cabinet:—
Approved the proposals in C. (60) 91.
1 Mr D Ormsby-Gore, ambassador to Washington from 1961.
11-ConGov-Doc 100-187-cp  18/10/00  2:06 pm  Page 556
[188] 557
CHAPTER 5
Aden, Mediterranean, Asian, West Indian and
other colonies
Document numbers 188–299
188 CO 1015/1911, nos 4–6 27–28 Mar 1958
[Aden Colony and Protectorate: future policy]: letters from Sir W
Luce (Aden) to W L Gorell Barnes (CO) [Extract]
[In a further covering note to this (in effect) three-part letter, the governor emphasised
the ‘very serious threat’ to the whole British and western position in Arabia, Red Sea, and
Horn of Africa: the loss of that position to the Soviet Union or Egypt would ‘create a new
threat of great magnitude to our wider interests’; an urgent and thorough reappraisal was
necessary. Gorell Barnes described the letter(s) as ‘important, long and rather
shattering’.]
I. 27 Mar 1958
The almost bewildering series of changes which have taken place in the political
structure of the Middle East during the last two or three years, the gathering
momentum of Arab nationalism towards the goal of reuniting the Arab world, the
shifting pattern of relations between the Arab States themselves and the strong
interest which the Soviet Union and its satellites are displaying in them have
inevitably had an unsettling effect on Aden and its Protectorate as also on the
neighbouring territories with which Great Britain has ties of interest or obligation.
The threat occasioned by these changes seems to me to make a reappraisal of our
position urgently necessary in order that we may consider the shaping of our policy
to meet the new situation.
2. In this letter I propose to set down my assessment of the present situation and
in a second and accompanying letter to suggest in general terms how best we should
meet it. A third letter will contain a specific proposal for action which I believe to be
essential if our position is not to suffer an immediate and severe deterioration.
3. Before passing to the wider issue, it may be convenient to sum up the present
policy of H.M.G. towards the Colony and Protectorate and the external forces which
at present it has to face. In brief the policy is to retain control of the Colony for the
foreseeable future in order to protect H.M.G.’s strategic and economic interests. To
achieve this we must also maintain our position in the Protectorate to enable us to
hold the Yemen at a safe distance from the Colony borders, and to fulfil our treaty
obligations to the Protectorate Rulers.
4. In the Colony we are following the normal pattern of gradual constitutional
development and H.M.G. have declared that this process will continue up to “a
considerable degree of internal self-government”. It would however be idle to assume
that the Colony Arabs will be content to stop anywhere short of full self-government
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 557
558 OTHER COLONIES [188]
and thereafter self-determination. It would be equally idle to assume that having
reached that point they would choose to be fully self-governing within the
Commonwealth. Nothing seems less likely than that outcome, whatever some
members of the Aden Association may say at the present time. The pull of pan-
Arabism will be far too strong. It is my estimate that the “considerable degree of
internal self-government” envisaged by H.M.G. will be reached at the beginning of
1963, with some further constitutional advance at the end of the four-year life of the
new Legislative Council. Thereafter it might be possible to hold the position for a
further 3 or 4 years, but in the face of a growing demand for full self-government and
self-determination. To retain control of the Colony after 1967 will in my view involve
a head-on collision with Aden Arabs, their physical repression and probably a
constitutional breakdown. It is quite possible that such a situation will arise before
1967 if the local situation is subjected to strong external influences and if the Colony
Arabs see no prospect but an indefinite continuation of British control.
5. In the Protectorate we have inherited a somewhat precarious position which
deprives us of any effective control over the conduct of its internal affairs and which
rests primarily upon the extreme indigence of most of the States and their dire need
for financial assistance and upon their fear of being subjected to the tyrannical rule
of the Zeidi Imam of the Yemen and their consequent desire for our protection.
There is no political or economic cohesion among the States, most of which are
primitive tribal autocracies riven by rivalries, feuds and jealousies. A small but
ambitious intelligentsia based on Lahej is hand-in-glove with Egypt and is prepared
to use the Yemen, in the pursuit of its own interests. For nearly forty years the
British position in the Protectorate has been challenged by the Imam of the Yemen
and in the past four years he has greatly increased his efforts to achieve his ambition
of domination over the Protectorate, mainly by means of subversion of Protectorate
tribes, and has constantly proclaimed his intentions with growing candour. In these
four years there has been a steady decline in security in the Protectorate, particularly
the western area; more and more rifles are being pumped in by the Yemen, some
road communications are permanently cut and others are highly precarious, the
public are being severely inconvenienced and development is being hampered. We
ourselves have been forced to hand out large numbers of rifles to enable Rulers to
hold the loyalty of their tribes, and our security forces are having to undertake
increasing commitments both on the frontier and within the Protectorate.
6. In these circumstances the Rulers and their people are beginning to wonder
what is to be the end of it all, and to feel that matters cannot be allowed to go on
deteriorating in this manner. In seeking a solution, and being Arabs, the thoughts of
many will turn, faute de mieux, towards the attractions of a wider Arab World and in
particular towards the glamour of Nasser1 and his star. The Protectorate’s growing
reliance on British protection against the Imam’s designs will become an increasing
embarrassment to its Rulers and people, particularly in the face of intense
propaganda from Cairo.
7. These are the basic features, as I see them, of the political situation in Colony
and Protectorate. They indicate a growing threat to the retention of our control of
the Colony in the years to come. But within the past twelve months new factors have
1 Gamal Abdel Nasser, president of Egypt, 1956–1970. In 1958 he created a federation with Syria, the
United Arab Republic (UAR), but Syria withdrew in 1961.
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greatly increased this threat. First, there is the supply of Russian arms to the Yemen
since May, 1957, followed by rapid political and economic penetration. Secondly
there is the formation of the United Arab Republic and the Yemen’s federation with
it. The Russian advent on the Yemen scene can only be regarded as the latest move in
Russia’s present main assault on the Western Powers—the drive to the South
through the heart of the Middle East, towards Africa and the Persian Gulf. The
association of the Yemen with the U.A.R. is a major advance in Nasser’s campaign for
Arab unity under the leadership of Egypt. For the present Russia’s and Egypt’s aims
are sufficiently in common for each to make the maximum use of the other; both
wish to destroy the Western position in the Middle East and both wish to penetrate
Africa. In pursuing these aims both will make use of the Yemen’s ambitions in south-
west Arabia, and it is Aden which will feel the first impact of the Russian/Egyptian
drive to the South. In addition to the long-standing but limited threat from the
Yemen, we are now faced with a double threat of great magnitude.
8. I am the first to recognise the instability of the Arab world and its politics, and
the rifts which divide the present rulers of the Arab States. But in my view it would
be the greatest mistake to continue to rely indefinitely on these factors to protect us
from the accomplishment of Nasser’s aims. Whatever we may think of Arab
nationalism and its leaders, there is no gainsaying that it does represent a deepseated
emotional urge in the rank-and-file of the Arab peoples, and to the Arab emotion is
the strongest of all motives. However unrealistic and unstable the U.A.R. and its
federation with the Yemen may appear to us, there is no doubt that it has caught the
imagination of Arabs generally and has enhanced Nasser’s prestige as the
embodiment of a vague longing for Arab unity. By contrast the federation of Iraq and
Jordan is regarded as a defensive move by two monarchs to protect their personal
position. Nasser is now in a stronger position to appeal over the heads of the
monarchs to the people and to dissatisfied elements among the ruling classes and in
the trial of strength which is now clearly beginning, the monarchs may be hard put
to it to maintain their position. Saud2 would appear to have become a back number
already. On the other hand, as you already know, I consider that neither Russia’s nor
Egypt’s position in the Yemen is yet secure and that prompt and effective action on
the lines I have proposed elsewhere could at least check their plans. But the sands are
running out and in the absence so far of any decision on my proposals, I am
assuming for present purposes that Russia and Egypt will be able within the next few
months to consolidate their hold on the Yemen sufficiently to discourage or to deal
with any serious spontaneous uprising among the Yemenis.
9. On the above assumption, my own assessment of the likely course of events is
that Russia and Egypt will lend strong diplomatic support to the Imam in his claims
on the Protectorate and Colony, will open a violent propaganda campaign appealing
to Arab nationalism in south-west Arabia against British “imperialism”, will supply
the Imam with additional means to increase his subversive activities and will make
the maximum use of our extreme nationalists, such as the Jifris, to embarrass our
position.3 But for the time being I believe they are likely to try to restrain the Imam
from over-provocative actions against the Protectorate frontier or serious sabotage
2 King of Saudi Arabia, 1953–1964.
3 The Jifris were a ruling family, violently anti-British, who were especially influential in the Lahej,
Haushabi and Alawi states.
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and terrorist activities in the Colony for fear that we shall strike back at the Yemen
really hard (I wish I could believe that their fears are justified) before they have
completed their preparations for their next move. The preparations I have in mind
are such as the construction of a harbour at Ras el Khatib, the construction of an
airfield and probably other military installations in the Bab el Mandeb area, the
improvement of other airfields and communications and a considerable build-up of
their military strength in the Yemen, including of course aircraft. When those
preparations have been made they will be in virtual control of the Red Sea and will be
ready both to put extreme pressure on our position in Aden and to exploit the
opportunity offered by Somalia’s independence in 1960 to penetrate the Horn of
Africa. If in the meantime Saudi Arabia, as now appears most likely, has joined the
“glorious Egyptian caravan” then there will also be of course a severe threat to our
oil interests in the Persian Gulf, which would be extended to the Eastern Aden
Protectorate were oil to be found there.
10. To sum up, as I see it, Aden is in the grip of four powerful currents in the tide
of world affairs. One is the evolution of the Colonial Empire from dependence to inde-
pendence, either within or outside the Commonwealth, the second is Arab national-
ism, the third is the decline of British power and the fourth is Russian expansionism.
All these currents flow towards the same point, that is to say, the termination of
British control in Aden. To swim against one would be hard enough, to swim against
all four is, I firmly believe, beyond our strength. By fighting Arab nationalism we shall
facilitate Russian expansionism. If we could rely on Aden as a secure base from which
to resist the Russian advance into the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea area, that would
be a very strong argument for entrenching ourselves here indefinitely. But as it is,
Arab ambitions constitute the more immediate threat to our position and by resisting
them indefinitely we shall present Russia with the simplest means of furthering her
own aims. Our aim should rather be to enlist Arab nationalism against Russian
expansionism. Some would say that this is impracticable because anti-Westernism,
and anti-Britishism in particular, is an essential component of Arab nationalism.
Nevertheless, I believe that the Arab world will become aware of the dangers of
Russian imperialism, but only when we have removed the main source of antagonism
between ourselves and the Arabs, namely the remains of British political power in the
Middle East. This seems to me to be also the inescapable conclusion to which we are
carried by the third current I have mentioned above, the decline of British power in
the post-war years. Those years have seen our surrender of the Palestine mandate, our
withdrawal from Jordan and the Sudan and our evacuation of the Suez Canal base.
Whatever the reasons for each of these acts we have set in motion a process of aban-
doning British power in the Middle East and any attempt to arrest it in its last stage
will merely bring us the worst of both worlds. We shall deprive ourselves of any long
term benefits which may accrue from making a virtue of necessity by finally exorcis-
ing British “imperialism” from the hearts of Arabs, and we shall be involved in a mili-
tary effort which will rapidly become out of all proportion to the issues at stake and
which will, in my view, end in disaster.
II. 28 Mar 1958 (1)
In my letter of yesterday’s date, I attempted to set forth my views on the new
situation which we have to face in the Middle East today and its implications for our
position in Aden Colony and Protectorate. I concluded that all the forces and trends
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ranged against us point in one direction, the termination of British control of Aden.
In this letter I propose to consider the policy we should adopt to meet this situation.
There appear to me to be three possible courses and these I will now examine briefly
in turn.
2. The first is to hold to the present policy of retaining control indefinitely of
Aden Colony and, consequentially, of maintaining our status in the Protectorate, in
other words to dig in and defend our position, come what may. We must recognise
that, if this course is taken, not only shall we be faced with growing military, political
and propaganda pressures from outside but also the ground on which we stand will
become progressively insecure. Not only will the Colony Arabs become increasingly
restive but we shall lose the confidence of our best friends in the Protectorate. For, as
I pointed out in my despatch No. 1909 of 11th December, 1956, federation and its
long-term consequences are not compatible with indefinite retention of British
control of the Colony; we should therefore have to reject federation to which our
firmest allies among the Rulers are beginning to attach so much importance. In
these circumstances we should be faced with growing military commitments, both to
meet the mounting threat from outside and to suppress increasing opposition within
both Colony and Protectorate. The strain on the loyalty of our Arab forces would
become intense and we should have to rely more and more heavily on British troops
whose presence would in turn only aggravate the situation. Apart from its cost, such
a policy appears to me to be utterly bankrupt. As the security situation deteriorated
so the strategic and economic value of Aden Colony to H.M.G. would decrease, and in
the end there could be only one of two results; either we would be defeated or we
would voluntarily abdicate our responsibilities. In either case we should do immense
damage to our prestige, and in the process of holding on to the bitter end we should
have given Russia and Egypt the opportunity to strengthen their hold on the Middle
East and would have done untold harm to our interests in other parts of the Arab
world.
3. The second possibility is a very early withdrawal. I am well aware that the
rising cost of maintaining our position in the Protectorate and the possibility that
soon the defence of the Colony itself may add an extra burden to H.M.G. might in the
face of H.M.G.’s present economic difficulties make such a proposal superficially
attractive, but it is to me unthinkable that we should ever thus abrogate our
responsibilities and indeed our solemn engagements. Not only would we be breaking
faith, not to mention treaties, with our friends in the Protectorate by leaving them an
open prey to the wolves at the door and also be guilty of an act of ingratitude towards
the Colony from which H.M.G. has derived immense advantages for over a hundred
years but we should also be ruining any chance of retaining our economic interests
in the Arabian world, especially in the Persian Gulf, where the last remnants of our
prestige would be lost. I cannot conceive that H.M.G. would ever countenance such
an act of despair.
4. We are left therefore with the third course of action which is to embark on a
policy of gradual disengagement from our position in south-west Arabia, with the
object of strengthening our friends in both Colony and Protectorate during the
period of disengagement and of replacing thereafter our political power by a new
relationship more in keeping with modern trends and with the realities of the
situation.
5. It is my view that we should aim to complete this disengagement within a
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period of about ten years, recognising that the timing of the process must be flexible
if we are to secure the maximum political advantage from the policy. During that
period we should do our utmost to build up a successor State covering both Colony
and Protectorate to which we could transfer power and which would have a
reasonable chance of determining its own future status. We should have to set up
political institutions to which the responsibilities of government could be
progressively handed over and through which, at the appropriate time, the future
status of the territories could be decided. To ensure that this decision was reasonably
free it would be necessary to maintain and develop as far as is practicable the
economic assets and the social services of the territories, and to provide them with
adequate defence forces.
6. To deal first with the Colony, we are already following the normal process of
constitutional development on parliamentary democratic lines and the main
requirement of a policy of disengagement would be recognition that the process will
not stop short at “a considerable degree of internal self-government” but will
continue up to full self-government and thereafter self-determination. At the same
time it would be necessary to urge on the training of Adenese for Government service
and commercial employment, including employment with the Port Trust, and to
make arrangements for closer association between the Adenese and the directorate of
the oil refinery. Steps have, in fact, already been taken to set all these processes in
motion. At the same time we should aim to encourage and support those Arabs
whose open or secret views coincide with our own.
7. In the case of the Protectorate the situation is much more difficult and
complex, owing to difference of views and aims among the Rulers, and the lack of any
political cohesion in the Protectorate as a whole. Nevertheless the recent revival of
interest in federation and the approach of three of our closest friends among the
rulers in the matter seem to me to afford an opportunity which we should and must
take to offer to the Rulers and peoples of the Protectorate a goal of unity and eventual
independence which would do much to dissipate the doubt and frustration which has
spread over the land in recent years. My reasons for this belief and my
recommendations regarding the steps which should be taken form the subject of a
further letter.
8. But before concluding this letter it is obviously necessary to consider the
effects of the policy I am advocating on H.M.G.’s strategic and economic interests in
Aden which hitherto have been held to require indefinite retention of control of the
Colony.
(a) Strategic interests
(i) As I understand it, Aden’s chief importance from this aspect is as a support
base for the protection of British oil interests in the Persian Gulf. This is of
course a matter outside my own particular sphere, but I would venture to
suggest that the concept of military action to ensure the flow of oil from Kuwait
is rapidly becoming outworn and unrealistic. Leaving aside the possibility of a
major war with Russia, it seems to me that the danger to our Persian Gulf oil
supplies is far more likely to arise from political nationalist considerations than
from any overt military threat. In other words, I find it difficult to envisage a
situation in which H.M.G. will actually implement their plans for large-scale
reinforcement of the Persian Gulf area. We did not fight the Persians for Abadan
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in 1951 and it seems most unlikely that we should fight the Arabs for Kuwait,
particularly after a further decade has elapsed. I would suggest that the future
security of our oil supplies must depend on diplomacy and on self-adaptation by
the oil companies to changing conditions rather than on military action,
bearing in mind that the oil-producing countries are unlikely to want to kill
once and for all the goose that lays the golden egg.
(ii) A further strategic interest in Aden is that it forms a link in the chain of
Commonwealth air communications. I am not qualified to say how important
this factor is likely to be in ten years time, but it does not appear impossible that
within that period an alternative route further south across the Indian Ocean
will become usable by transport aircraft. So far as civil airlines are concerned, I
see no reason to assume that Aden would not remain available as an
international airport whatever status the territory might acquire after the
transfer of power.
(iii) From the naval point of view Aden has no base or dockyard facilities and its
usefulness is limited to bunkering services.
(b) Economic interests
(i) The oil bunkering service provided by Aden port for British shipping is
presumably the most important economic interest. There is no reason to
assume that a successor State in Aden would wish to destroy deliberately its
most valuable asset, though the efficiency of the port might decline and there
might be a tendency for shipping gradually to seek alternative ports. The danger
that port facilities at Aden might at some time after the transfer of power be
denied to British shipping for political reasons is in my view of no great
importance for if an Arab State of south-west Arabia has taken such action it
seems unlikely that the Suez Canal would at the same time be open to British
shipping. As experience has shown, Aden is only important to shipping in
relation to the Suez Canal.
(ii) A second economic interest is the oil refinery at Little Aden.4 I understand
that considered purely as a commercial enterprise, some of the existing
installations will have completed their useful economic life within the period of
ten years which I have in mind. Thereafter considerable capital expenditure
would be required to give the refinery a new lease of life. From the limited
viewpoint of British Petroleum’s interests, the refinery would therefore probably
become expendable without undue loss within a period of ten years. On the
other hand, the removal of the refinery would reduce to some extent the value of
Aden as a bunkering port and would be a considerable blow to the economy of
the territory; moreover, it would be politically undesirable to demonstrate such
lack of confidence in the future of Aden. Provided that steps are taken during
the next few years to associate Adenese closely with the refinery at both the
technical and directorate levels (and this is already British Petroleum’s policy), I
see no reason why the refinery should not continue to operate usefully and
profitably even if British political control were withdrawn.
(iii) Thirdly, there are general British commercial interests to consider. In the
past the entrepôt trade of Aden has been an important source of wealth to a num-
4 See map on p 567.
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ber of British firms and British banks in Aden have profited considerably from
such transactions. Aden’s importance as a trading centre has, however, already
decreased and it now seems clear that Yemeni economy will be tied more and
more to Egypt and the Soviet bloc and indeed there are already reports that
Egyptian banks are to open up in that country and that a paper currency is to
replace the existing Yemeni and Maria Theresa dollars. Whatever future prospects
may be, experience elsewhere has shown that the transfer of power to dependent
territories does not necessarily mean that commercial interests are seriously
damaged, provided that firms are prepared to adapt themselves to changing con-
ditions and to give local people the greatest possible opportunity of employment.
From the point of view of trade with the United Kingdom, apart from the
products of the oil refinery, Aden is of little significance. The total value of
imports from the United Kingdom in 1957 was about £8 million and of exports
to the United Kingdom (other than petroleum products) about £11⁄2 million.
9. My conclusion from the considerations in the foregoing paragraph is that the
relinquishment of control of Aden Colony within the next decade would not have
such an effect on British strategic and economic interests as to make it preferable to
retain control indefinitely in spite of all the difficulties and dangers inherent in such
a policy.
III. 28 Mar 1958 (2)
. . . 3. . . . [T]here is now a strong desire among our most friendly Rulers to form a
federal organisation which will lead eventually to independence, and this desire has
been expressed officially in very general terms. . . . My and my advisers’ reaction to
this is that we cannot possibly afford not to support and encourage this desire,
particularly in view of the quarter from which it comes. When federation was last
under active discussion two years ago, the Rulers were told that it was up to them to
make the next move and we ourselves deliberately put the proposal into cold storage
in the belief that federation would mean the eventual break-away of the Protectorate
from our control and would therefore jeopardise our future position in the Colony
(My despatch No. 1909 of 11th December, 1956). But since then times have changed
and we are now faced with the situation described in my previous letter. In these
circumstances I believe that federation now offers the best hope of retaining our
influence in the Protectorate for a number of years to come, and thus enable
constitutional development to self-government and self-determination to proceed as
peacefully as possible. Its rejection will mean a serious discouragement to our friends
and a rapid further deterioration in the Protectorate which would reveal the full
precariousness of our position and might quite possibly make it untenable.
4. . . . [I]t is quite clear that we cannot hope at present to obtain any form of
political cohesion in the Protectorate as a whole; the approach must be empirical.
The group of States [consisting of Audhali, Beihan and Fadhli] clearly offers the most
favourable foundation on which to build and it is from this group that the initiative
has now sprung.
5. To give a federal organisation the greatest possible chance of success and of
attracting wide support, we must in my opinion be guided from the beginning by the
following principles, which conform generally with the views of its three chief
sponsors:—
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(a) The federal organisation must be a reality and not merely a façade; in
particular it must not appear to be perpetuating the present situation under a new
guise, but must be seen to be a major advance towards a new relationship between
H.M.G. and the Protectorate. To this end H.M.G. should be prepared to enter into
new treaty relations with the federal organisation. . . .
(b) The federal organisation must be given teeth, both to defend its territory from
aggression and to maintain internal security. All the emphasis at present is on the
protection of the Protectorate and the maintenance of internal security by British
forces; this total dependence on British aid is becoming an increasing embarrass-
ment to the Rulers and makes them highly vulnerable to hostile propaganda. Our
aim in future should be to shift the emphasis to enabling the Rulers and people of
the Protectorate to do this as far as possible for themselves through the federal
organisation, with British support in the background if required. . . .
(c) It must be made clear that H.M.G. will in future put their money, both
metaphorically and literally, on the federal organisation, as earnest of their deter-
mination to bring about a new relationship with the Protectorate, and also of course
in order to encourage as many States as possible to join the federation. . . . I must
emphasise here that the federal organisation will require substantial financial assis-
tance from H.M.G. if it is to become firmly established and to enlarge its scope in
the future. To what extent this financial assistance might exceed H.M.G.’s existing
expenditure on the Protectorate plus the additional funds mentioned above could
only be determined in the light of detailed discussion with the sponsors of the fed-
eration scheme. I can only say at this stage that the total cost to H.M.G. of building
up an effective federation is likely to be very much less than the cost of the British
security forces which would in my view be required to maintain our position indef-
initely on the present basis if the policy of digging in to which I referred in para-
graph 2 of my letter of 28th March, 1958, were forced upon us. . . .
6. I realise that the proposals I am putting forward are drastic, but in my view this
is a time for bold measures. I do not suggest even so that it will be easy to launch a
federation on these lines; on the contrary the process will be fraught with difficulties.
There will be many problems in determining the precise form of the federal organisa-
tion and in negotiating H.M.G.’s relations with it and the degree of financial assistance
to be given to it. But the greatest difficulty will come from the Imam of the Yemen
who took the strongest exception to the original federation proposals, and it was on
that account that he increased his activities against the Protectorate in 1954. It is
known that the Imam has already reacted violently on hearing of the revival of the idea
of federation by the Sherif of Beihan and the Audhali Sultan, whom he regards as his
arch-enemies in the Protectorate, and that he has enlisted the Jifri family, with the
Sultan of Lahej in their wake, to sabotage it by all possible means. In this the Jifris will
also have the backing of their friends and paymasters the Egyptians. I would therefore
expect that during the formative period we shall have increased trouble from the
Yemen and from its friends within the Protectorate. . . .
8. In spite however of the difficulties of bringing about this federation and of the
almost certain need for further financial aid from H.M.G. I am firmly convinced that
we must not let this opportunity slip of encouraging our friends in their aspirations.
Indeed the eventual success of the federation and the consequent ability of the future
State to stand on its own feet or make what terms it will with other entities are
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probably of less immediate importance than the psychological and emotional impact
which would be created by a definite announcement from H.M.G. that they were
working for the eventual independence of the Protectorate States in a form which
would enable them to take their rightful place in the comity of nations. With such a
declaration behind them our friends in the Protectorate would be able to show their
peoples that they were not “lackeys of imperialism” endeavouring to maintain
Britain’s position in the Protectorate for their own immediate selfish ends but were
leading them to an honourable future in the Arab world, with the disinterested help
of that power which had long been their protector.
9. . . . I trust I have made it clear that there is little time to be lost if we are to
avoid a very serious situation in the Protectorate and Colony, and that it is most
important that we should not discourage our friends by appearing to drag our feet. I
therefore should be grateful if the earliest possible consideration may be given to
these proposals and if I may be authorised to discuss them in detail with the three
Rulers mentioned and with any others who may indicate their sympathetic interest.
In my letter of 28th March, 1958, I have made it clear that in my opinion the only
course to be followed is that of gradual disengagement in the process of which the
formation of a federation such as that described above would be essential. I rejected
two alternatives but I would emphasise here that those are the only two alternatives
that I can envisage and it is unrealistic to suppose that we shall be able to continue as
at present without adjusting our policies to meet changed circumstances.
189 CO 1015/1911, no 20 14 Apr 1958
[Aden: future policy]: letter (reply) from W L Gorell Barnes to Sir W Luce
You will already have gathered from the Secretary of State’s telegram No. 215 of the
5th April that we have been getting on as fast as we possibly can with consideration of
your three very important letters to me of 27th and 28th March about future policy
in Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate. You will realise that it is bound to be a
little longer before either we in the Colonial Office or H.M.G. as a whole can reach a
considered view on your proposals. They have, however, already been given
preliminary consideration both in this Department and at a first meeting of all the
Departments in Whitehall concerned with south-west Arabia and the Persian Gulf,
and I think it may help you if I let you know what first reactions have been.
2. We are very glad that you have not hesitated to set out in such fullness and with
such lucidity your views of the developing position in the Arab world and your sug-
gestions regarding the policy which, in the light of those developments, it seems to
you best for us to follow in Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate. Some of us have
a feeling that, as is perhaps inevitable in a re-appraisal of this kind, you may possibly
have over-simplified some of your assessments of feelings, intentions and probable
developments in the Middle East, and I do not think that everyone in Whitehall would
think it realistic to regard diplomacy and military potential in any area as quite as sep-
arable as is perhaps suggested in paragraph 8 of your second letter. Again, whilst no
one here would like to prophesy how things are likely to turn out, the Foreign Office
are far less certain than you appear to be about the likely trend of developments in
Saudi Arabia or even in the Yemen. Nor would they agree with the thesis in your second
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letter that the policy followed in 1951 at Abadan, which is undoubtedly foreign terri-
tory, necessarily implies that H.M.G. would never use force to protect their vital oil
interests in Persian Gulf territories under British protection.
3. What I have said in the preceding paragraph is not said by way of criticism of
your general analysis. All I wish to suggest is that the future trend of events in the
Arab world may be rather less certain than anyone attempting to prophesy is bound
to appear to think it is.
4. Against this background, there is a slight difference of emphasis, though not I
think more than that, in the approach of most of us here to the problems of future
policy in Aden Colony and the Aden Protectorate. You suggest that we should adopt a
definite policy of disengagement and, whilst retaining flexibility, should have in our
own minds a period of about 10 years as the period during which we may expect to
stay in Aden. We would agree with you that it is almost certainly unrealistic to
believe that we can stay indefinitely. On the other hand, some of us here think that, if
we play our cards rightly, it is possible that, when it comes to actions rather than
words, responsible Arabs both in the Colony and the Protectorate may let their
material interests outweigh their emotions for rather longer than that; and that in
any case, if we once get into the state of mind that we shall be out in 10 years, then
we are likely in fact to be out in 2 or 3; for, whatever their material interests, even the
responsible people are not likely to back us once they think we are on the way out. To
the general problem, therefore, our approach can perhaps be defined thus. Our aim
should still be not to get out within a specified period but to stay as long as we can
without forfeiting the goodwill of the responsible elements in the population. We
should, however, adapt our tactics from time to time so as to be sure of not forfeiting
that goodwill or making it impossible for responsible people to show it in their
actions, if not always in their words.
5. To turn now from the general to the particular, we do not think that this slight
difference of approach affects at all significantly our attitude to the views you have
expressed about policy in the Protectorate. In view of the developments you have
described in your letters, it seems clear that, if we do not make a positive response to
the approach you have received from the three Rulers most friendly to us, they will
be bound to make their peace with Nasser or the Yemen, or both; and that
consequently the position now is that encouragement of the movement towards
federation which they have initiated is likely to have the ultimate effect of making it
possible for us to stay longer in Aden Colony than would failure to encourage it. It is
difficult to be more specific than this before we receive the two annexes to your letter
No. [3] of the 28th March, and, before final decisions are reached, we shall certainly
need to know both what you think the financial cost will be and at what stage you
would expect the Levies and the Government Guards to go over to the proposed
federation, and, if at that stage the federation did not cover all the Protectorate
States, what you would propose to do about the security of the remaining
Protectorate States. We shall also wish to give further consideration to the exact line
which should be taken, both in private with the Rulers concerned and in public,
about the ultimate objective for the proposed federation. We accept that it will
almost certainly be essential to acknowledge that at some time or other such a
federation may look to becoming independent. On the other hand, we are disposed to
think that it is very important that any statements on this subject should be so
worded as to make it impossible for agitators and other ill-wishers to put it about
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that we are on the way out; and in this connection we are glad to note the pretty
cagey wording used by the three Rulers in the third paragraph of their letter of the
21st February to you.
6. I now turn to the question of the future of Aden Colony. We agree with you
that we cannot expect to maintain control of the Colony indefinitely and that, if a
federation is successfully launched in the Protectorate with independence as an
ultimate objective, it seems very likely that sooner or later an irresistible demand will
grow up for the inclusion of the Colony in the federation, at any rate when it
ultimately becomes independent. We therefore also agree that we should be wise in
future to avoid statements suggesting that we intend to hold on to the Colony
forever, or even “for the foreseeable future”. On the other hand, we are doubtful
about the wisdom of getting the idea fixed even in our own minds that we shall be
out of the Colony at the end of a predetermined period, be that period 10 years or
some other period; for the Colony certainly could not stand on its own feet as an
independent State. Consequently, until we are sure that a federation has been
successfully launched in the Protectorate, we think it would be a very big gamble to
set ourselves a definite limit for our control of the Colony. We would be even more
dubious about any proposal to state publicly in present circumstances that we are
planning for the independence of the Colony, much less that we are planning for that
independence within a specified period. Clearly we must continue with the policy you
are so successfully following of helping the Colony to progress by stages towards
internal self-government as rapidly as it is capable of progressing. As regards any
target beyond that, if it is really essential to say anything at all, could we not say that
we do not regard internal self-government as necessarily the end of the road, but that
we consider it is too early, and conditions are too uncertain, to say now in what
direction, if any, it will thereafter be in the interests of the inhabitants of the Colony
for the Colony to march further forward?
7. As I explained at the beginning of this letter, which has not been submitted to
Ministers, these are very preliminary thoughts and may of course be subject to much
modification when we have received the annexes to your second letter, and when
study of your proposals both in the Colonial Office and in the other Departments
concerned has progressed further. We will write to you again as soon as we can.
Meanwhile, if you have any views on what I have said in this letter, please do not
hesitate to send them to me.
8. One further point, and that an urgent one. I realise that, for a particular
reason, you may be very anxious to say something quickly either to the three friendly
Rulers or publicly about future policy in the Protectorate. If, in the light of this very
preliminary expression of our views, you think there is anything you can usefully do
along these lines, I suggest that you should telegraph us a draft on which we would
attempt to let you have the Secretary of State’s views with the greatest possible speed.
You will, however, realise that it would be bound to take some time to get a decision
on any draft which involved further commitments on finance.1
1 After his visit to Aden, Gorell Barnes reported to S of S (14 May 1958), saying he was ‘much encouraged
. . . we have a chance of turning the tide & checking Nasser’s ambitions in this part of the world. . . . We
shall, I’m sure, be unable to maintain the Colony as a colony indefinitely. Its future lies neither in
perpetual colonial status nor in independence as an isolated unit, but in some form of closer association
with the Western, & perhaps also eventually the Eastern Protectorate, & possibly, though this is for the
F.O, even Muscat & beyond’ (CO 847/74, no 11).
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190 CAB 134/1557, CPC 10(58) 19 June 1958
[Policy for Aden Protectorate]: minutes of a Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(58) 12) proposing that Her Majesty’s Government should accede to the proposal of
the friendly Rulers in the Western Aden Protectorate for the formation of a federation
with which Her Majesty’s Government would enter into a treaty relationship and to
which they would give military and financial support.
The Colonial Secretary recalled that in March 1956 Her Majesty’s Government had
suggested the possibility of federation to the Rulers of the Aden Protected States, but
that it had not been thought desirable in any way to press this possibility and we had
since concentrated more upon a policy of social and economic development. Those
Rulers in the Western Protectorate who were most friendly to us had however
themselves now taken an initiative in the direction of federation, believing that this
would best serve to strengthen them against Yemeni pressure and, by offering their
people a better future, enable them to contain the anti-Western influences of Arab
nationalism in their States. Three of the Rulers concerned were now in this country
and the fourth would be arriving shortly, and a formal expression of Her Majesty’s
Government’s views was due to be given to them on 29th June. The proposals in
C.P.C. (58) 12 had been agreed with the Foreign Secretary and the Minister of
Defence, but discussions with the Treasury had not yet been concluded. It was
difficult to foresee with certainty our position in south-west Arabia in the long-term,
but it was the view of the Governor of Aden that the present proposals offered the
best means of preserving our interests there for as long as possible. The plan would
leave it open for Aden Colony to join the federation later if this step appeared
desirable, and since Aden itself would be the federal capital it was to be hoped that
the moderate forces in the Protectorate would be able to exert a restraining influence
upon extremist elements in the Colony. We should however remain free, if the
federation did not develop in a way which accorded with our interests, to keep the
Colony separate from it and under our full control, though this might require the
use of military force. Although the Sultan of Lahej, the senior of the Rulers, was
opposed to the plan, he was much disliked and distrusted by the loyal Rulers and his
opposition would not be an effective obstacle to the creation of the federation.
It was the general view of the Committee that it would be desirable to support this
progressive move on the Rulers’ part. It was recognised that this would involve some
reversal of our previous thinking, in that the creation of a more powerful political
unit in this area was likely to lead to greater independence of British control, and our
experience of federations had not been entirely satisfactory. On the other hand the
Rulers’ initiative had brought about a new situation: to repulse this approach would
cause the present movement for unity in the face of the Yemen to fall apart; and our
agreement to federation need not prejudice the future of the Colony. Moreover there
would be political advantages if a new Arab State which was friendly to the West was
created in this strategically important area.
In further discussion the following points were made—
(a) The Rulers had proposed that the federation should be known as the Union of
Southern Emirates. But it would be desirable that the title should emphasise that a
new Arab State was being created.
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(b) The Minister of Defence1 emphasised the key importance of Aden Colony to
our policy in the Persian Gulf. While he was disturbed at the prospects for our future
position in south-west Arabia generally, he accepted that successive Governments
might not be ready to incur the cost and odium which would be entailed in
maintaining our control over the Colony indefinitely, if need be by force. No
statement should however be made at this stage which would imply that the Colony
would later join the federation. Moreover as a safeguard for the future it would be
desirable not only to arrange for Perim (and with it possibly the Kuria Muria Islands)
to be separated from the Colony, but to examine the possibility of excising a strategic
enclave in the Colony itself, possibly consisting of the air base and part of the
harbour, which we should retain in perpetual sovereignty under our full control. A
suitable opportunity for this might occur on the occasion of the constitutional
advance planned for next year. Though such a measure might be interpreted as a sign
of our intention to withdraw from the Colony, it might well be easier to effect it now
than at a later date when political advance and the pressures which went with it had
progressed further.
(c) It was for consideration whether the Island of Socotra might not be reserved
for a similar strategic purpose. This was however on an entirely different footing to
Perim (which formed part of our Colonial possessions) in that it belonged to the
Sultan of Quishn and Socotra with whom we had concluded a treaty of protection.
(d) The Chancellor of the Exchequer2 said that he recognised the difficulty of
discouraging the Rulers’ approach and was therefore in general sympathy with the
proposals in C.P.C. (58) 12. He must however reserve his position on the increased
cost involved, which was at present estimated to be between £1–2 millions per
annum pending further information about the details of the additional expenditure.
This should cover the cost of the increases proposed in the Government Guards and
the Aden Protectorate Levies, of political and administrative measures to support the
federation and of the separation of the islands from the Colony, and should take
account of any offsetting contributions from the States themselves. It would also be
necessary to form some idea of the increased expenditure on social and economic
development which might result from the survey now being undertaken. . . .
1 Mr Sandys. 2 Mr Heathcoat Amory.
191 CO 1015/1910, nos 23 & 24 8 Dec 1958
[Possibility of keeping Aden Colony and proposed federation apart]:
minute by Mr Amery to W L Gorell Barnes.  Minute by W L Gorell
Barnes
I thought it might be convenient if I let you have a note of my thoughts on the
possibilities of keeping Aden Colony and the proposed Federation apart.
I entirely agree that if some of the friendly rulers wish to federate, we cannot afford
to discourage them. It may well be, indeed, that a merger of some of the petty
principalities which make up the Protectorate would be to our advantage. The crucial
question concerns the future relationship between Aden Colony and the Federation.
The Chiefs of Staff have made it clear that they regard the maintenance of our
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defence facilities in Aden Colony as essential to the preservation of our position in
the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. No doubt these
defence facilities might be maintained if Aden Colony were ceded to a friendly Aden
Federation. But would such a Federation stay friendly? Recent experience in Egypt,
Jordan and Ceylon suggests only too pointedly that overseas bases are only secure
when they are under British sovereignty.
If I am right in this, the ideal solution would be to keep the Colony out of the
proposed Federation. Is this practical politics? The Governor, I gather, does not think
so: and I feel considerable hesitation, in view of my very slight personal experience of
the Protectorates, in contesting his view. It occurs to me, however, that there may be
a number of ways in which, particularly in the early stages, we could so influence the
development of the Federation that it might grow apart from the Colony and the
Colony apart from it. The following are examples of the kind of thing I have in mind.
1. The constitution. If the Federal constitution develops along “liberal” lines
with executive and legislative councils, a modern civil service, and a modern
judiciary, then the federal government machine will tend to be staffed by Nationalist
politicians from Aden Colony. In due course it would then become their instrument.
If, on the other hand, the Federation were encouraged to develop along more
traditional Arab lines into an autocracy or tribal oligarchy similar to the monarchies
of Muscat and the Gulf, the trend might well be the other way. The tribal rulers
would be afraid of the townsmen in the Colony, and, given greater independence
from British advice, would deal with any opposition after their own summary
fashion. The townsmen, on their side, having enjoyed the law and order and relative
freedom of Crown Colony rule, might well be reluctant to throw in their lot with
what they would regard as a backward and arbitrary despotism. Aden Colony would
thus continue along the normal path of development towards internal self-
government. The Federation, meanwhile would go its own way under a constitution
corresponding to the tribal and feudal ways of life of its inhabitants.
2. Composition of the Federation. Some of the states wish to federate: others as
yet do not. Will it be our policy to encourage reluctant states to join the Federation
or shall we leave the matter entirely to them? The more all-embracing the
Federation, the stronger will be the tendency for the Colony and the Federation to
grow together. If on the other hand some of the states stay out, we shall be on
stronger ground in insisting on a special status for Aden Colony as the Port serving
the whole Protectorate. This really raises the question whether we want to see an all-
embracing Federation or whether, at this stage, our interests would be better served
by limiting our objective to reducing the number of protected states by a merger of
those states which now wish to federate.
3. Defence. The future of the Aden Protectorate Levies must largely depend upon
whether we wish to see the Federation embrace all the states of the West (and East)
Aden Protectorates or whether we should be content with a more limited merger.
The more limited the merger, and the more the A.P.L. have to serve outside the
Federation, the more control shall we keep over defence whatever its precise
constitutional position. The A.P.L. would then tend to remain a British force based on
Aden Colony and serving all the state, federated and unfederated alike.
4. The capital. It is, I understand, proposed that the Federation should have its
capital in, or at any rate near, Aden Colony. The Federal Government would thus
evolve behind the shelter of British law and order and under the influence of the
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Aden press. Its leaders would be under continual pressure of Aden Colony public
opinion and even of the Aden mob. These are circumstances which would seem to
favour the fusion of the Colony and Federation and the predominance in the
Federation of Nationalist townsmen from the Colony. If, on the other hand, the
capital were located outside the Colony—say at Lodar—the Federal Government
would evolve under the rougher auspices of Arab tribal society. Nationalist lawyers
would find this inconvenient, uncomfortable and possibly dangerous.
The idea of locating the capital in Aden Colony seems to have come from the rulers
themselves. Could we not explain to them that the Federation would seem unduly
subordinate to British rule if its Headquarters were to be in British territory?
I appreciate, of course, that if Aden Colony is discouraged from joining the
Federation it may well claim ‘enosis’ with the U.A.R. As far as British and world
opinion, however, are concerned, this is a claim which it would be relatively easy for
us to reject.
Perhaps we could discuss all this in due course.
Minute on 191
I find it very difficult to offer any very profound comment until Ministers have given
the answer to the $64,000 question which is to be put to them in our C.P.C. paper.
Meanwhile I offer the following modest contribution:—
(1) With reference to the last paragraph of the introductory part of your minute,
I do not think the Governor has ever said that it is not practical politics to keep the
Colony out of the Federation, at any rate for the time being.1 I understand his view to
be that it is not practical politics to maintain the Colonial status of the Colony for
more than a limited period and that, if we do not steer the Colony into the
Protectorate Federation, then it will either become independent on its own or else
join up with the Yemen and the U.A.R.
(2) As regards your first point, it is impossible to start the Federation off as a
monarchy, since there would at present never be agreement on who the monarch
should be. It is, however, going to be started off as an oligarchy, since there will
either be a President or a sort of Presidential Council consisting of the 6 Rulers and
all the Members of the Legislative Council, and the Council of Ministers will be either
Rulers or their nominees. Whether those moderate Colony leaders who are already
pressing for the Colony to become part of the Federation yet realise this, I do not
know.
(3) With reference to your paragraph 2, I am afraid I have always assumed that it
is in our interests that at any rate the other States in the Western Protectorate
should come into the Federation.2 If they do not, then I feel sure that, if only in
rivalry and opposition to the Federation, they are bound to gravitate towards Cairo or
the Yemen. The position of Lahej, if it does not come in, will be particularly tricky,
particularly as it marches with the Colony and historically could work up some kind
of a claim to the Colony.
1 Amery wrote in the margin here: ‘Would it be very difficult to say “no” to independence or enosis with
the UAR?’
2 Amery wrote in the margin here: ‘I wonder. They might compete for our favour’.
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(4) I have always been a bit doubtful about the location of the capital in the
Colony myself. When I discussed this matter with the Governor last summer, he said
that there could be no question of locating the capital in the fastnesses of the
Protectorate, since it would be terribly expensive and administratively quite
impracticable.3 I understand that what is actually happening is that the capital is
going to be built in the Protectorate but just outside the boundaries of the Colony,
which will not prejudice the future as much as if the capital were an enclave cut out
of the Colony and which will be administratively practicable, but which certainly will
not encourage separatism in the way you have in mind.
It might be as well if the Secretary of State were to see this exchange of minutes
before our talk tomorrow. If we were going to change direction as regards the siting
of the capital of the Colony, we should clearly have to move very fast indeed, if it is
not too late already.
W.L.G.B.
10.12.58
3 Amery wrote in the margin here: ‘The political gains of locating the capital “up country” might well
justify the expense and administrative inconvenience’.
192 CAB 134/1557, CPC 16(58)2 22 Dec 1958
[Policy for Aden Colony and Protectorate]: minutes of Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee meeting
[This document should be read in conjunction with the COS discussion on 16 Dec: see
document no 183.]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(58) 23) regarding our future policy in Aden.
The Colonial Secretary said that, following the review of our policy in Aden Colony
and Protectorate earlier in the year, the decision had been taken to set up a
Federation in the Western Aden Protectorate but to retain direct rule in Aden Colony.
But in the light of events in the Middle East during 1958, the Governor of Aden had
formed the view that, unless we were prepared to ultimately to maintain our hold on
Aden by force, our interests would best be served by following a policy of
disengagement over a period of about ten years and allowing the Colony to join the
Federation provided that the leaders in both territories were in favour of such a
development. This course would have the further advantages that it would subject
the extreme political elements in the Colony to the moderating influence of the more
conservative Rulers in the Protectorate. The forthcoming announcement about a
further constitutional advance in Somaliland made it desirable that a corresponding
announcement of our intentions should be made in Aden as soon as possible, and the
Governor had urged that an appropriate occasion would be at the inauguration of the
Western Aden Protectorate Federation in February, 1959. On the other hand there
would be advantage in deferring a final decision on the matter until the strategic
consequences of the proposed policy had been studied in more detail and the
outcome of the elections in the Colony and the inauguration of the Federation was
known.
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In discussion it was pointed out that from a purely military point of view the most
satisfactory course would be to retain direct control of the Colony. But if it became
impossible politically to maintain the present arrangements the proposals outlined
in C.P.C. (58) 23 represented the best solution that could be devised. Our policy in
Aden might, however, be affected by the review of our policy in the Middle East as a
whole, which was at present under consideration between Departments and by the
Chiefs of Staff. The result of this review might be to demonstrate that the importance
of retaining Aden as a military base would diminish. If, on the other hand, our
interests necessitated our keeping some permanent strategic facilities in the Colony,
we should have to examine whether there was any other way in which our needs
could be met, such as the retention of an enclave under our own control.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the policy of creating a
friendly state comprising the Western Aden Protectorate Federation, and, if they so
wished it, Aden Colony, had certain attractions, particularly since it might eventually
be possible to accommodate such a State within the Commonwealth. No final
decision as to our future policy for Aden should, however, be taken pending the
review of our policy in the Middle East as a whole and the Colonial Secretary’s
forthcoming visit to Aden and Somaliland. . . .
193 CO 1015/1910, no 46 10 Mar 1959
‘Long-term policy in Aden’: minute by Mr Amery
1. It is clear from discussions in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and in the Cabinet
Committee on the Middle East that we shall need the full and unrestricted use of our
military facilities in Aden, for as far ahead as we can see, to support operations in the
Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Experience in Egypt, Ceylon and Libya suggests that the security of defence
facilities held under Treaty is inadequate. This is particularly so when, as in Aden,
facilities situated in one Arab country are needed for operations against other Arabs.
3. The present Protectorate Rulers and the moderate politicians in Aden Colony
are at present friendly to us. They and their successors may not always be so. Sultan
Ali of Lahej1 was not an isolated phenomenon. A main cause of his defection was a
belief that we were the losing side. Another setback in the Middle East, say the loss of
Saudi Arabia, might well convince even stauncher Rulers that they had to make
terms with Nasser. The friendship and influence of the Moderates in the Colony may
prove even more ephemeral than that of the Rulers. No very long-term value can,
therefore, be placed on agreements concluded with the Rulers or the Moderates. In
these circumstances sovereignty would seem to offer the most secure basis on which
to rest our defence facilities in Aden.
4. There is much to be said for making our defence facilities as unobtrusive as
possible. How much of the Colony do we need for our military purposes? It may be
that we could abandon Little Aden and Sheikh Othman, though both are fairly
closely integrated into the economy of the rest of the Colony; and part of the water
supplies are in Sheikh Othman. It would, moreover, be awkward if the frontier came
1 The senior of the Rulers, opposed to federation.
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so close to Khormaksar as to bring the latter within range of mortar or small-arms
fire. Any withdrawal besides, tends to whet appetites for more. It would in any case
seem quite impracticable to abandon anything else. We need the neck of land
connecting the main port of the colony to the mainland. It is the site of the airfield
and most of the barracks. To have an Arab authority in Crater would only be to create
a Tom Tiddler’s Ground or safe harbour for saboteurs and dissident elements. There
would thus seem to be no basis for a partition of the Colony.
5. If it be agreed that British sovereignty should be retained over the Colony it
will be necessary for H.M.G. and the Government of Aden to work systematically
henceforth for the separation of the Colony from the Federation rather than for their
closer association. This can be done partly by administrative measures, e.g. the
judicious encouragement of non-Arab immigration, and the avoidance of services
common to the Colony and to the Federation. But the main instrument of separating
the Colony from the Federation will be political and constitutional.
6. If the Federation develops along “liberal” lines with executive and legislative
councils, a modern civil service and a modern judiciary then the tendency will be
for the Colony and the Federation to grow together. If, on the other hand, the
Federation is left to follow more traditional lines and become an autocracy or tribal
oligarchy reproducing some of the features of Muscat, the Gulf States, and indeed
the Yemen, the Federation and the Colony may tend to drift apart. The tribal Rulers
would be afraid of the townsmen in the Colony and, given greater independence
from British advice, would deal with any opposition after their own summary fash-
ion. The townsmen on their side, having enjoyed the law and order and relative
freedom of Crown Colony rule, might well be reluctant to throw in their lot with
what they would regard as a backward and arbitrary despotism. To do so indeed
would be to risk their necks or their wrists! A process of mutual repulsion might
thus be set up. The Federation might go its own way under a constitution corre-
sponding to the tribal and feudal ways of life of its inhabitants. The Colony with its
more modern economic structure would then continue along the normal path of
development towards diarchy.
7. There is of course a risk that under a diarchy the Arabs in the Colony would
begin to agitate for union with the U.A.R. Such a union would be unacceptable, but
the demand for it might be turned to advantage. The Federation Rulers would be
opposed to it. British public opinion—despite our history—seldom favours unions
across the sea. If the diarchy got out of hand on the issue of ‘enosis’ [union] with the
U.A.R. we should be able to suspend the constitution with the full approval of the
Federation and without much opposition at home.
8. Nor should the maintenance of internal security in Aden Colony be too heavy
a burden. One of the greater heresies of contemporary thought is that a base is
useless if situated amidst a hostile population. I spent some time during the war
trying to sabotage German port facilities in Greece. The population was 90% on our
side but we never caused the Germans more than inconvenience. It may be said that
the Germans were more ruthless than we could be. Our own experience in the Canal
Zone, however, only confirms the German experience. The present C.I.G.S.,2 who
served in the Zone at the height of the crisis in our relations with Egypt, tells me that
2 F-M Sir F Festing, who was GOC-in-C Eastern Command, 1954–1956.
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in the worst moments our labour force never fell below 70%. And this was in
territory where the Egyptian police operated and the Egyptian writ ran.
9. By comparison with many bases, the security problem in Aden would seem
relatively simple. The population is small—out of a total of 150,000 there can be only
about 35,000 Arab males between the ages of 16 and 60. The Yemenis among them
are liable to deportation. All are dependent for their livelihood on a highly organised
commercial community. Under such circumstances it is difficult to believe that we
could need more than two or in emergency three battalions to maintain our grip on
the Colony.
10. A more serious problem may arise from the natural desire of the Federation
Rulers to put their paws, in due course, on the port and wealth of Aden. Many of
them, however, have ambitions in the Yemen. It would seem prudent, therefore, to
encourage them to hope for expansion at the expense of the Yemen, thus deflecting
their ambitions inland and away from the Colony.
11. There remains the problem of presentation. Hopkinson’s “never” though
right enough in private should never have been allowed out in public.3 If we should
decide to keep Aden Colony permanently out of the Federation it will in all
probability be essential not to say so. Eve would doubtless have left the apple alone if
it had not been forbidden. In so far as the initiative lies with us, the right course
would seem to be to discourage speculation and take no steps, such as staff
examinations into partition, which would tend to arouse interest in the subject. If we
are asked what our policy is, we could perhaps reply:—
(i) that the Federation must be given time to find its feet before either the
Federation or Aden Colony can be asked whether they want to join together;
(ii) that Aden Colony must be taken a stage or two further along the road to
internal self-government before its people can be in a position to determine their
own future.
12. My conclusions are:—
(1) We need Aden Colony as a base and cannot be satisfied with bases in Aden
Colony.
(2) Our bases and other facilities in Aden will best be secured by the insistence of
[sic] British sovereignty over the Colony.
(3) We must therefore work to separate the Colony from the Protectorate as much
as we can both by administrative measures and more particularly by encouraging
the Federation to develop along traditional South Arabian lines and the Colony
along modern diarchical lines.
(4) The Arabs in the Colony may agitate for enosis with the U.A.R. We might then
have to suspend the constitution. The Federation would probably support us in so
doing. The size of the Colony, moreover, and the way of life of its inhabitants
should make it possible for us to maintain ourselves there without undue effort.
3 Mr H L D Hopkinson, minister of state at CO, 1952–1955, who in answer to a supplementary question
after a statement on Cyprus, went slightly beyond his brief by declaring: ‘it has always been understood
and agreed that there are certain territories in the Commonwealth which, owing to their particular
circumstances, can never expect to be fully independent’ (H of C Debs 28 July 1954, vol 531, cols 504–511,
repr in Porter & Stockwell, eds, British imperial policy and decolonization vol 2, pp 319–325, document
44). Hopkinson left the CO at the end of 1955 and never held ministerial office again.
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(5) We should encourage the ambitions of the Federal Rulers to expand at the
expense of the Yemen. This will help to deflect them from coveting Aden.4
4 The governor was sent a copy of this minute, and commented that he thought Amery was reverting to
Lord Lloyd’s policy of 1956; this militated against the government’s general policy of evolution to self-
government and self-determination, as well as against the trend of its relations to the Arab world. Sir W
Luce wanted, essentially, more flexibility, and warned against ‘divide and rule’; the further they took the
Colony towards self-government in isolation from the Federation, the stronger the demand for
independence would be, and ‘Nasserism would become the only alternative to British imperialism’;
attempts to hold Aden Colony by force would have disastrous economic effects, and Britain could not rely
on Federal Rulers for approval (no 60, to S of S, 14 Apr 1959). Amery’s reaction is the subject of the next
document.
194 CO 1015/1912, no 61 27 Apr 1959
[Response to the governor’s comments on future policy in Aden]:
minute by Mr Amery to Mr Lennox-Boyd
I return the papers from the Governor of Aden and Air Vice Marshal Heath,1 together
with comments by Mr. Watt and Mr. Gorell Barnes. I attach at annex A & B2 my own
comments on the detailed points raised by the Governor and the Commander.
2. This latest correspondence confirms that there is a major difference of
conception between the Governor and myself. The Governor’s aim, as I understand it,
is to build a viable South Arabian State out of a merger of the Colony and the
Federation. Seen against the general background of British Colonial development
and against the particular background of his own experience in the Sudan, this is a
perfectly respectable aim. It involves, however, a radical departure from our
traditional policy towards Aden. According to this traditional policy, Aden Colony is
important to us primarily as a fortress; and the Protectorate should be viewed mainly
as a glacis to that fortress. The fortress is vital today in relation to our oil interests in
the Persian Gulf; but, so long at least as geography has any influence on strategy or
politics, it will always be to our advantage, as a world power, to control the key
position which Aden holds.
3. The Governor’s decision to recommend a radical departure from our previous
policy is based on three main considerations:—
(1) As his earlier papers have shown, he regards our disengagement from the
Middle East in the face of the movement towards Arab unity as inevitable. Paragraphs
2 and 3 of his latest note show that he does not expect or seek to hold Aden Colony
indefinitely. His hope is that the Federation will remain under our protection or
allied to us for about a decade. During this time we should enjoy the use of our
present defence facilities. Thereafter we should be able to count at least on the
benevolent neutrality of the independent Federal State. In all this the Governor
seems to me to underrate the powerful forces which have always tended to keep the
Arabs divided. The conflict between Nasser and Kassem3 has already largely made
1 Commander, British Forces Arabian Peninsula, who argued that the ‘real heresy’ was thinking an
insecure Base could be made secure by use of a vast garrison. For the governor’s comments, see previous
document, n 4.
2 Not printed. 3 General Qassim, the new ruler of Iraq.
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nonsense of the assumptions on which most of Whitehall was working only a few
months ago. As a result of this conflict, Jordan and the Persian Gulf States are
breathing more freely. The Nasser–Kassem conflict may be shortlived; but historical
trends have an odd way of not running their full course. Portugal’s Eastern Empire,
for instance, began disintegrating nearly three centuries ago; but Goa and Timor
illustrate how circumstances can favour tenacity. I think the Governor is also in
danger of forgetting how often in British history the mood of weariness that so often
follows a great war has been overtaken by a reversion to more retentive and even
more acquisitive policies.
(2) The Governor holds that racial, geographical and economic factors make a
merger of the Protectorate and the Colony ultimately inevitable. These factors are
certainly strong. At the same time I think he still underrates the extent of the
obstacles to such a merger. For one thing the social structures of the Colony and the
Protectorate are wholly different. For another, Aden Colony lives from the sea far
more than from trade with the Protectorate; while the Protectorate lives from its
own resources—agriculture, raiding, etc. far more than from trade with or through
the Colony. For yet another, the ambitions of the Sharif of Beihan and the Ruler of
Mukeiras, the two most loyal elements in the Federation, lie towards the Yemen and
not towards the sea.
(3) The Governor urges a third reason for promoting a merger between the
Colony and the Federation. This is, that Moderates in the Colony will otherwise find
their influence undermined and their position taken by the extremists. This
argument, while quite possibly true in itself, seems to me in flat contradiction, at any
rate in the medium term, with the view that a merger of Colony and Federation are
inevitable. Its implication is that if the extremists predominate in the Colony they
will either not want to join the Federation (presumably because they will be seeking
to join the U.A.R.) or they would not be acceptable to the Federal Rulers, even if they
did want to join. In all this I am inclined to think that the Governor underrates the
extent to which the moderates may be forced to side with us in order to defend their
interests against the extremists. This could happen, for instance, if Nasser or his
successor were to join forces with the West against Kassem. I am also a little
surprised that the Governor should foresee so much difficulty in dealing firmly with
the extremists so soon after he had himself recommended proscribing the powerful
nationalist trade union.
4. Arthur Balfour used to say that there were no differences of principle, only
differences of degree. I have tried to apply this dissolvent method to my difference
with the Governor. The result is not very different from the conclusions reached by
Mr. Gorell Barnes. I would express it as follows:—
5. Let us accept that there are powerful forces making for a merger of the Colony
with the Protectorate. Let us also admit that such a development is clean contrary to
our interests in that it would in all probability herald the end of our unchallenged
tenure of defence rights in Aden. On the basis of these two assumptions the right
policy, I submit, would be:—
(1) to seek by every means to delay and where possible even to reverse the
movement towards a merger.
(2) In so doing, however, to avoid getting into a Canute’s position of saying ‘no’ to
the inevitable. Our overall strategic object would be firm—to keep the Colony
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separate from the Protectorate for as long as possible. Our tactics, however, would
have to be opportunist. We might have to make concessions at one time, while
seeking to recover lost ground at another.
6. If it be once accepted that keeping the Colony separate from the Protectorate
is our main purpose and more important in itself than, say, keeping the Moderates in
power in the Colony or adding new members to the Federation, we could then
consider how far existing pressures require us to make the kind of statement Mr.
Watt and Mr. Gorell Barnes recommend. I would have no objection in principle to
making such a statement on the basis of the policy described above, but I would
think it quite wrong to do so in the spirit of paragraph 6 of the Governor’s letter to
you in which he regards such a statement as a further step in the process of bringing
about a merger. This means, I fear, that, despite the use of the Balfourian dialectic, an
important difference still remains as to the way we should play the hand in the
future.
7. I apologise for the length of this minute and its annex, but I felt it would make
for an easier discussion and thus probably save your time if I set down my views in
writing before we spoke.
195 CO 1015/1912, no 63 13 May 1959
[Future policy in Aden]: letter from Mr Lennox-Boyd to Sir W Luce
I have given a lot of thought to your letter of the 14th April and its enclosures about
future policy in Aden.1
I have the impression that all our thinking is beginning to come closer into line. It
is important, however, that we should have a real meeting of minds and not just
agreement on a formula reached as a result of correspondence about which there
may later be misunderstandings. I would therefore like to talk about this with you
when you are home. Meanwhile I am not proposing to take it any further with my
colleagues. I assure you, however, that I am determined that you shall get firm policy
guidance before you go back, and with that assurance I hope you will be able to hold
the position and avoid taking on any commitments in the period before you come on
leave.
I do not want to prejudge our discussions, but it may help if I tell you in this letter
where I think we are getting to.
As you say in your comments on Amery’s Note, our aim is identical, nor does our
political thinking include the word “never”. Again, we, like you, believe that our
policy should be flexible so far as is compatible with obtaining our essential agreed
objective. The need for flexibility in policy in British territories in Arabia hardly
needs to be emphasised in times when political conditions in the Middle East are
liable to sudden, and sometimes radical, changes. Not many experts would have
predicted two years ago, or even a year ago, that the differences between Cairo and
Baghdad would have displayed the shape and intensity which they do at present; nor
would it have been altogether wise last autumn to assert that Jordan’s return to
1 See document no 193, n 4.
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something like stability was probable. None of us would now assert that the aims and
methods of Iraq or the U.A.R. may not again change course quickly, or that Hussein’s
country is secure.2 All I would say—and I am sure you will agree with this—is that
conditions in that part of the world are sufficiently unpredictable and unstable for us
to avoid commitments other than those which our fundamental objectives or
interests demand.
Nevertheless we need both to be clear what our long term objective is and to have
complete agreement between us as to what we should say about it in public as and
when we need to say something.
The position in Aden as we see it at the moment is that the maintenance of
colonial status in perpetuity or even some higher form of existence within the
Commonwealth short of complete self-determination is not a respectable political
philosophy for any town Arab and consequently the majority of Arabs of the Colony
who would like to co-operate with us are looking for some alternative respectable
political aim and they think they have found it in the ultimate inclusion of the
Colony in the Federation to form an independent Arab State; and they tend to press
us to commit ourselves to this objective and may before very long become somewhat
importunate in this. The Protectorate Rulers tend to have the same ultimate
objective but they have it for quite different reasons and at present at any rate they
have no sense of urgency whatever in the matter. Neither party has probably thought
at all seriously about the problems involved, or faced up to the political difficulties
which will arise if and when a real attempt is made to incorporate a town with
increasingly democratic parliamentary institutions into a Federation consisting of
feudal states.
We here are all agreed that if and when it becomes clear that the continued sep-
arate existence of the Colony as a British Colony is no longer tolerable to the
Protectorate Rulers, then our best hope of successfully maintaining our interests
for any length of time may well be to encourage the entry of the Colony into the
Federation. So long however as that is not the case, and we do not feel that it is
the case now, some here think that our purpose should be to keep the present
position or something like it going as long as we can and if anything to try to keep
the Colony and the Protectorate apart rather than deliberately to bring them
together.
That is not to say that those who hold this view consider that we should so
describe our policy publicly or indeed do or say anything which would cause the
public to realise that this was what we were trying to do. On the contrary, even those
who feel like that would agree that if and when public statements about our policy
have to be made, they must inevitably lean in the direction of encouraging rather
than discouraging closer association between them. But what some feel is that such
statements should not lean further in this direction or land us in more commitments
than is absolutely unavoidable.
This may all sound a little Machiavellian; but I suspect that it is not really very far
removed from your own train of thought. Anyway, let us have a really good
discussion when you get home.
2 Jordan.
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196 CAB 134/1558, CPC(59)12 14 Aug 1959
[Future policy for Aden Colony and Protectorate]: memorandum by
Mr Lennox-Boyd for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
1. In my memorandum C.P.C. (58) 23 I described the Governor of Aden’s
proposals tending towards a merger of Aden Colony with the Protectorate
Federation, first under our protection and later as an independent South Arabian
State in treaty relations with us. I also set out the possible disadvantages of the policy
to our defence interests in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. At its 16th
Meeting (C.P.C. (58) 16th Meeting, Conclusions) the Committee agreed that I should
make no announcement about future policy when I went to Aden.1
2. I visited the Colony and the Protectorate last February and discussed future
policy with the Governor and his official advisers. I also sounded the more reliable
Rulers in the Protectorate and—in more guarded fashion—some of the moderate
politicians on the Colony’s Executive Council.
3. The Rulers wish to see the Federation consolidated and extended before active
steps are taken towards a merger with the Colony. Their eye, moreover, is mainly on
the Yemen border. There is little doubt, however, that they would like “to put their
paws” on Aden Colony. They see in it an important new source of revenue. They also
fear that a weak British Government may one day fail to maintain itself in the Colony
and let it fall under the hostile influence of Egypt or the Yemen.
4. The moderate politicians in the colony approach the problem rather
differently. Accused by their extremist opponents as “Colonial stooges”, they see in
the promotion of a merger between the Colony and the Federation a means of
escaping from Colonial status and of appearing as the emancipators of Aden. Some of
them also dream that the Protectorate may have oil. These moderate politicians
would like us to make an early public statement in support of the merger.
5. The Governor remains convinced that, in these circumstances, it is no longer
practical politics to maintain, as we have done hitherto, that Aden cannot expect
more than a wide measure of internal self-government under the Colonial Office. To
do so would, in his view, undermine the position of the moderate politicians in the
Colony, play into the hands of the extremists and lead perhaps to serious industrial
disturbances. I have already discussed the extent of this last danger in C.P.C. (59) 4.
The Governor also fears that in the longer run such an attitude might alienate the
Protectorate Rulers. Their appetite for Aden will grow and, with the passage of time,
they too may come under increasing pressure from Arab nationalist opinion to take
up an anti-colonialist position. It should not prove too difficult to maintain order in
the Colony alone, if the Protectorate were friendly. The Commander B.F.A.P. has
advised, however, that if the Protectorate as well as the Colony turned against us we
should need substantial forces to protect our military installations. There would,
then, be no accommodation in the Colony for troops destined for service elsewhere.
6. The Protectorate Rulers and the moderate politicians agree in private that it is
to their interests that we should maintain our base in Aden. They would, no doubt,
eventually agree to a treaty with us guaranteeing our defence requirements. How
1 See document no 192.
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long they would stand by it is another matter. They are Arabs; and Aden is a place
from which operations against other parts of the Arab world might well be mounted.
7. In our discussions on the Middle East (M.E. (M) (59): 4th Meeting) we
recognised that we should retain a major strategic interest in the Aden Protectorate
and Colony and in the Persian Gulf States. Aden itself was described as “of practical
and great importance to the United Kingdom”. For the purposes of planning future
policy, therefore, I assume that we shall continue to require unrestricted use of our
defence facilities in the Colony. The problem therefore is how to devise a policy
which takes account, on the one hand of our vital defence requirements and on the
other of the pressures building up in the Colony, and more slowly in the Federation,
for a merger of the two and their subsequent independence.
8. The Governor and the Commander have considered whether it would be
possible to partition the Colony with the idea of our retaining sovereignty over a
military enclave. They have had to reject this as impracticable. The Colony is too
small in area and the military facilities too closely integrated with the civil facilities
to permit of division. Both the civilian and the military communities are dependent
on Aden port and on Arab labour. The base is also dependent on the port and refinery
of Little Aden; and the latter is itself a key point requiring protection.
9. I cannot, as at present advised, recommend that we should meet the moderate
politicians in the Colony or the Protectorate Rulers by coming out at this stage in
favour of a merger of the Colony and the Federation. The risks to our defence
interests seem to me too great. Our best chance, indeed, of safeguarding these would
seem to lie in keeping the Federation and the Colony apart. I agree with the
Governor, however, that it is no longer practical politics to maintain that Aden will
remain a Colony indefinitely. I am also convinced that we must not get into the
position of publicly saying “No” to the idea of a merger of the Colony and Federation.
To do so, indeed, would almost certainly have the effect of making the merger more
attractive to Arab opinion.
10. In the circumstances I believe the wisest course will be to play for time and
to avoid defining our policy too clearly. The Protectorate Rulers are not pressing us
for a statement on the merger. They are busy consolidating and extending the
Federation and playing their favourite game of border politics. The moderate
politicians in the Colony will be more insistent. In the light, however, of recent
discussion with the Adenese members of his Executive Council, the Governor now
considers that he can avoid making a public statement on the merger for the next
year or so. He would, however, wish to be able to indicate to the members, in
confidence, that we should not stand in their way if they were to come forward with
proposals for practical measures of co-operation between the Colony and the
Federation in such matters as health, education and communications, provided these
were sound on their own merits. I would propose to authorise the Governor to speak
on these lines on his return should the Adenese press him and should he consider it
politic to respond.
11. There are important factors in the situation which will assist a delaying
action and may even tend against the merger. Neither the Colony politicians, nor the
Protectorate Rulers have thought seriously about the practical problems involved.
Politically and ideologically, moreover, the two parties are tending in opposite
directions. Aden Colony, with a cosmopolitan and industrial population, is
developing like other British Colonies towards internal self-government on
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democratic lines. The Federation remains a traditional South Arabian feudal
oligarchy, and there are no signs of departure from its traditional authoritarian ways.
These social and political factors may well delay the merger for some time, and it is
even possible that they may develop into lasting obstacles to it. How far we could or
should encourage the development of obstacles to the merger would depend on
circumstances; and it will, of course, be important that Her Majesty’s Government
and the Governor should not be seen to be working against the merger. Should there
be no merger, we may well be faced with strong demands for independence for the
Colony alone. This would seem a rather unrealistic aspiration for so small a
community—150,000 people—and we should have to try to limit it to something
like the status accorded to Singapore.
12. I would accordingly invite my colleagues to endorse the line of policy
indicated in this paper and more particularly the proposals at paragraph 10.
197 CO 1015/2392, no 1 3 Sept 1960
[The future of Aden Colony: purposes, policy and proposals;
relationship to Federation]: valedictory letter from Sir W Luce to E
Melville (CO).  Minutes by I Watt, C A Kirkman, E Melville, Sir J
Martin, Sir H Poynton and Lord Perth [Extract]
. . . 9. H.M.G.’s prime purpose in Aden is to retain the free and unrestricted use of
the military base so long as their strategic interests require that base. But I think we
would all agree that in pursuing that purpose it is incumbent upon H.M.G. to help
the people of this area to build the foundations of a State which will give them some
hope of determining ultimately their own destiny. It seems to me unthinkable that
we should make use of this area for our own purposes and then eventually abandon it
to chaos and leave its people at the mercy of the Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.R.,
to say nothing of the Communist bloc. If this thesis is accepted, then the basic
problem is to reconcile the pursuit of H.M.G.’s interests in Aden with our duty
towards its people. In seeking the solution to this problem I am sure that the first
and most important thing is to recognise who are our friends in this area and who
are our enemies. First and foremost among our friends I put the Rulers of the
Western Protectorate, who are also the backbone of the Federation. Second to them I
put the Colony moderates, led by Bayoomi1 who appears to me to be emerging
steadily as a dominant figure in Colony politics. Our internal enemies are the
extreme Arab nationalists, headed at present by the leaders of the A.T.U.C., who are in
collusion with our external “enemy”, the U.A.R. I think it is essential to recognise
that this group is irreconcilable to H.M.G.’s basic purpose here and that there is no
hope of reaching any understanding with them which would not involve the defeat of
that purpose. Having recognised our friends and our enemies, we must strengthen
and encourage the former, and confound the latter. In the context of Aden, our
enemies are also the enemies of our friends and we shall only lose their friendship if
1 Hassan Bayoomi (or Bayyumi), minister of labour and local government, the principal political leader in
the Colony.
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we show signs of weakness towards the common enemy, or follow a policy which
gives him the opportunity of gaining power.
10. So far as the Federal Rulers are concerned, I believe that we can keep and
strengthen their friendship, and through it retain our essential military
requirements in the Protectorate, for many years to come provided that we give
generous support to the Federation and help them to establish a position of
“respectability” in the eyes of both their own people and the outside world. Self-
interest and self-protection will be powerful factors in maintaining the British
connection.
The retention of our friendship with the Colony moderates is a more delicate
matter, for here we have to help in building up the prestige and power of men who,
unlike the Rulers, have no innate or traditional claim to authority or the allegiance
of the people. In addition, we have to help them too to become politically
“respectable”, and this is a more difficult task when they are our partners in a
colonial administration than it is with the Federal Rulers with their already semi-
independent status. To hold and strengthen their position with the public, the
moderate Colony politicians must be enabled to clear themselves, to some extent at
least, of the extremists’ accusation that they are mere puppets of the British.
Finally, I would repeat that the active encouragement of our friends, in both
Federation and Colony, must be accompanied by the active discouragement of our
and their enemies; without this our friends will always doubt the real sincerity of our
intentions.
11. Against the background of the above general observations, let us now look at
the situation, which will arise towards the close of 1962, when the life of the present
Legislative Council ends. It is obvious that at that moment something new must
happen; nobody in their senses would believe that we could merely have a new
Legislative Council elected on the basis of the present constitution. If we are to retain
any friends in the Colony, there must be a change of some sort. On the normal
pattern of constitutional development in Colonial territories, that change would take
the form of a further step towards internal self-government, based on the
Westminster model of parliamentary democracy. I think it is clear from earlier
paragraphs of this letter that such a step, to command the support and retain the
friendship of the Colony moderates, would have to be a long one, carrying us
virtually to full internal self-government. At the least it would, in my opinion, mean
an almost entirely elected Legislative Council, with a wider franchise than at present,
the retention of only two official members in the Executive Council (Chief Secretary
and Attorney General), and a full Ministerial system with the Governor remaining
directly responsible only for external affairs and defence, including, I would hope,
internal security.
12. Would such a step help us to solve the problem I have posed in paragraph 9
above? I firmly believe that it would not; on the contrary, I believe that it would tend
to make the problem insoluble for the following reasons:—
(a) It would be likely to play right into the hands of our enemies, the extreme
nationalists; all the indications are that they have learned the futility of boycotting
elections, and that they would take part in elections with a constitution of the type
I have envisaged above. With a wider franchise, their influence over labour and the
aid of Egyptian money, they could well secure a majority in the Legislative
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Council. Such a result would be wholly inimical to H.M.G.’s interests and would
lead rapidly to either a crumbling of the British position in Aden or the suspension
of the constitution, with all its barren consequences. Our Colony friends would be
powerless to help us, and would probably blame us for having let them down. It is
clear from a recent conversation he had with the Chief Secretary that Bayoomi
himself has seen these dangers and is now seeking ways to avoid them.
(b) The Federation Rulers would be bitterly critical of any such development and
would regard it as an indication that H.M.G. no longer attached importance to
their friendship and alliance. This could only result in grave harm to our position
in the Western Protectorate and to the value of our military facilities under the
Federation Treaty.
(c) Apart from the above considerations, another strong dose of parliamentary
democracy in the Colony will only widen the existing differences between Colony
and Federation, and so increase the difficulties of a constitutional marriage in the
future. As you know from previous correspondence, I regard a coming together of
these two units as the only development which can make political or economic
sense of this area, and which can provide a reasonable foundation for the sort of
State which, as stated in paragraph 9 above, I consider it both our duty and our
interest to work for.
To sum up, it is my view that another, and inevitably big, advance by the Colony
along the Westminster road will help our enemies, alienate our friends and rapidly
jeopardise British interests in this area. I therefore conclude that it must be
discarded as a solution of the problem.
13. What we need is something which will meet the views of our best friends, the
Federation Rulers, enable our Colony friends to remain in power, facilitate the
coming together of Colony and Federation and serve the long-term interests of
H.M.G. I suggest that the only solution which can fulfil all those requirements is the
conversion of the Colony into a Protectorate (a true Protectorate on the Aden
pattern) before the end of the life of the present Legislative Council, say, in the
autumn of 1962, with the further aim of bringing about a merger between the new
Protectorate and the Federation. An alternative, and perhaps more desirable, course
would be to extend the life of the present Legislative Council by Order-in-Council for
a period of one year, having declared publicly H.M.G.’s intention of carrying out the
conversion; this would allow more time for the complexities of the operation. The
conversion would entail the relinquishment of British sovereignty over the Colony
territory, and thereafter H.M.G.’s relations with the new Protectorate would be
governed by the same kind of treaty terms (with appropriate additions and
omissions) as those which now exist between H.M.G. and the Federation.
14. The advantages of this proposal, as I see them, would be as follows:—
(a) We should hand over full control of the internal affairs of Aden (in the narrow
sense of what is now the Colony) to our friends who are co-operating with us
under the present constitution. H.M.G. would no longer be responsible for
constitutional development and would thus be able to avoid the dangers of a
further advance of parliamentary democracy which would be virtually inevitable
were the territory to continue as a Colony after 1962. It would be for the successor
Protectorate Government to decide what shape the future constitution should
take, and when and on what basis there should be new elections; but it can
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reasonably be supposed that our friends in the successor Government would so
arrange these matters as to ensure as far as possible the maintenance of their own
authority.
(b) Our friends in the successor government would have a freer hand to deal with
their, and our, political enemies in their own way; they would not be so deeply
influenced as we are by the principles of democracy, individualism and liberalism
which, when strictly applied in the realities of a place like Aden, spell the defeat of
H.M.G.’s main purpose here, and provide no sure basis for a stable independent
State in the future.
(c) It would greatly strengthen the political position of our Colony friends, not
only in the sense described in (a) and (b) above, but also by giving them the
“autonomy” they seek and the credit and respectability of having gained
emergence from colonial status and brought at least semi-independence to Aden.
In the same conversation to which I have referred in paragraph 12 (a) above,
Bayoomi showed that his own mind is moving in this direction.
(d) It would, if fully explained to them, reassure the Federal Rulers about our
intentions for the Colony. Their great fear is that we intend to give it more and
more democracy which to them would mean ensuring sooner or later the
supremacy of their enemies, the extreme Nasserite nationalists who seek
republicanism and the overthrow of traditional authority as the surest and fastest
road to power for themselves. It is true that the Rulers would prefer to see the
British remain in firm control of the Colony for some years to come, but they must
be brought to see the impossibility in these days of standing still indefinitely, and
the value to them of strengthening the position of the Colony moderates vis-à-vis
the extremists. It is true also that they like to profess a certain blue-blooded
contempt and mistrust of these self-made Colony politicians, but the fact is that
some of them have quite close personal relations with Bayoomi and others, and I
have little doubt that their common fear of Nasserite nationalism will increasingly
draw them together.
(e) It would leave external affairs and defence in the hands of H.M.G., and also, for
all practical purposes internal security. . . . It would also give H.M.G. all the
military facilities they have at present in the Colony.
15. Though at first sight my suggested solution may seem drastic and
revolutionary, I would point out that so far as my own thinking on the future of Aden
is concerned, there is nothing new about it. The germ of what I am now suggesting
was contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of my letter 12367/59–60 of 28th March, 1958,
to Gorell Barnes.2 My thinking about the future of the Colony in paragraph 6 of that
letter was subsequently modified when the formation of a Federation in the Western
Protectorate was approved by H.M.G. in the summer of 1958. . . . It is my firm
conviction that these dangers [of taking the Colony any further along the road to full
internal self-government] are a much greater threat to H.M.G.’s interests here than
would be any risks which may attach to the policy I am advocating. The main
development in my thinking on all this is in the matter of timing; and that seems to
me now to be dictated by the ending of the life of the present Legislative Council at
the close of 1962.
2 See document no 188(3).
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16. If it were argued that the security of H.M.G.’s military interests in Aden
cannot be made the subject of an act of faith in the continued goodwill of our present
friends here, I would reply that the British cannot in practice “go it alone” and still
retain what they need here. We must have some friends in the future and we should
do all we can to retain those we already have. It is not as if our friendship with the
Rulers and Colony moderates were based solely on sentiment; it has a far more solid
foundation in common interests and dangers, and in material considerations such as
their long-term need for our military, financial and technical assistance. Moreover, in
the last resort, we, through our best friends, the Federation Rulers, would have the
whip hand over our second-best friends, the Colony moderates, should the latter try
to let us down after they had emerged from Colonial status; the Federation will have
the F.N.G. and its own Army which the ex-Colony would be powerless to resist once
we had allowed them to be unleashed.
17. The final point I should like to make in arguing my case is that we should not
be fearful of our enemies, either internal or external. A combination of ourselves, the
Federation and the Colony moderates, supported by a large element which has
strong commercial interests in stability and security, would far out-weigh any
political forces which the extreme nationalists could range against us. The recent
exercise of introducing our new industrial legislation has shown that there are
definite limitations to the power of the nationalist T.U.C. leaders in the face of
Government firmness and determination. We hold the very powerful weapon of the
threat of deportation against their main body of supporters, the Yemeni labourers,
and there was plenty of evidence during the Renown operation that the use of this
weapon after the October, 1958, riots has not been forgotten. There is little in fact
that Egypt can do, apart from propaganda and perhaps the supply of funds, to help
the Aden extremists, and the Imam of the Yemen is unlikely to rupture our present
improved relations merely to help people who are strongly hostile to his regime and
whose ideas for the future of “Greater Yemen” conflict sharply with his own. It is true
that once we began public discussion of the idea of converting the Colony into a
Protectorate within the lifetime of the present Legislative Council, with the obvious
prospect of a merger between it and the Federation, there would be a vociferous
outcry from the Nasserite nationalists and their Egyptian allies, but we should be
prepared to face this; we certainly have the power to deal with any security risks
which might arise, and we should not be afraid to use it. . . .
Minutes on 197
Mr. Melville
In this letter Sir William Luce tells us about recent political developments in the
Colony and Federation, and looks to the future. We do not need to take executive
action at present on this letter, but I think that higher authority and, in due course,
Mr. Amery should see it.
In paragraph 15 the Governor refers to correspondence with the Office in 1958 and
1959. You need not, I suggest, trouble to re-read these back papers in detail; and it
will, I think, be sufficient if you glance again at the two papers [in which] Mr.
Lennox-Boyd sought confirmation from his colleagues that H.M.G. required the use
of Aden as a base, and discussed the dilemma posed for us by political awakening in
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the Colony and Federation. Two years ago, as Sir William Luce reminds us, he
proposed to the Secretary of State an elaborate scheme of gradual disengagement,
which included the merger of Colony and Federation under Protectorate status.
Ministers did not feel that they could commit themselves to so definite a programme
of disengagement, and, in fact, our present policy in Aden is to play for time without
appearing to obstruct any local moves towards a closer association between Colony
and Protectorate.
In fact, during the past year the Governor has not needed to indicate H.M.G.’s
views on this last point, but recently, as he describes in his letter, the Government
have had to show their hand in the Legislative Council and indicate the probability of
constitutional change in the Colony when the present Legislative Council comes to
an end at the end of 1962. This public debate sparked off the Rulers in the Federation
to some typical remonstrances. These Rulers have, of course, for some time been
identifiable as the political leaders in the Protectorate, and they are the people with
whom we have come to terms over the Federation. Although I myself think that the
younger generation of educated Arabs—many of whom are coming to this country
for training—are perhaps as hostile to the conception of rule by the Rulers as to the
British connection, I think that at present the Rulers are the people who have the
power in the Protectorate. We cannot hold Aden Colony without a friendly
Protectorate and for the present we must put our shirts on the Rulers.
In the Colony, however, it has not been so easy to identify the Arabs (or for that
matter Indians) who have power. In part, of course, this is due to the fact that it is
only in the past two years that Aden has emerged from Crown Colony government.
Even now, there are no real political parties—apart from the Aden T.U.C.—and very
few public men who command an assured following. Still the ‘quasi-Ministerial’
system which we have been operating for the past 18 months has given one or two
Unofficials an opportunity to obtain some public backing. The best of them—as the
recent Industrial Legislation business showed—is Mr. Bayoomi, and I would agree
with the Governor that he is becoming a dominant figure in Colony politics.
The Governor indicates that, although there are still wide differences between the
Rulers and the Colony moderates led by Mr. Bayoomi, there are some signs of the
growth of some common understanding between them, and he implies that it is in
our interest to devise a long-term policy which will establish them in power in the
Colony and in the Federation. As a means of doing this, he recalls his earlier proposal
for a Protectorate over the two areas. He suggests that it would be wrong to try to
maintain our authority in the Colony by continuing to develop internal self-
government on orthodox Colonial Office lines.
This idea of turning the Colony into a Protectorate has certain attractions. Arabs
have not demonstrated any remarkable talent for Parliamentary government and, as
I have said, there has been no real sign in the Colony of a political party system which
could make Parliamentary government effective. On the other hand, I am not
convinced that the mere change from Colonial to Protectorate status would of itself
alter conditions in the Colony. In paragraph 3 of his letter the Governor refers to a
hint by the Sharif of Beihan that the Colony originally belonged to two of the
neighbouring States, and Mr. Lennox-Boyd indicated that the Sultan of Lahej might
have historical claims to the territory which is now the Colony. The Sharif of Beihan
is hardly an impeccable historian, but these doubts as to the traditional ownership of
the Colony territory serve to remind us that, so far as I know, we have never entered
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into Protectorate relationship otherwise than with an authority which existed before
we came to the territory. In several parts of Africa we have employed the Foreign
Jurisdiction Act, post hoc, to transfer Protectorates virtually into Colonies, but that
is a different process from what the Governor seems to have in mind. I do not, at this
stage, see how we could change the Colony into a Protectorate without taking some
established authority under our Protection—and who is this established authority to
be? The Governor implies that it should be the moderate Colony politicians but I
foresee great difficulties in our establishing in advance, as it were, an authoritarian
regime in the Colony with which we could enter into Protectorate relationship, and
remain confident that it would endure and would be able to conduct itself, with
consent, in such a way as to enable us to retain all we want in the way of defence, etc.,
facilities. There are admittedly dangers, as the Governor points out, in giving Aden
Colony another dose of constitutional advance along orthodox lines, but I am not
convinced as yet that this danger is greater than those which would be involved in
trying to set up Mr. Bayoomi and his friends and then disengage ourselves into a
situation where we could not come to their rescue.
On other papers, as you know, the Middle East Official Committee is examining
our Persian Gulf commitments and their consequences. It looks, at this stage, as
though the need for us to retain the use of Aden as a base, which has governed our
policies hitherto, will be again emphasised. I hope that we shall be in a position to
adopt a policy which will combine the need to do this with the need to govern in the
Colony and in the Protectorate with consent. These two needs are the basis of the
Governor’s suggestions.
It would, I think, be useful for the department to examine the historical point
about the claim to Aden Colony were H.M.G. to ‘liberate’ it from Colonial status. Sir
Bernard Reilly’s advice on this would be invaluable.3 It would also be useful, I think,
to have examined more closely the principles involved in an exchange of Protectorate
for Crown Colony status and, in particular, the question of what kind of authority
would be required before the Sovereign could take a “neutralized” territory under
Protection. I think that Mr. Branney could give us valuable advice on this point.
Looking a little further ahead, you yourself will be visiting Aden and no doubt find
Sir William Luce’s suggestions useful in forming your own impressions, and for
discussion with the new Governor. Looking further ahead still, I suggest that there is
a good case for a Ministerial visit to Aden after Sir Charles Johnston has had some
time to settle in and before the time comes when we have to take firm decisions of
policy, i.e. before we have to decide finally what kind of Colony constitution is going
to replace the present one at the end of 1962.
I.W.
13.9.60
The Governor’s suggestions do not, in my view, provide a workable basis for future
constitutional development of the Colony and Protectorate. I agree with the
objections pointed out by Mr. Watt but I would not go as far as he does in saying that
we cannot hold the Colony without a friendly Protectorate and I would certainly not
go with the Governor in placing all our reliance on the Western Protectorate Rulers
3 Resident/governor and C-in-C, Aden, 1931–1940. He continued to be used by the CO as an adviser until
1961.
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as our best friends. They are all unpredictable and many of them are corrupt or
incapable. The suggestion that our base rights might be preserved by letting them
loose on the Colony with the Armed Forces paid for by us appears to me to be
unthinkable. It would lead to chaos and defeat our objective.
Although the Protectorate Rulers and the Colony have many problems to settle
between them, their interests are likely to be opposed and it seems pointless to
expect that this will lead to a permanent basis for closer association.
As to the historical claims of the Rulers in relation to Aden Colony, I shall be very
interested to hear Sir Bernard’s views but it would, in my view, be fatal to concede
such interests. Apart from anything else this would go far to undermining our own
rejection of the historical claims of the demands of the Yemen and would lose us the
friendship of the people in Aden Colony who have made their homes there under
British rule.
I agree with the Governor that we cannot afford to let this problem wait too long or
we shall be caught on the wrong foot. It appears to me to be largely aggravated by the
creation of the Federation, which has greatly restricted our freedom of manoeuvre as
well as frightening the Colony people into increasing their pressure towards indepen-
dence so that they can protect themselves from the Federation. It seems to me ques-
tionable whether the Federation can hold together for long without the overall
pressure of Her Majesty’s Government’s policy and it would have made more sense to
think of uniting the Colony with Lahej and possibly one or two other adjacent states
so that the Colony would have been the senior partner in the union and could have
gradually extended its system of administration to take in the more developed parts of
Lahej. This would have provided a basis for framing a Constitution with a block of tra-
ditionalists representing the states to balance the elected representatives from the
Colony. The union of Lahej with the Colony would have safeguarded the Colony’s trade
with the Yemen and enabled the Colony to acquire more breathing space.
As things are we have little alternative but to devise a further constitutional
advance for the Colony alone, as far as possible placing the power in responsible
hands. In the circumstances of the Colony with its dependence on the port, the
refinery and military base for its prosperity, and with no rural population to balance
the large accretion of raw, uneducated, rootless people in the town, it would be folly
to place power in the hands of a popular majority. Responsible people in the Colony
are not pressing for a greater degree of democracy in the administration but a
further step in the transfer of power to local hands as a concession to their
nationalism. Our objective should therefore be a Constitution which confers further
responsibilities on the local people but restricts the ability of demagogues to
undermine the stability of the Colony.
Obviously, a Constitution of this nature would provide ammunition for our critics
in Arabia but they will condemn any Constitution which does not provide the hostile
Arabian Governments with the means of evicting the British from Aden. Similarly,
any Constitution that would be acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government is bound to
be bitterly attacked by the Aden T.U.C. Unless, therefore, Her Majesty’s Government
intends to give way to these hostile and malign forces, it must discount all such
hostile criticism and propaganda and select a course in the interests of the settled
stable population of Aden Colony and of Her Majesty’s Government. This may well
involve the use of novel and possibly curious constitutional devices but if these fit the
circumstances we should not reject them.
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We should make up our minds that in the peculiar circumstances of Aden, where a
very high proportion of the population have come into the territory from outside in
recent decades, the determining voice in the Government should be that of the
settled Adenis who have a permanent interest in the Colony and a vested interest in
security and prosperity; these are the property owners, the businessmen and
employees in reasonably responsible positions, together with the professional classes
which, though small in number, have a major contribution to make. We should aim
to create a strong Executive and a weak Legislature and a Constitution which will
avoid dramatic upheavals and reversals of policy. Apart from providing the degree of
stability needed in the Colony for its commerce and shipping interests, such a
government would provide the best chance of developing closer relations with the
Protectorate. Because of the very small number of men with experience in
responsible positions in public life, the Constitution should provide for the retention
of such men in public life even though they may not be elected representatives and
should provide more opportunities for holding office and acquiring the necessary
experience. It is of course essential that the next step should include a move towards
a full Ministerial system.
Among the devices which might be examined I suggest the following:—
(a) That seats in the Legislature should not be filled by General Elections but by
elections in rotation of a proportion of the representatives, as in local government
in the United Kingdom. This would have the advantage of avoiding dramatic
changes, damping down the excitement of General Elections and it could be used
to retain in power the present Arab leaders who are prepared to co-operate with
the Government, for a period beyond the life of the present Legislative Council.
The rotational system could be introduced by enlarging the Council so that none
of the existing members would have to be called upon to vacate their seats for
election.
(b) If it were considered essential to enlarge the elected majority, this should
certainly be balanced by a restriction of the franchise. The latter should probably
be introduced in any case. The residence qualification for British subjects and
British Protected Persons should be increased from the present figure of two years’
out of the three preceding the election to something like five out of the seven
preceding the election. This would go some way to meeting a grievance of the local
Arabs that Indians and other British subjects can acquire the vote after only two
years’ residence and it would also reduce the influence of newly-entered
Protectorate people, many of whom are among the supporters of the Aden T.U.C.
and would take their instructions on voting from that organization. No aliens
should be given the vote and this would leave the Yemenis where they stand at
present. A higher property and income qualifications should if possible be adopted
in order to weaken still further the voting power of the T.U.C. and the irresponsible
element in the Aden population.
(c) Another device to weaken the Legislature and strengthen the Executive might
be the creation of an Upper Chamber something on the lines of the Portuguese
Corporative Chamber, which includes representatives of the sectional interests of
the community. This could be a nominated body which would bring into public life
responsible and experienced people who would not be thrown up by the elections
or who had lost their seats and it would make it possible for the Executive to
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include nominated as well as elected members. Seats could be provided in this
body for representatives of the Labour Movement so that there could be no valid
criticism that there was no opportunity for them to express their views in a
constitutional manner. The Upper House might have limited powers to delay
legislation put up by the Lower House and also powers to initiate legislation. While
all this would help to make the process of legislation and public discussion more
cumbersome and reduce the possibilities of ill-considered action by the elected
Chamber, it could not ensure the Executive a majority to carry through its
proposals in the elected Chamber. It is for this reason that the restriction of the
franchise is so important.
(d) It is also time that the Aden Government faced up to the job, which it
continues to shirk, of finding out who the people are in Aden and what they are
doing. If the Colony is to become politically stable and to run more of its own
affairs, it is essential to its security that it should have control of the people from
the Yemen and the Protectorate who come into the Colony. While the migrant
labour will always, as far as one can see, play a part in the economy of Aden it
seems desirable to maintain as sharp a distinction as possible between the settled
population and the migrant labour and to prevent the growth of a large
transitional class. Nobody knows how long the migrant labour are really staying
now and how many of them tend to develop permanent connections with the
Colony. This danger to Aden comes not only from the Yemen but also from the
Protectorate and already one can see Protectorate families who might throw their
lot against our protégés both in the Colony and the Protectorate and who have
members in influential positions in both Colony and Protectorate organizations. It
is far easier for people in the Colony and the Protectorate to find a common
interest at this level than it is for the Protectorate Rulers to reconcile their vested
interests with those of the Colony political leaders.
I have not so far commented on the definition of “Adeni”. The Governor’s attitude
is that no official definition can be adopted until public opinion has hardened on the
subject and I do not believe that it is in Her Majesty’s Government’s interests to see a
formal definition adopted. Indians and Pakistanis in the Colony, who might be
excluded from any definition in deference to the majority Arab opinion, are more
often than not people whose interests are identical with those of Her Majesty’s
Government and whose interests are beneficial to Aden.
Some of these thoughts may seem far-fetched but they are no more outrageous
than those of the Governor and I am sure that we need a full examination of the
problem from first principles without any preconceived solutions.
C.A.K.
15.9.60
Sir John Martin
I send this forward at this stage for you to see Sir William Luce’s swan-song letter.
Sir William Luce’s analysis of the political scene and of likely future developments
is keen and perceptive and I don’t think that we could find much to quarrel with in it.
It is over his conclusions and recommendations for future action that there seems
likely to be disagreement. I myself know so little about Aden and the Arab world
generally that I hesitate to express critical views. The short visit which I propose to
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make to Aden in November will give me more confidence to do so although it is
scarcely likely to fill in the gaps in my knowledge of Aden affairs. I must, however, say
that I find it very hard to swallow Sir William Luce’s solution of translating Aden
Colony into a Protectorate. Some of the arguments on this are set out in Mr. Watt’s
minute of the 13th September and Mr. Kirkman’s minute of the 15th September
above, both of which you should read. It seems to me that if we were to try to take
this step, we should create more difficulties for ourselves than we should solve. The
basic difficulty would be to find the authority to whom sovereignty could be
transferred, and in the absence of a traditional sovereign such as we have in the
Federated States and in other Sultanates it is hard to see how the Protectorate idea
avoids the issue of conferring full self-government on some form of democratically
elected executive government. There are indeed a number of strands in Sir William
Luce’s argument which suggest a parallel with Singapore, both internally and in its
relations with the Federation of Malaya. It is surely more in accordance with our
traditional policy, and with the way in which we have hitherto devolved power in
Aden, for us to direct future advances along Singapore lines.
As I think you know, the Official Middle East Committee have recently attempted
to answer a number of questions by the Minister of Defence about the future defence
of the Arabian Peninsula and particularly our oil interests in the Persian Gulf, on the
assumption that our present military facilities in Aden were lost to us. The
conclusion reached by the Committee, which I have no doubt will be endorsed by the
Chiefs of Staff and by Ministers, is that alternative arrangements to Aden would be
difficult and expensive to create and that our policy should therefore be directed
towards maintaining our position in Aden as long as possible. The Committee have
recognised, of course,—as we did in Singapore—that the free and unfettered use of
military facilities can be assured only by the consent of the people of Aden and that
there may come a stage at which we should be faced with the choice of remaining by
force or getting out. In the meantime, moreover, it would be necessary, in order to
retain the consent of the local people, to offer advances in self-government. All this is
obvious enough and is, I think, an accepted doctrine by other Departments in
Whitehall including Defence Departments. But the importance of Aden as a defence
base means that we shall have to continue to carry the Defence Departments with us
in the constitutional changes which will become inevitable in 1962. We should
therefore bring them into consultation at a fairly early stage on our constitutional
plans.
But first I think we must clear our minds in the Office on the issues which we have
to face at the next stage of constitutional advance, in the light of Sir William Luce’s
analysis and recommendations in his letter. I would propose therefore to ask Mr. Watt
to set this in hand in consultation with the lawyers and then, after my return from
Aden in November, to submit outline proposals on which consultation with other
Whitehall Departments could take place. Before a final plan goes to Ministers, we
shall of course have to consult the new Governor. But we must keep the discussions
moving along fairly steadily if we are not to be caught short at the end of the present
constitutional period; and we can most profitably take the new Governor’s advice
when we have clarified our ideas here internally and with other interested
Departments.
E.M.
30.9.60
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I do not submit at this stage any recommendation on [Sir W. Luce’s] suggestions
about future policy, since these require further detailed study in the Department.
Prima facie I share the doubts expressed in departmental minutes. The dangers of
further advance towards parliamentary democracy are clear enough, but it is not so
clear how we could hope to preserve our military position by handing over
sovereignty to “our friends” the moderates, who are upheld neither by traditional
loyalties nor by popular political support.
J.M.M.
3.10.60
This is an extremely interesting and important letter from Sir William Luce whose
views on the future of the Aden Colony and Protectorate are clearly entitled to very
great respect. I have never dealt directly with Aden affairs in the Office and I have
never visited Aden so I do not feel very well qualified to express any opinion at this
stage. Nevertheless my instinct tells me that Sir W. Luce is clearly right in urging
that the future of the Colony and the future of the Protectorate must be considered
in parallel and in relation to each other. For one thing, if it became necessary to
grant independence to the Protectorate I should imagine it would be quite
impossible to hold on the Colony. It is only the strong racial antipathies between the
Federation of Malaya and Singapore which have enabled us to retain Singapore as a
separate entity. If both States wanted to join up I am very doubtful whether we could
retain our position in Singapore. The same considerations seem to apply in Aden.
But working from this premise I think where the subsequent argument begins to
go a bit wrong is in a certain ambiguity in the meaning of the word “Protectorate”.
As I read Sir W. Luce’s letter I think what he has in mind with his Aden [?Sudan]
background, is something much more like what we should normally call a
Protected State (or a group of Protected States) with recognised local rulers with
whom we can be in treaty relationship, e.g. the Federation of Malaya before inde-
pendence, Tonga or Zanzibar. Unless there is some recognised arrangement of this
kind under which the sovereignty and jurisdiction lie with the local rulers there is
no escape from the fact that even if we turned Aden Colony into a Protectorate we
should still have to devise some form of constitutional Government. Nyasaland is a
Protectorate; so too is Uganda where perhaps one gets the nearest analogy of an
area which contains local rulers whose jurisdiction does not cover the whole area of
the Protectorate.
Nevertheless, there is a great deal of food for thought in Sir W. Luce’s letter and I
entirely agree that his proposals should be examined in detail and the views of the
new Governor sought when we are in a position to make any comment of our own.
A.H.P.
4.10.60
There is indeed much to be thought about. All of the thinking however, as I see it,
should be based on the fact that we can hold the security situation if we have to.
Starting from this premise, I would not unduly worry about my enemies who were
always going to be enemies, or even worry too much about my friends! I do not mean
by this that I do not want to keep my friends and indeed to strengthen them in every
way possible, but it does seem to me that here is a situation where we are in control
and can so remain over the next years. To this end continued friendship with the
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Federal rulers is of obvious importance and firm action is something they
understand and would welcome.
All the same one does not want unnecessarily to stir up trouble or makes things
difficult; hence I agree that we should try to give encouragement to our political
friends in the colony. This means a greater degree of self-government, although just
how great a degree would need much thought. It also means, I think, cooking the
elections to ensure that they remain in power. Mr. Kirkman’s minute of the 15th
September has various valuable ideas in this respect. Whether in helping our
political friends one has to talk about protectorate status, full self-government and
all the other things, I am inclined to wonder.
One last comment. I am very clear that we must take the Federal Rulers along with
us in any steps to greater self-government for the Colony, more especially if this is
part of a plan for bringing the Colony and the Federal Rulers together. I know that
the wind of change blows almost everywhere, but is this not a point where our
friends (and I would include the Imam in this context!) do not want the rule of
Princes too fast [sic] subject to the pressure of the rule of the people? Our enemies
will always want us out and want change for that purpose.
P.
11.10.60
198 CAB 131/24, D(60)53 27 Oct 1960
‘Constitutional development in Aden’: memorandum by Mr Macleod
for Cabinet Defence Committee
The Defence Committee has agreed (D. (60) 10th Meeting) that the protection of
British interests requires the retention of our base at Aden and has invited me to
submit a memorandum on the likely course of constitutional development.
2. In January, 1959, a new constitution in Aden Colony provided, for the first
time, for significant participation by elected members in the Legislative and
Executive Councils. There is an elected majority in the former, and in the latter five
elected Members with responsibilities for departments. Defence, external affairs,
internal security and the civil service remain in official hands. The franchise is
confined to British subjects and British Protected Persons with two years’ residence
in the Colony and a modest property or income qualification. The Arab Nationalist
element, urged on by the Aden T.U.C., boycotted the elections for this Legislative
Council and, as a result, persons of moderate disposition who were willing to work
the constitution were elected. There is no real party system in the Colony, but the
Nationalists form a coherent group deriving their support mainly from the labouring
classes, most of whom come from the Protectorate or from the Yemen. This
constitution has worked satisfactorily despite hostility and criticism by the
Nationalists, who get regular support from Cairo Radio. The Members in Charge of
Departments have shown that Adenese can, working in collaboration with the civil
service, take charge of domestic affairs. They showed praiseworthy determination
and responsibility in supporting industrial legislation to deal with strikes, and thus
clip the Nationalists’ wings.
3. Recently there have been distinct signs of public interest in a further stage of
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constitutional development. The trend towards self-government in other British
territories, particularly in Somaliland, has had its effect. The leaders of the moderate
element wished to go with this trend and thereby disarm their Nationalist critics.
They suggested to Sir William Luce, the recently retired Governor, that the expiry of
the lifetime of the present Legislative Council, in January, 1963, should be the
occasion for a constitutional change which would give the Adenese responsibility for
all domestic affairs, leaving H.M.G. responsible for all defence, external relations and
security. They stated that they recognise that we should wish to continue to have the
use of Aden for defence purposes, and that they would welcome our presence. This
private approach was followed by a public debate in the Legislative Council, which
brought unanimous support for a Government resolution looking to a new
constitution in January, 1963.
4. The declared intention of the Nationalists is to force us out of Aden as quickly
as possible, and to unite Colony, Protectorate and a “reformed” Yemen with the
U.A.R. So long as we remain in Aden we must expect their hostility. Our problem is to
devise arrangements which will meet the wishes of the moderates for further self-
government, thus enabling them to work with us and at the same time retain public
support from that considerable element of the population which, like ourselves,
knows that, if the Nationalists obtained power, security and stability would disappear.
5. We must take account of the Federation of Arab Amirates of the South, which
was created in February, 1959, and has since been growing in coherence and
authority. Federal Government headquarters are virtually in the Colony, and this has
contributed to making the people of the Colony and the Federal leaders more aware
of each other’s existence, of some common interests, and of the possibility of a
common destiny. The Federation Rulers are as subject to Nationalist hostility as are
the Colony moderates, but the Rulers have the strength which comes from
traditional authority in rural Arabia, and there is no overt sign that they cannot
maintain it, provided we continue to help them militarily, financially and with
discreet political advice. Just as it is important that the Colony moderates should be
able to demonstrate to public opinion there that they can bring increasing self-
government, so it is important for the Federal Rulers to demonstrate to the peoples
of the Protectorate that Federation and the British link can bring them material
benefits and a respectable political future. The Rulers are apprehensive lest we
concede too much too quickly in the Colony; and any constitutional changes which
gave the Nationalists an opportunity would make the Rulers doubt our purpose and
might lead them to precipitate, irresponsible action. We have not yet been called on
to give any public indication of H.M.G.’s attitude to a closer merger between the
Colony and the Federation, but there are signs that the Rulers and the leaders of the
Colony moderates are beginning to realise that they have a common political interest
in resisting the Nationalists, as well as in more material affairs. We must handle the
Colony so as to obtain at least the acquiescence of the Federal leaders.
6. The first important date in forward planning is January, 1963; and we shall
have to make our intentions public before then. Merely to repeat the present
constitution for a further four years is unlikely to serve, since to do so would
disappoint and lose us the support of the moderates. There would then be little
prospect of our being able to remain in Aden with any significant measure of
consent.
7. There would, however, be grave danger in the grant of a further measure of
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responsible government on the normal Colonial pattern. To enlarge the elected
Membership of the Councils and widen the franchise would be to invite the
Nationalists to strive for a majority. They might well succeed, and we would soon
have a crisis. The Federation Rulers would not forgive our foolishness.
8. Our efforts should rather be directed towards devising arrangements which
will meet the desire of the moderates to run domestic affairs, leaving us with control
of external relations, defence and security. Such a scheme will not, we must assume,
assuage Nationalist hostility, and we must pay particular attention to the
maintenance, and if necessary, improvement of the police and security forces. I
believe that it may be possible to make such arrangements, but I cannot yet make
detailed proposals. I intend to examine the problem in consultation with the new
Governor during the next few months and in due course to submit my
recommendations to the Colonial Policy Committee.1
1 The new governor was Sir Charles Johnston. The CO had not agreed with Sir W Luce that the Colony
should be turned into a protectorate or protected state—it would be too risky to the continuation of the
use of Aden as a base (as ministers intended) by ‘premature’ withdrawal of ultimate jurisdiction (CO
1015/2392, no 8). At the Defence Committee meeting on 2 Nov, the prime minister said they should ‘take
special care, in promoting the constitutional development of Aden, to safeguard our defence requirements’
and be prepared ‘if necessary, to make some moderate financial contribution to assist the development of
the Colony and Protectorate’; there were ‘good hopes of maintaining our position by agreement’ (CAB
131/23, D 11(60)2).
199 CO 1015/2392, no 29 3 Mar 1961
[Tactics and methods for attaining long-term objectives in Aden]:
despatch (no 399) from Sir C Johnston (Aden) to Mr Macleod.
Minutes by I Watt, E Melville, Sir J Martin and Mr Fraser [Extract]
[This appraisal was awaited with interest in the CO. Extensive extracts were published in
C H Johnston, The view from Steamer-Point: being an account of three years in Aden
(1964) pp 36–40. Johnston had formerly been ambassador in Amman.]
. . . 71. I submit proposals on these grave matters with much diffidence. I have only
been in Aden four months. Conditions in Aden Colony are such that it is not possible
for us to sound local leaders, however informally, on such problems without starting
every kind of undesirable speculation. For these reasons I must emphasise that the
present despatch should be regarded as a preliminary exercise in clearing the
ground. In fact it seems essential that in this exercise we should preserve a high
degree of flexibility and not commit ourselves to any detailed solution in advance of
full consultation with Colony and Federal leaders. It will however be of advantage to
us to clear our own mind as soon as possible. Even though our Arab friends here will
certainly not accept our views on all points without demur, they will no less certainly
expect us to give them a lead.
72. As regards “playing the hand”, there are certain factors of which we should I
think take full advantage. It may be convenient to set these out in tabular form.
(a) We should use the Colony’s wish for early self-government to justify the
handing over of power to the Colony moderates as soon as possible, with the effect
of avoiding the holding of Legislative Council elections early in 1963 under the
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present constitution, with the disastrous implications which they would almost
certainly have.
(b) We should use the Colony’s fear of being swallowed by the Federation to get
the Colony moderates’ support for the maintenance of a special British position in
regard to our bases in the Colony not only during the transitional phase, but
during the final phase as well.
(c) We should use the Federal Rulers’ fear of the Colony going Nasserite to get
their agreement to our retaining this special position in both phases. On present
form they are unlikely to oppose this. They will be terrified lest, by granting self-
government to the Colony, we are taking the first step towards pulling out of it.
The more cast-iron we can make the position of our bases in the Colony, the better
placed we will be to retain their confidence.
(d) We should use the Colony’s wish for independence in order to shorten the
transitional phase and expedite the merger with the Federation. This will mean
making it quite clear to the Colony that we refuse to let it achieve separate
independence. A firm line on this point will, in my view, be fully justified. It is not
a question which can or ought to be decided on the basis of the Colony’s interests
alone, still less of what a mistaken majority believe those interests to be. The
Federation, and the Protectorate as a whole, are also vitally concerned. They
cannot survive in isolation from the Colony. We should be betraying our trust to
them if we allowed the Colony to achieve separate independence, whatever its own
majority may desire.
(e) In general we should use the conflicting fears and aspirations of Colony and
Federation to produce a balance of forces giving us the position which we require.
73. I realise that the foregoing paragraph may sound cynical, Machiavellian and
generally in line with the worst traditions of European diplomacy. Nevertheless I
have thought it important to set down our assets frankly, together with my views on
the way in which they can best be exploited. We need not, I suggest, be ashamed of
our objectives. This is after all a special case in the history of the late-colonial era.
Instead of conflicting, the true interests of coloniser and colonised are here in
substantial agreement and point to the same solution: the continued co-operation of
Colony, Protectorate and U.K., but on a basis more in keeping with the times in
which we live. To put this solution into effect will nevertheless be an extremely
difficult task, having regard to the irrational and hysterical character of the Arabs.
There is every possibility of things going wrong, and some risk of our losing our
position here altogether in the process. For that reason we must play all our cards for
all they are worth. Given good management and—almost more important in the
Middle East—good luck, we need not despair of obtaining our requirements in some
such form as I have outlined.
74. I personally would very much hope we can do so, and for a reason which has
nothing to do with strategy, or even with oil. In other parts of the world where we
have had an imperial position—Africa, India, South East Asia—we have succeeded,
or are succeeding, in achieving a happy new relationship with former subject peoples
on a basis of independence and partnership. Although the Arabs, outside Aden
Colony, have never been our subjects in the technical sense, we have played a
predominant part in the Near and Middle East since 1882, and even in this short
period have managed to leave an extremely long-term mark on the area, e.g. by the
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creation of modern Egypt and modern Iraq, to say nothing of modern Israel. The
latter part of our Arabian chapter has been an unlucky one. It would be useful for our
historical record if we could end it on a happier note: if, for example, while
maintaining our essential strategic facilities in Aden, we could at the same time
establish in Southern Arabia an independent and prosperous Arab state in relations
of friendly partnership with ourselves. Such a state could serve throughout the Arab
world as an advertisement for the British connexion in a new form. It might have
considerable attraction for other Arab states, starting with the Yemen.
75. The fact is that the Arabs are going to need foreign help for a considerable
time to come, and that objectively speaking we British, with all our mistakes, seem
better qualified to do this job than the Americans, the Russians, the Chinese or any of
the other foreign powers who have attempted it. As long as we need the oil of the
Persian Gulf we shall have a mercenary motive for keeping the idea of Anglo-Arab
partnership alive. I would however not wish to rule out the possibility of such
partnership continuing even after the end of the oil era. Our special national
qualities will not die out just because atomic energy has supplanted oil fuelling and
internal combustion. The Arabs will probably still need foreign help—perhaps more
then than ever. It would be a fine thing if we were still in a position to give it, and still
had a special relationship with parts of the Arab world which would make it natural
for us to do so. This may seem looking rather far ahead; it is however a point of view
which I have formed strongly as a result of observations in North and South Arabia
over the past few years.
76. Conclusions. Starting from the assumption that it is essential for us to retain
our strategic facilities in Aden Colony, I conclude that:
(a) Further constitutional advance in Aden Colony cannot be avoided, both in
view of our general principles, and in order to keep us the support of the moderate
leaders who are our best friends in the Colony.
(b) It is however essential for us to change our present course, leading as it would
straight to fresh elections for the Colony’s Legislative Council early in 1963 which
could be expected to produce an overwhelming radical nationalist majority and
thus to lose us Aden altogether.
(c) The right solution, in the interests both of H.M.G. and of the peoples of the
Colony and the Protectorate, is a merger of Colony and Protectorate into a single
Union. This is also desired by a majority of these peoples as a whole, including the
Colony moderates and the Rulers of the Federation.
(d) Nevertheless, taking the Colony separately from the Protectorate, radical
nationalist opinion is so strong here at present that in a referendum it would
produce an overwhelming majority against a merger with the Protectorate under
its present pro-British Rulers and against any continuation of the British
connexion.
(e) In the circumstances, we must accept some deviation from our democratic
principles in our plans for the Colony’s future.
(f ) Before a merger with the Protectorate can be effected, some transitional stage
will be needed for the Colony. This should be unmistakably designed as an
approach to the merger.
(g) One alternative would be to introduce a substantive transitional stage of
internal self-government under British sovereignty, the main purpose of which
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would be to ensure that the present moderate leaders should take responsibility
for the Colony’s entry into the Union. This course is likely to be that preferred by
the Colony leaders themselves.
(h) The Federal Rulers on the other hand believe strongly that any transitional
stage should be either a purely formal one, or else omitted altogether, and that
after discussion between them and the Colony moderates the Colony should merge
with the Federation as soon as possible into a Union where our military facilities
would be assured to us by treaty.
(i) The alternative in conclusion (g) is recommended, as preferable both from the
point of view of public presentation and also because it would ensure us the
enjoyment of our military facilities in virtue of sovereignty for a proportionately
longer period.
( j) Nevertheless, in order to meet the Federal Rulers’ position as far as possible, it
is also recommended that at an early stage H.M.G. should make a statement
stressing the impossibility of separate independence for either Colony or
Protectorate; and that following this we should sponsor discussions between
representatives of the Federation and the Colony Legislative Council on the
question of a Union and the means by which it should be brought into being.
(k) When the Union was formed, the Colony should enter it not as just one more
new state which is what the Federal Rulers wish, nor on a footing of equality with
the present Federation as a whole, which will probably be the wish of the Colony
leaders, but on a basis half-way between these two extreme solutions, taking
account both of the Colony’s small permanent population and also of its great
economic and geographical importance.
(l) Without prejudicing the cohesion of the Union, the special position of the
Colony inside it should be safeguarded.
(m) As part of this special status for the Colony, appropriate means should be
found of ensuring us that secure unilateral control over our strategic facilities in it
which Treaties in practice do not guarantee.
(n) As it is impracticable to follow the Cyprus pattern and carve British sovereign
areas out of the Colony, conclusion (m) implies that we must seek some limitation
on the Union’s sovereignty in respect of our military facilities in the Colony even
after full unity and independence had been achieved.
(o) Thanks to the existing balance of forces between Colony and Protectorate, we
may be able to create the political conditions for a solution on these lines. If so, it
would be a question of finding a suitable constitutional expression for such a
solution, novel though it would be. The effort to do so will be worth making, since,
failing a solution on these lines, the only course left us would be to fall back on a
Treaty type of solution, with all the risks which that involves.
(p) The states of the W.A.P. outside the Federation should be brought into the
Union as opportunity offers.
(q) The states of the E.A.P., including Socotra, should also be brought into the Union.
(r) The same applies to Perim and Kamaran; as regards the Kuria Muria Islands,
the Political Resident, Persian Gulf, who at present administers them, should be
asked to advise.
(s) The retention of our strategic facilities is unlikely to be achieved without
considerably increased expenditure by H.M.G. in terms of aid to the Colony and
increased aid to the Federation.
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(t) The foregoing proposals represent a preliminary attempt to clear the ground.
Our plans should be flexible and subject to amendment when the Colony and
Federal leaders have developed their own ideas further.
(u) Throughout the exercise we must as always in the Arab world be ready with
plans for the worst case. This may include suspending the Colony’s constitution,
and resuming direct administration of it, if things go wrong here during the
transitional stage, as they easily may.
(v) Our ultimate aim should be, while maintaining our essential strategic facilities
in Aden, to establish in Southern Arabia an independent and prosperous Arab state
in relations of friendly partnership with ourselves. . . .
Minutes on 199
Mr. Melville
It is proposed to discuss the Governor’s despatch with the Ministry of Defence,
Foreign Office and Treasury on 9th March; and to hold further discussions with the
Chief Secretary next week.
In devising his proposals, the Governor has drawn upon the knowledge of H.M.G.’s
views about Aden which he derived from consultations and study in the Office last
summer, from his discussions with you in Aden in the autumn, and more recently
from the reports we gave him (in your letter at (23)) of the talks here with Mr.
Trevaskis1 and Mr. Bayoomi in January. The despatch, I submit, shows that the
Governor has fully apprehended the main points brought out in correspondence and
discussions; and I think that his proposals should be accepted as much on the right
lines.
In his Memorandum D(60)53 to the Defence Committee last October2 the
Secretary of State told his colleagues that it would seem likely that we should have to
devise a special form of arrangement which would go with the desire of the Adenese
for greater self-government, would yet keep out the Nationalists, and would
commend itself to the Federation. The Governor’s scheme attempts to reconcile
these intentions, as far as they can be reconciled in practice. You will recall that Sir
William Luce, in seeking to achieve essentially the same objective, felt that the best
way would be to take a leap and turn the Colony into a “State”, having the same kind
of constitutional position as the various States in the Protectorates. We have told Sir
Charles Johnston that we questioned whether such a proposal would work, and
indicated to him that H.M.G. would probably be uneasy about relinquishing
sovereignty in the Colony, so long as the Colony remained something of a separate
entity. The Governor has acknowledged our point, and his scheme for the Colony
would retain sovereignty.
Yet the Governor does argue that the only political way to encourage our friends to
work with us and give us what we want is to bless a union of the Federation and of
the Colony in principle. He harks back to the idea which Mr. Amery (when he was
Parliamentary Under Secretary) put forward,3 that the best way for us to make sure of
1 K Trevaskis, adviser and British agent, Western Aden Protectorate; subsequently high commissioner.
2 See document no 198. 3 See document no 193.
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what we want was to play upon such divergencies between the Colony and the
Federation as, admittedly, exist. The Governor argues that this policy is now out of
step with the facts, and in paragraph 23 of his despatch makes a new point—and I
think a telling one—that unless the British foster a union in a sensible way, then it
would not be long before the Federation Rulers brought it about in a far from
sensible manner. When we had our talk with Mr. Trevaskis he was, as is to be
expected, in favour of bringing about an early union between the Colony and the
Federation before the Colony had time to draw breath. We told Mr. Trevaskis that we
felt that it would be difficult for Ministers to bless so drastic a process, and paragraph
29 of the Governor’s despatch shows that this point of ours has also gone home. At
the risk, therefore, of some grumbling by the Federal Rulers, the Governor suggests
that the wiser thing is to give the Colony a period of internal self-government during
which arrangements for a union can be worked out. He does emphasise that we
should declare that it is an aim of policy that such a union should come about. The
Governor suggests the outlines of a constitution for the Colony. I suggest that it is
not, in principle, out of step with what is being done elsewhere, although even at a
first reading there are a number of omissions which we will have to sort out very
soon. We should not, I think, have any difficulty in reserving foreign affairs and
defence in the Governor’s hands; the Governor also suggests that we could retain
internal security. Here we come up against a familiar problem since I would imagine
that the administration, at any rate, of the police would have to become a self-
governing matter. I have spoken to Police Department who are going to let us have,
in the course of the next few days, a comprehensive note of the ways in which
problems of internal security and police have been resolved in recent constitutions,
and we can examine these precedents in discussion with the Chief Secretary. . . .
As we might expect, the Governor has taken the opportunity to remind us that in
his opinion (and in that of Mr. Trevaskis I am sure) H.M.G. does not provide enough
cash to the peoples of the Colony and of the Protectorate. There has long been a
feeling in Aden, which Sir William Luce shared, that somewhere, somehow, is a kitty
in London which should be handed out for “development”. We have, I think, now got
the Federation people to appreciate that our development funds are those voted by
Parliament for Colonial Development and Welfare and that they are disbursed on a
“project” basis. They have also learnt that the grant-in-aid which we give them has to
be based on “need”, although the definition of “need” may vary from time to time. I
should certainly regard any money which it was thought right to spend in the Colony
or in the Protectorate in order to pay friends as well-spent—if it does the trick, but I
do not expect that the Treasury can be asked to devise a new form of charity for Aden
alone. So far as I am aware, the best we can do is to see that the Protectorate gets as
generous a share of the remaining C.D.& W. money as can be made available (its
present allocation is only until 1962); and that when we have the block grant
negotiations later this year we shall show that we are willing to help with the
provision of welfare services on perhaps a more generous scale than hitherto. I am
glad that the Governor has given up the idea of trying to get the Service Departments
to pay rent for the large pieces of Aden which they occupy, but I do not know how we
can assist the Colony otherwise than we are doing at present, i.e. by C.D. & W. grants,
Exchequer loans, and (perhaps) C.D.C. participation in housing. However, the
Governor will of course expect us to examine seriously whether these present forms
of aid can be increased, and if they cannot, whether some new category of assistance
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can be devised. As I have said, however, I do not honestly feel that we can expect Aden
alone to be offered some form of large-scale charity.
We have all along recognised that the most difficult decision to be taken in
connection with the next stage of constitutional development in the Colony is about
elections. We have indicated to the Governor that there are difficulties of principle
about extending the life of a Legislative Council beyond its due expiry date, but we
have acknowledged that it might be the lesser of two evils to do something like this
when the lifetime of the present Legislative Council ends, rather than have another
election on the present franchise which would, as the Governor acknowledges,
probably be won by the Nationalists. What the Governor proposes is that before
January, 1963, the Legislative Council should be reconstituted by replacing the
present ex-officio members by five new members nominated to represent certain
interests. It is implicit in this proposal that the Legislative Council thus
reconstituted should then be given a further term of life. The Governor proposes that
during this further term of life (which would, I assume, be concurrent with the
proposed term of an internally self-governing Colony) the Government thus
constituted should devise its own future electoral legislation (and devise it in such a
way that they could be sure of winning subsequent elections). This proposal as the
Governor recognises, will occasion criticism and is in any case risky. The only
alternative in practice is, I submit, to go through with elections in the normal way at
the appointed time of January, 1963, and run the greater risk of seeing a Legislative
Council dominated by Nationalists who would, I would suppose, pass a resolution
asking for independence and withdrawal of British forces. It might be argued that it
would be easier for H.M.G. to adopt the second of these courses and then do a ‘British
Guiana’, in order to prove that we had given the Adenese a chance to behave
respectably which they had not taken. I do not consider that to take such a great risk
as this would be wise counsel at this time of day.
These are impressions from a first reading of the Governor’s despatch which on
the whole I find sensible and encouraging. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr.
Vile, Mr. Harding and Mr. Hammer. I should be grateful if Mr. Hammer would
consider what useful lessons there may be in recent “internal self-government”
constitutions such as Sierra Leone, British Guiana and British Honduras to deal with
the problems of the Civil Service, internal security, a Governor’s ability to legislate
on foreign affairs, defence and any other subjects which are within his discretion,
and (I have already spoken to him about this) arrangements to resume legal
authority should government break down.
I.W.
6.3.61
. . . Mr. Watt has attempted, very successfully I think, to crystallize the first reactions
of other interested Departments, and our own provisional conclusions. . . . In essence
the Governor’s proposal is that, given the need to create a friendly state in our part of
South Arabia and given in particular the need to keep our base facilities in Aden for as
long as possible with the consent of the local people, we must now begin to move for-
ward by stages to a merger between Aden Colony and the present Western Federation.
In his view we cannot just sit still. Nor can we safely advance Aden Colony alone along
the path of constitutional progress which we normally follow in other Colonial terri-
tories. His argument on this is fully and clearly set out in his despatch.
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I am myself convinced that this approach is right; and I do not think that we shall
meet much opposition to it from the Political Departments. But the Defence
Departments and the Treasury are bound to ask whether this is indeed the way in
which we can maintain ourselves in the Aden base for the longest possible time. I
would expect that the Secretary of State for Air4 (who of course has the largest stake
in the Aden base) would challenge the Governor’s proposition au fond and would
argue, as he did when he was in the Colonial Office, that it is illusory to imagine that
constitutional progress of the kind now envisaged and the maintenance of secure
base facilities are compatible; and in particular that we shall only be able to stay in
Aden if we can keep a direct grip on the Colony and prevent a merger between it and
any part of the Protectorate. . . .
Even if there is no frontal challenge to the essence of the Governor’s proposals,
there must certainly be an assessment of the risks which they entail for the
maintenance of sufficiently good relations between us and the Colony and Federation
as would secure the free and unfettered use of base facilities in Aden.
The Governor rightly argues—and all our experience confirms—that base
facilities are no good, or cannot long endure, without the consent of the local people.
But at the same time he accepts that a majority in Aden Colony oppose our presence
and indicates that they are not likely to be won over to accepting it. It is on this
ground that he justifies his proposal to amend the Aden Constitution without
holding elections in such a way as to give the Moderates the authority with which he
hopes they can maintain themselves in power when elections are eventually held.
This is obviously a risky process. If the opposition to our presence is genuine and
indeed irreconcilable then its suppression from attaining political power, by
whatever means we adopt, is bound to increase its strength. It is therefore a serious
question whether, in the transitional stage while union is being negotiated between
the Moderates and the Federal Rulers, and at the elections which follow, government
by consent would in fact be possible in Aden Colony. A good deal will depend on the
toughness and political skill of the Moderates, both of which are as yet untested; and
on the part which the Rulers can play in influencing opinion in Aden Colony itself.
Assuming that the interim stage goes according to plan and that it results in a
form of union satisfactory to us and accepted by the Aden Colony electorate (as it is
then defined), the longer term risk to our continued military presence is whether,
and if so how soon, pressures for complete independence of the new union will
manifest themselves in such a way and in such strength that we have to give way to
them. This in fact brings us back to the challenge of the Governor’s broad approach
which may be expected from the Defence Ministers. What hope is there, we shall be
asked, of our being able to retain sovereign defence rights within this proposed
union until the end of the present decade—the period for which the Chiefs of Staff
consider the retention of our base at Aden to be essential? Obviously we can give no
categorical assurance on this. For the present the Federal Rulers, who will play a
big part in shaping the policies of the new union, need and welcome our military
presence. They will no doubt be prepared to give all sorts of general assurances that
they will go on welcoming and needing it for as long as can be foreseen. But it
would be dangerous for us to assume that this means that we can be certain of
retaining our base facilities as of right for as long as we want. At some stage, and
4 Mr Amery, from 28 Oct 1960, when he was promoted from the CO.
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perhaps at an early stage, the idea of moving to a defence treaty arrangement is
bound to be mooted and possibly pressed by the new union if only as a means of
extracting more financial assistance out of us as a quid pro quo for our military use
of Aden Colony. Our only way to turn this argument therefore is to demonstrate
that, while we cannot guarantee that the Governor’s plan gives the complete answer
to our military desiderata, it is the best answer which we can offer in the political
circumstances of the area; and that no alternative plan—least of all standing still
where we are—will give us as good a chance of keeping for as long the free use of
the Aden base. . . .
E.M.
16.3.61
. . . We must expect strong opposition from Mr. Amery if proposals on the lines
recommended by the Governor are put forward for approval by other Ministers.
I am not entirely convinced that the balance of the argument is in favour of the
idea of a “transitional stage” before merger especially as it appears that the Rulers
and the moderate leaders in Aden have already entered into discussions. In the
Governor’s words in his paragraph 35 “if the two parties in these talks reached
agreement, then clearly we should have to take another look at the question”. . . .
J.M.M.
20.3.61
As to the Amery opposition I think the letter from Heath, then C-in-C B.F.A.P. & an
airman, is good enough ammunition. . . .5
As to the need for a ‘transitional stage’ I rather agree with you and Rulers that
hostages to fortune could be unlimited. Obviously Govr’s scheme of balances is [best]
theoretical stance but in an uncertain world unless or until I knew more about local
personalities involved & certainties of managed or rigged elections I remain dubious.
His point that storms political here would be less for his scheme than for
Trevaskysis’s [sic] is beside the point. A storm in either case we’re going to have.
A.F.
21.3.61
5 See document no 194, n 1.
200 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)10 3 May 1961
‘Constitutional development in Aden’: Cabinet Colonial Policy
Committee memorandum by Mr Macleod
Following the decision of the Defence Committee last year (D(60) 10th Meeting
Conclusions) that the protection of British interests requires the retention of our
base at Aden, I undertook to examine the problems involved in constitutional
development, and to submit my recommendations to the Committee (D(60) 11th
Meeting Conclusions).1 I have already reported briefly to my colleagues (C.P.C. (61)7)
1 See document no 198, n 1.
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on the visit which I paid to the Colony and Protectorate during the Easter Recess,2
and I now submit my detailed proposals for further measures which I consider are
the most likely to enable us to secure our objectives.
2. Since he took up the Governorship in October, Sir Charles Johnston has
devoted much thought to devising a scheme which will enable us to retain free use of
our defence facilities in the Colony and Protectorate with the greatest practicable
measure of consent for as long as possible during this decade. Before I visited Aden,
he submitted to me the outline of a plan which was based on the belief that the best
aim of policy is a merger of the Colony and the Protectorate into a single unit or
Union. He rejected two other possible courses, namely: (i) to try to keep the Colony
and Protectorate separate and continue to rule with a firm hand in the Colony; and
(ii) that defence enclaves should be established in the Colony. He rejected course (i)
because it would turn against us the moderate Colony politicians, who are disposed
to see us continue to exercise responsibility for defence and external relations, but
who insist upon advancing to self-government. He rejected course (ii) because it is
physically impossible.
3. My main purpose in visiting Aden was to discuss these matters with the
Governor, and to hear the views of the political leaders in the Colony and
Protectorate. Having done so, I consider that the Governor’s plan is the best basis on
which to proceed.
4. The five elected Ministers who have since 1959 been responsible for most of
the civil departments of government, and their supporters in the Legislative Council
and among the community generally, consider that a further measure of responsible
government is their due. They feel that they must prove to the Arab world that
Southern Arabia can emerge respectably from dependence. They are bitterly attacked
by the Arab Nationalist element, particularly the trade union movement, which
wishes British rule ended as quickly as possible; and they argue that they can only
continue to co-operate with us and pursue moderate policies if they are able to
oppose their Nationalist critics with the evidence and authority of increased
responsibilities. In expectation of constitutional changes, the Moderates have
recently been organising themselves in political parties, and it was as party leaders as
much as ministers in the Executive Council that they put their views to me. While
they asserted that their ultimate aim can only be complete independence, they are
realistic enough to recognise that Aden Colony by itself could not sustain
independence in the modern world, and they acknowledge how much the Colony’s
security and prosperity is linked with the British connection. It is as a means of
achieving their ultimate aim without jeopardising the Colony’s stability that they
look towards a Union with the Protectorate, beginning with the Federation which
already consists of the States forming the Colony’s hinterland.
5. The moderates, however, made it clear that they could not enter into serious
negotiations with the Federation until they can obtain a degree of political and
constitutional responsibility in the Colony which will enable them to do so with
adequate authority. Specifically, they propose that well before January, 1963, when
the present Legislative Council is due to end, the constitution should be amended so
as to transfer to elected representatives responsibility for internal matters. They are
prepared to leave us with responsibility for external affairs and defence and suggest
2 See document no 127 above for the brief report on Aden.
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that responsibility for internal security should be shared with H.M.G. They are
anxious that this constitutional change should take place well before January, 1963,
so that they may proceed to devise a new franchise upon which, in due course, they
would propose to have an election in the expectation that they would then be
confirmed in power after which they would negotiate a merger with the Federation.
The keynote of their political philosophy is “Aden for the Adenese”. Translated into
practical terms, this would mean replacing the present franchise which gives the
vote to British subjects and British Protected Persons (on modest residential and
property qualifications) by a narrower one which would confine the vote to those
qualified by birth or by long residence and with an emphasis on Arab race or ability
to speak Arabic. Such a narrow franchise would, it is true, exclude some of the Indian
community, but the moderates would be prepared to see them and other minorities
represented by nomination. More important, it would deny the vote to the itinerant
labourers from the Protectorate who can scrape on to the electoral roll as it is at
present, but who would be excluded if a longer residential period were stipulated. It
is these Protectorate labourers along with the Yemenis (who, of course, would not
get the vote) who form the main mass strength of the Nationalist opposition.
The moderates are not at present disposed to think of a rapid deal with the
Federation. Indeed they indicated that they would expect a period of 2 or 3 years after
the elections during which negotiations for a merger would take place.
6. I consider that, in essentials, the moderates deserve our backing in this plan.
The expectation of further self-government is widespread and could not be thwarted
without a serious risk that the moderates, disappointed, would be unable to sustain
their position against the Nationalists. Indeed some of them might throw in their lot
with the Nationalists. Admittedly there is a risk, which I do not under-estimate, that
the moderates might not succeed even on the basis of a narrower franchise in
winning an election; and to guard against such a possibility I would propose that
under the new constitution we should retain ultimate sovereignty so that if need be
we can resume control. Nevertheless, this risk, I consider, is less dangerous to our
interests than would be the certain dangers involved in our refusing the moderates
their wish for constitutional advance. I consider that in the first stage of self-
government, the Constitution should have the following main features:—
(a) The present Executive Council to be replaced by a Council of Ministers,
consisting of a Chief Minister and other departmental Ministers nominated by
him. It will be a matter for negotiation whether the Governor normally presides,
or whether the Chief Minister normally presides, but should the latter
arrangement be decided, then the Governor would retain the right to summon
meetings of the Council, and he would exercise this right whenever the Council
discussed any of the matters in (b) below.
(b) The Governor to have sole responsibility for defence, external relations,
internal security, the use and operational control of the Police, and the Public
Service, and with reserved legislative and executive powers at least in respect of
these matters. One of the Ministers could have departmental responsibility for the
administration of the Police; it might also be desirable to create a consultative
body such as a Police Council, on which the Governor and certain Ministers could
meet.
(c) We should retain constitutional power; i.e. to make or amend the Constitution.
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7. The Rulers, who have the power in the Federation, also wish to see a union
with the Colony, but their present motives differ from those of the Colony moderates.
The Rulers represented to me forcefully their concern at any changes in the Colony
which would imply any weakening of the present degree of British authority and
control. Their case is that the Colony is historically a part of the State of Lahej (one
of the largest States in the Federation) and that, while they are content to see it
remain under British sovereignty, they are not prepared to see us transfer authority
to Colony politicians. They fear either that the Colony moderates will not succeed
under self-government in resisting the Nationalists (who assail the Rulers as bitterly
as they do the British) or that if they do succeed in doing so they will lose interest in
union. Rather than run these risks they would wish us to force through a union
before making any changes in the Colony. I assured them that H.M.G. were
determined to frame their future policies in Southern Arabia on the basis of firm
friendship with the Federation, that any changes in the Colony will take full account
of the Federation’s interests and position, and that whatever we consider needs to be
done in the Colony will be based on the consideration that we are determined that
the Nationalists shall not acquire power and influence. I explained to them, however,
that we could not exclude Aden Colony from the general aims of our overall Colonial
policy and that we must give due weight to the principles of consent; and
endeavoured to persuade them that, in essentials, their interests, those of the
moderates, and those of H.M.G. are the same.
8. There remains some risk to our good relations with the Federal Rulers in
giving the Colony moderates what they seek, but I believe that this is another risk
which has to be taken, in the interests of our overall objective; and I intend to use to
the utmost the good faith which the Rulers are at heart disposed to place in our
intention and advice to carry them with us and bring them to see that such a step is
in their own best interests.
9. I have considered whether it would be useful to appoint a Constitutional
Commissioner to visit the Colony and make recommendations, but I believe that to
do so would be neither appropriate nor wise. It is, however, most desirable that there
should be a process of public consultation and discussion over the next constitution
for the Colony, and it is important that the Federation should be associated with it. I
consider that there would be advantage in convening a Constitutional Conference in
London either towards the end of this year or early in 1962. The first part of the
Conference would be attended by representatives of the Colony and its task would be
to reach agreement on a new constitution for the Colony. The second part of the
Conference, which would follow upon the first, would be attended by representatives
of the Federation as well as of the Colony, and its task would be to reach agreement
on a basis on which a merger should take place within an agreed programme; thus
making it clear that the new Colony Constitution was to be regarded essentially as a
step towards a merger. It will be essential, whatever the form of the merger, that our
defence facilities shall not be, in the Protectorate and in the Colony, any the less
assured; that our treaties of protection and advice with the Protected States and
Federation shall be maintained, and that the position of the Federal Army (which in
accordance with our Treaty with the Federation we are entitled to draw upon for
defence and internal security purposes) shall not be impaired.
10. The Governor has emphasised throughout that an integral part of any
constitutional and political plan which aims to strengthen goodwill and retain our
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military facilities with consent is the provision of more financial help. Both the
Colony political leaders and the Federal Rulers stressed the same point. The Rulers
represented that they cannot as yet bring home to their peoples the benefits which
Federation was designed to provide without greater funds for economic and social
welfare development than we have been able to provide. They ask for an increase of
C.D. & W. monies, and will undoubtedly expect us to be generous in our budgetary
aid. The Colony leaders made the most of the argument that the Services in Aden get
very many benefits, such as free use of land and various tax exemptions, and that
several utilities (such as the airport and water and electricity supplies) have been
expanded largely to meet the Services demands, while some welfare developments
have had to be deferred for lack of funds. I think it important that we should be able
in the context of the constitutional plan which this paper recommends to assure the
Rulers and Colony moderates that we are ready to consider additional financial
assistance, and I shall be consulting further with the Governor how far we can go in
this direction, granted the other calls on our resources.
11. There is also considerable irritation that the Colony still has to pay what they
believe to be an annual defence contribution of £40,000 to H.M.G.; this payment is in
fact essentially for internal security and I recognise that it has thus a valid basis in
principle, inasmuch as we are providing a considerable force for the Colony’s
security. It has however become a disproportionate irritant and we would, I believe,
do well to dispense with it.
12. I did not discuss with the Colony politicians the position of the civil service
under a new constitution. A scheme for training local people for higher posts in
Government service already exists, but there is some impatience among the Colony
politicians to see rapid results. So far it has not been found necessary to disregard
normal promotion criteria in providing sufficient opportunities for promotion for
suitable local officers. But as the number of these officers increases there may in the
next year or so be a requirement for some special measures to give the Governor,
while maintaining ultimate control of the Civil Service, some elbow room to provide
for the rapid promotion of promising local officers. But there is no question at this
stage of a transfer of control over the Civil Service which would involve a general
compensation scheme for all overseas officers and, as I have said above, I intend to
ensure that the Governor is provided with adequate discretionary powers to
safeguard the position of the Civil Service as a whole under a new constitution for
the Colony.
13. I realise that there are dangers and difficulties in this plan. We must expect
hostility from Arab Nationalism within as well as beyond the Colony. It will not be
easy to give the Colony moderates as much as they seek without prejudicing our own
essential desiderata and without risking the displeasure of the Federal Rulers. We
cannot guarantee that the Colony moderates will succeed in establishing their
position, and we cannot, therefore, rule out the possibility that, if they fail to do so
and lose out to the Arab Nationalists, we shall have no choice but to suspend the
constitution and resume direct rule. Nor can we assume that we shall be able to
guide negotiations between the Rulers and the Colony leaders in the precise
direction which would be most beneficial to our interests. Nevertheless, despite these
dangers and difficulties, I am convinced that the policy proposed is one which best
enables us to exploit to the maximum advantage the several solid assets which we at
present possess.
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14. Hitherto our line has been that we would not openly encourage moves
towards closer association between Colony and Protectorate. I consider that a
necessary first step in implementing the policy proposed in this Memorandum is a
public statement to the effect that the promotion of self-government in the Colony is
the first step towards the ultimate objective of closer association and eventually
union with the Federation, to which, with the consent of those concerned, the other
parts of the Protectorate will be able to adhere. Such a statement is essential to our
retaining the friendship of the Rulers. I propose also that the Governor be authorised
forthwith to embark upon formal discussions with Colony political leaders and
representatives, with a view to reaching the greatest possible measure of agreement
upon a plan which would form the basis of consideration by a constitutional
conference in London. He would, of course, keep the Federal Government fully
informed and seek to obtain their support.
15. I invite my colleagues to agree to my proceeding on the following lines:—
(i) A public statement be made that we favour the eventual union of Colony and
Protectorate and that constitutional advance in the Colony is a first step to this
end. (The precise timing of this statement will require further consideration.)
(ii) That we keep the Federal Rulers informed at every stage, and make retention
of their friendship a consistent principle.
(iii) That the Governor begin discussions on the details of a new Colony
constitution as quickly as practicable, with a view to his recommendations being
considered at a Constitutional Conference in London in late 1961 or early 1962;
the Conference would also seek to define the basis on which negotiations for union
with the Federation might be begun.
(iv) The introduction of a new constitution for the Colony, early in 1962, giving a
substantial measure of internal self-government, but with our retaining ultimate
sovereignty as well as explicit responsibility for external affairs, defence, the Civil
Service and internal security.
(v) That the question of the £40,000 defence contribution be urgently examined
with a view to removing the irritation which it at present causes.
16. This paper has been drafted in consultation with the Treasury.
201 CAB 134/1560, CPC 5(61) 5 May 1961
[Future constitutional development in Aden]: minutes of Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(61)10) regarding future constitutional development in Aden.1
The Colonial Secretary said that, following discussions which had taken place in
the Defence Committee in the previous October (D. (60) 10th Meeting), he had
undertaken to examine the problems involved in constitutional development in
Aden, having regard to the importance of retaining our military facilities there for as
long as possible.
1 See previous document.
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The proposals contained in C.P.C. (61) 10, which had been put forward by the
Governor, were supported both by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, and
himself. Their object was to unite the friendly elements in Aden Colony, represented
by the moderate political leaders at present included in the Executive Council, with
the Rulers in the Aden Protectorate, who were anxious to retain our protection. Aden
Colony was however exposed to nationalist pressures, mainly due to the large
amount of Yemeni labour which sought employment in the Colony, and it was
important that new franchise arrangements in Aden Colony should be worked out
before the next elections which were due to be held early in 1963, so as to preserve
the moderate political leaders in power. There were undoubtedly certain risks in the
plan, but both he and the Governor were of opinion that it offered a better chance of
retaining our defence facilities in Aden for a number of years than if we sought to
maintain the present position in the Colony. The plan carried with it certain financial
implications and it would be necessary in order to keep the goodwill of both the
Colony politicians and the Protectorate Rulers to consider additional financial
assistance. He also hoped that it would be possible to waive the defence contribution
of £40,000 which had been paid by the Colony annually to Her Majesty’s Government
and which had become a disproportionate irritant in our local relations.
He proposed that the Governor should be authorised to embark upon formal
discussions with political leaders in the Colony with a view to reaching the greatest
possible measure of agreement, as a basis for the holding of a constitutional
conference in London to which not only the Aden Colony politicians but the
Protectorate Rulers also would at a suitable stage be invited. It would also be
necessary in order to retain the friendship of the Rulers to make a public statement
to the effect that we favoured the eventual union of the Colony and Protectorate.
The Minister of Defence2 said that in view of the necessity to retain our defence
facilities in Aden in peaceful circumstances for some considerable time to come he
would prefer to leave matters in Aden as they now were, but if this was impossible he
hoped that the pace of any constitutional advance in Aden would be as slow as
possible. He suggested that it would be better to conduct such constitutional
discussions as were necessary in Aden rather than to call a constitutional conference
in London, where the nationalist element would be open to undesirable influences
and where the importance of the occasion might make it more difficult to secure the
agreement of all the Rulers.
In discussion there was general agreement in the Committee that some action
would have to be taken as regards the franchise in Aden Colony before the life of the
present Legislative Council came to an end in January, 1963, in order to avoid the
nationalist elements achieving political power. Differing views were however
expressed on the desirability of coupling this action with preparations for a merger
between the Colony and the Protectorate. On the one hand it was argued that the
Protectorate Rulers were strongly in favour of a merger and that it might be difficult
to retain their confidence if we did not make every effort to achieve it; that it would
be to our advantage to tie the more advanced and more nationalistic elements in
Colony into a new and wider state dominated by the more stable element represented
by the Protectorate Rulers; and that this policy was likely to be the more effective the
2 Mr H Watkinson.
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sooner it was carried out, and in particular before the nationalist element in Aden
Colony had acquired political power. It was also suggested that a central Government
dominated by the Protectorate Rulers would be more effective in preserving internal
security—a necessary condition for the effective operation of our military
facilities—than if we were to grant Aden Colony internal self-government, but
retaining the responsibility for internal security ourselves. On the other hand it was
pointed out that the setting up of a new state to include the existing Protectorates
and Aden Colony would be likely to increase the pressure and hence the pace of
progress towards independence; and once independence had been conceded the
retention of our defence facilities would have to rest on a treaty, in which case it
might prove impossible to use them against another Arab State. Much would
however, depend on the form of merger which was contemplated, the relative
weighting within it to be given to the Protectorates and the Colony, and the
distribution of powers between the central authority and the constituent elements.
It was agreed that there would be little point in summoning a constitutional
conference in London unless there were reasonable grounds for believing that a
settlement on the lines which we desired could be readily achieved. It would not in
any case be the intention to invite representatives of the nationalist element to take
part and there would therefore be little opportunity for Aden politicians to be
deflected by undesirable pressure being brought on them in London; indeed they
were likely to be subjected to even more undesirable pressures if the formal
constitutional discussions were held in Aden.
In further discussion the following points were made—
(a) It was suggested in paragraph 7 of C.P.C. (61) 10 that the Rulers of the
Protectorates would be much concerned with any changes in the Colony which
would imply a weakening of the present degree of United Kingdom authority and
control. But was it likely that the functions which it was suggested should be
retained by the United Kingdom in the next stage of constitutional advance in
Aden—namely, defence, foreign affairs and internal security—would represent a
sufficient degree of United Kingdom control to satisfy the Rulers?
(b) Whatever constitutional arrangements were made for Aden Colony there would
be advantage in dissociating from them the Island of Perim and keeping it under
direct United Kingdom control. There would also be advantage in the territory on
which United Kingdom defence facilities were situated being clearly retained under
United Kingdom sovereignty, whatever the relationship between the United Kingdom
and the Aden Protectorate and Colony short of independence. But a solution on
Cyprus lines under which independence would be granted to most of the territory,
the United Kingdom retaining certain sovereign areas, would not be practicable
owing to lack of port facilities in those areas.
Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that further consideration
should be given to future constitutional arrangements for Aden Colony and Aden
Protectorate, and two alternative plans should be prepared for further consideration
by Ministers.
The first should be based on the proposals put forward in C.P.C. (61) 10, including
a merger at an early date between the Colony and Protectorate; it would be necessary
to consider carefully the form which such a merger should take, in particular the
relative influence which would be wielded by the Protectorate Rulers and the Colony
politicians within such a framework, and the distribution of powers as between the
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United Kingdom, the central government and the authorities in the Colony and
individual Protectorate states. The second plan should be based on keeping the
Colony and Protectorate separate for the time being, but introducing a measure of
constitutional change in Aden Colony so as at the same time to restrict the franchise
and to hand over more responsibility for the internal affairs of the Colony (other than
internal security) to elected representatives. The Committee should then meet to
consider which of those alternative plans was likely to preserve our essential defence
facilities for the longer time. In the meantime no announcement of policy should be
made. . . .
202 CAB 128/35/1, CC 29(61)8 30 May 1961
[Course of constitutional development in Aden]: Cabinet conclusions
[Macleod wanted to support ‘the moderates’ and do everything possible to consolidate the
goodwill of the Rulers who were prepared to work with Britain, and not incur their
resentment by lack of support for their desire for union; this, he argued, was the best way
to secure defence facilities. Amery, by contrast, took a ‘somewhat different view’: the
merger should not be encouraged, because it was bound to lead to a demand for
independence—though he conceded that there might be advantage in bringing a
‘potentially turbulent Colony’ under the control of a Federation whose Rulers were ‘loyal
to the British connection’ (CO 1015/2387, no 98, CO brief for S of S, 29 May 1961).]
The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 68) and
the Secretary of State for Air (C. (61) 70) on the course of constitutional development
in Aden.
The Colonial Secretary said that our objective was to secure the use of our defence
facilities in the Colony and Protectorate of Aden for as long as possible during this
decade. The continued co-operation of the moderate elements in the Colony could
only be secured if we acceded to their demand for some further measure of
constitutional advance. They were, however, inclined to favour a closer association
between the Colony and the Federation. The Rulers of the Federation were keenly
interested in a merger, but they feared the development of nationalism in the Colony;
they accordingly wished British authority over the Colony to be maintained and, if
necessary, used to force a union with the Federation in which the position of the
Rulers would be dominant. Some constitutional change in the Colony was
inescapable, since it was important that new franchise arrangements should be
worked out before the next elections to preserve the position of the moderate
political leaders there. It would be expedient to encourage at the same time the idea
of a merger with the Federation, partly because this was the best way of preserving
the friendship of the Rulers and partly because a union of the British territories in
Southern Arabia would hold out the best hope of retaining our defence facilities for
the longest possible period. He therefore proposed that the Governor should conduct
a series of discussions during the next few months with representatives of the Colony
and the Federation, in which he would make it clear that we supported a merger,
subject to the retention of our defence facilities. His purpose would be to reach
agreement on a new constitution for the Colony, to come into force as early as
practicable in 1962, which, in addition to the adjustment of the franchise, would
allow for greater devolution of responsibility to the Government of the Colony,
although the Governor would remain responsible for internal security, defence and
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external relations. In order to give these discussions the best chance of success, a
delegation of the Rulers would be invited to a preliminary meeting in London: the
advantages of giving increased authority to the moderate elements in the Colony
could then be explained to them, and they could be informed that we regarded a
merger between the Federation and the Colony as a desirable aim of policy.
The Secretary of State for Air1 said that, although the moderate leaders in the
Colony and the Rulers were favourable to the idea of a merger, it was by no means
certain that they would agree on the form of such a union. The Rulers wanted to
annex the Colony to the Sultanate of Lahej, whereas the Colony leaders
contemplated entering the Federation as a principal member. Without our
encouragement a merger might not take place. Should we, in these circumstances,
exercise our influence in favour of it? The creation of this larger unit would lead to
earlier demands for independence, in which event our defence facilities would rest on
treaty rather than on sovereignty. In view of the likely spread of nationalist
influences, it was doubtful whether we could place much reliance upon a treaty,
particularly as our defence facilities in Aden would be needed mainly for operations
against other Arab States. A merger might have the advantage of bringing dissident
elements in the Colony under the control of the Federation; but internal security in
the Colony would not be a substantial problem and, if we could avoid a merger, we
might be able to retain our defence facilities on the present basis for a longer period.
In his view, therefore, although we should not resist a merger if the moderate
elements in the Colony and the Rulers could agree to its terms, we need not actively
encourage such a development. We might be in a stronger position, both as regards
defence facilities and financial assistance, if we had not urged the benefits of a
merger on the Rulers and the Colony leaders.
The Minister of Defence2 said that, while it would suit us better if the present
position could remain unchanged, some constitutional development in the Colony
was inevitable if the influence of the moderate elements there was to be maintained.
This made some discussion of a merger unavoidable, and it seemed that if we did not
encourage this we might lose the friendship and support of the Rulers.
In further discussion it was pointed out that the Rulers would regard any
constitutional advance in the Colony as a betrayal of their interests, if it were not
accompanied by some progress towards a merger on the lines they favoured. In
practice, therefore, there was no real alternative but to say that we would welcome a
merger if this could be agreed between the Rulers and the Colony leaders. It would be
necessary to take account of the extent to which, in the preliminary discussions in
London, the Rulers themselves showed that they favoured merger in deciding how
warmly this aim should be commended by us. There was much to be said for treating
the Rulers frankly and explaining to them in general terms the purpose of the
constitutional developments which we proposed for the Colony.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that, in the preliminary discussions to be held in London with a
delegation from the Aden Federation, the Colonial Secretary should explain in
general terms the purpose of the constitutional development proposed for the
Colony, and should further say that, if the Rulers wished to pursue the possibility
1 Mr J Amery. 2 Mr H Watkinson.
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of a merger with the Colony, the United Kingdom Government would welcome
such a development and would recommend the Rulers to discuss the matter with
the Colony leaders.
(2) Subject to Conclusion (1) above, endorsed the course proposed in C. (61) 68.
203 CO 1015/2388, no 206 20 Oct 1961
‘Future policy in Aden Colony and Protectorate’: CO submission for
Mr Maudling.  Minutes on policy and immediate problems by I Watt,
Sir J Martin and H T Bourdillon [Extract]
[This lengthy paper, and the minutes which led up to it, were intended as a briefing for
the new S of S.]
. . . 11. The timetable of political development which the [previous] Secretary of
State and the Governor themselves envisaged was as follows:—
(1) Early in 1962 Colony to have a new constitution which would provide for a
Cabinet of elected Ministers responsible for all departments of government other
than defence, foreign relations, security and the Public Service.
(2) Between early 1962 and, say, mid-1963 the Government thus constituted
would devise a new franchise, confining the vote to the “Adenese belongers” and
thus doing its best to exclude itinerant Protectorate labourers who at present get a
vote by virtue of being British Protected Persons and who also swell the
Nationalist ranks. It would probably be necessary to extend the life of the
Legislative Council beyond January 1963, perhaps for as long as 12 months.
(3) 1963–64, negotiations for bringing about Union with the Federation.
(4) In 1964, on the best possible estimate, the achievement of Union.
12. The Cabinet stipulated that even after the Colony had entered into Union we
should retain sovereignty over it and responsibility for its defence, external relations
and security. (We do not enjoy sovereignty over the Federation. Our rights in respect
of the proposed Union would be those secured to us by treaty, not rights of
sovereignty.)
13. The discussions in Aden with his two sets of Ministers, which the Governor
initiated in July, made quite good progress initially, in that there was a disposal to
agree on the departmental arrangements which, after Union, would deal with such
matters as health, civil aviation, communications, etc. However, there were fairly
soon signs that some of the Colony Ministers, in particular, were beginning to feel
uneasy; in fact by the end of August, when the Governor was due to take home leave,
it became clear that it was most unlikely that he could obtain agreement on the
crucial point (to the Colony Ministers) of the size of the Colony’s representation in
the Union legislature; there was also disagreement about how intermediate and
higher education should be dealt with. Just before coming on leave, therefore, the
Governor advised the Colonial Office that, should it not prove possible to get a
sufficient measure of agreement to the Cabinet’s plan, we must have a respectable
fall-back position. This fall-back position would be that, instead of introducing
constitutional changes in the Colony in 1962, we should content ourselves with
appointing a Select Committee of the Legislative Council to make recommendations
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for changing the franchise before the next elections. The Governor thought that the
Rulers would be content with thus going slow on the project of Union. An additional
point which weighed with the Governor in making this recommendation was that
Mr. Bayoomi, who had hitherto been confident that he could win an election on a
revised franchise and then take the Colony into a Union with the Federation, was
beginning to have doubts about his ability to do so.
14. During the Governor’s absence in September we received reports from the
Acting Governor of what seemed a surprising development. This was that Mr.
Bayoomi and the Federal Rulers had come to a private deal. The terms of the deal
were that, a few months after Bayoomi had been made Chief Minister of the Colony
(in accordance with the constitutional changes which he expected H.M.G. to grant),
he would take the Colony into the Federation without running the risk of an
election. The most surprising feature of this deal was that it represented an entente
between the Rulers and a man whom they had hitherto spoken of with contempt. A
disquieting feature of the situation was that Mr. Bayoomi appeared to have cut
himself off from his own Ministerial colleagues and also from that moderate support
among the Colony public which, so we understood, he had hitherto relied upon
obtaining. The Governor came into the Colonial Office for a few hours just before
going back to Aden at the end of September and was shown these reports. Colonial
Office officials told him that at first glance they were not attractive, since if H.M.G.
were to back a private deal of this kind they would lay themselves wide open to
accusations of disregard of the principle of public consent. The Governor then
returned to Aden.
15. After considering this new situation in Aden, the Governor gave us his
considered views. He confirmed that the secret deal existed, because it had been
revealed to him by the Federal Rulers, who commended the arrangement as the best
one in the circumstances. The Governor analysed the various choices open to us and
has come down in favour of our also supporting a plan based on the secret deal. He
has told the Rulers that he is recommending in this sense to H.M.G. The main
reasons for his point of view may be summarised as follows:—
(1) The Nationalist opposition has been upset by the blow to Nasser’s prestige in
Syria and we are therefore in a better position to get our way. As a further
consequence of this set-back to Nasserite nationalism, moderate opinion is now
rallying behind Bayoomi.
(2) The Bayoomi/Rulers secret deal represents an agreement between people of
authority and determination, who are disposed to remain our friends, who wish to
see the British military presence remain, and whose authority will increase with
success; in other words, if the British are seen to be backing Mr. Bayoomi, then
those other moderates who are at present not inclined to support him will in due
course jump on his bandwaggon.
(3) If we do not support this deal, we will not only alienate Mr. Bayoomi but, what
is more important, will imperil our relations with the Federal Rulers, who are our
best and most reliable friends. . . .
19. While we see that it is important not to offend the Federal Rulers, we are
bound, as always, to look first and foremost to H.M.G.’s defence interests. We do not
believe that they will be as well secured as we should like if we bring about a Union as
early as 1963. Once Union between the Colony and the Federation is achieved, then
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we must be prepared for political pressures for further advances in the direction of
independence. Such pressures will come about anyway, but inasmuch as we want to
hold on to Aden for as long as possible, we must pay out the rope as slowly as we
decently can. The Governor’s proposal to take advantage of what may be a temporary
situation, and please what may be a very narrow circle of our friends, does not seem
to us to contain sufficient evidence of stability to justify our advising its acceptance
at this stage.
20. If the Secretary of State decides that the right thing to do is to adopt some
course markedly different from the one approved by the Cabinet, he will no doubt
wish to consult his colleagues again. However, our advice would be that, before
reaching a firm decision, it would be desirable to invite the Governor home for
further discussion. Meanwhile our present view, among officials, can be summed up
as follows:—
(1) To support the Bayoomi/Rulers deal involves a greater risk to our interests
than we consider justified by the arguments advanced in favour of our doing so.
The Ministry of Defence are most uneasy about the implied shortening of the time
in which we can continue to use Aden as we wish. The Treasury, who would be
prepared to give a reasonable amount of financial assistance if it were a sure
investment, share these doubts. The Foreign Office advise us that we ought not to
discount Nasser’s continuing appeal to Arab Nationalism, nor probably that other
Arab countries will continue to criticise and attack our policies.
(2) The Colonial Office share the views of these other Departments, and are much
concerned about the effects of a blatant abandonment of the principle of consent
to which Mr. Macleod gave public support in Aden and which is generally a key
feature of our Colonial policies. We are not persuaded that Mr. Bayoomi’s credit or
his powers of survival are sufficiently assured for us to support him. We believe
that the better course would be to adopt the fall-back position, perhaps coupling
this with a public statement to the effect that H.M.G. believe in and will support
the movements towards Union between the Colony and the Federation, and
certainly give a most thorough explanation to the Rulers of why we believe that
this more limited scheme is in their own best interests. We could repeat to them
our assurance that self-government will only be granted to Aden as part of a
programme including Union and could point out to them that, if things go wrong
in the elections on the new franchise, we should be better able to deal with the new
situation with control of the Colony’s government still firmly in our own hands
than we should be if, before the elections, we handed over authority to Arab
ministers (as contemplated in their agreement with Bayoomi). Similarly, by
conceding constitutional advance at this stage we should have largely lost our
power to influence events should Bayoomi after all find himself unable to carry his
people with him and to give effect to his part of the bargain.
(3) We are greatly concerned also about our ability to retain the expatriate civil
servants in anything like their present strength after merger. The Governor
himself recognises that after merger it may be impossible to avoid giving
expatriate civil servants the chance to take compensation for loss of career. We
might be able to avoid this course in the case of certain categories of official who
would remain in the employment of the Colony Government alone, but all our
experience is that, once the right to leave with compensation is given to any part of
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the Public Service in any territory, it is difficult to persuade others to remain
behind indefinitely. The run-down of the expatriate service would probably reduce
the efficient administration of the government services of Aden, and thus affect
our defence interests there.
21. We suggest that the further examination of the problem with the Governor is
desirable before final decisions are taken, and that this could best be accomplished by
inviting him to London as early as convenient.
Minutes on 203
. . . I have had a brief word with the Ministry of Defence and with Mr. Carstairs, who
tell me that there is nothing in the current reappraisal of our overseas commitments
to suggest that the Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff are changing their minds
about the importance of Aden as a base.1 We may therefore continue to regard
political events in Aden Colony with as much self-interest as before. It is in this light
that Mr. Formoy and I have discussed these recent telegrams. We do not think that
H.M.G.’s interests would be served by permitting a very early union between the
Colony and the Federation. We would, it is true, probably please the Rulers by
conniving at a “shot-gun wedding”—and the importance of the Rulers’ friendship is
not to be underestimated—but the Secretary of State did persuade them in the
June/July talks to acknowledge the need for the appearance of consent on the
Colony’s part, and I feel that this is a stipulation which the Secretary of State would
wish, at this stage, to continue to insist upon. Nor do we see any necessity for this
hasty “shot-gun wedding”. We are not faced with mass opinion more or less
unanimously demanding a certain political course. If anything, mass opinion in the
Colony is not prepared to see an early Union with the Federation. Admittedly such
latter opinion contains a large nationalist element whose views we have already
decided to discount, but there is only too much evidence that it contains a good
many of the ‘moderates’ as well. We cannot, I suggest, afford to antagonise the latter.
I myself think that part of the trouble is that the talks in London and in Aden have
up till now been confined to Ministers only. The Aden public, including Members of
the Legislative Council, have not been told anything at all about the talks. They have
been left to form their impressions from leaks by Mr. Bayoomi’s disenchanted
colleagues and from the comments of the Aden Press which is not particularly
authoritative or truthful. I think that there is something to be said for a public
statement of policy by H.M.G. Hitherto the Secretary of State has said to the Colony
and Federal Ministers in confidence that H.M.G. supports the principle of Union, and
little more than that. The Governor’s original proposals provided for a full-scale
public statement by H.M.G. blessing Union and putting constitutional advance for
the Colony into the context of Union. However, this proposal was played down in the
C.P.C. and deferred.2 The people of Aden Colony are, like most Arabs in other
countries, coffee house politicians whose views change with the mood of the hour. If
1 Sir J Martin wrote in the margin here: ‘In the short term it may be even more important, if (as must be
assumed) we do not retain a base in independent Kenya’.
2 See document no 201.
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they are left to form their own political ideas without any public statement of
intention by H.M.G., then we should not be surprised if they chop and change their
opinions quickly, form little groups and short-lived alliances, and give ear to every
rumour. However, our experience has shown (and Sir W. Luce consistently made this
point), that they do respect the law and they do respect authority. They have been
more or less respectful of British authority for 130 years. We shall of course have to
await the Governor’s promised report next week, but, subject to that, I believe that
we should consider seriously H.M.G.’s making a public declaration of policy. . . .
I.W.
29.9.61
I think it would be wiser to suspend judgment on this development and on our future
course until we have the expected report from Sir Charles Johnston, who has now
returned to the Colony. Meanwhile I should regard Bayoomi’s shares as an extremely
speculative investment.
J.M.M.
30.[9.]61
[The Governor] recommends that H.M.G. support the plan (which he understands
unofficially to have been agreed upon between the Federal Supreme Council and Mr.
Bayoomi) for an early achievement of merger, i.e. before any elections take place in
the Colony. . . . Our main reasons for doubts are that the Governor’s proposals seem
to be based on very short-term considerations. Thus it would be a mistake to
underrate Nasser, who is not so down and out that he could not make ample trouble
in Aden if the political situation there were mishandled. His propaganda machine has
certainly been centering on Syria during the past week, but he is unlikely to neglect
any opportunities for attacking our policies in Southern Arabia, and I should like to
be more convinced than I am at the moment of Mr. Bayoomi’s ability to command
and retain a large following before I would regard him as able to discount Egyptian
attacks (indeed the Governor in the telegram at (194) admits that Mr. Bayoomi will
remain exposed to dangers). . . .
With great respect, we question the Governor’s assumption that we are not—to
put this matter in its bluntest form—knocking two years off our expected tenure of
Aden. The Governor’s present instructions contemplate merger taking place in 1964,
and if that were adhered to we should have gone quite some way towards meeting the
present defence stipulation that we hang on to our defence interests by right as long
as possible during this decade. Mr. Formoy and I feel that we should have no illusions
about the readiness of the Arab politicians to sit down quietly after merger and forget
about independence. After internal self-government in the Colony and merger, they
will have no other political objective to think about. . . .
The main purpose of the telegram to the Governor and of our talks among officials
must be, I suggest, to assess whether or not the Governor’s recommendation gives us
the longest and most sure tenure of the base in Aden, with the greatest possible
measure of common consent. We need not, at this stage any more than in the past,
count on getting the consent of the Aden T.U.C. and the Nationalist element, but I
am still uneasy that, by backing Mr. Bayoomi too much, in a very short time we shall
lose the support of some of the Moderates, e.g. Mr. Luqman, whom I still think it
important to try to carry with us. As I say, neither Mr. Formoy nor I, attempting to
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judge these essentially political aspects from this distance, are as yet convinced that
the Governor’s plan is solid enough.
I.W.
6.10.61
. . . I share all your doubts and am aghast at the fact that the Governor has disclosed
to the Federal Supreme Council that he had decided to recommend course (c) to the
S of S. . . .3
J.M.M.
7.10.61
. . . I am not, as yet, convinced that we could advise Ministers to go nap on a secret
Bayoomi/Rulers deal, knowing that it is likely to lack supporters whose friendship
and co-operation we have hitherto been concerned to maintain. What I think is for
consideration, as a means of bridging the gap between plan (c) and the Governor’s
present instructions, is the idea of a public statement by H.M.G. saying that, whereas
we do not consider that the Colony or Federation ought to aspire to independence
separately, we do endorse their efforts to come together and build a united nation in
South Arabia. (You will recall that the Governor made such a statement a feature of
his own first proposals and that Mr. Macleod himself commended it to the C.P.C.
Ministers, however, decided to defer the making of such a statement until after the
Secretary of State’s talks with the Rulers in London.) I should have thought that the
Rulers would prefer such a public statement to some kind of private endorsement of
their deal with Mr. Bayoomi. After all, if Mr. Bayoomi does come unstuck, then
however much the Rulers may bluster there is little that they hold us to.
Such a statement might also make it easier for us to persuade all concerned in this
plot that elections are desirable before merger. Mr. Macleod when in Aden said, in his
public statements as well as in his private discussions, with the Rulers and Ministers,
that the principle of consent in these matters was one to which H.M.G. attached
importance. At the beginning of this minute I have indicated that we have from the
first been prepared to see this principle diluted somewhat, but not to the extent that
we should flagrantly deny the right of the “Adenese” to have some say about whether
Aden should enter the Federation. The Governor’s present feeling is that Arab
nationalism in the Colony has been rendered despondent by events in Syria and that
those moderates who do not support Bayoomi at present will jump on his band
waggon if it is seen to be travelling safely. The Foreign Office may care to predict how
well founded is the Governor’s argument that Nasser is less likely to plague us than
hitherto. There is, I think, a good deal in the Governor’s point that the Aden Arabs
will jump on the best band waggon they can see. Nevertheless, I am not at this stage
persuaded that we are in a position to assume that we can be too disrespectful
towards the idea of displaying “consent” through elections before merger takes place.
The Ministry of Defence will, I should expect, show concern about the prospect of
the merger taking place in 1963. Were I more convinced myself that the merger
would gain us more friends than it lost us, or that it would stick in the way the
3 i.e, ‘the private deal’ by which Bayoomi and the Rulers would be informed in confidence that when a
ministerial system was in operation in the Colony (with Bayoomi as chief minister) HMG would back him
up if he proposed publicly that the Colony should join the Federation as early as possible.
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Governor seems to think, I would not consider that the difference of a year in
bringing it about was “time lost” to H.M.G. However, the Governor does not, I think,
answer convincingly our suggestion that, once merger takes place whenever that is,
the pressure for independence is going to be stepped up. I am not, for one thing, sold
on the idea that because the Arabs will need H.M.G.’s money this is going to damp
down their political ambitions. Nor do I care for the argument that, even after
merger, suspicions between Colony and Federation are going to play into our hands.
The Governor returns again to the general line he took when he was first
appointed, namely “massive economic aid” is a necessary part of all our political
thinking for Aden Colony and Protectorate. I had hoped that the gradual instruction
in Colonial Office methods of financial help which Mr. Melville and I have been giving
him would by now have sunk in, but he reverts to his rather ambassadorial ideas and
rather vaguely suggests that another £2 million a year would be well spent. Certainly
we have to go through the usual difficult times with the Treasury which any grant-in-
aid territory creates. In particular, we have been hammering at them for some time
to lift the present £40,000 defence contribution which Aden Colony has paid to
H.M.G. for many years. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury turned this down
some months ago and we are about to return to the charge. If the Treasury would
yield this up with a good grace, it would be helpful out of all proportions (the Colony
Legislative Council are in fact unlikely to vote it much longer). I have just had the
Governor’s advance proposals for the three-year block grant for the Federation. He
asks for an extra £1,000,000 per annum, and this in spite of a clear warning about
financial stringency which on the advice of Finance Department I wrote to him
shortly after the Chancellor’s last statement. We shall have to do our best with the
Treasury. . . .
I.W.
13.10.61
Sir John Martin and I discussed these recent developments with Mr. Fraser yesterday.
The following were the main points in our discussion:—
(1) Although the Governor admits that we should not grant constitutional
advance “ad personam”, the plan which he is backing does in large measure
amount to doing just this.
(2) Although the Governor is advocating that merger should be accomplished
before the next elections in the Colony, his timetable would mean that there would
be probably a comparatively short interval between merger and the date when
elections are bound to be held. This the Governor appears to admit, inasmuch as
he says that such elections would provide the Colony with a means of “opting out
of Union”. There would seem to be a danger that such an opportunity, given to
those Colony voters who might feel that the Colony had been bounced into
Federation, might bring an anti-Union vote coupled with a cry for early
independence for the Colony.
(3) The main difference between the Governor’s present proposals and his
instructions from the Secretary of State remains the giving to the Colony voter an
opportunity to say, before Union, whether he wishes to embark on it. We are not
yet convinced that, if we accept the case for an early merger, the Union thus
formed will be content to remain dependent for long. We would expect that fairly
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 622
[204] ADEN COLONY AND PROTECTORATE 623
soon after the Union was brought into being, there would be pressure for us to give
up our Sovereignty over the Colony, thus bringing the Colony into the same
position by Treaty as the rest of the Federation. Then, there would be further
pressure for us to replace that Treaty by one appropriate to relations between two
entirely independent countries. . . .
(5) It might be desirable to invite the Governor home for consultations (which
could be presented as largely consequent upon the change of Secretary of State);
alternatively there might be advantage in Mr. Fraser visiting Aden, although a
Ministerial visit might well be taken locally as an opportunity to reopen the whole
matter.
(6) The Governor’s plea for increased financial assistance comes at a very difficult
time for H.M.G., and he is likely to be disappointed to some extent.
(7) It is desirable to obtain the views of other interested Departments before
considering what advice should be given to Ministers. . . .
I.W.
17.10.61
I agree throughout with Mr Watt’s submission, to which I have only made one or two
very small alterations and additions. The submission is long, but on this first
occasion I think Mr Maudling will welcome the background it contains. To my mind
the main point is that if we adopt the Governor’s new proposals we shall, I fear, be
throwing over too readily, for the sake of a deal between one of the leading Aden
Colony moderates and the Federal Rulers, the principle of consent. I am sure the late
S. of S. was wise in attaching great importance to this principle in the context of
merger between the Colony and the Protectorate, for the very practical reason that
there can be no lasting basis of a settlement without it.
H.T.B.
20.10.61
S of S
[Mr Fraser is] inclined to think that the arguments in favour of proceeding as the
Governor proposes are stronger than the [CO Aden] Dept suggests. . . . In the recent
Ministerial discussions on future planning for Defence Aden was classified as a base
of which we could rely on having unfettered use until 1970. In the light of political
developments in the Colony, we in the Dept feel considerable doubt whether it is
prudent to rely on unqualified freedom of tenure for so long. . . .
J.M.M.
23.10.61
204 CO 1015/2388, no 221B 8–10 Dec 1961
[Draft Cabinet paper on Aden]: minutes by J C Morgan and I Watt (CO)
. . . 2. The proposals in our draft Cabinet paper rest on the doctrine of the
acceptance of the “lesser risk”. We propose to stake everything on basing assent to
the Union in the Colony on a vote of the present unofficial members of the
Legislative Council, and then proceeding to bring about the Union before there is a
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general election in Aden Colony on a reformed franchise. The argument is that if we
have a general election in the Colony before the Union is brought about, the
Nationalists will win, and we shall lose the friendship of both the Bayoomites and the
Protectorate Rulers. If we have the general election after Union, it is argued firstly
that by then a number of people in Aden Colony will have shifted their allegiance
towards the newly established authority, reinforced by the Arab sentiment for unity,
and that in any event even if the Nationalists do win that election, we shall still have
the friendship of the Rulers and the moderates. I think it ought to be realised
however that on the basis of the information we have received from the Governor,
and the general probabilities, it still remains likely that a general election held after
Union in the Colony will be won by the extreme Nationalists (unless they boycott
again). One reason for thinking this is that I do not really believe that a sufficient
number of people in the Colony electorate will in fact shift their allegiance to the
new authority after it has come into being, i.e. “join the bandwaggon”. And part of
my reason for thinking this is that I do not really believe in the alleged strong
sentiment for unity in Southern Arabia; indeed, I was surprised when I heard the
Governor recently (and Mr. Trevaskis) appealing to this sentiment as part of their
argument, since it so strongly conflicts with the advice so frequently given by
previous Arabists in positions of authority, notably Sir Tom Hickinbotham1 and Sir
Bernard Reilly, that if there is a dominant motif in Arab character it is the fissiparous
tendency to almost individual independence or anarchy—“every Arab is his own
King”. I therefore think that the paper could possibly bring out a little more clearly
that the gamble may very well not come off, and that if it does not, and if the Colony
Nationalists win a post-Union election, we may then be in an extremely awkward
position, and even with the support of the Rulers of the Protectorate be obliged to
use force to maintain our necessary strategic interest in the base.
3. Because this risk is (in my view) so great, I think we are entitled to insist on
the Rulers falling in with all conditions which we may seek to impose for fostering
the Union. Among these I would rate at highest the necessity that the Governor
should maintain for a period of years control of the Public Services in the Colony, the
Federation, the Union, and the rest of the Protectorate. I have recently had an
opportunity of seeing the papers on this subject, and have there minuted that it is a
“must” to achieve this aim, particularly as our legal advice is that through proper
constitution making it can be done. I would therefore . . . suggest the following
amendment from “Y” of the last page of the draft:—
“I consider it of the first importance that the Governor exercise control of the
Public Services of the Union, the Colony, and the Protectorate, until the Union
has been established for several years. It may be difficult to persuade the
Federation Rulers of the necessity for this, but, if my scheme is adopted, I shall
insist upon it as one of the necessary conditions of the formation of the Union. We
should also . . .”
J.C.M.
8.12.61
Thank you for these views, which, if I may say so, go very much to the heart of the
business. . . . Certainly there are Arab characteristics which, as we have all seen, cause
X
1 Governor of Aden, 1951–1956.
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a remarkable amount of political instability. Yet the Federation has acquired a fair
measure of cohesion and authority—more perhaps than you might have forecast
three years ago. My own short experience in Aden, for what it is worth, makes me
think that the motives behind the present moves for political union are perhaps
more to be sought in Aden conditions than in something called ‘Arab psychology’.
They are:—
(1) the realisation by the Rulers that now HMG. is ready to deal with them as an
established Federal government.
(2) the realisation by the Rulers that HMG. cannot maintain Colonial rule very
much longer in the Colony—producing a determination to avert a Nationalist-
dominated government there.
(3) the realisation by the Colony public of the above, leading to the deduction that
the Federal Govt., with its existing pledge of eventual independence, has now to be
taken seriously.
(4) a realisation by the Colony public that the Cairo-inspired Nationalists and the
Yemeni labourers are not those to whom they want to see their fate entrusted.
These factors, I think, do give the present leaning towards union some reality.
However, I agree with you that there is a danger that elections in the Colony after
union may still go wrong; and have redrafted [Cabinet paper] again to bring out your
point.
None of us dispute your point ‘X’, but at the moment I do not think the S of S. is in
a position to make retention of the power to control the public service a sine qua
non. The Governor is, as you know, having the facts of life drummed into him, and I
think that we shall soon be in a position to lay down the law as you propose. But I
would not wish, nor could I, take the Governor’s agreement to what you propose for
granted; and we had better let him continue his present examination of this
problem . . .
Perhaps, at this time, I might offer two general observations:
(1) G.H.2 Aden (whoever is the occupant) is sometimes apt to say that such and
such is ‘politically impossible’. My experience is that it is in fact rarely so. It is
remarkable what can be done if we, H.M.G., show the Arabs that we know our own
minds and display patience—great patience—in explaining things.
(2) the generality of Arabs in the Colony and Federation still have confidence in
our integrity and intentions, and give us their respect.
I.W.
10.12.61
2 ie, Government House.
205 CAB 134/1561, CPC 4(62)1 16 Feb 1962
‘Constitutional development in Aden’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial
Policy Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(62) 8) on constitutional development in Aden.
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The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs1 said that it was now proposed, and had
been accepted by the Committee at their previous meeting, that our object should be
to secure a merger of Aden Colony with the Aden Federation before further elections
were held in the Colony. The Colonial Secretary had, however, been asked to report
back to the Committee on two points; the possibility of retaining sovereignty over
British military installations in Aden, on the analogy of the sovereign base areas in
Cyprus, and the possibility of accelerating the proposed merger between the Colony
and the Federation. Before turning to any detailed consideration of the base areas it
should be borne in mind that the merger between the Colony and the Federation did
not of itself involve any loss of British sovereignty; our proposals provided for the
retention of British responsibility for defence, foreign affairs and internal security in
the territory as a whole.
The Minister of Defence2 explained the practical difficulties which would be
involved in the creation of sovereign base areas in Aden if the rest of the territory
became fully independent. The present enclave at Khormaksar was overlooked by the
heights of Aden itself and would be very vulnerable to attack; it had limited fuel
storage and the road linking Khormaksar with the Federation would run through
independent territory. It would be possible in theory to consider the creation of a
base area at Little Aden but apart from the formidable cost involved—possibly
amounting to £50 million—this presented difficulties of its own, particularly for
harbour facilities, water supplies and the construction of a new airstrip. The
conclusion which the Chiefs of Staff had reached, and with which he agreed, was that
the only practical course of action in present circumstances was to retain effective
control over the whole territory; this should be one of the main objects of the
forthcoming discussions. In the longer term the possibility of establishing facilities
at Socotra might have to be considered.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) Under present defence plans it would be essential to retain facilities both at
Aden and at Singapore for a period of at least ten years and this should be borne in
mind in negotiation. At the end of the ten-year period it might be possible to look
forward to a strategy based partly on larger seaborne forces and partly on the
provision of operating facilities in strategically placed islands.
(b) Although the Sultan of Socotra might at some stage have to consider linking
his possessions on the mainland with the Federation, particularly if oil were found in
them, there was no indication that he would want to do the same for the island of
Socotra itself. The island was in any case five hundred miles from Aden. He would
not object to the establishment of British facilities on the island and might indeed
welcome them; apart from anything else they would bring him increased revenue.
This possibility should be further considered.
Turning to the programme for constitutional development the Minister of State
for Colonial Affairs explained that under the plan now envisaged the representatives
of the Colony and of the Rulers would be invited to consider proposals for a merger;
the result of their negotiations could be announced at the end of the year. At about
the same time certain measures of constitutional advance in the Colony itself would
be announced; only if these measures were carried out, and a new Government
1 Lord Perth. 2 Mr H Watkinson.
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formed, would it be legally possible for the Colony to give effect to the merger. But it
would not be necessary to hold new elections; indeed when the proposed
constitutional changes had taken place it would be possible to postpone until 1964
the elections which under present rules were due to be held in 1963. The next step
would be for the Legislative Council in the Colony as well as the equivalent body on
the Rulers side to accept the proposals for merger, which would then be put into
effect. The whole object was to take advantage of and to strengthen the support
which we were now receiving from the moderate element in the Colony; early
elections might result in the return of a nationalist majority whose programme
would include early independence for the Colony in isolation and the removal of
British bases.
In further discussion the following points were made:—
(c) The general scope of the proposals was sound, and seemed most likely to secure
the support of those elements in the Colony favourable to us and undisturbed
possession and use of the military facilities.
(d) If against all present indications the proposals for a merger were not accepted
by the Legislative Council in the Colony or by the representatives of the Rulers, or
were altered in ways unacceptable to us, the United Kingdom Government would
retain a power of veto.
(e) Not all the Rulers in the Western Protectorate and only one of the Rulers in the
Eastern Protectorate had so far joined the Federation. It would, however, be open to
them to accede at any time and it was our hope that an increasing number would do
so. . . .
206 CAB 128/36/2, CC 52(62)1 1 Aug 1962
[Negotiations for a merger between Aden Colony and Aden
Federation]: Cabinet conclusions
The Commonwealth Secretary said that there were two major questions of policy to
be faced in the negotiations for constitutional development in Aden—the political
implications of the proposed merger of Aden Colony with the Federation, and the
safeguarding of the military bases and installations. On the first point it was known
that a majority of the population of the Colony was opposed to the merger. The fact
that it commanded support in the Aden Legislature was due to the fact that the
elections had been held on a limited franchise and had been widely boycotted on that
account, even by those entitled to vote. It must therefore be assumed that the merger
would lead to unrest and possibly to disorder, which would have serious political
repercussions in this country and in the United Nations. Nevertheless, the
Government had now before them a request from the Aden Legislature that the
merger should proceed and it had long since been decided that this would best serve,
not only the interests of this country, but the interests of the population of Aden
Colony itself and of the territories of the Federation. While he considered that the
merger should go forward, he thought it right to warn the Cabinet that this might
lead to serious political difficulties.
So far as the military base was concerned it was contemplated that after the
merger Britain would retain sovereignty over Aden Colony and remain responsible
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for defence, foreign affairs and internal security in the territory as a whole. But it was
not to be expected that this situation could long continue. Pressures would develop
for the transfer of sovereignty and full responsibility to the new Federation, and on a
favourable estimate it was unlikely that we could maintain our position in the Colony
beyond the late 1960s. If the Colony was not merged with the Federation the process
would be more rapid and independence for the Colony could probably not be delayed
much beyond 1965.
Against this background there were two possible ways of preserving our defence
interest. The first would be to retain, on the analogy of the sovereign base areas in
Cyprus, British sovereignty over those limited areas of the Colony in which our
defence installations were concentrated. The second would be to rely on a defence
treaty with an independent Federation or to introduce into the instrument under
which independence would be granted some form of words recognising the
continuing interest of the United Kingdom Government in the defence installations.
There were, in his view, strong arguments in favour of the first course; the retention
of sovereignty would secure to us a clear legal right to the unrestricted use of the
military installations. All recent experience suggested that reliance on a defence
treaty or some alternative arrangement on the same lines would be less effective and
that our position under such a treaty would be progressively weakened by political
action. It was noteworthy that the President of Cyprus had welcomed the fact that
the existence of the sovereign base areas made it possible for him to refuse to accept
any responsibility for British activities within these areas.
The Minister of Defence1 said that, while he accepted the critical importance of
maintaining the viability of our defence installations in Aden, he doubted whether
that object would best be met by seeking to retain British sovereignty over limited
areas of the Colony on the lines proposed. In the first place, there would be the
greatest practical difficulty in so doing. Aden Colony was small and densely
populated, and the military installations did not form a compact whole. To retain
sovereignty over the airfield at Khormaksar for example would produce immediate
difficulties about the civil use of Khormaksar and about such matters as access and
services, e.g., water supplies and fuel storage. Another area over which it would be
necessary to retain sovereignty lay across the trunk road linking the two main
centres of population in the Colony. Quite apart from these serious practical
difficulties, for which experience in Cyprus provided no parallel, there would also be
political objections. All the advice he had received was to the effect that a proposal at
this stage to retain British sovereignty over defined military areas would make
negotiations for a merger very much more difficult and would lessen rather than
improve the prospects of a satisfactory settlement.
In discussion it was agreed that, in spite of the political consequences,
negotiations for a merger of the Aden Colony with the Aden Federation should
proceed on the lines already authorised.
The Prime Minister said that he would wish to discuss further with the Ministers
concerned the question of retaining sovereignty over the military areas. It would be
helpful to him if the Commonwealth Secretary, together with the Lord Chancellor
and the Minister of Defence, could give further thought to the issues involved and to
the relative advantages and disadvantages of the various courses open to us.
1 Mr P Thorneycroft, since mid-July 1962.
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The Cabinet:—
(1) Authorised the Commonwealth Secretary to proceed with negotiations for a
merger of Aden Colony with the Aden Federation.
(2) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Minister of
Defence and the Lord Chancellor, to give further thought to the maintenance of
United Kingdom control over our present defence facilities in Aden and to report
their conclusions to the Prime Minister.
207 CO 1015/23881 16 Aug 1962
[Explanation of the government’s policy on Aden]: FO tel (no 325),
circular to overseas representatives and high commissioners
In comment you should stress the following points:
(a) Aden and its hinterland, the Federation, form a natural unity, which has only
been divided by historical accident.
(b) Unity in Arab brotherhood is undoubtedly an aspiration of all the people, even
if some oppose the present Rulers in the Federation or Ministers in the Colony.
(c) The proposals therefore represent encouraging progress towards the common-
sense solution of a merger which would be greatly to the advantage of the 500,000
inhabitants of the Federation and the 220,000 of the Colony. Continued separation
would be a nonsense.
(d) The eventual goal of the Federation is independence, as stated in the Preamble
of the 1959 Treaty. Aden, no longer isolated as a small colonial territory, can now
aspire to share in the future nationhood of a larger country.
(e) The arrangements safeguard our important requirements arising from our
world-wide defence responsibilities. They will assist us to fulfil our Treaty and
other obligations in the Middle East. (One of our principal interests, the defence of
Kuwaiti independence, is approved by all Arab states except Iraq).
2. The arrangements will be attacked by Arab nationalist propaganda, supported
by a vociferous faction in Aden Colony and perhaps by anti-colonialist opinion
elsewhere. You may make the following points in answer to criticisms:
(a) It cannot be denied that the proposed Union is right and in the true interests
of the inhabitants of the area as a whole. The Federal and Aden Ministers have
given a firm lead in this direction, with the support of Her Majesty’s Government.
The initiative has been theirs, not ours.
(b) Ample time is being given for discussion in the Colony and elsewhere (see
timetable, for your information, in following Saving telegram).
(c) It would be untrue to allege that the more advanced society of the Colony
would be swamped by the predominantly tribal organisation still existing in the
Federation. It is just as likely that the richer and more sophisticated Adenis will
soon assume the leadership.
3. The following points are delicate ones on which it is not in our interest to have
speculation or publicity:
1 This paper is unnumbered, and appears to be an interloper in this file.
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(a) Article IX of the Draft Treaty provides that the United Kingdom Government
might exclude or withdraw specific areas within Aden for defence reasons.
(b) The exclusion of Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands may arouse suspicion.
(c) The ultimate relations of the new Federation with the United Kingdom are
undefined. Hostile propaganda may allege a plot to entice the new State into the
Commonwealth.
4. If it becomes necessary for you to comment on any of the points above you
should say (respectively):
(a) It is quite unnecessary to go behind the text, which speaks for itself.
(b) These islands have never been administered as part of the Colony or
Federation.
(c) Any such talk is pure speculation. The future independent State will obviously
decide its own future for itself.
5. The most damaging criticism may be the lack of any electoral process either
before the Colony advance or before merger. We shall send guidance on the line to be
taken in public in reply to this. Meanwhile you may draw on the remainder of this
paragraph in conversation with reliable contacts. The present Colony franchise is
unsatisfactory to all parties—too narrow for the left-wing, too broad for the
moderate leaders who wish to exclude all who are not true Adenis—and the Aden
Government must therefore review and completely revise it before new elections;
this may take 18 months, and meanwhile merger cannot wait. Revision of the
franchise and choice of the date of the next election will be entirely a matter for the
new Colony Government. Provision is made for the possibility of Aden secession after
six years’ experience of Union.
208 CO 968/707, no 84A 21 Oct 1962
[Aden: possibility of sovereign base areas]: record of a meeting in CO
with Sir C Johnston about defence facilities
[In Sept 1962 the Aden Legislative Council voted for the colony to join the Federation, ie,
for ‘merger’. On the very next day the Imam of Yemen was overthrown by a revolutionary
republican coup backed by Egypt. The Aden TUC thus acquired powerful neighbouring
support in its opposition. The governor later wrote: ‘If the Yemeni revolution had come
one day earlier or the Leg Co vote one day later . . . the agreement would never have
obtained the support of a majority of local members’ (C H Johnston, The view from
Steamer Point: being an account of three years in Aden p 124). The British government
agonised over recognition of the new Yemeni republic. The Americans and the FO were in
favour, but the CO feared the price to be paid—weakening the British position in Aden and
the Federation by disheartening the ‘moderates’ and encouraging the ‘extremists’—was
too great. (CAB 130/189, GEN 776, minutes of meetings, 31 Oct 1962 & 5 Feb 1963; CAB
134/2371, OP(63)2 & 4, memos by Sandys, 5 & 12 Feb 1963; OP 1 (63)3, minutes of Oversea
Policy Committee meeting, 13 Feb 1963). The issue was settled for the government when
in Feb 1963 the Yemeni regime evicted the British mission. Meanwhile, over Aden itself,
the principal issue for the British government was whether the base areas should be
included in the merger, which formally took place on 18 Jan 1963.]
The Secretary of State said his object in forming Base Areas was to confer on us
bargaining power against the day that we had to give independence to the
Federation. We should, however, aim at life going on as normal. He wanted to
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examine how to ensure that the services which we required the Federal and State
Government to carry out for us in the areas would be continued.
2. The Governor said that he must stress his belief that to proceed with the idea
of excluding Base Areas from the merger would lead to a very dangerous situation.
The Adenis might be fatalistic enough to accept our going ahead with merger and we
should have the Federation with us over this, but the reaction if we attempted to set
up Base Areas would be explosive. Nationalist and moderate opinion in the Colony
would never submit to it and even, he feared, opinion in the Federation might not
accept it.
3. The Secretary of State said he doubted whether adding the Base Area scheme
to merger would materially worsen the explosion which merger alone would provoke.
Nor did he accept as certain that the Federation would come out against Base Areas.
His discussion with Mohammed Farid1 did not suggest that there was any likelihood
of this. We should play the matter down as a purely administrative measure, the other
side of the coin of Constitutional advance, and stress that everything would go on as
usual without fences to demarcate the areas or any other difference.
4. The Governor repeated that in his view the merger proposals would be the last
straw and might provoke a Cyprus-like situation. The Secretary of State questioned
whether there would be any advantage in proceeding with merger but in some way
reserving our power to exclude the Base Areas until later. Mr. Fisher2 thought that
this might only lead to two rows instead of one. The Governor thought that in
addition to losing all the Ministers but Bayoomi over merger, we would even lose
Bayoomi over the Base Areas. He was a man capable of great bitterness and once he
was gone, we should not be able to build back on him.
5. The possibility of excluding the Base Areas after merger, e.g. by means of a
statement that the precise area to be transferred to the Federation would be for later
demarcation, was discussed but was thought to be impractical, since the proviso
about demarcation was bound to attract attention and we should have no explanation
to give. The Secretary of State said that in his belief it was now or never with Base
Areas. If they were ever included in the Federation it would be impossible to
withdraw them. He did not agree with the Governor’s view that we could expect to
bargain over them when we came to grant independence to the Federation. He said
that whilst he had not reached a final conclusion on the matter he was inclined to
think that if it was impossible to set up Base Areas then it would be unjustifiable to
have any further expenditure on the Aden Base. This would be a source of regret in
Aden, whereas in introducing Base Areas he would be able to explain that these
facilitated continued expenditure.
6. The Governor said that there would be outcry for more development
expenditure in the Colony anyway. Could it be expected that there would be very
substantial extra payments if Base Areas were formed? The Secretary of State made it
clear that there would not. They would be losing no revenue and they would not be in
a position to bargain with us because we should not be taking anything from them
that was not ours already. The Governor said that no Adeni would look upon the
separation of Base Areas in this light: they would be viewed as a gift to us at their
expense.
1 Ruler of the Upper Aulaqi state; federal minister of finance.
2 Under-secretary of state since mid-July 1962.
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7. The discussion then turned to the legal implications of establishing Base Areas
and the suitability of arrangements similar to those applied in the case of Perim was
discussed. The Secretary of State queried whether these arrangements would put the
Governor in a position to enforce our obtaining from the State or Federal
Governments the facilities the Base Areas required. The Governor considered that in
the Colony, since we retained sovereignty, he would have the necessary power to do
so, but not in regard to Federal services, e.g. education. It was agreed, however, that
this particular instance should not raise any difficulty because the number of Adenis
living in the Base Areas would be so small (on the assumption that it would be
possible to exclude the refinery and all the population of Little Aden from the Base
Area). The Secretary of State emphasised that he wished to avoid giving grounds for
negotiation having to take place before setting up the Base Areas.
8. There was discussion whether it would be possible to carry out the merger in
stages, e.g. beginning with confederation between the Colony and the Federation.
The Governor said this course had seemed to him to offer no advantages. The
Secretary of State wondered whether [we] could avoid e.g. a boycott of the
administration, by leaving open the timing in which the merger was applied in
practice. It was considered however after discussion that it would be difficult to do
this since upon merger the Colony would automatically lose the authority to wield
certain executive powers. There would have to be an Exchange of Letters with the
Federation modifying the terms of the proposed Treaty, but this would lead to a deep
suspicion on the part of the Federation that we were beginning to hedge. Mr. de
Winton3 suggested that the desired effect might be obtained by inserting in the
Federal legislation, which merger would necessitate, provisions for transitional
arrangements. This could be presented as a purely technical matter and yet would
allow the actual hand-over to the Federation of certain Colony services to be phased
in a way that would soften the blow to public opinion. The Secretary of State asked
that the possibility of doing so should be urgently considered in consultation with
legal advisers in Aden.
9. The Secretary of State examined maps showing the suggested Base Areas and
asked that up to date maps showing precise figures of local population resident in the
Areas should be prepared. By local population is meant here persons other than
Service personnel and their families and British civilians employed directly by the
Services. It would thus include both Adenis and Europeans other than military
personnel and their families.
10. The Governor was authorised by the Secretary of State to sound out informally
the Sultan of Lahej and Mr. Bayoomi to test their reactions to excluding Base Areas
from the merger. The Governor should be free to choose his own time to do this.
3 M G De Winton, senior legal assistant in CO since 1961.
209 CO 1055/129, no 95 7 June 1963
‘Aden: future policy’: CO departmental brief for S of S (with minutes
by Mr Sandys)
[Mr Sandys wrote minutes or comments in the margins of this paper, reproduced here as
footnotes. After merger in Jan 1962, the gov became high commissioner to Federation.]
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The Federal Supreme Council’s proposals for further constitutional development are
contained in a letter of 3rd June to the Secretary of State, the text of which is
contained in telegram No. 560. A copy of the letter will be given to Mr. Bayoomi,
Chief Minister, Aden, on his arrival in London tomorrow by sea.1
2. As agreed in our recent discussions with the Secretary of State, Sir Charles
Johnston has encouraged the Federal Ministers to put forward these proposals. They
include the desired offer to the United Kingdom to exercise the legal right to excise
the Base Areas over which British sovereignty may be retained after the grant of
independence to the Federation and Aden.2 The Federal Ministers recognise that the
exercise of our legal rights in this matter would not be the subject of negotiations:
nevertheless they ask that the Federal and Aden Governments should be consulted
regarding the details before the Base Areas are excised. This seems a reasonable
request:3 it would cause needless friction if it were to be rejected.
3. The proposals envisage the immediate grant of Protectorate State status to
Aden, and complete independence in 1969. This course is an amalgam of the Third
and Fifth Courses, the pros and cons of which were discussed in some detail in the
Department’s memorandum of 17th May, 1963.
Removal of advisory clause of treaty
4. The High Commissioner in telegram No. 561 raises no objection but
comments that the Qa’iti and Kathiri States would press for abrogation of their
advisory treaties. The Department’s view is that although we would like to keep the
advisory powers as long as possible as a safeguard, it must be recognised that they are
of no more practical use than the reserved powers in Aden, since they could only be
used in the last resort and at the risk of a crisis in our relations with the Federation.
Moreover their retention is an irritant to the Federation. We considered that the
balance of advantage lies in dispensing with the advisory powers now to secure the
political benefits, namely agreement to the proposed programme including the
excision of the Base Areas.4
5. We have considered the effect on expatriate staff of giving up our advisory
powers. In view of the Exchange of Letters5 with the Federal Government relating to
the conditions on which expatriate staff are made available by the High
Commissioner, we do not think that the loss of the Treaty advisory powers would
automatically involve the introduction of a general compensation scheme.6
Nevertheless we should recognise that it would probably bring nearer the
introduction of such a scheme: individual cases are arising already. We would have to
make it clear to the Federal Government that annulment of the Advisory Clause of
the Treaty would not diminish the validity of the Exchange of Letters and that we
would expect them to continue to abide by the agreed conditions on which staff have
been made available.
6. If we give up our advisory powers in the Federation, there is no reason to
object to giving up similar powers in the Eastern Protectorate States.
1 I must see Bayoomi & he must be offered every courtesy.
2 The Aden Ministers appear to ask for something “in return”. This we cannot accept.
3 Provided our right is recognised unconditionally, we can discuss their wishes separately.
4 I think this is probably right.
5 What is this?
6 Good.
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Further constitutional advance in Aden
7. Detailed arguments for and against this proposal have been examined in the
memorandum of 17th May. The High Commissioner discusses these arguments
further in his telegram No. 562 and concludes that it is better to limit constitutional
advance to the grant of internal self-government. The Department concur with the
High Commissioner’s view on this point.7 It may however be questioned whether any
form of constitutional change in Aden is absolutely necessary at this stage, unless it
is clear that a concession must be made to obtain agreement on the Base Areas.
8. The Federal Ministers point out that the making of a new Constitution for
Aden would involve a convenient delay in the Colony elections. What they really
mean is, no doubt, that when the new Constitution was introduced there would be
no elections at all. However, in either case we would not avoid the difficulties in
Parliament and in international circles which we have already foreseen as the main
disadvantage of this course.
9. This raises the main question whether we are to allow elections to proceed and
accept the possibility of a PSP Government in Aden, or whether to take positive steps
to prevent elections from being held, and face the inevitable criticism in Parliament
and elsewhere.8 The answer to this question is relevant to the timing of the whole
process of constitutional development, since it will determine whether we need to
take any action before the end of the current year.
Independence in 1969
10. The High Commissioner does not comment on this proposal. The
Department’s view is that it is acceptable on the assumption that no radical change
in policy emerges from the Chequers’ review. The date proposed corresponds roughly
with the end of the period allowed by Article X of the Treaty of Accession, relating to
the withdrawal of Aden from the Federation.
Excision of base areas
11. This is the quid pro quo which the Secretary of State wishes to have in return
for the prospect of further constitutional evolution.9 The High Commissioner
comments that discussion with Federal and Aden Ministers of the details of the
proposed excisions would be inevitable, although we should not admit any limitation
of our full legal rights. See also paragraph 2 above.
Future assistance to the Federation
12. Federal Ministers seek a formal assurance that financial, military and
technical aid would continue indefinitely after the grant of independence in 1969.
The High Commissioner in his telegram No. 561 reiterates his familiar arguments
about the need for a substantial increase in aid to obtain the necessary goodwill for
the whole operation. The Department’s view is that any promise of future aid must
depend upon the outcome of the Chequers’ review, and that it is likely to be
7 [Sandys appears to have placed a very large question mark against this sentence.]
8 [Sandys appears to have placed a large question mark against this sentence.]
9 No. I have never accepted that this is a “quid pro quo”. We have already given the “quo” in the form of
merger and the recent constitutional advance. We are now entitled to the “quid” without further payment.
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extremely difficult10 to obtain the Treasury’s agreement to any open-ended
commitment such as that proposed. We think that we can go only so far as to give an
assurance that we will continue to honour our existing Treaty obligation to assist the
Federation, and give an undertaking that we will review with the Federal
Government shortly before the grant of independence the possibilities of continuing
assistance after the attainment of independence.11
Further accessions
13. The High Commissioner points out that this refers to the accession of the
Qa’iti and Kathiri States. The Department’s view is that there is much to be said for
allowing these States to join the Federation, but the benefit will accrue to the
Federation rather than to HMG, who will have to shoulder an additional financial
burden.12 We think that this point may be useful as a potential bargaining counter to
secure some advantage to ourselves—e.g. some slowing down in the process of
constitutional advance in Aden if that were desired.13
Other preparations for independence
14. These proposals relate to a number of minor matters which are irrelevant to
the main constitutional issues and which can be considered separately later on.
Use of Singapore constitution as model for Aden
15. The High Commissioner’s comments are in his telegram No. 563. This is a
matter to which we need give detailed consideration only in the event of a decision to
give Aden internal self-government as the next step.14 It is unnecessary for the
Department to comment at this stage, but it may be noted that the High
Commissioner proposes to retain an advisory Public Service Commission and that it
appears that a satisfactory answer to the problem of security arrangements might be
found when the time comes to concede internal self-government.
Timing
16. Even if we excise the Base Areas at the earliest possible moment (which we
understand to be the Secretary of State’s wish), it might be possible to agree with the
Federal and Aden Ministers on a programme which would allow a decent interval
before the introduction of another new Constitution in Aden.15 The sooner the next
constitutional change is made, the greater will be the pressure for earlier
independence, and the difficulty of delaying independence until 1969 will be
increased. As noted above, the question of deferring the next constitutional advance
in Aden is bound up with a decision on the question whether elections are to be
allowed to take place in the normal course. If, however, we were to attempt to fix a
time for the next constitutional change perhaps one or two years hence, it would be
necessary to give the local Ministers (particularly the Aden Ministers) some
10 Impossible.
11 Yes.
12 The money available is not unlimited. If this is their top priority, we should agree. But it will reduce
money for other things.
13 I am not sure that we do.
14 We must study this before we decide whether to give Aden internal self-govt.
15 Let us discuss.
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concession which they could represent publicly as a quid pro quo for the excision of
the Base Areas. This concession might perhaps take the form of an undertaking to
call a Constitutional Conference at a specified date to consider the details of the
proposed new Constitution, and such a conference would afford an opportunity to
invite the Opposition factions to consultations. Even if this invitation were rejected,
we would be in a better position to justify the postponement of elections in Aden.
210 CAB 128/38, CM 9(63)2 5 Dec 1963
[Constitutional status of Aden]: Cabinet conclusions
The Colonial Secretary informed the Cabinet that he would shortly have to initiate
discussions with the Government of Aden about the constitutional status of the
Colony. It was already included within the dependent Protectorate of the Federation
of South Arabia, which would continue to look to the United Kingdom for support
and protection; and he had it in mind that its position should now be assimilated to
that of the other States which were members of the Federation. In so far as this
change would imply the termination of colonial rule in Aden, it could be presented as
in some sense conferring on the Colony the status of independence within the
Federation; and this should help the moderate party1 to retain power in the
forthcoming elections. But it would also have the advantages that it would transfer to
the Federation the embarrassing responsibility for internal security in Aden, a
responsibility which the authorities of the Federation would discharge with greater
severity than we could afford to; and that, by further consolidating the union of Aden
with the Federation, it might help to forestall demands by the extremist party2 in
Aden for genuine and complete independence outside the Federation. It would be for
consideration whether, at some point, we should preserve our essential interests in
Aden by exercising our right to excise the military base areas from the territory to be
transferred to the Federation and retaining these under our own sovereignty. For the
moment, however, it would probably suffice to make it clear that we retained this
right and that the change in the status of Aden implied no weakening of our purpose
to retain a military presence there indefinitely.
In discussion it was suggested that there was no precedent for the conversion of a
Colony into a Protectorate and that further consideration would need to be given
both to the means by which such a change might be effected and to its possible
implications. It would not necessarily be to our advantage to substitute a treaty
relationship for direct sovereignty, especially since the military base areas were so
intermingled with the rest of the habitable territory within the Colony that, if we
were ever compelled to seek to give effect to our right to excise them, we might find
it impracticable to do so. If, in these circumstances, the authorities of the Federation
proved incapable of maintaining internal security in Aden and we were compelled to
1 The ‘moderates’ were led by Hassan Bayoomi until his untimely death in the summer of 1963, and then
by Zain ’Abdu Baharoon (Baharun), who succeeded him as chief minister in June 1963. The ‘moderates’
were a group rather than a political party, mostly middle-class merchants and businessmen.
2 The ‘extremists’ were led by Abdullah al-Asnaj, general secretary of the Aden Trades Union Congress, and
leader of its political wing, the People’s Socialist Party (PSP), the main ‘opposition’ party. Al-Asnaj had
been a clerk with Aden Airways until he was imprisoned for sedition, Jan–May 1963.
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intervene, we might find that we lacked both the constitutional authority and the
physical means to do so effectively; and we might be exposed to greater international
criticism if our action had to take the form of external intervention rather than the
assertion of direct sovereignty. Such a situation might be the more likely to arise in
that our presence in Aden, in so far as it ensured stability in the Persian Gulf, was
probably regarded by the Egyptian Government as, on balance, to their own
advantage. If, however, we appeared to surrender effective control over Aden and the
Egyptian Government believed that, as a result, the Rulers in the Gulf might be
attacked by Saudi Arabia, they might feel compelled to intervene themselves; and in
that event we should be ill-placed to deal with disorders which might be provoked in
Aden by the extremist party with Egyptian encouragement.
On the other hand it was desirable to ensure, if possible, that the moderate party
would be returned to power in the forthcoming elections and that any attempt by the
extremist party to win support for the complete independence of Aden outside the
Federation would be resisted not merely by moderate sentiment in Aden itself but
also by the loyalty of the whole Federation. Moreover, if the United Nations sought to
intervene in Aden, it would be possible to resist such intervention more effectively if
Aden were only one member of a Federation which, as a whole, was concerned that a
British military presence should remain in the area.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that further consideration
should be given, initially by the Committee on Defence and Oversea Policy, to the
issues which the discussion had exposed. In particular, the constitutional
implications of the proposed change in the status of Aden should be examined in
greater detail; the possibility of our retaining some degree of responsibility for
internal security, even if the status of Aden were changed, should be explored; and it
might be desirable, if only in order to avoid the legislation which might otherwise be
necessary, to consider the alternative course of giving effect to the substance of the
present proposal by an Order in Council conferring full internal self-government on
the Colony.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Colonial Secretary to circulate, for initial consideration at an early
meeting of the Committee on Defence and Oversea Policy, a memorandum
discussing, on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister in his summing up, the
implications of, and possible alternatives to, the proposal that the status of Aden
should be assimilated to that of other States which were members of the
Federation of South Arabia.
211 CAB 148/1, ff 35–36 26 Feb 1964
‘Aden’: minutes of Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee
meeting on proposed constitutional changes
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (D.O.
(64) 15) about his proposals for constitutional changes in Aden.
The Colonial Secretary said that in the light of his recent discussion with the High
Commissioner for South Arabia he wished to make certain amendments to his
previous proposals, which had been approved by the Defence Committee. It had at
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first been thought that there was a prospect of the moderate elements in Aden
winning the forthcoming elections, but it was now clear that we must plan on the
assumption that the extremists would do so. This would make it difficult to use
effectively our constitutional powers in the colony to prevent subversion, having
regard to pressures upon us both internationally and in this country. He considered
that the best way to maintain security was to give up certain remaining
constitutional and treaty powers in Aden and in the Federation respectively. In the
Federation the fact that we had under treaty powers of mandatory advice exposed us
to pressure, both in international circles and in Parliament, to use it frequently in a
manner contrary to the wishes of the Federal Government. He proposed that we
should abandon this power save in respect of external affairs and defence, which
would include power in respect of internal security to the extent that this might be
necessary for the defence of the military base. We should not then be susceptible to
pressure to interfere with the action taken by the Federal Government to maintain
security. In Aden it would free us from political embarrassment if we handed over full
control of day-to-day affairs to the local Government. Although this would increase
the powers of an extremist Government, security throughout the Federation would
be the responsibility of the Federal Government, which could also take over control
of the Aden police in emergency. The retention of sovereignty over Aden itself would
mean that we retained the right to excise in the future any part of the colony
necessary for our defence interests. These proposals involved a constitutional change
which would necessitate the introduction of a compensation scheme for members of
the Overseas Service: this would cost about £1 million over five years.
The High Commissioner for South Arabia1 said that as long as the Aden
Constitution gave us powers over internal security we were vulnerable to pressure
from the extremists, who were adept at enlisting outside support for their cause. The
transfer of responsibility to the Federal Government would ease the position, not
because that Government would be likely to have to resort to the more frequent and
sterner exercise of these powers, but because the Adeni extremists would be less
likely to cause trouble if they knew that responsibility rested with the Federal
Government. Furthermore, as long as affairs in Aden remained our responsibility it
was a centre for subversion against our friends in the Federation, and it was difficult
for us to control this without being subject to criticism for the infringement of
democratic rights and freedom of speech.
In favour of the Colonial Secretary’s proposals it was argued that:
(a) The position in Aden did not present a parallel with that of a colony about to
reach independence. It was a constituent state of the Federation with a constitutional
status less advanced than the remaining states. The proposed transfer of powers
would do no more, therefore, than put Aden in a position of parity with other
members of the Federation.
(b) It was the retention of our military position in Aden which mattered to us, not
the continued control of Aden affairs.
(c) All important powers would rest with the Federal Government which would be
better able to control security throughout the Federation without the intervention of
the High Commissioner (and therefore ultimately of the British Government)
between it and the constituent states.
1 Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, since Aug 1963.
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(d) As long as we retained sovereignty in Aden the position could be legally
reversed at any time to enable us to resume control. The High Commissioner would,
under the proposals, retain the power to appoint certain senior administrative and
police officers.
(e) The introduction of a compensation scheme for British members of the Service
which would enable them to retire at any time thereafter at six months’ notice was
not only a commitment at a constitutional stage of this nature but was desirable in
order to meet the present discontent in the Service and to facilitate the more rapid
Arabisation of the senior posts.
(f ) If we ignored the present pressure for constitutional advance there would be
serious political trouble, in the face of which we should eventually have to give way.
It would be better to make the advance now.
On the other hand, it was argued that:
(g) The Adenis might dislike coming more directly under the control of the
Federal Government; and in any case constitutional changes now would not
purchase their good will in the future.
(h) The Aden Government would under these proposals have day-to-day control of
the Aden police and of Aden Port; and this represented a potential threat to our
control of the military base.
(i) If, through the introduction of a compensation scheme, British members of the
Service were allowed to leave, this would not only lead to a lowering of the standard
of administration, with consequential effects on the base, but would leave us without
any instrument available if we wished to resume control in the colony.
(j) In view of some recent popular manifestations in the Federation it was doubtful
whether we could rely upon the present Federal Government remaining indefinitely
in control.
(k) The form of the proposals represented a close parallel with the normal pattern
of a colony advancing towards independence and would be represented as a British
intention to withdraw completely in the near future.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the proposals presented
certain difficulties in respect of our retention of powers necessary to maintain our
military base in Aden and might be widely misrepresented. These difficulties would
need to be considered further.
212 PREM 11/4679, ff 56–59 8 Apr 1964
[Aden, the Yemen, and Middle East policy]: minute by J O Wright
(PM’s Office) to Sir A Douglas-Home
The Cabinet clearly took the right decision on Thursday about the Yemen.1 Equally
clearly they took it à contre-cœur.
1 The Cabinet decided Britain should abstain on a UN Security Council resolution condemning the British
attack on Harib (see next note), and should inform the US government that Britain would deplore it if the
US supported the resolution, since in principle the action was similar to the American one in Cuba (see
CAB 128/38/2, CM 21(64)2, f 189).
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The fact is that our action at Harib2 left us friendless in the world; even in this
country there has been not much support for it (e.g. the Sunday Times). This is not
very good for a country like Britain which, at home, aims to have as bi-partisan a
foreign policy as possible and, abroad, hopes to make friends and influence people by
the balanced sanity and commonsense of its policies. Frankly, I think we are in as
grave danger of failing to protect our true interests in the Middle East as we were in
South-East Asia, before you met Bobby Kennedy and subsequently President
Johnson. I think a fresh rescue operation on your part with the President may be
necessary.
I think the first essentials in successful policy in the Middle East are:—
(1) To recognise and accept the sort of world we live in.
(2) To get our policies aligned with those of the Americans, whose broad interests
in the area are the same as our own.
With respect, I do not think we have done either at the moment. What we are in
fact doing is making precisely the same mistake (and for the same reason) as we were
doing in Malaysia–Indonesia namely over supporting our short term interests
regardless of their impact on our long term interests.
We have really only two interests in the Middle East.
The first is access on reasonable terms to Middle East oil. The second is over flying
rights across the Middle East barrier so that we may get to the other parts of the
world where our presence is necessary. We also have a Treaty obligation to defend
Kuwait.
The true security for our Middle East supplies of oil is the purely commercial
consideration of willing buyer and willing seller. The great protections are first the
fact that the Middle East countries have no-one else to sell the oil to in such quantity
as they can to ourselves; and secondly that we could always import cheap Soviet oil if
the Arabs get too troublesome. The military defence of Kuwait and the need to retain
Aden in order to defend Kuwait are useful and should not voluntarily be given up.
But I do not for one moment believe they are more than a secondary protection and I
think we shall be fighting a rear-guard action to maintain them.
The Americans also have the same basic interests as ourselves in the Middle East:
the reasonable access to oil and the general peace of the area. They recognise the
value of peace and stability in the area and our base at Aden. Their only quarrel is the
way we go about it.
Our present attitudes, seem to me to be based on a number of fundamental
misconceptions. The first is that the Americans are hostile to our interests. The fact
is that they are not. Secondly that the American policy in the Yemen has failed. It has
no more failed than Egyptian policy has succeeded. The Egyptians are bogged down
in the Yemen. There is a stalemate. The Americans recognise that there is a
stalemate. This suits us very well. The measure of this is that when there was
a possibility a week or so ago that Nasser and King Saud might be making it up, a
2 On 13 Mar 1964 the Yemenis bombed a frontier village in the State of Beihan. On 28 Mar, ostensibly on
a request from the South Arabian Federation government, and after due warning to the locals, a reprisal
bomb attack was launched on a government fort near Harib (known as Fort Harib) in the Yemen. The
British had treaty obligations to the federal government. But the US government disapproved of the
action.
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quiver of apprehension ran through Whitehall. Whether or not American policy has
failed, the result of American policy, the stalemate, suits us very well.
Thirdly there is an underlying trend in our dealings with the Middle East to have a
bash at Nasser. This is very understandable but very unwise. We had a bash once and
failed with ignominy. We must resist the temptation to do so again. Our only interest
is to see that Nasser does not unite the Arab world under his leadership. There is
really no prospect that the Arabs are ever likely to get united under any single
person’s leadership, least of all under the leadership of Egypt. The whole history in
the Middle East in recent years shows that Nasser has had a series of setbacks in
Syria. He has only got bogged down in the Yemen. Let us leave him alone and let him
stew in his own juice. Above all do not let us become querulous about the American
attitude to Nasser. We complained bitterly to them when John Foster Dulles cut off
aid for the Aswan Dam.3 Are we now going to complain equally querulously if they
give aid?
Policy for the future. I think we must recognise that the best way of protecting our
interests in the Middle East is summed up in the phrase: “Softly, softly catchee
monkey”. We must meet our Treaty commitments to Kuwait, to Libya and to the
Arabian Federation but in a totally unspectacular and totally unaggressive and
unprovocative way. It may be unfair that the world condemns Harib. The fact is
however that Indians and Pakistanis can slay each other in their thousands. Hutsis
and Tutsis4 can murder each other with impunity and no-one cares. Equally, no-one
would care if the Wars of the Roses broke out in England again. What the world will
not stand is white men killing non-whites except perhaps at the request of a non-
white government who happens to be in the right.
My recommendation would be that we ought to seize the opportunity of the review
both by ourselves and the Americans of the Libyan Treaty to have a proper go over
the ground of the Middle East with the Americans. The object would be not to bring
the Americans round to our point of view, as this is unattainable and would in my
view be wrong. The idea would be to re-establish a sense of common purpose in the
Middle East on the lines of a sense of common purpose that has now been established
in South-East Asia. The advantage of this is that it would be conducted by the
Foreign Office which is the only Department in Whitehall which is making sense at
the moment on this subject. The Colonial Office ought to be making Aden a better
place to live in.5
J.O.W.
8.4.64
3 In 1956; the action precipitated Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.
4 In Rwanda.
5 The prime minister minuted: ‘I think Mr Butler and the Commonwealth Sec. should go over the whole
of this ground with Mr. Rusk. I agree with a lot of this, but how do we defend the Aden Federation against
attack from the air? A.D-H.[nd]’.
213 PREM 11/4680, ff 140–144 22 Apr 1964
‘Aden and Yemen’: minute by J O Wright to Sir A Douglas-Home
[The high commissioner, Sir K Trevaskis, warned of an ‘urgent and serious’ situation, in
which Britain would almost certainly have to resort to severe and determined repression
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in Aden and the other states in order to hold the position (ff 148–149, tel no 347, 21 Apr
1964). Wright believed that without ‘more basic thought, we shall be hell-bent for
disaster. The Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Ministry of Defence are all pulling in
different directions at present’.]
. . . There are so many currents and cross-currents in this problem it might be as well
to start off from a basis of accepted fact. There seem to me to be three main factors in
the situation:—
(1) Our interest in Aden is not Aden itself, nor the Federation, but in the existence
of the base in order to be able to protect our oil supplies in the Persian Gulf and
specifically to meet our Treaty commitment to Kuwait.
(2) It is the general objective of Nasser, and in this he speaks for most of the
revolutionary and progressive sentiment among the Arabs, to get us out of Aden.
(3) To judge from Sir Kennedy Trevaskis’ telegram, our policy in Aden and the
Federation is virtually in ruins so that it looks as if we may have less and less
support, not merely from the volatile urban Adenis but also now from the
supposedly stable Federal rulers, for our continued presence.
Factors (2) and (3) are harsh and unpalatable but they must be faced if we are to
make any sense of the problem.
There are a number of alternative courses of action which we can take:—
(1) We can try to do a deal with Nasser, by which he will agree to call off his
subversive activity in the Federation in return for our agreeing to call off our
subversive activity in the Yemen. This, as the Foreign Secretary said this morning,
is the action favoured by the Foreign Office; but Mr. Butler said that he did not
think we could go as far as that.
(2) The second alternative is to hit back at Nasser in the Yemen. The Colonial
Secretary has put forward a number of suggestions. But before we go into this
retaliatory policy we must be absolutely clear in our minds that this means
escalation. Where would such escalation stop? We have always set our faces against
it elsewhere. Why should we think that it is now likely to be successful?
(3) Disengagement and withdrawal from Aden. This would be humiliating in
present circumstances. But clearly we are on shifting sands and a plan ought to be
made whereby we can meet our Treaty commitment to Kuwait from somewhere
other than Aden.
(4) Granting independence to the Federation in the hope that we may be able to
retain our base at Aden for a little while longer while we make alternative
arrangements and are able to disengage with decency.
It would require the wisdom of Solomon to know what is the best course to take.
All I would say is that the alternative which leads to escalation is, in my judgement,
bound to lead in the end to disaster. The Americans would not support us. There
would be an outcry in the whole Arab world. We should be in for trouble in the U.N.
And we should end up by being booted out not only of Aden but out of Libya and
Kuwait as well.
It is also, in my judgement, too early and too humiliating to contemplate
immediate withdrawal.
This surely means that we must make a further effort to obtain a political
settlement. This political settlement should, surely, have at least two ingredients:
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first, the deal with Nasser and secondly the deal with the Federation rulers. I
personally think this is the only way that we could salvage something from the
wreckage of Aden. And meanwhile, as an insurance against the failure of policy and
as a recognition of the inevitable, we should set the military planners to work to see
how our Treaty commitment to Kuwait can be met without Aden.
Above all I firmly believe that, since Ministers are to take two bites at this cherry,
one before Mr. Butler goes to see Mr. Rusk and the second after he comes back, this
whole problem should be remitted to the Official Committee of D.O.P. for urgent
study and recommendations. The foreign, colonial and defence requirements are in
conflict and must be reconciled.
214 PREM 11/4680, ff 106–107 5 May 1964
[Need to get to grips with the problem of Aden and the Yemen]:
minute (M49/64) by Sir A Douglas-Home to Mr Butler (FO)
I think that the moment has now come for us to make a real effort to get to grips
with the situation in the Arabian peninsula. We are in danger of losing sight of the
main British interest, which is to protect our position in the Persian Gulf and East
Africa and our communications to South East Asia.
The situation has two aspects: the internal aspect in the Aden Federation and the
international aspect of relations with the Yemen and Egypt.
I think we should make a renewed effort at the United Nations to get the heat
taken out of the international aspects of the problem. Whether we like it or not we
have to face the fact that escalation of the Aden–Yemen trouble always redounds to
Nasser’s advantage and not to ours, since it always rallies to him popular support, not
least in Aden itself. At the United Nations we might make a final effort to see if we can
make the disengagement plan succeed. Failing that our objective should be to get the
United Nations interest fixed on the Aden–Yemen border. It would be best if we could
get it demarcated and/or demilitarised but at the very least we should aim to have
observers stationed there. I do not see why we should necessarily jib at having
observers on our side of the border only. If we paid for them ourselves we should be
able to control them.
In addition, I think we should now take a new diplomatic initiative in the Arab
world. Our purpose would be to get our objectives across. We should stress that we
have no quarrel with the Yemen and Egypt but that we do have treaty commitments
with the Federation of Saudi Arabia which we intend to honour. The present brawl
between Aden and the Yemen does no-one any good and we should seek Arab support
at the United Nations for the initiative we are taking.
In Aden, we really have to make a serious effort to make our presence there
worthwhile to the local inhabitants. Clearly we have not yet succeeded in doing so.
But there is obviously no secure future for our base there unless we have at least the
acquiescence of the local population. I should like to see a well thought out plan for
the political advance and economic development of Aden which would give us a
reasonable chance of keeping, for some time yet, the military facilities we need. I
realise that for such a plan to succeed we would need the right man to put it into
effect and that this may call for a change in Aden. . . .
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215 CO 1055/123, no 72 5 May 1964
[Aden: ‘surrender of sovereignty’]: letter from Sir K Trevaskis (Aden)1
to Sir J Martin (CO).  Minutes by Sir H Poynton & Mr Fisher
Thank you for your Top Secret and Personal letter of 24th April.
I hope that we shall now be spared any demand for immediate independence on
the part of the Federation. But I fear that there is no certainty that this will be the
case since the rulers are in a touchy mood and it does not need much to upset them.
In particular if things go badly and they feel that we are pulling our punches, they are
quite likely to revert to a cry for immediate independence.
2. Should they do so the Adenese would obviously counter with a demand for the
democratisation of the Federation: which would inevitably be refused. We would then
almost certainly have to face up to a demand for secession on the part of Aden in the
event of our conceding independence.
3. The Federation would, I think, argue that if we were to pull Aden out we would
be breaking the Treaty. The Adenese would argue that the Treaty envisaged a
dependent Federation and that independence would automatically invalidate it.
4. It would, I think, be impossible, even if desirable, to justify independence for
the whole Federation including Aden in the face of Adenese opposition. On the other
hand secession would certainly sour the Rulers to a dangerous degree. Consequently,
I think what we should aim at, should the eventuality arise, is for Aden to remain
attached to the Federation as at present.
Minutes on 215
I have seen Sir John Martin’s minute and Mr. Formoy’s paper of which you have
copies.
2. My own conclusion is much the same as Sir John’s, namely that it would be
better to give Aden Ministers the fullest possible degree of internal self-government,
short of independence, without surrendering sovereignty. But I should like to
analyse the reasons which have led me to this view.
3. If I may say so, I think there is often a lot of loose thinking about the phrase
“surrender of sovereignty.” To whom is it proposed to make this surrender? In other
words, what do we propose to put in its place? We can ignore the transfer of
sovereignty to another Colonial power—that is not in contemplation. Even apart
from that however, there are I suggest three possibilities:—
(i) Full sovereign independence; this again is not in contemplation.
(ii) The status of a “protected state” in which jurisdiction as well as sovereignty
would lie with the local government. This would put Aden State on the same
footing as the other Arab states in the South Arabian Federation and is presumably
what is proposed.
(iii) Status of a Protectorate comparable to some of the African territories,
Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, Swaziland or Uganda in earlier days. In these
1 Sir [G] Kennedy [N] Trevaskis, high commissioner for Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia, Aug
1963–1965; formerly British agent, Western Aden Protectorate, 1954–1963.
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 644
[215] ADEN COLONY AND PROTECTORATE 645
countries although we did not have sovereignty we did exercise jurisdiction and
were responsible for the affairs of the territory.
4. I do not, however, believe that there is really any incompatibility, so far as
constitutional progress is concerned, between protected state status and internal self-
government with British sovereignty retained. Does anyone propose that Aden State
within the Federation should be more self-governing than say Malta or British Guiana
in both of which British sovereignty still resides? In other words, so far as the objective
is to transfer to the Federation responsibility for keeping order in Aden, it seems to me
that this can be achieved just as well without the surrender of sovereignty as it could be
by turning Aden into a protected state. But the necessary steps could be done by Order
in Council whereas the surrender of sovereignty would require an Act of Parliament.
5. I am myself sceptical about the argument that the Federal Government would
be able to act with greater severity than we could use ourselves. If it is thought that
they would act with greater severity than we could defend to Parliament, then we
ought not to transfer the responsibility to them anyhow whether by making Aden a
protected state or by giving self-government as part of a Federation. I am also
sceptical as to whether we can really continue to rely upon the Federal Government
in such circumstances to continue to allow us full use of the base. The arguments in
(iv) and (v) of Mr. Formoy’s note have considerable force.
A.H.P.
15.6.64
The real problem is, I think (as Sir J. Martin has minuted) that the Federal ministers
demand this, and Mr Baharoon2 may also demand it. The S of S has authority from
his colleagues to concede it.
I doubt if the future of the base is really in jeopardy either way. Owing to the
economic advantages it brings, no-one is asking us to leave it, because the whole
prosperity of Aden depends on our staying there. (Presumably Nasser would not
spend anything like the £11m p.a. spent by our forces & their families there).
I do not feel very strongly about this either way. You will remember that we had
decided to concede it last December, but in the aftermath of the bomb incident3
D.O.P.C. wd not agree. Now, I understand, they have agreed. I would like advice on
the public service & the problem of a full compensation scheme. I am inclined to
think that this will become necessary if we give any further constitutional advance.
If you & the Dept feel strongly, I think we shd have an early talk with the S of S
before he commits himself.4
N.F.
15.6.64
2 See note 1 to document no 210.
3 At Aden airport on 10 Dec 1963, targetting federal ministers and the high commissioner, Sir K Trevaskis,
as they were leaving for talks in London. The high commissioner was slightly injured in the hand, but two
other people were killed and 51 injured. The incident precipitated the declaration of a state of emergency.
Lady Trevaskis suffered prolonged neurological problems as a result, and this was one reason why Trevaskis
was recalled by the Labour government (CO 967/433, Sir H Poynton to Sir H Caccia, 10 Dec 1964).
4 Sir J Martin pointed out that full internal self-government was favoured by Trevaskis; ‘prosperity’ did
not mean evacuation of the base might not be demanded, because ‘sometimes Arabs’ emotions drive them
to ignore self-interest’; there was ambiguity in the attitude of the DOPC: ‘S of S still thinks D.O.P.C.
minutes are incorrect!’
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Mr Fisher
I have discussed with Sir John Martin and Mr. Monson the points raised in your
minute of the 15th June about the surrender of sovereignty in Aden State and the
necessity for drawing up a full compensation scheme for the public service.
2. To take the latter point first, we agree with your view that a full compensation
scheme will become necessary if we give any further constitutional advance. The test
has always been the giving up of the Secretary of State’s ultimate power of protection
of the Civil Service and even in territories which are technically colonies (i.e. British
sovereignty) a compensation scheme has always been agreed to at the moment when
the public service commission becomes an executive body. In a sense therefore this
question of a compensation scheme for the public service is irrelevant to the
question of retaining sovereignty in Aden State. I submit for your approval for
circulation to the British Delegation at the Conference a draft brief on the public
Service which develops these matters in greater detail.
3. On the question of surrender of sovereignty as such, we still feel that this
should be avoided if possible mainly because it is irrevocable and the reason for
staying in Aden is to be able to use the base and our use of the base depends on our
being able to ensure internal security in and around the base area. Because we are
sovereign in Aden we have already been able to take by Order in Council powers by
which the High Commissioner can step in over the Federal Government to preserve
law and order in Aden in the interest of our defence responsibilities. We cannot
guarantee that even the Federal Government will always see eye to eye with us on the
needs of such measures. If we gave up sovereignty we should lose this position and
should have to depend on our right to give mandatory Advice to the Federal
Government. We have no means of taking quick action in an emergency if they are
not disposed to take our advice (the only sanction is the withholding of money which
is slow to bite).
4. In the circumstances, I think we ought to have an early talk with the Secretary
of State.
A.H.P.
19.6.64
Yes. I agree. We tried to introduce this matter at a recent mtg with the S of S but he
was non-committal & the talk was indecisive. Will you now arrange a further mtg
with him?
N.F.
22.6.64
216 CAB 128/31/1, CC 25(57)4 28 Mar 1957
‘Cyprus’: Cabinet conclusions on revised draft parliamentary
statement
The Cabinet had before them a revised draft of a Parliamentary statement on Cyprus.
The Prime Minister said that as compared with earlier versions this draft had the
advantage that, by omitting any detailed statement of the extent to which we
contemplated relaxing the existing measures, it avoided any impression that the
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Government were prepared to bargain with Archbishop Makarios1 about the terms of
his release. It should, therefore, be more acceptable to the Turkish Government. The
statement could, however, be strengthened still further by omitting the reference to
the wording of the Archbishop’s appeal and the indication that the Government were
prepared to take a liberal view of it, and substituting a simple statement that in
present circumstances it was no longer necessary to continue the Archbishop’s
detention. It would be mistaken to pretend that the Archbishop had responded
adequately to the original offer, and it would be wiser to base our action on a plain
statement that we had decided, as an act of policy, to disembarrass ourselves of an
individual whose continued detention no longer served any useful purpose. It was
arguable that, whatever the ultimate objective of our policy as regards Cyprus, the
release of the Archbishop would assist us in realising it. If we could envisage no more
than a continuance of the deadlock which had been reached hitherto, the resumption
of the constitutional discussions which we must shortly contemplate would probably
contribute to this end, since we were bound to accept the Archbishop as one party to
those discussions, and he was likely to insist on the condition, which we should be
unable to accept, that Cyprus should be granted the right of self-determination
within a limited period. If, on the other hand, our ultimate objective was a partition
of the Island, we might succeed in securing agreement on this course more easily
after the Archbishop was released, or, alternatively, the Greek Government would
find the approaching prospect of partition so distasteful that they would reluctantly
accept Lord Radcliffe’s2 constitutional proposals without seeking to attach any
condition that Cyprus should enjoy the right of self-determination within a definite
period. In neither event, therefore, should the release of the Archbishop be an
obstacle to further advance; and, provided that we succeeded in making progress
towards our objective, it would be less important that this progress would inevitably
appear to be, to some extent, a series of concessions to the Archbishop.
The Lord President3 said that he remained convinced that the release of the
Archbishop would be a profound mistake. His appeal for the cessation of EOKA4
violence had been made conditional on our own willingness to bring the state of
emergency in Cyprus to an end; and if we attempted to ignore that condition he
would be free to withdraw his appeal at any time. He would therefore be free to
exploit this situation to extract further concessions from us until he had completely
regained the initiative. In particular, he would seek to insist that he should be
allowed to return to Cyprus on the ground that he could not otherwise take part in
further constitutional discussions and that, in his absence, no other individuals were
entitled to represent the Greek community in the Island. Moreover, his release would
be liable to alienate the Turkish Government and would be universally interpreted as
a sign of weakness, which would react against us in the negotiations on other
difficult international issues which we must shortly face. He could not, therefore,
1 M K Mouskos, Makarios III, primate of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus; president of Cyprus, 1960–1974,
1974–1977 (died); detained in 1956.
2 C J Radcliffe, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary since 1949, constitutional commissioner, Cyprus, 1956; his
proposals envisaged a very wide measure of self-government.
3 Lord Salisbury.
4 EOKA = Greek initials of National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters.
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endorse a statement which, in his view, would be a prelude to a process of gradual
retreat in the face of the pressure which the Archbishop would mobilise as soon as he
was again at liberty.
In discussion it was suggested that, despite the embarrassment which would result
from the release of the Archbishop, the balance of advantage lay in restoring his
freedom. He had come some part of the way to satisfy our conditions, and EOKA
terrorism had now been brought under control. It was the considered view of the
Governor of Cyprus that, if in these circumstances the Archbishop was not released,
sentiment in Cyprus would consolidate behind EOKA once again and terrorism
would revive. We should then have lost an opportunity, which might not recur, of
securing a permanent relaxation of tension in the Island. Moreover, we should have
adopted an attitude which we might find it impossible to sustain. We were
committed to a resumption of constitutional discussions, from which no useful
result could follow unless the Archbishop was present. We were committed also to
co-operate in the conciliation procedure in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
and this procedure would be liable to be similarly frustrated by a refusal on our part
to contribute, by a gesture of generosity, to bringing terrorism in Cyprus to an end. If
we released the Archbishop on terms which would preclude his return to Cyprus and
would not commit us to define the scope of the relaxation of security measures
which might prove to be possible, we should be regarded by public opinion as acting
from strength rather than weakness. If, on the other hand, we continued to detain
the Archbishop indefinitely, it was impossible to foresee when, and on what
conditions, we should be able to resolve the present deadlock. The strategic
importance of Cyprus would progressively decline over the next decade and, apart
from the importance of maintaining our control over a sufficiently large portion of
the Island to enable us to operate an effective air base, we were unlikely to continue
to need its facilities on a scale which would justify the indefinite continuance of
repressive measures which were becoming increasingly repugnant to public opinion.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the arguments were
evenly balanced. There were clear risks in releasing Archbishop Makarios. In
particular, he would be bound to try to organise international support for his return
to Cyprus—where, even if he did not instigate a revival of terrorism, his presence
would be a considerable embarrassment. On the other hand, it might still be a
considerable time before the forces of terrorism in Cyprus were completely
eliminated; and public opinion, which might be disposed to accept the Archbishop’s
appeal as broadly satisfactory, would be liable to be critical of the Government if they
sacrificed an opportunity of breaking the present deadlock. It appeared to be the
general view of the Cabinet that, in these circumstances, the wiser course would be
to release the Archbishop without suggesting that we were in any way satisfied with
his conditional response to our offer. At the same time, the Turkish Government
should be informed that, while we now regarded the Archbishop as a greater liability
in detention than at large, our objective remained, as before, either the partition of
the Island or the implementation of Lord Radcliffe’s constitutional proposals on the
basis on which we had originally put them forward and without any commitment
about the ultimate grant of self-determination. Further constitutional discussions
would contribute to the realisation of either of these objectives. But while, in
releasing the Archbishop, we envisaged that he would need to be a party to these
discussions, we should regard him as the representative of only one section of
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opinion in Cyprus and should not be prepared to recognise him as in any sense the
accredited spokesman of Cyprus or entitled to negotiate with Her Majesty’s
Government about the future of the Island as a whole.
The Lord President said that he was still convinced that the release of Archbishop
Makarios in these circumstances would be an error of judgment. If this course of
action were adopted, he would be unable to support it, and he would therefore need
to consider whether he could remain a member of the Government.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that Archbishop Makarios should be released from detention in the
Seychelles.
(2) Authorised the Colonial Secretary to make, in the House of Commons that
afternoon, a statement on the lines of the draft which they had before them, as
amended in their discussion.
(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to instruct H.M. Ambassador at Ankara to
inform the Turkish Government of the intentions of Her Majesty’s Government, on
the lines approved in their discussion.
217 CAB 134/1555, CPC 9(57) 29 May 1957
‘Cyprus: future policy’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(57) 15) covering a report by the Government of Cyprus on methods, costs and
consequences of a partition of the island, together with a memorandum by the
Minister of Defence (C.P.C. (57) 16) about the minimum military facilities which we
should require to retain in a partitioned Cyprus.
The Committee also had before them Athens telegram No. 385, containing the text
of a letter to the Prime Minister from Archbishop Makarios. In this letter, the
Archbishop referred to the need to create an atmosphere of peace and freedom of
expression in accordance with the resolution of 26th February, 1957 of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, called for the termination of all emergency measures
in Cyprus, and declared his readiness to take part, on behalf of the people of Cyprus,
in bilateral talks on the basis of the application of self-determination.
The Committee discussed first the general lines upon which future policy for
Cyprus should be based.
The Colonial Secretary said that there were some signs that Archbishop Makarios
was in a position of increasing embarrassment and was at a loss how to recover the
initiative. For the time being, therefore, Her Majesty’s Government could rest on
their previous statements of policy, though we should continue to express our
readiness to consider comments on Lord Radcliffe’s constitutional proposals and to
co-operate in the N.A.T.O. conciliation procedure. Partition might be useful as a
threat; but it seemed doubtful whether it would be a practical proposition, unless we
were ready to retain large forces in the island to enforce it, while if we withdrew to
one or two military enclaves, as was proposed in C.P.C. (57) 16, their security,
communications and supplies would be liable to be threatened by a hostile
population.
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The Foreign Secretary1 said that Archbishop Makarios was due to make a public
statement on 30th May, in which he was likely to renew his demand for an
unequivocal statement by Her Majesty’s Government on self-determination, to offer
to participate in a transitional scheme of self-government for Cyprus under
international trusteeship as a prelude to full self-determination, and to call for action
by the United Nations in the autumn. At the same time the terrorist leader in Cyprus2
was expected to issue a fresh proclamation, warning us that violence would be
renewed if no action had been taken by Her Majesty’s Government before the matter
came before the United Nations in September. In the light of declarations of this kind
it would be difficult for us to make no further move in the coming months. But in
considering what form such a move might take we must be satisfied whether
partition was a course which we should be ready, in the last resort to adopt. It would
be dangerous to employ the threat of partition if it had no reality behind it. Early self-
determination leading to partition might in fact prove to be the only real alternative
to the introduction of the Radcliffe constitution, since independence for Cyprus
under international guarantee would almost certainly not be acceptable, particularly
to Turkish opinion, while the indefinite maintenance of the present situation was
likely to prove beyond our resources. But the prospect of a gradual concentration of
Greek and Turkish Cypriots on either side of a partition line during a period of some
ten years, as proposed in the report by the Government of Cyprus (C.P.C.(57) 15), was
a very unattractive one if it involved continuing supervision and responsibility on
our part. It would be more realistic to envisage a plebiscite, (in which the Turkish
and Greek Cypriots would vote on separate electoral rolls) offering the choice
between partition and a unitary constitution on the Radcliffe lines. If the voting
favoured partition, we should then have to announce the partition line and the date
for our withdrawal to our military enclaves, and invite the Greek and Turkish
Cypriots to remove to their respective areas. It could then be left to the Greek and
Turkish Governments to accept responsibility for the completion of the process of
partition and resettlement.
The Minister of Defence3 said that we could not maintain the present
establishment of troops in Cyprus indefinitely. We should not contemplate any plan
for partition which left us with responsibility for the whole of the island, since this
would perpetuate the strain upon our military resources while impairing the value of
Cyprus to us as a single unit. If partition came about, we should retain merely the
enclaves which we required for military purposes. The Akrotiri–Episcopi area would
be suitable from this point of view, since it contained virtually no local population.
We might, however, also require to retain the tip of Cape Greco and perhaps an area
round the Cantonment at Dhekelia. There was no reason to foresee great difficulty in
maintaining our hold on these bases, provided that suitable port and communication
facilities were guaranteed to us by treaty.
The Prime Minister said that we must seek so to frame the next stages of our policy
that, if we were ultimately compelled to enforce partition, it would be wholly clear
that all other possible solutions had been exhausted. It was for consideration,
therefore, whether we should now appeal to the Cypriots, to the Greek and Turkish
1 Mr Selwyn Lloyd. 2 G T Grivas, known as ‘Dighenis’. 3 Mr D Sandys.
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 650
[217] CYPRUS 651
Governments, to N.A.T.O. and to world opinion in general to accept the Radcliffe
constitution, subject to any detailed discussion which might be desirable, and to
agree to postpone, for a period of, say, ten years further consideration of the issue of
self-determination. We should add that if this proposal was not acceptable we should
partition Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, withdrawing ourselves to specified
military enclaves which would remain under our sovereignty. This course would
have the merit of bringing the issue to a head, and would strengthen our position in
the United Nations. Agreement on these lines was not, however, very likely. The
Turkish Government, in particular, would seek to hold us to our policy statement of
19th December, 1956,4 with its reference to partition as an ultimate possibility; and
we might, therefore, only precipitate partition. Alternatively, therefore, we might
announce our intention to implement the Radcliffe constitution towards the end of
this year, and offer to hold ourselves available, for a definite period in advance, to
receive any comments upon its provisions which any Cypriot individual or
representative might care to make, in person or in writing. We should be prepared to
carry this course through to the point of holding elections. If, however, these
elections failed to provide the basis of a satisfactory administration of Cyprus, or if it
appeared, at an even earlier stage, that the introduction of the constitution itself
would not be feasible, we should fall back on partition. The advantages of this course
were that we should be seen to have done our utmost to maintain unitary self-
government in Cyprus, and that it was still not impossible that, when the time came,
the Greek Cypriots would in fact co-operate. On the other hand, our prestige might
suffer if Archbishop Makarios secured a boycott by the Greek population of our
arrangements; and such a plan would necessarily be more protracted and less
dramatic in its effect than the first. Further consideration should therefore be given
to these alternatives and to their presentation. Under either of them we should also
consider the possibility of taking early steps to redeploy our military installations in
the proposed enclaves.
In the light of these considerations, the Committee approved the terms of the
reply to be sent to Archbishop Makarios. This rebutted the accusation that Her
Majesty’s Government had made no conciliatory moves to match the suspension of
terrorist activity in the island; emphasised that, in the light of the Archbishop’s
actions since his release from detention, the Government could not regard his offer
as a genuine contribution towards a settlement; and, while rejecting his proposal
that the future of Cyprus should be settled by bilateral discussions between himself
and Her Majesty’s Government, offered to consider any views which might be put
forward by communities or individuals in Cyprus, including the Archbishop, on the
Radcliffe constitution. It was agreed that publication of this reply should be
synchronised with that of the Archbishop’s letter. Its terms which excluded any
suggestion of bargaining with the Archbishop, should be satisfactory to the Turkish
Government, and when the Foreign Secretary, who would shortly be leaving for the
meeting of the Council of the Bagdad Pact, met the Turkish Prime Minister, he
should emphasise that it was still our desire to implement the Radcliffe constitution
for Cyprus. . . .
4 See Goldsworthy, ed, Conservative government and end of empire, Pt II, document no 333 (Cabinet
conclusions, 17 Dec 1956).
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218 CAB 134/1555, CPC 10(57) 20 June 1957
‘Cyprus: future policy’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
meeting
The Committee had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.(57)
19) and the Foreign Secretary (C.P.C. (57) 21) about future policy towards Cyprus.
In discussion there was general agreement that the Government must now take
some fresh initiative in this matter in advance of the autumn meeting of the United
Nations. The initiative most acceptable to the Turkish Government would consist of
an invitation by ourselves to a tripartite conference between the United Kingdom,
Greek and Turkish Governments; and there might be some advantage in our offering,
as an initial step, to convene a conference of this kind. On the assumption, however,
that it would probably break down, we should be prepared subsequently to move
towards the implementation of the Radcliffe constitution, after further discussion of
its details with the Cypriot leaders. It was for consideration, however, whether, as the
Colonial Secretary proposed, the enactment of the constitution should be carried to
the point at which elections would be arranged, or whether, as the Foreign Secretary
preferred, we should abandon the attempt to institute the constitution as soon as it
became clear that we could expect no co-operation from the local communities in its
implementation. It was agreed that the decision on this question must depend
largely on the practicability of an early partition of the island, since this would then
constitute the only remaining solution to the problem. It could be argued that, if we
made it sufficiently clear that, failing co-operation from the Cypriots, we intended to
partition the island, the inhabitants might be induced to collaborate in bringing the
constitution into effect. On the other hand, if the Turkish Government believed that
we were prepared to contemplate partition in the near future, they would be the less
willing to co-operate in the introduction of the Radcliffe constitution, for which they
now felt little enthusiasm. In any event partition would be a difficult and unpleasant
operation; before committing ourselves to any course of action of which partition
might be the logical conclusion we should be sure that we were prepared to face the
political and strategic implications of this course, including the risk of some degree
of Russian penetration in the Greek Zone.
It was suggested that a partition of the island, which would be interpreted as a
unique surrender by the United Kingdom of a Colonial possession, would have
unfortunate political repercussions both in this country and throughout the Middle
East. It was for consideration, therefore, whether, as an intermediate stage, a federal
system of government could be introduced, in order that, in the interval during
which this system survived we could redeploy our forces more systematically for the
eventual solution of partition. On the other hand, the United Kingdom would then
remain responsible for the internal security of the island, and we should not be able
to look for any early release from the odium and expense which we carried at present.
Moreover, there was no reason to suppose that the Bagdad Pact Powers would react
adversely to a partition of Cyprus, provided that we retained adequate defence
facilities. The alternative plan for an independent Cyprus, internationally
guaranteed, which the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
had propounded, would be wholly unacceptable to the Turkish Government, and
would expose Cyprus to the risk of Russian infiltration.
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 652
[219] CYPRUS 653
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee would
be assisted if they had before them a memorandum defining, with a precise
indication of the timing involved, a programme of action on the following lines—
(a) We should initially offer to arrange a tripartite inter-governmental conference
on the Cyprus problem.
(b) If and when this conference broke down, we should announce that we
intended to introduce the Radcliffe constitution and were prepared to receive
representations from the Cypriot leaders about its detailed implementation. We
should appeal to all parties to accept a postponement of the issue of self-
determination.
(c) We should make preparations to put the constitution into effect up to the
point at which elections could be held if the co-operation of the Cypriot communities
was forthcoming.
(d) If these preparations were frustrated—e.g., by a refusal of the local popula-
tion to co-operate in the registration preliminary to the elections—we should hold
a plebiscite which would offer a choice between the maintenance of British rule
and a partition of the island (apart from our own enclaves) between Greece and
Turkey.
(e) We should continue to study the detailed military preparations which would be
necessary for the redeployment of our forces in the enclaves which we envisaged if
partition was put into effect. This study should establish whether these enclaves
would be adequate to our needs; whether they could be held in circumstances in
which, even if the Turkish population were friendly, the Greek Cypriots must be
assumed to be hostile; and by what date it would be administratively feasible to
complete the withdrawal of our troops to these areas.
In the light of a study of this kind it would be possible to establish a time-table of
action which should satisfy both our political and our military requirements. . . .
219 CAB 129/88, C(57)161 9 July 1957
[Cyprus: a fresh initiative]: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Macmillan
We must take a fresh initiative to break the present deadlock.
Cyprus is, as we know, not a Colonial problem but an international problem. No
solution will be acceptable which does not satisfy the interests of the United
Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. Our interest is to secure our essential military needs
and to reduce our Colonial commitment. Turkey, though she favours partition, is
mainly concerned to ensure that the island shall never pass wholly under the control
of Greece. Greece will continue to demand Enosis1 but must be convinced that it
cannot be attained.
2. After discussion with those of my colleagues who are most directly concerned
and after consultation with the Governor of Cyprus I recommend that we should now
put forward new proposals on the following lines:—
1 Union with Greece.
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(a) Our essential military needs in Cyprus are to secure the continued use of an
operational air base, primarily for the support of the Bagdad Pact, and of certain
wireless facilities for intelligence and propaganda purposes which cannot be
provided elsewhere. These needs can be met if we insist on retaining exclusive
British sovereignty over relatively small enclaves at Akrotiri-Episcopi, Dhekelia-
Pergamos, Cap Greco and a few small establishments elsewhere which are
required for wireless services. These areas would be small in extent and there
would be few Cypriots resident within them.
(b) We should offer to surrender the rest of the Island to a condominium of the
United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. The sovereignty would be vested in the three
countries jointly. The indigenous population would acquire Greek and Turkish as
well as British nationality.
(c) The whole of the Island outside the British enclaves would be placed under the
government of a Governor to be nominated by the three sovereign Powers or, in
default of agreement between them, to be appointed by the Powers (other than the
three sovereign Powers) which are for the time being members of the North
Atlantic Alliance. The Governor should not himself be a national of any of the
three sovereign Powers. The Governor, once appointed, would be responsible to
the three sovereign Powers (see below). His appointment could be terminated by
the agreement of the three Powers or, in default of such agreement and on appeal
from two of them, by the other North Atlantic Powers.
(d) The three sovereign Powers would appoint resident representatives to watch
their interests in Cyprus. Their status and precise functions require further
consideration. Their duties would probably range from consular work to the duty
of advising the Governor on “reserved” subjects.
(e) Outside the British enclaves there would be a system of responsible self-
government on the general lines of the constitution proposed in Lord Radcliffe’s
report. This constitution would need to be adapted to accord with the concept of a
triple sovereignty and Lord Radcliffe might himself be asked to advise what
detailed changes would be required. If the general concept were accepted, the
three Governments should offer to discuss these adaptations with representatives
of all interests in the Island. Meanwhile, the essential features would seem to be as
follows:—
(i) As regards internal affairs (other than internal security) the Governor
would act on the advice of Ministers responsible to an elected Chamber except
where the constitution expressly provided otherwise.
(ii) The “reserved” subjects would comprise defence, external relations and
internal security.
(iii) The constitutional responsibility for the external defence of the Island must
rest with the three sovereign Powers. As, however, those Powers are all
members of the North Atlantic Alliance it would be reasonable that they should
look to the Council of the Alliance to interest themselves in its defence.
(iv) The external relations of the Island, so far as they raise any practical
problem, would be conducted by the three sovereign Powers.
(v) On matters of internal security the Governor would have the assistance
of an advisory body comprising the resident representatives of the three sover-
eign Powers and appropriate elected Ministers. He would be able to call on a
force comprising British, Turkish and Greek contingents, in equal numbers,
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who would be available to support the civil power in maintaining law and
order.
(f ) These arrangements should not be subject to any limit of duration. They
should be designed to remain in force indefinitely—though provision would need
to be made for their amendment or termination by agreement between the three
sovereign Powers.
3. It will not be easy to secure agreement to a solution on these lines. But what
are the alternatives? To carry on as we are, in the hope that disorder will be
suppressed and the agitation for Enosis will die away? This would commit to Cyprus
a disproportionate amount of our military strength; it would offer no early prospect
of an easement of the internal political situation in the Island; and it would be
unlikely to produce any solution within the lifetime of this Parliament. The other
alternative is partition. This would be a confession of failure. Moreover, it would
involve a grave risk of open conflict between Greece and Turkey. And in the Island
itself it would mean great hardship, suffering and disorder—with widespread
bloodshed. I do not think we should ourselves accept the responsibility for this. If
partition were the only course open, I would wish that it should be undertaken by
some international agency.
The plan which I have outlined could be presented as a just and fair solution which
would avoid those evil consequences. If it were rejected we should be entitled to ask
either that the United Nations itself should assume responsibility for partition, or
that we should be allowed to continue to administer the Island under our own
sovereignty and be supported in so doing.
4. This plan could not succeed without the maximum of international co-
operation and good will; and all the influences making for this must be mobilised in
its support. We must rely especially on the United States Government and the North
Atlantic Council. At the outset, therefore, we must persuade President Eisenhower
and M. Spaak2 that an initiative on these lines, which calls for some sacrifice of
national interest by all the parties concerned, offers the best hope for the future
peace and stability of the Island and get their assurance that they will vigorously
commend it and, in particular, bring all possible pressure on the Greek Government
to accept it. We must recognise that Greek acceptance can be secured only by
American pressure. Simultaneously we should do our utmost to convince the
Turkish Government that this is a reasonable plan and that they have nothing to
gain—and possibly something to lose—by rejecting it in the hope that by their
obduracy they may achieve partition.
5. If we decide to adopt this plan we should do so, not as a mere tactical move,
but because we believe it to offer a sound and practical solution and are resolved to
do all in our power to make it work. We should make this plain to all concerned. We
must also move quickly. We should aim to complete our diplomatic soundings in
time to enable us to launch the plan publicly, with the maximum assurance of
international support, well before the next meeting of the General Assembly of the
United Nations.
2 P H Spaak, Belgian minister who became secretary-general of NATO, 1957–1961; one of the founding
fathers of the EEC.
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220 CAB 128/31/2, CC 51(57)6 11 July 1957
[New approach to the problem of Cyprus]: Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C. (57) 161)
outlining a suggested new approach to the problem of Cyprus.1
The Prime Minister said that this memorandum was the result of consultations
which he had held with the Governor of Cyprus2 and the Ministers mainly concerned
during the past few days. Three possible courses of action were now open to us. First,
we could continue to govern the Island ourselves on the basis that we had recently
had some military success in the repression of terrorism and had also secured a
political advantage by the release of Archbishop Makarios, who was proving3 an
increasing embarrassment to the Greek Government. Secondly, we could proceed to
partition—which would be an admission that our policy had failed and would be
liable to provoke a new outbreak of communal conflict which it might prove
impossible to localise. Thirdly, we could adopt the course outlined in C. (57) 161,
whereby we would retain under our own sovereignty certain enclaves which were
strategically essential to us but would surrender the rest of the Island to a
condominium of the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, who would jointly share
the sovereignty between them. The whole of the Island outside the British enclaves
would then be placed under the government of a Governor, to be nominated by the
three sovereign Powers or, in default of agreement between them, to be appointed by
the Powers (other than the three sovereign Powers) which were for the time being
members of the North Atlantic Alliance. Outside the British enclaves a system of
responsible self-government would be introduced on the general lines of the
constitution proposed in Lord Radcliffe’s report; and, as regards internal affairs
(other than internal security), the Governor would act on the advice of Ministers
responsible to an elected Chamber, except where the constitution expressly provided
otherwise. Defence, external relations and internal security would be “reserved”
subjects. As regards defence, it would be reasonable that the three sovereign Powers,
being members of the North Atlantic Alliance, should look to the Council of the
Alliance to protect the Island. The three Powers would themselves conduct its
external relations. On matters of internal security the Governor should be able to call
on a force comprising British, Turkish and Greek contingents, in equal numbers,
which would be available to support the civil power in maintaining law and order.
The Chiefs of Staff had informed the Defence Committee that from the strategic
point of view they would prefer that British sovereignty should continue to be
maintained over the whole Island. But they recognised the political difficulties of this
course and the increasing burden which it was liable to impose on the resources of
the United Kingdom. They were therefore prepared to accept the new proposals,
subject to a more detailed examination of the exact boundaries of the proposed
enclaves. It was now necessary to consider whether these proposals were likely to win
support in the United Kingdom and abroad and, if so, at what point they should be
made publicly known.
1 See previous document.
2 F-M Sir J Harding, CIGS, 1952–1955, governor of Cyprus, 1955–Nov 1957 (when he was succeeded by
Sir H Foot).
3 While resident in Athens.
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In discussion there was general agreement that an attempt to maintain exclusive
British sovereignty over the whole Island was likely to involve political and economic
consequences which could not be tolerated indefinitely. An act of partition by
ourselves must also be rejected, as unacceptable to public opinion in this country
and damaging to our international reputation. In principle, therefore, an
arrangement on the lines proposed in C. (57) 161 had much to commend it.
Nevertheless, it would need further consideration from the following points of
view:—
(a) It was uncertain whether these proposals would win even initial acceptance
from the Greek and Turkish Governments. It would be necessary to bring all possible
pressure to bear upon them for this purpose; and the declared support of the United
States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) would be essential to the
success of the scheme. The Greek Government would be most susceptible to the
influence of the United States, and we should seek to secure that the United States
Government would use their maximum influence to ensure Greek co-operation in
the new policy. Nevertheless, even though the United States appeared now to have
abandoned their earlier support for the Cypriot claim to be unified with Greece, they
remained favourable in principle to the concept of self-determination, and they
might not be prepared to endorse whole-heartedly proposals which did not envisage
self-determination of the Island within the foreseeable future. The Turkish
Government would be most likely to be influenced by the consideration that, if they
rejected the present proposal and were also given no reason to believe that the United
Kingdom Government would proceed to partition, a subsequent Government in the
United Kingdom might yield to the pressure of Archbishop Makarios for the
unification of Cyprus with Greece. This possibility should be brought clearly to their
attention. Nevertheless, it could not be assumed that our proposals would win
acceptance from the Governments of Greece and Turkey; and it was essential that,
before we gave any publicity to them, we should have defined the policy which we
should adopt if they were rejected. It was open to question whether, in that event, we
should resume the government of the Island ourselves or should propose that the
United Nations Organisation should assume responsibility for its partition. Partition,
however effected, would be bound to result in bitterness and bloodshed; but it was no
less certain that we could not carry indefinitely the burden of sole responsibility for
the administration of the Island.
(b) Alternatively, it was possible that the Greek and Turkish Governments would
at the outset offer to co-operate, however reluctantly, in the working of an
arrangement of the kind described in C. (57) 161, but that this arrangement
would subsequently collapse in the face of a renewed outbreak of terrorism. In
that event, it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the United Kingdom to
resume exclusive sovereignty over the whole of Cyprus. It could admittedly be
argued that, if the Greek and Turkish Governments initially accepted our propos-
als, they would realise that it was in their joint interest that those proposals
should prove effective in restoring peace and stability in the Island. They might be
further restrained from conniving at any renewal of communal strife by the risk
that their own nationals in other areas of mixed Greek and Turkish population
outside Cyprus would suffer retaliation. Nevertheless we could not ignore the risk
that communal strife might break out afresh in Cyprus after the system of tripar-
tite sovereignty had been brought into effect; and it was therefore desirable that, if
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a scheme on the lines proposed in C. (57) 161 was to be launched, it should pro-
vide some safeguard against this risk in the form of alternative arrangements
which would be even more unpalatable to the Greek Government than the scheme
itself.
(c) It might also be desirable that the scheme should enable the Governor, in an
emergency, to suspend the constitution. If so, however, it would be necessary to
decide whether, in that event he would be entitled to rely on British troops in the
enclaves as well as on the British component in the joint force to be created to
maintain internal security.
(d) The proposals might in any event place the Governor in a position of
considerable difficulty if, in a situation falling short of a major emergency, the
representatives of the three sovereign Powers who would be appointed to advise him
were unable to agree on the policy to be followed. This difficulty, which was implicit
in any system of tripartite sovereignty, might be overcome if British administration
of the whole Island could be maintained under a mandate from NATO. An
arrangement of this kind would have the further advantage that it would strengthen
our hold on the airfield at Nicosia and on the communications between the vital
strategic points in the Island and Famagusta which would be their main source of
sea-borne supplies. On the other hand, a mandate would not be consistent with the
maintenance of British sovereignty; and the complete surrender of British
sovereignty over Cyprus would be unwelcome to the Government’s supporters.
Moreover, a mandatory system of this kind would too closely resemble a mere
continuance of the existing situation to be likely to command the acceptance of the
Greek and Turkish Governments. It was clear, however, that the powers of the
Governor as envisaged by the Radcliffe constitution would need to be reconsidered if
a solution based on tripartite sovereignty was adopted. Lord Radcliffe had undertaken
to examine this question.
Discussion then turned to the timing of publication of these proposals, if they
were eventually approved. The choice lay between, on the one hand, publishing
them in advance of the forthcoming debate on Cyprus in the United Nations and,
on the other hand, holding them in reserve, to be launched during or after the
United Nations debate, and limiting our action in the immediate future to proceed-
ing with one of the other plans which had been discussed at an earlier stage, e.g., a
tripartite discussion between the three Governments or an invitation to the Cypriot
communities to offer their suggestions for amendment of the Radcliffe constitu-
tion.
It was suggested that, since the Greek Government had recently indicated their
support for the plan of independence for Cyprus which had been put forward by the
Secretary-General of NATO, there might be some advantage in our holding our new
proposals in reserve. Moreover, the surrender of Cyprus to a condominium would be
liable to be criticised by the Government’s own supporters unless they were given an
opportunity to reflect further on the arguments against any attempt to maintain
indefinitely exclusive British sovereignty over the Island.
The Prime Minister said that the Cabinet would need to give further consideration
to the important issues involved in the new proposals outlined in C. (57) 161.
The Cabinet:—
Agreed to resume their discussion at a subsequent meeting.
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221 CAB 129/90, C (57)258 4 Nov 1957
[Allegations of breaches of European Human Rights Convention by
government in Cyprus]: joint Cabinet memorandum by Mr Selwyn
Lloyd (FO) and Lord Perth (CO)
The Sub-Commission of the European Commission on Human Rights, referred to in
C.P. (56) 152, have been considering the Greek allegations that in certain respects
our actions in Cyprus are in breach of the European Human Rights Convention and
decided on 6th September that before they could conclude their report they wished
to carry out investigations in Cyprus. The matters to be investigated are:—
(a) the existence and extent of a public danger threatening the life of the Nation.
(The existence of such a public danger is required under article 15 of the
Convention in order to justify the detention of persons without trial. The extent of
the public danger is relevant since the Sub-Commission are entitled to decide that
it exists but that some of the Emergency measures are extreme and unnecessary);
(b) the circumstances in which the curfew regulations are applied.
The Sub-Commission have indicated by way of clarification that they desire to hear
evidence not only from the Government but also from the representatives of the
communities in Cyprus.
2. The report will be sent to the Commission on Human Rights, which will in
turn report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, who have power
under the Convention to make binding recommendations by a two-thirds majority.
We are advised that the Sub-Commission are within their rights in deciding to visit
Cyprus, and that there would be no advantage in seeking to prevent or even to defer
the visit on purely legal grounds. Despite such arguments as we might deploy, it is
virtually certain that the Sub-Commission will stand by their decision—and they
have indicated as much in writing—and that an attempt on our part to change their
mind would be resented and might tell against us when the report was being
prepared. It is true that since the Sub-Commission made their decision there has
been a renewal of terrorist activity, though not on a large scale. Further, a
surrendered terrorist has revealed documents exposing EOKA’s plans and
preparedness for renewed violence. Nevertheless we are advised that to proffer this
new proof of public danger would be most unlikely to deflect the Sub-Commission
from their decision.
3. We have to decide whether we are going to allow the investigating Committee
into Cyprus or not.
4. A further important and relevant fact is that the Human Rights Commission
have now admitted as prima facie suitable for further examination twenty-nine cases
in which the Greeks allege ill-treatment of persons in Cyprus, contrary to the
Convention. Our attitude to the present decision of the Sub-Commission may serve
as a strong, although not necessarily an irresistible, precedent if and when the
“atrocities” case reaches the same stage. As matters stand we have been given two
months for the preparation of our written pleading on these cases; if an oral hearing
followed, as is likely, a longer period would elapse.
5. The Governor, Sir John Harding, recognises the disadvantage of rejecting the
Sub-Commission’s decision. He is convinced, however, that substantial dangers
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would be involved in accepting the decision unconditionally at the present time.
Copies of telegrams exchanged with him are attached.1 In brief, he represents that
unconditional acceptance would involve a loss of British prestige in Cyprus in that
the Greek Cypriots would be elated and conversely the Turkish Cypriots exasperated
by the apparent British weakness; that the effect on the two communities in Cyprus
would be reflected in Greece and Turkey with corresponding repercussions on the
possibility of rational discussion of the Cyprus question in the General Assembly of
the United Nations, or elsewhere; that, because of terrorist intimidation and lying
witnesses the Sub-Commission would be unlikely to reach the truth; and that the
visit might well lead to violence and bloodshed, particularly on the part of the
Turkish community.
6. The Governor is particularly concerned at the prospect of an investigation on
the present issues serving as a precedent for a local investigation of “atrocities”. Such
a possibility he views with the gravest concern since it would raise in an aggravated
form the disadvantages mentioned above, and in addition would have the most
serious effect on the morale of the security forces. There is little doubt that Sir John
Harding would consider that an investigation of this kind ought to be rejected
outright.
7. We consider below alternative courses of action:
(i) Immediate direct appeal to the Committee of Ministers over the heads of the
Sub-Commission and the Commission: This course is strongly advocated by Sir
John Harding on the grounds that it is intolerable that the Greek Government
should be able to pervert the spirit of the Human Rights Convention to put us in
the dock, on charges which could never have been brought forward but for the
Greek Government’s encouragement of armed rebellion. There is, however,
nothing in the Convention which envisages such a direct appeal: the Committee of
Ministers would be likely to refuse to interfere with proceedings still in the hands
of the Sub-Commission. Further, we should be at a serious tactical disadvantage
with the Committee because our appeal could only succeed if we had the support
of two-thirds of the members, and in certain circumstances the unanimous vote of
the Committee would be required. We should have to deploy our political
arguments prematurely and sacrifice the advantage (which, at the ultimate stage
in the normal course of events we should enjoy as “defendants”) of requiring only
the support of more than one-third of the Committee to block any adverse
decision.
(ii) Rejection of the Sub-Commission’s request: The practical and political
arguments outlined in paragraph 5 above could be used to explain a refusal. On the
other hand we should be in breach of the Convention and would incur odium on
that account. The Sub-Commission would continue with their report and in the
end might be more likely to find against us on the substance of the question. The
refusal would be embarrassing in the United Nations where in previous Cyprus
debates we have taken a strong line on the sanctity of treaties. We might, however
unfairly, be compared to the Russians in the case of Hungary. We might try to
make the refusal look better by saying that we would undertake to review the
position later with the object of admitting the Sub-Commission if the situation in
1 Not printed.
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Cyprus had by then improved; but we consider that this would be regarded by
everyone including the Sub-Commission as a mere device to cover up a refusal.
(iii) Unconditional acceptance: This would be the normal course and would be of
assistance to us when the substance of the case eventually came before the
Committee of Ministers. The objections are those given in paragraphs 5 and 6.
(iv) Acceptance subject to specific political conditions: e.g., that the Greek
Government which has been responsible for stimulating terrorism—largely
directed against Greek Cypriots—which is the negation of the human rights the
Convention exists to protect, should denounce violence in Cyprus and curb their
propaganda. Any such conditions are unlikely of satisfactory fulfilment. There is
no legal provision for such a procedure and the Sub-Commission would almost
certainly regard any such conditions as a disguised outright rejection. If the Sub-
Commission themselves decline to accept our stipulation, we should then still
either have to accept or reject their request and to accept in these circumstances
would be doubly embarrassing.
(v) Acceptance without conditions, but playing for time: i.e., negotiating to
secure that the best possible arrangements on timing and procedure are reached.
We could indicate to the Sub-Commission that while we accept their proposed
visit in principle, we had to consider not only our responsibility to them for the
practical arrangements connected with the visit, but also our wider responsibility
for the maintenance of law and order in Cyprus. We could expect to gain an
interval in which developments might occur; e.g., if international discussions had
begun, we might perhaps—though this is rather unlikely—persuade the Sub-
Commission not to proceed with its proposal. In the end, however, we should,
unless any really plausible reasons arise in the interval for refusing the
investigation, have to admit the investigation.
8. Course (ii) above is the most attractive. Such a decision, however, would be
used with great effect against us in the United Nations debate on Cyprus. It would be
construed as an admission of guilt on the atrocity cases also. It would damage our
reputation in the Council of Europe and among European parliamentarians, at an
awkward moment in view of the wider issues now being debated. Therefore after
carefully considering the alternatives we have reluctantly reached the conclusion
that we should adopt the fifth alternative described above and accept the Sub-
Commission’s request to go, but play for time when it goes. We would wish to use
such reasons as the change over of Governors to postpone any arrival until, say, the
New Year. There seems to be a reasonable chance, particularly as we understand that
the Sub-Commission does not at present have in mind an earlier date for the visit
than the end of November, that we could succeed in this, by which time we might
conceivably have made progress in negotiations and the United Nations debate
should be out of the way. Furthermore, if there were a recrudescence of widespread
violence in the interim, it would give us new grounds for reconsideration. If we did
follow this course, we might consider asking the Committee of Ministers to appeal
for the renunciation of violence in the Island, though not making this a condition of
our acceptance of the Sub-Commission going. We may be able to manoeuvre in this
way to the embarrassment of the Greek Government.
9. We must emphasise to the Cabinet that if this investigation on the spot is
accepted it will not dispose in any way of the more serious possibility of subsequent
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investigation into alleged “atrocities.” That case will take its normal course and we
expect to be faced, in about two or three months’ time, with the decision whether to
allow another local investigation on that account. It might be more difficult to resist
an investigation on the spot on the “atrocities” application if one had been admitted
on the first application particularly if the first investigation has passed off without
incident and has resulted in a fair report. On the other hand, the United Nations
Assembly will not be in session, and there may have been other developments. We are
agreed about the effect on the morale of the security forces of such an investigation.
We have already refused a Parliamentary demand for one. Our present strong view
therefore is that we should have to refuse or prevent such an investigation, although
obviously that decision must be completely weighed when the application is made
and in the light of conditions at the time.
Recommendation
10. Her Majesty’s Government should accept the Sub-Commission’s request to visit
Cyprus but negotiate to secure that the best possible arrangements in timing and
procedure are reached in consultation with the Governor of Cyprus.
222 CAB 128/32/1, CC 4(58)2 6 Jan 1958
[Cyprus: draft parliamentary statement of policy]: Cabinet
conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (58) 4)
covering a draft Parliamentary statement of policy on Cyprus, together with an
outline of measures to be announced simultaneously by the Governor.1
The Colonial Secretary said that a new initiative by the Government was necessary
if the situation in Cyprus was not seriously to deteriorate once again. The draft
statement in Annex A to C. (58) 4, which had been approved by the Colonial Policy
Committee and was intended to be made to Parliament on its reassembly, reaffirmed
the Government’s intention to achieve a settlement of the problem of Cyprus on the
basis of the principle of self-determination seven years after the ending of the present
emergency, provided that—
(i) questions affecting the Turkish community in Cyprus would be fairly settled
and the Turkish-Cypriots no less than the Greek-Cypriots would be given the right of
self-determination as a community;
(ii) such bases and installations as might be required to meet the strategic needs
of Her Majesty’s Government and their Allies would be retained under British
sovereignty;
(iii) the people of Cyprus showed during the seven-year period that they were
ready to co-operate in working and maintaining a representative Constitution, the
details of which would be for discussion, in the first instance, with the Governor of
Cyprus in the Island.
1 Now Sir H Foot, previously colonial secretary in Cyprus, 1943–1945, chief secretary of Nigeria,
1947–1951, and governor of Jamaica, 1951–1957.
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At the same time measures would be announced in Cyprus by the Governor to
bring the state of emergency to an end in a period of three months. These measures,
which were outlined in provisional form in Annex B to C. (58) 4, would involve the
progressive release of individuals detained under the emergency regulations and the
revocation of the regulations themselves at the end of the period, after which
Archbishop Makarios would be free to return to the Island on his assurance that he
would use all his influence for the maintenance of peaceful conditions.
Proposals on these lines would not prejudice the final solution of the problem, while
they would also make clear our readiness to accept at any time dispositions for the
future of the Island which had the approval of the Greek and Turkish Governments
and of both communities in Cyprus, provided that our requirement in respect of mil-
itary bases was satisfied. They would also preserve the basic assurance to the Turkish
community to which the Turkish Government attached such great importance. There
were grounds for hoping, therefore, that they would enlist the support of moderate
opinion in Cyprus and would create a new and calmer atmosphere in which genuine
progress might be made towards an ultimately satisfactory solution.
The Foreign Secretary said that an initiative of this nature was not likely to be wel-
comed by the Turkish Government, for whom Cyprus has now become a major issue
in domestic politics. At best we could hope to secure no more than their grudging
acquiescence. To this end they should be given adequate time in which to consider the
proposals, and these should therefore be communicated to them in the first instance
by H.M. Ambassador in Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter the Governor of Cyprus
should visit Ankara for consultation with H.M. Ambassador and for discussion, as nec-
essary, with the Turkish Government about the new proposals. He should then make
a similar visit to Athens, when he would take the opportunity to meet Archbishop
Makarios. The Greek Government would probably reject the proposals outright, unless
they were influenced by the Archbishop, who might fear that his own standing in
Cyprus would be jeopardised if he rejected a plan which involved the end of the emer-
gency in the Island. If so, it was marginally possible that the Greek-Cypriots would be
given a genuine opportunity to seek a solution which was neither Enosis nor parti-
tion. On the other hand, if both the Turkish and Greek Governments reacted strongly
against the proposals, it would be necessary to reconsider them. In any event it was
essential that they should, if possible, remain strictly secret until it become clear
whether it would be realistic for the Government to announce them.
In discussion there was general agreement that these proposals and the
procedures for implementing them should, in principle, be endorsed. The following
points were made—
(a) It might be pointed out to the Turkish Government that their interests would best
be served by a settlement which might command a measure of bipartisan support in this
country. It was for consideration whether they might also be offered a base in Cyprus.
(b) Any suggestion of negotiation with Archbishop Makarios must be avoided. His
return to Cyprus at the end of the emergency should not, therefore, be made
conditional upon his giving an assurance that he would use all his influence for the
maintenance of peaceful conditions, and we should confine ourselves to providing
that those individuals who had been excluded from Cyprus during the emergency,
including the Archbishop, would be free to return when it was declared at an end. If,
however, the Archbishop volunteered a statement of his readiness to work for peace
in Cyprus, we should be free to use it as we saw fit.
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(c) It was desirable that we should not commit ourselves even by implication, to
continue to enforce law and order in Cyprus regardless of developments; and it might
be politic explicitly to reserve our freedom of action if, during the seven-year period,
the inhabitants of Cyprus made the orderly administration of the Island impossible.
On the other hand any suggestion that we might be prepared to abandon our
sovereignty over the Island would be politically damaging and might provoke the
Turkish Government to renew intercommunal strife in Cyprus in the hope of forcing
the issue of partition without further delay.
(d) It would be desirable to make it clear that the detainees to be released would be
individuals who had not been legally convicted of any offence, that the least danger-
ous of them would be released first and that the process could be suspended if peace-
ful conditions were not maintained. Indeed, it was for consideration whether fresh
powers should be taken to retain the most dangerous of the detainees after the end of
the emergency, if the situation so required. In practice, however, it might prove diffi-
cult to single out these individuals; and all but a very small number of the present
detainees could, in any case, be rearrested if the situation deteriorated again after their
release. The balance of advantage, therefore, would probably lie in releasing all those
now detained by the date when the emergency was declared at an end.
(e) The cases of those convicted during the emergency would fall to be reviewed
by the Governor in Executive Council. But there would be no automatic amnesty for
persons who had committed criminal offences during that period and were arrested
after its end. It would, however, be desirable to maintain the previous Governor’s
offer of a safe conduct out of the Island for the leader of the terrorist forces if he
surrendered when the new proposals were announced.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved, in principle, the proposals in C. (58) 4.
(2) Invited the Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Colonial Secretary, to arrange
for these proposals to be communicated to the Turkish and Greek Governments.
(3) Invited the Colonial Secretary, in revising the draft Parliamentary statement
and in giving further consideration to the measures to bring the state of
emergency to an end, to have regard to the points made in their discussion.2
2 At a meeting of the Cabinet on 22 Jan 1958 it was agreed that discussions with the Turkish government
‘should be so conducted as not to exclude the possibility of partitioning the Island, if necessary, at an
earlier point than was envisaged, as a hypothesis, in our latest proposals. If terrorism broke out again in
Cyprus, we could not afford indefinitely to devote military resources to its repression’. Since the Turkish
economy was considerably dependent on US aid, it was hoped the Americans could influence the Turkish
government’s attitude to the British proposals (CAB 128/32/1, CC 8(58)5).
223 CO 926/1062, no 962 3 Mar 1958
[Need for a constructive plan for Cyprus]: letter from Sir H Foot
(Cyprus) to Sir R Allen (Athens)1
I was very grateful to you for your letter of the 22nd February, and I have been
carefully pondering what you say. It is of course most important to us here to
understand the views and attitudes of the Greek Government.
1 Ambassador to Greece, 1957–1961.
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It would not help very much to enter into any long discussion on these terribly
difficult matters in this correspondence, and I shall not attempt to do so, but I think
I should say that all our thinking here is dominated by the dangers arising from the
intense pressure of the Turks for partition. The Turkish Government has made its
determination very plain, and it has given most positive assurances to the Turkish
community in Cyprus that partition will be achieved. What is more there is good
reason to think that the Turks will not hesitate to resort to violence in the Island if
they don’t get what they want. Since we agree that partition would be a disaster it
seems to me that it is essential to think very urgently of every possible means of
fending off that danger.
On the other hand we cannot deny that Turkey has a real and legitimate interest in
Cyprus, and it is for that reason that I believe that an invitation to Turkey as well as
Greece to participate in some form in the administration of the Island must be
considered. I believe that the principles of common interest and participation and
partnership are sound in themselves—indeed I believe that in the end a solution will
have to be found on the basis of those principles.
We cannot assume that there must always be a tug-of-war between Enosis and
partition. Surely we must rather work on a constructive plan based on co-operation
between the three Allied Governments in order to reach and work an agreed solution,
and the initiative for a new approach must come from us.
I do not for a moment underestimate the difficulties of getting the Greek and
Turkish Governments to agree with any new approach, but in the end I believe we
shall have to get their co-operation if utter disaster is to be avoided. If we go on
hoping that we can satisfy both governments from the start I see no hope of avoiding
civil war in Cyprus and even worse results in the wider sphere of international
relations. The fact that neither the Greeks nor the Turks wish to push things to a
final break with us—or with the Americans—may make them stop short at the edge
of the precipice.
It is because the dangers are so close and the possibilities so terrible that I feel that
we must urgently think what new course would be sound in itself and justifiable to
world opinion. I don’t suggest that what I put forward is necessarily the best course
(it is obviously subject to many variations) but none of us can deny the need to find a
new course—and find it very quickly.
I am sure that you will not mind my putting down the random comments which
will at any rate help to show you how serious things look here. . . .
224 CAB 134/1557, CPC  5(58) 13 Mar 1958
‘Cyprus: future policy’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
meeting
The Committee had a preliminary discussion of the political principles upon which a
settlement of the Cyprus question might be based. They had before them for this
purpose a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C.P.C. (58) 5).
The Prime Minister said that in negotiation with the Turkish Government our
object was to secure the abandonment by them of partition as their ultimate aim in
Cyprus. This was unlikely to be achieved without the early concession of a Turkish
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base in the Island. This might secure Turkish acquiescence in a fifteen year interim
arrangement under which the United Kingdom would retain responsibility for the
external affairs, defence and internal security of Cyprus, the remaining aspects of
government being regulated by a new constitution on the lines proposed by the
Governor in Cyprus telegram no. 319. If at the end of this period the people of Cyprus
should opt for independence or union with Greece, Turkish (and United Kingdom)
bases would be placed upon a permanent treaty footing, specific guarantees would be
given of the rights of the Turkish minority and suitable arrangements would be made
for the neutralisation of the Island on the Austrian model. Such a plan could be
commended to the Greek Government as one involving the exercise of self-
determination, albeit with certain safeguards.
In discussion there was general agreement that this plan merited further
consideration. It was suggested, however, that the situation in the Island might make
both difficult and dangerous an interim period of as long as fifteen years during
which we should remain responsible for the Island’s security. Further consideration
would be necessary subsequently of the military factors, but it was emphasised that
the introduction of a foreign base at a time when we retained responsibility for
internal security would be likely to create an impossible task for our military forces.
It would be preferable therefore to move quickly towards a final solution of the
Cyprus problem. One such might be the early application of self-determination to the
Island as a whole, subject to appropriate safeguards in the event of union with Greece
and in return for the grant of a suitable base to the Turks (we ourselves of course
retaining another). It was thought however that this was by itself unlikely to induce
the Turks to abandon partition as their ultimate aim, more particularly since it was
not easy to see how a guarantee of minority rights could be enforced, and so long as
the Turks maintained this aim we were bound by our declaration of 19th December,
1956.1
It might be however that a more promising line could be found in the concept of a
tridominium which had never yet been propounded to the Turkish and Greek
Governments. Such a plan might harmonise well with a constitution of the type
envisaged by the Governor in his telegram no. 319, and might serve to transform
Cyprus from a storm centre to a focus of active partnership inside the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation which might set a useful precedent for the future. Once put into
operation a tridominium should effectively prevent partition of the Island, and if two
of the three powers concerned were prepared to accept such an arrangement there
would be a strong incentive for the third power to participate. It remained true,
however, that in the absence of co-operation from both Greeks and Turks Enosis and
partition were the only solutions which we ourselves could implement.
It might be thought that the establishment of a foreign base would prejudice the
working of a condominium or a constitution on the lines which the Governor had in
mind: it would be preferable that we alone should retain a full-scale military base and
that Turkish and Greek troops should form part of a properly integrated security
force under neutral command. But though our initial proposals for a tridominium
might exclude the grant of a base, it was unlikely that the Turks could be brought to
relinquish a safeguard on which they had latterly come to lay so much stress.
1 To the effect that ‘the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed community [as Cyprus] must
include partition among the eventual options’: H of C Debs, vol 562, cols 1268–1278.
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It was agreed that the alternative solutions (by way of Enosis or a tridominium)
which had been referred to in discussion should be set out in a paper for subsequent
consideration along with the proposals in C.P.C. (58) 5.
225 CAB 134/1557, CPC 6(58) 21 Mar 1958
‘Cyprus: future policy’: minutes of Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Prime Minister (C.P.C. (58)
5) and a note by officials (C.P.C. (58) 6) setting out three possible forms of a political
settlement of the Cyprus question together with a report by the Cyprus Committee
on the implications of granting military bases in Cyprus to the Greek or Turkish
Governments (C.P.C. (58) 4).
The Prime Minister said that leaving aside partition, which we should only
contemplate as a last resort, there were three forms which a political solution might
take. The first discussed in C.P.C. (58) 5, involved an interim period of continued
British rule during which internal self-government might be introduced on the lines
recently proposed by the Governor with a considerable measure of communal
autonomy. It was unlikely however that the Turks would be disposed in present
circumstances to defer their acquisition of a base in the Island for say, fifteen years,
and the Chiefs of Staff had drawn attention to the grave military risk of our retaining
responsibility for internal security for a prolonged period during which a Turkish
base would afford both a standing provocation to the Greek community in the Island
and a means for the introduction of arms for the Turkish Cypriot population. This
consideration might be held to rule out such a plan from immediate further
consideration, though if other solutions proved fruitless it might be necessary to fall
back upon the simpler variant proposed in Cyprus telegram no. 319.
The Committee turned to consider other possible solutions by way of the union of
Cyprus with Greece or tri-dominium.
The Foreign Secretary said that the possible form of settlement which he had
discussed with the Greek Government envisaged the application of self-
determination to the whole of the Island, less British and Turkish military enclaves,
within the shortest possible period of years. The Cypriot people would have the
option of maintaining their present status, becoming independent, or joining
Greece, and suitable guarantees would be established of the rights of individual
citizens and the demilitarisation of the Island less the agreed military bases. Such a
solution would be so welcome to the Greeks that they were unlikely to make
difficulties. It was hard to see however how the Turks could be brought to accept
such arrangements, even with a base, unless its area could be considerably extended;
and then the problem would be how to distinguish this from partition. Moreover
such a solution might give rise to political difficulty in this country.
There was general agreement that tri-dominium merited serious consideration.
Such a solution would avoid the political difficulty of complete surrender of British
sovereignty, and could be represented as an entirely new approach to the Cyprus
problem which might set a pattern which could be followed in other situations of
comparable difficulty. Under such an arrangement it would be preferable that we
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alone should maintain a full scale base, but all three sovereign powers would
maintain troops in the Island. This solution should fully satisfy Turkish interests. It
would not be attractive to the Greek Government; but if the difficulty of a solution by
way of Enosis could be brought home to them, they might be induced to accept tri-
dominium if it could be presented as a solution for a limited period at the end of
which self-determination might [be] left open. The precise period and formula
involved would require further consideration according to the bias to be given to the
Greek or Turkish viewpoint. This might incline to the former, in that the tangible
advantage of such an arrangement would lie with the Turks, who might for that
reason be prepared to make some concession to Greek opinion. A similar
consideration might govern the constitutional arrangements to be associated with
tri-dominium: the protection which the Turkish population of the Island would
automatically enjoy might make it unnecessary to adopt the special communal
safeguards of the Governor’s latest plan, and [a] constitution on the Radcliffe lines
might then be found adequate.
The Committee finally considered the next procedural steps. It was agreed that
action should immediately be taken to disabuse the Turkish Government of their
perhaps wilful misconception regarding our readiness to make an immediate grant
to them of a military base in Cyprus. We should make it clear that we were only
prepared to consider the grant of such facilities as part of an agreement embody-
ing a lasting political settlement. This would lead to Turkish enquiries regarding
our proposals for such a settlement, but it would be undesirable that we should
engage in further negotiation during the period of the Greek elections. Although
the plan involving union with Greece might need first to be discussed with the
Turks, that of tri-dominium would best be discussed initially with the Greeks, and
we should wish to avoid any such negotiations becoming an election issue. The
Turkish Government should therefore be informed that while we had a number of
ideas about possible political solutions, we proposed to defer discussion of these
till after the Greek elections. A similar statement should be made in Cyprus. In
the meantime we should give further consideration to the formula under which
the tri-dominium plan should be presented and to the constitutional arrange-
ments which would be associated with this solution, and should also examine the
possibility, in a solution involving self-determination, of providing the Turks with
a large military enclave which would yet fall short of partition of the Island. The
Governor of Cyprus need not return for further consultations until our planning
was further advanced. It was for consideration whether, when international discus-
sion came to be resumed, we should abandon the technique of private negotia-
tions and seek public discussion of our offers, perhaps by means of an
international conference. . . .
226 CAB 134/1557, CPC  7(58) 28 Mar 1958
[Further discussion on future policy for Cyprus]: minutes of Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee meeting
The Committee resumed their consideration of the policy to be adopted to secure a
settlement of the Cyprus question. They had before them a note by officials (C.P.C.
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(58) 7) on the points raised by the Committee at their last meeting1 regarding
presentation to the Greek and Turkish Governments of the concept of tri-dominium,
the arrangements for the internal government of the Island which might be
associated with tri-dominium, and the possibility of an enlarged Turkish base.
The Committee again reviewed the various forms which a political settlement
might take.
In discussion, the following points were made:—
(a) Partition of the Island would satisfy our Turkish ally and might involve less
military risks for us than other solutions. But the economic distress which partition
would create in the Island would be to our discredit, and our prestige would suffer
both in the Middle East and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. At worst, this
solution might exacerbate the hostility of Greeks and Turks and convert Cyprus into
a second Palestine: and in these circumstances the security of our base would be
endangered. These considerations applied even more strongly to the alternative
course of withdrawing our forces to military enclaves in the Island and leaving the
Greeks and Turks to find their own solution. It would follow, therefore, that, if all
other attempts at solution failed, we should have to continue to carry the present
burden of responsibility in the Island.
(b) In telegram no. 447 the Governor of Cyprus had said that he regarded tri-
dominium as unworkable. But his own plan for a partnership between ourselves,
Greece and Turkey in the administration of the Island under continued British
sovereignty was equally dependent upon Greek and Turkish co-operation. Moreover,
there was a danger that the separate communal Assemblies which it contemplated
would lead to a perpetuation, rather than a diminution, of antagonism between the
two races. It might, however, constitute a preliminary to the establishment of a tri-
dominium, with which it might later be combined.
(c) On the hypothesis of tri-dominium the problem of a final court of appeal in the
event of a dispute between the three sovereign powers might be met by associating
the United States and another Power with the three co-domini for this purpose as
guarantors of the treaty establishing the condominium, suitable constitutional
provision being made for a suspensory power in case of discriminatory legislation
pending appeal to this final body.
(d) Tri-dominium would be likely to be more acceptable to the Turks than to the
Greeks, though the former would be reluctant to abandon the idea of a military base
under their own sovereignty. As a concession to Greek opinion the scheme might be
presented as an interim one for a period of years, at the end of which the Cypriot
people would be free to choose their future status. It might need to be conceded that,
if this choice resulted in Enosis, the Turks would be permitted to transform such
military installations as they might be occupying in the Island under tri-dominium
into a military base under their own sovereignty.
(e) But if the tri-dominium plan, when presented to the Greek and Turkish
Governments, was rejected by either or both of them, it would be impossible for us to
substitute an alternative plan at short notice. It might, therefore, be wiser, before
committing ourselves openly to the concept of tri-dominium, to explore the
possibility of the remaining solution which would maintain unified sovereignty.
Application of unitary self-determination would be accompanied by the grant of a
1 See previous document.
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military base to the Turks, which might be somewhat larger than the minimum
required for an infantry brigade, and, in the presumed event of Enosis, by suitable
guarantees of minority rights and of Greek demilitarisation which would be under
international supervision. In presenting such a solution to the Turks we should make
it plain that, without retracting our declaration of December, 1956, we were most
reluctant to contemplate the partition of the Island and that the grant of a base
would represent a substantial and immediate advantage for them. It would, however,
be very difficult for the Turkish Government, in present circumstances, to forgo their
demand for partition, and maximum pressure would be necessary from the United
States. Moreover, even if such a solution were agreed, there could be no guarantee
that the Turks would not use their base to subvert the administration of the rest of
the Island. The Chiefs of Staff had already expressed their anxiety about the
introduction of a foreign military base in the Island, and its enlargement to a size
which might satisfy the Turks would involve many of the dangers of partition. In
addition, the Government would be liable to political criticism for the surrender of
British sovereignty which this scheme would entail. There would, however, be
general relief if a settlement could be reached. The scheme had the attraction of
simplicity and satisfaction of the Greek demands, and it would be desirable to test
Turkish reaction to such a plan before advancing the alternative scheme of tri-
dominium.
The Foreign Secretary said that, as already agreed, he would make it clear to the
Turkish Government that the grant of a military base was bound up with the
conclusion of a durable political settlement. It appeared, however, that the Greek
elections would not now be concluded until early in May and it would be difficult to
defer embarking on any further discussions with the Turks until a new Greek
government had taken office. He proposed, therefore, that as soon as the necessary
preparations had been made for American diplomatic support, he shoud follow up his
immediate communication to the Turkish Government with a proposal that they
should receive a base in Cyprus in return for their acquiescence in a solution by
means of unitary self-determination.
It was agreed that the Cabinet’s endorsement should be sought for a course of
action on these lines. If such an approach to the Turkish Government proved
unsuccessful, it would be necessary to take our stand publicly on the alternative of
tri-dominium which should be further studied in the meantime on the lines
suggested. . . .
227 CAB 128/32/1, CC 28(58)3 1 Apr 1958
[Cyprus: proposed policy of unitary self-determination outside bases]:
Cabinet conclusions
The Foreign Secretary said that, in view of the postponement of the Greek elections,
there was now no prospect of an early resumption of negotiations with the Greek
Government about Cyprus. It would be difficult to justify to Parliament a period of
complete inactivity over this problem, and some means must therefore be devised of
maintaining discussions with the Turkish Government in the interim. As a first step
he had informed them that they were not entitled to interpret his recent discussions
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in Ankara as offering them a strategic base in Cyprus except as part of a plan for a
political settlement likely to command the acquiescence of the three Governments
concerned and of both the Cypriot communities. The next step would be to indicate
to them our own view of the possible basis of such a settlement. For this purpose we
might suggest to them an arrangement whereby, in return for the establishment of a
Turkish base in Cyprus, they would release us from our undertaking to accept a
partition of the Island in the last resort and would acquiesce in a policy of unitary
self-determination for the part of the Island outside the British and Turkish bases
with the minimum of delay, subject to adequate guarantees, embodied in a Treaty, for
the rights of minorities and to certain limitations of sovereignty as regards
militarisation and foreign policy.
In discussion it was suggested that, if we put forward this proposal immediately
after appearing to modify the undertaking about the establishment of a Turkish base
in Cyprus, the Turkish Government would be likely to reject it and to adopt an even
more intransigent attitude towards any other solution which might subsequently be
suggested, including the conception of tri-dominium. Moreover, the proposal would
imply that, apart from the British and Turkish bases, Cyprus would be free to achieve
union with Greece; and if, as a result, communal disorders broke out or the Soviet
Union sought to gain a foothold in the Island, public opinion in this country would
be critical of an arrangement whereby, although we retained troops in Cyprus, we
failed to intervene in order to restore law and order. For this reason it might be wiser
to put forward the concept of tri-dominium at the next stage in the negotiations and
to reserve the proposal outlined by the Foreign Secretary for discussion only if tri-
dominium proved to be unacceptable.
On the other hand, this proposal was known to have the support of the United
States Government. Moreover, it was likely to be more acceptable than tri-dominium
to the Greek Government; and it could be regarded as deriving originally from a
suggestion which the Turkish Government themselves had tentatively made at one
point during the earlier discussions. There was no reason to suppose that, if the
situation in Cyprus deteriorated again, a system of tridominium which would depend
upon the full co-operation of the three Governments concerned would be any more
effective in securing the maintenance of law and order.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the balance of
advantage appeared to lie in putting this proposal to the Turkish Government not as
a definite plan which we sponsored but as a suggestion which they themselves had
originally made and we had subsequently been considering. This approach should be
made as informally as possible, preferably through the Turkish Ambassador in
London, in order to ascertain whether the Turkish Government were prepared to
entertain it. If they rejected it, we should then have no alternative but to put forward
publicly our own solution based upon tri-dominium, for which we should continue
to make preparations.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Invited the Foreign Secretary to ascertain informally, on the lines indicated by
the Prime Minister, the Turkish reaction to the proposal which he had submitted
to the Cabinet.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to arrange for officials to continue their
examination of the means of giving effect to the conception of tri-dominium.
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228 CAB 134/1557, CPC(58)9 14 Apr 1958
[Cyprus: future policy]: memorandum (letter to Mr Lennox-Boyd) by
Sir H Foot for Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
I do hope that you managed to get some rest in Nassau1—and that you had a great
success there to add to the long list of your colonial trophies.
I am afraid that I have nothing encouraging to tell you from this corner of your
Empire. For a week or two past the Turks here have been stepping up attacks on me,
and I have little doubt that they have been encouraged to do so by Ankara. They are
very confident and truculent and they would naturally react very fiercely to any
incident in which a Turk were injured or killed—and that might happen any day.
Our local Greeks on the other hand are depressed to the point of despair, and it looks
as if Grivas has decided to take his own line in spite of any restraint which Athens
may have endeavoured to impose upon him. The nightly list of explosions continues
and increases, and it seems impossible that this can go on without anyone being
hurt. I imagine that we must continue in this wretched state of uncertainty for
another month or two (until the Greek elections are over and a Greek Government is
back in position) but it is difficult to see how we are to steer a course through the
dangers for that long while we wait for decisions and declarations.
Meanwhile I am filled with alarm about the line which is being pursued in
discussions with the Turkish Government. I have always thought that a Turkish base
in Cyprus might be an ingredient in a final settlement, and I understand the Greek
case for self-determination. I see the attraction therefore in the possibility of a deal in
which the Turks would get a base and the Greeks would get the rest, but I am bound
to say that to attempt a solution on these lines seems to me to invite continuing
conflict between Turks and Greeks—and if conflict continues the wretched Cypriots
will get the dirty end of the stick all the time. I cannot persuade myself that under
the sort of deal proposed the Turks would be content to leave it at that, and in any
event we on our side have a clear obligation not to leave the Turkish Cypriots in the
lurch.
Surely the right answer is to allow this small Island to enjoy the advantages of
association in some form or other with the British Commonwealth and with Greece
and Turkey too. Surely the right and sensible purpose is to enable the Island to
remain undivided with a system of self-government in its internal affairs and with a
good measure of communal autonomy. Surely the function of the three
Governments concerned is to come together and co-operate to hold the ring. The
aim must surely be that everyone should win and no-one should lose—and Cyprus
should get the best of all worlds. And surely, since we have an obligation to the
people whom we have governed for the best part of a century, we should take the lead
and maintain the responsibility to achieve these obvious objectives.
It is a choice between conflict and co-operation. The Greeks must be made to
realise that Turkey has a legitimate interest in Cyprus. The Turks must be made to
accept the proposition that participation is better than partition.
1 Lennox-Boyd visited the Bahamas in April 1958 after disturbances and a general strike, and arranged for
constitutional changes—the number of seats in the elected House of Assembly was increased from 1960.
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Shouldn’t Great Britain declare that having tried every possible way to get
agreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments we shall continue to carry
our responsibilities for a set period at least, inviting the Greek and Turkish
Governments to come in and help us and accepting the principles of internal self-
government and communal autonomy and dual nationality? I believe that such
proposals would command widespread approval in all parties and indeed in world
opinion and we here would have a course to follow which would make it worthwhile
putting up with anything.
It seems to me that for too long we have gone backwards and forwards between
Athens and Ankara hoping for some bargain. What a wonderful thing it would be if
we had a clear policy of our own.
I believe that the line which I have advocated might at first be received with
consternation by both Greeks and Turks here, but secretly there would, I believe, be a
good deal of relief and increasing support if it were clear that we really meant what
we said and were not going to be pushed off it. And both Athens and Ankara would I
suggest in the end, if not at the beginning, have no alternative but to go along with
us.
As you know I have always tried to apply the overriding test of what is best for the
people of Cyprus. Most certainly I feel convinced that on that test the line I have
proposed is by far the best. I do hope that within a month or two we can declare such
a policy and go ahead with it.
One last point. I know that there are many objections to bringing international
authorities into this but the more I think of it the more I believe that it might be a
good thing to state our readiness to place Cyprus under United Nations trusteeship
so that a policy of common interest and co-operation can have international backing.
I don’t know whether you will wish me to come home later this month as has been
proposed. I do hope however that I can be given an opportunity of arguing this case
before any final decision is taken. . . .
229 CAB 128/32/1, CC 42(58)2 13 May 1958
[Various possible plans for settlement of the Cyprus problem]: Cabinet
conclusions
[The Colonial Policy Committee’s preferred solution was a tri-dominium with the Greek
and Turkish governments: ‘an idealistic approach, based on the concept of partnership,
and would constitute a fresh and imaginative initiative on our part, which might have a
considerable political impact’ (CAB 134/1557, CPC 8(58), 23 Apr 1958).]
The Cabinet had before them notes by the Secretary of the Cabinet (C. (58) 102, 103
and 106) covering memoranda on various possible plans for a settlement of the
Cyprus problem.
The Prime Minister recalled that the Cabinet had previously favoured a plan for
the establishment of a tridominium in Cyprus. Subsequently, however, the Governor
of Cyprus and Her Majesty’s Ambassadors at Athens and Ankara had indicated that
this plan was unlikely to be acceptable either to the two communities in Cyprus or to
the Greek and Turkish Governments. Moreover, the United States Government had
given the proposal only qualified support. After further discussions with the
Governor of Cyprus the alternative plan outlined in the Annex to C. (58) 106 had
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therefore been prepared. This plan provided that the international status of Cyprus
should remain unchanged for seven years, during which internal security would
remain under full British control; that the Greek and Turkish Governments should
be invited to appoint representatives in Cyprus to co-operate with the Governor in a
joint effort to achieve peace, progress and prosperity in the Island; that, under a new
Constitution, the two Cypriot communities should enjoy autonomy in communal
and cultural affairs, while matters of common concern should be administered
jointly; and that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots should be given the opportunity of
acquiring Greek or Turkish nationality in addition to their British nationality. In
presenting this plan we should indicate that, if it succeeded, the initial period of
limited partnership might be succeeded by a lasting settlement, based on the
surrender of sole British sovereignty over the Island (apart from bases and military
facilities retained for strategic reasons) and a full sharing of that sovereignty with the
Greek and Turkish Governments. If, however, the plan failed and it became necessary
to seek a final solution of the problem of Cyprus on other lines, we should regard
ourselves as bound by our previous assurances in regard to the application of the
principle of self-determination.
In discussion it was suggested that this new plan constituted, in effect, a reversion
to the original proposal for the continuation of British rule in Cyprus, albeit with a
different form of Constitution from that proposed by Lord Radcliffe. It could provide
only an interim solution to the present problems of the Island, whereas tridominium
might have proved to be a final settlement. The new plan might not, therefore, make
so favourable an impact on world opinion as the concept of tridominium. On the
other hand, it now appeared that a tridominium would not be acceptable either to
the Cypriots or to the Greek Government, whereas the new plan was likely, in the
opinion of the Governor of Cyprus, to be welcomed by the majority of the inhabitants
of the Island. Moreover, it had the merit that it could be implemented in part if it was
accepted by one community even though it was initially rejected by the other.
Doubts were, however, expressed about the desirability of including in the
proposals any specific term of years as the limit of the proposed continuation of the
present status of the Island. The Governor of Cyprus had proposed a period of seven
years in order to allow a reasonable opportunity for stable conditions to be
established and the habit of co-operation to develop; and he was inclined to feel that
any shorter period might only encourage the more extreme elements of Cypriot
opinion to continue to promote their own solutions of the problem by violent means.
But, in the absence of goodwill on the part of all the parties concerned, it would
become increasingly difficult to provide the necessary British troops in the Island to
maintain law and order over so long a period as seven years. Moreover, a statement of
intention to maintain British sovereignty for this period would not commit any
future Government in the United Kingdom and would not, therefore, necessarily
ensure the internal stability of Cyprus to which the Governor rightly attached
importance. It might be preferable, therefore, merely to indicate that the present
status of the Island would be maintained for a term of years, without specifying any
particular period. Moreover, it would be desirable to present the final stage of the
plan, if it succeeded, as a sharing of sovereignty between the United Kingdom, Greece
and Turkey, and to omit any reference to the surrender by the United Kingdom of
sole sovereignty over the Island. It would also be desirable to modify the reference to
Cyprus as enjoying the advantages of “association” with the British Commonwealth,
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since the Island was already, and would presumably remain, within the
Commonwealth.
The attitude adopted by the Opposition in Parliament would be likely to influence
the reception given to the new plan. The Leaders of the Opposition should therefore
be given, in confidence, an outline of the new proposals.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Invited the Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Colonial Secretary, the
Governor of Cyprus and Her Majesty’s Ambassadors at Athens and Ankara, to
examine the proposals in C. (58) 106 in greater detail in the light of their
discussion.
(2) Agreed that, subject to the results of the discussions under Conclusion (1)
above, these proposals should be outlined in confidence, to the Leaders of the
Opposition.
(3) Agreed to resume their discussion at a subsequent meeting.
230 CAB 128/32/1, CC 43(58)4 15 May 1958
[Cyprus: revised policy statement]: Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a note by the Secretary of the Cabinet (C. (58) 109)
covering a revised policy statement on Cyprus.
In discussion there was general agreement that the proposed experiment in
partnership with the Greek and Turkish Governments in the administration of the
Island represented the best course now open to us.
In further discussion of the details of the draft statement the Minister of Defence1
expressed doubts regarding the advisability of our undertaking a commitment to
maintain British sovereignty over the Island for as long a period as seven years. The
plan would depend essentially on the co-operation of the Cypriot communities, and,
in default of such co-operation, might break down at an early stage. If we were
nevertheless committed to maintain internal security in the Island for the balance of
the seven years, we should be faced with a liability which was militarily unacceptable
since it could not be reconciled with the policy of a progressive reduction in the
strength of the Army. On the other hand it was argued that a definite statement of
intention was desirable in the interests of stable administration in Cyprus and in
order to reassure the Turkish Government. The balance of advantage therefore lay in
retaining the reference to a period of seven years, but to making it clear that this
period was itself part of the plan and was designed “to allow time for the new
principle of partnership to be fully worked out and brought into operation under this
plan in the necessary atmosphere of stability.” It was also agreed that the statement
should be amended to indicate that the people of the Island would, through their
representative institutions, be able to “exercise authority,” rather than merely “to
have a voice,” in the management of the Island’s internal affairs.
The Cabinet were informed that the Leaders of the Opposition, who had been given
in confidence an outline of the new proposals, had expressed some doubts about
them on the ground that they might be regarded as an attempt to perpetuate British
1 Mr D Sandys.
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sovereignty and to conciliate Turkish opinion without holding out any prospect to
the Greek Government of the exercise of unitary self-determination. They had
indicated that these objections might be reduced if the North Atlantic Council were
willing to endorse the maintenance of British sovereignty for a seven-year period,
and if the references in the draft statement to the ultimate future of the Island were
non-committal. The text appended to C. (58) 109 might be regarded as going some
way to meet this latter point, in that it no longer referred explicitly to the
Government’s previous assurances in regard to the exercise of communal self-
determination. But although it would be possible to maintain that those assurances
were relevant only to the failure of the plan, there could be no question of the
Government’s retracting their earlier pledge about the application of communal self-
determination in the last resort. It might, however, be possible to arrange for the
proposals to be communicated confidentially to the North Atlantic Council and to
secure their general approval. This possibility, together with the other problems of
presentation and timing involved, both as regards the Parliamentary statement itself
and the prior diplomatic approach to the Greek and Turkish Governments, would
require further study. It would be desirable, if possible, to avoid a Parliamentary
debate on Cyprus before the Whitsun recess; and it might therefore be necessary to
make an interim statement in the House of Commons on 19th May, promising a full
statement of the Government’s policy at the earliest opportunity after the recess.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved the draft policy statement annexed to C. (58) 109 subject to the
points made in discussion.
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would discuss with the Foreign Secretary
and the Colonial Secretary the problems of presentation and timing involved.
231 CO 926/1065, no 887 24 May 1958
[Cyprus: comments on the approved plan]: letter from Sir H Foot to
Mr Lennox-Boyd
[On 16 May 1958, Foot sent the following minute to the S of S: ‘I am convinced that our
hand will be greatly strengthened in dealing with disorder and violence once a clear and
new policy based on good principle is announced. My main fear is that the developments
of the past will bring about something like another Palestine in Cyprus. Civil war is an
immediate possibility, and this might well lead to a war between Greece and Turkey. That
is why I believe that it is essential to declare the new policy and pursue it, in order to
make a last stand against the disaster of a clash between Greeks and Turks which would
bring untold suffering and bloodshed’ (CO 926/1065, no 868).]
There are two or three things that I should like to say now about the plan for Cyprus
approved when I was in London.
First of all I devoutly hope that the plan as it stands will not be varied because of
adverse initial reaction in Ankara and Athens. We may expect complaint, criticism
and possibly violent opposition from one side or the other or both, but if we were
pushed off the decisions now taken I would see no hope at all for the future.
Secondly it seems to me essential that we should give as strong a lead as we can to
the Americans and our other friends. I am bound to say that the text of the Foreign
Secretary’s letter to Dulles given in telegram No. 721 worried me a great deal. It
seemed to me that the plan was represented in that letter as a second-best scheme
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rather than something which we strongly and positively believed in. In my opinion
the plan is the last hope of preventing civil war in Cyprus possibly leading to war
between Greece and Turkey. It seems to me that only if we represent and defend the
plan as imaginative, generous and just can we hope to win the support in British and
world opinion which is so necessary. I would hope that when the Prime Minister sees
Eisenhower the President can be persuaded to give strong positive endorsement for
our plan.
Thirdly it seems to me that we must make it quite clear from now that when the
plan is announced we shall not be deflected by opposition, however violent, from
either side. No one must be led to believe that the plan is dependent for its success on
immediate acceptance. What we propose is to state the action which we think is right
and then, over a long period if necessary, do everything possible to win support and
co-operation. We can no longer go on begging the parties to agree—and dropping
any proposal which they do not at once accept. That is why I was so concerned that
the Foreign Secretary’s letter to Dulles (see paragraph 3 of telegram No. 721) might
be taken to suggest that the plan would be a failure if it did not lead to a rapid
restoration of normal conditions.
The time has surely come to be tough with both the Greek and Turkish
Governments, and to go flat out to win the support of public opinion for our own
plan.
The position here and the situation as between the Greek and Turkish
Governments are so bad that we cannot possibly hope to come through without
making up our minds on the three things which I have emphasised in this letter—
first not to allow our initiative to be destroyed by the first reaction of the Turks or
Greeks; secondly to put forward and defend our plan with full confidence and
determination; and thirdly to recognise that before the plan can succeed we may well
have to ride through a lot more trouble.
I know that you very well understand these points which I have repeatedly
emphasised before (you will remember the note I gave you on the 16th May, a copy of
which is attached) and I hope that you will not mind my stating them again. The
worst thing of all would be for the Turks or the Greeks to see us off again, and leave
us to face an infinitely worse situation here with no policy at all.
232 CAB 128/32/2, CC 67(58)5 12 Aug 1958
[Report of prime minister’s discussions with Greek and Turkish
governments on Cyprus]: Cabinet conclusions
The Prime Minister informed the Cabinet of the course of the discussions on Cyprus
which he had held with the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey during his visit to
Athens and Ankara.
He had not asked either Government to approve the plan for the future of Cyprus
which he had presented to Parliament on 19th June. He had asked that they should
acquiesce in it and encourage their respective communities in Cyprus to co-operate
in working it.
The Greek Government did not like the plan because it embodied the principle of
partnership between Greece and Turkey in Cyprus and recognised a Turkish right to
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participation in the control of the Island’s affairs. They were, however, prepared to
support the plea for cessation of violence and a seven-year interval before the future
status of the Island was determined. On points of detail the Greeks had argued—(i)
that on the Executive Council they should have a greater majority, since the ratio of
4 to 2 would not represent the proportions of the population; (ii) that some provision
should be made for an elected assembly in which the population of the Island as a
whole could deal with the subjects not reserved to the Governor; (iii) that the
proposed provision for dual nationality would confirm the Turkish interest in
Cyprus; and (iv) that representatives of the Greek and Turkish Governments should
not be accredited to the Government and, in particular, should not sit as members of
the Governor’s Council.
The Prime Minister said that he had formed the impression that the Greek
Government lacked the political strength to give active support to any plan which
would solve the Cyprus problem. The Communists had improved their position at
the Greek elections in May 1958 and Enosis provided them with a welcome theme for
nationalistic propaganda. The Greek line was therefore to ask us to modify the
British plan in directions favourable to them.
By contrast the Turks had welcomed the plan in its entirety and had been strongly
opposed to any modifications designed to meet the Greek point of view.
The Prime Minister said that the Cabinet were now faced with a difficult decision.
There seemed to be three possible courses of action:—
(i) To announce that, as his discussions with the Greek and Turkish Governments
had shown no prospect of agreement, the United Kingdom would not proceed further
with the plan which they had announced on 19th June. This would leave both Greeks
and Turks entrenched in extreme positions. It would forfeit the opportunity to gain
their support for a cessation of violence and a seven-year period of pause before the
future status of the Island was determined. It would be a confession of failure.
(ii) To say that Her Majesty’s Government proposed to implement their plan as
announced, without amendment. This course would ensure the full co-operation of
the Turks, but it would arouse bitter opposition from Greece. It would also involve
disregarding the views expressed in the North Atlantic Council and in the United
Nations.
(iii) To say that we had decided to implement the policy already announced, while
modifying it in certain particulars. These amendments would be designed to secure
Greek acquiescence in the plan, while not making such substantial changes as would
antagonise the Turks. Sound reasons for the amendments would have to be given in
order that they should not appear to have been made solely for the purpose of
meeting Greek objections.
The Prime Minister explained that the modifications he had in mind were
contained in the draft statement which he had prepared before leaving Cyprus
(telegram No. 1170 of 12th August from P.O.M.E.F. to Foreign Office). The main
question was whether the suggested modifications would alienate Turkish support of
the British plan. He had therefore sought the views of H.M. Ambassadors in Ankara
and Athens on the likely effect of the draft statement on those Governments, and
these had just been received (Ankara telegram No. 1284 and Athens telegram No. 620
of 12th August to Foreign Office). H.M. Ambassador in Ankara had given his
considered opinion that the Turkish Government would not take the modifications as
a pretext for withholding their support of the plan as presented in the draft
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statement. He had, however, suggested two changes of detail, which were acceptable.
H.M. Ambassador at Athens had thought that the draft statement afforded a
reasonably good basis on which to approach the Greek Government, although he did
not believe that they would accept it without argument.
The Prime Minister added that any of the three possible courses of action was
likely to be followed by a period of increased disorder in Cyprus. But, horrible as the
atrocities committed by EOKA were, they should be seen in their correct perspective:
the British forces in Cyprus had incurred only 90 fatal casualties over the previous
five years. From his personal visit to the Island he was glad to report that the British
troops were in good heart.
Discussion showed that the Cabinet were strongly in favour of the third of the
courses outlined by the Prime Minister, namely that we should make known our
decision to put into effect the policy for Cyprus already announced to Parliament,
modified on the lines of the Prime Minister’s draft statement.
On the question of procedure, the Prime Minister said that nothing was to be
gained by attempting to secure the agreement of the Greek or Turkish Governments.
He suggested therefore that he should despatch to the Greek and Turkish Prime
Ministers letters in the terms of the drafts contained in telegrams Nos. 1171 and
1172 from P.O.M.E.F. to the Foreign Office and should issue the draft statement very
shortly thereafter.
The Lord Chancellor1 expressed the Cabinet’s gratitude to the Prime Minister for
the mission which he had undertaken and their appreciation of the results which he
had achieved. The outcome of these discussions had been more favourable than they
had ventured to hope.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that the Government should proceed with the plan for the future of
Cyprus which they had presented to Parliament on 19th June, subject to the
modifications approved in their discussion.
(2) Took note that the Prime Minister would inform the Greek and Turkish Prime
Ministers of this decision.
(3) Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for this decision to be
announced at the end of the week.
1 Lord Kilmuir.
233 CO 926/1070, no 1496 6 Sept 1958
[Record of Chequers discussion with Sir H Foot on Cyprus]: CO note
[This meeting was attended by Lennox-Boyd, and J Addis (FO) in preparation for a larger
meeting the next day, and a Cabinet meeting the day after that, which Sir H Foot
attended: see next document.]
The Prime Minister began by outlining the present position. There had originally
been a plan for Tridominium and a plan for Partnership; of these, Tridominium was
the most attractive but had not been possible. The Partnership Plan, when it came
out, had a good reception. The Turks at first reacted violently against it, and so did
the Greeks; there was then a period of calm during which talks took place in NATO,
under M. Spaak’s leadership. It was clear that the partnership concept presented
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difficulties, particularly to the Greeks, and the test and symbol of this was the
position of the Government Representatives under the plan. Rightly or wrongly, the
Prime Minister had decided to take the risk of visiting Greece and Turkey. The Greeks
did not wish to be brought to a point of decision in this way, and the Turks were at
first very unhelpful. The Greeks had four objections to the Plan, but the real point
was that they objected to any Turkish presence in the island although they were
prepared to give guarantees to the Turkish minority. As a result of his visit, the Prime
Minister had made a number of amendments to the original Plan to help the Greeks:
this was a risk with the Turks, but it had succeeded. The position now was that the
Turks accepted the modified Plan, but the Greeks opposed it. The question was
should the Plan proceed.
This was not an easy decision. Certain even of the British Press (e.g. the Daily
Telegraph) maintained that the Plan was now dead. If, however, Her Majesty’s
Government did not go on with it, the Turks would think that they had been betrayed
and it would be difficult to put any future plan forward. On the other hand, it could
be said that the Plan had depended on tripartite partnership which was now
impossible and the Plan could not be adopted. If the Plan was continued, the Turks
would be all right, the Greeks would be bad. The Plan would help in UNO and in
NATO, even though Monsieur Spaak might have to be carefully handled. In the island
there might be serious trouble.
The Governor of Cyprus said that he agreed that the Plan should go ahead. There
were great dangers in going on, but the Turks had been brought a very long way and
it would be very difficult to tell them now that at the last minute H.M.G. had been
pushed off their Plan by Archbishop Makarios. It was, however, no longer true to say
that the Plan, as such, could be put into effect; it was not partnership which was
being created, but rather safeguards for the Turks. But without these safeguards no
further progress would be possible; these safeguards were satisfactory to the Turks,
whereas paper guarantees would not be. It was true that even with the Plan there
might be war between Greece and Turkey, but disaster was more certain if there was
no Plan. The Turkish safeguards themselves were sound and in no way unfair.
Perhaps the Government Representatives were not in themselves desirable, and
justified the Greek view that they prejudiced a final settlement, but in return for the
Representatives the Turks had given up much more. The Governor concluded that he
was most strongly in favour of going ahead with the Plan. The Colonial Secretary
said that he took the same view. . . .
234 CAB 128/32/2, CC 69(58)2 8 Sept 1958
[Cyprus: future policy]: Cabinet conclusions
The Prime Minister said that it had now become clear that the Greek Government
would not accept any plan for the future administration of Cyprus which involved
their sharing the government of the Island with Turkey or acquiescing in the
physical presence in Cyprus of any symbol of Turkish authority. In these
circumstances the Cabinet faced two major decisions—first, whether we should
nevertheless pursue the plan which we had published; second, whether, if we sought
to put it into effect, we should allow Archbishop Makarios and the other political
exiles to return to the Island.
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On the first issue the balance of advantage appeared to lie in continuing to
promote our plan. We were committed to the Turkish Government to bring it into
force; and, in view of our success in persuading them to abandon their more extreme
demands for a partition of Cyprus or for the creation of a major Turkish base in the
Island, it would be unwise, by abandoning our plan at this late stage, to compel them
to revert to their former intransigence. Moreover, it was impossible to devise any
effective alternative to the plan which we had published. It was no longer feasible to
seek to introduce the Radcliffe Constitution; the Greek Government were powerless
to suggest on their own initiative any constitutional scheme which would be likely to
be accepted by the Turkish Government; and the indefinite continuance of British
rule in an atmosphere of increasing communal strife could not be contemplated. The
only realistic hope of achieving a solution lay in adhering to our plan but in
implementing it as unobtrusively as possible. We should therefore abstain from any
further declaration of policy and should allow the new arrangements to be seen to
come gradually into operation, in the hope that the Greek-Cypriot community and
the Greek Government would eventually appreciate the folly of refusing to accept the
opportunity to play the major part in the government of Cyprus and of deliberately
thwarting a plan which offered them their only safeguard against a partition of the
Island.
On this hypothesis the desirability of allowing Archbishop Makarios and the other
exiles to return to Cyprus would need to be reassessed. It would no longer be possible
to argue, as in our published plan, that, if violence ceased, we should be prepared
gradually to bring the state of emergency to an end and to allow the exiles to return,
since we could not maintain that violence had ceased or that we were putting the
plan into effect on the basis of the partnership between the Greek and Turkish
communities which we had originally envisaged. The return of the Archbishop, if it
was permitted, would therefore have to be justified by reference to our belief that, in
the circumstances in which the plan would now come into operation, he would be
less dangerous in Cyprus than he was at present in Athens, even though he would not
be required to abjure violence or to co-operate in restoring peace and order in the
Island. The Cabinet would need to consider whether this was in fact likely to be the
case.
The Governor of Cyprus said that, in his opinion, a fresh outbreak of violence and
terrorism was likely to occur in the period immediately ahead, in which the initial
stages of our plan would be put into operation. The establishment of the Municipal
Commission, the arrival of the representative of the Turkish Government, and the
holding of the first elections would represent critical points during this period.
Nevertheless, there was some hope that the Greek-Cypriot community and the Greek
Government, when faced with the new situation which would thereafter exist, would
hesitate finally to forgo the opportunity to play their part in the government of the
Island. We must be ready to take advantage of any change of attitude on their part.
We could not indefinitely govern the Island in collaboration with a minority
amounting to no more than one-fifth of its population and in the face of complete
absence of co-operation from the remaining four-fifths. Some means must be found
of resuming contact with this majority element; and, as Archbishop Makarios was the
only spokesman whom the Greek-Cypriot community would accept, it would be to
our advantage to offer him the opportunity to return to the Island. He might well
reject this offer; and in that case his prestige, which had grown, rather than
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diminished, during his exile, should suffer a serious reverse. But if he agreed to
return he would forfeit the position of power without responsibility which he at
present enjoyed in Athens and would become subject to the growing pressure of the
Greek community in Cyprus who were anxious, for both political and economic
reasons, that the state of emergency should be brought to an end as rapidly as
possible. On balance, it was to our advantage that the Archbishop should be
compelled in this way to face his responsibilities rather than be allowed to continue
to exert his dangerous influence over the Greek Government in Athens.
In discussion some doubt was expressed about the wisdom of allowing the
Archbishop to return to Cyprus. In present circumstances it would not be possible to
release the detainees or to terminate the state of emergency as rapidly as we had
originally hoped. These measures would now have to be deferred until peaceful
conditions had been restored. But there was little chance that the Archbishop would
co-operate in establishing such conditions; he was more likely to launch a campaign
for the immediate release of the detainees and to provoke bitter resistance to the
introduction of our plan. It would be necessary, therefore, to make it clear that, if he
returned to Cyprus, he would not be entitled to regard himself as above the ordinary
law of Cyprus and beyond the scope of the Emergency Regulations and that, if he
reverted to behaviour which was liable to disturb the peace and to subvert public
order, he would be arrested or deported for a second time. On the other hand, it
would not necessarily be easy to secure evidence which would justify his arrest; nor
would it be politically possible to detain him within a short period after his return to
Cyprus without provoking the suspicion that our consent to his return had been
merely a device to enable us to imprison him again.
The timing of the Archbishop’s re-entry into Cyprus would also need to be
considered. If we were to gain the maximum of advantage from such a concession, it
would be desirable that he should return to the Island in the near future, soon after
the representative of the Turkish Government had arrived on 1st October. On the
other hand it was doubtful whether public opinion was yet prepared for such a
change in our attitude towards the Archbishop. Moreover, there was risk of confusion
among the Cypriots about his status and functions if he was allowed to re-enter the
Island shortly after the arrival of the representative of the Turkish Government. For
these reasons it might be wiser to defer his return until the safeguards for the
Turkish-Cypriot community which our plan incorporated had been fully established,
i.e., until a date early in 1959.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that it would be premature
to seek to reach a decision on these issues without consulting the Turkish
Government. It was unlikely that they would formally consent to the return of the
Archbishop to Cyprus; but it might be possible to persuade them reluctantly to
acquiesce in a concession which appeared to offer the only chance of enabling us to
re-establish contact with the Greek-Cypriot community and to overcome Greek
resistance to our plan. He had asked H.M. Chargé d’Affaires in Ankara for his
personal assessment of the probable Turkish reaction to a proposal on our part to
allow the Archbishop to return to Cyprus; and in the light of the reply to this enquiry
he would consider what further action should be taken.
The Cabinet:—
Took note that the Prime Minister would give further consideration to the
desirability of consulting the Government of Turkey about the proposal that
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Archbishop Makarios and the other political exiles should be allowed to return to
Cyprus.
235 CO 926/721, no 36 6 Feb 1959
[Cyprus: timing of the approach to a ‘final settlement’]: letter from Sir
H Foot to J D Higham (CO)
I have just received your letter dated the 3rd February about the Brook Committee1
and I have looked through the enclosures. I shall now study them more closely and
let you know as soon as I can what comments I have to make.
I have concentrated for the moment on possibly the most awkward problem of
all—whether or not to press on to an early hand-over.
There is a number of precedents, I think, to show that once a decision to hand-
over to an independent government is made it is best to go ahead at top speed, so that
no-one can have second thoughts or suggest that Great Britain is giving something
grudgingly. On the other hand we all know that Cyprus is unique and I am not sure
that any of the lessons learned elsewhere apply here. From the time I came back
here, and indeed even before that, it seemed to me that the problems were so difficult
that there must be a fairly long interim stage. I still think that we should press for a
period of years during which the final settlement can be worked out and put into
effect. The possibility of agreement between Greece and Turkey and between the two
communities in the Island can certainly shorten the seven year period we have
proposed, but nevertheless some substantial interval will be essential, so it seems to
me. Moreover I believe that in our conditions once the decision in principle to set up
an independent state has been taken and announced even the Cypriots will be
anxious to take it easy. I almost said particularly the Cypriots. They have been
pushing against this door for so long that they take it for granted that it is
permanently closed, and it will be a great shock to them if it suddenly opens!
It would be best I think to go for a period of five years, being prepared to reduce it
to three or even possibly two in negotiation with the others concerned. With the best
will in the world it would be impossible to work out and put into effect and start
working institutions of the kind referred to in paragraph 15 of the paper in less than
a couple of years.
I have imagined that once the Foreign Secretaries have looked at the practical
problems in all their complexity they would come to the same conclusion as we did
and, while stating the final goal, agree to a considerable interim period. I have seen
from recent comments by Averoff2 that the Greeks are attracted by the idea of a quick
settlement but they still have to consider all the practical difficulties, and I think that
they may possibly swing back to favour a fair period before the final stage is reached.
Finally I refer back to what I have said before about the need to achieve an orderly
hand-over to a workable system. We owe that to the Cypriots and we owe it to
ourselves.
1 Working Party on Smaller Colonial Territories: see document no 562 in Pt II.
2 E Averoff, Greek minister of foreign affairs.
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You will understand that this first comment is very hurried, but I did want to
reinforce the plea I have put before for an interval leading to a final settlement rather
than to spoil everything by being in too much of a hurry.3
3 Foot followed this letter up with one to Sir J Martin in which he stressed their overriding interest in
getting agreement between Greece and Turkey, because the Cyprus dispute was harming the western
alliance and terrible damage was being done to the British good name; there was the risk of a war between
Greece and Turkey, with appalling results; if we seriously fell out with either or both our position would
soon be untenable. He would put no faith in enclaves in an independent Cyprus (no 19 in the file, 19 Feb
1959).
236 CAB 128/33, CC 9(59)1 13 Feb 1959
[Cyprus: details of the agreement reached by Greek and Turkish prime
ministers]: Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a note by the Foreign Secretary (C. (59)25) to which
was appended an unofficial translation of the original French text of the agreement
on Cyprus reached by the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers at Zürich.
The Foreign Secretary said that this agreement comprised four documents—the
first defining the “basic structure” of the proposed new Republic of Cyprus; the
second containing a Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic and the United
Kingdom, Greece and Turkey; the third containing a Treaty of Alliance between the
Republic and Greece and Turkey; the fourth comprising a “Gentleman’s Agreement”
between the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers on certain specific issues. These
texts should be considered from three points of view—the continuing commitment
which they entailed so far as concerned the United Kingdom; the extent to which
they safeguarded our own interests in Cyprus; and their implications as regards the
transfer of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to the new Republic.
The United Kingdom commitment
Under Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee we should be required, jointly with
Greece and Turkey, to recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial
integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus and “the state of affairs prescribed by
the fundamental articles of its constitution.” Under Article 3 we should undertake to
consult with Greece and Turkey on the action to be taken if any of the provisions of
the Treaty was infringed but should be authorised, if it proved impossible to reach
agreement with the other two Governments, to take independent action “with the
sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs laid down by the present Treaty.” It
would appear to follow from these provisions that we should be accepting a
commitment to guarantee a Greco-Turkish agreement (on the fundamental articles
of the Constitution) which we had had no part in shaping. Moreover, a right to
intervene in order to re-establish the “state of affairs” prescribed by the Treaty might
be embarrassing if we had no control over the Government of the Republic and no
assurance that they would in fact be able to implement the Constitution in a
satisfactory manner or to maintain law and order. On the other hand, the Treaty
represented an honest and courageous attempt to establish a balance between the
conflicting Greek and Turkish interests in Cyprus; and it gave us the right—though
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it imposed on us no obligation—to take independent action if we had reason to
believe that this balance was in danger of being disturbed. In addition it bound us to
safeguard the security of the Republic against external attack.
The United Kingdom interest in Cyprus
We should seek to ensure that our strategic interests in Cyprus would be
safeguarded by incorporation in the Treaty of Guarantee—particularly since the
Treaty was itself to be entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic and could not
therefore be amended by any legislative act of the new State. Our requirements could
be indicated in general terms to the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers as
follows:—
(i) We should need to retain certain substantial areas under British sovereignty as
permanent military bases.
(ii) We should need to retain control over other isolated sites throughout the
Island. It might appear anomalous to insist that these small areas should remain
under British sovereignty; and the alternative course of arranging for them to be
held on lease was open to the objection that it was difficult to specify a satisfactory
period for such a lease. It might therefore be preferable to rest on the fact that our
right to occupy and use those sites would be specifically provided in the Treaty and
would therefore be coterminous with it.
(iii) We should need facilities for access to the areas mentioned in paragraphs (i)
and (ii) above, for transit between them, for the supply of stores and services and so
forth. The guarantee of these facilities might be similarly incorporated in the text of
the Treaty.
(iv) We should need the right to use the airfield at Nicosia. It might be difficult to
insist that the main airfield in the island should be retained under British
sovereignty; but it would be essential to ensure that we—and, if necessary, Greece
and Turkey—would be authorised to use the airfield, without restriction, for both
civil and military purposes.
(v) We should need a satisfactory assurance that, if our strategic requirements
changed, we should be enabled to acquire alternative sites in any part of the Island.
The transfer of sovereignty
The agreement between the Greek and Turkish Governments envisaged that the
Republic of Cyprus should be established not later than three months after the
signature of the Treaties. But many administrative issues would need to be resolved
before the new State could come into being; and, although there would be a
psychological advantage in fixing a definite and early date for the transfer of power, it
should be accepted that any date provisionally selected at this stage might need to be
reconsidered in the light of developments.
The more important problems which would have to be solved in the interim were
as follows:—
(vi) Would the Republic of Cyprus be a member of the Commonwealth and of the
sterling area? It would not satisfy the criterion for full membership of the
Commonwealth; and it might be more appropriate that its status should resemble
that of the recently reconstituted State of Singapore. On the other hand, the
psychological impact of the political settlement would be enhanced if we could
welcome the suggestion by the Governments of Greece and Turkey that Cyprus
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should remain within the Commonwealth. Further consideration would need to be
given to the wording of any public statement on this subject which might be made
when the terms of the political settlement were published.
In the short term Cyprus would probably be a liability rather than an asset to the
sterling area; but the balance of advantage would probably lie in allowing it to remain
a member.
(vii) The Republic would continue to require financial and economic support for
some time. Its revenue might suffice to finance normal civil expenditure; but its
development programmes would require external support. We should avoid
accepting an indefinite commitment in this respect and should perhaps seek to
arrange for the annual grants which we had hitherto made to the Government to be
progressively reduced over a stated period.
(viii) The agreement reached between the Greek and Turkish Governments
appeared to make no provision for the Cypriots, numbering about 10,000, who were
of neither Greek nor Turkish nationality. It was, however, accepted by the Foreign
Ministers of Greece and Turkey that suitable provisions should be adopted in order to
safeguard the rights of these individuals.
(ix) Many other issues, including the important question of our civil aviation
rights in Cyprus, would need to be examined in greater detail before the new State
could effectively come into existence.
In addition, the “Gentleman’s Agreement” between the Prime Ministers of Greece
and Turkey envisaged that “immediately after the signature of the Treaties” all the
emergency measures at present in force in Cyprus should be lifted and a general
amnesty should be proclaimed. The timing of any relaxation of the emergency
measures would need further consideration, and any amnesty would be dependent
upon a corresponding willingness on the part of the terrorist organisations in Cyprus
to suspend their activities and to surrender their arms.
In further discussion it was agreed that our objective should now be to concert
with the Greek and Turkish Governments as rapidly as possible the text of a
statement of intention to give effect to the agreement reached by the two
Governments, of which our strategic requirements in Cyprus would be deemed to be
an integral part. This statement of intention might be initialled by representatives of
the three Governments on 16th February. Thereafter it should be initialled by
leading representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, who should
be invited to visit London on 18th February for this purpose. Archbishop Makarios
has already been informed of the scope of the agreement between the Greek and
Turkish Governments and was said to have endorsed it. It might be generally
expected that he would now be allowed to return to Cyprus. There were obvious risks
in this course. On the other hand, there was no evident reason why the ban against
his return should be maintained when he had initialled the statement of intention,
and there might be certain advantages in requiring him, in effect, to defend to the
Greek Cypriot community his acceptance of an agreement which should terminate
his efforts to promote the union of Cyprus with Greece.
It would be preferable to defer publication of the various agreements involved until
they had been formally accepted by the three Governments and by the
representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus. Appropriate
guidance should therefore be given to the Press during the next few days. It might
also be desirable to consider transferring to 19th February the Parliamentary debate
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 686
[237] CYPRUS 687
on foreign affairs which had been arranged for 18th February, in order that
Government spokesmen might take that opportunity to make a considered statement
about the successful outcome of the Government’s policy towards Cyprus.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Invited the Foreign Secretary to continue his discussions with the Greek and
Turkish Foreign Ministers on the lines indicated in their discussion, with the
objective of enabling the three Governments to initial on 16th February a
statement of intention to give effect to the proposals for the future of Cyprus
which had been prepared by the Greek and Turkish Governments, and to the
reservation to the United Kingdom Government of such strategic facilities in the
Island as they might regard as essential.
(2) Invited the Minister of Defence to prepare, for the purpose of the action to be
taken under Conclusion (1) above, a statement of essential strategic requirements
in Cyprus.
(3) Invited the Foreign Secretary to concert with the Greek and Turkish Foreign
Ministers appropriate arrangements for the detailed examination of the
administrative issues which would need to be resolved before the Republic of
Cyprus could come into being.
(4) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary, in consultation with the Foreign
Secretary, to consider the wording of a possible public statement about the
association between the future Republic of Cyprus and the Commonwealth.
(5) Invited the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to arrange for appropriate
guidance to be given to the Press on the lines indicated in their discussion.
(6) Invited the Home Secretary to consider whether it would be desirable for
arrangements to be made to enable Cyprus to be discussed during the
Parliamentary debate on foreign affairs in the following week.
237 CO 926/928 4–8 June 1959
[Assessing the handling of Archbishop Makarios]: CO minutes by J D
Higham, Sir J Martin, Mr Amery and Lord Perth
. . . I think . . . Sir John Martin should see the letter at (456), which is in reply to
mine at (453). This tends to confirm the feeling I have had ever since Makarios
failed to appoint a Left Wing Minister and was apparently compelled by Eoka pres-
sure to change the whole complexion of his Cabinet. Makarios’s more recent failure
to condemn the Ayios Ambroios murder; the Dervis attacks on the whole settle-
ment, on the Greek Government, on municipal separation in particular; and the
intervention of Grivas, confirm my feeling that Makarios is not an effective leader,
and that in the last resort, whatever his good intentions, he may be unable to con-
trol his public and in the long run will be faced with the alternative of going along
with his extremist Right Wing and becoming their puppet, or of getting out while
the going is good. . . .
4. When I was in Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot told me that he was convinced of
Makarios’s sincerity in operating the transition from colonial to Agreement rule. He
said that Makarios never at any time questioned the Governor’s ultimate authority
and was not attempting to take the line so common in situations of this kind that the
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days of British power were numbered and that it was the new rulers who were
masters even during the transitional period. The Governor had the impression that
Makarios who had for so many years been surrounded by bad advisers who were in
large measure responsible for his short-sighted and even nefarious actions, was
positively eager to discuss his policies and opinions with someone whom he felt to be
his interested adviser. I think there is probably a great deal in this view, but while the
Governor’s influence is bound to do some good, Makarios is not sufficiently a
dynamic leader to prevent him following the course which the most powerful
elements in his following urge on him. . . .
J.D.H.
4.6.59
Since his return to Cyprus the Archbishop has been much better in his dealings with
us as representative of the Greek-Cypriots than we could have dared to hope in the
light of previous experience. But he is riding a tiger and he is still the same person
who wrote to the Archbishop of Canterbury in 1955—“I am sincerely afraid that an
official condemnation of events by myself would not find at the present stage the
necessary response, but would involve the risk of exposing me rather unprofitably.”
It does not follow that we should try to bolster him up by “making concessions” to
ease his path as a leader who follows, but it would be disastrous if he were displaced
by the wild men and it is obviously necessary not to make his position impossibly
difficult e.g. by pitching our demands for military rights too high. Where there is a
dispute we have an appeal to the authors of the Zürich Agreement, on whose good
faith we can rely, but even they cannot enforce anything going beyond what public
opinion in Cyprus can be brought to swallow.
J.M.M.
5.6.59
It is probably our interest to cooperate with Makarios and to make his path as easy as
we can afford to. But:
(a) the London agreements represented the maximum possible concessions to
Greek Cypriot opinion which we can afford to make, if Cyprus is to be of real use to
us. There is no room for further concessions of substance.
(b) If Makarios is a weak leader and the prisoner of EOKA, it will in any case be no
use making concessions to him. He will not be in a position to deliver the goods.
2. The Governor inclines to a gloomy view of the future. If he is right, the first
principle of our policy now, as in the emergency, must be to keep in with the Turks—
both in Turkey and in the island.
3. Meanwhile we should press on with (a) tabling our demands as to sovereign
enclaves and other military requirements and (b) deciding and announcing what
financial aid we can expect to give to Cyprus.
4. We have already waited overlong in tabling our military demands and the
going will tend to grow stiffer the longer we delay. The announcement of what we
have to give should be presumably be timed to soften the impact of what we have to
ask.
J.A.
8.6.59
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I agree Mr Amery’s minute; of course 3(a) & (b) need careful handling; (a) must be
reasonable to the Turkish (& Greek?) Govt; (b) announcement of financial help may
need to be in two parts, one soon one later.1
P.
8.6.59
1 Mr Lennox-Boyd minuted: ‘I agree A.L-B. 10.6.59’
238 CAB 128/34, CC 3(60)2 26 Jan 1960
[Report on the course of negotiations with the Cypriot
representatives]: Cabinet conclusions
The Foreign Secretary made a report to the Cabinet about the course of the
negotiations with the Cypriot representatives. The exact details of the United
Kingdom’s requirements for the proposed sovereign areas had not yet been disclosed
to them, though the Greek and Turkish Governments knew what our final position
would be. Considerable progress had been made in the negotiations about sites and
facilities, though certain points regarding training facilities, the control of Nicosia
airfield, and the use of air space over Cyprus remained to be settled. The Cypriot
representatives had been provided with a statement of our intention to permit or
invite the authorities of the Republic to operate certain local administrative services
in the sovereign areas; it was understood that this would not derogate from the
principle of United Kingdom sovereignty in these areas, but he proposed to seek the
confirmation of the Lord Chancellor on this point. Negotiations had also continued
about a number of miscellaneous financial provisions, and he would seek to
safeguard the position on all of these in reaching a final settlement. As regards
financial assistance, the Cypriots had asked for a substantial but unspecified
immediate capital grant, together with an annual grant of £3 millions in return for
the retention of the sovereign areas and the use of sites and facilities in the Republic.
In view of the importance of securing a satisfactory settlement, he thought it
would be advisable to increase the amount of financial assistance which we had
hitherto been prepared to afford. The offer that had been made of Commonwealth
assistance loans of £5–£6 millions for specific projects was not particularly attractive
to the Cypriot representatives. While it would be best to leave this offer open, it
would be necessary, in order to reach a settlement, to be prepared to make available a
total grant of £8 millions, or even £10 millions in the last resort. The extent to which
the Cypriot authorities could draw on this grant year by year could be restricted. A
sum of £3 millions for the first year might be appropriate, but this should include
£500,000 to be paid specifically to the Turkish Cypriot authorities, who had benefited
less than the Greek Cypriots in the division of certain assets.
He proposed, if possible, to make clear to Archbishop Makarios what the final
United Kingdom position was on all the above matters, including the amount of
financial assistance, before the Archbishop returned to Cyprus, as he planned to do
on the following day. That would allow the Archbishop about a week in which to
reply, since the Bill to provide for the establishment of an independent Republic of
Cyprus on 19th March would have to be published on about 4th February.
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The Chancellor of the Exchequer1 said that it was extremely difficult to
contemplate financial assistance on the scale now suggested, especially if this was to
be in addition to the loan assistance which had already been offered. There was no
economic justification for any assistance by way of grant, and it would be an
undesirable precedent to link assistance to the provision of defence facilities. It
would hardly be possible, in view of the Estimates position, to accommodate this
expenditure in the financial year 1960–61. If any payment by way of grant had to be
made, it would be preferable for a large proportion of it to be paid before the end of
the current financial year. It was also essential that any continuing payment should
taper off over the next few years, and it might be necessary to insist on a longer
period than five years. He was, however, unable to decide what assistance could be
afforded without further consideration.
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) Financial assistance on the scale now suggested would be an embarrassing
precedent in future negotiations with colonial territories whose case for assistance
might be more deserving. On the other hand, the circumstances of the Cyprus
settlement were peculiar, and the defence facilities which we would enjoy were
extensive and valuable.
(b) It was suggested that, if financial assistance were made available in return for
the defence facilities, it would not be realistic to expect the assistance to be
terminated after a few years. On the other hand, that might be the time when
Commonwealth assistance loans would become of value to the Cypriot authorities.
The Home Secretary2 summing up, said that a satisfactory settlement was of the
highest importance, not only for political reasons, but in the interests of
international relations and world peace. Despite the financial difficulties, the Cabinet
hoped that, if it was necessary in order to reach a settlement which safeguarded our
essential interests, some additional financial assistance might be possible, even if this
meant curtailing other expenditure. On the other hand, it was difficult to
accommodate additional expenditure in the next financial year. It would therefore be
necessary for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Foreign
Secretary, to consider to what extent and by what means the need to provide
additional financial assistance for Cyprus could be met.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Foreign
Secretary, to consider to what extent and by what means the need to provide
additional financial assistance for Cyprus could be met.
1 Mr D Heathcoat Armory. 2 Mr R A Butler.
239 CAB 128/34, CC 38(60)3 30 June 1960
[Cyprus: negotiations and provision of general aid]: Cabinet
conclusions
The Cabinet were informed that, if the necessary legislation was to be enacted before
the summer recess, the negotiations in Cyprus must be brought to a final settlement
within the next few days. The only major issue now outstanding was the amount of
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financial aid to Cyprus. The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies
had already offered £10 millions, spread over five years, by way of general aid to the
new Republic, plus a grant of £1 million for the Turkish Cypriots; and he had been
authorised to offer a further payment of £1⁄2 million for Nicosia airfield. Archbishop
Makarios was demanding £16 millions for general aid plus a total of £3.44 millions
comprising the grant to the Turkish Cypriots, the payments for Nicosia airfield, the
rehousing of such of the inhabitants of Akrotiri as wished to leave the village and the
construction of a by-pass road. In order to achieve a settlement, the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State now sought authority to offer a general grant of £13
millions (including, if possible, £1⁄2 million for Nicosia airport and £11⁄2 millions for
the Turkish Cypriots) plus specific payments amounting to £ .84 million—a total of
£13.84 millions or, if the grants for the Turkish Cypriots and Nicosia airfield could
not be included within the general grant, £15.84 millions.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he had always regarded the retention of
military bases in Cyprus as more of a strategic liability than an asset; and he was
sorry that we had got ourselves into a position in which we were exposed to the
pressures which Archbishop Makarios was now applying. He recognised that at this
stage a settlement must be reached. But the figures now under discussion were
alarming; and he felt obliged to express his disquiet at the tendency for countries
attaining independence to expect continuing financial support from the United
Kingdom.
The Colonial Secretary said that the grants now envisaged for Cyprus were out of
scale with the level of assistance which we should be likely to give to other dependent
territories which were more deserving of assistance. They could not fail to embarrass
him in dealing with pending applications from Kenya, Singapore and Mauritius.
In discussion it was generally agreed that this opportunity of achieving a
settlement in Cyprus must not be missed. We could not accept either of the
alternatives—to continue to govern the Island, with the risk of renewed violence on
a large scale, or to withdraw from it altogether. The problem of Cyprus was more
international than Colonial: the objective of our policy in Cyprus over the last few
years had been to avoid war in the Eastern Mediterranean. This distinguished Cyprus
from other Colonial territories nearing independence. Even so, it was important that
the price which we paid for a settlement should be no higher than was absolutely
necessary.
In discussion of the tactics to be followed in the negotiations, a number of
alternatives were considered. It was finally agreed that the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State should be authorised to offer £12 millions spread over five years by
way of general aid and that he should try to secure agreement that this figure should
include the grant of £11⁄2 millions to the Turkish Cypriots and the payment of £1⁄2
million for Nicosia airfield. He might offer in addition specific payments amounting
to £ .84 million. If he could not achieve a settlement at this figure, he could improve
his offer up to a limit of £14.84 millions, but he should not go beyond that figure
without seeking further instructions.
The Cabinet:—
Invited the Foreign Secretary, in consultation with the Colonial Secretary and the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, to draw up instructions for the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for the Colonies on the conduct of further negotiations on the
amount of financial aid to Cyprus on the lines approved in their discussion.
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240 CAB 128/34, CC 47(60)6 28 July 1960
[Cyprus: membership of the Commonwealth]: Cabinet conclusions1
The Cabinet were informed that the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities in
Cyprus had now indicated their agreed desire that the Republic of Cyprus should become
a member of the Commonwealth. They had asked that the United Kingdom Government
should ascertain informally whether the other members of the Commonwealth were
likely to look favourably on an application from Cyprus for Commonwealth member-
ship. It was known that some of the member Governments might question whether
Cyprus could properly be considered to be fully independent, in view of her special rela-
tions with Greece and Turkey; and it would be desirable on that account that the new
Republic should first apply for membership of the United Nations, so that its interna-
tional status would have been determined by an independent body before its applica-
tion for Commonwealth membership was formally considered.
Discussion showed that there was general agreement in the Cabinet that it would be
preferable that Cyprus should apply for membership of the United Nations before sub-
mitting a formal application for membership of the Commonwealth. There was also
general agreement in the Cabinet that, once Cyprus had become a member of the United
Nations, the member countries of the Commonwealth would find it difficult to oppose
her application for Commonwealth membership. So far as the United Kingdom
Government was concerned, a decision by an independent Cyprus to remain within the
Commonwealth would be a final vindication of the Government’s recent policy in respect
of Cyprus. For this reason it was likely that a majority of Government supporters in
Parliament would favour the admission of Cyprus to Commonwealth membership—
though there would be some who would see disadvantage in this course, and there was
some risk of an open division of opinion among Government supporters on this issue.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Invited the Colonial Secretary to suggest to the Cypriot leaders that, after
independence, they should first apply for membership of the United Nations before
submitting any formal application for Commonwealth membership; but
authorised him to add that, in the meantime, the United Kingdom Government
would make informal enquiries to ascertain what attitude other member
Governments of the Commonwealth were likely to take towards an application by
Cyprus for Commonwealth membership.
(2) Authorised the Commonwealth Secretary to take informal soundings among
other Commonwealth Governments as contemplated in Conclusion (1) above.
1 See also on this issue, document no 532 (27 Apr 1960), in Part II.
241 PREM 11/4139, M 44B/63 27 Dec 1963
[Cyprus: is partition the only solution?]: minute by Sir Alec Douglas-
Home
Commonwealth Secretary
I have been thinking about the future of Cyprus and our role there. It looks to me as
though the present Constitution is proving unworkable. It is just possible that
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Makarios is so frightened that he will agree to work the Constitution as it is but I
doubt it. The Turks cannot agree to change because any alteration would put their
minority at a disadvantage.
It seems likely then that any Constitutional Conference will end in deadlock and
that the only possible solution will be partition.
If things turn out that way there will be no need for Guarantors and our presence
in the Island for any reason other than our own military convenience would be
superfluous.
What are our military needs? I suppose that the main one is to enable the
Canberras to cover Iran in the event of nuclear attack by Russia or as possibly a
staging post to the Near or Middle East. They seem rather thin.
I should like to see this re-examined urgently by the Chiefs of Staff. I should value
your thoughts.
242 CAB 128/31/1, CC 38(57)7 6 May 1957
[Malta: future policy]: Cabinet conclusions
[The prime minister of Malta, Mr Dom[inic] Mintoff, leader of the Maltese Labour Party,
was unco-operative in negotiations over the economic future, and Lennox–Boyd
suggested consideration of a phased integration of Malta with the UK (C(57)98), to which
Mintoff was not averse in principle. At a Cabinet meeting on 17 Apr 1957, the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, said it ‘would be unwise to reject any opportunity of
encouraging a dependent territory to seek to develop a closer relationship with the United
Kingdom’, and the idea was carefully examined (CAB 128/31/1, CC 35(57)6). The Maltese
themselves in a referendum held in Feb 1956 had voted 76% for integration with Britain
and representation at Westminster, but the turn-out was only 44%. Negotiations broke
down in Mar 1958, both the governing Labour Party and the Opposition party, led by Dr
Borg Olivier, demanding independence.]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (57) 113)
about the basis on which constitutional negotiations with the Maltese Government
should be resumed, together with a memorandum by the Minister of Defence, (C.
(57) 114) summarising his discussion of defence economies with the Maltese Prime
Minister during his recent visit to Malta.
The Colonial Secretary said that, if the Maltese Government were not prepared to
accept the offer of constitutional and economic development which we had made
during the recent negotiations, the suggestion that the political and economic
aspects of integration should be explored in successive stages was preferable to either
of the alternative courses which now appeared to be open to us, i.e., to rest on the
present dyarchy or to abandon integration and to allow Malta to become independent
subject to the conclusion of a defence agreement with the United Kingdom. On this
assumption we should now offer the Maltese Government a choice between, on the
one hand, the proposals for integration which we had put forward during the recent
negotiations and, on the other hand, interim arrangements designed to cover a
period of five years, at the end of which the two Governments would give further
consideration to the future of Malta. These arrangements would re-incorporate the
constitutional proposals which we had already put forward, subject to the exclusion
of Maltese representation at Westminster but with the possible additional concession
that Malta should be regarded as one of the British Isles which did not enjoy
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representation in the United Kingdom Parliament. They would also renew in
substance the economic proposals which we had already made, although we should
need to define with caution the extent to which we should be prepared to provide
financial assistance in the event of severe unemployment developing in Malta as a
result of the defence economies.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) The Maltese Government would show themselves unmindful of their own
interests if, after their recent discussion with the Minister of Defence about the
impact of the defence economies on Malta, they did not accept our offer of
integration with the United Kingdom.
(b) On the other hand, we should not sacrifice the benefits to be gained from the
defence economies by undertaking extensive commitments in relief of
unemployment in Malta or by diverting to Malta defence work which could more
economically be carried out in United Kingdom establishments. It was important
that the Maltese Government should clearly understand that we intended to
implement the economies which we had announced, and that, although we would
co-operate with them in mitigating the effects as far as possible, we could not
undertake to guarantee that Malta should be wholly insulated from the
consequences.
(c) Nevertheless, if severe unemployment developed in Malta, we should be under a
strong moral obligation to assist the Island to deal with the social and economic
problems which would arise.
(d) Our new offer should be presented as a final effort to conclude discussions in
which we had already treated Malta with great generosity. It should not be allowed to
become the starting point of a new round of negotiations in which we should be
expected to make further concessions to Malta.
(e) The final agreement with the Maltese Government would be embodied in an
exchange of letters, the wording of which would need to be carefully considered by
the Malta Committee.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved, subject to the points made in their discussion, the proposals in C.
(57) 113.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to submit, for consideration by the Malta
Committee, the text of the exchange of letters in which the final agreement with
the Maltese Government would be embodied.
243 CAB 128/31/2, CC 43(57)9 29 May 1957
[Malta: negotiations about future constitutional and economic
development]: Cabinet conclusions1
The Cabinet were informed of recent developments in the negotiations with the
Maltese Government about the future constitutional and economic development of
Malta.
The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs2 said that the Maltese Government had
1 Previous reference: see previous document. 2 Lord Perth.
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 694
[243] MALTA 695
again rejected the proposals for integration and had described the suggested
alternative of interim arrangements covering the next five years as such a radical
departure from previous policy that they would need to consult the Maltese people
about them. They proposed therefore to publish, on 4th June, a White Paper on the
recent negotiations. The Malta Committee had recommended that an immediate
reply should be sent to the Maltese Government, expressing regret at their continued
rejection of the proposals for integration, denying that the alternative arrangements
represented any change in policy, and asking that publication of the Maltese White
Paper should be deferred in order that the United Kingdom Government could
prepare a White Paper for simultaneous publication in this country. The Governor of
Malta considered that the Prime Minister of Malta might now demand independence
for the Island, and that, in this event, he might obtain the support of the other local
political Parties.
In discussion it was agreed that, if the Maltese Government were not prepared to
postpone the publication of their White Paper, it would be necessary that the United
Kingdom White Paper should also be published on 4th June. It would therefore be
desirable to bring forward, to the following day, the meeting between the Prime
Minister and the Labour Party members of the former Round Table Conference on
Malta, in order to avoid any impression that the Government had reached a final
decision before these members had been consulted.
In further discussion it was suggested that the alternative offer which we had
made to the Maltese Government, involving substantial assistance from the United
Kingdom Exchequer during an interim period of five years, might be more readily
accepted by public opinion as a reasonable response to the Maltese demand for
“economic equivalence” if it was coupled with some definite action on our part to
foster the development of the Island and to increase the productivity of its industries.
We might therefore offer to appoint an eminent industrialist or a small expert
committee to encourage the establishment of new industries in Malta and to advise
and assist the Maltese Government in the economic expansion of Malta during the
interim period. This individual, or committee, could be asked to report on the
progress achieved at the end of the five years, so that the two Governments could
consider whether a reasonable degree of “economic equivalence” was practicable in
the event of integration. The terms of reference for this task would need, however, to
be carefully defined in order to preclude the Maltese Government from using the
enquiry merely to assess the amount of subsidy required by Malta in order to achieve
“equivalence” with the United Kingdom. An offer on these lines should be made
forthwith to the Maltese Government, and the proposal should either be mentioned,
if possible, in the forthcoming United Kingdom White Paper, or be announced as
rapidly as possible thereafter.
Strategically, Malta was no longer essential as a naval base, and the implications of
this fact could be made plain to the Maltese Government if they eventually declared a
policy of independence of the United Kingdom. It would be important, however, that
we should not allow the discussions with the Maltese Government to reach this point
until we had clearly demonstrated that we had taken every reasonable step to satisfy
their demands.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Invited the Colonial Secretary to arrange for a proposal on the lines agreed in
discussion to be put to the Maltese Government.
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(2) Invited the Lord Chancellor, in consultation with the Colonial Secretary, to
take account of the points raised in discussion in the preparation of the White
Paper to be published in this country on the recent negotiations with the Maltese
Government.
244 CO 967/337, PM(58)62 25 Nov 1958
[Record of a meeting with Mr Mintoff about Maltese independence]:
minute to Mr Macmillan by Mr Lennox-Boyd
I had a second meeting today with Mintoff and his delegation, at which I explained
why I could not consider his demand for immediate independence as a basis for
further discussion. I laid most emphasis on Malta’s heavy dependence on us for her
livelihood and on the disastrous economic consequences of a severance of her ties
with us. I purposely played down our defence interests, saying that in the
hypothetical circumstances of independence there would be no prospects of our
defence needs being adequately met in Malta and that it was highly unlikely in these
circumstances that NATO would remain there either. I concluded by saying that it
was apparent that, if H.M.G. were now to support a claim for complete independence,
they would be condemning the Maltese people to appalling poverty, mass
unemployment and the extremes of hardship. To do so would be completely contrary
to our declared policy and would be regarded by the world as an irresponsible
abnegation of our duties. Defence considerations apart, therefore, we saw no
alternative in present circumstances to the maintenance of the U.K. sovereignty over
Malta in the interests of the Maltese people themselves. I went on to say that we were
prepared, in addition to providing capital for the dockyard transfer, to continue to
give Malta substantial capital assistance and to encourage the development of new
industries; and that we were ready to introduce a constitution which would give
Malta the highest degree of self-government consistent with our defence
requirements and our obligations for the well-being and economic progress of the
Maltese people.
2. Mintoff argued about the extent of our defence interests and tried to get me to
say—which I refused to do—that we were turning down his demand for
independence because we needed Malta as a base. When he saw that I was determined
to leave him stuck with his own ridiculous demand, he tried to argue that, having
presented his proposals, he should now be given ours. He refused to be convinced
that his demand for immediate independence rendered useless any further
discussion of constitutional arrangements based on the need, as we saw it, for
continuing the present relationship between Malta and the U.K. Although I took the
opportunity to emphasise that the form of constitution we had had in mind was an
interim one and that it did not preclude independence some time in the future, if the
conditions necessary for it were satisfied, I refused to put any detailed proposals to
him and said firmly that there was no point in my doing so with his demand on the
table. Mintoff made no move towards withdrawing his demand and I avoided asking
him to do so. Instead I adjourned the meeting with the suggestion that he should
consider what I had said again when the minutes were available and that if after that
he wished to have a further meeting I should be very ready to see him again.
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3. I think it is clear that Mintoff’s demand for independence was an opening bid
which he did not expect us to accept but by which he hoped to raise the price against
us and to retain the initiative. Having then heard our proposals, he would measure
them against his own and, if he thought he could get away with it, reject them as
being unacceptable to the Maltese people. This afternoon he was obviously jockeying
to get us into that position. I think we successfully prevented him from doing so.
4. Although none of his delegation spoke up against him, some seemed uneasy
and worried, especially the members of the General Workers Union who are over
here for separate talks with the Admiralty and whom I agreed he might include in his
delegation. The impression I was left with when the meeting adjourned was that
Mintoff will not, as he threatened to, consider the Conference at an end but will ask
for a further meeting. With this in mind I offered a discussion on the dockyard. We
cannot, however, exclude the possibility that he will break off the talks and publish
his own version of his reasons for doing so. I shall be ready with a statement of our
case against that eventuality. It would, I think, stand up well to criticism in the press
or in Parliament.
245 CO 926/797, no 17 [26]Sept–30 Oct 1959
[Malta: the dilemmas of attempting to restore elective government]:
CO minutes by N B J Huijsman, J O Moreton, and E Melville
[Mintoff resigned as prime minister in Mar 1958 to lead the Malta Liberation Movement.
Protest led to the suspension of the constitution in 1959, and assumption of direct rule,
after the Leader of the Opposition, Dr Borg Olivier, refused to form a caretaker
government.]
. . . as I assume that [a restoration of elected government to Malta] would probably
involve an advance beyond 1947,1 I take it that it would not be very much out of place
to look at the Maltese constitutional problem in terms of what our ultimate aims
should be. . . .
3. I have hesitated to put forward any specific nostrum because it seems to me to
be rather early days for such an exercise. Furthermore, I doubt whether my
suggestions would be of much value, or would be unbiassed. My only close contact
with Malta and the Maltese has, I am afraid, led me to appreciate the delicate irony
rather than the generosity of His late Majesty’s gift to the Islands;2 it follows that my
own hope is that integration will not be revived. The difference between the two
peoples, and the distance between them are too great for anything but the loosest
link between them to be desirable, or, I think, practicable. We tend to underestimate
the differences between the Maltese and ourselves, in our desire to give the Maltese a
square deal. Malta’s superficially European characteristics are the work of the
Catholic Church, whose great triumph has been to impose on the Maltese an
European code of morality and behaviour. With the increasing secularisation of
Maltese life however—which our development, T.V., and other plans will do much to
hasten—the moral discipline of the Catholic Church will increasingly tend to be
1 The self-governing constitution of 1947 provided for a unicameral legislature elected by proportional
representation. Defence, civil aviation, currency, immigration and nationality were all reserved to the
governor acting for the British government. 2 ie, the George Cross for civilian bravery in war.
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ignored and the Maltese Urgeist (hitherto only displayed in full flower by Mr Mintoff
and several of his associates) will, I fear, tend to regain the upper hand.
4. Leaving aside personal antipathies, I doubt whether integration would in the
long run be any more successful than any other constitutional arrangement not
giving the Maltese 100% of what they want—i.e. complete control over their
destinies, preferably with someone else footing the bill. The cultivated classes in
Malta may deplore the idea of sovereign independence, but in the century of the mass
vote they do not count. It is the aspirations of the thousands of Maltese men in the
street which will determine the future attitude of the Maltese people, and it would be
a mistake to assume that they are any more immune than other Arabs to
nationalism. We cannot count on an identity of views between them and the United
Kingdom on the latter’s defence rights in Malta, nor should we delude ourselves into
thinking that there is a fundamental affection for the British connection among the
Maltese clerks and artisans; the noted Maltese loyalty to the Crown has a certain
element of cupboard love in it. For these reasons I feel that any future constitutional
arrangements which do not hold out the prospect of full sovereignty within the
foreseeable future will eventually break down, not because Mr Mintoff and his like
cannot be trusted to work such arrangements, but because Mr Mintoff and his
associates represent the broad aspirations of the Maltese people and will continue to
be put into office to realise them. In other words Mr Mintoff is only a political
problem because he has the backing of the Maltese masses.
N.B.J.H.
[26].9.59
. . . 2. The basic thought underlying Mr. Huijsman’s thesis is that full sovereignty
has always been the aim of the Maltese and that nothing less will work. Against this
background he examines possible solutions, but it is axiomatic that since all of them,
in order to meet our defence requirements, fall short of full independence, none of
them can be regarded as fully satisfactory. As a preliminary, a reversion to dyarchy is
ruled out as leading to too much friction; and so also is the physical separation of
local and imperial interests in enclaves as being impracticable. The remaining
choices involve in the final analysis the subordination of Maltese to imperial defence
interests. Advanced colonial status is thought to be unacceptable to the Maltese since
it can only be expected to work as a stepping stone to full independence, which would
not be the case in Malta. Commonwealth Statehood, with a local representative of
H.M.G. responsible for dealing with the Malta Government on matters reserved to
H.M.G., is not ruled out. Independence within or without the Commonwealth with a
defence and foreign affairs agreement, has attractions provided it can be squared
with our defence needs. Lastly, some form of closer association with the U.K. would,
if complete, be unlikely to satisfy Maltese aspirations when seen in the historical
perspective of their need to assert a Maltese personality; and if something less than
this, would remain a continuing source of friction.
3. Since Mr. Hammer’s minute of the 2nd March on this file, the Working Party
of officials has, as you will know, prepared a report for the Colonial Policy Committee
on the future of the smaller colonial territories (CPC(59)7).3 I have placed opposite a
note summarising the concept of Commonwealth Statehood advocated in the paper.
3 See document no 563, in Part II.
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The Working Party were, however, doubtful about its suitability for Malta, since it
offered little more than the 1947 Constitution, and its attraction in Maltese eyes
would be lessened through its being of general applicability to other territories, in
particular African ones. The report has not yet been considered by Ministers and
clearly their decisions on it will have the closest bearing on future constitutional
proposals for Malta.
4. The reading I have so far done tends to confirm Mr. Huijsman’s thesis that the
Maltese have all along been consistent in their aim to achieve full sovereignty. I am,
however, bound to point out that over the space of many hundreds of years they have
not succeeded in doing a great deal about it. The fact remains that we are in a clear
dilemma. Last December Ministers accepted the Ministry of Defence recommen-
dation that our defence interests in Malta could not be safeguarded by an agreement
with an independent Malta, with the consequence that within the foreseeable future
external defence must be reserved to H.M.G. in the Constitution. But so long as there
is this limitation on full Maltese sovereignty, whatever constitutional devices are
dreamed up, there can be nothing but uneasiness and friction. (I have placed
opposite the text of the Secretary of State’s statement to the Malta Constitutional
Conference last December, which is the latest authoritative edict on Malta’s future
and our defence requirements).
5. I am forced to the view that it is very difficult to see how we could get Maltese
political parties to accept any constitutional proposals which would meet our defence
needs, especially if we were to insist as well—as we did last December—on retaining
safeguards for the police and public service. But if this is so, one is compelled to ask
how long it will be possible to sustain direct rule. It is after all like keeping a cork in
a bottle while all the time pressures are generating inside it, and the longer one waits
the greater those pressures become. The time may thus well come when our
insistence on defence needs being met by full sovereignty will be self-defeating. If the
Maltese are united against us and there are strikes and riots with universal support
for Mr. Mintoff, the strategic value of the island will be lost.
6. I would draw two provisional conclusions from all this.
(a) We must keep a very sensitive finger on the political pulse in Malta and watch
closely for any danger signals showing the alienation of the moderates or a
significant increase in support for Mr. Mintoff; and also for any hint of fuller co-
operation in the sort of Constitution we are aiming at from other parties.
(b) We should keep under constant review exactly what our defence needs are in
the Island and whether they must be equated with full sovereignty. If changes in
defence policy and the world situation would enable us to rely on a defence
agreement with an independent Malta, possibly linked with financial support, that
might well prove to be the answer.
7. Like Mr. Huijsman, I have not discussed how we should reach any of these
goals—i.e. the mechanics of switching from direct rule to representative
government. I should like to give further thought to this and to the preparation of a
paper for Ministers, putting up more positive recommendations on our
constitutional aims, after I have been to Malta and had the chance of discussing all
this with the Governor and his advisers on the spot.
J.O.M.
19.10.59
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. . . The dilemma, for H.M.G., is clear. If—as I think we must assume—we still have a
strategic need for Malta as a base (not a base in Malta), then we cannot risk
negotiations on independence—at any rate without safeguards which, if they are to
be effective, will be regarded by the Maltese politicians who count as intolerable
restrictions on their independence. In this connection I see no future in the concept
of a defence treaty relationship on the lines discussed in Mr. Huijsman’s paper. We
should, under Mintoff at any rate, subject ourselves thereby to constant blackmail of
an even more dangerous kind than we experienced in the integration talks. On the
other hand, as Mr. Huijsman’s paper shows, there is little prospect of getting
agreement of either of the main Maltese parties in any constitutional arrangement,
short of independence, which would give us the necessary security in Malta as a base,
far less fulfil the “fair play” undertakings to which we are, morally at least,
committed (control of police, civil service and broadcasting through some authority
independent of Maltese political pressures).
But, if the dilemma is clear, the way out is not. Indeed it is hard to see how we
could get talks started again, even if we wanted that, without giving way on some
principle or principles which seem to us to be vital.
My own view, at the moment, is that we should “soldier on” for a bit longer. I do
not believe that we can gain much credit by doing so, in the economic or in any
other field; but I don’t believe that we must necessarily lose ground or that, beneath
the surface, serious disruptive movements are being encouraged. The truth is, I
think, that at least half the politically active population—and much more than half
of the thinking people—are grateful for this respite from political strife, backbiting
and undemocratic pressures from within the Government. They cannot, and will not,
give up the aspiration of self-government—possibly independence—with financial
aid from outside. But they are prepared to dream about that for a bit longer, freed
from the bickerings, the responsibilities and the uncertainties which constitutional
self-government has always brought them.
If this view is right, it does not, of course, mean that we should sit back smugly and
let events take their course. We must, as Mr. Moreton says, keep our finger on the pulse
so as to be ready to seize and maintain any new initiative that becomes possible. But I
do not see that we can gain much by an over-elaboration now of possible alternative
courses of action in circumstances which we might judge to be favourable for a new
initiative. When the moment is opportune, we shall know within fairly precise limits
what choices are open to us and will be able to decide, in the light of the circumstances
at the time, on the tactics we should adopt with the local political parties.
E.M.
26.10.59
[This] was discussed at a meeting in Sir J. Martin’s room yesterday. Mr Melville, Mr
Vile, Mr Moreton, Mr Downie and myself attended.
The discussion confirmed that for the present the defence interest—which is an
UK and not primarily a NATO interest—in Malta must continue to govern HMG’s
policy towards Malta. Under these circumstances the prospects of agreement
between the Maltese political parties and HMG seems remote. Furthermore, the
development of Maltese political ambitions suggests that we cannot, as on previous
occasions, count on the device of a Maltese National Assembly both to gain time and
to provide HMG with an acceptable, or at any rate discussable draft constitution.
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The meeting agreed that perhaps it would be best to allow the interim constitution
to operate for some time longer so as to enable the practical reforms in Malta to be
prosecuted, and UK policy, especially in the defence field, to develop, but to keep a
close watch on Maltese public opinion.
N.B.J.H.
30.10.59
246 PREM 11/3870 8 Feb 1961
[Defence interests in Malta and the report of the Constitutional
Commission (chairman, Sir H Blood)1: minute by Mr Macleod to Mr
Watkinson (MoD)
Our officials and the Chiefs of Staff have been discussing the Report of the Malta
Constitutional Commission and I am now circulating my recommendations to the
Cabinet, but it may help if I give you in more detail my views on some questions
relating to our defence interests.
2. I understand that the Chiefs of Staff have grave misgivings as to whether the
kind of constitution the Blood Commission has recommended would adequately
safeguard our defence requirements in Malta. I am under no illusions as to the
difficulty of working any constitution in Malta; but we must make a move forward
and it seems to me that the Blood Commission has done a good job in producing,
within fairly tight terms of reference, proposals, which stand a chance of bringing
about elections. I have no doubt that we shall be in for a trying time in dealing, on
defence as on other matters, with whatever Maltese Government takes office and that
we shall have to exercise a full measure of vigilance and patience to preserve a
tolerable relationship. But I do not share the concern of the Chiefs of Staff that a
constitution based upon the Commission’s proposals would not adequately meet our
essential military requirements.
3. As for the future, I am well aware of your views that our defence requirements
can only be met by retaining sovereignty. I consider however, that I must say
something now to make it clear that ultimate self-determination is not excluded and
indeed hold out some hope of advancement, conditional upon satisfactory operation
of the Blood Constitution. I think the proposed form of words in Annex ‘B’ of the
Cabinet paper is the minimum that I can say to make any effect at all in Malta.2
4. The proposal that the United Kingdom and Malta should have concurrent
jurisdiction in matters of defence is, from the point of view of presentation, the
lynch-pin of our case. But the abolition of “reserved matters” over which (as in the
1947 Constitution) the Maltese have no jurisdiction should not, in my view and that
of the Governor, result in any less effective U.K. control in the defence field. The
responsibility for defence will remain firmly with the U.K. The interpretation of
1 Sir H R R Blood, governor of Mauritius, 1949–1954; constitutional commissioner for British Honduras,
1959, Zanzibar, 1960, and Malta, 1960—for which he recommended internal self-government.
2 ‘It is of course no part of Her Majesty’s Government’s policy to deny to the Maltese people the right to
determine for themselves their own destiny in association we hope with the United Kingdom and the
Commonwealth family. But the immediate aim must be the restoration of elections and a substantial
measure of self-government’.
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“defence” will rest with us alone—this is in fact an advance on the 1947 position
from the defence point of view. The Head of State will be required to reserve for
approval in London any Bills affecting or appearing to us to affect the discharge of
our defence responsibilities. Further, the fact that the Maltese Parliament will have
competence to legislate over the defence field will help to reduce the area of friction
between H.M.G. and the Maltese Government to matters which are actually in
dispute. The arrangement whereby the U.K. Commissioner will have both legislative
and executive powers overriding those of the Maltese Government is different in
form, but not in substance, from the Singapore arrangement, where, you will recall,
the local Legislature alone is competent to legislate on defence matters. (There is no
machinery of concurrent legislation in Singapore and our long-stop control is
suspension of the Constitution).
5. I have asked the Governor whether he considers that the U.K. Commissioner
is likely to find himself unable to get his decisions implemented owing to the
difficulty of getting the Maltese civil service and police to conform. His view is that
the U.K. Commissioner will be in no worse position than the Governor under the old
diarchy. Indeed, in so far as the provisions for an independent Public Service
Commission and for taking ultimate control of the Police out of the hands of Maltese
Ministers encourage the public service to resist improper pressures from local
Ministers, the Commissioner should be in a stronger position than previous
Governors.
6. As in Singapore, internal security will be the responsibility of local Ministers;
but there will be no ‘Internal Security Council’ procedure. In Malta there is not, of
course, the same problem of subversion as in Singapore, nor is there a third party
who could take on the role of the Federation of Malaya in an Internal Security
Council. Especially so long as a non-Maltese Head of State retains ultimate
responsibility for the police, the U.K. Commissioner’s power to intervene by
legislation and executive action in internal security matters affecting our defence
interests will give us in practice in many ways a stronger position in Malta than we
have in Singapore in relation to internal security.
7. One point that has been raised is that our right under a new constitution to
occupy, acquire and use defence facilities (including new land acquisition) should be
placed beyond doubt in the constitution. It is certainly my intention that this should
be done in terms similar to those used in the case of Singapore.
8. Concern was also expressed that there should be provision in the new
constitution whereby Maltese civil legislation adversely affecting our defence
interests should not be binding on the Crown in the right of the United Kingdom or
on Visiting Forces. I quite see the need for some such safeguard but I am not satisfied
that the various alternatives discussed by officials would be satisfactory and I should
like more time to consider the best way of solving this problem.
9. One of the points not covered by the Constitutional Commission concerns the
calling out of troops in aid of the Civil Power or for the protection of defence
installations, and their being safeguarded against the consequences of actions
performed in the course of duty. This is not the sort of matter which is normally dealt
with in a constitution, but I see the need for an agreed procedure. It seems to me,
given the general similarity between the Singapore Constitution and the proposals
drawn up by the Constitutional Commission for Malta, that there is no reason why
the procedure evolved for Singapore should not, with such local modification as may
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 702
[247] MALTA 703
be necessary to adapt it to Maltese circumstances, apply in Malta. I understand that
this should meet your requirements.
10. I am of course aware of the importance of ensuring that the privileges and
immunities which we are bound under International Agreement to accord to Visiting
Forces, e.g. N.A.T.O., are made available. There have in the past been difficulties over
this and I cannot pretend that there will not be difficulties in future. But we shall
have the right to secure the status of Visiting Forces by legislation and executive
action.
11. As regards privileges for N.A.A.F.I. and kindred organisations, we shall, of
course, have the constitutional right to claim that their needs are defence needs. But,
as you know, this is a question on which strong feelings can be aroused in Malta (as
elsewhere) of which we shall have to take account. I could not, therefore, give a
blanket assurance that the requirements of the Service Departments will
automatically be met.
12. I hope that these comments and assurances will enable you to endorse the
line of action I am recommending in my Cabinet paper. . . .
247 CAB 131/25, D 4(61)4 17 Feb 1961
[Constitutional changes in Malta]: minutes of Cabinet Defence
Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Minister of Defence (D. (61)
15) commenting on the implications for defence policy of the proposals for
constitutional development in Malta contained in a memorandum by the Colonial
Secretary (C.P.C. (61) 3).
The Minister of Defence1 said that, as a result of the discussion which had
previously taken place in the Colonial Policy Committee about the proposals for
constitutional development in Malta, it had now been agreed that the Governor of
Malta (whom it was proposed to call the Head of State) should not be a Maltese as
long as this seemed desirable in our defence interests. This would meet to a
considerable extent the apprehensions that were felt by the Service Ministers and the
Chiefs of Staff about the effect of the proposed constitutional changes on our ability
to fulfil our defence responsibilities in the Mediterranean. It would, however, also be
essential that the Governor, while continuing to be non-Maltese, should retain
control of the police, and that such control should not be progressively delegated to
Maltese Ministers, as had been proposed by the Blood Commission. Without this
arrangement we should not have the power to enforce our defence needs. In addition
to this overriding requirement, there were a number of subsidiary constitutional
requirements, in our defence interests, which it was thought could be met; these
were set out in the Annex to D. (61) 15.
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) While overriding power as regards defence and foreign affairs would remain
with the United Kingdom, the Blood Commission proposed that the Maltese
Legislature and Government would have concurrent powers in these fields. The
1 Mr H. Watkinson.
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Foreign Secretary2 suggested that this arrangement would be bound to lead to
continual friction, and that it would be more satisfactory if foreign affairs, and
perhaps defence, were entirely reserved to the United Kingdom Government.
(b) It was suggested that the relationship of the United Kingdom Commissioner to
the Governor, even while the latter remained a non-Maltese, would be bound to lead
to difficulty. The introduction of a United Kingdom Commissioner would make it
more difficult to justify retaining the governorship to a non-Maltese, and the control
which would be exercised over Maltese legislation which affected defence and foreign
affairs would be more objectionable if exercised by a United Kingdom Commissioner
and not by the Governor. The appointment of a United Kingdom Commissioner, in
addition to a Governor, might therefore accelerate constitutional development in a
way which would probably be inimical to our defence interests.
(c) The Chief of the Imperial General Staff 3 explained that it was the fear that
pressure for further constitutional development might prove irresistible, and the
virtual certainty that Mr. Mintoff would reassume office, that underlay the anxieties
that had been expressed on the score of defence. The value of Malta from the defence
point of view would disappear if it became progressively more difficult for the
Services to take advantage of the facilities in Malta. If this was likely to happen, it
might even be preferable to abandon Malta as a base. But to do so would undoubtedly
be a severe shock to the structure of our defence arrangements in the Mediterranean.
It might therefore be preferable to refrain from any constitutional development in
Malta at the present time which might impair our use of the island for defence
purposes; even if this led to disturbances, the situation would be capable of easier
control than the similar situation which had arisen in Cyprus.
The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs4 said that in addition to a firm
understanding that the Governor would continue to be a non-Maltese, it would be
understood that the control of the police would not be taken from the Governor
without the concurrence of the Minister of Defence. It could not be denied that there
would be internal security problems in Malta, especially when Mr. Mintoff reassumed
power. But the fact was that if, following the Blood Commission’s report, all
constitutional development were denied, the sympathies of all parties in Malta would
be alienated. On the other hand there was considerable latent goodwill towards us
among certain sections of the population, which might find more open expression if
some constitutional progress could be made. The proposals were designed to begin to
give the Maltese some share in government, while safeguarding our essential
interests, including defence. Ultimately, the only alternatives to an indefinite
continuation of the present constitutional arrangements for Malta were integration
with the United Kingdom, which had not so far been found practicable, or
independence.
The Prime Minister said that, apart from the question that had been raised about
the practicability of concurrent powers, some anxieties had been expressed lest the
implementation of these constitutional proposals for Malta might make it
increasingly difficult for us to fulfil our defence responsibilities in the Mediterranean.
A similar doubt might be thought to arise about the implication in the second
paragraph of Annex B to C.P.C. (61) 3 that Malta could achieve complete
2 Lord Home. 3 F-M Sir F Festing 4 Lord Perth.
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independence before it had become possible for us to relinquish our strategic
interests there. The Colonial Secretary had undertaken to consider what
modifications could be made to the formula in question in order to avoid that
implication, and the whole question, including the defence aspects, would be further
considered by the Cabinet.
248 CAB 128/35/1, CC 10(61)5 28 Feb 1961
[Malta: report of Sir H Blood’s Commission on constitutional
changes]: Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary about
constitutional changes in Malta following the report of the Commission under the
chairmanship of Sir Hilary Blood (C. (61) 26) together with a comparison of the
Singapore Constitution and the Commission’s proposals (C. (61) 24).
The Colonial Secretary said that doubts had been expressed in the discussions in
the Colonial Policy Committee and the Defence Committee about certain features of
the proposals, namely the Maltese Government’s concurrent powers in defence and
external affairs, the delegation of authority to conclude certain international
agreements, and the division of responsibilities and functions between the Governor
(or Head of State) and the United Kingdom Commissioner. It had also been
suggested that the proposals, and the terms in which it was proposed to announce
them, would encourage the pressure for subsequent constitutional advance which
would be premature having regard to our defence interests.
It was unlikely that there would be much scope for legislation by a Maltese
Government on external matters other than the local implementation of
international agreements, for which the Maltese had authority under their previous
constitution; the power of a Maltese Government to legislate on other external affairs
would be subject to the over-riding authority of the United Kingdom Government.
The principle of delegation was in no sense a new concept in Colonial government,
and it would be for the United Kingdom Government to define and control the extent
of it. In view of the fact that it had now been agreed that the Governor should remain
a non-Maltese at least as long as we considered it necessary, and that he should retain
in his hands the ultimate control of the police, the proposals provided full safeguards
for our defence interests. It was beyond question that the constitution proposed for
Malta would be safer in these respects than the arrangements obtaining in
Singapore, where the security risk was greater.
As regards subsequent constitutional development, the Blood Commission, who
were precluded from making recommendations except for the first stage,
nevertheless thought that some indication about the Government’s long-term
intentions would greatly improve the chances of success of the new constitution.
Although the Governor of Malta would prefer that nothing should be said in this
respect, on balance it was very desirable, in the interests of rallying moderate Maltese
opinion, to make it clear that it was not the Government’s intention to deny to Malta,
at the appropriate time, the right of self-determination. Such a statement would be
consistent with the description which had been given to the United Nations of our
policy for the advancement of dependent territories.
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In discussion the following points were made—
(a) It was suggested that, although it would be both difficult and expensive, it
might be possible for us to relinquish Malta and yet fulfil our defence responsibilities
in the Mediterranean. But it would still be necessary to deny the facilities of Malta to
the Soviet bloc and for this purpose our continued presence in the island seemed
essential.
(b) It was likely, though by no means certain, that Mr. Mintoff would achieve office
under the proposed constitution. Our defence facilities were so closely connected
with the ordinary life of the island that there would be innumerable opportunities for
him to be obstructive, if he so wished. It had to be accepted that, in these
circumstances, the proposed constitution might have to be suspended and direct rule
by the Governor reimposed.
(c) The Secretary of State for Air1 said that the introduction of a United Kingdom
Commissioner, separate from the Governor, might give rise to great difficulty. It
would be for the Commissioner to over-rule the Maltese Government, although he
himself would have no power to enforce his ordinances. At the same time, the
establishment of a Commissioner would be bound to weaken to some extent the
authority of the Governor, who would then be less able to rely on the loyalty of the
police and civil service.
It was suggested that, from this point of view, it might be preferable to reduce the
Commissioner’s responsibilities by reserving the power to over-rule the Maltese
Government directly to the United Kingdom Government, acting through the
Governor, and not to their local representative.
It was pointed out, on the other hand, that the introduction of a Commissioner
would help to insulate the Governor from political conflict. This, indeed, had been
one of the main objects of the Blood Commission and the principle might even be
carried further by entrusting control of the police and the responsibility for internal
security to the Commissioner rather than to the Governor. The present Governor
was, however, satisfied that the proposed division of functions between the Governor
and the Commissioner would not give rise to serious difficulty.
(d) It seemed reasonably certain that, since the United Kingdom Government were to
retain the power to over-rule the Maltese Government, the grant of concurrent powers
in defence and external affairs and of delegated authority to conclude certain
international agreements would not give Malta an “independent” status in international
law. The opinion of the Law Officers should, however, be sought on this point.
(e) It was suggested that the introduction of a United Kingdom Commissioner
tended to prejudge the question of subsequent constitutional development. Unless,
moreover, it was seriously contemplated that Malta might at some time be given the
right of self-determination, it might be unwise to indicate the possibility of this in
any public statement. For these reasons, it might be preferable to substitute for the
last three sentences of the draft reference which the Colonial Secretary proposed to
make to the future status of Malta (in Annex C of C. (61) 26) a less specific reference
to the future. This alternative would be more acceptable to the Governor.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Invited the Attorney-General to consider whether the proposals in C. (61) 26
would give Malta “independent” status for the purposes of international law.
1 Mr J Amery.
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(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to give further consideration, in the light of
their discussion, to the proposed references to the future status of Malta in the
draft statement in Annex C of C. (61) 26; and to circulate a revised draft.
(3) Agreed to resume their discussion of C. (61) 26 at a later meeting.
249 CAB 128/35/1, CC 11(61)4 7 Mar 1961
[Malta: parliamentary statement on Constitutional changes]: Cabinet
conclusions
The Cabinet had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 30) and
the Attorney-General (C. (61) 31) on constitutional changes in Malta.
The Colonial Secretary said that the doubts that had previously been expressed
about the effect in international law of granting to the Maltese Government
concurrent legislative powers and delegated authority to conclude certain
international agreements had been examined by the Attorney-General, who was
satisfied that the implementation of these proposals would not confer on Malta the
status of an independent sovereign State. The revised terms of the statement in
which it was proposed to announce the Government’s acceptance of the
constitutional recommendations of the Blood Commission were set out in the Annex
to C. (61) 30. This statement did not now contain any reference to subsequent
constitutional developments, but he would undoubtedly be pressed for some
indication of the Government’s attitude on this point. He would first reply: “As I said
when the Blood Commission was appointed, we are now concerned with the
immediate future. I did not then and do not now suggest that the constitution I have
just announced will be the final stage in Malta’s constitutional development.” If it
proved necessary to give some further indication about the ultimate future of Malta,
he would then say: “It is of course no part of Her Majesty’s Government’s policy to
deny to the Maltese people the right to determine for themselves, at the appropriate
time, their own destiny in association, we hope, with the United Kingdom and the
Commonwealth family.”
In discussion the following points were made:
(a) Although it seemed clear that the implementation of the Blood Commission’s
recommendations would not entitle other countries to regard Malta as an
independent sovereign State, it could be argued that there would be difficulty in
withdrawing responsible government once it had been granted. There seemed,
however, no legal foundation for this view, and in the past it had proved possible to
withdraw representative government when it had been necessary to resume direct
rule by the Governor, without challenge.
(b) There was general agreement that, on balance, it would be preferable to restrict
the grant to the Maltese Government of concurrent powers to defence, and to provide
powers in the field of external affairs only by specific delegation. The draft
announcement of the proposals had been revised on this basis, but the position
would be made quite clear if the relevant sentence were on the following lines: “The
Maltese Government will be given concurrent powers in the field of foreign affairs, by
specific delegation, and in that of defence.”
1 Previous reference: see previous document.
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(c) The proposed introduction of a United Kingdom Commissioner, who would be
able to overrule the Maltese Government, although the power to enforce his
ordinances would be reserved to the Governor who would retain control of the
police, might be a dangerous innovation. On the other hand, this arrangement might
well work satisfactorily unless the Maltese Government were deliberately obstructive,
in which case it would almost certainly be necessary for the Governor to resume
direct rule.
(d) In view of the strategic importance of the island, it was not likely that Malta
could be given the right of self-determination in the foreseeable future. It was
therefore desirable that any further indication which might have to be given about
the future should not refer to the right of the Maltese people to determine for
themselves their own destiny. On the other hand, it would be valuable to hold out the
prospect of some continuing association with the United Kingdom and the
Commonwealth. The reply which the Colonial Secretary might make, if pressed to
say something in addition to his first response about the future, should be on the
following lines: “I hope that Malta’s future will always lie with the United Kingdom
and the Commonwealth.”
The Cabinet approved a number of drafting amendments to the statement and
supplementary reply which the Colonial Secretary proposed to make to Parliament.
The Cabinet:—
Authorised the Colonial Secretary to announce proposals for constitutional
changes in Malta, as proposed in C. (61) 30, subject to the amendments agreed in
their discussion.
250 PREM 11/3870 18 Jan 1962
[Malta: views of Lord Perth and the Defence Committee]: minute by
Mr Macmillan to Lord Perth
I have considered your minutes of January 15 and 17—and also the minutes of
January 15 from the Minister of Defence and January 18 from the Chief Secretary.1
The points which you now raise were put to the Defence Committee by the
Colonial Secretary, when they considered this problem on December 19. The
Committee took the view that the deployment of our forces overseas must be
determined by the requirements of our strategy. I do not see how we can take any
different view. We cannot maintain bases for which we no longer have any strategic
need, or keep in particular places overseas forces larger than we need for military
purposes, in order to provide employment for the local inhabitants.
2. In these cases, therefore, we must first decide what is the right course to take
on grounds of defence policy. We must then make a plan for carrying out that
decision and, in the case of Malta certainly, this will be a phased plan spread over a
number of years. When we have that we can see what the economic consequences for
the Island will be; and we shall certainly consider what steps we can take to mitigate
those consequences. This is the procedure which the Defence Committee agreed to
follow at their meeting on December 19; and the Departments concerned are under
1 Sir E Boyle.
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an obligation to study and report upon the economic consequences of these
changes—in Cyprus as well as Malta. When that report is available, there will be
ample opportunity for argument on the financial point which you raise about the
real saving; but we shall then have the information on which to judge the extent of
the economic damage and also, I hope, the possibilities and the cost of mitigating it.
And it will be open to you to put forward any proposals you like for compensating the
islanders. I hope that the Minister of Defence and the Chief Secretary, Treasury (to
whom I am sending copies of this minute) will do all they can to ensure that the
preparation of this report is expedited.
3. One new point is raised in your minutes which was not mentioned to the
Defence Committee—namely, that what is to be said in the Defence White Paper will
deprive us of any ground for “refusing the demand of all major Parties in Malta that
she should have independence”. I do not know whether the Minister of Defence has
settled what he would like to say about Malta in his White Paper. But I am asking him
to arrange for the Chiefs of Staff to consider, in consultation with the Colonial Office,
what would be the implications, for defence policy, of granting independence to Malta.
251 CAB 131/27, D(62)8 5 Feb 1962
‘The effects of the new defence policy on Malta’: memorandum by Mr
Maudling for Cabinet Defence Committee
The more I consider the likely effects of our new Defence policy on Malta, the more
serious and far reaching they seem to be, not only for the economy of the Island but
for its political future also. I cannot seek to have the whole Defence policy changed
but my colleagues should realise the implications for this one small island.
2. One of the main reasons for the new Defence policy was to secure savings in
overseas expenditure.1 The immediate result of the cuts in Malta would be an
overseas saving of £7m. a year by the Services. From the balance of payments point of
view, this may be more than counter-balanced by a reduction in our exports, a
reduction in Maltese savings sent to this country and by the new expenditure on
relief measures, which we shall be bound to undertake.
3. I attach a note about the economic effects (Annex I.)2 The Island imports some
£30m. a year and exports under £5m. This great excess of imports is virtually entirely
due to expenditure by the Services and at present provides us with a favourable
balance of trade of over £10m. The living standards of the 330,000 people of the
Island are almost entirely dependent on the Services and with the big reductions now
planned, unless effective remedial action is taken over the next five years, 20 per cent
of the working population may well be out of employment. Jobs would need to be
found over five years for 14,000 men over and above the 7,500 for whom we are
seeking to cater under our present plan. Under the present Development Plan (to
which our contribution will be £291⁄4m.) strenuous efforts have been made and very
large sums spent and they have shown, depressingly, that industrialisation can only
produce slow and limited results. After 21⁄2 years we have created only 500 new jobs,
though we hope this will soon rise to 1,500.
1 See document no 66 above. 2 Annexes not printed. 
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4. The White Paper only refers to Malta in very general terms—and I am grateful
to the Minister of Defence for his drafting—but nevertheless it is certain to provoke
immediate questions from the Maltese about the effects on them. The Governor and I
are satisfied that it is necessary to forestall these questions. Many undertakings have
been given over the last few years and we are obliged by these, if defence cuts raise
unemployment in Malta above the U.K. level, to consult with the Maltese and to
consider with them such remedial measures as may be feasible. I must ask for
authority to make at the same time as the White Paper is issued a statement on the
lines of Annex II to this paper, and I hope that the Defence Departments will join with
my Department in consultations with Malta before active steps are taken to reduce
our forces there.
5. Such a statement may give us a breathing space but it will only be a tempo-
rary one. The great difficulty is going to be to find measures which really will rem-
edy so fundamental a blow to the existence of the Island. We shall find ourselves
embarking on a policy which we shall have to pursue for many years and which will
cost us much money. I would ask that I may have the co-operation of all
Departments—especially the Service Departments—in working out measures
which will help to ease such a situation, for instance by continuing to undertake
work in the Dockyard which could be undertaken possibly a little more cheaply else-
where. We shall need every bit of help we can get if the Island is to make both ends
meet.
6. Politically the timing of the White Paper could not be more unfortunate since
it is to be published the day after the Maltese elections are concluded. The Maltese
are bound to think this timing was deliberate and our friends will be gravely
embarrassed while Mintoff’s hand will be strengthened. As a result of these elections
it had been hoped to implement the new Constitution, based on the
recommendations of the Blood Commission, which would have restored to Malta
after nearly four years of direct rule a considerable measure of self-government.
Unless the statement I have suggested is made I am quite clear that there will be no
chance of persuading the winning party—we now hope it will not be Mintoff—to
form a Government and we could have an immediate political crisis on our hands
coupled with grave unrest and very likely civil disorder.
7. Even with a statement we shall have a hard task to work with any Maltese
Government. Both the main parties are committed to demanding independence for
Malta within or without the Commonwealth. These demands will be strengthened to
the extent that our defence needs in Malta seem less. As I understand it, our main
defence needs are now forward and staging facilities in the Island and denial of its use
to others. These facilities could, I suppose, be obtained if Malta became independent
but only in return for heavy payments. All possible courses of action including some
special form of association will need to be considered but I must repeat that
economically any course will be expensive, while politically it is bound to give rise to
acute difficulties.
8. To summarise I ask for:—
(a) authority to make a statement at the time of the issue of the White Paper on
the lines of Annex II;
(b) the co-operation of all Departments in working out possible measures of
alleviation for Malta;
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(c) the Defence Departments to join in consultations with the Maltese before
active steps are taken to reduce our presence in Malta.
I have no doubt that I shall have later on to make more specific proposals to my
colleagues on measures of alleviation and to put before them in more detail the
problem of the political future of the Island.
252 CAB 128/37, CC 44(63)5 4 July 1963
[Malta: independence]: Cabinet conclusions
[A new constitution, giving self-government, was put into operation in March 1962,
foreign affairs and defence remaining the ultimate responsibility of the British
government.]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (63) 112)
about the attainment of independence by Malta.
The Colonial Secretary said that in August 1962, the Government of Malta2 with
the support of all the principal political parties in the Island, had formally asked for
independence. For this purpose arrangements had been made to convene a
conference, to which all parties now represented in the Maltese Legislature would be
invited, in the second half of July.
Three main issues would be likely to arise at this conference; first, whether the
official status of the Roman Catholic religion should be maintained; second, whether
Malta should be granted membership of the Commonwealth; third, whether the
Constitution should be monarchical or republican. It would undoubtedly be the wish
of the majority of the inhabitants of Malta that the Roman Catholic religion should
remain the official religion of the Island; and we had no reason to dissent, despite
certain practical difficulties which would persist in relation to matters such as
marriage and divorce. Nor should there be any objection to accepting an independent
Malta as a member of the Commonwealth. A monarchical Constitution, however,
although undoubtedly supported by a majority of the Maltese population, would be
opposed by the Maltese Labour Party under the leadership of Mr. Mintoff; and it
would be unfortunate if the monarchy were made a party political issue after Malta
became independent.
It would be necessary to conclude a Defence Agreement with the Government of
Malta under which they would agree that we should retain the right to station forces
in the Island and that military facilities would not be granted to any other country
without our consent. In order to ensure the validity of this agreement and to reduce
the risk of its repudiation by a future Government of Malta it would be advisable that
it should not be concluded until after the Island had become independent: and it
might be desirable that the Government of the independent State should seek the
endorsement of a referendum before signing it. It would also be necessary that we
should undertake to provide continuing financial aid to Malta on a scale still to be
determined.
1 Previous reference: see document no 249.
2 Dr Borg Olivier was prime minister, after the victory of his Nationalist Party at the polls: from Aug 1962
he was again calling for independence. Mr Sandys visited Malta in June 1963, and convened a conference
in London for July.
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In discussion the following main points were made:
(a) It would clearly be desirable that Malta should retain, after independence, a
monarchical Constitution. If necessary, however, the question could be considered
again when the forthcoming conference had provided an opportunity to test the
strength of Maltese feeling on the issues involved.
(b) The maintenance of United Kingdom forces in Malta was no longer a
paramount defence interest in itself, although it might constitute a convenient
means of providing economic aid to the Island. The main purpose of the proposed
Defence Agreement would be to prevent the Soviet Government from obtaining a
military footing in Malta. From this point of view it was open to question whether the
agreement should not be concluded until the Island had become independent; and it
was doubtfully wise to submit the issue to a referendum. On the other hand it had
already been made clear both to the Government of Malta and to Mr. Mintoff that any
Soviet intrusion into the Island would not be tolerated either by the United Kingdom
or by the other member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; and it
was improbable that any Government of Malta would court the risks involved in
entertaining any policy of this kind, particularly if the Defence Agreement had been
endorsed by a referendum.
(c) In any event the only alternative course would be to reject the unanimous
request of all the main political parties in Malta that the Island should now be
granted independence; and the political consequences of such action would clearly
be unacceptable.
(d) Consideration should be given during the conference to the preservation in the
new Constitution of a right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
or to some alternative judicial tribunal, perhaps of a Commonwealth character.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved, subject to the points made in their discussion, the proposals in C.
(63) 112 for the attainment of independence by Malta.
(2) Invited the Commonwealth Secretary to report further, in the light of the
proceedings of the forthcoming conference on the terms of independence for
Malta, on the retention of a monarchical Constitution by the Island after
independence.3
3 The conference broke up without deciding the final details of an independence constitution, but Mr
Sandys suggested that the various Maltese parties should aim to settle their differences in preparation for
independence by 31 May 1964.
253 PREM 11/4914 21 Jan–17 Apr 1964
[Independence for Malta]: minutes by Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Sir A
Douglas-Home (M 14/64) and Mr Thorneycroft (MoD)
Prime Minister
Mabel Strickland1 came to see me the other day. She said that she had written to you
informing you that she was coming to see me. I cannot think why, except that we
1 The Hon M E Strickland, OBE, leader of the Progressive Constitutional Party in Malta since 1953; editor
of The Times of Malta, 1935–1950.
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have a mutual friend. The burden of her story was that there is a great revulsion in
Malta at the present time against Independence. They have seen what has happened
in Zanzibar. The police force in Malta is unable to control smuggling. If the country
becomes independent that police force, a thousand strong, will be completely
incapable of preserving law and order. Nasser will serve out arms to the dissidents
and disaster will follow. The Governor has changed his mind about the advice he gave
and Wakefield2 holds the strong opinion that to proceed with existing plans for
Independence next May would be wholly irresponsible.
I have never known anything about Malta and have no idea how much weight is
attached to her views. I suspect, however, that there may be something in them.
S.L.
21.1.64
I don’t much care for the speed of this either. I am asking the Commonwealth
Secretary to inform the Cabinet about it. . . . I have some misgivings. We don’t want
another Zanzibar in the Mediterranean.3
A.D-H.
22.1.64
Prime Minister
I attach a minute which I have received from the Secretary of State for War
reporting on a recent visit to Malta by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. I
am having examined the particular points which he raises. I am, however, anxious on
more general grounds.
2. The granting of independence to former colonies has no doubt been right, but
it has placed and is placing a very heavy burden on our defence forces. May I make a
plea that the process might be slowed down at least until we have recovered our
breath.
3. Is it really necessary to press on with independence for Malta? I should be glad
of an opportunity to discuss the military implications of this. . . .
P.T.
28.1.64
I understand that on present plans Malta would achieve her independence on 31st
May. It is my hope that these plans will be frustrated. The outcome of the referendum
on the Independence Constitution which is to be held early next month may
demonstrate that a postponement is desirable for political reasons but we cannot be
sure of this.
2. Meanwhile developments in Cyprus and Libya cannot but weaken our position
in both places. They could mean that Malta would become the only place in the
Mediterranean east of Gibraltar where our forces had any prospect of security of
tenure. While Malta could be no substitute for Cyprus and Libya, in a number of
respects her importance as a staging post for long-range aircraft would be enhanced
and the forward operating facilities for the Royal Navy would also assume greater
2 Sir E B Wakefield, commissioner for Malta since 1962.
3 It was feared Mintoff might stage a coup d’état shortly after independence. Zanzibar attained
independence on 10 Dec 1963 under a coalition led by the Sultan—this government was overthrown by a
coup d’état on 12 Jan 1964 led by Sheikh Karume and the Afro-Shirazi Party (see document no 139).
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importance. She would be the only practicable alternative for a stockpile in the
Mediterranean and would thus become the main United Kingdom base for the
mounting of operations in the Mediterranean whether these were purely national
operations or in support of an American intervention.
3. Officials have made considerable progress with the negotiation of a defence
agreement with Malta. This is satisfactory as far as it goes but it can at best provide
only a limited guarantee of our continued presence in Malta after independence. It
seems probable that we could count on the continued co-operation of the Nationalist
Party should they remain in power. There is a distinct possibility that the Malta Labour
Party would abrogate the agreement if they were to secure office after independence.
4. I believe therefore that we should consider carefully in the Defence and Oversea
Policy Committee whether there are not strong grounds for delaying the grant of inde-
pendence to Malta or, if that is not possible, whether there are any measures open to
us which would improve our chances of retaining the island as a base.
5. On the assumption that we can shelve the issue of independence, we must, I
believe, be reasonably generous with our assistance to the island and show ourselves
reasonably willing to make use of its military resources in order to re-establish a
better relationship there for our defence requirements. . . .
P.T.
17.4.64
I agree with this. I hope the referendum will be completely indecisive, but if not, we
will have to try and delay independence again.
A.D-H.
[nd] 
254 PREM 11/4912 4–25 June 1964
[Maltese independence]: ministerial exchanges—Lord Perth, Mr
Sandys, and Lord Boyd with Sir A Douglas-Home
Dear Alec,
I fear I am a bore about Malta and the attached suggestion comes, I know, at one
minute to twelve! Nonetheless, I hope it will be very seriously considered. Such a
bold move would solve Malta’s problems, be I am sure strongly welcomed in Malta,
and I suspect gain widespread approval here.
I have talked things over with Alan,1 shown him the memorandum and have his
full support, but he said he felt he should not also sign this letter as he is plaguing
you on another matter!
Yours ever
David
5.6.64
P.S. Don’t forget to find a day or two for the trout at Stockbridge—they are very fat &
good fighters this year.
1 Lord Boyd of Merton, formerly Mr A Lennox-Boyd.
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The referendum on the Maltese Constitution has come and gone. Whether it showed
that people do or do not want independence now is open to argument. Presumably a
further referendum asking this simple question is not on the cards.
It is understood that in fact constitutional talks are going forward with the aim of
granting independence shortly, and to this end a Defence Agreement and aid are also
being negotiated. The former is acquiring new importance as Malta’s strategic value
is again becoming apparent. If Mintoff is not party to this Agreement, if and when he
comes into power he will surely repudiate it, and the fact that our aid was tied to it
would make no difference. Malta is small and it would be easy for Russia to outbid. It
may be argued that the Catholic island would not accept aid from such a source, but
Mintoff’s presentation would surely be more subtle via the U.A.R. for example.
Is it too late to look at “integration” once again, plus the straightforward offer that in,
say, five years social services for the Maltese will be the equivalent of those in the U.K.?
Integration would solve the constitutional difficulties: the Church would accept
British practice if Malta were part of the U.K. Furthermore and most importantly,
there would no longer be need for a Defence Agreement. The offer of social services
equivalent to those of the U.K. would make an immense appeal to the people of
Malta. In practice, its cost should be small—British Industry, particularly tourism,
would readily go to Malta once political fears are removed, and the present
nightmare of unemployment might soon vanish.
Borg Olivier is likely to agree. After all, he would still be Prime Minister (which is
what he cares about) in control of internal affairs.
It is difficult to assess the House of Commons attitude, but once before they faced
the issue and were ready to play. Generally, the country’s reaction might be one of
welcoming those who want to join us—a change from the continual dismember-
ment of the Empire and large sums of money as parting gifts.
P.
4.6.64.
Prime Minister
David Perth’s letter of 5th June proposes integration for Malta with the offer of social
services for the Maltese, equivalent to those in Britain, in say five years’ time.
2. Although they are divided on the Church issue, the two major parties in Malta,
representing at least three-quarters of the voters, are in favour of Independence. To
refuse Independence would run the risk of uniting them both against Britain, and, in
particular, of provoking the hostility of Borg Olivier’s National Party, whose goodwill
is vital to us.
3. Our offer of Independence must therefore stand and, as David Perth no doubt
knows, the various outstanding questions are now being settled between the Maltese
and ourselves.
4. Only if it were to become apparent that a mutually acceptable solution to the
remaining outstanding problems could not be found, could we consider alternatives
to Independence.2
D.S.
12.6.64
2 The prime minister replied to Lord Perth along these lines (16 June). He regarded Malta as ‘a small but
terribly difficult problem’ (19 Feb 1964).
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My dear Alec,
As he mentioned in it, I saw David Perth’s letter to you last week and fully endorsed
it, and he has since shown me a copy of your reply.
I think the Maltese Referendum could be read in any number of ways, and I won’t
bother you with all these in this brief note.
Last evening at your C.P.A. party I had a talk with Dr. Holland, one of Mintoff’s
Labour members in the Maltese Parliament. He said he hoped nothing would be
settled for Malta until the ‘uncertainties’ had been cleared up—Libya, Cyprus and
the British Parliamentary Election. Tim Blyth3 was standing near and I asked
Holland to repeat this to Tim, which he did. I then asked Holland whether he would
say this sort of thing in Malta. He said that would not be possible but it was “what we
feel.” I asked if by that he meant many members of the Malta Labour Party, and he
said yes. With some knowledge of Malta I am sure this is the authentic voice of many
of the Maltese people.
I do most earnestly hope that we shall not lull ourselves into the belief that if we
give Independence to Borg Olivier’s Government now it will ensure the continuance
of their Government any more than what has happened in Zanzibar. I still believe the
solution in David Perth’s letter is the right one.
We both know how busy you are but if ever you have ten minutes to spare we
would welcome the chance of a word on Malta.
Yours ever
Alan
23.6.64
My dear Alan,
Thank you for your letter of June 23 about Malta.
You may well be right in believing that the people of Malta don’t really want their
affairs settled one way or another at the present moment. The trouble is, as you
yourself pointed out, that none of their leaders dare stand up and say so in public.
The consequence is that we have had to embark on the independence negotiations
with Borg Olivier; the alternative would have been to have both Borg Olivier and
Mintoff and their parties publicly against us, with all that that would have meant at
home, abroad and on the island itself.
I fear that, whatever may be the right solution for Malta, if indeed there is one,
independence looks like being the only possible one. We shall see. The negotiations
are not yet over.
Yours ever,
A. [D.-H.]
25.6.64
3 Perhaps Sir Timothy Bligh, one of the prime minister’s private secretaries, is meant?
255 CAB 128/38/2, CM 35(64)5 7 July 1964
[Malta: deadlock on discussions for independence]: Cabinet conclusions
The Commonwealth Secretary said that his discussions with the Prime Minister of
Malta, Dr. Borg Olivier, about the independence of the Island had now reached a
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deadlock. Three issues were outstanding—a financial settlement; a defence
agreement; and the constitutional status and privileges of the Roman Catholic
Church in Malta, with which was linked the amendment of the Island’s electoral law
which would be required in order to prevent the Church from exercising, by the
threat of spiritual sanctions, undue influence during elections. The difficulties in the
way of a financial agreement were not insuperable; and, since we had now succeeded
in enlisting the support of the Vatican authorities for the amendment of the electoral
law which we had in mind, it was possible to hope that this question also might
eventually be satisfactorily resolved. But this issue should be kept open since, if the
negotiations finally broke down, it would be to our advantage that they should be
seen to do so on an issue on which the Government could expect the maximum of
support from Parliament and public opinion in this country. Dr. Borg Olivier, on the
other hand, would wish to be able to attribute the failure of the negotiations to our
inability to accept his conditions for a defence agreement, particularly his stipulation
that we should not be entitled to use Malta, after it became independent, for the
storage of nuclear weapons, if we thought fit to do so. The Chiefs of Staff held that we
could not afford to compromise on this issue, not merely because any limitation of
our freedom of action in this respect would be unacceptable in relation to Malta itself
but also because it would establish a precedent which could be employed to our
disadvantage in relation to other military bases overseas where it would remain
essential that we should be able to maintain stockpiles of nuclear weapons, if
circumstances so required. Nevertheless, it would be embarrassing if Dr. Borg Olivier
succeeded in creating the impression that it was on this issue that the negotiations
had failed; and, if he went so far as to suggest that, while he was not prepared to
compromise on the defence agreement, he would accept the proposed amendment of
the electoral law and would dispense with a financial agreement altogether, we
should then have no alternative but to indicate that we must insist on the
incorporation in the defence agreement of acceptable provisions as regards nuclear
weapons. It would thus become clear that the question of nuclear weapons was the
real cause of the breakdown in negotiations; and the Government would then be in
an embarrassing position.
In discussion there was general agreement that, if as a result of the failure of
negotiations, Dr. Borg Olivier’s Government fell and was succeeded by an
Administration under Mr. Mintoff, Malta would be likely to succumb to the influence
of the United Arab Republic and, possibly, the Soviet Union. This made it very
desirable to reach a settlement with Dr. Borg Olivier if at all possible. Alternatively,
we could now abandon the negotiations and allow Malta to remain indefinitely in its
present Colonial status; but this, too, might merely accelerate the fall of Dr. Borg
Olivier and promote Mr. Mintoff’s prospects. Moreover, a breakdown in the
negotiations on the issue of our right to maintain a stockpile of nuclear weapons in
Malta would be as likely to bring this sensitive issue to public attention as the
conclusion of a defence agreement which specifically limited our freedom of action
in this respect. It was worth considering further, therefore, whether we need insist
on an unrestricted right in this respect or whether we could afford to accept the
limited facilities as regards the temporary transit of such weapons through the Island
which Dr. Borg Olivier was apparently prepared to contemplate. This issue had to be
considered in relation to the other oversea bases where it was essential that we
should be free to exercise the right to store nuclear weapons, if necessary; and, in
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reaching our decision, we must not overlook the interests of the United States
Government, who were disturbed about the possible repercussions on their own
oversea bases if we accepted any limitation on our right to store nuclear weapons in
Malta.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the Cabinet would wish
to have the advice of the Chief of the Defence Staff before forming a final view on the
difficult issues involved. An early meeting would be arranged for this purpose.
The Cabinet:—
Agreed to resume their discussion at a subsequent meeting.1
1 Held later the same day; summing up, the prime minister said that it was ‘greatly in our interest to
conclude an agreement on Malta’s independence, if this were possible on acceptable terms. In view of the
embarrassment to which we might be exposed if we concluded a defence agreement which was qualified by
an exchange of confidential letters about our intentions as regards the storage of nuclear weapons in
Malta, it might be preferable to confine ourselves to incorporating in the proposed defence agreement a
provision (with a corresponding clause in the proposed financial agreement) that it would be open to
either party, in the event of any subsequent change of circumstances, to raise any issue that they wished,
without commitment on either side to amend the agreement. He would be prepared, if necessary, to
discuss with Dr. Borg Olivier an arrangement on these lines and would consider whether, if so, we could
give him, orally, some additional private assurance about our intentions as regards the use of Malta as a
nuclear base’ (CM 36(64).) Agreement with Dr Olivier was announced on 21 July 1964. His Nationalist
Party won the 1966 election, but Mintoff was returned to power in 1971.
256 CAB 128/31/1, CC 15(57)3 4 Mar 1957
[Proposed constitution for Singapore]: Cabinet conclusions
[From early in 1953, Singapore had a large measure of internal self-government. The
arrangements for moving towards full internal self-government are discussed here. The
new constitution came into force in 1959, and Lee Kuan Yew became the first prime
minister of ‘the State of Singapore’—which became a State of the Federation of Malaysia
in Sept 1963, from which it separated again in Aug 1965. For Macmillan’s view of
Singapore in 1960, see document no 260 below.]
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary about the
proposed new constitution for Singapore (C. (57) 48).
The Colonial Secretary said that he hoped to resume discussions with the Chief
Minister of Singapore1 in the near future on the basis of the proposals outlined in his
memorandum. The new constitution would be a form of dyarchy, in which defence
and foreign affairs would be reserved to the United Kingdom Government, whose
spokesman would be the Resident Commissioner, while local Ministers would
discharge the remaining functions of government. The Governor would be a
Malayan-born personage, who would be appointed by The Queen on the advice of the
Secretary of State, would hold office during Her Majesty’s pleasure, and would be
bound to act in accordance with the advice of Ministers. The ultimate authority to
suspend the constitution would, however, vest in the Resident Commissioner, who
would in that eventuality supplant local Ministers as the adviser to the Governor.
These proposals were acceptable to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand
and were supported by the Governor of Singapore, the Commissioner-General in
1 Mr Lim Yew Hock.
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South-East Asia, and the Chiefs of Staff. They did little more than formalise the
existing situation in which, for some time, we had been unable to use our reserve
powers and had been compelled to rely, in the last resort, on the power to suspend
the constitution. This power would remain with the Resident Commissioner and,
together with the fact that he would preside over both the Defence and External
Affairs Council and the Internal Security Council, should suffice to retain in our own
hands an effective degree of authority in Singapore. At the moment the body of
opinion in Singapore which was friendly to this country was growing, and it would be
advisable to seize the present opportunity to establish a constitution which would be
popular with liberal opinion in the Colony and would, at the same time, safeguard
our essential interests.
In discussion doubts were expressed about the precedent which might be
constituted by the unique arrangements proposed for Singapore. The Government of
Malta, for example, might feel obliged to press for similar arrangements. But a
constitution on the model proposed for Singapore would represent a regressive step
for Malta, which already possessed most of the powers which, under the new
constitution for Singapore, would be transferred to local Ministers. There appeared
to be no other Colonial territory where the present stage of constitutional
development would provide a basis for a claim to treatment comparable with that
proposed for Singapore.
Doubts were also expressed about the extent to which the suggested constitution
would provide a lasting solution of the problems of the Colony. It was proposed that
local Ministers, although being consulted before the appointment of the Governor,
should not advise The Queen on this appointment. Nevertheless, the Governor, once
appointed, would exercise considerable power in such matters as the selection of a
Chief Minister and the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly. On the other hand,
the Resident Commissioner would be empowered, without necessarily consulting
local Ministers, to advise the Governor to reserve for The Queen’s assent any measure
affecting the responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government. The balance of
authority between local Ministers and the Resident Commissioner would, therefore,
be a delicate one; and although such an arrangement might prove feasible while the
present Chief Minister held office, it was doubtful whether it would endure if he was
replaced by a Chief Minister less well disposed towards this country. It was open to
question whether a constitution of the kind proposed was likely, for all its ingenuity,
to be compatible with either stability of administration or the maintenance of our
own essential strategic interests.
It was, however, argued that, so long as defence and external affairs were reserved
to the United Kingdom Government, our interest in Singapore as a major base
should be adequately safeguarded. Moreover, the fact that the interests of the
Federation of Malaya in Singapore were substantially the same as our own should
ensure that, in most cases, our view would prevail in the Internal Security Council as
well; and this, coupled with the arrangement whereby senior appointments to the
Police Force would be subject to the approval of the Council, should secure our
continued control over public order. We should enjoy a further and valuable
safeguard in the stipulation, which had still to be negotiated with Singapore
Ministers, that if any Bill passed by the local Legislature affected matters within the
sphere of responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, the Resident
Commissioner would be empowered so to inform the Governor, who would then be
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obliged by the constitution to reserve the Bill for The Queen’s assent. With these
safeguards the proposed constitution should enable us to maintain our essential
interests in Singapore, without appearing to attempt to arrest the increasing
tendency towards Malayanisation. It might not provide a permanent solution; but it
should make possible a period of political stability in Singapore until it became
practicable to advance towards the ultimate objective of unification of the Colony and
the Federation of Malaya. At that time an essential condition of such unification
would be our retention of the right to maintain a major military base at Singapore.
The status and powers of the future Governor were a concession to local opinion
which was in no way derogatory to the Crown and, provided that the ultimate right of
suspending the constitution remained in the hands of the Resident Commissioner,
should prove a useful precedent for maintaining our interests in other cases where it
was essential that we should retain a military base within a community which was
advancing towards independence. The constitution would not itself specify that the
Governor must be Malayan born; and if an emergency developed or if, in the event of
the constitution having to be suspended, a Malayan-born Governor proved
recalcitrant, there would be no impediment to the appointment as Governor, in his
place, of any person whom the United Kingdom Government wished to recommend
to The Queen. Nor were there grounds for supposing that the fact that the Governor
would normally be Malayan born would provide Singapore with a juridical basis for
seceding from the Commonwealth and appealing to the United Nations for
recognition as a wholly independent community. Opinion within the Common-
wealth, and probably elsewhere, would not endorse a claim by any nation to be
wholly self-governing unless it controlled its own defence and external relations; and
these subjects would, in the case of Singapore, remain reserved to the United
Kingdom Government.
The Cabinet:—
Authorised the Colonial Secretary to open discussions with the Chief Minister of
Singapore about the future constitution of the Colony on the basis described in his
memorandum, on the understanding that, inter alia—
(i) the constitution would not itself prescribe that the Governor should be a
Malayan-born person or debar the United Kingdom Government from
recommending any person to The Queen for appointment as Governor;
(ii) the Governor would hold office during The Queen’s pleasure and the
constitution would not preclude the United Kingdom Government from advising
Her Majesty to terminate the Governor’s appointment and to appoint another
person in his place;
(iii) the Royal Instructions, in conjunction with the provisions of the constitution,
would oblige the Governor to act in accordance with the advice of local Ministers
or, if the constitution was suspended, in accordance with the advice of the Resident
Commissioner;
(iv) the constitution would expressly provide that if, in the view of the Resident
Commissioner, any Bill passed by the Singapore Legislature affected matters
within the sphere of responsibility of the United Kingdom Government, the
Resident Commissioner would have the right so to inform the Governor, who
would then be obliged to reserve the Bill for The Queen’s assent; and in such cases
the United Kingdom Government would tender advice to Her Majesty.
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257 CO 1030/437, no 3 2 Aug 1957
[Commonwealth membership for Federation of Malaya; Mr Strijdom’s
views]: letter from H J B Lintott (CRO) to Sir P Liesching (South Africa)
[A conference held in London in May 1957 made the final arrangements for Malaya to
become independent on 31 Aug 1957. For the details of this process, see A J Stockwell, ed,
Malaya (BDEEP, 1995) part III The Alliance route to independence 1953–1957. With the
agreement of other Members, Malaya became a Member of the Commonwealth, though
not without some doubts in South Africa about procedure.]
Thank you for your letter of 14th March about Membership of the Commonwealth
for the Federation of Malaya.1
We are very grateful for your timely comments on the Union Government’s likely
attitude on this issue and for your further definition of Mr. Strijdom’s2 views on
Independence within, and Membership of, the Commonwealth generally.
In answer to the request in paragraph 5 of your letter, we have had prepared, and I
now enclose, a memorandum on the internal situation in Malaya which brings up to
date the earlier paper of February, 1956, to which you refer. There has not been time
to consult the High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur on its contents, but the note
has been cleared with the Colonial Office and gives, I think, a fair and unbiased
picture of the current Malayan situation. I hope that you will find it suitable as a basis
for discussion with Mr. Strijdom.
As to the questions raised in paragraphs 2 to 4 of your letter, it is no use our deny-
ing that Mr. Strijdom has some logic on his side when he argues that H.M.G. should
not promise “Independence within the Commonwealth” without prior consultation
with other Commonwealth Members, because the mere fact that a country has been
vouchsafed in advance the goal of full self-government within the Commonwealth, vir-
tually commits other Members to granting it Membership in its turn. But political
realities are more important than logic. To commit H.M.G. to the principle of prior
consultation as a preliminary step to granting a Colonial territory its Independence
within the Commonwealth, would, in practice, be tantamount to giving any member
country the right of veto on United Kingdom colonial policy. Mr. Strijdom will hardly
need reminding that it has for long been the policy of successive United Kingdom
Governments that the colonial territories, as they reach the goal of full self-govern-
ment and Independence, should remain within the Commonwealth. If, therefore, we
were to admit that unanimous agreement among the existing Member countries was
required for a newly independent ex-Colony to remain in the Commonwealth, we
should be allowing other Members to obstruct the implementation of decisions about
independence which are for the United Kingdom Government alone.
The above also answers the additional contention that colonies, once they cease to be
administered by a Member country of the Commonwealth, can no longer remain within
the Commonwealth. In practice, the Membership issue has in all past cases been settled
before the date of Independence, so that a hiatus of the kind foreseen by Mr. Strijdom
has in fact never arisen. Nor, of course, would it be our intention to allow things so to
develop that a dangerous gap existed between the date of a Colony’s attainment of
Independence and its acceptance as a Member of the Commonwealth. Clearly the
Membership issue must on every count be settled before Independence is brought about.
1 See Stockwell, ed Malaya, document no 445. 2 Prime minister of South Africa, 1954–1958 (died).
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You will be the best judge of how to handle this matter with Mr. Strijdom so as to
secure his agreement about Malaya while avoiding an intolerable theological argu-
ment. But subject to your views, we suggest that in presenting the enclosed memo-
randum to Mr. Strijdom, you might wish to speak to him on the following lines.
As the Prime Minister will realise, the decision to grant Independence to the
Federation of Malaya was reached as long ago as February, 1956, when the
Constitutional Conference, meeting in London, agreed that full self-government and
Independence within the Commonwealth for the Federation should be proclaimed by
August, 1957. Furthermore, the terms of reference of the Commonwealth
Constitutional Commission, which were at the same time approved by the Conference,
stated that the Commission should make recommendations for a form of Constitution
“for a fully self-governing and independent Federation of Malaya within the
Commonwealth”. The Union Government, together with all other Member countries,
were kept fully informed at the time of these developments. . . . H.M.G. have no reason
to believe that they gave rise to any doubt on the part of other Member countries as to
the aim which H.M.G. were pursuing in regard to the Federation.
You might then go on to say that the United Kingdom Government do not fully
appreciate the reasons underlying Mr. Strijdom’s suggestion that once a colonial
dependency ceases to be administered by a Member Government of the
Commonwealth, it should not be regarded as remaining within the Commonwealth.
The policy of H.M.G., as repeatedly stated by successive Governments, is not only to
bring the colonial territories stage by stage to the goal of Independence, but to
ensure that when they reach that goal they shall remain within the Commonwealth.
The U.K. Government, as the administering power, is in the best position to judge
when a colony is ripe for independence. It is of course the hope of H.M.G. that each
new candidate for independence within the Commonwealth will also be recognised
by other Commonwealth Governments as a Member of the Commonwealth. It would
be impracticable for the Membership issue to be left for discussion until after a
Colony had obtained its Independence. So far this situation has been avoided. If Mr.
Strijdom’s theory were to be accepted, very considerable practical difficulties would
follow. A juridical and constitutional vacuum would be created. The precise status of
the emerging territory would be open to question and the link with the Crown or
Sovereign would be, if only temporarily, interrupted.
In expressing the hope that the Union Government will agree, as in the case of
Ghana, to recognise the Federation of Malaya as a Member country of the
Commonwealth as from the date of its independence on August 31st, you might, if
you see fit, go on to emphasise the cogent political arguments which are advanced in
the latter part of the enclosed memorandum in favour of this course.3 The case for
accepting Malaya as a member of the Commonwealth in order to help her to resist
3 The final para read as follows: ‘It none the less remains true that Malaya is in the forefront of the
struggle for Communist domination of South East Asia. It is therefore all the more important that the
Federation should continue to have the benefit of the moral backing of the Commonwealth connection no
less than the material support of Commonwealth forces to assist them in the struggle. The issue is really
whether it is to the advantage of the Commonwealth as a whole that the newly independent Malaya should
remain within the Commonwealth and so have this all important guidance and backing, or be left out on a
limb to continue the struggle as an individual foreign country on their own. In the latter case, as Malayan
Ministers themselves recognise, the chances of their being able successfully to resist the encroaching Red
tide would be seriously reduced’ (no 2, 2 Apr 1957).
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Communism and to become a viable independent state capable of withstanding
external and internal trouble (in contrast with, for instance, Indonesia) is of course
of more general application. You may find it useful in speaking to Mr. Strijdom to
play up this argument.
I hope that you will shortly be receiving a message for Mr. Strijdom about possible
dates for the next Prime Ministers’ Meeting, and that soon after we shall be able to let
him have, through you, our suggestions for the items which might be included in
the draft agenda of the meeting. It would certainly be our intention that the
admission of Malaya to membership of the Commonwealth should be discussed at
the next meeting, though whether we would put the item formally upon the agenda I
do not yet know. I imagine that you might think it best to wait until we are in a
position to put specific suggestions about the topics that might be discussed at the
meeting before you deploy the arguments about Malaya.
In view of its general interest, I am sending copies of this correspondence to all
our other posts for information.
258 DO 35/8095, no 5 29 June 1959
[Hong Kong: views expressed at talks between Prince Philip and the
prime minister]: CRO brief by J Chadwick for Lord Home
The Kowloon Lease on the Chinese mainland expires in 1997. The question is what
will then become of the Colony of Hong Kong. Can we hold it even until that date, or
should we think now of preparing to withdraw?
Basically (as the last War showed) we hold Hong Kong only by the grace of the
dominant power on the Chinese mainland. We should probably continue to trade
with the territory whether or not it was in our hands.
For the Commonwealth Relations Office the following points have to be borne in
mind:—
(a) It would be essential to consult other Commonwealth Governments before any
change in Hong Kong’s status was decided on.
(b) There is an emotional Canadian interest in the Colony (heavy losses in the
defence of the Island in 1941; War Graves). Australia and New Zealand have in the
past had a vital strategic interest in seeing that Hong Kong remained a
Commonwealth bastion in a Communist dominated area (although the strategic
value of Hong Kong is now rapidly dwindling). The large Chinese minority in
Malaya (and even more so in Singapore) might well be influenced to our
disadvantage if 21⁄2 million anti-Communist Chinese in Hong Kong were to be
sacrificed before they need be to Communist China. There is a small number of
Indian and Pakistani citizens permanently settled in the Colony. They would
probably not wish to find themselves behind the Bamboo Curtain.
(c) There is no desire on the part of the Colony to obtain any more advanced
status. We are, therefore, not faced by agitation which might lead in the face of
opposition to demands for absorption into China.
(d) There are in brief considerable Commonwealth arguments in favour of
maintaining the status quo in Hong Kong for as long as possible. While we could
not hope successfully to resist intervention from the mainland there seems no
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reason to encourage the Communist Chinese, by overt action on our part nearly
40 years before the Kowloon Lease expires, to believe that we are packing up.1
1 See also document nos 9 & 10 above.
259 CO 1030/769, nos 6–9 23–24 Nov 1959
[Current problems in Hong Kong]: briefs by J C Burgh and Lord Perth
for Mr Macleod’s meeting with Sir R Black (Hong Kong) [Extract]
I. Financial
Sir Robert Black will ask the Secretary of State to consider a grant of say, £2 million
sterling to Hong Kong as a badly needed gesture to show Hong Kong that H.M.G. is
not losing interest in it and is not on the way out.
2. The Chinese consider Hong Kong to be Chinese territory and no doubt intend
sooner or later to regain control of it. They do their best all the time to build up their
influence in the Colony and to condition its people to regard it as part of China.
There is, however, no indication that the Chinese Government plan to try to regain
Hong Kong in the near future. It is useful to them commercially, as a means of
getting foreign exchange, and as a window on the world.
3. An attempt to take the Colony by force would carry the risk of general
hostilities with the West, including that of nuclear attack. We wish to maintain that
apprehension in the Chinese mind, but equally wish to avoid causing them to think
that Hong Kong may be used as a base for attack against themselves since that might
precipitate action by them against the Colony. Our policy towards Peking is therefore
to be firm, but not provocative.
4. Overt aggression by the Chinese is less likely than an attempt to get the
Colony by subversion. The Chinese Communists have it in their power to create
serious disturbances in Hong Kong at any time owing to the penetration by
communist unions of most of the essential services in the Colony and the
communists’ control over the main sources of the Colony’s food supplies. They
would hope to create a situation which could serve as a pretext for entering the
Colony to restore order.
5. It is therefore vital for us to preserve law and order in the Colony. Our ability
to do this depends essentially on the confidence of the local Chinese population in
our intention to stay with them and support them and in our ability to defend them.
The majority of them are politically inarticulate; their wish is to trade and to survive.
They do not wish to be on the losing side, and once confidence starts to slip, in
however small a way, the process will be cumulative and there will be an increasing
tendency to make terms with the other side. Any sign of weakening of will on our
part would have most damaging consequences.
6. It is the Governor’s view that a succession of things, done or not done, by
H.M.G. in the last two years has in some respects shaken confidence in the Colony in
our intention to remain there. An impression has begun to be created that it is
“expendible.” . . .
11. The fact is that Hong Kong is a relatively wealthy Colony which over the last
ten years has had annual budget surpluses. In relation to the needs for other British
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Colonies no convincing arguments can be adduced for aid to Hong Kong on financial
and economic grounds. We believe that Sir Robert Black himself recognises this, but
in Hong Kong the failure to give financial help in their refugee problem is contrasted
with, for instance, the price exacted for the naval lands.
12. Sir Robert considers that H.M.G. should take some action to restore confi-
dence in Hong Kong. While any action must inevitably be expressed in financial terms,
the reason for it would not be economic, but political. Sir Robert will ask the Secretary
of State, and we support his request, for a grant from H.M.G. of, say, £2 million to help
the Colony with its refugee problem in the context of World Refugee Year.
13. The Secretary of State will recall that the idea for the World Refugee Year
came from the “Bow Group” and was taken up by H.M.G. in the United Nations where
it received overwhelming support. H.M.G. has decided to contribute £200,000 and it
has indicated to the organisers of the World Refugee Year Committee in the U.K. that
they would like to see one-third of this amount devoted to the needs of refugees in
Hong Kong.
14. World Refugee Year would be an excellent pretext for the political gesture
desired by Sir Robert Black. It would eliminate the difficulty of creating a precedent
for requests from other territories. It presents a combination of unusual, perhaps
unique, opportunities. First, World Refugee Year is itself universally recognised as a
once-for-all operation. Secondly, Hong Kong is the only British Colony with a
refugee problem and one recognised to be of appalling proportions. And thirdly, a gift
of this magnitude could not fail to redound to Britain’s credit internationally.
II. Immigration control
Approximately one million inhabitants, of a population of nearly three million, are
refugees from China. They have entered the Colony during the last decade following
the disintegration of the Nationalist Government in 1948/49 and the establishment of
the Chinese People’s Government on 1st October 1949. This influx of people, intensi-
fied by the natural increase in the population, has posed tremendous problems for the
Hong Kong Government, which has tackled them virtually unaided with great enter-
prise and imagination. Although perhaps 300,000 people are still living in wretched
conditions as squatters on hillsides and rooftops, approximately the same number have
been accommodated in vast new multi-storey resettlement estates.
2. The need for immigration control. The resettlement programme must be
accompanied by strict immigration control. A large proportion of the Chinese
refugees seek refuge in Hong Kong from the intolerable living conditions in China.
They have done so in the past despite the economic miseries of life for many of them
in overcrowded Hong Kong; and the better conditions are in Hong Kong, the more
temptingly it beckons. But Hong Kong is too small to absorb yet more and more
people; with its pre-war population of 1.6 million it was regarded as filled to capacity.
3. There are two other important reasons for effective immigration control.
First, the Chinese will be quick to cash in on social discontent if the population
swells to a point where its basic needs can no longer be met. Secondly, United
Kingdom industries critical of Hong Kong competition find it difficult to understand
why they should be undercut by products made largely by non-British, Chinese
labour, albeit in a British Colony. . . .
J.C.B.
23.11.59
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(1) On the suggestion for a grant of £2m. sterling, this I suspect will be difficult to
get agreed by colleagues who have not (including the Prime Minister) over much
sympathy for a Colony which they rightly consider is rich. On the other hand the
Admiralty do appear to have driven a pretty hard bargain, and if there were to be a
grant it could clearly be a once for all related to the World Refugee Year. Incidentally
the initial subscription of £200,000 by H.M.G. was only arrived at after a great deal of
pressure on the Treasury.
(2) On the immigration question, I have personally been consistently worried
about it, feeling that the people of Hong Kong have not really tackled it with
sufficient energy. The Governor knows my views and indeed I had quite a talk with
him about it a few days ago. Illegal immigration has been proceeding over the last
years at around 100,000 a year and there is no obvious reason why this should
diminish unless the strongest preventative steps are taken. These are estimated to
cost £1m. a year and even then would not be fully effective.
Personally I believe that if this £1m. a year prevented half of the illegal
immigration, it would prove immensely worth while both materially and from the
point of view of the long term future of Hong Kong.
Materially the cost of housing over the next ten years for half-a-million refugees
plus all the municipal services would certainly exceed the £1m. annually of the pre-
ventative service. Having said this, I do recognise that the coming of the refugees
has other economic benefits to the Colony as a whole. The influx of new labour
keeps down labour costs; the needs of food, clothing, housing etc., even if paid for
by the Government, are a profit to many citizens, and so on. Indeed it is my belief
that this is one of the reasons why the pressure to stop illegal immigration is not
greater.
More important than the material argument is to me the fact that inevitably if
immigration continues at the present rate there will come a moment when Hong
Kong will be the ripest of plums to drop into the Chinese lap. If only we can cut
down the rate of immigration, to that extent we would have a chance of putting off
the date when the plum drops. Even today it is probably true to say that there are
one million Chinese refugees in Hong Kong who have come in, often illegally, and
who in a sense may well have their first loyalty to China as they have only recently
come to Hong Kong. In another ten years the figure might be a further million
unless a preventative service operates effectively. Furthermore I believe that this
great influx of Chinese makes it extremely difficult for us to support the case of
Hong Kong in our markets or the markets of the rest of the world. When their
goods flood in we cannot truly say these are goods from colonial territories when
we know that there is Chinese capital and Chinese people so largely producing
them.
For the above reasons I believe we should press the Governor very hard to start the
preventative service, even at a cost of £1m. a year.
(3) It occurs to me that no Colonial Minister has visited Hong Kong in a very
long time. Would it help from the neglect angle if one of us—and I am quite a ready
candidate!—paid a visit within say the next six months?
P.
24.11.59
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260 PREM 11/3276 17 Mar 1960
[South-East Asian issues]: letter from Mr Macmillan to Lord Selkirk
[The earl of Selkirk had only recently taken up his post as UK commissioner-general for
South-East Asia, so Macmillan directed that a ‘cheerful and encouraging’ reply should be
prepared to his report (17 Feb 1960) about the conference of regional governors and
envoys meeting at Eden Hall in Singapore, 20–23 Jan 1960. In a postscript, Selkirk wrote:
‘As elsewhere your Cape Town speech made a great impact here’. The reply was drafted by
Sir N Brook, and made ‘somewhat more colloquial’ by P de Zulueta.]
Thank you very much for your letter about the Eden Hall Conference which I was very
interested to read. I am sure that these meetings are very useful because they help peo-
ple to consider the problems of South East Asia as a whole. Of course it is a very impor-
tant part of the world not only for us but for the West in general, and I was encouraged
by what you told me. Certainly I think that our policy has been surprisingly success-
ful and that we must continue to act as vigorously and intelligently as we can.
English teaching is, as you say, of great importance. Fortunately we have a scheme
now being examined to set up an English Institute in South East Asia, possibly in
Kuala Lumpur. I am not sure yet if this scheme will come off, but in any case we are
planning a meeting of experts at Makerere College in Uganda in January, 1961.
Equally important, perhaps, is the need to have more of our people speaking oriental
languages. On this I have nothing concrete to report, but I hope that we shall be able
to give you some help.
Service Attachés are also important and there is a plan to increase the posts in
South East Asia by adding a Naval Attaché at Djakarta, an Assistant Naval Attaché at
Rangoon, and Military Attachés in Vietnam and Cambodia. I hope that we shall be
able to tell you soon that this increase has been possible, since we must do all we can
to stiffen the South East Asian countries although I suppose that if we stress military
aid too much, we may alarm the more timid. In this connection it is annoying that
the Malayans will not co-operate and we are considering what can be done to change
their mind. Perhaps we can talk to the Tunku1 at the Commonwealth meeting.
Anyway, as you say we must keep his goodwill.
Economically it is more difficult. We have almost doubled the Government
assistance to the less developed countries since 1957/58 and now we devote
something like 11⁄4 per cent of our national income to helping them. A large share of
our future capital lending will go to India and estimates for the Colombo Plan
technical assistance for next year are 10 per cent up. Really, of course, we are limited
in what we do by our own economic position.
I am sure that you are right about Singapore. Some of our neighbours are
understandably nervous but I think that they are wrong. The present constitutional
arrangements really make it less likely that we shall have to decide soon whether to
stay or go. If we had not given internal self-government we should by now have a
Cyprus situation in Singapore with the Chinese playing the part of the Greeks. As it
is, we at least have a Government in Singapore which is not pro-China. That
Government is conducting our battle for us and although it may lose, we shall at
least have gained time. The real difficulty is how to help the Singapore Government
without appearing to do so.
1 Abdul Rahman, Tunku (prince) Putra, prime minister of Federation of Malaya, Aug 1957–Feb 1959, and
from Aug 1959.
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I hear a lot about the vigour with which you are tackling the various problems
which you have found. I am really grateful for all the hard work you are putting in
and you know that we will do everything we can to help. Incidentally, I was very glad
to know that you had a good reception from Ayub and Nehru;2 I am sure it is very
important to keep as close to them as we can.
2 ie, in his journey across Pakistan and India. F-M M Ayub Khan was president of Pakistan, 1958–1969.
261 DO 169/10, no 78 24 Aug 1961
[Greater Malaysia]: letter from Lord Selkirk to Mr Macleod about
prospects for the scheme
I think the time has come when it is necessary to consider how far a crash
programme for the “Greater Malaysia” scheme is desirable and practicable. As I see it,
the situation is as follows.
2. Lee Kuan Yew has not been successful in riding the Communist tiger and was
in danger of being gobbled up. He has however now broken with the Communists
and, if he can obtain merger on reasonable terms, is apparently prepared to take a
firm stand. The original Communist concept was to accept merger as a long-term
aim in the belief that, on the one hand, it would give them a broader base from which
to work for the Communisation of the whole peninsula, and, on the other, that it was
unlikely to be achieved in the near future. Meanwhile they would continue in
Singapore to undermine the P.A.P.1 with a view to ultimately taking it over. In these
calculations they may not have fully grasped the implications for them of giving the
Tunku control of Singapore. At all events it appears that they have now realised that
if the Tunku takes over internal security in Singapore, they will be much more
directly threatened than they were by the present Internal Security Council.
3. Lee is now mad keen to achieve merger and indeed sees in it the only possible
salvation for his own political future and his party, the P.A.P. If he fails to get merger
by the end of the year, he will probably have to face a general election where he would
lose to the new left-wing “Barisan Socialis”2 manipulated by the Communists.
Alternatively, he may try to force us to suspend the Constitution and take over. We
have to decide whether it is worth trying to save him. On balance, I think it is,
though this opinion might have to be revised in the light of Singapore developments.
Certainly, no other Singapore political leader (except Lim Yew Hock)3 would be likely
to fight for merger. The successor to Lee will almost certainly present us with
demands for a further measure of independence, if not more. The problem is,
however, whether there is any hope of getting the Tunku to move in time.
4. Tunku Abdul Rahman is quite keen to take over Singapore since he now
realises the political danger. But he believes it is politically impossible for him to do
this unless he can explain to his Malay electors that he has some counter weight to
the large chunk of Chinese who constitute the bulk of the population of Singapore.
This means the Borneo territories.
1 People’s Action Party, founded in 1954, which came to power in 1959; its leader Lee Kuan Yew was
prime minister of Singapore, 1959–1990.
2 A newly-formed party, with Lim Chin Siong as secretary-general.
3 Chief minister of Singapore, 1956–1959 (Singapore Labour Front government).
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5. All three Borneo territories are quite unfitted as yet to enter an association of
this sort on the basis of popular representation. But they will continue to be so
unfitted for many years to come. I should give Sarawak about ten years and North
Borneo at least twenty years before a clear-out electoral opinion could be given on
this subject. This means bluntly that if we proceed by normal constitutional
methods, and assuming the Tunku will not compromise, merger between the
Federation and Singapore is virtually out.
6. But I believe it may be possible to give the Tunku enough association with the
Borneo territories to justify his closer association with Singapore in the eyes of his
Malay population. In the sort of picture I have in mind, which is one which I have
only tentatively formulated and which I am bound to admit contains many
difficulties, Singapore would become a self-governing state of the Federation with
much more extensive powers than the other States; something on the lines of Ulster.
The Kuala Lumpur Government would, however, be responsible for defence, foreign
policy and internal security. The powers of internal security would necessarily
require to be fairly extensive to be acceptable to the Federation. The great advantage
of the Tunku taking over foreign policy is that it would effectively prevent Chinese or
Russian missions being set up in Singapore. The Borneo territories would be
substantially in the same position, subject to certain safeguards. That is to say, they
would send to Kuala Lumpur the same number of representatives as Singapore. If
the Singapore representatives were increased, the Borneo territories should be
increased. That should reasonably safeguard the parliamentary position. The Borneo
representatives would of course have to be nominated, which Tun Razak4 quite
specifically told me he would be perfectly satisfied to accept.
7. I can see at first sight that such an arrangement might not greatly appeal to
the Governors, particularly in so far as it meant their being subordinated in some
way to the Kuala Lumpur Government in respect of internal security. It is of course
not the ideal for them, but failing some such solution the future of their territories
will present an increasing problem to which it is hard to see the ultimate answer. I
think in fact that their requirements could be met in fair measure by forming a
Borneo Defence Council in Kuala Lumpur on which the U.K. High Commissioner
would necessarily sit and which would be specially charged with the problems of
defence and internal security of the Borneo territories.
8. Such a plan does, of course, involves a number of considerable risks. The
Borneo territories might very well react violently against it. They have, however, had
in Singapore recently a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference which
has been open to the press. The representatives of the Borneo territories have come a
very long way in saying that they support Greater Malaysia in principle, and there
have latterly been several further indications that, if handled properly, the local
peoples will be prepared to go along with the idea.
9. It would of course be essential that British staff should remain for some
considerable time and should be assured of doing so. I have no doubt that the
existing peace and quiet which runs throughout the Borneo territories is entirely
due to the quality and manner in which the British staff carry out their duties. The
4 The Tunku’s trusted lieutenant and eventual successor, formerly known as Dato Abdul Razak bin
Hussein, a civil servant until 1955; deputy prime minister of Malaya, 1957–1963, and of Malaysia,
1963–1970; prime minister, 1970–1976.
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Federation Government appear to be quite willing to give the fullest undertaking in
regard to this matter and could be kept up to it through the Borneo Defence Council
or some similar organisation in Kuala Lumpur. There would have to be, I do not
doubt, a provision enabling any of the territories to opt out within a period of say five
years if they should wish to do so. I should have thought something of this sort
would be essential to satisfy local sentiment as well as to meet backbench criticism in
the House of Commons. In any case I think it is a desirable safeguard.
10. This leaves the question of defence. On this subject there has been a great
deal of discussion and I will not go into details here. But I believe that basically, if we
can get the political organisation right, we can fit in defence requirements with the
broad agreement of the people concerned. I think it is important that we do so and in
any case, unless the defence arrangements are broadly accepted by the people, they
will not be of long duration.
11. Of course all this is putting tremendous confidence in Tunku Abdul Rahman.
We cannot foresee precisely his political life but he seems to be very reasonably estab-
lished and we have to take a chance on the irresponsible remarks which he makes from
time to time. There will be considerable difficulties and the scheme may seem so loose
that it hardly constitutes a political unity. These are all risks which I think have got to
be run. But I have come to the conclusion that, unless we are prepared to take a
chance, we may miss the psychological moment in the tide of the affairs of men which
would enable the foundations to be laid for the only stable evolution of these territo-
ries which seems to me and most of our advisers to be sound.
12. There is one further possibility, which has been suggested by Lee Kuan Yew,
i.e. that if Brunei by itself were to join the Federation now, the Tunku might agree to
early merger for Singapore if offered some prospect of North Borneo and Sarawak
being brought in at a later stage and an assurance of our intention to work to this
end. A union of Brunei with Malaya would not of course present the same
constitutional, social or economic difficulties as exist in the case of the other two
territories. It is by no means certain that the Tunku would be prepared to
contemplate such a proposal or indeed that it would be acceptable on the Brunei
side. But the possibility may be worth exploring.
13. Some of the above points have been touched upon in Melville’s letter of
August 11 to the Governors and White, of which I have just seen a copy. It is
encouraging to know that the problem is under active study in London. I am not sure
however whether Melville’s main suggestion of a declaration of intent will go far
enough to satisfy the Tunku. It may therefore be worthwhile to consider the
admittedly more drastic and far-reaching solution which I have outlined above. . . .
262 DO 169/29, no 185A 16 Sept 1961
[Greater Malaysia]: letter from Lord Selkirk (South-East Asia) to Mr
Macleod about the scheme and the problem of the Borneo territories
Dear Iain,
In my telegram No. 41 I have given a short answer to the point about relinquishment
of sovereignty in your telegram No. 360 on Greater Malaysia. I am now writing to
give you my further comments.
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2. In my letter of August 24,1 I said that I thought the time had come when it was
necessary to consider a crash programme for “Greater Malaysia”. I should like first to
recapitulate the various reasons why I consider that such a programme is necessary.
(i) We must look at the whole scheme against the background of our overall policy
in the area. In my earlier letters and despatches on the subject I have made it plain
that I believe that “Greater Malaysia” would be an important factor for stability in the
area and that it would satisfy long-term British and Commonwealth interests.
(ii) Owing to the speed and manner in which the situation is now developing
there is a serious risk that unless Greater Malaysia can be achieved in the near future,
the opportunity may be lost for good. This is due to a combination of circumstances
in the various territories involved, i.e., notably:—
(a) For the first time we have governments in both the Federation and in
Singapore that are actively in favour of Greater Malaysia; this may never recur.
(b) The present Singapore Government will almost certainly fall in the next few
months if rapid progress cannot be made. If this happens there will be no prospect
of merger as long as the Tunku remains in power in Kuala Lumpur.
(c) If we do not bring the Borneo territories in now (i.e. by 1963–64) so that the
Greater Malaysia plan fails, the long-term alternatives for them would be
independence or absorption by Indonesia or China. The first of these alternatives is
not likely to be maintained and would probably lead to the second. Moreover it is
certain that if we do not take the opportunity presented by the Tunku’s present
initiative, we cannot expect to remain in the Borneo territories for another ten or
twenty years. The Tunku’s proposals have already made their impact on political
consciousness there and, whatever happens, we must expect demands for political
change to come forward with much greater urgency than they have hitherto.
(d) The Tunku has, to a considerable extent, staked his political future and
reputation on the success of his “Greater Malaysia” proposals. If they fail, it will be
a set-back for him which could be damaging to his position at home. Moreover
failure will be blamed on us, and this would mean a serious blow to our present
good relations with the Tunku. We should be faced with an angry and resentful
Tunku over Singapore and over other problems.
(e) This may be our last chance to prevent Chinese preponderance in the area
which must inevitably involve a serious risk of ultimate Communist domination.
3. Before I set out my further comments on how the Borneo territories might fit
into the Greater Malaysia concept I should like to say this about our own policy
there. We must of course continue our efforts to train the peoples of those territories
for self-government and to bequeath to them respect for the rule of law. But we have
at the same time to face up to the fact that “one man, one vote” has not been a wild
success in South East Asia. In my view therefore our greatest contribution to the
future stability of the Borneo territories has been and will be made in the fields of
administration and of education and in such economic spheres as communications,
land utilization and agriculture.
4. I said in my telegram No. 41 that I thought we could surrender sovereignty in
the Borneo territories provided that satisfactory arrangements were made for us to
continue making this contribution until such time as the local people are ready to
1 See previous document; and, for the background, the introductory note to the next document.
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run their own affairs at the State level. We want the Tunku to assume sovereignty
over Singapore and it would certainly be logical for him to want the Borneo
territories to join a Greater Malaysia on essentially the same basis. Moreover, I doubt
if it would be wise to share sovereignty with the Federation even in the unlikely event
of our being able to induce the Tunku to do so, lest we lend countenance to the
allegation that Greater Malaysia is a plot for the preservation of British imperialism.
5. The basic problem is how to ensure that the constitutional provisions for the
Borneo territories are properly worked out, put to the territories for their consent
and then enacted in such a way that the people in the territories can be assured that
they will in due course be brought into full operation, while at the same time making
progress as rapidly as the Tunku and Lee Kuan Yew require. I suggest that the best
way of doing this would be to negotiate now State constitutions for the Borneo
territories with whatever State powers, financial provisions and so-forth that are
desirable. These constitutions would include provision for representative institutions
and for the Governors ultimately to be in similar positions to the Governors of
Penang and Malacca. The constitutions would, however, come into force in stages
and, in this way, the pace of constitutional advance could be suited to the territory. At
the same time the important requirement of an assured ultimate constitutional
position would be achieved by enacting these constitutions by means of appropriate
legislative action in both the United Kingdom and the Federation. This legislation in
the Federation would provide that these constitutions would be capable of
amendment only in the same way as the Federal constitution itself, thereby
entrenching them to the same extent.
6. If the suggestion I have outlined is constitutionally feasible it remains to
determine to whom the Governors would be responsible for the administration of the
Borneo territories at the State level until they are ready to administer themselves and
the full provisions of their State constitutions have been brought into operation. In
addition, there must be some means of deciding when each suspended section of the
State constitution should become effective. Broadly speaking, there seems to be
three possible alternatives.
7. The first of these is to trust the Tunku absolutely. By this I mean that we make
the Governors finally responsible to Kuala Lumpur and leave it to the Tunku to
decide when the State constitution can become fully operative. The difficulty here is
that the Tunku does not want to take over colonies and the Borneo territories do not
want to become colonies of the Federation (the Ibans for example are not Moslems
and do not relish being administered by Moslems). The other obvious disadvantage of
this course is that it would probably undermine the morale of the expatriates in the
Borneo territories with the result that our further contribution to their future
stability would be much reduced.
8. The second alternative is that the Governors should continue to be
responsible to London. In other words, although sovereignty was transferred to the
Federation they would agree to derogate from it to the extent of leaving direction of
State administration to H.M.G. for a transitional period. This would presumably re-
assure the local people and the administrators, but it would hardly appeal to the
Tunku. Moreover, I should have thought that H.M.G., on the analogy of the Central
African Federation, might not like it either.
9. Both these alternatives could, of course, be modified by various measures of
joint responsibility and consultation. But if this is to be the case, it seems to me worth-
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while to think in terms of formal machinery. This might be done by setting up by
agreement with the Federation Government a Joint Trust Council for the Borneo ter-
ritories. There are obviously various possibilities for the membership of this council
which I will not go into at this stage, but I think it might well be necessary to give the
Federation the chairmanship, at any rate on a rotating basis. The powers of the coun-
cil would include the ability to give the Governors, who would, I hope, be prepared to
continue in office in these circumstances, general guidance on State matters, the
future selection and appointment of new Governors and the power to decide on the
introduction of successive stages in the State constitutions. The Council would not
however meet too frequently and the Governors should be able to conduct day to day
affairs without interference from it. As a concomitant of this arrangement it would be
essential to include in the constitutional arrangements provision for the establish-
ment immediately of a Public Service Commission with powers to make recommen-
dations only to the Governor and to have it agreed that the Governor would act solely
in his discretion in matters affecting the Public Service. I would hope in this way to
postpone for some time the need to introduce a scheme of compensation for expatri-
ate officers, though I realise that in due course this would have to come as the pres-
sure increases, as it surely will, for increased Borneonisation.
10. So far, I have been primarily concerned with the interests of the peoples of
the Borneo territories. From H.M.G.’s point of view there is also the need for a
satisfactory arrangement on Defence. This I envisage would take the form of an
extension of the Malayan Defence Agreement to cover the Borneo territories, as well
as Singapore. It must however be on a basis that would make it clear to the
Federation Government that they were responsible for their own defence and that we
were merely helping them to achieve their objective, probably through some form of
Defence Council in Kuala Lumpur. It would also have to be understood that they
would be prepared to undertake to co-operate in assuring the Defence and Internal
Security of remaining British territories in this area. Such arrangements would
necessarily presuppose goodwill and continuous consultation between the two
Governments. Such goodwill is fundamental to the whole concept of Greater
Malaysia and at this stage we must assume it.
11. I realise that it will not be easy to persuade the Tunku to accept the arrange-
ments I have proposed above even though we are prepared to cede sovereignty over the
Borneo territories. The opting out clause for the Borneo territories which I advocated
in my letter of August 24 would obviously make the scheme very much easier to put
across there, but I am seriously wondering whether, in the light of Tory’s2 telegram No.
651 of September 7 to the Commonwealth Relations office, there is any chance of get-
ting the Tunku to agree to it. That being so, and since some way must be found of con-
sulting the peoples of the Borneo territories before they are irrevocably committed to
Greater Malaysia, the only alternative is some form of consultation within the next year
or two. At first sight this may sound impracticable, but we should not forget the speed
with which other former colonies at least as underdeveloped as North Borneo and
Sarawak have been asked to decide their future. While still without any substantial expe-
rience of managing their own affairs, Singapore may hold a referendum towards the
end of this year. Obviously, we could not move as quickly as that but popular consulta-
tion in the Borneo territories in, say, late 1962 would be a very different proposition.
2 Sir Geofroy Tory, high commissioner in Federation of Malaya since 1957.
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This would mean that the Tunku would have to accept that the inclusion of the Borneo
territories was subject to the will of the people there as expressed in 1962, but there
would be no provision for opting out once Greater Malaysia had been chosen. Of course
the risk of an adverse vote would have to be incurred but if we believe, as I think we do,
that the people must be consulted at some stage, this would have to be faced sooner or
later. The Tunku may not much like this, but since, us Tory has said in his telegram No.
652 of September 7 to the Commonwealth Relations Office he believes that we could
swing public opinion in the Borneo territories in favour of Greater Malaysia, he might
be prepared to agree if it comes to the point. There would still be the problem that the
Tunku would presumably not finally accept Singapore until the outcome of the Borneo
Consultation was known but this also need not be an insuperable difficulty.
12. If we had a crash programme on the lines I have described with such
consultations as the Governors think fair in the Borneo territories in about twelve
months’ time we should clearly have to try to ensure that the result was the one that
we and the Tunku wanted. I am quite sure that the influence of the administrations
in the Borneo territories is very considerable and that whatever is said about Greater
Malaysia by Her Majesty’s Government, by the Governors and by their District
Officers will carry very great weight with the local people. Conversely silence would
be taken as disapproval of the scheme. I recall the criticism in the case of the Central
African Federation that there had at the time of its introduction been no firm
instructions to District Officers in the protectorate to take a positive line in support
of it. I believe this point was commented on in the Monckton Report. It is therefore
essential for its success that any Greater Malaysia scheme should have the full
support of the local administrations on whom would fall the task of explaining its
implications and of setting its practical advantages against the immense problems
that would otherwise face the peoples of the Borneo territories when they became
independent. I believe that the Greater Malaysia scheme would be in the long term
interests of the Borneo peoples and that we can tell them this in all sincerity.
13. I realise that there are many other important aspects to be considered that I
have not dealt with in this letter. A joint Working Party will clearly have to be set up
to produce a detailed plan once the broad heads of agreement have been reached at
the top level discussions. I think a scheme on these lines could be worked out and the
prospective results merit the risks involved. The Tunku is very keen on this concept
and would, I believe, co-operate in the organisational change. . . .
Geordie
P.S. I am sending copies also to Alec & Duncan.3
3 ie, Lord Home and Mr Sandys.
263 CAB 131/26, D(61)66 24 Oct 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: Cabinet Defence Committee memorandum by Mr
Amery (Air)
[The idea of political association between Malaya, Singapore, and the British territories in
Borneo (North Borneo, Sarawak, and the protected state of Brunei) had first been mooted
soon after the Second World War. This ‘Grand Design’ appealed to British planners
mainly as a way of gaining control of Singapore before the communists did. It was not,
however, until 1961 that it became a practicable proposition, when in May the prime
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minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman, spoke out publicly in favour of the project.
Though he was worried about the Malay/Chinese racial balance, inclusion of the Borneo
territories would act as a counterbalance against the Chinese. The Tunku’s initiative was
broadly welcomed by the British government, though not by Mr Amery, who had long
been keenly interested in the Singapore base. On 22 Nov 1961 the British and Malayan
prime ministers issued a joint statement that they had agreed ‘Malaysia’ was a desirable
aim, but they must first ascertain the views of the people of North Borneo and Sarawak
and of the sultan of Brunei—a recognition that they could not force the pace of local
opinion or bundle them into a shot-gun marriage. Meanwhile there was a hotly debated
referendum in Singapore, where Lee Kuan Yew’s government favoured the merger but
the opposition parties did not. The Cobbold Commission in the Borneo territories yielded
positive answers, and in Aug 1962 the two governments announced that ‘Malaysia’ would
come into existence by 31 Aug 1963.]
South East Asia forms the land bridge between China and Australia in much the
same way as the Middle East forms the land bridge between Russia and Africa. It also
offers China the best access routes to India and Pakistan.
2. It is important to deny South East Asia to China:—
(i) because of our extensive investments (rubber, tin and oil) and commercial
interests in the region;
(ii) because its fall would pose an immediate threat to Australia and to India and
Pakistan.
3. The defence of South East Asia will depend mainly upon the United States; but
it will be important for us to have the means of influencing American policy in the
area. A British military presence, including nuclear power, will be necessary for this
purpose. It will also be important to our relations with Australia and New Zealand.
Besides, Britain, alone or at least with the help of Australia and New Zealand, is still
capable of preventing the subversion of Malaya by the communists or the effective
consolidation of a communist revolution in Indonesia.
4. Singapore constitutes the best and, indeed, the only effective base for a British
military presence in South East Asia. It has excellent Naval, Air Force and Army
facilities. Our legal title to it is unchallengeable. The predominantly Chinese
population must indeed be regarded as potentially hostile in a crisis, but just because
it is Chinese it cannot rely on the support of neighbouring Malaya or Indonesia, nor
will it command much sympathy from world opinion.
5. The British presence in South East Asia today rests upon Singapore. It is now
suggested that we should look upon Singapore as “no more than a forward operating
base on the use of which we could not rely in all circumstances”. But what does this
mean? If operational restrictions are accepted, they apply just as much to a forward
operating base as to a main base. The fact remains that if we want to contribute to
keeping the communists out of South East Asia and if we want to maintain our
influence with Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and the United States on
the other, we must have the effective use of Singapore. Without it our influence in
the area could sink to the level of that of France.
6. The Committee of officials argues that political developments in Singapore
already threaten our position and that Greater Malaysia “offers that only satisfactory
prospect of settling the political problem of Singapore”. But how will Greater
Malaysia settle this problem? If the Chinese communists in Singapore refuse to
remain under the present very indirect form of British rule, are they likely to accept
the more direct rule of a right-wing Malayan Government?
7. It is further argued that Greater Malaysia “would relieve us of a heavy and costly
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military burden in the field of internal security” and so would help towards solving our
manpower and financial problems. But would it, in fact, do so? If the Chinese
communists in Singapore really constitute the formidable internal security problem
for us which the paper alleges, is there any reason to think that the Tunku’s forces can
keep them under control? We are, after all, still helping the Tunku to keep order in his
own northern border province. Is it not more likely that we shall be called back to help,
but only after the situation has deteriorated to what we now see in South Vietnam?
8. If we make deal with the Tunku, it will no doubt last as long as the Tunku
remains in power. But how long can be and his friends hold the position? There is
already considerable opposition to his regime among the Malays. In Greater Malaysia,
the Chinese would be the largest as well as the most efficient single community.
9. The Tunku is our best friend in South East Asia and the fact that he has called
for Greater Malaysia is the strongest argument in favour of the proposal. But what has
brought him to his present view? In the past the Tunku was firmly opposed to any
merger between Malaya and Singapore. H.M.G. has not always favoured a merger. On
earlier occasions it has been held that it was a major British interest to keep Malaya and
Singapore apart. It would appear from certain reports that the Tunku’s change of mind
has been brought about by the belief that H.M.G. are no longer prepared to hold on to
Singapore and that, if he did not seize the opportunity of a merger now, he would soon
be faced with an independent State of Singapore probably under communist control.
10. All this leads me to the conclusion that Greater Malaysia would solve neither
the political nor the internal security problems of Singapore. Instead it would lead to
a loose confederation with a Chinese majority which it would be even more difficult
to maintain under Western influence than the status quo.
11. For these reasons I deeply regret that we should already have gone so far to
commit ourselves to the principle of Greater Malaysia. If therefore the course of the
negotiations shows that the Greater Malaysia principle is not viable, I suggest we
need feel no regret but should concentrate on ways and means of maintaining our
position in Singapore.
12. If, on the other hand, the Greater Malaysia proposal goes forward, then we
should surely decide in advance of talks with the Tunku what are our minimum
defence requirements. It is no doubt right, as the officials’ paper recommends, to begin
by asking for unfettered use of the bases. If, however, the Tunku refuses this, I ques-
tion whether we should be wise to assume “that agreement can and will be reached
and that we, therefore, need not delay such action as can be taken in other ways to pro-
mote the realisation of the Greater Malaysian concept”. The Borneo territories are our
trump card in any negotiation with the Tunku. Ought we to facilitate their merger
with Malaya regardless of progress over defence? Ought we not rather to conduct
negotiations about the Borneo territories in parallel with the negotiations about
defence? It may be that we shall not be able to get a satisfactory defence agreement
out of the Tunku and that we shall have to face a breakdown. In that case we should
be in a much better posture if it could be made to appear that any breakdown was con-
nected with the interests of the Borneo peoples as well as with our own.
13. In considering the detail of a defence agreement we should give
consideration to the creation of Sovereign Base Areas around the main Naval and Air
installations. This would not be too difficult geographically; and the maintenance of
Sovereign rights might enable the Tunku to turn the awkward political corner which
our need to use the bases for S.E.A.T.O. purposes undoubtedly represents.
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14. I conclude:—
(i) that the maintenance of the base in Singapore is essential to the protection of
our interests in South East Asia, including our influence on Australia and on
American policy in South East Asia;
(ii) that Greater Malaysia will not solve the political or security problems
presented by the Chinese population in Singapore but, on the contrary, is bound to
weaken our title to the bases without bringing any lasting relief of our manpower
and financial difficulties;
(iii) that if nevertheless the Greater Malaysia proposal goes forward we should, in
order to achieve a better bargaining position, conduct any negotiations over
defence in parallel with negotiations over the three Borneo territories;
(iv) that we should give consideration to retaining the main Naval and Air Force
installations in Singapore within one or more Sovereign Base Areas.
264 CAB 131/25, D 14(61)6 25 Oct 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: Cabinet Defence Committee meeting minutes
[At a meeting in August, the Chiefs of Staff considered that ‘progress towards the “Grand
Design” offers the best prospect of continued stability in the area’; the freedom of use and
security of Singapore base would be adversely affected, but Australia and Labuan might
provide some alternative (DO 169/28, no 110A, COS(61)259, report, 8 Aug 1961).]
The Committee had before them notes by the Secretary of the Cabinet covering a
report by the Official Committee on Greater Malaysia (D. (61) 62) and a
memorandum on Greater Malaysia by the Secretary of State for Air (D. (61) 66).1
They also had before them a directive from the Prime Minister to the Minister of
Defence on defence policy and strategy (D. (61) 65).2
The Commonwealth Secretary said that the present proposals by Tunku Abdul
Rahman, the Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, for a Greater Malaysia
comprising Malaya, Singapore and the three British Borneo territories represented a
striking change of mind since he had in January of this year discussed with the
Tunku the possibility of a merger of Singapore with Malaya. The Tunku was then
utterly opposed to such a merger despite pressure for it from Mr. Lee Kuan Yew,3 the
Prime Minister of Singapore. In the meantime, however, the shift of political
strength in Singapore away from Mr. Lee towards the extreme Left had evidently
persuaded the Tunku that he must as a matter of urgency incorporate Singapore
while it still had a Government with which he could agree terms acceptable to
Malaya, the alternative being an increase in Singapore of Chinese Communist
influence which he did not trust the British to control. At the same time, the Tunku
was not prepared to take Singapore into the Federation of Malaya unless by then he
could also incorporate the three British Borneo territories, in order that their
predominantly non-Chinese populations should be available to counter-balance the
overwhelmingly Chinese population of Singapore. This presented the British
Government with a difficult problem of timing as the Borneo territories were far
from ready for such an association: in the last analysis we must do what we thought
right about that and not simply abide by local opinion in Borneo, but it would be
important to carry local opinion with us and the Tunku must be made to understand
1 See previous document. 2 Document no 66. 3 Prime minister of Singapore, 1959–1990.
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 738
[264] EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 739
the need to do so. At present he over-rated the strength of Malaya’s attraction in the
Borneo territories. More difficult still was the problem of our bases in Singapore. The
Tunku clearly aimed at getting all the military and economic advantages of a major
British military presence in Malaya and Singapore while subjecting to his veto our
operational use of our bases and other facilities.
We could agree to the creation of a Greater Malaysia subject to reasonable
arrangements for the Borneo territories and satisfaction of our defence
requirements, but we should exercise great caution in the conduct of our first round
of talks with the Tunku next month. He was now so bent upon achieving a Greater
Malaysia that we could afford to insist that our needs, particularly in the field of
defence, must be adequately met. These talks should be regarded as an exploratory
operation, and we should be ready to reserve our position for further consideration at
a later stage if the Tunku’s initial attitude proved intransigent and uncompromising.
The situation in Singapore certainly imparted an element of urgency to the matter
but was not itself immediately decisive.
The Secretary of State for Air said that the issue turned on whether we should be
prepared to maintain our military position in Singapore, and whether we could in fact
do so. In his view our whole position the Far East, and our ability to exert any influ-
ence with our allies—especially the United States, Australia and New Zealand—
depended upon the retention of nothing less than our present rights in both Malaya
(where they were limited) and Singapore (where they were quite unfettered). It was an
illusion to think that, if we withdrew our forces from their internal security role in
Singapore, the Tunku could still safeguard internal security with his own forces. In a
Greater Malaysia the influence of the Chinese was bound to increase and in due course
to prevail. It was asking too much of the Tunku to leave this problem with him; and if
we did so we should find ourselves having to move back again in difficult circum-
stances, such as those now facing the United States in South Vietnam. On the other
hand, if we made the pivot of our policy a determination to stand firm in Singapore
we could succeed in safeguarding our essential interests. The Tunku’s confidence in
us would be restored; non-Communist opinion everywhere would support us; and in
Singapore itself we could count on the advantages of the local economic importance
of our bases and the fact that the Singapore Chinese were an isolated community sur-
rounded by hostile neighbours in Malaya, Indonesia and other countries.
In discussion the general feeling of the Committee supported the view of the
Commonwealth Secretary that in the first round of talks with the Tunku we should
adopt a favourable attitude towards the principle of Greater Malaysia but avoid giving
any impression that we were prepared to implement it forthwith at all costs. We
should bring out into the open all the very real difficulties for us attending the
project, notably the necessity for great care in dealing with the Borneo territories
(where too forceful an approach could not only wreck the whole enterprise but turn
local eyes dangerously in the direction of Indonesia) and the vital importance which
we attached to agreement upon defence arrangements fully adequate to our needs. 
The other main points made in discussion were:
(a) In the long-term we could not afford to go on defending Commonwealth
countries which did not co-operate with us to the full. As was pointed out in the
Prime Minister’s minute of 23rd October to the Minister of Defence,3 and as was clear
3 ie, document no 66 above.
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from the Tunku’s declaration that in a Greater Malaysia our Singapore bases would
not be available for SEATO purposes, we could not assume that our defence facilities
in Malaya and Singapore would indefinitely offer a balance of advantage to us. We
must therefore in any case reconsider our long-term position there but we must also
make every effort to ensure that our present position was not meanwhile further
weakened. In this connexion the Chief of the Defence Staff 4 said that the island of
Labuan had an airfield, a good anchorage, and only some 10,000 inhabitants; if
necessary, Labuan might be to Singapore what Gan was to Ceylon. The island had
been a gift to Queen Victoria, and recently had been administered by North Borneo
purely as a matter of administrative convenience. The Official Committee’s report
had recommended that no mention be made at present of the possibility of our
wishing to retain sovereignty, although this might make it difficult to mention it for
the first time at a later stage. This seemed to be a somewhat unrealistic approach.
(b) In the short term it was very desirable that we should be able to reduce our heavy
commitment to maintain internal security in Singapore; and we should remember that,
if that responsibility passed to the Tunku, he could be expected to find it much easier
than it would be for us to take and sustain repressive measures. For that reason he could
afford to rely upon smaller forces than we had to earmark for internal security. We
needed to obtain this reduction in Singapore for two main reasons. One was the press-
ing requirement for the savings which it would represent in men and money. If we had
indefinitely to keep forces in Singapore for internal security purposes on the present
scale the whole balance of our long-term plans for the Services would be upset as regards
both finance and man-power. The other reason was the urgent demand in other the-
atres for the forces thus tied up in Singapore. On these grounds the achievement of
Greater Malaysia—if we assumed that it would relieve us of responsibility for internal
security—would be most welcome. Moreover, if Greater Malaysia was not in sight before
the review of the Singapore Constitution due in 1963 we were likely to encounter trou-
ble there (as we could even earlier if Mr. Lee and his Government fell). In that case we
should probably have to suspend the Constitution, perhaps for an indefinite period.
Whether or not we suspended the Constitution we should be very ill-placed in Singapore
(or Malaya) if we had to maintain our position in circumstances of local hostility. No
doubt, as experience elsewhere had shown, we could hold the bases for some time—
perhaps quite a long time—against the will of the local Governments and peoples, but
this would inevitably make it extremely difficult to operate effectively from the bases.
We should be in a particular quandary in Singapore since, although the Army could
possibly be moved from the city into the naval and air bases, the bases themselves were
so placed that reorganisation into a relatively compact and easily defensible pattern was
impracticable. The idea of retaining sovereign areas in Singapore had its attractions,
but an arrangement of that kind might not be of great help in practice.
(c) The paragraphs in the officials’ report dealing with finance were as fair a
statement of this issue as was possible at this stage, and there appeared to be no
decisive financial objection to the Greater Malaysia project.
Summing up the discussion the Prime Minister said that the matter was one of
great difficulty since it seemed likely that we should be faced with grave problems
whether or not Greater Malaysia were achieved. Further consideration by Ministers
would be necessary before the discussions with the Tunku took place.
4 Lord Mountbatten.
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265 CAB 128/35/2, CC 63(61)6 16 Nov 1961
‘Greater Malaysia’: Cabinet conclusions on discussions of the project
The Commonwealth Secretary recalled that the Cabinet had previously agreed that
discussions should be held with the Prime Minister of Malaya about the project for a
Greater Malaysia. This project had now been examined by the Ministers concerned,
and exploratory discussions with the Prime Minister of Malaya were to begin on 20th
November.
Broad agreement had been reached between the Governments of Malaya and
Singapore about the terms for a merger. The main remaining problems which would
arise in the coming discussions were—first, the need to retain our defence facilities
in the territories concerned, including those necessary for the fulfilment of our
obligations to the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation and for the deployment of the
Commonwealth brigade; and, second, the means of securing the agreement of the
Governments and peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak, in addition to the
concurrence of the Government of Brunei, to their association in a Greater Malaysia.
As regards the former, the Prime Minister of Malaya no doubt realised that our
ability to fulfil our obligations to the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation was an
essential element in the defence of the whole area, including Malaya, but he had
indicated that he would seek to impose limits on our freedom in the future to use our
existing facilities in Singapore for this purpose. It might be that it would be more
acceptable to him if these facilities were to be regarded in future as available to
Commonwealth forces in the context of a defence agreement for the whole area in
which Australia and New Zealand would join.
The Prime Minister said that it seemed desirable to proceed without delay with the
exploratory discussions since an association of all the territories concerned, if it
could be secured by agreement and in such a way as to provide for our defence
requirements, represented the best hope of providing for the future stability of the
area and avoiding a deterioration of the position in Singapore.1
The Cabinet:—
Took note of these statements.
1 The discussions were successfully completed by 23 Nov (CC 65(61)4).
266 PREM 11/3811, M 86/62 26 Mar 1962
[Ministerial responsibility for Greater Malaysia]: minute by Mr
Macmillan to Mr Sandys
[Lord Cobbold (formerly C F Cobbold, governor of the Bank of England, 1949–1961) was
chairman of the Malaysia Commission of Inquiry (1962) to ascertain views about a
federation of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. Mr Sandys was
urging strongly that Cobbold’s recommendation should be anticipated by putting the
territories under himself as S of S for Commonwealth Relations at once. Macmillan got
T J Bligh to write a ‘tactful’ minute, adding, ‘It might be worth your talking to him too as
you are so good at soothing my colleagues down (24.3.62)’.]
We had a useful discussion on Wednesday, March 21 about the state of play on
Greater Malaysia.
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I have been thinking further about the question of Ministerial responsibility for
this. The first thing to be clear about is the timing. I believe it would be wise to wait
until Cobbold has reported. The Cabinet will then have to consider in the light of this
Report whether to go ahead with the scheme. Those of us who have been most
closely concerned with this are extremely anxious that it should come off.
If the Cabinet accept the policy we shall have to decide how this is to be presented,
whether the Cobbold Report is to be published, and so on. It would, I feel sure, be a
great help in putting this across if we could give it a new impetus by having the
whole scheme under a single Minister. It would all then have a new look.
I hope therefore that you will feel able not to press me for the time being on
transfer of responsibilities. I fully understand the arguments and agree that we must
do all we can to avoid a repetition of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.1
1 ie, with two ministers pulling in different directions. Sandys replied that he ‘entirely agreed’ with the
prime minister’s proposed procedure (minute no 9/62, 27 Mar 62).
267 PREM 11/4183 23 Apr 1963
‘The future defence of Malaysia’: brief for prime minister’s talks with
Lord Selkirk by Sir B Trend (Cabinet Office)
[Macmillan was ‘rather uneasy’ about future defence commitments to Malaysia; the USA
and Australia were hesistant about helping, and Britain might be taking on a ‘formidable
liability’, because ‘Malaysia was encircled unless Indonesia and the Philippines could be
kept neutral’ (PREM 11/4347, minute M 131/63, 3 Apr 1963).] Sukarno opened Indonesian
‘confrontation’ with Malaysia in Feb 1963.]
The discussion of this memorandum1 has been arranged as a preliminary to your talk
with Lord Selkirk on Thursday.
The salient facts are as follows:—
(a) We are committed to bring Malaysia into being by the end of August; and we
cannot now evade this commitment.
(b) We are also committed to help to defend Malaysia when constituted against
external aggression. This is a potentially formidable commitment, since Malaysia
is practically encircled by hostile countries—Indonesia to the west and south, the
Philippines to the east and the rickety structure of Indo-China to the north. Of
Malaysia’s enemies, Indonesia is the most dangerous.
(c) The chances of a reconciliation between Malaysia and Indonesia are very
slight. But the Indonesian threat is more likely to take the form of infiltration
(particularly of the North Borneo Territories) than of overt attack. Even so,
infiltration may take place on a scale which would justify the Malaysians in
regarding it as an “external” attack and therefore invoking our assistance.
(d) The United States will not help us to defend Malaysia except in the event of a
major and direct attack. They will regard it as our business to deal with mere
infiltration. Australia and New Zealand, who have from the first been doubtful of
the political viability of Malaysia, have recently been taking a more robust line; but
they too have so far avoided any specific commitment as regards defence of the
new entity.
1 CP(63)6, by Lord Home.
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(e) The Chiefs of Staff regard the British forces available in South East Asia as
adequate to deal with infiltration (although replacement forces might have to be
sent to Singapore from the United Kingdom). Anything more than infiltration
would require further reinforcements, including V-bombers.
(f) It follows that as long as we are committed to defend Malaysia against attack we
shall be unable—even if attack is limited to infiltration—to make any significant
reduction in our forces in South East Asia. We recently decided that for very
different reasons we could not hope for any saving on our troops in Germany in
the foreseeable future. Little by little the defence “economies”, which the
Chequers meeting undertook to secure, are being shown to be impossible as a
result of our overseas political obligations.
In these circumstances we should ask ourselves two questions:—
(1) Must we accept the political obligation to defend Malaysia as an indefinite com-
mitment? Or is there some alternative policy that we could adopt? The tone of para-
graph 10 (viii)—“we must continue to treat the Indonesians and Philippinoes both
with firmness and with great care and courtesy”—is disappointingly negative. Can
we not take or sponsor some initiative to promote greater political stability in the
area and so enable ourselves gradually to reduce our commitment? Paragraph 9(a)
of the memorandum indicates that once Malaysia is formed the Tunku is prepared
to undertake tripartite discussions with the Indonesians and Philippinoes about
Malaysia’s future relations with them. What could we do—either now or in the near
future—to give some substance to these discussions and to ensure them some pos-
itive outcome?
(2) If we must accept our obligation to Malaysia as being for all practical purposes
one of indefinite duration, should we not seek to share this burden with Australia
and New Zealand? Their expenditures on defence are about 2.7 per cent and 2.0 per
cent of G.N.P. respectively. If these figures were raised—necessarily over a period of
several years—to our own level of 7 per cent of G.N.P., the additional resources made
available would amount to about £320 million a year. This is just about half the fig-
ure which our own defence expenditure in the Far East will probably reach by 1970.
Here again the memorandum is disappointingly cautious—“it is probably wiser
to wait until after Malaysia Day before applying a great deal of extra pressure on
[Australia and New Zealand]”.2 But is any pressure at all being exerted at the moment?
And even if we must wait until intensifying it, should we not already be considering
how much of the burden we can realistically hope to shift onto Australia and New
Zealand in the next year or two; and what form their contribution might best take?
2 Square brackets in the original.
268 PREM 11/4348, FS/63/58 24 June 1963
[Difficulties over negotiations for Malaysia]: minute by Lord Home
(FO) to Mr Sandys
[In Sept 1962 a referendum in Singapore resulted in a decisive majority in favour of the
merger; and Sarawak and North Borneo also confirmed in principle their willingness to
join. The Leg Co of Brunei had previously also supported Brunei’s entry in principle, but
negotiations were broken off by a revolt which broke out in Brunei in Dec 1962. Early in
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Aug 1963 the presidents of Indonesia and of the Philippines put pressure on Malaya to
allow the secretary-general of UNO to ascertain whether the people of North Borneo and
Sarawak genuinely wished to join; he concluded that they both did. This investigation
caused the starting date of Malaysia to be put back to 16 Sept 1963. Singapore left the new
federation in August 1965.]
You must be very concerned at the difficulties which have arisen between Malaya and
Singapore over the negotiations for Malaysia, and also with the deadlock over Brunei.
I see that it has been suggested that the Prime Minister should invite the Tunku, Lee
Kuan Yew and the Sultan of Brunei to London, and you are no doubt considering what
should be said to them, and in particular how we should handle the Tunku’s sugges-
tion that, in the last resort, Malaysia might be formed on August 31 without Singapore
and Brunei. I presume that you will be strongly opposed to this, but I thought it might
be helpful if I were to summarise the foreign policy implications of any solution of this
sort. They would also apply to a decision to allow Malaya, North Borneo and Sarawak
to federate temporarily while pursuing the negotiations with Singapore and Brunei
with a view to bringing the whole of Malaysia into being later on:—
(i) If Singapore fails to get into Malaysia, now or at a later date, there is a strong
likelihood that any arrangements for the continued use of our base there would
fairly soon become unworkable. This would undermine our relationship with the
Americans in the area and our ability to carry out our obligations to SEATO, and
would greatly weaken our whole position in South East Asia.
(ii) The failure of our policy would lead the Indonesians and Filipinos to abandon
any restraint and to go all out for their own territorial ambitions in Borneo. I do
not know what our defence commitments would be towards a lesser Malaysia of
this kind, but I would doubt whether we should be justified in getting involved in
serious military operations with the Indonesians in defence of a Malaysia which
did not include our base at Singapore.
(iii) While the Americans and Australians have made it clear that in the last resort
they would be prepared to help us to defend Malaysia, I am not at all sure that they
would wish to do so if it no longer served the purpose of giving a stable and
permanent future to Singapore.
(iv) The idea of Malaysia is by no means popular with the uncommitted countries,
but if it comes into existence rapidly and as now planned I think it will be widely
accepted and will be received by the United Nations. But a lesser Malaysia would
risk being considered a trick to terminate our own difficulties and would leave so
many problems unresolved that neutral opinion might swing sharply against it,
and I can foresee a very difficult time in the United Nations. . . .
269 PREM 11/4188 5 Aug 1963
[Reflections on the position after negotiation of the Malaysia
agreement]: letter from Mr Macmillan to Lord Selkirk
Thank you for your very interesting letter of June 14 about this year’s Eden Hall
Conference. I thought it better to wait until we had finished our negotiations in
London on the Malaysia Agreement before replying.
The risk in these negotiations that the Tunku might seriously try to go for a “lesser
Malaysia” without Singapore has yet again underlined the significance of Malaysia
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both for the immediate future of South-East Asia and for our own position there. If it
failed to come off, we might find that our immediate position was untenable.
There can be no doubt about the immediate need for us to remain in Singapore to
meet our current strategic commitments. Nor can there be any doubt about the need
for us to try to ensure that Malaysia is successfully launched and, in particular, fulfil
those obligations to the peoples of Borneo and Sarawak to which you rightly referred.
I hope that you will agree that the financial arrangements which we have concluded
should do a good deal to help. The point to which you do not refer, however, is the need
for aid either from the United States or from Australia and New Zealand. I hope that,
now that our own aid is settled, the Federation will take up these questions. I think it
particularly important that both Australia and New Zealand should contribute sub-
stantially to an enterprise which must surely be of great strategic importance for both
of them. The limitations on what both we and the Federation can do make it particu-
larly necessary to get help from other Commonwealth countries which should have
an interest in the success of Malaysia as great as or greater than our own.
In the longer term I hope that our interests will not be entirely dependent upon a
continuing British military presence once Malaysia has been successfully launched.
We are as you know anxious to effect significant economies in our own defence
expenditure in South-East Asia and I would hope that, as the Federation comes to be
established and accepted and as its defence forces are built up, we should be able to
realise this ambition. You pointed out that our stake in India is less than in Malaya.
But it is still pretty large (£300 million in India compared with £400 million in
Malaya), and it has not proved necessary to preserve it through a military presence.
Indeed, the amount of money we spend to keep British troops in South-East Asia
over a few years probably comes to substantially more than our financial stake there.
On the other interesting points raised in your letter, I enclose a memorandum of
comments prepared by officials here, with which I am in general agreement.
I could not end this letter, however, without saying how much I have valued your
work and your advice over the last three years. They have been of crucial importance
both in furthering our interests in South-East Asia generally and above all in helping
to bring about Malaysia.
270 DO 169/242, ff 221–223 11 Dec 1963
‘Malaysia: Confrontation’: despatch from Lord Head (Malaysia) to Mr
Sandys: future British defence commitments [Extract]
[Lord Head (previously high commissioner in Nigeria), as high commissioner in Malaysia,
reported that Sukarno (known locally as Bung)—‘an unpredictable, mystical demagogue
with some resemblance to a minor Hitler’—intended by ‘confrontation, subversion and
propaganda, to break up the new federation and absorb its fractured remains’ but without
losing the support of those Western powers who regarded him as a defender of the region
against communism. Sukarno was first president of Indonesia from 1945 to 1967.]
. . .
Future British commitments in Malaysia
13. First let us assume the best case, i.e., Bung stops confrontation. Because of
the clear indication of Bung’s attitude to Malaysia which confrontation has exposed,
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 745
746 OTHER COLONIES [270]
and taking account of the long period needed for training and expansion before
Malaysian forces are anything like self-sufficient, I do not believe that for at least
three or four years after confrontation stops we are likely to be able to withdraw any
significant quantity of British forces from Malaysia. It would I think be unrealistic to
assume that the cessation of confrontation would be any guarantee that Bung would
not start up again or that at least he would not continue subversion and creating
mayhem throughout. Whatever may happen we should, I suggest, be prepared to face
the prospect of a lasting commitment even on the best of assumptions.
14. What is our likely commitment if confrontation continues? Although I do
not wish to be pessimistic I think it would be very bold to rule out the possibility of
confrontation lasting for three or four years. Confrontation is of course causing
Bung very considerable economic difficulties; but dictators habitually seem capable
of surviving such vicissitudes, especially when they have an external adventure to
divert their suffering people’s attention. Furthermore, Indonesia has been blessed
with abundant fertility and Bung seems to have a certain hypnotic effect on both his
followers and waverers.
15. If it were to continue for a long period one cannot but assume that training
and operational experience will increase the effectiveness and intensity of terrorist
activity. I was closely concerned with our commitments in Mau Mau, Cyprus and
Malaya and the anticipated requirements were in each case exceeded largely because
operations were protracted and the enemy gained in skill and experience.
16. If one assumes a continuance of three or four years and that at some time
during that period internal security problems arise, demanding the assistance of
soldiers, I think it conceivable that the requirement in Borneo might go as high as 12
or even 14 infantry battalions. It is notoriously dangerous to make predictions in
such matters especially as I am not the responsible military authority. Nevertheless I
think it would be unwise to preclude such a commitment although, provided certain
risks could be accepted in Hong Kong and the SEATO strategic reserve, assuming the
three Malaysian and two Australian and New Zealand battalions were available, I
understand that such a demand could initially be met from forces already in this
theatre. If the commitment were to continue at this high level for any length of time
some reinforcement from outside for roulement [sic; enrolment?] purposes would
probably be required.
17. I would however stress that infantry reinforcements would be relatively
ineffectual unless they were matched by an increase in the airlift, particularly
helicopters. Without helicopter backing battalions become static. Helicopters are of
critical importance in operations in Borneo and in view of the mobility they confer
and the consequent economy in forces deployed, I would strongly recommend that
their production and availability should be treated as a war-time emergency.
18. There is one further possibility which must be mentioned. Bung may become
very desperate. Can one entirely rule out a desperate Bung launching an attack
against Singapore? He could either prepare a planned attack by his air force at
maximum strength (in all about 40 bombers) or he could launch a sudden
unprepared attack by a few aircraft. We should get some warning of a planned attack
and put up our defences. But an unplanned low level attack is more difficult to guard
against. Having launched his surprise attack he might then lie that he had been
aggressed, that his retaliation was justified and he would then yell for U Thant to
come and stop the war. If he did and got away with it he might do considerable
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 746
[270] EAST AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA 747
damage to our face [sic] in South-East Asia, and avoid retaliation which I understand
would be likely to take us 48 hours to mount and despatch. The present air defences
of Singapore are inadequate to protect us from a surprise and unprovoked attack and
if it is decided that we are to remain in Singapore a long time this state of
unpreparedness seems of dubious wisdom in this somewhat troubled area.
Is Malaysia worth defending?
19. I venture into this field because it seems to form an inescapable part of any
consideration of the problem of confrontation. I fully appreciate, and indeed
apologise for the fact that I am straying into fields outside my direct responsibility.
20. I assume that both the creation and the survival of Malaysia are very closely
linked with our position in Singapore. I also assume that we are not staying in
Singapore as an asset in atomic war. Its complete lack of dispersion and absolute vul-
nerability to atomic attack would seem to preclude its usefulness in such an event.
21. It would therefore seem that our continuing presence in Singapore will be
valuable either in the event of conventional war somewhere in South-East Asia or
perhaps, most of all, as a politico-strategic base from which we can stem the spread
of Communism in South-East Asia and also retain our communications and our
close relations with Australia and New Zealand. It would also seem to have
importance in a complementary role with the Philippines as a system of retaining
Western influence and encouraging our friends; and incidentally the loss of
Singapore would greatly weaken America’s hold in the Philippines.
22. So far as Malaysia is concerned the break-up of the federation would almost
certainly undermine and eventually destroy our position in Singapore.
23. Because our presence in Singapore is inextricably bound up with the
continuance and success of the new federation its prospect of survival must have
great strategic importance.
24. There are without doubt very many divisive elements within the federation
which demand tolerance and time before they can be reconciled. The Tunku and Lee
Kuan Yew are oil and water. The people in the Borneo territories dislike the Malays
and the Malays despise them. Right-wing Chinese hate Left-wing Chinese, Malays are
frightened of Chinese and the Left-wing Malays dislike the Tunku’s régime, &c.
Paradoxically, were it not for confrontation I believe that this new and disparate
federation might have had less of a sense of common purpose; but the presence of
large numbers of British troops in Malaysia, the fact that the Borneo territories do
not want to be occupied by Indonesia, the necessity for some degree of co-operation
and unity under present conditions has undoubtedly favoured cohesion. The
continuance of Bung’s threat, even short of confrontation, and the presence of
British troops will, so long as they both last, favour the unification of the federation.
In my view this sort of situation is likely to continue for three or four years. During
this time I hope and believe that a number of Malaysia’s current antagonisms and
rivalries may be sorted out within this emergency climate and that it will thus afford
a favourable running-in period for this new and somewhat ill-assorted federation.
25. To sum up I think we should accept the possible financial and military
burden of underwriting Malaysia’s future because:
(a) our position in Malaysia forms a vital part of the Western politico-strategic
defence of South-East Asia against Communism;
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(b) Malaysia constitutes a most important link within the Commonwealth;
(c) the failure of Malaysia would seriously damage our prestige and trade in an
area of great political and economic importance;
(d) its failure would afford a major opportunity for Communist expansion into the
vital areas of Thailand, Burma and thus to the gates of India; and we all know what
Lenin said.
Recommendations
26.—(i) I would submit that if it has not already been done a firm decision
should be made about British long-term policy in Malaysia in the light of
confrontation, ideally with the agreement of the Opposition, and that this decision
should be forcibly expressed at a high level to doubter countries.
(ii) That any requests from the Malaysian Government for assistance in stiffening
and improving the special branch, police and psychological and propaganda services
in the Borneo theatre should be given the highest priority.
(iii) That the production or availability from other sources of helicopters for the
Borneo theatre should also be given the highest priority. . . .
271 CAB 128/38/2, CM 6(64)3 23 Jan 1964
[Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia]: Cabinet conclusions
The Minister without Portfolio (Lord Carrington) informed the Cabinet that, as a
result of the discussions which the United States Attorney-General, Mr. Robert
Kennedy, had recently held with various Governments in South-East Asia, it had
been agreed that a meeting of Foreign Ministers of Malaysia, Indonesia and the
Philippines should be held early in February in preparation for a subsequent meeting
of the three Heads of Government, at which they would make a fresh attempt to
resolve their differences. It was not clear whether, in endorsing this project, the
Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman, had waived any or all of the
stipulations—e.g., formal recognition of Malaysia by Indonesia—which he had
hitherto propounded as the conditions of his willingness to attend any tripartite
conference. This aspect of the proposal, together with its other implications, would
need to be further explored with Mr. Robert Kennedy during his forthcoming visit to
London.
In discussion there was general agreement that, although we shared with the
United States Government the common purpose of arresting the advance of Sino-
Soviet influence in South-East Asia, there was some risk that the means by which the
two Governments sought to achieve this objective would diverge. The United States
Government were chiefly concerned to dissuade Indonesia from making common
cause with Communist China; we attached greater importance to maintaining the
integrity of Malaysia. If, as a result, we judged it right to seek to restrain the
Government of Malaysia from making any concessions of substance to Indonesia in
the forthcoming discussions, we might appear to the United States Government to be
deliberately thwarting their own policy; and, if Indonesia succeeded by these means
in promoting disunity between the United States and ourselves, our position in
South-East Asia would be weakened. On the other hand it might be no less
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endangered if we acquiesced in any settlement whereby the Government of Malaysia
undertook to arrange for the withdrawal of United Kingdom forces from the Borneo
Territories; for in that event those Territories would eventually be overrun by
Indonesia, the integrity of Malaysia would be destroyed and our ability to maintain a
military presence in South-East Asia for the protection of our interests and the
discharge of our commitments in the area would be gravely weakened. It followed
that, while we must continue to seek a political solution of the differences between
Malaysia and Indonesia—if only because the alternative course of maintaining
United Kingdom forces indefinitely on the Borneo frontiers would ultimately be
intolerable—we must be on our guard against allowing the Government of Malaysia
to pay too high a price for it.
The Cabinet:—
Took note that the Prime Minister would arrange for the latest developments in
South-East Asia to be discussed in greater detail with the United States Attorney-
General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, during his forthcoming visit to London.
272 CO 1031/2880, no 26 25 Sept 1957
[Grants-in-aid to the federal government of the West Indies]: letter
from P Rogers (CO) to A D Peck (T) [Extract]
Now that I have got back from leave I am replying to your letter of the 13th
September . . . about Caribbean Federation, since we discussed the matter before I
went on leave. Although I realise that our general aim of policy in the West Indies is
well-known to the Treasury, as well as all the political difficulties which have arisen
from time to time about it, it may perhaps be helpful if at this point I try and put it on
the record briefly. I think that in the light of that our views on the particular issue in
dispute between us may be more readily explained than I fear we have been able to do
so far.
2. Our major aim of policy in the West Indies is the establishment of the West
Indian Federation and its development, as soon as consistent with good government
in its broadest sense, to the stage of independent membership of the Commonwealth.
That is based on three major aspects:—
(1) our general aim of Colonial policy to lead Colonial peoples wherever possible
to independence within the Commonwealth wherever consistent with good
government;
(2) the hope that by this development we may establish in the western hemisphere
a second, even if relatively small, independent member of the Commonwealth,
with all the advantages that we would hope to gain from that to our wider
Commonwealth interests, vis-a-vis the U.S.A. and Latin America;
(3) the hope that by the establishment of an independent State we may gain
thereby some relief from our relatively heavy financial burdens in that part of the
world.
3. It has taken us very many years to get even to the present stage when the
Federation is about to be established. As you will know from our general discussions
from time to time, the success of that Federation when established is far from
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certain. West Indian leaders in particular are still highly suspicious of the U.K.
Government and our aims in promoting Federation. In particular there are many,
and particularly among some of the more influential politicians in Jamaica, who
consider that our sole aim is to get the larger Islands to take over H.M.G.’s financial
responsibilities in the smaller Islands and then wash our hands of our West Indian
responsibilities. Any action on our part which gives reasonable colour or support to
that point of view seriously weakens Federation. By that I do not mean that we can
see anything now preventing Federation actually coming into being. We do not. But
if the leading political figures in the West Indies, and especially Manley,1 do not go
into the Federal Government, it will be so weak that its survival is doubtful. It is
touch and go whether or not Manley himself will decide to go into Federal politics
and we know that this particular aspect is extremely important in relation to his
decision but, individuals apart, there is a tremendous weight of West Indian opinion
which can be aroused adversely to Federation, with all that that implies for its failure
if we play our cards wrongly before our final aim is achieved.
4. To go back now to the specific issue of our undertaking to help the Federal
Government with the payment of grants-in-aid for a period of 10 years. This is
designed:
(a) financially to meet the inevitable need of the Federal Government in its early
years for assistance to meet grant-in-aids until such time as it will, we hope, be
able to stand on its own feet;
(b) politically to reassure the fears, which are after all very natural ones, to which
I have referred in the preceding paragraph.
5. The Treasury take the view that the form of our commitment means that our
own assistance to the Federation in respect of grant-in-aid must cease at the end of
ten years. The Colonial Office view, as you know, is that the undertaking means
merely that all we are committed to is assistance for ten years, but that if the
Federation were still a dependant State, and therefore a U.K. responsibility at the end
of ten years, its needs would then have to be examined on the same basis as those of
any other territory for which we are responsible. We do not regard the differences
between us on this as anything other than academic however, except insofar as a
public interpretation of the undertaking in the terms understood by the Treasury
would have the adverse political repercussions which I have mentioned. We agreed at
the time of the London Conference of 1956 that there was no need to pursue our
differences on this aspect in view of its lack of practical importance except on the
political handling of it. In fact it is clear from the way things are going, with Manley
for example talking of independence in five years time, that the whole Federal
Constitution and our own relations with it, including our financial ones, will have to
be revised long before the end of the ten year period. It is for that reason that we do
not for a moment consider that the commencing of the ten year period on the 1st
January 1959 instead of the 1st January 1958, because of the arrival of the Governor
General, and the consequent inauguration of Federation, in January next instead of
this year, has any practical financial significance in the sense that it in any way
increases our practical financial commitment. You are, of course, perfectly correct in
saying that in theory it extends the period of the ten year guarantee until the end of
1 Norman W Manley, QC, chief minister of Jamaica, 1955–1959, premier, 1959–1962.
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1969 instead of the end of 1968, but you have I know been so closely in touch in the
Treasury with Colonial affairs that you will understand that the pace of political
progress is such that the point is an academic one for the reasons I have mentioned.
What happens financially when the time for independence comes will depend on the
then circumstances, not on the date when the old ten year period came to an end.
6. In any case the commitment about assistance during the first ten years of
Federation was made long before any specific date was attached to it and I think you
will agree that at the time of the London Conference of 1956 it was not a point of any
importance between you and us, let alone mentioned to the West Indians as such
that the Governor General might take up office in the autumn of 1957 and the
Federation consequently formally be inaugurated then. The date then suggested for
the arrival of the Governor General was suggested purely for practical reasons in that
it was hoped that he would be able to take charge of the Pre Federal Organisation and
establish the administrative framework before Ministers took office. In the upshot,
the administrative arrangements have not worked out quite as was expected (this
cannot be said to be a reason either for surprise or misgiving) and it is now
abundantly clear that it would in fact be administratively very much more
convenient for the Governor General to arrive in January, as has been arranged. To
adopt some legal device, which would quite obviously be phoney, to bring Federation
legally into being before the arrival of the Governor General could obviously only be
done with one purpose in view, namely, to make our formal guarantee to the West
Indies end at the end of 1968 instead of 1969. (Any attempt to get the agreement of
the West Indians that the Governor General should go out earlier than January is
quite obviously impossible.) I should add here for the record that the date of Lord
Hailes Commission as Governor General2 will be the 1st October and that the S.F.C.
wished to pay him salary from that date in view of the amount of time and attention
which he has devoted to West Indian affairs while still in this country. Lord Hailes
has decided not to accept the payment of salary until he takes up office in the West
Indies but whether or not he had done so, that, and the date of his commission has
no effect on the issue we are discussing (neither brings Federation into being). To
revert after that digression to the proposal to adopt a legal device to bring Federation
into being before the arrival of the Governor General, we have no doubt that to take
this step would, as indicated above, give us no practical financial advantage but bring
with it immense political disadvantage and eventually, through that, financial
disadvantage, in that anything which weakens the Federation is to our financial as
well as to our political disadvantage. I hope you will agree therefore on further
thought in the light of what is, I fear, a rather lengthy letter, that the right course is
clearly to accept that the Federation comes into being in January, and the payment of
grant-in-aid to the Federal Government as opposed to the unit territories therefore
starts on the 1st January, 1959 instead of the 1st January 1958. This will, incidentally,
. . . be very much easier to work administratively and financially.
7. I hope I have made it clear that the question of “protecting the Exchequer”
does not arise any more because of this change of plan than it did originally. In other
words we have a financial responsibility and commitment to the West Indian
territories and to the West Indian Federation, which must be considered in the usual
way with, of course, due regard to present U.K. difficulties. Discussions of budgets
2 Formerly P G T Buchan-Hepburn, government chief whip, 1951–1955.
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with delegations from the territories has undoubted political and administrative
advantages, and I am sure the Treasury will agree that it enables both you and us to
recognise the financial issues much more clearly than we could do solely by
correspondence. I trust therefore you will agree that it is necessary to have these
delegations over here in the late autumn as we proposed. . . . It is becoming urgent
for it to do so and I hope you will be able to let me have Treasury clearance very
shortly. . . .
273 CO 1031/2311, no 21 5 Nov 1958
[Dominion status for the West Indies]: minute by Mr Lennox-Boyd to
Lord Home (CRO)
Your minute of 28th October1 referred to the possible repercussions of early
“dominion status” for The West Indies.2
2. The present Federal Constitution in The West Indies, and particularly the fixed
Federal income of less than £2 million a year, means that the Federal Government is
hardly worth the name. We knew this when agreement was reached to set it up; it
was a price we knew we had to pay to get West Indian agreement. For the first year it
does no harm when the Federal Government must concentrate on establishing its
administrative machinery and finding its political feet. But unless we can increase
the powers, and above all, the revenue, of the Federal Government very soon we run
a grave risk of Federation failing, with all that that implies to our policy in that part
of the world. The preponderance of political and financial power remaining with the
unit territories means that some of them, and particularly Jamaica, may yet revive
separatist tendencies.
3. The conference proposed for next year will, I hope and expect, concentrate
primarily on relations between the Federal Government and the unit Governments,
though the relationship of the Federal Government with H.M.G. is bound to come
up, with a call for some changes. The conference will not only be the only way in
which there will be a chance of increasing the powers of the Federal Government vis-
a-vis the units, but it will also give H.M.G. an invaluable opportunity of making clear
to all the delegates from the West Indian territories just how far they have to go
before the Federal Government could be considered one that can properly be
sponsored for full membership of the Commonwealth. I do not expect a demand for
very early independence; the political sentiment on this in The West Indies is very
different from that in say, West Africa. I have always made it clear, moreover, that
there can be no question of independence for The West Indies until they are viable
both financially and in other respects. I did this both during the 1956 London
Conference and when piloting the present Federal Constitution through Parliament.
The West Indies are very conscious of the financial and other burdens that
1 No 20 in file: Lord Home argued that a constitutional review was not required within five years, and a
‘premature’ demand for independence should be avoided; in addition he thought it would create
difficulties for the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, where first review was not due until late in 1960.
2 The official designation was ‘the Federation of The West Indies’. This particular piece of governmental
pedantry has not been followed editorially.
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independence involves and none of the present members of the Federal Government
are at all anxious to press for an early date for it.
4. As far as I can possibly foretell, therefore, I do not think you need be unduly
concerned about the effects of this conference on the Rhodesian Federation. I will, of
course, always have this in mind, but the extent to which we can control the pace of
the movement towards independence in the West Indies by reason alone of possible
reaction in Central Africa is very limited.
I know there is some risk in having the conference but I do not believe it to be
great; and the advantages of and indeed the need for it, are so great that I am sure we
ought not to seek a postponement.
5. I have discussed all this with the Governor-General, who agrees with my
assessment.
6. I would welcome a discussion in the Colonial Policy Committee if you wish
but there is little I could add to what is in this minute.
7. I am sending a copy of this minute to the Prime Minister.3
3 Mr Lennox-Boyd regarded this draft as ‘excellent’. Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘It should be discussed in
Colonial Policy Committee if Ld Home so wishes. H.M. 6.11.58’. Lord Home did not press for this
discussion, satisfied that he had sufficiently signalled ‘the very great difficulties that would be involved in
any acceleration of the timetable in the case of the West Indies and we shall have to keep a close watch on
this’ (nos 22 & 23 in file).
274 CO 1031/2573, no 61 8 Dec 1958–15 Feb 1959
[Future policy in the West Indies: ‘Dominion status’ and
‘confederation’]: minutes by P Rogers, G W Jamieson and Mr Amery
(CO) [Extract]
. . . A promise of “Dominion status”. We have known all along that the prime reason
for Federation is the enhanced political status which it will enable the West Indies to
obtain. Going right back to Colonel Stanley’s despatch of 1945, from which the
official consideration of Federation starts, we spoke then of “the ultimate aim of any
Federation which may be established (being) full internal self-government within the
British Commonwealth”. That was as far ahead as we could look then and it meant a
lot at the time. The Report of the Standing Closer Association Committee, which laid
the foundations of the Federal Constitution, again declared forthrightly that the aim
was Dominion status, and it may be useful to recall their words since they are the
best definition of the political need for Federation and are words moreover signed by
many leading West Indians of the day. The relevant extract from the Report is
attached opposite.1 Going further ahead it will be recalled that this again was one of
the most important aspects of the London Conference of 1956, and that the Secretary
of State’s Opening Address to the Conference on this subject contained a passage
which had been very carefully weighed and approved by a Cabinet Committee
beforehand. Again it may be useful to have the relevant passage available for
1 See next document, at n 2. The introduction to the report is printed in S R Ashton & D Killingray, eds,
The West Indies (BDEEP, London, 1999), document no 4.
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reference, and it is quoted on the sheet opposite following the quotation from the
S.C.A.C. Report.
What holds The West Indies back from full Dominion status is essentially not our
reluctance to grant independence on political grounds, but the financial weakness of
the Federal Government and the reluctance of many West Indians, a reluctance
which is quite understandable, to assume the full burden of independence. Because
there are a number of West Indians who claim that the idea of Dominion status is
merely a device on the part of H.M.G. to avoid their financial responsibilities, we have
always been careful, as for example in the extract quoted opposite, to avoid the
impression that H.M.G. is urging The West Indies on this path faster than they
themselves wish to go. It is for that reason that I am very doubtful about the wisdom
of Sir Jock Campbell’s2 proposal that we should ourselves propose a definite date as
target for independence. There is, moreover, the difficulty of the reaction of what we
do here on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the Secretary of State will
recall his recent exchange of minutes with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations on the subject. It is true that that correspondence was primarily concerned
with the outcome of a revisionary conference next year and the embarrassment
which that might cause to the negotiations with Sir R. Welensky in 1960. The setting
of a target date for West Indian independence of say, 1963, would not be so
embarrassing on that score, but I am inclined to think that it would still raise
difficulties. Nevertheless the idea is one that needs further consideration and, I
suggest, consultation with the Governor General. . . .
P.R.
8.12.58
The critical question, of course, is what our attitude should be to a development of
the kind I have suggested is possible in the months ahead. Firstly, perhaps one
should say that it is not surprising that the Federation is bumping along badly at
present. There are (on my count) some 15 federations at present in existence.
These are, of course, of two kinds; ones which have been formed deliberately by the
dissolution of a unitary state and those which are “genuine” federations formed by a
number of independent units coming into voluntary association. I can only trace five
such “genuine” federations coming into being in the last century (Canada, Australia,
South Africa, Central Africa, The West Indies) and obviously The West Indies has a
peculiarly difficult set of problems; it is the only federation without a continuous
land-mass and it has a longer pre-federal history of separate existence with modern
governmental apparatus in each of the units than any other federation. Most of the
others were formed at a time when the State did (and took) less than today and where
it engendered fewer controversies. Building a Federation in the mid-20th century is
much harder than a century earlier and it may be that in the West Indies there is no
real alternative to accepting a withdrawal for a period of years to a position of
confederation in the hope that it will lead gradually to a re-introduction of true
federalism. We should, of course, argue against this but if the West Indies leaders are
determined to have a confederation, I cannot see how we can stop them or even (I
know this is heresy) say that they cannot get Dominion status, when their Central
2 Sir Jock (John M) Campbell, chairman of Booker-McConnell since 1952; strong West Indian and sugar
interests, president of West Indies Committee, 1957.
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Government is not really what we consider seaworthy as a sovereign State. In other
words, the tide is much stronger than we can swim though we should try to do what
we can. . . .
G.W.J.
6.2.59
. . . vy thoughtful and interesting minute by Mr Jamieson. . . . I do not think we can
usefully take specula. further now. All these things are straws in the wind and we
have not enough straws yet with which to build a haystack. However, I think there is
a lot in what Mr Jamieson says about the way in which Mr Manley may be thinking, &
I believe it to be highly dangerous. . . .
P.R.
12.2.59
Mr Jamieson’s minute is very interesting. I don’t know enough about The West Indies
to judge whether a Confederal system could be made to work there. I am, however,
inclined to agree with the general proposition that, in the 20th Century, when the
state interferes in so many fields, Confederation is easier to bring about than
Federation and may even have certain advantages over the latter.
J.A.
15.2.59
275 CO 1031/2311, no 36 9 May 1959
[Draft statement on West Indies Federation and its independence]: CO
paper for S of S.  Minutes by G W Jamieson, P Rogers and Sir J
Macpherson
It is now [x] months since the Federation came fully into operation with the
inauguration of the Federal Legislature by Her Royal Highness Princess Margaret in
April of last year. For some months before the inauguration a purely official Federal
Government had already been in existence and before that the pre-Federal
organisation, working under the able direction of Sir Stephen Luke,1 had done much
to lay the foundation for a sound federal administration. Since taking over its full
responsibilities the Federal Government has done a great deal of valuable ground
work and planning.
2. Now that the Federal Government has begun to establish itself it is
appropriate that we should have a further look at its goal. Opinion in The West Indies
clearly takes this view to judge from the terms of the motion which was unanimously
passed in the Federal House of Representatives [x] months ago. This motion called
for a conference “in order to achieve the goal of independence and Dominion status
within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment”. The Federal and unit
Governments are now considering in consultation with H.M.G. the arrangements for
the holding of a conference or conferences for this purpose. Much detailed work,
1 S E V Luke, commissioner for preparation of West Indies Federal Organisation, 1956–1958; senior
Crown Agent for overseas governments and administrations, 1959.
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hard thinking and willingness to make sacrifices for the common good will be
necessary to achieve at those conferences the success which all of us wish, both in
The West Indies and in this country without distinction of party. But those will not
alone be enough unless we keep clearly in view what is the goal and what is necessary
to achieve it.
3. Let me go back to the main reason why the people of The West Indies first
agreed to join in a federation. This has never been better described than in the classic
statement by those eminent West Indians who formed the Standing Closer
Association Committee.2 They said:—
. . . “We start from the assumption that the main underlying purpose of our task is to
seek the shortest path towards a real political independence for the British peoples of
the region, within the framework of the British Commonwealth—what is meant in fact
by “Dominion Status”. We assume further that we have been charged with this task
because there is general agreement that this object cannot be attained without some
form of federal association between the territories concerned, but that with Federation
its attainment becomes practicable. We are aware that in some circles there is a demand
for full independence, or for self-government, either in advance of or simultaneously
with Federation, on the basis of existing political units. While we reaffirm the view
expressed at the Montego Bay Conference that the political development of the units
must be pursued as an aim in itself, we are satisfied that the sheer force of
circumstances of the modern world makes independence on a unit basis a mirage.
Independence or self-government as a Federation is however a practical possibility, and
we have framed our proposals with this specific objective in view”. . . .
Let me emphasise the view they took then, and it still seems to me to hold good
today, that none of the existing units of The West Indies, not even the largest,
Jamaica, could expect as independent countries to take that place in the counsels of
the modern world to which collectively their people rightly aspire. I believe today
that thinking West Indians would agree with the view expressed ten years ago by the
Standing Closer Association Committee on the basic reason for federation.
4. Yet federation by itself—the mere act of federation— is not enough in itself to
produce a state which can look to attain, and, once having attained, sustain
independence. I made it clear in the past, but it may be well if I reiterate, what is the
view of H.M.G. on this issue. Independence within the Commonwealth means
something more than the formal relinquishment by H.M.G. in the U.K. of
constitutional powers of control. It means the country must be able to stand on its
own feet economically and financially, that it has to finance its own administration
and that it is able and prepared to assume responsibility for its own defence and its
own international relations to the extent that either is involved by its geographical or
international standing. On the other hand in these days no country is independent in
the sense of being entirely self-contained and self-sufficient. Mutual help is one of the
great principles of the Commonwealth and there is no reason why one member or
group of members should not help others with their economic development, nor
does independence preclude arrangements for inter-Commonwealth commerce such
as the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. A state which relies for its very existence on
outside help is independent in nothing but name but there is nothing derogatory to a
2 See Hyam, ed, Labour government and the end of empire Part III, document no 254 (summary), esp
para 2.
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country’s dignity in accepting the help of other partners to improve its economic
situation and to develop its resources.
5. Since independence within the Commonwealth means at once burdens as well
as privileges, let me repeat that H.M.G. in the U.K. would not think it right to urge
the West Indies towards this status faster than West Indians themselves wish to go.
But we have every sympathy with their aim and when they themselves wish to take
on these burdens they will find H.M.G. in the U.K. very glad to sponsor their aims
[sic] to full Commonwealth membership.
6. That however is not the full story. An independent member of the
Commonwealth has to be accepted as an equal, by other members, and to play its proper
part in Commonwealth activities. Similarly in the wider international sphere a nation
state has to have certain minimum attributes of statehood if it is to be an acceptable
member of the community of nations and to play a worthy part in the United Nations
Organisation. I must say frankly that the Federal Government of The West Indies has
not yet got those attributes and that the major obstacle in the way of its attaining them
is not its constitutional ties with the U.K., but its Governmental weakness within the
West Indies itself. No representative of the Government of The West Indies would have
the standing in Commonwealth or international circles which is the due of the people
of The West Indies, until he can speak for a Government which has adequate powers
and resources in respect of the region which it represents. I look forward, we all look
forward, to a representative of The West Indies playing a worthy part at the
Commonwealth table but he will not do so until he has the full backing of The West
Indies behind him. This does not mean the disappearance of unit Governments. The
circumstances of geography and history mean that there will always be work for them
to do. But I must say frankly that if The West Indies are to speak as an equal at the
Commonwealth Conference table, the unit Governments must be willing to surren-
der to the Federal Governments some of their present powers and above all a field of
revenue which can support a modern state. The factor which might well hold the West
Indies back from independence within the Commonwealth is not a question of policy
on the part of H.M.G. in the U.K. but a tendency on the part of unit territories in The
West Indies who, however understandable their pride in the work of their governments,
may be reluctant to endow the Federal Government with those powers and resources
which alone can enable it to achieve the goal which West Indians and we in this coun-
try wish it to achieve.
Minutes on 275
. . . We should, I suggest, consider a little more fully the reasons for and against this
proposal; they will in any case have to be fully set out in subsequent documents to
the C.P.C., etc.
For the proposal it can be argued that such a statement will do something to clear
the air. It will indicate to West Indian opinion who is holding up their achievement of
independence. It will act as a prod to mental effort (one sometimes feels there is
much talk but inadequate thought given to these problems in The West Indies).
Finally it should be a highly useful piece of Federal ammunition for the purpose of
trying to obtain a strengthening of the Federation at the forthcoming Federal
Constitutional Conference.
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Against the proposal is the possibility that it might be felt that we were trying to
“bounce” The West Indies into independence, possibly to enable us to escape our
rightful burden of making full amends for “the historic wrong” etc. etc.; Some might
feel that this was not the juncture for the Secretary of State to intervene—there is,
as we know, a growing opinion in The West Indies that they should sort these things
out themselves without intervention from the U.K. There is finally an element of risk
in laying down and closely defining a set of conditions which may be interpreted as
both a minimum and as a sufficient set of conditions for independence. I have in
mind that we could conceivably get into a position when the conditions to be fulfilled
in the statement had in fact been fulfilled with a consequent demand for
independence but that on the other hand there might be other reasons outside and
beyond the terms of the conditions in the proposed statement which might have the
effect of making us reluctant to a final hand over.
4. Nevertheless after weighing up all the pros and cons I think a statement is
desirable as the most important thing at present is to strengthen the Federal
Government’s hand in advance of the Constitutional Conference. This may be a more
critical occasion than the 1956 London Conference in that its decisions are likely to
affect the shape of the Federation for a number of years to come and very likely
beyond that period over which the Secretary of State will have any control.
5. There is however one difficulty which might result in the future from too
definite a statement. There has been much talk in The West Indies about
circumscribing the activities of the Federal Government, particularly in the
economic field. Jamaica is known to hold such views and probably will receive
support from some of the small islands. Trinidad is likely to take the opposite view
with Mr. Eric Williams having his eye on the Prime Ministership (though one need
not deny him other more altruistic motives in his belief that the Federation must be
strengthened).3 The result of these contrary pressures is hard to predict. The Federal
Government that emerges after the forthcoming conference may be stronger or
weaker or just about the same as it is now. Whatever the result of the conference we
should, I suggest, be prepared at least in our own minds for a fairly early demand for
Dominion status, and it is quite possible that this will happen even though the result
of the conference has been to do nothing, or very little, to improve the Federation’s
position. In such a set of circumstances we should be faced with having to decide
either to refuse the request or alternatively to jettison the Statement of Policy that is
the subject of this minute. When it comes to the pinch I cannot conceive more than
a rather half-hearted rear-guard action by H.M.G. for I do not think we would have
any alternative but to give in to the demand although it would mean the emergence
of The West Indies as an independent State with a Central Government which was far
weaker than we thought it should have. Important though these considerations are I
do not think they should deflect us from issuing a statement, though we should have
an eye to its wording in case it results in some undignified swallowing of words a few
years hence. . . .
G.W.J.
10.3.59
3 Premier of Trinidad and Tobago, 1959 (chief minister from 1956); author of Capitalism and slavery
(1944).
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. . . the view I formed during the visit with Mr. Amery to the Federation last month
[was] that West Indians now have a greater sense of urgency than hitherto about full
independence. Lord Hailes does not appear to doubt that Dominion status will be
called for at the Federal Constitutional Conference. As we know, Mr. Manley has
condemned the present Federal Constitution as “colonial in character” and Dr. Eric
Williams has been going about saying that independence ought to be proclaimed on
the 22nd April next year, the second anniversary of Federation.
5. Our view in the Department has been hitherto that Dominion status is
nothing like as close as the above would make it seem. This view—which I shared—
was based in part on the recognition by us that it ought not to be rushed; it was
furthermore reinforced by Sir Grantley Adams’4 near distaste for the subject when we
tried to discuss it with him in April. He, I am sure, is no sound guide at present to
feeling on this subject. His views are markedly more moderate than those of most of
his government, and I submit that he will shortly have to come into line with the
thinking of others on the subject in The West Indies, or risk being left out on a limb.
6. We should, I suggest, be prepared at least in our own minds for the worst. This
could be a demand for Dominion status in Trinidad in September, repeated here a few
months later, together with a demand that full independence be achieved within
perhaps a year or eighteen months. It could indeed mean a demand for the
introduction of Dominion status before the end of 1960, or perhaps early in 1961,
which is a good deal earlier than we are geared to.
7. Such a demand would of course ignore the need to prepare the administrative
structure of the new Dominion, enlarge its diplomatic apparatus, and build up its
military forces, and it might be possible to delay it on such arguments. On the other
hand, we are on something of a runaway train, the brakes of which are not very
powerful.
8. I suggest that apart from simply taking the aforesaid into account in our
calculations, the time has come to speed up action on the following questions, on the
first two of which we have made a little progress, on the third none.
(a) the training of a Diplomatic Service and agreeing on interim foreign
representational arrangements, should Dominion status overtake the Federation’s
ability to establish its network of missions;
(b) the examination of the need for Armed Forces including the question of a Navy
as well as the terms of such defence agreement as we and The West Indies may
jointly require for our purposes.
(c) an examination of what forms of financial assistance H.M.G. can consider after
Dominion status, and of what sums.
9. I hope this does not sound all too alarmist. On the other hand I feel that we
will do best to start early with these preparations. If our predictions prove unduly
pessimistic, we will have a bonus of time at our disposal. We must in any case have
firm views on all three matters in para. 8 in advance of the main Federal
Constitutional Conference in London, probably in January: and it would be desirable
to have got the main lines sorted out before the September conference.
10. A major unstated assumption in the above is, of course, that the Federation
4 Sir G H Adams, QC, prime minister of the Federation, formerly premier of Barbados, 1954–1958.
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will survive the September conference. This is being discussed separately on WIS
175/01.
G.W.J.
26.6.59
Sir J. Macpherson
I have already informed you orally of the fact that the political pace seems to be
quickening in the West Indies in respect of the approach of the Federation to
Dominion status. Whereas previously the talk of political leaders has avoided
mentioning specific dates, and even Mr. Manley has talked in general terms like “five
years ahead”, Dr. Eric Williams has recently entered the fray as shown in paragraph 2
of the draft opposite. We know that Sir Grantley Adams at least still does not wish to
hasten us, but he is losing political ground rapidly and it seems unlikely that he will
be able to stand in the way, if, as we are informed is the case, there is a more general
move towards the fixing of an early date for independence.
We are conducting a mammoth exercise on the implications for the U.K. as well as
for the West Indies of such a move, and I will report on that as soon as our exercise is
completed. In the meantime we should clearly inform the C.R.O. and, I suggest, leave
it open to them to inform members of the Commonwealth in confidence if they so
wish. . . .
P.R.
27.7.59
Mr. Amery
The purpose of the draft opposite is to keep the Commonwealth Relations Office
informed of developments in the West Indies—but I think that, although our
information is still rather sketchy, the indications of a change of mood in some
quarters in The West Indies are clear enough to justify dealing with this now at
Ministerial level.
2. In his minute of 28/10/58 to the Secretary of State at (20) Lord Home
expressed apprehension lest the proposed review of the Federal Constitution might
go beyond the question of relations between the Federal and Unit Governments, and
that we might be met with a request for a date to be set for independence. Our reply
at (21)5 recognised that there was a risk but we didn’t rate it at all high. It was
decided not to discuss in the C.P.C. but to keep a close watch on developments (See
(23)).
3. When we report to the C.R.O. (and to C.P.C?) that there are indications that a
request for independence may be forthcoming as a result of, or after the September
Conference on the Federal Constitution, we may be charged with having been too
complacent. But until quite recently there was no sign of an urge to accelerate
Constitutional advance for the Federation, and even now we haven’t got anything
very explicit—except Dr. Eric Williams’ statement referred to in the draft opposite. I
gather however, that Mr. Mordecai6 has confirmed that some of the people who are
5 See document no 273.
6 J S Mordecai, federal secretary preparing for the West Indies Federation, 1955–1958, deputy governor-
general, 1960–1962.
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preparing for the September Conference are thinking in terms of a demand for a date
to be fixed for independence.
4. The Department has set in hand a major study of what would be involved—
particularly in the fields of finance, defence, representation abroad, international
treaties etc. . . .
5. There are many imponderables—e.g. Mr. Manley’s recent manifesto about
limiting the Federal Governments power of taxation, and demanding greater
representation in the Federation for Jamaica. We have yet to see what effect his
comfortable majority in the Jamaican Election this week will have on his thinking
about Federation. . . .
J.S.M.
30.7.59
276 CO 1031/2574, no 105 12–13 June 1959
[Future of the Federation, after Mr Manley’s statement on Jamaica]:
minutes by G W Jamieson and P J Kitcatt (CO)
We now have the long awaited statement by Mr. Manley on Jamaica’s proposals for
the review of the Federal Constitution which was foreshadowed in (98).
2. The proposals in this document (which has the spare elegance of all Mr.
Manley’s compositions) are much as we expected; with the surprise addition of a call
for early dominion status. Otherwise the proposals are those we feared and are clearly
designed to turn the constitutional arrangements between the Federation, and at
least Jamaica, into confederal rather than federal terms. On the other hand they do
not require parallel modifications of the relationships between the Federation and all
the other unit governments. Although the legislative lists in the Federal Constitution
would have to be redrawn to suit Jamaica’s special case, each of the remaining units
could voluntarily elect to retain the existing provisions, by invoking a provision on
the lines of Article 58(1), of the present Federal Constitution; this Article allows unit
governments to hand powers not set out in either the Exclusive or the Concurrent
list to the Federation. The statement also clearly rejects that version of Customs
Union propounded in the Croft Report,1 and calls for the Federal House of
Representatives to be constituted on a population basis (see paragraph 2 of my
minute of 12th May, and subsequent minutes, on this).
3. The first question to be answered is whether the statement is “serious” or
merely electioneering tactics to be forgotten after the Jamaica General Election.
Many competent observers hold the latter view. I do not because I believe that Mr.
Manley has been thoroughly alarmed by evidences of Federal bumbling and
incompetence, which, taken along with signs of Federal hostility or jealousy against
Jamaica, represent in his mind (not entirely without reason) a serious danger to the
success of his plans for the development of Jamaica, about which he and his
Ministers feel more strongly than anything else. This minute is written on this major
assumption that Mr. Manley means to stick to his guns. If it is falsified so much the
better, but we should be prepared for the worst.
1 Sir W D Croft, chairman of Board of Customs and Excise, 1947–1955; chairman of Trade and Tariffs
Commission, West Indies, 1956–1958.
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4. I do not myself feel that Mr. Manley is guilty of breaking some kind of moral
bargain or faith in taking this new line. Federation is not an end in itself and if any
unit comes to feel that the purposes it sought to achieve on entering into
membership are not going to be satisfied I do not see why they should not attempt to
review the contract. After all it was not Jamaica who asked for the forthcoming
Federal Constitutional Conference. Nobody knew how the Federation was going to
turn out. Even granted the way it has been constitutionally hamstrung, and
politically underpowered (the second Eleven etc.) its performance has not been
impressive. If I were a Jamaican I am not sure but that I would not support what Mr.
Manley is seeking to do.
5. The statement caused a good deal of dismay in The West Indies, and there is
no doubt that there will be even less sympathy than there might otherwise have been
for Jamaica’s difficulties and point of view at the Federal Constitutional Conference.
Sir Grantley Adam’s views are well known, and the possibility of spite and
irresponsibility on his part must be reckoned a factor in the situation. Dr. Eric
Williams is already reconciled to Jamaica’s secession, and probably even sees
advantage in an East Caribbean Federation entirely in his own hands. Perhaps the
only support or sympathy for Jamaica may come from people like Mr. Bird of
Antigua, a determined defender of State Rights. It is all the more important,
therefore, that such influence as this Office still has with the West Indies (and Lord
Hailes thinks it is very little!) should be exercised to avoid an irreparable breach.
Jamaica’s difficulties and fears are real, and not to be dismissed as electioneering.
This point should be pressed on all possible occasions and to all concerned.
6. The stage nevertheless is set for a clash at the Federal Constitutional
Conference between what are likely to be two irreconcilable points of view and there
is now a greater possibility of the disintegration of the Federation. Mr. Manley is
clearly trying to avoid such a crisis and his statement does have the merit of
producing a formula which would enable a looser and constitutionally weaker
Federation to work by the device of the voluntary surrender of powers other than
those in the reduced legislative lists by the other units.
7. This device, however, may not be acceptable to the other units who can claim
that Mr. Manley has turned his back on the 1956 Agreement and the whole
development accepted at the series of meetings and conferences since Montego Bay
in 1947. In anger they may take steps to finalise the breach. We must try to stop this.
It may, for example, be possible to reach reconciliation by various more or less Heath
Robinson constitutional devices. We might, for example, have to accept the secession
of Jamaica from the present Federation, but work for a Confederation comprising
Jamaica and the remaining Eastern Caribbean Federation. This would be cumbrous
and expensive and a step backwards. But it need not be unworkable if it restricted
itself to defence, foreign affairs, and the “common range of services which can best
be provided for all” referred to by Mr. Manley. It would at least mean an association
for the minimum purposes of sovereignty of two units of roughly equal size, which
together, though not separately, could put on a reasonable face as a sovereign
dominion. It would moreover be open to British Guiana to enter such a
Confederation at a later date as a third partner. I suspect Dr. Jagan2 might welcome
such a possibility speaking as he has done of being ready to accept a Singapore
2 Mr C Jagan, minister of trade and industry, 1957–1961, British Guiana (premier, 1961).
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solution for an interim period before final independence. In addition the Eastern
Caribbean Federation would be able to draw much closer to a unitary pattern of
government, without the presence of Jamaica within the actual Federation.
8. We are also faced with a clear cut rejection of the Croft Report. If I may confess
to a personal heresy I have never been entirely convinced that Customs Union was an
absolute essential for the success of Federation, though obviously it would have been
very desirable. On the other hand, on Mr. Manley’s proposals (as also in the
“Federation within a Confederation” system) the way would still be open for the
Eastern Caribbean to form their own Customs Union. As Jamaica will only accept a
high tariff Customs Union and Trinidad will only join in if tariffs are low, we may
have to accept that progress will only be possible towards an Eastern Caribbean
Customs Union, despite what happens on the wider issues.
9. The statement also condemns the present Federal constitution as “Colonial in
character” and calls for dominion status “as soon as is practicable and possible.”
From all indications dominion status is a good deal more in the minds of thinking
West Indians than Sir Grantley Adams would like us to believe. Dr. Eric Williams
talks of declaring independence on the 22nd April next year, though this need not be
taken very seriously. Mr. Manley’s statement too may include an element of window
dressing on this score. We must however be prepared to deal with the real possibility
that the Federal Constitutional Conference at its preliminary meeting in September,
will call for dominion status within a fixed time, perhaps two years. There has,
however, obviously been little West Indian thinking of the associated problems,
particularly of defence arrangements. We are now examining these in the office, in
the light of the Malayan arrangements, which enabled the United Kingdom to retain
forces and bases in that country, in return for assistance in developing their armed
forces.
10. The prospect is of heavy weather ahead. Mr. Manley will, I think, stand firm.
The Federal leaders and the other units may well lose their heads or come to the end
of their patience. Perhaps the last important service we can render the West Indies
will be to persevere in trying to maintain some kind of continued constitutional
relationship between Jamaica and the Eastern Caribbean.
G.W.J.
12.6.59
I am quite sure that Mr. Jamieson is right in arguing that Mr. Manley’s paper must be
taken seriously. Mr. Manley may well have his eyes on the forthcoming General
Election. It does not follow that his paper is designed primarily to secure the return
to power of his own party and that, if he is successful in the General Election, Mr.
Manley will cease to beat these particular drums. I suggest that if Mr. Manley thinks
that these proposals will enhance the prospects of his party at the General Election it
is because he thinks that they reflect popular feeling about Federation. In other
words, if Mr. Manley is returned and this paper is one of the planks in his platform we
may take it that it does in fact reflect public opinion in Jamaica, which is all the more
reason for taking it seriously. Furthermore Mr. Manley can be quite conscientious
about matters on which he has or has not been given the “mandate” of the electorate;
and even if he were not so disposed over this particular issue, I strongly doubt
whether public opinion would let him be otherwise.
2. I believe Mr. Manley to be quite serious and sincere in his approach to
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Federation. I think that he believes in it, that he wants Jamaica to stay in it, and that
in this paper he is trying to be constructive. I do not think that it is correct to regard
him as a wrecker. His concept of Federation may not be the same as that which exists
in the eastern Caribbean, nor may he share our own vision. Nevertheless I think he
reflects a pretty substantial measure of Jamaican thinking on the subject. Because
Mr. Manley does not wish Federal policies to harm Jamaica it does not follow that he
wants Jamaica to harm the Federation and I do not believe that there is at present
any strong pressure for secession. As evidence of Mr. Manley’s serious and
constructive approach I would mention two facts. Very shortly before I arrived in
Jamaica a professor of Constitutional Law from McGill University had visited Jamaica
at Mr. Manley’s invitation to help him and his Ministers to study Federal/Jamaican
relationships; secondly, Mr. Manley is having a detailed study of the implications of
the Croft proposals made by the Central Planning Unit—whose Director is certainly
not anti-Federation. I am sure that Mr. Manley is genuinely trying to secure a
unanimous bi-partisan approach to this issue.
3. I am reinforced in my view by what has been said to me in private
conversation on this subject by a number of Jamaicans, mainly but not entirely civil
servants, both while I was in Jamaica and since. Their attitude is perhaps a variant on
the thesis that what is good for General Motors is good for the United States. They
think that what is good for Jamaica is good for the Federation. Jamaica must forge
ahead economically and must not be retarded by the other units. When Jamaica is
prosperous she will be ready and willing to help the poorer territories. This is of
course a very attractive thesis if you are a Jamaican, but the snag is that, particularly
with a rapidy increasing population, the time when Jamaica feels prosperous enough
to help the other units may be a long way off. This way of thinking finds its
expression in para. 7 of Mr. Manley’s paper.
4. The line which the paper takes on income tax and the development of
industry, and the line which it takes about representation in relation to population,
are in a sense two barrels of the same gun. They are both partly designed to secure
that the Federation does not interfere with Jamaica’s development. If in one part of
the Caribbean there is a tendency to regard Jamaica as fundamentally hostile to
Federation, there is in Jamaica a feeling that the Federal Government is
fundamentally hostile to them—that in effect Sir Grantley Adams says from time to
time to his minions “go and find out what Jamaica is doing and make them stop it”.
To Jamaica’s way of thinking his remarks about retrospective taxation were a classic
example of this attitude. Jamaicans therefore hope that by removing these subjects
from the Federal legislative list the Federal Government will not be able to interfere
with Jamaican industrial development; and that if they do show any disposition to
interfere in this or in any other matter the substantial Jamaican influence which
would be secured by increased representation would be able to prevent them. There
is also at the bottom of this the point of view which we have heard expressed before
by Mr. Manley, namely that the Federal Government should move very slowly at first
and should consolidate its position in the subjects which are of common concern like
defence and external relations, leaving the units to get on with the things about
which they know better.
5. At the forthcoming conference we shall have to guard against at least two
dangers. In extreme terms, one is that the Federal Government may be reduced to
little more than an organisation on the lines of the East Africa High Commission.
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Opposed to that is the danger that, inspired partly by jealousy, spite, personal
antipathy and personal ambition, the representatives of the other units and
particularly Sir Grantley Adams and Dr. Eric Williams may try to engineer Jamaica
out of the Federation. They may not find that a particularly difficult manoeuvre, and
it may need considerable statesmanship on the part of H.M.G. to prevent it from
happening.
6. I do not think that Mr. Manley will necessarily have to return to Jamaica from
the Federal Conference having secured precisely the proposals in his paper, provided
that he can say that he has achieved something which should have the same result.
Leaving aside, at any rate for the time being, the question of representation (which
is, as Mr. Rogers has said, primarily a matter for the West Indians to settle among
themselves) would it be worthwhile to consider whether there would be a means of
securing the results which Mr. Manley wants without taking income tax etc. off the
concurrent list? Possibly an agreed statement of policy in this particular field might
be drawn up and signed by the Federal Government and representatives of the units
at the conference, including an undertaking to the effect that concessions granted by
unit governments would be honoured when the time came to pass Federal
legislation. Possibly some sort of Federal economic committee ought to be set up. I
confess that I have no clear ideas on this, but I suggest that the Economists Section
[sic] might be asked to consider the problem.
7. I fear that there is no easy solution to the central problem of economic
planning. I very much doubt whether the Federal Government should be expected to
channel investment to one part of the Federation rather than to another. But it
would be quite an achievement if it could ensure that the unit Governments compete
fairly for whatever investment was going, on the assumption that if this were so the
investor would be able to make his own decision about where best to establish
himself. Jamaica could not reasonably object to this, and would I think accept it,
particularly if they were bringing more influence to bear within the Federal
Government.
P.J.K.
23.6.59
277 CO 1031/2311, nos 44 & 48 31 July 1959
[Fixing a date for West Indian independence]: minute by Lord Home
to Mr Lennox-Boyd.  Minutes by Mr Amery, G W Jamieson, Sir H
Poynton and W B L Monson
I am a bit disturbed by the indications which there have recently been that the
Federation of the West Indies may be pressing for the fixing of a date for
Independence, which would be much earlier than that which we have previously had
in mind, i.e. 1964. In particular I have noticed the suggestion by the Premier of
Trinidad, even if it need not be taken altogether seriously, that Independence might
be achieved on the 22nd April, 1960.
2. I gather also that there may be pressure for a Constitutional Conference to be
held in London next year, possibly even as early as January, 1960.
3. Either of these courses might be awkward in relation to some other parts of
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the Commonwealth. The holding of a Conference in the early part of 1960 might well
create embarrassment in relation to the Conference for the review of the constitution
of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which is contemplated for October,
1960, especially if the earlier Conference resulted in the fixing of a definite date for
West Indian Independence.
4. Nor is this all. We can by no means be sure that, when the Federation of the
West Indies achieves Independence all the Members of the Commonwealth will be
willing to accept it as a fellow Member. This applies particularly to South Africa,
especially in view of the recent action of Jamaica in imposing an embargo on trade
with South Africa for purely political reasons, and the threat that some other West
Indian Colonies might follow its example. The earlier the date suggested for
Independence, the greater will be the difficulties in this respect.
5. It does seem to me, although I don’t want to delay independence unreasonably
that there is a strong case for playing for the maximum time. What do you say and
how do you estimate the timetable? If things are going to mature far earlier than we
thought we in the C.R.O. must begin to prepare at once.
Minutes on 277
. . . 2. In view of Lord Home’s minute the question will now have to be dealt with at
Ministerial level. I should, therefore, be glad of a discussion with the Department—
say, next Monday afternoon, with perhaps a further talk next day with the
Department, plus Lord Hailes. We can consider how best to reply to Lord Home after
these talks.
3. Meanwhile my first reactions are:—
(1) It would be absurd to embark on independence when:
(a) there are no means of defence,
(b) no provision for finance for the central government,
(c) even no freedom of movement for goods or persons within the Federation, and
(d) no provision yet for staff for overseas representation.
(2) It would be very difficult to “sell” this one to the rest of the Commonwealth.
(3) The West Indies and Central Africa must each be judged on its merits. Central
Africa could be independent in the sense that it’s got the ships (guns and planes), it’s
got the men, it’s got the money too. There are good reasons for withholding
independence in Central Africa but we must be careful not to make the contrast with
the West Indies absurd, by giving the latter a purely fictitious Commonwealth status
when they have none of the means of supporting it.
(4) If faced with a demand in January for independence within twelve months, I
should have thought we should be prepared to counter with a planned programme
which would give the West Indies the chance of achieving the necessary criteria of
independence by 1965. In practice we might be able to settle for 1963 or 1964; but I
do not think that we should consider a further fall back position at this stage. The
West Indies themselves still have plenty of hurdles to jump at the Conference and
may not be in a position to put a united demand for full dominion status, quite so
soon as some fear.
(5) Meanwhile I would be against sounding other Commonwealth Governments at
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this stage. The Commonwealth has become a great whispering gallery and
consultations are sure to get back to West Indies’ ears. This will only encourage them
in their demand. If the C.R.O. feel they must consult their High Commissions, they
should be asked to do so in the strictest secrecy.
4. These are only provisional and first reactions but the Department may like to
take account of them before we hold our meeting.
J.A.
6.8.59
. . . 2. The Federal Government is having a conference with the ten Unit
Governments in Trinidad on 28th September to consider the changes necessary in
the Federal Constitution—“in order to achieve the goal of self-government and
Dominion status within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment”. This is
to be a preliminary to a full-dress conference some months later with H.M.G.,
probably here in London in the first quarter of 1960. The Federal Government has
invited two U.K. observers to attend, but the invitation has not yet been accepted to
give time to assess any adverse reaction to this step from the Units, some of whose
leaders (notably Mr Manley and Dr Williams) may disagree with it on the grounds
that it should be a purely West Indian affair.
3. On present indications the Trinidad conference will probably agree that
Dominion status should come as soon as possible. This demand may be put in
various forms. They may say as soon as legislatively possible, or alternatively by some
fixed, and fairly early, date. It is possible but unlikely that they will agree to further
period with a somewhat further advanced constitution before independence.
4. H.M.G.’s previous policy has been clear. It has been that we will not stand in
their way as soon as they have reached a position when they can stand on their own
feet economically and financially, and assume responsibility for the conduct of their
own defence and foreign affairs to the extent required by their own geographical and
international standing.
5. These criteria are vague. Their interpetation is going to be the trouble. We feel
the present Federation doesn’t measure up to them but could do so if only West
Indians wanted to. In preparation for the September conference we have tried to give
the criteria greater precision in what we have entitled our “minimum criteria”
namely
(a) A strong central administration capable of determining the lines of policy
within the main fields of governmental activity. (This in The W.I. implies a
Customs Union and Freedom of Movement.)
(b) Adequate financial resources at the disposal of the central administration
including independent taxing powers sufficient to enable it to finance its own
recurrent expenditure and obligations, e.g. Grant-in-aid. (This need not rule out
occasional help from others in time of stress or some transitional help for a
limited period at the outset.)
(c) A defence force capable of keeping the peace within its own boundaries and
posing at least a nominal deterrent to an outside aggressor. (A rudimentary navy
appears essential for these purposes.)
(d) A diplomatic organisation able to maintain external relations with the United
Nations and the more important friendly and neighbouring countries.
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6. Central Africa is a further complication. Lord Home has always been nervous
lest the progress of The W.I. to independence causes difficulties for us in our
relations with Sir Roy Welensky’s government. He, our S. of S. and the Prime
Minister exchanged minutes about this last year1 but at that time we were of the
opinion that the West Indians were likely to concentrate at the conference on
problems of the internal structure of the Federation. The C.R.O. have been told what
we now fear, and Lord Home has again minuted the S. of S. We are considering what
we can now advise the reply to Lord Home might be.
7. Mr Amery, Lord Hailes and Mr Rogers have discussed this earlier this week. . . .
Lord Hailes and the Department take the line that the negotiations subsequent to
any demand for early Dominion status will be difficult unless we go into them ready
to take a good deal on trust e.g. the West Indians will probably say that they will fulfil
the “minimum criteria” if not before, then shortly after independence, and that there
is little we can do but accept these earnests of intention, sceptical though we may be
of them. Mr Amery is somewhat more inclined to take a strong line and tell them
that Dominion status is just not on until they have fulfilled, or made a good measure
towards fulfilling, the criteria. He takes the line that we have to put them up for the
Commonwealth Club, and this being so, we are entitled to require clear evidence that
the new state will be a respectably sea-worthy one.
8. Thinking on this is still inevitably rather fluid. We are preparing a long brief
for the U.K. observers at the September conference and discussion of this should at
least clarify some of these difficulties. This will be submitted up for approval of
Ministers, and we hope to have Lord Hailes views on the second draft which should
be ready within the next week.
G.W.J.
13.8.59
Independence of the West Indies. We did not discuss this in any great detail but Lord
Hailes was extremely anxious that we should not hold back longer than was
necessary on purely practical grounds. He was evidently a little disappointed that Mr.
Amery had not been more encouraging at the meeting yesterday. He thought that
The West Indian Ministers themselves were almost certain to announce a date as
their goal during the preliminary Conference in the autumn, and it would be very
difficult for H.M.G. to put the brakes on for any other than purely practical reasons.
If we wanted to play it a bit slowly the best hope was that Dr. Williams would advocate
so early a date as to be ridiculous (e.g. April 1960, which he has already mentioned)
and that this would bring Mr. Manley into opposition and result in some compromise
that might be more reasonable. He was aware of the timing difficulty with the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland but while he seemed to appreciate the
difficulty of The West Indies attaining independence (or having a date fixed) ahead of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland he could not really see why it should be damaging in the
Rhodesian context if The West Indian constitutional conference were held before the
Central African Conference, the latter, I understand, being due for the autumn of
1960. He thought it would be impossible to defer The West Indian Conference later
than March or April, i.e. pretty well immediately after the Princess Royal’s visit if that
took place in January or February. I reminded Lord Hailes that in the case of Nigeria
1 See document no 273.
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 769
770 OTHER COLONIES [277]
the date of independence had been fixed almost exactly two years ahead of the final
constitutional conference, that the working out of independence was, in fact, quite a
long drawn out process, not only in the preparation of constitutional instruments
but in a whole lot of preparations that have to be made in the international field,
including the training of diplomatic staff and the getting ready for the C.R.O. and a
United Kingdom High Commissioner to take over. Anything less than two years
seemed to me to be rushing it unduly, even if we should get reassured that the
Federal Government would be sufficiently in control to take over. I instanced one or
two examples including Chaguaramas, of the difficulties we found at this end over
the perpetual jealousy between the Federal Government and the Unit Governments.
On this latter point Lord Hailes expressed complete agreement. . . .
A.H.P.
13.8.59
. . . 2. A draft reply to Lord Home is set out opposite for consideration. I have
assumed that Mr Amery would sign this.
3. It might be felt that the draft is a shade uncompromising in tone. This is
intentional. There are indications that the CRO have not yet really understood how
far things have gone in the West Indies, and that they overestimate HMG’s effective
power to call a halt or put on the brakes. Unless we are quite explicit about the way
we see the position there will be further misunderstandings. Nor have I given too
much encouragement to hopes that the West Indians will see sweet reason, when
faced with our list of conditions which they are to fulfil in advance of independance.
Our position on these may well have suffer some erosion (Mr Bradshaw’s2 favourite
word) to avoid a serious breach of friendship with the West Indies.
4. I have intentionally not given any explanation of the reason for our very
different assessment of the situation compared with that given in the last minute
sent to Lord Home (21). The plain fact is that we got out of touch with the way things
were going, and that happened because of the virtual absence of any continuous
attempt by the Federal Government to keep us up to date. They have now begun to
send us regular political reports, but this is quite a recent innovation. I do not think
we want to say this, at least in a minute of this kind which may be given wider
circulation.
5. I have not referred to any possibility of discussion by the CPC, though this
may be necessary after the September conference, and possibly before it if there is
any question of the UK observers being given instructions that go beyond the
existing policy of HMG quoted in the minute to Lord Home.
G.W.J.
19.8.59
1. On a drafting point I don’t like the comparative reference to Ghana and
Nigeria in paragraph 7 of the draft—not that I dispute its truth but because it is
precisely the point made by Federation and Southern Rhodesian spokesmen in
relation to their prospects of independence and is quoted by the C.R.O. to us. Mr.
Rogers would accept the alternative comparison which I have made on the draft.
2 R L Bradshaw, of St Kitts; federal minister of finance.
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2. On the main issue raised by Lord Home with which I am concerned viz. that
the holding of a conference in the early part of 1960 with the theme of independence
for the Federation of The West Indies would be embarrassing in relation to the
independence of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the criteria for the
latter’s independence has been set by the P.M. in the Debate of 22nd July. . . . Quite
clearly none of the considerations set out in this statement apply to The West Indian
situation. Also Sir R. Welensky has by now accepted that there is no question of
independence for the Federation in 1960—but the 1960 conference is going to be
difficult enough for us. At the official level we think that the future of the Rhodesia
and Nyasaland Federation depends on building up the Territorial Governments as
against the Federal Government (even including reduction of the Federal
Government’s present powers). The Federal authorities will resist this strongly and it
would be embarrassing to us if the discussion took place against the background of
the grant of independence to yet another “coloured” country of no great competence.
W.B.L.M.
21.8.59
I also agree—but I understand from the Private Office that the S of S will be back if
not on Monday at any rate about the middle of next week.
A.H.P.
21.8.59
. . . By far and away the most important matter at present is the question of
independence for the Federation and this note deals only with this question.
2. The Federal House of Representatives agreed in June of last year that a
Constitutional Conference should take place within a year “to achieve the goal of self-
government and Dominion status within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible
moment”. The intervention of other matters, notably the Leewards/Windwards
Constitutional Conference, have conspired to delay things beyond the time they had
originally intended, but indications now are that they will almost certainly want to
have this Conference probably in London some time in the first quarter of 1960.
3. As preparation for this the Federal Government has convened a preliminary
Conference in Trinidad on the 28th September to co-ordinate the views of the
Federal and Unit Governments. Subject to the agreement of the Units they have
invited us to send two observers. Trinidad, however, has already objected and
although Barbados, Dominica and St. Kitts have agreed to the invitation to the
observers we still do not know the views of Jamaica or the other five Units. The
invitation to send observers therefore, is in cold storage until the Federal
Government has decided whether they can still issue it in the light of the views of the
Units. Mr. Rogers and Mr. McPetrie would be the observers.
4. We had always hoped that this Conference would concentrate more on the
question of the internal structure of the Federation dealing with such questions as
the allocation of revenue and powers between the Federation and the Units, Customs
Union, etc. But it now looks as if they will be much more interested in getting
independence than we thought a few months ago. We now think that the September
Conference may well demand immediate independence (i.e. as soon as the necessary
legal and formal steps can be taken) or for independence by some fixed fairly early
date (perhaps in eighteen months or two years). They may agree not to demand
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either of these and accept something like full internal self-government for a final
period of a few years before full independence. We hope they will do this so that they
can get the Federation into seaworthy condition, but there are strong indications
that they may not want to wait.
5. This has upset the C.R.O. and Lord Home has suggested we play for the
maximum time. Mr. Amery has replied to Lord Home and I think the Secretary of
State should read both these minutes.
6. If the C.R.O. can be viewed as taking one extreme view about this question it is
probably fair to say that Lord Hailes takes the opposite extreme view. He argues that
independence has got to come and that indeed, only early independence is likely to
preserve the Federation intact and keep Jamaica a member. The Department’s view is
that H.M.G. would not be acting responsibly in agreeing to independence until we
were satisfied that they had fulfilled certain conditions which we think are essential
to the new state having a good chance of surviving.
7. We think these conditions are:
(a) A central administration capable of determining policy in those fields in which
sovereign states normally negotiate with one another. This includes economic and
financial policy and development which in The West Indies must include a
Customs Union as well as freedom of movement.
(b) Adequate financial resources at the disposal of the central administration
including independent taxing powers sufficient to enable it to finance its own
recurrent expenditure and obligations, e.g. grant in aid. (This need not rule out
occasional help from others in time of stress or some transitional help for a
limited period at the outset).
(c) A defence force capable of keeping the peace within its own boundaries and
posing at least a nominal deterrent to an outside aggressor. (A rudimentary Navy
appears essential for these purposes).
(d) A diplomatic organisation able to maintain external relations with the United
Nations and the more important friendly and neighbouring countries.
8. The argument with The West Indies is likely to centre about these conditions
and about the related question of how much financial help we will give them after
independence.
9. A paper is being prepared on the complex issues which would be used as a brief
to guide the U.K. observers at the September Conference. It will, of course, be
submitted for the approval of Ministers.
G.W.J.
28.8.59
278 CO 1031/2311, no 50 27 Aug 1959
[Fixing a date for West Indian independence]: minute by Mr Amery
(for S of S) to Lord Home
As Alan Lennox-Boyd is away until the end of this month I am replying to your
minute of 31st July about the West Indies.1
1 See previous document.
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2. The position is that the Federal Government has invited all the units of the
Federation to take part in a preliminary constitutional conference in Trinidad on the
28th September. Subject to the agreement of the unit governments (and Trinidad has
already expressed its opposition) the Federal Government has invited Her Majesty’s
Government to send two observers.
3. The relevant resolution of the Federal House of Representatives describes the
purpose of this conference as: “to achieve the goal of self-government and Dominion
status (sic) within the Commonwealth at the earliest possible moment”. It is the
present West Indian intention that this September conference, which is to be a
purely West Indian affair, should lead up to a full dress constitutional conference
with her Majesty’s Government in London early next year. The present Federal
constitution provides that such a conference should be held within five years of the
inauguration of the Federation; and although 1960 is rather on the early side we do
not think it would be politically possible to refuse a request for a West Indian
conference on this ground alone.
4. The West Indian delegations to the September conference will have to deal
with the highly contentious question of how power is to be distributed between the
Unit and the Central governments. They will also have to resolve the differences that
have arisen between Jamaica and the rest over customs union. We cannot foretell
what the outcome of their discussions will be. It is possible that the conference will
break down, in which case the request for a constitutional revision conference may
be postponed for some time. It is equally possible that the degree of agreement
reached may not be sufficient to justify the West Indian delegations in asking for
Dominion status by a fixed date. My advisers, however, and the Governor-General,
consider that the September conference is just as likely, if not more likely, to end in a
demand for independence at once (by which they will mean as soon as the necessary
legal and legislative steps can be taken) or by a definite date. We do not take the
Premier of Trinidad’s statement about independence by April 1960 very seriously. We
would not, however, be surprised if the date proposed were 18 months or two years
from the Constitutional Review conference in London. Assuming this conference was
held in the spring or early summer of 1960, this would mean independence some
time in 1962.
5. Our observers at the September conference will not have the same status as the
other delegates. Assuming, however, that they are invited it is our intention that they
should in so far as the opportunity presents itself, make it clear that Her Majesty’s
Government cannot agree to sponsor the West Indies for Commonwealth membership
unless they have fulfilled certain conditions with regard to the weight of powers and
revenues in the hands of the Central Government, the progress towards customs
union, the provision of certain military and naval forces, and the strengthening of
their administrative and diplomatic apparatus. These criteria are being worked out in
greater detail in the brief for the United Kingdom observers at the September confer-
ence, and an advance copy will shortly be sent to your Office in case you wish to com-
ment. This approach is in keeping with the Report of the 1956 London Conference on
British Caribbean Federation, which said, in reference to the eventual independence
of the Federation: “a country must be able to stand on its own feet economically and
financially . . . finance its own administration and (be) able and prepared to assume
responsibility for its own defence and its own international relations to the extent that
was involved by its geographical or international standing”.
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7. I recognise that early independence for The West Indies would not make our
task easier in relation to Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This factor is being given due
weight in our thinking. But you will appreciate that it will not count for much with
West Indian opinion. The West Indies are in many respects (not least their standards
of political life and internal stability) in advance of the general run of Latin-American
states in their immediate neighbourhood who already enjoy full international status.
This is the criterion that counts most with them.
8. I also appreciate what you say about the views of South Africa and how this
might affect the reception of West Indian candidature for the Commonwealth. I
made this point firmly to Mr. Manley and his ministers when I discussed the boycott
of South African goods with them last May in Jamaica. The United Kingdom
observers at the September conference will naturally lose no opportunity to reiterate
Her Majesty’s Government’s views on the undesirability of any extension of the
boycott by the rest of the West Indies. I doubt, however, whether the fear of a South
African “blackball” will do much to restrain the West Indians. They are more likely to
put their faith in Ghanaian and Indian support and if necessary even turn to them to
sponsor their membership of the Commonwealth.
9. I agree with you that there is much to be said for playing for time in dealing
with any demand for West Indian independence; and as you will see from the line we
are proposing to take, we shall certainly do nothing to hasten the process. Our power
of putting on the brake, however, is now very limited. Moreover, even where we still
have it, we have to be very careful how we use it. The Federation is still a delicate
plant and any excessive check at this stage to West Indian aspirations could have
grave repercussions on the standing of the Federal Government and even
compromise the existence of the Federation. While, therefore, we shall not neglect
reasonable opportunities for delay, I am sure you would not wish us to pursue these
to a point which risked injury to the Federation itself.
9. The September conference is due to meet in less than a month from now. I
would, accordingly, submit that we should review the whole problem again as soon
as the outcome of that conference is known. I do not know whether you will wish,
meanwhile, to let our High Commissioners know our preliminary views. It might,
however, be wiser not to discuss the problem at this stage with other Commonwealth
Governments. Any leakage of such discussions which reached the West Indies would
only spur them on in their quest for early independence.2
2 Mr Amery made substantial alterations to the CO draft of this minute: the whole of para 4 was written by
him, also the last sentence of para 7, and from the penultimate sentence of para 8 to the end. Lord Home
accepted the reply (no 57 in file).
279 CO 1031/2311, no 60 5 Nov 1959
[Timetable for independence after a breakdown of West Indies
Federation]: minute from Mr Macleod to Lord Home
Julian Amery wrote to you on the 27th August about the preliminary Federal
Constitutional Conference opening in Trinidad on 28th September.1 He suggested
1 See previous document.
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that we should review the likely timetable of independence for The West Indies as
soon as the outcome of the conference was known.
2. Your Department has already had a full account of what happened from one of
the United Kingdom observers. The Federal Government and the Trinidad
Government who were pressing for increased federal powers achieved none of their
aims. The conference failed to resolve the issue of representation in the Federal
House of Representatives and the other items on the agenda were never reached. A
complete breakdown was avoided only by agreement that all the issues on the
agenda, including representation, should be remitted to two inter-governmental
committees. One of these is to deal with constitutional and political issues, the other
with economic and social issues. The committees are to report not later than the 31st
March, 1960, and the conference will then be reconvened at the earliest practicable
time to consider the committee reports and “discuss proposals which shall be put to
Her Majesty’s Government, including the setting of a date for Dominion Status”.
3. The conference also agreed that the next stage of constitutional advance for
the Federation should be “Dominion Status”. This was however essentially a face
saving formula to cover up the breakdown; and no date for independence has been
set. The conference cannot now resume until about the middle of next year and
indeed the Jamaican Government does not wish it to resume until the autumn. The
full scale conference with H.M.G. which will then be necessary can therefore hardly
take place until the end of 1960 at the very earliest. This means that even if The
West Indies resolve their disagreements by the end of 1960—and it is far from cer-
tain that they will—the date for final independence can hardly be earlier than the
first half of 1962 though an announcement might have been made early in 1961. We
need not therefore fear any embarrassment to the review of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland provided this is not delayed beyond the first month or two
or 1961.
4. We now face, however, the graver issue of the possible breakdown of West
Indian federation. I do not expect it, but it is a possibility. Jamaica has made rapid
economic progress in recent years. Even if it achieves broadly proportionate
representation in the Federal House of Representatives, Jamaica may still be
unwilling to see the Federal government assume extensive powers over taxation and
industry. In this they might well have the backing of at least one or two of the small
units. Some of the others, however, led by Trinidad, wish to see a strong federal
government with a view to independence at an early date. It is just possible that they
might go for a smaller Eastern Caribbean Federation, without Jamaica.
5. We are doing what we can to stimulate the expression of opinion favourable to
federation and we shall do all we can to try and make the conference a success when
it meets again. Some of my officials had a useful talk with yours and with Mr.
Norman Robertson2 on 3rd November about the possibility of getting help from
Canada on this.3
2 N Robertson, under-secretary of state for external affairs, Canada, since 1958.
3 Lord Home replied that he hoped that, ‘despite the obvious difficulties, the situation will eventually sort
itself out’; he thought the discussion with Robertson was ‘undoubtedly useful’ (no 61, 10 Nov 1959). The
CO hoped the Canadians might be able to mitigate Jamaican isolationism: ‘calling in the New World to
redress the balance of the even newer!’ (CO 1031/2574, no 136 C, Sir H Poynton to Sir A Clutterbuck, 26
Oct 1959).
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280 CO 1031/2311, no 68 4 Jan 1960
[West Indies: announcement about dominion status]: letter from Mr
Amery (for S of S) to Lord Hailes (West Indies).  Minutes by P Rogers
and G W Jamieson
Iain1 has not yet cleared up the aftermath of his African visit, so I am writing to thank
you for your letters to him of the 11th and 18th December about Adams’
announcement on Dominion status. I will show your letters to Iain in the next few
days but I thought it might be helpful if I sent you some first thoughts meanwhile.
We quite agree with you that the suggestion that Dominion status could be
achieved in the course of 1960 is preposterous, and that this Resolution of the House
of Representatives faces us with the necessity for some plain speaking on Dominion
status. The problem is when, and in what context and in what terms. I am not quite
sure from your letters whether you have it in mind that the Secretary of State’s first
riposte should be specifically in answer to your despatch No. 864 in pursuance of
Adams’ announcement, or in some other way. I expect however that you will feel as
we do that it would not be suitable for the Secretary of State to make some
pronouncement to the House when it reassembles. This would be liable to be taken
as a discourteous rebuff of the Federal Government’s approach. While this might not
be so in the same degree if the statement were made in answer to a Question in the
House, there might still be (justified) suspicion that the Question was arranged and
criticism that a specific answer should have been avoided until he had discussed the
request with the Federal Government.
Assuming, however, that you have it in mind that whatever is said should be
specifically an answer to the Federal Government’s request, no one could then accuse
the Secretary of State of gratuitous interference in the consideration by West Indians
themselves of the future of Federation a matter on which I know you feel strongly—
even if the content of the statement were to be criticised. A more valid and damaging
criticism might be that we were anticipating the outcome of the actual Conference
with H.M.G. about the constitutional future of the Federation. Indeed a great deal of
the detail of any general statement would have to await that Conference. Unless
however you feel on further thought that we ought to refrain from saying anything
until then, we agree that there would be value in saying something fairly blunt in
reply to the Federal Government’s formal request.
If so, do you agree that the statement should be broadly on these lines? It might
rehearse the previous statements by Alan2 at the 1956 Federal Conference and the
Windward and Leeward Conference this year and refer to and endorse your own
speech at the opening of the Trinidad Conference. It might then go on to explain that
there are certain requirements of independence which are in no sense imposed by
H.M.G. but by the facts of international life. It might at this point acknowledge that
there is another kind of independence, such as that of several very small territories
which really exist by sufferance of larger neighbouring territories but that H.M.G.
feel, as they are sure The West Indies will feel, that this is not the kind to which The
West Indies rightly aspire or which would represent the place which they would
1 ie, Mr Macleod. 2 ie, Mr Lennox-Boyd.
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rightly seek to take in the world. It is for West Indians themselves to say when they
wish to give the Federal Government the powers which are necessary for it to sustain
independence and presumably this will be discussed in detail at the forthcoming
conferences between the Units and the Federation and later with H.M.G. Subject to
allowing the time required to pass the necessary U.K. legislation and to bring into
effect all the internal changes in The West Indies which are required, the date is
essentially one for West Indians themselves to decide since H.M.G. are now, as they
had already made it clear previously, ready to agree and sponsor The West Indies for
independent membership of the Commonwealth when they are ready for it. Until
however West Indians themselves decide when they will bring these internal changes
into effect it would be inappropriate, indeed impossible, for H.M.G. arbitrarily to fix a
date.
On the assumption that our reply should be broadly on these lines we are setting
down to drafting something and we will consult you about it privately before we send
it officially. What we would very much hope is that we should be able to get a
statement with which the Federal Government were able to express publicly their
agreement, but perhaps this is too much to hope?
Minutes on 280
. . . The uncompromising Jamaican attitude over representation and the nature and
strength of Jamaica’s objections to the strengthening of the Federal Government and
to institution of a Customs Union are certainly a major cause of the breakdown of the
Conference and the present crisis in federation. This must be viewed against the
appalling effect of Sir Grantley Adams’ statement about retrospective taxation and
the vigour of the Jamaican economic development in recent years. Moreover account
must be taken of the fact that the Jamaican Government as a whole, i.e. politicians
and civil servants combined, is undoubtedly more efficient than that of any other
West Indian Government (the Federal Government not excluded), and it is only
human and indeed reasonable that they should be fearful of a less efficient
government interfering (as they see it) in what they are doing.
A major cause of the blame must also be attributed to the Eastern Caribbean,
partly through not having gone any way to meet the realities of the Jamaican
political scene. Above all responsibility must rest on the present Trindad Government
for having put forward proposals which, however desirable in principle, are just not
acceptable on timing and for pressing these just as uncompromisingly as Jamaica has
pressed its points of view. In particular the view of some of the small islands e.g. St.
Lucia, in looking upon federal government primarily as a source of doles for the
small islands has understandably alarmed Jamaica and this attitude too must bear
some part of the blame.
The third major cause of the breakdown, & at present the one which is probably
the most important, is the lack of leadership and the political inefficiency of the
Federal Government.
These causes are analysed at greater length in Lord Hailes’ recent despatch about
the Conference and what he says is entirely in line with our own views.
P.R.
13.11.59
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. . . 2. I am by no means convinced for the reasons set out below that Lord Hailes’
suggestion of a “firm blunt statement of fact on the matter of dominion status” is
timely, though I do not dispute that we might one day have to advise the Secretary of
State to take a somewhat more positive line with The West Indies than that they have
been accustomed to in recent years, if they do not look like going a reasonable way to
meeting our “minimum criteria”:
(a) If at all possible we should avoid having arguments with The West Indies about
the date for their independence. To fall into this trap would be grist to the mill of
the more extreme nationalists particularly Dr. Eric Williams; such a step might in
any case be ineffective; and it could very well sour our present very good relations
with the Federation which we hope to keep after their independence.
(b) It would not be wise to enter into an argument while the proceedings of the
inter-governmental committees are still, so to speak, sub judice. They may after all
come to a reasonable set of decisions which would implement the “minimum
criteria”. I think it would be better to give this at least a chance.
(c) I cannot see how the statement could go very much further in substance and
tone than the more recent statements of the Secretary of State’s predecessor on
this subject (set out in (64) ). It could of course spell out in rather more detail
what the statements in (64) generalise about, as was done by Lord Hailes when he
opened the September Conference. I doubt very much if the mere repetition of all
this would strike the West Indies as either fresh or arresting. It should, moreover,
be borne in mind that we have on at least one occasion . . . got very close to saying
that they could have independence when they feel ready for it.
(d) Is there in any case anything we should object to in the Prime Minister’s
statement recorded in paragraph 2 of (63)? As long as the date for independence he
has in mind is one which will allow reasonable achievement of the “minimum
criteria” I am not sure that we should not instead welcome this move of Sir
Grantley’s which does at least show signs of life, direction and purpose instead of
the usual fumbling and ineffectiveness.
(e) I do not want to sound disrespectful but it seems to me there is a slight touch
of panic in (63). This was entirely missing from Lord Hailes’ last communication
to us in which he reproved the Office for having taken positive steps after the
failure of the September Conference to ginger up exponents of Federation and told
us that the time was past when intervention from here was likely to be either
welcome or effective, and generally set out a point of view which Sir Kenneth
Blackburne3 later neatly summarised (and incidentally supported) of “masterful
inactivity” by the Office.
3. Despite all these doubts I do not think there are any overwhelming objections
to going along with Lord Hailes’ suggestion, at least a little way. For one thing we do
not want to give him any suspicion or feeling (and I fear he may be sensitive in this
regard) that we do not trust his judgment. Also I do not think that in the present
situation any action of this kind is likely to have very much effect, either good or bad.
My impression is that at long last we now see a head of steam built up behind the
concept of independence. I doubt if this is likely to be deflected from its goal by
3 Capt-gen and governor-in-chief of Jamaica, 1957–1962.
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 778
[281] WEST INDIES FEDERATION 779
general statements of policy though I am optimistic enough to believe that it may be
carried forward in a realistic way when the politicians really get to grips with what
one may call the technical aspects of the problem—training diplomats, getting their
defences improved, making a start with Customs Union, etc.
G.W.J.
17.12.59
281 CO 1031/2574, no 144 13 Jan 1960
[West Indies: assessment of present position and future prospects]:
letter from P Rogers (CO) to Lord Hailes.  Minutes by G W Jamieson,
P Rogers, Sir H Poynton, Mr Amery and Mr Macleod [Extract]
. . . 3. We entirely agree with you that “no solution which does not have its roots in
West Indian thinking and action is of any lasting value”. We also fully agree that
“West Indians are too far advanced to be greatly influenced in the last resort by
outside advice and (that) it is they alone who will make or mar Federation, and their
future”. Equally, I hope I am right in inferring from your letter that you will agree
that they can like the rest of us to some extent be influenced by outside advice and it
is perfectly proper either for H.M.G. or for other outside friends to offer that advice or
to try to influence events. The crux of the matter, and the point in doubt, is what
particular kind of advice and influence is likely to be effective. . . .
. . . 6. But a careful study of what has been said in the Debate in the House of
Representatives and on other occasions does still leave us with a feeling that there is
a very long way to go. For example, even Manley’s statement quoted in the Jamaica
Monthly Intelligence Report for November that “I regard this as an issue with very
deep and far-reaching conclusions to my country because a decision to leave Federation
is fraught with far-reaching consequences and a decision to stay in the Federation is
fraught with immediate and disastrous consequences”, makes it clear that, whatever,
Manley’s own views, he has to pay careful regard to powerful forces in Jamaica which
still seem to be opposed to the real implications of Federation. . . .
7. No doubt there will, as you say, be many ups and downs in the state of public
feeling in Jamaica and elsewhere about Federation as about other things, and on
balance in Jamaica there certainly seems to be something of an “up” since the
Conference; but does not the underlying seriousness of the situation still remain? . . .
11. The second aspect of the question is what, if anything, should be done to deal
with the situation. It is to this, I think, that your criticism is mainly directed. If we
have got the picture right—indeed even if it is rosier than the one I have painted—is
there not still a need to give encouragement to the Federation in any way that can be
done without being counter-productive? Your own letter of 21st November said after
all that “there is a chance—not stronger than that—that the Federation looks like
turning a dangerous corner by its own efforts”. If it is no more than a chance—
indeed even if things are by now better than that—are we really justified in confining
ourselves, to use Blackburne’s phrase, to “masterly inactivity”? As we see it here, it is
only you yourself who have given a lead within the West Indies in favour of
Federation. Governors and senior Federal civil servants are by the nature of their
offices prevented from doing this publicly and the public explanation and advocacy of
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Federation by West Indian politicians and other unofficial leaders of public opinion
has been seriously lacking (this criticism has been made to me by many West Indians
and I am sure you will agree that they are right). What we have been trying to do is to
stimulate such explanation and advocacy by West Indians themselves. We tried
working mainly, though not solely, through expatriates because they are the persons
with whom we are more easily in touch in London, and because we should not, in
any case, do much directly. There is admittedly a risk here. But the particular
expatriates we had discussed it with are all persons who, as I am sure you will also
agree, are very well aware of just that background, who know that it is only West
Indians themselves who can create their own salvation, and who are well accustomed
to working accordingly. . . .
Minutes on 281
On the general question of whether the role of this office should from now on, in
relation to the Federation, be purely passive or whether instead we should still try
discreetly to push the Federation, I have to admit that in general I support Lord
Hailes’ central thesis that we cannot do much more than act when requested as
honest broker (e.g. Mr. Rogers’ role at the Trinidad Conference).
2. I would not, however, go as far as Lord Hailes does, as clearly all kinds of situ-
ations could arise in which the Secretary of State or this office acting on his behalf,
might have to intervene in Federal questions because of H.M.G’s continued responsi-
bility for the area right up to the point of independence. I think it can be fairly argued
that we were justified in abandoning our usual position of neutrality immediately after
the conclusion of the September Conference. For despite what Lord Hailes says, there
was a crisis atmosphere at this stage. The 50,000 people would not otherwise have
turned out on the streets of Kingston to welcome Mr. Manley. On the other hand, I
think it has to be accepted that it was a pity that we did not find time to consult Lord
Hailes before embarking on the lobbying. But presumably those present at the meet-
ing on the 21st October (recorded at (121) ) clearly felt that there could be no delay in
setting about our reparative activity and Mr. Rogers embarked on his series of meet-
ings with business men, etc., two days later.
3. We do, however, not want to engage in an argument with Lord Hailes at this
stage, particularly when he has recently become so much friendlier and receptive
towards the Department’s ideas. In any case, he is “the man on the spot” and if he is
unwilling to admit that there was, or continues to be, an atmosphere of crisis, it is
not easy to see quite how we can contradict him. He may of course be right that there
is no atmosphere of crisis now, as matters appear to have improved considerably
judging by the account of the inter-Governmental Committee’s first meeting in (138)
and the general review of Lord Hailes’ visit to Jamaica in (139).
G.W.J.
2.12.59
. . . I much regret that I should have proposed action in the sense I did without sug-
gesting that it be cleared first with Lord Hailes. I had not expected that he would do
other than welcome it. Having said that, I am bound to say that I do not agree with him
on the policy of “masterly inactivity”. When the situation is so serious that Lord Hailes
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himself says that there is no more than a chance that the Federation will turn a dan-
gerous corner by its own efforts, I feel that H.M.G. is not justified in being passive.
P.R.
21.12.59
. . . I realise that it is very difficult for us in London to form an exact assessment of the
situation in the West Indies but the general impression that I get from talking to
people in London, outside the Office with West Indian contacts, is that our rather
pessimistic assumptions about the Federation are rather nearer the mark than Lord
Hailes’ rather more optimistic picture. . . .
A.H.P.
23.12.59
Secretary of State
Frankly I think we are in danger of making a mountain out of a molehill.
2. The idea of stimulating propaganda in favour of federation was, I think, a good
one. But plainly we were wrong to put it into practice without first consulting Hailes.
We were also quite right to take the Canadians into our confidence; but, plainly again,
it is awkward for Hailes if the picture we give them is in his view unduly alarmist.
3. On balance I agree with Hailes’ appreciation of the situation and judge that
under present circumstances and given the present distribution of personalities
there is more to be feared from excess of zeal than from masterly inactivity on our
part. Federation is after all a West Indian show; and though you can take the horse to
the water you cannot make him drink.
4. I would prefer a much shorter letter simply saying that (1) we are sorry we
didn’t tell Hailes what we were doing; (2) we trust no harm has been done; (3) we are
glad things seem to be going better and (4) we are still rather worried about the
prospects of the Federal Civil Service.
J.A.
30.12.59
Mr. Amery
I think on the whole I would rather send Mr. Rogers’s draft. It is my general
experience that if somebody writes, as Hailes has done, a very long, involved and
rather diffuse letter of complaint it is a good thing to send a long reply in return. I
am not sure how I read the tea-leaves about West Indian Federation at the present
time, but in any case I don’t think we prejudice anything by replying as is suggested.
If you agree, therefore, we will write accordingly.
I.M.
31.12.59
282 PREM 11/3236, PM(61)52 30 May 1961
[West Indies: result of the preparatory inter-governmental
conference]: minute from Mr Macleod to Mr Macmillan
The resumed Inter-Governmental Conference (attended by Colonial Office observers)
ended on 16th May. In general its results are satisfactory. It agreed a new basis for
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representation in the Federal Legislature, new arrangements for financing the
Federation, a formula for the achievement of Freedom of Movement within the
Federation, and a Customs Union plan. It also endorsed plans for the expansion of its
military forces and for the establishment of a necessary minimum of diplomatic
missions. Agreement on some of the more contentious issues was only achieved on a
majority basis and these may well be re-opened at Lancaster House, though I intend
to do my best to prevent it. There were also some (mainly minor) issues which the
Inter-Government Conference did not resolve and which remain to be settled.
2. The Constitutional Conference with H.M.G. for which the Inter-Governmental
Conference was preparatory starts at Lancaster House on 31st May. While there will
be difficulties to surmount (not least over the control of Income Tax and Industrial
Development), I am hopeful that this Conference will result in general agreement on
the form of the Federal Constitution for independence and on an independence date.
I understand that the West Indians have in mind some date between April and June,
1962. Subject to examination of the considerable constitutional drafting problem
this necessitates, I hope it will be possible to fix the independence date within this
period.
3. Unfortunately this is not the end of the road. There is still the Jamaican refer-
endum which I now understand is likely to take place around August or September.
Present reports are not optimistic about the probable result but the position may well
change when Mr. Manley’s campaign in favour of federation gets into its stride. If
Jamaica were to decide against Federation she would want independence fairly quickly
as a separate state and we should have little alternative to letting her “go it alone”. In
such a situation our main efforts would have to be concentrated on doing what we
could to keep the rest of the Federation intact, though this would be difficult: indeed
I understand that if Jamaica withdrew, Trinidad would follow suit. At present, however,
there is no need to plan for this contingency though I shall keep my colleagues in
touch as necessary with this aspect of the situation.
4. There is to be another conference in the autumn to discuss financial,
economic and defence matters. I may be put under very heavy pressure at the
Conference opening on 31st May to reveal our hand on the question of economic aid;
I hope however to maintain the position that H.M.G. will not be able to discuss its
post-independence aid plans for the Federation until the autumn conference.
5. I will report at regular intervals to you as the Conference proceeds.1
1 Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘Many thanks. Not bad, so far. H.M. 30.5.61’.
283 PREM 11/3236, PM(61)54 7 June 1961
[Report on the West Indies constitutional conference]: minute by Mr
Macleod to Mr Macmillan.  Minute by Mr Selwyn Lloyd (Exchequer)
The West Indies Conference at Lancaster House is at a critical stage. All conferences
go through such a period, but as there is usually a unanimous wish on the part of the
delegates to press on with constitutional advance or independence as the case may
be, difficulties can usually be surmounted. But here there are so many personal
conflicts and also such a difference of approach between the large and the small
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islands that it appears very doubtful whether this conference will in fact end with
sufficient agreement [to] arrive at the naming of a date for independence.
2. There are two possible rocks which might shipwreck us:—
(a) the rather technical question of the transfer of matters from the reserved list.
This particularly affects Jamaica, who were asked to consider at the inter-
governmental talks in Trinidad a new formula. Jamaica, however, who like the idea
of a very loose federation, have been unable to offer any advance at all and this is
very much resented by most if not all the other delegates. Manley cannot move and
I shall have to make an appeal to the Conference to understand his position and
accept the Jamaican formula.
(b) However, the more serious matter, and the one that carries great risks for us,
is that the Conference might break down on the issue of freedom of movement. As
you know, there is very limited freedom of movement in the West Indies and
Trinidad is the magnet for the poorer islands. But Trinidad has very heavy
unemployment and heavy under-employment and does not feel, particularly in the
absence of strong Federal powers for economic planning, that she can possibly
accept free entry at this stage, nor indeed for some years to come. A tenuous 6 to 5
majority was finally achieved for a formula which in practice accepts this position
in relation to Trinidad, but unfortunately goes on to link it with an interim plan
for development of the small islands to be financed by the United Kingdom. This is
in spite of the fact that agreement had previously been reached on the basis that
financial matters were to be deferred until an autumn conference.
3. The Federal Government has now produced from the requests of the smaller
units a plan which asks us to provide £6 million for the small islands alone for a one-
year plan. This proposal cannot possibly be defended either in total or in detail and
the amounts asked for are far beyond anything that we can contemplate, or indeed
anything that the islands can spend. The needs in particular of the African territories,
where the standard of living is much lower than in the West Indies, have far higher
priority. In this move by the Federal Government and the small islands in particular
there is a great deal of politics and a good proportion of blackmail. I know this and
they know that I know it. Nevertheless we are not going to be able to get this item
through the Conference without making a response that they consider satisfactory to
this idea of an interim plan. Seven out of the ten territories are grant-aided and fear
their future in a Federation dominated by Jamaica and Trinidad. They are therefore
only really prepared to ask their Legislative Councils for endorsement of the plan for
Federation if they can show something tangible on this item. I am quite clear that for
the small islands this is the crux of the Conference.
4. One must, however, look at the other side of it. It seems to me very serious if
our plans for Federation were now to break down, particularly as it would appear that
they had broken down on our reluctance to find a very small sum of money. We would
have contributed to the Balkanisation of the Caribbean and Jamaica and Trinidad, and
possibly Barbados, would move to their separate destinies leaving us with a gaggle of
small islands to grant-aid for ever, which would also land us with serious problems for
their defence, subject as they would be to all the malign influences in the Caribbean.
Moreover we would have lost the chance of making the Federation a magnet suffi-
ciently powerful to attract British Guiana and British Honduras into it. Serious
though the results would be for us, I believe they would be worse for America. She is
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most closely concerned to see a successful outcome to this conference and would be
profoundly disappointed if it failed. The Caribbean is an area of acute anxiety to her at
the moment and to fail to create a Federation now would surely have disastrous effects
on our relationship with the United States. Canada too, though in minor degree, would
be very unhappy. America are going to be very helpful in terms of aid for the Federation
and have undertaken to match £ for £ what we can do at least up to 1964. I believe in
practice they will do better than this, but the difficulty is to make use of this accord at
the present time. I believe present American thinking is that they should follow a suc-
cessful conference here with an indication of their general interest in time, it would
be hoped, to help Manley with his September referendum in Jamaica. But we have got
to get through this conference successfully first.
5. So far Hugh Fraser,1 who has been in the chair for two days during my
absence, has expressed surprise that this matter should be raised at all, has said that
we cannot look at the sort of figures that they appear to have in contemplation, and
has warned them that we cannot embark on detailed financial discussions now in
advance of the autumn. This is certainly the right line for us to take and hold as long
as we can, but I shall have to make a statement, perhaps on Tuesday of next week, at
the conclusion of this part of the Conference, and what I say then will mean either
that the Conference succeeds or that it breaks up. I am thinking of making a
statement along the following lines:—
(i) of repeating again the points that Fraser has made to them from the chair;
(ii) of saying that nevertheless I recognise the importance of this matter to the
West Indies and am prepared to send out a small survey team to study, in
conjunction with the Federal Government and the unit Governments, a small and
limited number of projects for the smaller islands for which special finance might
be considered;
(iii) I could if I re-cut and re-shaped the plans that I have for African finance
possibly find up to £1⁄2 million, although this would be a very difficult and
distasteful exercise. I have not yet decided whether to mention a figure of this sort
to the Conference: the danger of mentioning it is that it would be taken as derisory
against the requests they have put forward to us.
6. My judgment is that if the approach mentioned above seems insufficient, and I
believe that it will be, I could in fact buy a settlement for a total of £2 million. It may
be necessary to ask for an urgent meeting of Ministers, perhaps on Monday, to con-
sider in the light of further progress at Lancaster House whether in the last resort what
I might broadly call the foreign affairs aspect is to prevail and whether I should put
forward such a proposal. I am almost equally reluctant to put forward a suggestion as
to where this money should come from. There are only really two possibilities:—
(i) I would have to take money away from essential projects in East Africa to
meet this comparatively undeserving case in the West Indies; or
(ii) we would have to treat it as we did Cyprus, as a case where we had to pay a
certain amount of money because of the international importance of what we were
seeking to achieve, and in that case I would have to ask for something like £11⁄4
million of new money from the Treasury.
1 H C P J Fraser, parliamentary under-secretary of state at CO, 1960–1962; husband of Lady Antonia
Pakenham.
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7. I will report further on this important matter as we make progress at
Lancaster House.2
8. I am sending copies of this minute to the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, the Foreign Secretary and the Lord Privy Seal, the Commonwealth
Secretary and the Minister of Defence.3
Minute on 283
Prime Minister
You asked for my views on the Colonial Secretary’s minute of 7th June about this
Conference.
2. I think that we shall have to consider whether the threat is likely to be pressed
to the point of breaking up the Conference; and if so whether, and to what extent, we
shall be obliged to give in to it. I should hope that we could get away with sending a
small survey team to study a few selected projects in the smaller islands; though even
this could be embarrassing unless the team is carefully chosen and briefed.
3. If we cannot get away with this and have to make a cash offer, the purposes to
which the money would be put seem to make it clearly appropriate for C.D. & W.
financing. In my view therefore the money would have to be found from existing C.D.
& W. resources, including the extra £19m. which is under consideration by you as an
amount to be made available for the next two years.
4. The alternative of finding new money on the Cyprus model raises very great
difficulties in the present situation regarding our overseas expenditure and balance
of payments, as well as in other ways, and I very much hope that the Colonial
Secretary will not find it necessary to pursue it.
5. Even if this alternative is not pursued, I think that Ministers will have to meet
to consider whether we should give way at all to this pressure.
S.L.
12.6.61
2 The conference concluded on 16 June with agreement in principle that the West Indies could move to
independence by 31 May 1962; however, a further conference was fixed for Jan 1962 to deal with defence,
financial, and economic matters, and international relations issues. The possibility of additional
development funding would be examined meanwhile. Planning was overtaken by the referendum in
Jamaica on 19 Sept 1961: 54.1% voted against remaining in the Federation.
3 Mr Macmillan minuted: ‘What does C of Exr say? I suppose ministers will have to meet. H.M. 7.6.61’.
284 CAB 128/35/2, CC 52(61)4 28 Sept 1961
[Implications of Jamaica referendum—withdrawal from Federation]:
Cabinet conclusions
The Cabinet had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C. (61) 142)
on the implications of the referendum in Jamaica which had resulted in a decision
that the territory should withdraw from the West Indies Federation.1
1 See n 2 to previous document.
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The Colonial Secretary said that there could be no question of repudiating this
decision which, although reached on a narrow majority of a low poll,2 was accepted
both by the Prime Minister, Mr. Manley, and by the Opposition Parties in Jamaica.
Given the precedents of Cyprus and Sierra Leone, and having regard to the size of the
population, economic viability and relative stability of the territory, a request from
Jamaica for full independence within the Commonwealth could not reasonably be
resisted. He proposed, therefore, that in the discussions he would have with the
Prime Minister of Jamaica in the following week he should indicate that the United
Kingdom Government were willing in principle to agree that, after the necessary
preparations had been made, Jamaica should become independent and would
sponsor her application for membership of the Commonwealth. As some time would
be required to resolve a number of legislative and administrative problems created by
the withdrawal of Jamaica from the Federation, it would be possible to avoid a firm
date for independence at this stage, but this would probably take place in the latter
half of 1963.
The implications of the decision for the other islands in the Federation could not
yet be clearly seen. He was discussing this problem with Sir Grantley Adams, the
Federal Prime Minister, and hoped shortly to have the views of Dr. Williams, the
Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago. Subject to these consultations, it might be
possible to establish an Eastern Caribbean Federation which might include British
Guiana. A conference with representatives of the smaller islands might be desirable
when opinion had had time to crystallise.
In discussion the following points were raised:—
(a) It would be important to maintain, in discussion with representatives from all
the West Indian territories, the cautious attitude which had so far been adopted
about financial assistance by Her Majesty’s Government. There did not seem any case
for providing assistance for Jamaica, and the poorer islands should not be allowed to
suppose that in independence they could expect full financial support from the
United Kingdom.
(b) The withdrawal of Jamaica from the Federation might make the inclusion of
British Guiana in a federation of all the remaining islands a little easier.
(c) As the British Overseas Airways Corporation were losing substantial sums
annually in supporting the West Indies airline, which aspired to the status of an
international airline, it might now be possible to cut the rate of loss by reducing
operations to the more modest level of an inter-island air service.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Agreed that, in his discussions with the Prime Minister of Jamaica, the
Colonial Secretary should accept in principle that, after the necessary preparations
had been made, Jamaica should have full independence and that in due course Her
Majesty’s Government would sponsor the admittance of Jamaica to
Commonwealth membership.
(2) Invited the Colonial Secretary to submit for their consideration at a later
meeting a report on the prospects of establishing an Eastern Caribbean Federation
which might include British Guiana.
2 The turnout was 60%.
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285 CO 1031/3278, no 147 22 Nov 1961
[British interests in the West Indies]: minute by Lord Perth to Mr
Maudling
I have read through West Indian Department ‘A’ paper on conferences and legislation
concerned with the West Indies in 1962. As it says, it is in the main confined to time-
tables based on various half pledges and guesses about, for example, what Williams of
Trinidad is going to do. It proposes a ministerial visit to see how local politicians react
to Jamaica’s leaving the Federation and generally to explore the future.
But are we clear ourselves where we want to go?
I suppose the first question is what are our basic interests in the Caribbean—and I
use the term Caribbean to include British Honduras and British Guiana.
Strategically, as I see it they are nil. Of course we don’t want to see them in un-
friendly hands, but the U.S.A. and Canada must ensure this does not come about,
although as friends and allies we should be prepared to help by influence and? money.
Economically, to the Government the whole area is a constant and considerable
drain whether by disguised subsidy or direct help. On the other hand there is a large
(how large) private investment (real estate and oil) which may or may not bring in a
handsome return. Clearly we do not want to jeopardise such investment, but is there
danger of this?
Morally, there is of course a strong sentimental tie which must have some weight.
The Immigration Bill will be straining the West Indian side of the sentiment.
I suggest we need now to review the whole of the West Indian position. The grand
concept of Federation, perhaps ultimately to embrace British Hounduras and British
Guiana, is in ruins. Jamaica is out and other groups of islands, for example Bermuda
and the Bahamas, were never in. Is it wise to try and salvage the rest of the
Federation? In that event is it reasonable to expect Trinidad to carry the burden of
the smaller islands? Surely she won’t without the promise of continuing and
substantial aid. What do we want to do about British Guiana? Jagan is pressing for its
independence. Geographically it is of course within sight of Trinidad. And then there
is British Honduras with the prospect of tens of millions being spent for a new capital
and for what purpose? There are of course lots of other questions which will need
thought.
I can think of all sorts of other constitutional solutions than those which we are at
present more or less drifting into, especially if we are prepared to be tough about the
giving of aid and attaching strings to it. Strategically and probably economically we
can afford to be tough and only sentimentally have we reasons not to be. At a time,
and I think sooner rather than later, we ought to consult with the Americans and
Canadians, but before this we should know our own minds.
286 CAB 134/1561, CPC 3(62)1 2 Feb 1962
[Future developments in the West Indies]: minutes of Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee meeting
The Committee had before them memoranda by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C. (62) 5
and C.P.C. (62) 6) on future developments in the West Indies.
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The Colonial Secretary said that the defection of Jamaica and the refusal of
Trinidad to participate in any federation of the Eastern Caribbean had removed any
possibility of continuing the present West Indian Federation in any form. He
proposed, therefore, to put forward a Bill dissolving the Federation and establishing
at the same time a Commission to take charge of the existing federal services until
such time as more permanent arrangements could be made for them. The
Commissioner would in effect be a trustee in bankruptcy. So far as the future of the
territories themselves was concerned the Government were already committed to
provide for the independence of Jamaica and a conference was in session. It would be
impossible to refuse the grant of formal independence to Trinidad, which was already
independent for all practical purposes. The same applied to British Guiana. It was
indeed ironical that the Government were delaying independence for British Guiana
at the request of the United States Government; but action could not be long delayed.
The real problems of the West Indies centred round the general question of financial
viability and the particular problem of the smaller Islands, who could not support
independence on their own without a continuing and indefinite subsidy and whose
prospects would be profoundly affected by the dissolution of the Federation. The
smaller islands had proposed to him the formation of their own federation; their
ideas were still unformed but they were working on more definite proposals which
they hoped to present to him shortly. They were aware of the economic problem and
would take it into account. A possible alternative to such a federation was a re-
grouping of some of the islands with Trinidad in a unitary state; it was unlikely that
Barbados at any rate would accept such an arrangement but her financial prospects
were less depressing. If it were accepted that negotiations for the independence of
Jamaica and Trinidad should go forward he would propose to give further
consideration to the problem of the other islands in the light of their own considered
proposals for federation and of the possibility that when the bitter feelings aroused by
the breakup of the main Federation had abated Trinidad and some of the smaller
islands might be prepared to form a unitary state on their own.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) It would not be practical to withhold the grant of independence to Trinidad,
but it should be our object to ensure that as many as possible of the smaller islands
were grouped with Trinidad in a unitary state. The advantages to Trinidad were that
the accession of other islands would help to counteract the rapid growth of the
Indian population in Trinidad itself. The advantage to the United Kingdom would be
that such a unitary state might be financially viable and would reduce to some extent
the subsidy required to keep the smaller islands going. A separate federation of the
smaller islands should not be ruled out but would need careful examination in the
light of the scheme which they were now understood to be preparing.
(b) There would be no question of the automatic Commonwealth membership for
West Indian territories attaining independence although we had already entered into
an understanding with Jamaica to support her application. There would be particular
difficulty about Commonwealth membership for British Guiana. No formal
procedure for Commonwealth membership had ever been laid down; this had
advantages and disadvantages, but at least it made it possible to look at each case on
merit.
(c) The whole question of finance for the West Indies, both in terms of the cost of
government, compensation for federal staff and subsidies, and in the broader context
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of persuading the Governments of Canada and the United States to accept greater
responsibility for an area which was now of more strategic importance to them than
to us, needed fuller examination. It should be studied in detail by officials of the
Treasury and the Colonial Office.
(d) It could be argued that it would be justifiable for the United Kingdom
Government, in spite of the dissolution of the Federation, to grant independence to
all the smaller islands of the West Indies as well as to Trinidad and leave them to
work out their own future. As against this the Government could not altogether
avoid a moral obligation to avert the chaos and bankruptcy in the smaller islands
which might well ensue. In the particular case of Trinidad it would be difficult to
make conditions about independence in the form of requiring her to accept
responsibility for her smaller neighbours in view of the fact that for all practical
purposes she was independent already.
(e) It would be possible to delay action on British Honduras for some time; efforts
were at present concentrated on repairing the damage done by the recent hurricane
and political questions had been put aside for the time being. It might in the longer
term be to our advantage to accept a merger of British Honduras with Guatemala. It
was no longer possible to think in terms of making British Honduras a member of
the West Indian Federation and there was no prospect of her attaining a viable
independence on her own.1 . . .
1 The Cabinet reluctantly agreed ‘that the dissolution of the West Indies Federation could not be
prevented’, and it would be ‘premature to describe the suggested federation of Barbados and the Leeward
and Windward Islands as more than a promising development’ (CAB 128/36/1, CC 11(62)3, 6 Feb 1962).
287 DO 200/111, no 2 10 Apr 1962
‘Federation of the Eight’: brief for S of S by L B Walsh Atkins (CRO)1
on Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee memorandum
The problem
1. The withdrawal of Jamaica and Trinidad from the Federation of the West
Indies poses the problem of what to do with the eight smaller territories, Barbados,
the four Windward Islands units and the three Leeward Islands units. Trinidad has
only half the size and population of Jamaica: and the Little Eight all together are
smaller in area and population even than Trinidad. Though perhaps several times
better off per head than many African and Asian territories they are by local
standards (and particularly in contrast with Trinidad, with its oil) extremely poor,
depending predominantly on the export of bananas and sugar, plus tourism. All
except Barbados are now grant-aided. To put them on the same footing as Jamaica
and Trinidad in the obsolescent Federation their advance to full internal self-
government was accelerated; and in most of them financial irresponsibility and
administrative incompetence are flowering. It is necessary to take an early view of
the future of the “Little Eight” because of the break-up of the old Federation (the
West Indies Bill has just been enacted) and because the governments of the Eight,
1 Formerly deputy high commissioner, Karachi, 1959–1961.
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 789
790 OTHER COLONIES [287]
after meeting in Barbados at the end of February, have sent the Colonial Secretary a
memorandum proposing a federation among themselves.
Colonial Secretary’s recommendations
2. The Colonial Secretary sees three possibilities:—
(i) to reject any possibility of setting up a Federation of the Eight;
(ii) to accept the proposals put forward by the eight governments as a basis of
discussion;
(iii) to put forward counter proposals of our own for a much stronger federation
(“in all but name a unitary state”). Mr. Maudling recommends this last.
C.R.O. points
3. We can emphatically agree that the second possibility should be rejected. A
loose federation of these little islands, with a total population of some 600,000, mal-
administered and economically unviable, all except Barbados likely to “degenerate
into little paradises for political boss rule” and run rapidly downhill would be an
unacceptable liability both political and economic: economic, because even though
on its attaining independence the Colonial Secretary, as he says, would no longer
have responsibility for the mal-administration occurring, and however defined and
limited in cash and time our aid to them might be, H.M.G. would still morally be at
risk into the indefinite future to make some response to the pressing requests for
further help which such poverty and chaos would provoke.
4. As between the other two possibilities, it would undoubtedly be preferable
from our point of view that the long term solution should be the amalgamation of
these little islands with Trinidad: their combined populations—at present
approaching 11⁄2 millions—would make a little more sense and Trinidad’s wealth
should do something to carry the other islands. It would not be much of a State but it
would be better than the two we look like being saddled with. The Colonial Office,
however, to whom this point has been put do not see much hope of it in the visible
future as Trinidad has of late rather alienated the other eight; and also run itself into
some financial difficulties. The only path to union with Trinidad is in fact course (i).
Once the Eight became independent in any shape, vested interests in independence
would grow up and the possibility of union with Trinidad would recede.
5. On the other hand, if the Eight’s own plans are rejected and the prospect of
unification with Trinidad is remote, the Colonial Secretary dislikes the prospect of
being saddled with eight separate little units for the indefinite future especially as
trouble might follow (and we are very short of troops to deal with any trouble). That
leaves his third possibility—counter proposals by H.M.G. for a strong federation with
the prospect of early independence. The main features of the counter proposals do
not, curiously, say anything specific about the external financial aspects except that it
would probably be necessary for the grants-in-aid to be given to the federal and not
the unit governments (we should insist on this), the grant to taper over a fixed period
of years and be immutable save in exceptional circumstances. He points out that to
grant bilateral budgetary aid to an independent country, and to confer political
independence on a country without hope of financial independence, are hitherto
unprecedented. We need not perhaps take a stand on this in the present day. But we
should recognise that there is no possibility in practice of our aid to an independent
Eight being “immutable”. We would be under pressure to increase it. In any case it is
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 790
[288] WEST INDIES FEDERATION 791
not at all clear on what basis the Colonial Secretary proposes to determine the
amount of the grant. The only basis mentioned is that of Professor Lewis (the
distinguished West Indian economist) which was used by the governments of the
Eight in formulating their own plan. But “it is extremely doubtful whether [Professor
Lewis’s] assumptions are realistic” (though to do him justice he does hedge them). It
would be illusory to base any policy conclusions on Professor Lewis’s forecast. We
should also want to be sure that any financial settlement with a federation of the
Eight was not so drawn (as was that for Tanganyika) that we provide untied the aid
needed to meet local costs and any tied aid provided by the Americans or Canadians
has the effect of diverting all the Government’s purchases away from their normal
sources of supply in Britain.
6. Moreover neither Professor Lewis nor the Colonial Office make any reference
to the effect of the Common Market negotiations on the West Indies’ crucial exports
of bananas (they are not very efficient producers and depend greatly on the British
protected market) and sugar. Two alternative proposals for bananas are being
considered in the E.E.C. context. One would allow the British market to be
segregated from the French. We could then continue our preferences and allow an
expansion of supplies. The other would be more complex and might discourage a
large increase in production. Sugar should not be affected by the E.E.C. negotiations
since we shall seek to continue in effect the arrangement now existing under the
Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. The West Indies are a fairly likely candidate for
association with the Community.
7. Consequently before any decision is reached to adopt course (iii), some further
investigation may be desirable in particular:—
(a) Since grants after independence for purposes other than those of technical
assistance would fall on C.R.O. votes, the Secretary of State may feel that a reliable
assessment which Ministers could defend to Parliament really must be made
before any commitment whatever is entered into, even if this takes longer than the
“month or six weeks” which the Colonial Secretary contemplates. Is this not a case
for a small economic mission of officials?
(b) The Secretary of State may also wish to consider whether, if (as the Colonial
Secretary points out) we intend to depart from the recent practice of simply
waiting for the West Indies to make proposals to us, the political aspects of the
future of the Eight should not also be investigated by a commission before any
counter proposals by H.M.G. are launched. The political and economic
examinations could perhaps be combined in one commission.
288 CAB 134/1561, CPC 8(62) 11 Apr 1962
[West Indies: possible ‘Federation of the Eight’]: minutes of Cabinet
Colonial Policy Committee meeting
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (C.P.C.
(62) 14) setting out his proposals for dealing with the report of the recent Conference
of Ministers of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands which had
recommended the setting up of a “Federation of the Eight”.
The Colonial Secretary said that the proposals which the Conference had now
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formally submitted to him envisaged a Federation in which substantial powers would
still be retained by the local administration in each island; economic aid had been
provided for on a diminishing scale, disappearing altogether in 1968. There were two
main objections to the proposals in their present form. Firstly, they would involve
the retention of the present corrupt, inefficient and top heavy administrations in
smaller islands. Secondly, and partly in consequence of this, the economic
assumptions on which the proposals had been framed were almost certainly
optimistic. In practice it was likely that the economy of a Federation on the lines
proposed would steadily deteriorate and that economic aid would be called for on an
increasing and not on a diminishing scale.
There were broadly speaking three courses of action now open to the Government.
Firstly they could reject the proposals of the recent conference and continue to
administer the islands on present lines. Apart from the political difficulty of such a
course, it would saddle the United Kingdom Government with indefinite
responsibility for economic assistance and development to eight small and separate
territories. Secondly, they could accept the proposals of the Conference. This had the
advantage of making it easy to reach early agreement and, by accepting the proposals
at their face value, to limit the scale and duration of economic aid to the territories.
It had, however, the serious disadvantages already mentioned; if the economic
situation deteriorated, as it almost certainly would, it was unlikely that the United
Kingdom would be able to stand aside. We should then have the worst of both worlds;
increased responsibility for providing aid and less control than at present over the
ways in which it would be spent. The third possibility which he himself would
recommend would be to put forward counter proposals for a federation under which
greater powers would be given to the Federal Government, and the local
administrations correspondingly reduced. They would thus be deprived of most of
their present opportunities for corruption and chicanery and economic prospects for
the area would improve.
At one time it had been suggested that the smaller islands, but not Barbados,
might combine with Trinidad in a unitary state. This was no longer even a possible
development in the short-term, although in the longer-term some association
between Trinidad and a Federation of the Eight could not be ruled out. Trinidad was
at present deeply divided on racial lines with all the likelihood of political conflict
which that involved; although potentially a wealthy country her economy was at
present in a shaky condition and she would certainly demand a high price for any
agreement to assume responsibility for any of the smaller islands; finally, the
personality of the Prime Minister of Trinidad was not such as to encourage the
smaller islands to put themselves under his control.
If it were agreed that the best course of action in present circumstances would be
for the Government to submit alternative proposals for a Federation of the Eight, it
would be desirable to obtain as much advance publicity for them as possible.
Although the local politicians in the smaller islands could be relied on to object
strongly to measures which would necessarily involve a large diminution of their
present powers, there would be likely to be considerable public support elsewhere for
precisely such a development; the absurdity of maintaining the full apparatus of
Ministerial Government in these small islands was widely recognised.
In discussion it was generally agreed that the course proposed by the Colonial
Secretary was the best which could be devised in present circumstances; economic
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issues were clearly of great importance and would need to be further discussed
between the Treasury and the Colonial Office, particularly since the Eight would be
likely to demand a greater measure of economic aid as the price of agreeing to
proposals other than their own. It would also be necessary to make every effort to
persuade the United States Government to support our initiative and to increase the
level of her economic aid to the territories concerned.1
1 Although Mr Maudling announced on 16 Apr 1962 that a federation of Barbados, the Leewards and
Windwards seemed to offer the best solution to the problems of the area, and its establishment was
recommended by a conference of the representatives of the eight governments in London in May 1962,
such a federation never emerged.
289 CO 1036/413, nos 1 & 2 10 Mar 1958
[Seychelles: long-term future and constitutional development]: letter
from Mr J K R Thorpe (Seychelles) to Sir J Macpherson (CO).
Minutes by J H Robertson1
Please refer to your Secret and Personal demi-official letter 3rd January, 1958,
enclosing copies of three reviews connected with constitutional development in the
Colonies.2
While we receive honourable mention as being, up to 1956, one of the small band
of eight stalwarts who received no assistance of any kind (apart from C.D. and W.),
the papers certainly bring home to one in a depressingly frank fashion the supreme
unimportance of Seychelles in the imperial future! I had rather hoped that with the
closing down of the East Indies Naval Station and other general defence re-appraisals
we might have qualified for some increasing degree of strategic importance.
While I agree on the whole with the statement made under A (4) on page 683 of
“Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies”, I doubt the accuracy of the
remark that “in general, Seychelles are African rather than Indian in atmosphere and
outlook”. The atmosphere is definitely not Indian, and unless large scale Indian
immigration were permitted there would certainly be no tendency to look towards
India for a future link-up. Indian or an Indianised Mauritius would not take over with
the consent of the people, but it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that they
would do so by economic or physical force. On the other hand I doubt if the
atmosphere and outlook can validly be deemed African. The majority of the people
are of African descent, but I doubt if the outlook is any more African than, say, the
West Indian outlook. Indeed, if I were asked to describe the situation in a few words I
think I might say “the atmosphere is West Indian and the outlook (notwithstanding
traditional French influence) is British”. I agree that our thoughts here turn
eastwards to Africa rather than westwards to India as regards the future. It is on this
peg that I would like to hang a few thoughts on our future political and economic
development, and I trust I may be forgiven if this is not entirely the correct context
in which to place them.
1 A principal in CO, son of Sir J Robertson, sometime governor of Nigeria.
2 See especially document no 2 above. 3 Not printed in document no 2.
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While our internal constitutional development will doubtless follow the lines of
the small West Indian Islands—probably at greater expense to H.M.G., and in an
even more frustrating way to the people concerned, unless some new substantial
enterprise alters the financial picture—the question still remains, what then? I
would doubt if by any sort of modern standards the territory could be an
economically viable entity. Before many years pass the pressure of population will be
terrific. Federation à la West Indies, or integration à la Malta are scarcely feasible.
The only possible line seems to be some form of closer association with East Africa.
This being the case it seems to me to be none too early to divert some thought to
the question of what sort of association might be acceptable and practical. Where
such small numbers are involved, East Africa as a whole should, without too much
difficulty, be able to absorb enough Seychellois to keep the population here down to
reasonable limits. It should also be able to supply such higher technical and
administrative skills and know-how as may be required in the Government service
and by private and public enterprise in Seychelles. It is more difficult to see what
contribution Seychelles could make as a quid pro quo. Our market is likely to be too
small to make a customs union attractive to East Africa. We might undertake to
supply their needs in copra, if in fact they will not become self-supporting in this
commodity. Complete “freedom of movement” would probably be objected to in East
Africa, and might well result in swamping rather than depopulating Seychelles.
These, I am afraid, are little more than some random and undigested thoughts, but
I hope to lick them into some kind of form before long. If one could get some idea of
how the future might be shaped it would then be possible to work in at least the right
direction. Our educational policy, for example, could be directed towards fitting out
our citizens in the way which seemed most likely to be profitable to them.
Minutes on 289
Mr. Profumo will have seen from the other briefs on Seychelles that there is very
much to be done in every aspect of internal development in the Colony before the
question of its long-term future can sensibly be discussed at all. Economic, social
and political development is still at a very early stage and indeed the question of any
change in status for the Colony has not yet been raised locally or in the United
Kingdom. Apart from this, the small population (about 40,000) of the Colony, its
scattered nature and its isolation will inevitably put serious obstacles in the way of
any proposal to change its present status, which is that of complete and direct
dependence on Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom.
The strategic importance of Seychelles is almost entirely of a negative character in
that although we would not wish anybody else to use the Islands for strategic
purposes, we do not at present wish to use them for these purposes ourselves.
Coetivy, one of the smaller Seychelles islands, was at one point considered as a
possible alternative to Gan in the Maldives as an R.A.F. staging post but the Air
Ministry now appear to have lost interest in this idea.
In order to develop the internal economy of Scychelles we must find some way of
reducing its present isolation. It is to this end that determined efforts are now being
made to improve the Seychelles’ external communications in the form of shipping
and possibly air services. In addition to the actual improvement of these services,
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however, it is important that connections in every field between Seychelles and the
East African mainland (which will always be Seychelles’ chief contact with the big
world outside) should be strengthened. There are a number of ways in which this is
already being done and in which the process can be stepped up. Seychelles is, for
example, a member of the East African Tourist Travel Association and participates in
the East African Meteorological service. The proposal has recently been put forward
that the interests of Seychelles in the United Kingdom should be looked after by the
East African Commissioner and his office. It may be possible to arrange for more
frequent visits to Seychelles by senior East African technical staff when shipping
services to the Colony have been improved.
Although it must continue to be our aim to strengthen wherever possible
Seychelles connections with East Africa, it is far too early to say whether eventually it
will be possible to associate the Colony politically and constitutionally more closely
with any one or all of the East African territories. If Mr. Profumo is questioned when
he is in Seychelles about Her Majesty’s Government’s ideas for the ultimate status of
the Colony (which is, incidentally, very unlikely) it is suggested that he should reply
that there is a very great deal to be done to develop Seychelles’ internal economy and
its political and social institutions before any change in its present status can be
envisaged.
[J.H.R.]
17.9.58
In so far as we have been able to give any thought to the long-term future of the
Seychelles we have always assumed that it would be in our best interest and in the
best interest of the inhabitants if it were possible eventually to link it more closely
than at present with East Africa. Such a closer link would always have been difficult
to achieve in any way that would have made a practical difference to the
administration or indeed the economy of the Island. Recent events in East Africa
itself, in Aden and in the Maldives have prompted me to wonder whether we should
continue even to aim at linking Seychelles more closely with East Africa.
2. In spite of the optimism which the Aden Government, the Colonial Office and
the Service Departments have (rightly, if our present policy is to have any chance of
success) about the future of Aden, in spite of the similar optimism which the C.R.O.
and the Service Departments no doubt have about our future ability to use the
airfield at Gan in the Maldives without let or hindrance by the local inhabitants, and
in spite of our hopes that Kenya would grow into a multi-racial community with
strong and stable links with the U.K., there must inevitably be some doubt whether
we can really bet safely on being able to make use of all these places for military
purposes for more than a limited number of years. In these circumstances it might
be felt wise for H.M.G. to decide now before it is too late that the link between
Seychelles and the U.K. must be kept as direct as possible and that the potentialities
of the Seychelles as a military base, particularly for the R.A.F. and the Navy, should be
safeguarded in case our other military installations in the North-west Indian Ocean
area should ever cease to be available to us. Such a decision would obviously involve
our making a determined effort at the cost if necessary of several million pounds to
ensure that the loyalties of the people of the Seychelles were bound as closely as
possible with the U.K. This would mean in the first instance that we should have to
make a really big effort with economic development over the next few years in order
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 795
796 OTHER COLONIES [290]
to remove the social and political discontent which appears sooner or later in every
under-developed society and which is just beginning to show its head in the
Seychelles.
3. I know that the possibility has been considered before by the Air Ministry of
building a staging post in the Seychelles and that the decision was made not to
proceed with that project, at least for the present. My present enquiry is, however, on
the more general subject of whether or not in view of the changing loyalties of the
peoples who live on the coasts of the Indian Ocean, and apparently in the Maldives
too, we should do what we can to make sure that in the Seychelles at least we would
be able, if the need arose, to site and use military, naval and air installations.
4. We are in any event hoping that the next five years will show an
unprecedented rate of development in the Seychelles. If we knew that the Colony was
regarded as being potentially of strategic importance in the long term we might be
able to make an even bigger development effort than we at present contemplate.
5. We shall shortly be considering specific proposals for economic development
in the Seychelles. . . .
J.H.R.
29.1.59
290 CO 926/769 1 June 1960
[Gibraltar: constitutional forward thinking]: minute by N B J
Huijsman (CO)
. . . 2. The latest constitutional changes were introduced last year, and their import
is set out at (108). Since then the measure of financial devolution requested by
Gibraltar has been conceded and Mr Hudson will be going out to the Colony in July
to examine the relations between the Colonial Govt and the City Council. Gibraltar is
now, roughly speaking, at the dividing line between gubernatorial and ministerial
government.
3. The present constitution is working satisfactorily and the way is clear to
consider what the ultimate goal for the Colony should be. . . . [I]n so far as the
possibility of devising a general pattern of constitutional development, into which
Gibraltar could be fitted, is concerned it looks as if some time is likely to elapse
before any clear recommendations emerge from the intra-Commonwealth
examination that has started. It seems to me therefore, that Gibraltar’s ultimate
status will for the time being have to be worked out on the basis of the Gibraltarians’
own wishes and the realities of the situation.
4. It is fairly clear that the politically-minded Gibraltarians are aiming at an
advanced form of responsible government led by local Ministers. The realities (apart
from the political maturity of the Gibraltarians) of which account must be taken
are—HMG’s defence interest in the Colony, Gibraltar’s economic position, and
Spain. HMG’s defence interest in Gibraltar is even more pervasive than it is in Malta.
Gibraltar is also far more dependent on Service expenditure for its economic well-
being than Malta. With the possible exception of tourism there is no economic
alternative to the Forces. Were the latter to withdraw from Malta it might still be
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feasible to keep the Maltese economy afloat by diversification of the economy; it does
not look as if a similar possibility exists in Gibraltar.
5. A further factor to be taken into account is Spain. Ever since the Rock was
transferred to UK possession by the Treaty of Utrecht [1713] it has been Spanish
policy to secure retrocession. The policy has at times not been pressed—when
Spanish governments were weak—but of recent years it has been reasserted more
vigorously. The more tenuous the connection between the UK and the Colony, the
more the Spaniards are likely to assert their claims against the latter.
6. On balance it looks as if UK and local interests coincide in aiming at a
retention of UK sovereignty over the Rock. UK sovereignty would make the retention
of a base at Gibraltar more attractive, would enable Gibraltar to rely upon the UK as a
source of financial assistance, and would provide a measure of protection against
Spanish claims.
7. Given the retention of UK sovereignty, how far could one go towards granting
the Gibraltarians responsible government, and what would be the most useful
constitutional framework into which to fit it? On present form I should have thought
that one could go pretty far along the road towards responsible government without
endangering UK interests. Apart from one storm in a teacup Gibraltar’s advance has
been uneventful and the local elected Members have demonstrated responsibility and
some political finesse. They have looked well after the Colony’s finances and the
pressures exerted at different times by the Spaniards have kept them aware of the
larger world outside the Colony, which has been helpful in broadening their outlook.
There appears to be genuine goodwill towards the UK and there is adequate local
experience of dealing with the Services on a friendly basis. Gibraltar therefore looks
to be an instance of a territory where one could not only restrict the reserved
subjects to a minimum, but where one could also go a long way towards limiting the
UK Parlt’s ultimate authority to legislate on local matters. The reservation of defence
and external affairs, and the retention of an emergency power to intervene in or to
take over the administration would appear to be adequate. As for the rest, I should
have thought that the UK Parliament need ultimately only retain power to legislate
in respect of the reserved subjects, internal security and finance.
8. As far as the ultimate constl set-up is concerned, there seems to be no
particular reason to depart from the pattern of unitary govt established by the 1950
constitution. The Colony is minute, with a total population of about 25,000, and no
particular purpose would be served by having in Gibraltar the type of dyarchical rule
envisaged in the ‘Commonwealth State’ proposals. I should have thought that it
would be acceptable locally to have the reserved subjects and powers vested in the
Gov., provided Gibraltar ceases to be a Service governorship.
? Set our sights as above.
291 CO 1024/326, no 15 6 July 1960
[Constitutional change in St Helena: Advisory Council]: CO telegram
(no 117) to St Helena.  Minutes by C G Eastwood, Sir H Poynton and
Lord Perth (CO)
[With the encouragement of a visiting Labour MP, Mr Cledwyn Hughes, a trade union,
the St Helena General Workers’ Union, was founded in 1958, with Fred Ward as the
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general-secretary. (For economic problems at this date, see document no 314 in part II.)
Ward demanded a fully elected Advisory Council, which, since 1956 had been enlarged
to a body of 9 or 10 unofficials appointed by the governor. Reluctantly, the governor, Sir
R Alford, advised that indeed, as he could not persuade the union to accept them, nomi-
nated members should no longer be insisted on, other than the government secretary
and the colonial treasurer ex officio. In the CO, A Emanuel thought they should agree,
otherwise there would be endless agitation for ‘pure democracy’, since the demand was
solidly backed by the union, which consisted of most of the adult male population.
Others, such as Eastwood, were concerned whether the concession would give the gov-
ernor sufficiently good advice, as the revised council would probably be dominated by
the trade unionists. Lord Perth was very doubtful about excluding nominated members,
and the governor was accordingly informed of the doubts (CO 1024/252, minutes by
Emanuel, 10 Dec 1959 & 4 Jan 1960, and others). Since the governor was unpersuaded,
the S of S reluctantly agreed to reconstitute the Council as desired by the union. But
then opposition to such a change emerged in the Executive Council, so the governor
wanted deferment of action. The following telegram was now sent, embodying compro-
mise proposals which essentially were for a half-elected Council. The governor contin-
ued to stall over this. However, in Mar 1962 the deadlock was broken when Ward
climbed down and accepted the plan for a half-elected Council (CO 1024/326, no 15; CO
1024/328).]
Advisory Council. I have now had an opportunity to consider this further in
consultation with the Governor, and have reached the following conclusion.
2. The principle of including elected members in the Council has been accepted
for some time; it is also accepted that there should be two ex-officio members,
Government Secretary and Treasurer, and that it is clearly desirable that other
officials could be called in as and when required by the business under discussion, to
give technical advice and information. The outstanding question is whether to
include non-elected unofficials. I understand that, while there is a considerable body
of informed opinion which favours this course, there is opposition to it on ground
that Council should be wholly representative if it is to have the confidence of the
electorate. This objection however appears to me to overlook the need to ensure that
Council is effective means of providing Governor with advice which will be required
in reaching decisions affecting the welfare of the island. Experience elsewhere has
shown that very useful advice is obtainable from persons who either may not wish to
stand for election for personal reasons or who may be less popular than those who
would be elected; normal practice elsewhere has therefore been to retain services of
nominated unofficial members when elected members are first introduced. Moreover
in St. Helena at present it is likely that in a wholly elected Council there would be no
representation of any minority opinion.
3. I have carefully considered whether circumstances in St. Helena would justify
a departure from the usual practice. I must however say in all frankness that I do not
think they do and I believe that the best chance of making the new Advisory Council
a success lies in accepting need at this stage for inclusion of nominated unofficial
members. This would not of course prejudice possibility that in the future, when
elective system has established itself and proved successful, consideration would be
given to the abolition of nominated members; indeed it is intended to work towards
that end.
4. I am therefore prepared to make arrangements for creation of Advisory
Council consisting of two ex-officio, eight elected, two nominated officials and four
nominated unofficial members; if electoral districts are not increased to provide
separate representation for Half Tree Hollow and Levelwood, total of elected
members including two for Jamestown would be six and there would be two
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nominated unofficial members. I am not at this stage prepared to dispense with
nominated members and if there should not be sufficient local acceptance of my
proposal only alternative is to continue for the time being on the present basis. In the
latter case the number of Advisory Councillors might be raised from nine to ten
within the existing Royal Instructions, and I hope that after dissolution and selection
by you of district and friendly society representatives the General Workers Union
would co-operate in the selection of as many Union members for some or all of the
remaining three seats as you might think it advisable to nominate, after considering
extent of representation achieved by Union through districts and friendly societies.
In this case also the District Associations might be willing to hold meetings of
residents including non-members to decide whom to recommend as district
representatives.
5. I should be glad if in Governor’s absence you would conduct further
discussion with interested persons and let me know which of above two alternatives
appears to be acceptable. I must make it clear that since Union has been main
protagonist of change I would not propose to introduce first alternative unless I were
assured they were prepared to give new system a chance. It would clearly not be
worth effort to establish new machinery if it were to be frustrated at the start by non-
co-operation of substantial organised element of the community.
6. You will note that with the consent of the Governor I have not insisted on a
non-elected majority in the Council if its constitution is revised.
7. In discussion you should state my views as in the foregoing, omitting
paragraph 5 which is for your information.
Cost of telegram £20. 16s. 0d.
Minutes on 291
Sir Hilton Poynton
You have not, I think, come as yet into this tiresome business of the proposed
constitutional changes in St. Helena.
The existing Advisory Council (N.B. it is purely advisory) is somewhat unsatisfacto-
rily constituted. It was due to be dissolved in August last year and the proposal was
that it should be reconstituted with some provision for properly elected members. Mr.
Ward, the very strong-minded secretary and organiser of the General Workers Union,
was not prepared to accept anything less than a wholly elected body (apart from two
ex-officio members) and the Governor could not persuade his Executive Council to
take any contrary view. With a great deal of reluctance, therefore, we eventually acqui-
esced in a Council with 8 elected members and 2 ex-officios. (The life of the existing
body had to be continued for a year and it now expires in August this year).
When, however, this proposal was put by the Governor to his Executive Council
just before he came on leave they had plucked up sufficient courage to say that they
disliked this idea very much indeed. It is satisfactory that they should at last have had
the guts to formulate a view of their own. Strengthened by this the Governor, with
whom we have discussed matters, now advises that the Secretary of State should
insist on the inclusion of 4 nominated members and if it seems that this is going to
arouse a great deal of local controversy then they will jolly well have to stick to the
existing constitution of the Council.
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A slightly complicating factor is that the number of elected members may be
reduced to 6 if 2 new constituencies are not created; in that case there will be only 2
nominated unofficial members.
I agree with the attached draft telegram, with which the Governor agrees, and
recommend it for the Secretary of State’s approval.
I would however recommend that the Secretary of State should first have a short
talk with Sir Robert Alford. He has not yet met him and he ought to make his
acquaintance. His three years appointment expires early next year but it is proposed
that he should carry on for about another year. There are separate papers about this.
C.G.E.
24.6.60
I think this represents about as good as we can do given that local public opinion is
as it is.
A.H.P.
27.6.60
We only agreed to the proposal at 8—no nominated members—with great
reluctance because we were advised by the Governor that there was no alternative.
Now the Executive Council has shown ‘guts’ the whole position is changed and we
can revert to what we always wanted.
I therefore agree the procedure proposed in the draft telegram which means we
may face trouble but have local support & do not have to capitulate to Mr Ward.
The ‘Advisory Council’ is in fact a good deal more than advisory.
P.
27.6.60.
292 CO 1036/612, no 58 12 July 1961
[Fiji: a formula for pace of constitutional advance]: minute by Sir H
Poynton (CO)
The Governor of Fiji1 is asking for a formula which will reassure the Fijians in Fiji
that they will not be forced to go faster than they wish towards internal self-
government or independence. The formula already used for this purpose in
paragraph 3 of (19) reads:—
“There is no intention of forcing the pace of constitutional advance in Fiji and H.M.G.
will only decide on any major changes after full consultation with representatives of the
various communities in the Colony”.
I gather that the Governor does not think this goes far enough and indeed as Mr.
Hall says in his minute of the 5th July what the Fijians really want is to be able to
veto indefinitely changes which they do not like.
One can do a great deal by clever draftsmanship but there are some points of
principle that cannot be “fluffed” by draftsmanship. This question of “imposed
1 Sir K Maddocks, since 1958, formerly deputy and acting governor, Northern Nigeria, 1956–1958.
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constitutions” versus changes made by consent is a common feature of almost all our
recent constitutional discussions. The doctrine of consent is an admirable one if you
can get consent; but if you cannot then the Secretary of State cannot escape the
responsibility for taking a decision. To give one community in a colony a power of
veto over constitutional changes even when that community is the indigenous race
in a multi racial community, is tantamount to an abdication by the Secretary of State
of his responsibility to Parliament for the orderly constitutional development of the
territory. The point of principle is just the same whether we are talking about the
Fijians in Fiji, the Dominion Party in Rhodesia or the late Group Captain Briggs in
Kenya.
I conclude therefore that it is impossible by any feat of draftsmanship to give the
Fijians (and therefore the Governor) a formula that will satisfy them. That being so
I would far rather stand on the formula already used in (19) which was approved by
Mr. Fraser, than to start glossing it by new variants such as that suggested in Mr.
Hall’s minute of the 10th July at ‘A’. And indeed if the Governor doesn’t think that
even this will go far enough to reassure the Fijians I see no purpose at all in
putting it forward. I recommend that we should tell the Governor quite candidly
that it is not possible to go beyond the formula already approved in (19) [tel to gov,
18 Nov 1960].2
2 Mr Fraser, after talking with the governor, felt they should say they hoped to give some measure of
increased responsibility to unofficial members as soon as they were ready to accept it, though the timing
would take into account the need to safeguard legitimate Fijian interests. Poynton commented: ‘If
Ministers feel that we must go beyond the formula used in (19) . . . [I think this] is as good as we can get &
I would not wish to oppose it. 13.7.61’.
293 DO 161/53, nos 49 & 64 15 & 19 Sept 1961
[British Guiana: constitutional development and American anxieties]:
minutes by Mr Macleod to Mr Sandys & Mr Macmillan (PM(61)72)
[The British Guiana constitution was suspended in 1953 after less than six months, to
prevent ‘the subversion of government’ by the majority party, the People’s Progressive
Party (PPP), led by Dr Cheddi Jagan and appealing mainly to the Indian community (D
Goldsworthy, ed, The Conservative government and the end of empire, 1951–1957
(BDEEP), part II, nos 336 (Cabinet memo) and 337, Cabinet conclusions). After the PPP
gained a majority in the elections of 1957, a closely supervised return to partly elected
government was allowed. Jagan was gradually re-introduced into political society, and
Jaganite ministers were thought on the whole to have been reasonably responsible, so
that by Mar 1960 Macleod was prepared to regard Guiana as having ‘purged its offence’
(PREM 11/3666, minute to Macmillan, 7 Mar 1960). At a Lancaster House conference, the
majority of delegates pressed hard for independence within the Commonwealth. The
Cabinet decided there was no question of that for the near future, but backed a degree of
constitutional advance leading to full internal self-government in Aug 1961, with
independence following in two or three years (CAB 128/34, CC 15(60)7, 8 Mar 1960).
Jagan was a self-styled Marxist. His American-born wife Janet had been a member of
the Young Communist League in Chicago. It was hardly proven that either were ‘proper’
communists or that communist bloc countries (or Castro) were much interested in them;
but they undoubtedly had communist and fellow-travelling contacts outside Guiana.
Opposition parties, such as Burnham’s People’s National Congress and D’Aguiar’s United
Force Party, were unsympathetic to the communist leanings of the PPP leadership.
Elections in August 1961 were again won by the PPP (DO 161/53, no 16, CO briefings,
1961).]
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(1) 15 Sept 1961
In your minute of the 31st August you asked me to let you have some ideas about the
future constitutional development of British Guiana. Our basic policy is stated in the
following paragraphs. You will however recognise that the fulfilment of this policy
may be affected, in timing at any rate, by the degree of co-operation shown by the
new British Guiana Government and by external pressures including that from the
Americans, who are anxious lest Castroism, if not communism, should take root in
an independent Guiana. We shall need a little time to gauge the weight of such
factors.
2. At the British Guiana Constitutional Conference held at Lancaster House in
March 1960 (Cmnd. 998) the constitutional future of British Guiana was provided for
in two stages. A new internal self-governing constitution was to be established in
time for the August 1961 elections: independence was conceded in principle but
there was to be a waiting period of two years from the August elections after which
the local legislature could call on me to summon a conference “to consider when it
would be practicable” to implement the promise of independence. If independence
were meanwhile granted to The West Indies Federation this waiting period would be
reduced to one year. The British Guiana general elections have just been held and the
new Government under Dr. Jagan is expected to take office under the internal self-
governing constitution within the next few days. One of the first acts of the new
Government is expected to be an approach for “immediate independence” and in this
it is expected to have the support of the principal opposition party. I doubt if
immediate independence is either practicable or desirable but the Lancaster House
formula may be difficult to adhere to and the result may be a compromise that the
Colony may have its independence in 1962. I should not however wish it to be earlier
than the date on which the Federation of The West Indies is to have its independence,
which is the 31st May, 1962.
3. According to public pronouncements, there is no question but that Dr. Jagan
seeks to lead British Guiana to independence within the Commonwealth. The first
request of the British Guiana legislature in June 1958 was for full self-government
within the Commonwealth and this was reiterated by Dr. Jagan as leader of the
British Guiana delegation at the Lancaster House Conference in March 1960. It
would be wrong however to present this as a point of policy on which Dr. Jagan and
his party have nailed their colours to the mast. My expectation is that they will in fact
seek independence within the Commonwealth if their path to it is made congenial;
but, if otherwise, they may be inclined to break away.
4. British Guiana is not strategically placed, nor has it any corner in strategic
products. With only about half a million population its present importance in world
affairs turns on the question whether, given its independence under a leader who if
probably not a Communist in the real sense, is a theoretical Marxist, it might become
a potential pawn of Castroism, if not communism, in the Western hemisphere. Our
policy is of course to steer it clear of this. We will have to work closely with the
Americans in all this, and I am in fact seeing the Ambassador and some
representatives of the State Department this week.1
1 Sandys minuted: ‘I assume that the acceptance of British Guiana as a member of the Commonwealth
cannot be taken for granted. I am not at all sure that she would be an asset to us? . . . D.S. 7.9.61’.
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(2) 19 Sept 1961
On the initiative of Dean Rusk2 an official American team was over here all last week
to discuss the situation in British Guiana following the return of Jagan and his
People’s Progressive Party at last month’s elections. The Ambassador came to see me
twice during the week but, that apart, the discussions were with my officials and
representatives of the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office.
2. As you know, the Americans have shown great anxiety about the way things
are going in British Guiana. They are afraid that after independence (which under
present arrangements should come around mid-1963 but could come sooner)—or
even earlier—we shall see the emergence of a Communist or Castro type
Government. We have done our best over a longish period to impress upon them
that, while we too are much concerned with trends in British Guiana, we are not
justified on the evidence in writing off the P.P.P. leaders as lost to the West; and that
our best hope of deterring them from turning to the East is for the West to show
them a friendly face and be prepared to offer economic aid towards the ambitious
programmes which Jagan will put forward.
3. The Americans have clearly been doing a lot of hard thinking and their team
came over with a carefully worked out programme to put to us. Briefly it can be
summed up as a policy of cooperation with and economic help to Jagan but with
“safeguards” in case what they regard as a gamble does not come off.
4. On the positive side they are prepared to show a friendly attitude, arrange for
Jagan to meet the President when in the United States, and send an I.C.A.3
representative to Georgetown to discuss an Economic Aid programme up to
$U.S. 5 m. in 1962. All this represents a big advance in their thinking and is wholly to
be welcomed. They also propose to step up their Information Services. This is
acceptable and could be useful provided it is circumspectly done.
5. On the “negative” side they have pressed us to agree to stretch the period up to
independence for as long as possible, to insist on new elections before independence,
and to use the powers which we have retained to suspend the constitution by Order-
in-Council to prevent the establishment of a “communist or Castro type” regime. We
have explained to them the limitations under which we operate at this advanced
constitutional stage in British Guiana and the difficulties attached to these
propositions, and they understand our position. We have agreed to keep in touch
with them on all these matters as things develop. . . .4
7. It is not our normal policy to allow covert activity in a British dependency. In
cases where we have agreed to C.I.A. representatives, their appointments have been
made known to the Governments concerned who have accepted them as a valuable
addition to their own Special Branches and the U.K. Security Liaison Officers with
both of whom the C.I.A. representatives liaise. In British Guiana, however, the
appointment of a C.I.A. representative could not in the circumstances be made
known to Jagan. Moreover, if it became known through an indiscretion that the
United States were operating a secret intelligence source Jagan would assume that
we had agreed to it. Our capacity through the Governor to influence Jagan for the
2 Secretary of state in Kennedy administration.
3 International Cooperation Administration (USA).
4 Para 6, approximately ten lines long, removed from PRO copy under Section 3(4) of the Public Records
Act (1958).
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good would then be prejudiced if not destroyed, and with it our ability to steer things
along a reasonable course up to independence.
8. On the other hand the circumstances of British Guiana are very special. There
can clearly be no question of introducing there at present (though maybe it could
become possible later) the usual type of acknowledged C.I.A. representative since
Jagan would not agree to it; there is a real danger of trends there developing into an
alignment with the Eastern bloc; and the Americans naturally have a special interest
in the country as being on the American continent. They have made it clear that
their new programme must be considered as an integrated whole and that its positive
aspects of political friendliness and economic aid will only be implemented subject to
our acceptance of their covert proposal. I am satisfied that they are not bluffing in
this. They have too many difficulties in Washington with Congressional opinion to be
able to give aid to a country with British Guiana’s reputation without being able to
satisfy themselves that they are at the same time taking precautions. It would be a
great misfortune if now that after much heart-searching they have resolved upon a
positive approach, they were to revert to the negative and unhelpful attitude from
which we have helped to wean them. I should add that they have made it much easier
for us to accept their proposals by having agreed that their representation in British
Guiana would be governed by the provisions which govern C.I.A. representation in
other dependencies, save only that the appointment would be covert. This would give
us “controls” in regard to the appointment of individuals and their activities which
our own Security Services consider satisfactory and reduce to a minimum the risk of
embarrassment to us or the Governor. . . .5
5 The remainder of the document removed from PRO copy under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act
(1958).
294 CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)32 15 Dec 1961
‘British Guiana independence’: memorandum by Mr Maudling for
Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee
[British Guiana achieved full internal self-government in July 1961. The elections held on
21 August 1961 resulted in a government formed by Dr C Jagan and his People’s
Progressive Party. Maudling aimed at independence by the end of 1962 (minute PM(62)1,
10 Jan 1962). Sandys welcomed this proposal to accelerate independence: ‘the sooner we
get these people out of our hair the better’ (minute 11 Jan 1962). Maudling’s aim was to
‘ensure an orderly transition to independence with the least damage to Anglo-American
relations’ in a ‘difficult and dangerous’ situation (minutes PM(62)15 & 16, 2 & 6 Mar
1962).]
The British Guiana Constitutional Conference, 1960, agreed on a formula that an
Independence Conference would not be called until a minimum of two years had
elapsed after the General Election of August, 1961, unless a decision had in the
meantime been taken to grant independence to the Federation of The West Indies; in
the latter event, the two year minimum would be reduced to one year. A decision was
taken to grant independence to The West Indies on the 31st May, 1962, and although
that has been upset by Jamaica’s decision to secede, it would be impracticable to
argue that the minimum of one year does not now apply. The earliest date for an
Independence Conference in accordance with the above formula would be August,
12-ConGov-Doc 188-299-cp  18/10/00  2:07 pm  Page 804
[294] OTHER TERRITORIES 805
1962 and on this basis, allowing for the necessary legal and other preparations,
independence could take effect by mid-1963 or a little earlier.
2. Both houses of the local Legislature recently adopted a Resolution asking me
to fix a date during 1962 for independence and Dr. Jagan in the course of discussions
I had with him on the 13th December has pressed me to implement the Resolution.
Publicly he has expressed the desire that British Guiana should attain its
independence on the 31st May next.
3. The main argument for adhering to the formula is that we are under certain
obligations to the Americans, who take a great interest in the affairs of British
Guiana. In their eyes, the problem is of tremendous importance and in view of
hostile public and congressional opinion towards any softening by the U.S.
Government towards a “communist” country, it is a hypersensitive spot for the
Administration. What happens in British Guiana is, therefore, not merely a matter of
British colonial policy, but has a bearing on general Anglo/U.S. relations.
4. Shortly after the introduction of the present British Guiana constitution, an
informal U.K./U.S. Working Party of officials reviewed the situation in the Colony and
worked out an agreed approach to its problems. The U.S. representatives expressed
the hope that the period prior to independence could be prolonged and that
arrangements for another election as one of the steps towards independence could be
made. In their view a longer period of internal self-government would provide
needed additional time to show Dr. Jagan that the West meant well by him, and
would also provide a better opportunity to evaluate the results of working with him.
It was impressed on the Americans that developments in the Colony would have to be
judged in the light of circumstances, and it was agreed with them that there should
be further consultations as the situation developed. The report of the Working Party,
which has been endorsed by Foreign Secretary, Commonwealth Secretary, and by
me, set out inter alia that the United Kingdom would “endeavour to adhere to the
London formula which would provide for a conference on British Guiana
independence not earlier than August, 1962”.
5. Although there is no firm commitment to the U.S.A. to adhere to the formula,
there is a strong moral obligation to do our best to do so, and there is a clear
obligation to consult with the U.S. authorities. To depart from the formula so shortly
after the Anglo/U.S. discussions and so soon after the Americans have begun
(however haltingly) to carry out their side of the bargain by inviting Dr. Jagan to
meet the President and discussing future aid, would be contrary to the spirit of our
many mutual dealings over British Guiana.
6. A subsidiary point is that the more time we have to settle the future relation of
an independent British Guiana with the Commonwealth the better. Moreover, the
Government of British Guiana so far have declined to agree to satisfactory
compensation terms for certain categories of overseas officers for whom I have a
special responsibility.
7. Argument for departing from the formula. On the other hand I can see good
reasons for moving more quickly to independence.
(a) The Legislature has passed the independence resolution referred to above by a
very substantial majority. Both Dr. Jagan’s party and the main opposition party,
which together polled some 85% of the votes cast at the August elections,
supported it.
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(b) We have no strategic or economic reasons for delaying independence. Nor is
the internal situation such as to provide a cogent argument for the retention of
U.K. sovereignty in the interests of preventing communal disturbances.
(c) We should gain nothing politically from delaying; in fact to do so would be
more likely to lead to souring relations between H.M.G. and Dr. Jagan’s
Government.
(d) Economically, so long as British Guiana remains under British sovereignty the
tendency in the U.S. and elsewhere seems likely to be to regard this country as
primarily responsible for aid to British Guiana. The aid is sought on a scale which
is beyond U.K. resources, having regard to our other commitments. The sooner
British Guiana is put in a position in which she can in her own right tap other
sources of financial assistance, and in which the Americans have to recognise that
British Guiana is more vital to their interests than ours, the better.
8. The Governor’s considered advice is that we should accelerate the pace
towards independence. The representative of the Security Services in the West Indies
is of like view. Having regard to the circumstances in British Guiana and to the
advice which I have received, I am of the opinion that there would be no real
advantage in refusing to agree to an earlier date for British Guiana’s independence. It
seems to me that the best course to follow, taking into account my other
commitments, would be for the independence conference to be held in May of next
year (i.e., about three months sooner than the earliest date possible under the
Lancaster House formula), and that we should be prepared to grant independence by
the end of 1962 if, as I hope, this leaves time for the necessary legal drafting. I should
be grateful for my colleagues’ agreement to this proposal.
9. While I should like to inform Dr. Jagan of the above as soon as possible, it is
clear I cannot do so until we have consulted the Americans and, if possible, carried
them with us. I hope to start consultations with the Americans soon, and if it appears
clear that my proposal will create difficulties with them, I shall, of course, consult
with my colleagues again. Otherwise, if the Americans accept our views, I propose to
inform Dr. Jagan that I should be pleased to call a Conference in May, 1962 to discuss
independence, but I may have to make it a condition that before the Conference is
held the Government of British Guiana have agreed satisfactory compensation terms
for certain categories of overseas officers for whom I have a special responsibility.
295 PREM 11/3666 26 Feb 1962
[British Guiana: policy differences with the Americans]: letter from
Lord Home (FO) to Mr Dean Rusk (USA government).  Minute by
Mr Macmillan (M 51/62)
Thank you for your letter on British Guiana. From our past discussions we have
known your pre-occupations and you have known the efforts which we have made
despite setbacks to provide for the orderly development of this territory. We are
studying what best to do now to discharge our responsibilities and when we have
decided, we shall be glad to see in a more official way what can be done to concert our
action and yours.
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Meanwhile there are some general thoughts which I should like to put to you
privately and with the same frankness with which you wrote. I do so not only because
I think this is right between us, but because you have often shown in the
conversations which the two of us have had, that you recognise the sustained efforts
over long periods that we have made in our dependent territories to try to ensure
that they have a reasonable chance of using and not abusing freedom when they get
it. This must depend to a large extent on the progress of each different territory and
its readiness to run its own affairs. But once this process has gone as far as it now
has, there is bound to be an added risk over timing in the remaining dependent
territories which are still either backward or have peculiar racial or other difficulties.
This was inherent in the problem from the beginning.
Now it was your historic role to have been for long years the first crusader and the
prime mover in urging colonial emancipation. The communists are now in the van.
Why? Amongst other things because premature independence is a gift for them.
What I do not think possible is to beat them by cancelling the ticket for
independence and particularly if this is only to be done in the single instance of
British Guiana. You say that it is not possible for you “to put up with an independent
British Guiana under Jagan” and that “Jagan should not accede to power again”. How
would you suggest that this can be done in a democracy? And even if a device could
be found, it would almost certainly be transparent and in such circumstances if
democratic processes are to be allowed, it will be extremely hard to provide a
reasonable prospect that any successor regime will be more stable and more mature.
So I would say to you that we cannot now go back on the course we have set
ourselves of bringing these dependent territories to self-government. Nor is it any
good deluding ourselves that we can now set aside a single territory such as British
Guiana for some sort of special treatment.
This of course does not mean that we should not try to mitigate the dangers in
British Guiana as elsewhere in the areas of the Americas and elsewhere. You will
know our present concern over Kenya, the Federation and other territories in East
Africa. I take comfort from your letter to think that you will be ready to understand
and support us in solving these problems. I do not want to go into them further here.
But I should like to draw your attention to another territory in the area of the
Americas, British Honduras.1 It will be difficult enough to provide for the future well-
being of this territory. We now have in addition the President of Guatemala using
language reminiscent of Hitler to press his claim. “The Guatemalans”, he said
publicly on February 20, “would maintain their unshakeable determination to regain
Belize.” As the present regime in Guatemala would hardly have come into being
without your support in 1954 and since, I shall be asking you to use your good offices
at the right time to prevent another possible misadventure on your doorstep.
Let us by all means try and do what is possible to prevent the communists and
others from perverting our common aim of doing our best to assure a timely and
orderly development of independence in the remaining dependent territories. But we
must do this across the board and you will realise that while territories like British
Guiana may be of special concern to you in your hemisphere, there are others of at
least equal importance to us elsewhere.
1 See document no 435 in Part II.
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Minute on 295
Foreign Secretary
I have just received a copy of a message to you from Mr. Rusk about British Guiana. I
am bound to say I have read it with amazement. One or two phrases are incredible,
for instance, “I must tell you now that I have reached the conclusion that it is not
possible for us to put up with an independent British Guiana under Jagan” or “It
seems to me clear that new elections should now be scheduled and I hope that we
can agree that Jagan should not accede to power again”. I hope Sir Patrick Dean will
be given these sentences.
How can the Americans continue to attack us in the United Nations on colonialism
and then use expressions like these which are not colonialism but pure
Machiavellianism. Of course, it is nice to feel that they are partners with us and have
such confidence in you as to send you a letter of this kind but it does show a degree of
cynicism which I would have thought Dean Rusk could hardly put his pen to. He,
after all, is not an Irishman, nor a politician, nor a millionaire; he has the reputation
of being an honourable and somewhat academic figure.2
H.M.
21.2.62
2 The prime minister’s remarks no doubt strengthened Lord Home’s determination to address Dean Rusk
plainly, but when they met in Geneva on 12 Mar 1962, Rusk said the President had wondered if Home’s
letter was not a bit ‘sharp’ in tone; to which Home replied that Rusk could assure the President that frank
and forceful writing was ‘the normal practice as between Oxford men’. Rusk said the Americans ‘were
really terrified of another Cuba on their continent’. (Rusk had been at St John’s College, Oxford.)
For further documentation up to May 1966 when British Guiana became independent as Guyana, see
Ashton & Killingray, eds, The West Indies (BDEEP).
296 CO 1036/775, no 8 19 June 1962
[Fiji: general observations on future of constitutional advance]:
despatch (no 388) from Sir K Maddocks (Fiji) to Mr Maudling
[Extract]
[This despatch—which the CO thought as depressing as it was important—began by
analysing the ‘insurmountable obstacle’ to the introduction of local government: the fear
of Fijians that any significant advance towards inter-racialism was a step towards Indian
domination. The Europeans encouraged this view. Fijians adamantly opposed co-
operation with Indians where they felt their fundamental interests were threatened.
Fijian opposition had thus thwarted three attempts in sixteen years to start inter-racial
rural local government.]
19. . . . [T]he Fijians regard the British Government as being committed to remaining
in control of Fiji indefinitely to protect Fijian interests, or to handing over control in
accordance with a constitution which will ensure the paramountcy of their
interests. . . .
20. All I would say about these alternatives now is that they are both
unattractive. For Fiji to continue indefinitely under British control is a disturbing
prospect. The present constitution is suitable for conditions within Fiji only to the
extent that it provides a modus vivendi between conflicting racial interests. The
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modifications which are to be introduced next year, which include a greatly extended
franchise and the increase in the number of members are designed to permit the
introduction at an early date of a “member” system but until this is accepted the
official majority is to be retained. Outside Fiji the constitution is likely to be
increasingly subject to attack as being archaic. In its present form it leads to a
racialistic and irresponsible approach by certain elected members of the Legislature,
and makes it difficult to get controversial but necessary measures adopted. This
latter defect impedes constructive government which is a serious disadvantage at a
time when the problems here require forceful action if they are to be resolved. The
alternative of handing the government of the country back to the Fijians sounds well
as a rhetorical statement but appears somewhat unrealistic on examination. The
Fijians show little sign of being able to accept the responsibility and it would lead to
the peculiar position of the industrious and economically powerful majority being
governed by the economically weak Fijians, most of whom live simply and under
primitive conditions in the country. It is unlikely that the Indians would be prepared
to accept this state of affairs.
21. I would mention, however, that the principle of Fijian paramountcy is sup-
ported by a number of senior Administrative Officers who have spent most of their
service in Fiji and I feel that you should be aware of their views. They do not go so
far as to say that Fiji should be “handed back” to the Fijians but they do maintain
that to concede “paramountcy” to the Fijians is the only way in which the present
deadlock can be broken without antagonising the Fijians to an extent which might
be disastrous. They think, also, that there is a fair chance of the Indians accepting
the principle, providing their own political status is improved in relation to that of
the Europeans. What is visualised, in brief, is internal self-government on the basis
of a Fijian racial majority on the Legislative and Executive Councils, with the
Indians next in numbers, and the Europeans, combined with the other racial
groups, coming last. The proposal is really a device to introduce greater flexibility
into local affairs by forcing the local leaders to accept responsibility for govern-
ment and, by doing so, overcome their racial prejudices. Although racial in con-
ception, therefore, it might prove to be the best way of achieving inter-racialism.
The proposal merits serious consideration, especially as more orthodox approaches
appear unacceptable to the Fijians. My present view is that while the majority of
the Indian community would be ready to accept it, Indian politicians and leaders of
opinion would regard it as political suicide to do so. And I fear that even this solu-
tion would not make the Fijians any more enthusiastic about multi-racial local
government. . . .
297 CAB 134/2370, OP(62)8 12 July 1962
[British Guiana: Commonwealth membership]: memorandum by Mr
Maudling for Cabinet Oversea Policy Committee
I have had to postpone the British Guiana Independence Conference until after the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in September, as the Report of the
Commission of Enquiry into the disturbances in Georgetown in February last will
not be available until mid-August. One of the items which the British Guiana
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Government proposes for discussion at the Conference is the question of United
Kingdom sponsorship of British Guiana’s membership of the Commonwealth.
2. The policy of the British Guiana Government and of the Opposition parties is
to seek membership of the Commonwealth. At the last Constitutional Conference in
1960 the British Guiana Delegation with one exception proposed, and the Conference
accepted, the principle of independence within the Commonwealth for British Guiana.
In October, last year, the territorial Legislature passed almost unanimously a
Resolution requesting Her majesty’s Government to grant independence within the
Commonwealth this year. At the end of March, Dr. Jagan issued an official statement
of his Government’s intention to apply for membership of the Commonwealth. It is
known that the British Guiana constitutional proposals for independence are being
drawn up on the assumption that the territory will become a member of the
Commonwealth. (The Constitutional proposals are, however, less dependent on this
assumption than has been the case with most other countries since the local
Government propose that British Guiana should become a Republic on independence).
3. The arguments against United Kingdom support may be summarised as
follows:—
(a) the territory is small, has few natural resources, and has a population of less
than 600,000;
(b) it will need substantial economic aid for many years to come;
(c) the main political parties are divided on racial lines and a bitter communal
struggle between Africans and East Indians could develop;
(d) the leaders of Dr. Jagan’s governing People’s Progressive Party are widely
believed to have communist leanings and associations and there is some
foundation for this belief;
(e) an unstable political situation after independence could result in an embar-
rassing request for British troops.
4. As against that it should be pointed out that:—
(a) we have never yet failed to sponsor for membership any of our emerging
territories which desired it;
(b) with the acceptance of Sierra Leone, Jamaica, Trinidad and Cyprus, it would be
difficult to justify British Guiana’s exclusion on grounds of size and lack of
resources;
(c) to cold-shoulder British Guiana because of Dr. Jagan and his fellow-politicians
would run counter to the argument that the Commonwealth is an association of
peoples not governments, and would tend to drive British Guiana into the arms of
Castro or Krushchev. (Communist influence is limited to a small group of Dr.
Jagan’s party and does not pervade even the party as a whole, let alone the general
population; and my impression is that Dr. Jagan himself is an unpractical idealistic
nationalist devoted to Marxist economics rather than a dedicated Communist).
(d) If British Guiana remains a member of the Commonwealth we may hope to
have rather more success in encouraging her to turn to the West than to the Iron
Curtain countries for the economic aid which she will undoubtedly continue to
need for her development.
(e) There is a genuine attachment to the Crown and the Commonwealth among
the great mass of the people of British Guiana.
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(f) A refusal by the United Kingdom to support British Guiana would be likely to
meet with resistance from many members of the Commonwealth and would in all
probability be ineffective as Dr. Jagan could almost certainly rely on India or
Ghana to sponsor his application if the United Kingdom did not do so.
(g) The Americans appear to attach great importance to keeping British Guiana
within the Commonwealth.
5. I consider that the balance of advantage lies in our supporting British Guiana’s
application for membership. On the general question of Commonwealth
membership, in a recent discussion with some of my colleagues the view was taken
that we might work towards a position in which any territory which sought
membership on becoming independent would be accepted without question. In view
of this and of the particular arguments set out above, I should therefore be glad to
have my colleagues’ agreement to my informing the British Guiana Delegation at the
Independence Conference that Her Majesty’s Government will be prepared to support
an application by British Guiana for membership of the Commonwealth.
6. I do not consider that it would be necessary for me to indicate at the
Conference what the attitude of the other Commonwealth Governments is likely to
be; nevertheless it would be most helpful to my colleagues if, before the Conference
opens, we could obtain some confidential indication of the likely reactions; and I
would hope that it would be agreed to sound them now, or at the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ meeting, informally on the assumption that an official request
would be forthcoming.
298 CAB 134/2371, OP 5(63)1 28 May 1963
[Situation in British Guiana]: minutes of Cabinet Oversea Policy
Committee meeting
[No agreement could be reached by the deferred constitutional conference held in
October 1962. Dr Jagan’s government proved unable to maintain order unaided.]
The Committee had before them a memorandum by the Colonial Secretary (O.P. (63)
9) on the situation in British Guiana.
The Colonial Secretary1 said that after five weeks of total strike the economy of
British Guiana was at a stand-still and the country on the verge of collapse. If the
strike came to an end Dr. Jagan’s Government might be able to maintain them-
selves in office without further disorder until August or September, but there would
then be a crisis over rice stocks. Either in the near future or in a few months time
the possibility of serious rioting would arise, and if the police lost control it would
not be tolerable to use British troops for any length of time to keep Dr. Jagan in
power.
In such a situation the best course might be to suspend the constitution and
resume direct rule, which would then have to be continued for several years to
enable the political and economic life of the colony to be restored. The cost would be
considerable.
1 Mr D Sandys.
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Before adopting this course it would be essential to obtain an assurance from
the United States Government that they would provide the Colony with sub-
stantial economic aid, even though it was under direct British colonial rule. We
would also need to be assured of the wholehearted support of the United States
and Canadian Governments in the United Nations where Dr. Jagan had many
supporters.
In order to make it possible to resume direct rule at very short notice, if the need
should arise, certain precautionary steps should be taken now. The secret draft Order
in Council which permitted the United Kingdom Government to take over the
powers of government should be brought up to date; a one-clause Bill should be
drafted to remove from the British Guiana Act, 1928, the provision that an Order in
Council suspending the constitution must lie before Parliament for forty sitting days;
additional staff should be selected and an additional battalion held in readiness to
reinforce the garrison if necessary.
In discussion the following points were made:—
(a) The inter-racial difficulties in British Guiana, which had largely led to the
present situation, had existed in other territories—notably Trinidad. In their case,
however, these difficulties had not been held to produce [?prejudice] the early
attainment of independence; indeed the responsibilities of independence had induced
a greater sense of unity in the population. The sole reason for not having allowed
British Guiana to proceed to independence had been the objections of the United
States Government to such a course, and to their fear that Dr. Jagan would become a
focus for Communist ambitions in Latin America.
(b) Nevertheless, it was by no means clear that we should be any longer justified
in withholding independence from British Guiana to meet the wishes of the United
States Government. The colony was of no value to us economically or strategically,
and represented a continuing and substantial liability. The United Nations were
pressing us to grant it independence, and to resume direct rule would expose us to
heavy criticism, to the danger of revolution, to the deployment of troops which were
needed elsewhere, and to heavy expenditure.
(c) The early grant of independence might, however, lead to a situation anal-
ogous to that which had occurred in the Congo, which would also expose us to
criticism. The United States Government would have the power, as they had the
major interest, to avert such a situation by providing economic aid, and by reac-
tivating their military bases in British Guiana. They would, however, be unlikely
to do either so long as we continued to shoulder both the responsibility and the
cost of maintaining law and order. There would also be likely to be difficulty in
persuading the United States Congress to grant economic aid to a British
colony.
(d) In all the circumstances it would be right to inform the United States
Government that we were no longer able or prepared to accept continuing responsi-
bility for maintaining colonial rule in British Guiana, and that we now saw no practi-
cable alternative, taking into account the probable development of events both in
British Guiana and in the United Nations, to the early grant of independence to the
Colony.
(e) Our course of action would then be reviewed in the light of the reply of the
United States Government to a communication in this sense.
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299 CAB 128/38, CM 3(63)3 31 Oct 1963
[British Guiana: imposed solution after conference failure]: Cabinet
conclusions
The Colonial Secretary informed the Cabinet that the political parties at the British
Guiana Conference under his chairmanship, having failed to reach agreement
between themselves, had remitted the questions involved to his arbitration and had
agreed to accept his decision. He might find it necessary to announce the
Government’s intentions that day.
The most critical of the problems at issue related to a reform of the electoral sys-
tem in the Colony. Under the existing system the Government Party, led by the Prime
Minister, Dr. Jagan, had achieved a majority of seats which was disproportionate to the
votes cast in their favour. Since the lines of party division in British Guiana coincided
with the lines of racial division, this situation had created acute discontent; and any
solution to the problem must seek to compel candidates in future to win support from
all the main racial elements of the population. For this purpose it would be advisable
to introduce a system of proportional representation. This would entail some risk of a
proliferation of small parties; and it might be necessary, after the first elections under
the new system, to try to limit developments of this kind by establishing certain min-
imum qualifying conditions which any candidate must satisfy.
Dr. Jagan’s reaction to a decision to introduce proportional representation was
unpredictable. But, if his Government resigned in protest, a critical situation might
develop and it might become necessary to reimpose direct rule of the Colony. For
this purpose the executive powers of the Government would need to be transferred to
the Governor by Order in Council; legislation would have to be enacted rapidly in the
Parliament at Westminster in order to invest him with legislative authority; and he
would need to be reinforced by the despatch of additional administrative personnel
from the United Kingdom.
If local disturbances developed, they could probably be controlled by the police,
with the assistance, if necessary, of the two battalions of United Kingdom troops
already in the Colony. It was unlikely to be necessary to reinforce these troops at the
outset; but the situation would need to be kept under review.
Since it was clearly desirable that the first elections on the basis of proportional
representation should be conducted while we retained control of the Colony, the
issue of independence would have to be deferred until those elections had taken
place. In the meantime any additional financial assistance which the Colony might
require would be made dependent on the local Government’s accepting the normal
degree of financial control by the United Kingdom.
The United States Government would endorse a policy on these lines; and we could
rely on their support if it became necessary to defend our actions in the United Nations.
In discussion there was general agreement with these views.
The Cabinet:—
Approved the policy proposed by the Colonial Secretary in relation to British
Guiana.1
1 In spite of renewed disturbances during 1964, the elections were duly held under the proportional
representative system in Dec 1964, as a result of which, Mr L F S Burnham, leader of the People’s National
Congress, formed a coalition government with the United Force.
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